**1**. Ockham: “A universal is that which is fit (*natum est*) to be predicated of many”, Expos. Perih.1 c.5 §3, OPh II, p.399/430; cf. Aristotle, “A universal is that which is apt to be predicated of many”, *De Interpr.* 17a 38 -b 3. “Predicated” means to be the predicate in a statement of the form “X is/is not a human being”, where “human being” is the predicate. “Apt to be”, “*natum est*”, means “suited to be”: it may not be actually predicated of many — in “Socrates is a human being” it is predicated of only one, but we *could* go on to predicate the term of other individuals.

**2**. *Any occurrence* of which: If we say “Socrates is a human being, and Plato is a human being”, there are two occurrences of “human being”.

**3**. Plato explores some of the difficulties of his theory in *Parmenides* 128e-134e.

**4**. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 990 b.\*?\*

**5**. Cf. Conti, “Categories and Universals in the Later Middle Ages”, p.376.

**6**. Ockham writes: “All I have seen agree in saying that the nature, in some way universal (at least potentially and incompletely), is really in the individual, though some say that it is distinguished really, others that it is distinguished only formally, others that it is distinguished in no way in reality [*ex natura rei*] but only according to reason or by consideration of the intellect”, Ord.1 d.2 q.7, OTh II, p.225/258. Historians call such theories “moderate realism”, i.e. moderate in comparison with Plato’s theory in the degree of reality they attribute to the nature. Ockham explains and criticises these theories in Ord.1 d.2 qq.4-7, OTh II, p.99ff/132ff (translated Spade, *Five Texts*, pp.114-231).

**7**. See Boethius in Spade, *Five Texts*, p.25. On Thomas Aquinas’s version of this theory see PWO, pp.79-80.

**8**. For the ancestor of such theories of individuation see Plato, Timaeus, 49a-52d.

**9**. “In so far as an opinion asserts that there are *additional things besides singulars existing in them*, I regard it as quite absurd and destructive of the whole of Aristotle’s philosophy and every science and every truth and reason, and that it is the worst error in philosophy… and that those who hold it are unfit for science”, Expos. Perih.1 Proem. § 8, OPh II, p.363/394.

**10**. “[J]ust as every spoken word (*vox)*, however much it is common by institution, is truly and really singular and one in number because it is one and not many, so an intention of the mind [i.e. a concept] signifying many external things is truly and really singular and one in number, because it is one and not many things, though it signifies many things”, SL 1 c.14, OPh I, p.48/126 (translated OTT, p.78). “Every universal is a singular thing, and therefore is universal only by signification, because it is a sign of many”, ibid.

**11**. SL 1 c.1, OPh I, p.7-8/84 (translated OTT, p.49). Some words signify words, some concepts signify other concepts SL 1 c.12, OPh I, pp.43-4/120 (translated OTT, p.74-5).

**12**. Boehner, “The Realistic Conceptualism of William of Ockham”, pp.315-6; Gál, “Gualteri de Chatton et Guillelmi de Ockham Controversia de Natura Conceptus Universalis”.

**13**. “Some say [1] that an intention [concept] is simply something made (*fictum*) by the soul, others [2] that it is some quality subjectively existing in the soul, distinct from the act of understanding. Others say [3] that it is the act of understanding. And in their [those who hold 3] favour is the argument ‘in vain is something done by many that can be done by fewer’ (*frustra* *fit per plura quod potest fieri per pauciora*). But whatever can be ‘saved’ [i.e. accounted for] by positing [i.e. asserting the existence of] something that is distinct from the act of understanding can be saved without such a distinct thing, because, as much as any other sign, an act of understanding can stand for and signify something. Therefore it is not necessary to posit anything besides the act of understanding... it is enough for now that an intention is something in the soul naturally signifying something for which it can stand and that it can be part of a mental proposition”; SL 1 c.12, OPh I, pp.42-3/120 (translated OTT, p.74). According to theory [1] a concept is the thing in “objective being”, i.e. the being of an object of thought, as distinct from its “subjective” being as an extra-mental subject. For a review of Ockham’s treatments of these theories see Boehner, “Realistic Conceptualism of William Ockham”, pp.315-19. The relevant texts include: Ord.1 d.2 q.8, OTh II, pp.266ff/300 (translated Spade, p.215ff); Expos. Perih., proem., OPh II, p.347-371/378; Qdl.4 q.35 a.2, OTh IX, p.472ff/512 (translated QQ, pp.389-90); Qq. Phys.q.1-7, OPh VI, p.397-412/444. See PWS pp.41-5*,* PWO pp.496-510.

\*Perihermeias para.4 [Estne passio qualitas animae distincta ab actu intelligendi?

**14**. SL 1 c.1, OPh I, p.7-8/84 (translated OTT pp.49-50); Expos. Perih.Prooem. §2, OPh II, p.347/378. See PWO, pp.16-17. A word does not signify a concept; it signifies the thing that the concept signifies. \*explain signifies\*

**15**. Rep.2 q.12-13, OTh V, p.261ff/288. The habit is caused by the abstractive cognition that accompanies every intuitive cognition; see note 47 below.

**16**. “[T]he two incomplex knowledges of singular whitenesses… cause naturally, like fire causes heat, a third knowledge, distinct from them, that produces in objective being the whiteness previously seen in subjective being, without any activity of intellect or will, because such things are caused merely naturally”; Qq. Var. q.5, OTh VIII, p.175/200. (This passage reflects the “fictum” theory, above, note 13 ) “Nature works hiddenly in [producing] universals”, Ord.1 d.2 q.7, OTh II, p.261/294. Cf. Aristotle: “The soul is so constituted as to be capable of this process;” Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* 100 a13. Cf. PWO, pp.494-6; WO*,* pp.525-9. \*needs more explanation VI 65/86\*

**17**. Ord.1 d.2 q.6, OTh II, p.211-12/244 (Socrates and Plato really are more alike than Socrates and an ass: answering the objection that “every universal would be a figment of the intellect”, p.211.14). Cf. Qdl.6 q.25, OTh IX, p.679-80/718, lines 18-26, 50-8 (translated QQ, pp.572-3).

**18**. Boehner, “Realistic Conceptualism of William of Ockham”, pp.309-11, suggests that concept resembles thing because effect resembles cause. Ockham does say that the intuitive cognition of an individual is *of* that individual because that individual is its cause (Rep.2 q.12-13, OTh V, p.287.16-289.7/314; Qdl. 1 q.13, OTh IX, p.76, translated QQ p.66). He also says that concepts resemble things signified: “The cognition of a man is not more like one man than another, but by such a cognition is understood a man rather than an ass, because such a cognition, in *some* mode of likeness, is more like a man than an ass”; Qq. Phys. q.6,OPh VI, p.408/456 (my emphasis). Cf. Expos. Perih.1 Proem. §6, OPh II, p.355/386. But I do not know of any text in which Ockham explains this mode or says that it is due to causation.

(The main texts Boehner refers to are found in the modern edition as follows. Note 4: OTh V, p.287.16-289.7/314. Note 5: OTh V, p.261ff/288. Note 6: OPh II, p.351ff/382. Note 7: OTh II, p.261/294 Note 8: OTh VIII, p.175/200. Note 9: OTh IV, p.241/264. Note 10: OTh II, p.283/316.)

**19**. For more, see Kilcullen “Ockham on Universals”.

**20**. See King, “Ockham on the Role of Concepts”, pp.3-6; King, “The Failure of Ockham’s Nominalism”. Also WO pp.121-141 (“I do not see how Ockham can specify, either on the objective existence theory or on the mental act theory [cf. note 13 above], a similarity relation that can constitute the natural signification relation for general concepts”, p.132; neither theory “gives an adequate account of what makes a thought a thought of a given particular”, p.141).

**21**. See above, note 5 .

**22**. If two individuals share the same nature, then each individual has “numerical unity”, i.e. if they are “numbered” or counted, each counts as one (“one, two”). The nature is one, but it is not as much a unity as the individuals are.

**23**. For Ockham’s statement and criticism of Scotus’s account of universals, including criticism of the formal distinction, see Ord.1 d.2 q.6, OTh II, p.161ff/194, translated Spade, *Five Texts* p.153ff (p.156 on the formal distinction). See also SL 1 c.16, OPh I, p.54/132ff, lines 11-18, 66-85 (translated OTT, p.82ff); PWO pp.73-5. See WO pp.22-9, 46-52. \*a parte rei?\*

**24**. WO pp.931-9.

**25**. In creatures: see below, note 218 .

**26**. Ord.1 d.2 q.3, OTh II, p.78/112.

**27**. Ord.1 d.2 q.1, OTh II, pp.14-20/48. What sorts of distinctions there are and how they are proved continued to be controversial in philosophy into the seventeenth century. See Alanen, “On Descartes Argument for Dualism”, Ariew, “Descartes and Leibniz as readers of Suarez”.

**28**. “Many theologians are of this opinion, and I also once believed that it was Aristotle’s opinion, but now it seems to me that the opposite opinion follows from his principles”, SL 1 c.49, OPh I, p.154/232 (translated OTT, p.158). Ockham’s views on relations were an early concern of his colleages: Etzkorn, “Ockham at a Provincial Chapter”.

**29**. “Some [including Ockham] say that a relation is not a thing outside the soul distinct really and totally from an absolute thing and from absolute things”, SL 1 c.49, OPh I, p.154/232 (translated OTT, p.158).

**30**. The terms *res parva* and *res media* are used often in Qdl. See for example OTh IX, pp.359/398, 611-6/650, 614/654, 631/670, 635/674, 645/684, 652/692, 674/714, 679/718, 683/722 (or QQ, pp.297, 512-8, 531, 535, 544, etc.). See also Qq. Phys. q.63, OPh VI, p.569/616.

**31**. “Sortes’ likeness to Plato imports nothing except that Sortes is white and Plato likewise....Whoever could understand Sortes and Plato and their whitenesses, without understanding anything else, would straightway say that Sortes is like Plato”; Ord. 1 d.30 q.1, OTh IV, p.310.1-8/334. For arguments against the *res parva*, see Qdl.6 q.8, OTh IX, p.611ff/650 (translated QQ, p.512ff). (“Sortes” or “Socrates” and “Plato” are dummy names, like “Joe Blow” or “John Doe”.)

**32**. “In one way a relation is said to be ‘real’ because it signifies some little thing outside the mind distinct from absolute things, in another way because it signifies absolute things outside the mind or in the mind that are said to be *such as they are denoted to be* by such a relative term *without any operation of the intellect*. I say that in the first way there are no real relations, because there are no such little things between absolute things… I say that in the second way there are real relations, because they signify absolute things in the way explained (e.g. ‘likeness’ signifies two white things and that each white thing is similar to the other without any operation of the intellect)…”; Qdl.6 q.25, OTh IX, p.678/718 lines 9ff (translated QQ, pp.571-2). “[T]he intellect does nothing to make it fact that the universe is one, or that a whole is composed, or that adjacent causes cause, or that a triangle has three angles, and so on, any more than that Socrates is white or fire hot or water cold”, Ord.1 d.30, q.1, OTh IV, p.316-7/340. Cf. Qdl.7 q.8, OTh IX, p.728/768, lines 45-7, 56-66 (translated QQ, p.614-5). Cf. note 17 above. For more on Ockham’s treatment of relations see SL 1 c.49-51, OPh I, p.153ff/230 (translated OTT, p.158ff); also Ord.1 d.30 q.1, OTh IV, p.281ff/304 (esp. p.306ff/330). See PWO pp.47-53, WO p.215ff.

**33**. Ord.1 d.30 q.1 discusses this carefully-formulated question: “Whether — aside from any authority of faith and of certain philosophers — it could more easily be denied than held that every relation is something real somehow distinguished from any absolute?”, OTh IV, pp.281-2/304. Ockham does not say that philosophical arguments show that there cannot possibly be relative entities; only that there is a philosophical answer to every philosophical argument to prove that such entities must exist. This leaves room for theological arguments to prove the reality of some relations.

**34**. Ord.1 d.30 q.4, OTh IV, p.366-74/390. See Etzkorn, “William of Ockham and the Meaning of the Hypostatic Union”, p.188. Also Adams, *William Ockham*, pp.267-76. As Adams remarks (pp.274-5), “On examination, Ockham’s concessions to the thing-theory of real relation are quite substantial”.

**35**. Ockham takes over the terms intuitive and abstractive cognition from Scotus, but changes their meaning somewhat. (\*See Ord. prol. q.1, OTh I, pp.33-8/74.\*) For modern readers “intuitive” may be misleading. In Ockham’s language *intueri* means “to look at”, *cognitio* means knowlege. Looking at the page of the book you are now reading is an example of intuitive cognition. Remembering the look of the page after you have closed the book is “abstractive” cognition. Ockham’s intuitive and abstractive cognitions are the counterpart of Hume’s impressions and ideas.

**36**. Ord.1 Prol. q.1, OTh I, p.31-2/72; Rep.2 q. 12-13, OTh V, p.256-67/284; Rep.2 q. 12-13, OTh V, p.334-7/362; Qdl.5 q.5, OTh IX, p.495ff/534 (translated QQ, p.413ff). The existence of intuitive cognitions is presumably a hypothesis to explain the assumed fact that we truly have knowledge of things, which we could not have without direct apprehension. This reason is implied here: “And yet it is certain that these [i.e. contingent] truths can be known evidently”, Ord.1 Prol. q.1, OTh I, p.32.16/74.

**37**. The intuition is not itself knowledge. See the passage quoted in Stump, “The Mechanisms of Perception”, p.189.

**38**. Ord.1 prol. 1, OTh I, p.70.18/112; Rep.2, q. 12-13, OTh V, p.259/286. See Boehner, “The Realistic Conceptualism of William Ockham”, and Boehner “The Notitia Intuitiva Of Non-Existents.” Perhaps Ockham thinks that normally a judgment of non-existence or absence is not intuitive but an inference, e.g. from the premise: “I would have seen it by now if it were here”.

**39**. Ord.1 prol. 1, OTh I, p.38-9/80; Qdl.6 q.6, OTh IX, p.604-5/644 (translated QQ, p.506-8). Ockham differs from Scotus in not specifying in the definition of intuitive cognition that the object must exist and be present, Rep.2 q.12-13, OTh V, p.259/286.

**40**. Ord.1 Prol. q.1, OTh I p.31.13-16/72.

**41**. “God cannot cause in us a cognition such that it appears to us *evidently* that a thing is present when it is absent, because this includes a contradiction”; Qdl.5 q. 5, OTh IX, p.498/538 (translated QQ, p.415).

**42**. “However, God can cause a creditive act by which I believe that an absent thing is present. And I say that that creditive cognition will be abstractive, not intuitive; by such an act of faith [i.e. belief] a thing can appear to be present when it is absent, but not by an evident act”; Qdl.5 q. 5, OTh IX, p.498/538 (translated QQ, p.416). The possibility that God might cause false belief has sceptical implications (Descartes!), but Ockham did not draw any sceptical conclusions. Can God cause a false judgment about an intuited existing thing? Would there then be two conflicting judgments? Stump, “The mechanisms of perception”, pp. 186, 188, says that according to Ockham an intuition need not cause a judgment. But what then determines whether a judgment does occur?

**43**. “Abstractive” in this context does not have the meaning it has when we speak of abstract nouns or concepts. “Abstractive cognition is taken according as it abstracts from existence and non-existence and from other conditions that contingently happen to a thing or are predicated of a thing”, Ord.1 Prol. q.1, OTh I, p.31.4-6/72. On the two kinds of cognitions see PWS pp.22-5.

**44**. Ord.1 prol. q.2, OTh I, p.86.21-3/128.

**45**. “Imperfect intuitive” cognition is in fact abstractive: Rep.2, q. 12-13, OTh V, pp.262.5-6/290, but it differs from other abstractive cognitions, and resembles intuitive, in that it enables a past-tense judgment of existence, p.266-7/294. To remember a particular individual, such as a person, requires a complex of abstractive cognitions covering various characteristics of the individual; Qdl.1 q. 13, OTh IX, pp.77/116 (translated QQ, p.67).

**46**. On memory see Rep.2, q. 12-13, OTh V, pp.261-2/288; Rep.4 q.14, OTh VII, p.278ff/308.

**47**. “Positing that an intuitive cognition always necessarily has with it an incomplex abstractive cognition, then the intuitive cognition will be the partial cause of that abstractive cognition, and that abstractive cognition will be the partial cause of a habit inclining one to another incomplex abstractive cognition like the one from which the inclining habit is generated”; Rep.2 q.12-13, OTh V, p.263.7ff/290. (This passage, down to p.264 line 10, is thought to be an addition, which may belong after p.265.7; see Miethke, *Ockhams Weg zur Sozialphilosphie*, p.174 n.147.) “The intuitive cognition is a partial cause of the [abstractive] cognition, though not of the habit generated by the abstractive cognition”; ibid., p.265.5-7.

**48**. A habit is something in some way accessory to a substance, its clothing, as it were. A habit may be caused in us by some other agent (as when God infuses grace), or it may be formed by repeated acts, or even by a single act. See Baudry, *Lexique philosophique de Guillaume d’Ockham*, p.107.

**49**. Rep.2 q.12-13, OTh V, p.261ff/288. Alternatively, Ockham suggests (p.265-6/292), the generally-valid principle that a habit is generated by acts of the same kind might not apply here, so that an *intuitive* cognition might itself cause a habit that enables future *abstractive* cognitions.

**50**. Rep.2 q.12-13, OTh V, p.264.15ff/292.

**51**. On theories of Ockham’s contemporaries see Tachau, *Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham*.

**52**. Ord.1, d.27 q.3, OTh IV, p.241/264; Rep.2 q.12-13, OTh V, p.268-76/296; Rep.3 q.2, OTh VI, p.44ff/66. \*the last is the main text\*

**53**. Rep.3 q.2, OTh VI, p.48ff/70. “In debita approximatione”, Rep.2 q.12-13, OTh V, p.258.15ff/286.

**54**. Rep.3 q.3, OTh VI, p.107ff/128; Qdl.6 q.6, OTh IX, p.60652-9/646 (translated QQ, p.507). On intuitive cognition and species see Stump, “The Mechanisms of Cognition”.

**55**. Ord.1 Prol. q.1, OTh I, p.32-3/34. On science see PWS p.2-16. \*\*\*Livesey

**56**. Ockham: “However, there is no science properly speaking of individuals, but only of universals *for* individuals”, i.e. *standing for* individuals; Expos. Predic. c.2 §11, OPh II, pp.45.40-2/76.

**57**. Expos. Phys*.* prol. §4, OPh IV, p.11/24; Ord.1 d.2 q.4, OTh II, p.134-138/168.

**58**. SL 3-2 c.20, OPh I, p.537.7-9/614; Ord.1 prol. q.1, OTh I, p.8-11/50;Expos. Phys*.* prol. §2, OPh IV, p.6-10/20, line 55ff, § 3 line 64ff.

**59**. Ord.1 prol. q.1, OTh I, p.10.15/52.

**60**. SL 3-2 c.21, OPh I, p.539ff/616 (translated Longeway); Ord.1 prol. q.1, OTh I, p.10/52, 14/56.

**61**. ST1 q.1 a.2. On discussion in 13th century Paris on the possibility of a science of theology see Dumont, “Theology as a Science”.

**62**. Ord.1 prol. q.7, OTh I, p.199/240.

**63**. Ord.1 prol. q.7, OTh I, p.187.17-20/228. Ockham thinks that Paul may have had intuitive vision of God, Qdl.6 q.1 , OTh IX, p.587/626 (translated QQ, pp.492-3). Cf. 2 Cor. 12:2. (Such intuition would not be the “beatific vision”.)

**64**. Ord.1 prol. q.7, OTh I, p.187ff/228.

**65**. Ord.1 prol. q.7, OTh I, p.200.12-15/242.

**66**. By “moderns” Ockham meant theologians of his own time and just before. In their footnotes the editors of OPh and OTh identify the writers Ockham criticises. He is himself a modern, so sometimes he ascribes his own opinion to “some moderns”; cf. Expos. Phys. 3 c.2 §7, OPh IV, p.436.18-9/450.

**67**. “It is the beginning of many errors in philosophy to think that to every distinct vocable there corresponds a distinct significate, so that there is as much distinction of signified things as there is of signifying names or vocables even when those names or vocables are not synonyms”; Sum. phil. nat. 3 c.7, OPh VI, p.270/318. “The making of abstract nouns from adverbs, conjunctions, prepositions, verbs and syncategorematics causes many inexplicable difficulties and leads many people into error. For many imagine that for each distinct noun there is a distinct corresponding thing, … And therefore in modern times, because of errors arising from the use of such abstractions, it would be better, for the sake of simple people in philosophy, not to use such abstracts”; Expos. Phys. 3 c.2 §6, OPh IV, p.433-4/446. Someone, probably not Ockham himself, gathered together passages from Expos. Phys. into a tract *De successivis*, on motion, time and place, included as an addition volume in the electronic edition of *Opera Philosophica*, after vol.VII

**68**. SL 1 c.45, OPh I, p.145/222 (translated OTT p.151).

**69**. For “a thing totally distinct” Ockham uses a number of apparently equivalent expressions. Of motion or time, etc., he says that it is not a thing “really and totally distinct” from every permanent thing, or “distinct according to its whole self”, it is not “outside the essence of” a permanent thing (Expos. Phys. 3 c.2 §5, OPh IV, p.421/434), or “inhering in it in the way whiteness is something belonging to a white thing” (Expos. Phys. 4 c.20 §2, OPh V, pp.212-3/222), “just as a man and whiteness are two things outside the mind, totally distinct, so that nothing that is one of them or part of one of them is the other or an essential part of the other” (Expos. Predic. c.7 §1, OPh II, p.159/190); “Time is not something absolute really distinct from enduring things and from motion”, Rep.2 q.10, OTh V, p.185/212. For the arguments see Sum. phil. nat., OPh VI, p.261/308 (motion), p.344/392 (the instant), p.347/394 (time), p.391/438 (place). Motion: Rep.2 q.7, OTh V, 103ff/130; Expos. Phys. 3 c.2 §3, OPh IV, p.430ff/444; Qdl 1 q.5 a.1, OTh IX, p.475/514 (translated QQ, p.28). For commentary on the arguments see PWO pp.417-451 and WO pp.799ff.

**70**. SL 1 c.10, OPh I, p.36-8/114 (translated OTT p.70-71). A connotative term primarily signifies a substance or quality and adds information about it secondarily. See below, note 106 .

**71**. “Import” covers both [1] referring to and [2] asserting propositions about: “The noun ‘motion’ imports [1] many permanent things, namely the changing thing and what is acquired by the changing thing, and [2] that one [part] is acquired after another;” Expos. Phys. IV c.18 §3, OPh V, p.196/206.

**72**. Nouns derived from verbs, adverbs, conjunctions, prepositions and syn­cate­gore­matics “were introduced only for brevity or elegance of locution”; Expos. Phys. 3 c.2, OPh IV, p.425/438. Many terms relating to motion “have been invented so that we can have an abundance of words to express elegantly (*ornate*) what we conceive in our minds, and not because they are necessary”; Sum. phil. nat., 3 c.4, OPh VI, p.253/300.

**73**. Propositions that need to be expounded in this way are called “exponible”; SL 2 c.11, OPh I, pp.279-282/356.

**74**. “And therefore such short propositions must be expounded by other long ones, and by the long ones that are more proper and clearer and plainer we must judge of the others”; Sum. phil. nat., 4 c.10, OPh VI, p.365/412.

**75**. “One must speak as most do”, Expos. Phys. 4 c.18 §3, OPh V, p.199.134/208. “What is said for the sake of elegance, though improperly, is not said in vain (*frustra et vane*) but well. However, such expressions must be understood sensibly (*sane*), and to see whether they are true or false they must be resolved into the proper words for which the improper have been put”; Sum. phil. nat., 3 c.4, OPh VI, p.253/300.

**76**. “Such propositions should be expounded in the above way, or in some other more suitable way if one is found. Because it is enough for me that besides permanent things past present and future there is no other thing distinct from them according to its whole self. I care little about the manner of speaking, as long as there is a good understanding”; Expos. Phys. 3 c.2, OPh IV, p.447/460.

**77**. “Permanent continuous quantity is nothing but one thing that has part situationally distant from part, so that ‘continuous permanent quantity’ and ‘thing having part distant from part’ are equivalent in meaning... And therefore, since a substance may have part situationally distant from part, and similarly a quality, some quantity will not be another thing than a substance, and some quantity will not be another thing than a quality”; SL 1 c.44, OPh I, p.137/214 (translated OTT, p.145). De Corp. Christi, c.12, OTh X p.112ff/144 (translated Birch p.107-8).

**78**. “In being produced by some created agent, they [the parts] are produced in a distinct situation, so that one part stands apart from another in situation and is outside the other”; De quant. q.3 a.2, OTh X, p.53/84. “Whence a quantity is nothing but a thing that has part outside part and has part standing apart in situation from another... It is not necessary to posit some thing that drags one part outside another, but the extrinsic causes of the thing, i.e. efficient and final, suffice to produce diverse parts, one in one situation and another in another situation, without any ‘middle thing’ between them. Therefore the substance itself is quantified without any other thing applied to it or made at the same time with it. And as I say of substance, so I say proportionately of every bodily quality”; De quant. q.3 a.3, OTh X, p.64/96. Cf. Expos. Predic. c.10 §4, OPh II, 210-11/242; Qdl.4 q.24, OTh IX, pp.412-415/452 (translated QQ, p.340-3). \*Beuscher: De corp. Christ, c 28; De corp. Christi, c. 15; Qdl.4 q.26. \*

**79**. “It is Aristotle’s opinion that the whole world is not in a place, because it does not have anything outside it that contains the world; but many parts of the world are in a place, namely all parts contained by other parts”; Expos. Phys. 5 c.8 §1, OPh V, p.95/104.

**80**. It moves in comparison with imagined bodies outside the world: “… the *primum mobile* that does not have any body around it truly and really moves…. because if there *were* a surrounding body that did not move, one part of the *mobile* would truly coexist with one part of the surrounding body and afterwards another”; Expos. Phys. 4 c.22 §4, OPh V, p.237/246. The *primum mobile* moves also because its parts vary in distance from given parts of the earth; *ibid*., lines 110-2. This would be true even if the earth moved; Expos. Phys. 4 c.8 §1, OPh V, p.97.116ff/106.

**81**. Expos. Phys. 5 c.10 §8, OPh IV, pp.438-9/452.

**82**. “Permanent” is puzzling. In local motion the cause, the body that moves, and the places, all exist both before and after the motion, but in other motion, viz. the gradual acquisition or loss of a quality, Ockham says that the “permanent” things include past and future things which do not at present exist. Cf. Expos. Phys. 6 c.1 §2, OPh IV, pp.443.124/456, 446.195-6/460, 447.227/460.

**83**. Local motion means “first to be in one place (no other [transient] thing then posited), afterwards without an intermediate rest to be in another place (without any other thing besides the place and the body and other things that are permanent), and so on. And consequently, besides the permanent things, there is nothing else, but we need add only that the body is not in all those places at once and that it does not rest in those places”; Expos. Phys. 3 c.2 §6, OPh IV, p.433/446.

**84**. Expos. Phys. 4 c.22 §1, OPh V, p.230/240; 3 c.2 §5, OPh IV, p.425/438; 3 c.2 §6, 435/448 \*

**85**. “For example, while motion lasts, it must be the case that something is in such a way future that it does not have being outside the soul though it can be known by the soul, or it must be that something coexists with something else that does not yet coexist with it outside the soul (which I say on account of the local motion) and yet it can be known by the soul that it will coexist with it”; Expos. Phys. 4 c.18 §3, OPh V, pp.196-7/206. \*check translation\*

**86**. Qq. Phys.q.38, OPh VI, p.497/544.

**87**. Expos. Phys. 4 c.27 §4, OPh V, 291-6/300. “In the definition of time soul should be put, or speaking more properly the noun ‘soul’; because measure is put in the definition of time; but in the definition of measure soul is mentioned, because a measure is that through which the soul should be made certain of some unknown quantity”; Sum. phil. nat. 4 c.15, OPh VI, p.387/434. “Because the noun ‘time’ imports an act of the soul numbering, which the noun ‘motion’ does not import, therefore these nouns do not have the same definitions expressing *quid nominis*, and are not synonyms”; Expos. Phys. 4 c.21 §6, OPh V, p.228/238. “‘Time’ imports, beyond motion, an act of the soul actually measuring, because time is the motion by which the soul knows how great another motion is; and therefore it is impossible that time be time except through the soul”; Qq. Phys.q.40, OPh VI, 504/552.

**88**. Qq. Phys.q.42, OPh VI, pp.508/556; q.43, pp.510-11/558. The motion of the *primum mobile* is the ultimate standard of comparison since it is the swiftest and most uniform motion: a very swift motion can be measured against the swiftest, the irregularity of an irregular motion can be detected by comparison with the most uniform. But time can also be measured, though with less certainty, by comparison with other motions, such as the motion of the sun or a clock or one’s inner sense of change.

**89**. “If soul could not exist, nothing could be time, because nothing could be a number or measure. Whence the first movement [i.e. the movement of the *primum mobile*] could be uniform and most swift though soul did not exist, but if soul did not exist, that movement could not be time”; Sum. phil. nat. 4 c.15, OPh VI, p.388/436

**90**. “Time is really outside the soul and it does not depend really on the soul; however, time could not be time, or *that which is* time could not be time, without the soul, i.e. unless the soul could exist; just as a cause depends in no way on its effect, and yet a cause could not be a cause without an effect”; Sum. phil. nat. 4 c.15, OPh VI, p.389/436

**91**. Sum. phil. nat. 4 c.10, OPh VI, p.365/412.

**92**. Expos. Phys. 4 c.18 §4-§6, OPh V, pp.201-3/210; 4 c.22 §4, p.234ff/244. Cf. Aristotle, *Physics* 218a 8-30. Sum. phil. nat. 4 c.1, OPh VI, p.344ff/392.

**93**. “It should not be granted that the same ‘now’ always remains, as if it were some thing continuously remaining; and it should not be granted that it is other and other, as if there exists some such thing, first one and then another”; Expos. Phys. 4 c.18 §4, OPh V, p.203/212.

**94**. “An instant is not a thing distinct from permanent things, but it imports the *primum mobile* existing in a determinate place so that immediately before it was in another [place] and immediately afterwards will be in another”; Sum. phil. nat. 4 c.8, OPh VI, p.360/408. See the whole chapter. “And so it is clear how we can assign an earlier ‘now’ and a later ‘now’, by saying first that this part of the mobile is now in this position, and afterwards in another position, yet without any newness of a thing produced: but not without the coexistence of the parts of the mobile with different parts of a stationary ambient body (if there were such), or also a variation of distance between a given part of the heaven and a given part of the stationary earth. For continually, as the heaven moves, a given part of the heaven changes its distance from another part of the earth before and afterwards, and yet nothing new need be posited in the heaven because of this”; Expos. Phys. 4 c.22 §4, OPh V, p.237/246. \*More on the instant see Rep.2 q.10, p.208/236

**95**. “Time is not something hidden to us and unknowable by us, as some say; … indeed it is known to all who have the use of reason… But time is said to be quite quite unknown because of the many difficulties that come up in treatments of the nature of time from badly-understood texts of philosophers”; Sum. phil. nat. 4 c.3, OPh VI, p.350/398. Cf. SL 1 c.51, OPh I, pp.170-1/248 (translated OTT pp.170-1). On the reality of action see also WND 67.40ff, pp.451-9, especially pp.456, 458-9.

**96**. An exception is Leibniz. See Loemker, pp.1108-9, 1145-9; McDonough, “Leibniz’s Philosophy of Physics”. On Newton see Rynasiewicz, “Newton’s Views on Space, Time, and Motion”.

**97**. “It is commonly asserted by modern writers that every quantity is a thing really and totally distinct from substance and quality, so that continuous quantity is an accident intermediate between substance and quality, which is asserted to be in substance as its subject and to be the subject of qualities. Similarly it is posited that discrete quantity is a thing really distinct from substances; and the same is asserted of place and time;” SL 1 c.44, OPh I, p.132/210 (translated OTT, p.142). “… I argue that a point is not another thing than a line, or a line another thing than a surface, or a surface another thing than a body; and by the same argument a body is not another thing than substance and quality, according to him [Aristotle];” SL 1 c.44, OPh I, p.133/210 (tranlated OTT p.143). “… I say therefore that the intention of Aristotle and of many others was that every quantity is not some thing totally distinct from substance and quality, and that point, line, surface and body are not things wholly (*secundum se totas*) distinct from one another;” SL 1 c.45, OPh I, p.145/222 (translated OTT, p.151). “It is not Aristotle’s opinion that quantity is a predicament importing some absolute thing, really and wholly distinct from things in the genus of substance and in the genus of quality, as is commonly held; but it is his opinion that no thing is imported by the genus of quantity that is not really some substance or quality”; Expos. Predic. c.10 §4, OPh II, p.205ff/236.

**98**. For Ockham’s treatment of quantity see SL 1 c.44, OPh I, pp.133-153/210ff (translated OTT pp.142-58), and Expos. Predic. c.10, OPh II, 203-238/234ff (where he argues about point, line, surface, body, time, instant, place); De quant., OTh X p.5ff/36; Qdl.4 q.24-34, OTh IX, pp.412ff/452 (translated QQ, pp.340ff).

\*Beuscher’s references: See Ockham. Report. 4, q 4 ; Quodl 4, qq. 23‑39; Quodl 6, q 3, Quodl. 7, q 25; Summa totius logicae (Venice. Lazarus de Soardis, 1508), p 1, cc 44‑8, fol 17 r ‑19 v ; Expositio aurea, Super librum praedicamentorum, cc 10‑11; De sac alt , passim\*

**99**. “There is another opinion [besides that of some moderns] about quantity, which seems to me to be in accordance with Aristotle’s thinking, whether it is heretical or Catholic, which I wish to recite now, though I do not wish to assert it. And therefore when I have set out this opinion and written on philosophy, I have not written it as mine but as Aristotle’s and explained it as it seemed to me, and likewise I will now recite it without assertion”; SL 1 c.44, OPh I, p.136/214 (translated OTT p.145). Ockham distances himself from Aristotle on this topic also in other places: De quant., OTh X, p.5-6/36, p.90/122, p.125/156; Expos. Phys. Prol. §1, OPh IV, p.3-4/16. \*check these\*

**100**. \*References, de corp. etc.\*

**101**. “It is difficult to prove that there are only ten predicaments”, Expos. Predic. c.7 §1, OPh II, p.161/192. For questions relating to the categories see Qdl.4 q.25-8, OTh IX, p.416ff/456 (translated QQ, p.343ff) and Qdl.6 q.8 up to Qdl.7 q.8, OTh IX, p.611ff/650 (translated QQ, p.512-616).

**102**. SL 1 c.41, OPh I, pp.114-7/192 (translated OTT pp.128-31); Quodl.5 q.22, OTh IX, pp.564-9/604 (translated QQ, pp.471-5).

**103**. SL 1 c.41, OPh I, p.116/194 (translated OTT p.130), Qdl.5 q.22 a.2, OTh IX, p.567/606 (translated QQ, p.473-4).

**104**. Expos. Predic. c.7 §1, OPh II, p.159/190.

**105**. SL 1 c.55, OPh I, p.180/258 (translated OTT p.178).

**106**. Spade, “Ockham, Adams and Connotation” criticises Ockham on connotative terms, pp.602-8, and on exponible propositions, pp.609-11.

**107**. For an example of such an argument, see Sum. phil. nat. 4 c.1, OPh VI, p.344-7/391.

**108**. Ockham did not invent it. See Wey’s note on Qdl.4 q.27, OTh IX, p.433/472, referring to Aristotle, *Physics* VIII.6, 259a 8-15. Ockham himself refers it to Aristotle, Qq Phys. q.11, OPh VI, p.420.14/468, which the editor takes as a reference to *Physics* I.4, 188a17-18. Other people used it: cf. Thomas Aquinas, ST 1 q.2 a.3 obj.2.; Duns Scotus \*Cross ecclesiology Ord. 4.1.4–5, n. 9 (Wadding, 8:90).). No one in the middle ages called it a razor. For examples of Ockham’s use, see index, OPh VI, p.868/916.

**109**. De corp. Christi, c.29, OTh X, p.157-8/188, punctuation altered. Cf. Ord. 1 d.30 q.1, OTh IV, p.290.1-3/314.

**110**. Ord.1 d.14 q.2, OTh III, p.432/454. Cf. d.17 q.3, p.478.18-20/500. “Ad argumentum principale dico quod aliquando ponenda sunt plura miracula circa aliquid ubi posset fieri per pauciora, et hoc placet Deo”; \*Qdl.4 q.30, OTh IX, p.450/490.

**111**. Qdl.4 q.24, OTh IX, p.413.15-17/452; cf. Qdl.4 q.35 a.2, p.472.70-2/512 (translated QQ, p.389); “If one thing is sufficient... it is superfluous to posit two”, Qdl.7 q.2, OTh IX, p.707.23-4/746; “If two or three are sufficient... then a fourth thing is superfluous”, Qdl.7 a.1, OTh IX, p.704.17-19/744. On the other hand: “If two things are not sufficient... it is necessary to posit a third”, Qdl.1 q.5, OTh IX, p.31.40-2/70; “When a proposition is true for things, if permanent things are not sufficient for its truth it is necessary to add something further,” Qq. Phys. q.13, OPh VI, p.425.4-6/472. Walter Chatton weakened the requirement: “So great a necessity to plurify things is not required that it be evident that a contradiction follows if they be not plurified... It is enough that all be saved more suitably by many than by few”; quoted Tachau, “The problem of the species in medio”, pp.394-443, n.64, p.412 (my translation). See Maurer, “Ockham’s Razor and Chatton’s Anti-Razor”; Keele, “Walter Chatton”. \*Subtle discussion: Qdl.1 q.5 ad 1m, OTh IX, pp.32-3/72 (translated QQ, p.30-1).\* \*not Anti-razor: Keele, Res, n.21\*

**112**. “But setting aside everything but matter, form, an agent and other permanent things, if the matter first does not have the form and afterwards has it, and not part before part, the matter truly is changed; therefore, to *save* change, it is vain to posit anything besides matter, form, an agent and other permanent things”; Expos Phys.3 c.2 §5, OPh IV, p.423/436. “Save” is used in the same way in the phrase (from Simplicius) “saving the phenomena”.

**113**. Ockham, 1 Dial. 4.10.

**114**. An efficient cause is that upon the existence of which something else totally distinct from it begins to exist; Sum. phil. nat. 2 c.3, OPh VI, p.218/266. When the cause, apart from anything else, is posited, something else can be posited, and when it is not posited the other cannot naturally be posited; Ord.1 d.45 q.1, OTh IV, p.664-5/688; Rep.2 q.12-13, OTh V, pp.269.10-13/296, 276.19-21/304.

**115**. God could have ordained that whenever fire is near a combustible he himself alone would cause combustion to happen. We can never prove from an effect that something is a man, because an angel could produce the same effect, Rep.2 q.3-4, OTh V, p.72.21-73.9/100.

**116**.  Rep.2 q.12-13, OTh V, p.269/296.

**117**. Expos. Phys. 7 c.1 §1, OPh V, p.598-600/608. This is a rejection of Thomas Aquinas’s dictum that whatever moves is moved by another, ST 1 q.2 a.3.

**118**. Qdl.4 q.1, 2, OTh IX, 293/332-309/348 (translated, QQ, pp.245-56.) For more on Ockham’s treatment of causation see Moody, “William of Ockham”; Adams, “Was Ockham a Humean about Efficient Causality?”; Courtenay, “The Critique on Natural Causality in the Mutakallimun and Nominalism”.

**119**. God’s existence is one of the “truths naturally known or knowable”, Ord.1 prol. q.1, OTh I, p.7. “The argument proving the primacy of the efficient is sufficient, and is the argument of practically all philosophers”, \*check\* Ord.1 d.2 q.10, OTh II, p.354/388. “God’s existence can be demonstrated” , Qdl.1 q.1, OTh IX, p.3.

**120**. Qdl.1, q.1, OTh IX, p.2/42 (translated QQ, p.6).

**121**. Plato, *Laws* X 893b-899d.

**122**. Ord. 1 d.2 q.10, OTh II, p.355.3-11/388; Qq. Phys. q.135, OPh VI, p.765/812.

**123**. Ord.1 d.2 q.10, OTh II, p.355.12ff/388; Qq. Phys. q.135, OPh VI, p.767ff/814.

**124**. Qdl.2 q.1, OTh IX, p.107-8/146 (translated QQ, p.93-4). **\*check: Qdl.1 q.10 ad 2.**

**125**. “There is only one simply first being, though against *protervientes* [last-ditch objectors] it is difficult to prove this.” In an addition he remarks: “This argument seems probable, though it does not demonstrate sufficiently”; Ord.1 d.2 q.10, OTh II, p.356-7/390.

**126**. Qdl.2 q.1, OTh IX, p.109ff/148, line 61ff (translated QQ, p.94-5); Qdl.4 q.2 OTh IX, p.306-8/346, line 138, line 175 (translated QQ, pp.254-5).

**127**. Qdl.1 q.1, OTh IX, p.3.43/42 (translated QQ, p.6).

**128**. E.g. Thomas Aquinas’s “fifth way”, ST 1 q.2 a.3: “For we see that some things that lack cognition... operate for an end, which appears from the fact that they always or most often operate in the same way so as to seek what is best.”

**129**. See above, note 118 .

**130**. Ord.1 d.43 q.1, OTh IV, p.636.10-14/660; Rep.2 q.3-4, OTh V, p.55.16-18/82; Qdl.2 q.2 OTh IX, p.116/156 (translated QQ, p.99).

**131**. Ord.1 d.42 q.un, OTh IV, p.617-21/640; Qdl.2 q.1, OTh IX, p.107-8/146 (translated QQ, p.93-4).

**132**. Ord.1 d.35 q.2, OTh IV, p.441.12-18/464; Qdl.2 q.2 ad 1, OTh IX, p.115/154 (translated QQ, p.98).

**133**. Augustine, *De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus*, Q.46 De ideis (translation https://academic.mu.edu/taylorr/Reading\_Groups/Translations.html). Cf. Plato, *Timaeus* 29. See Rich, “The Platonic Ideas as the Thoughts of God”; Dillon, “The Ideas as thoughts of God”.

**134**. Ord.1 d.35 q.5, OTh IV, p.480/504.

**135**. See above, note 27 .

**136**. “God has an infinity of ideas, because infinite things are producible by him”; Ord.1 d.35 q.5, OTh IV, p.493/516.

**137** “God foreknows the very things that he afterwards produces... He knows what he does perfectly, not only in a universal but also in particular and most distinctly”; Ord.1 d.35 q.5, OTh IV, p.504/528. “God not only has knowledge of universals, as a created craftsman has of things he will make, but has also distinct and particular knowledge of whatever particular is to be made. Therefore for him the very particular is the idea”, ibid. p.505/528. Cf. Rep.3, q.3, OTh VI, p.121-2/143.

**138**. “God foreknows something that does not actually exist to make what he makes in accordance with it. However he intuits something that is not himself, nor anything real, but which can be real, to make in accordance with it that very thing”; Ord.1 d.35 q.5, OTh IV, p.506/530. A human maker thinks of a thing of a certain kind to be made, without intuitive knowledge of the very thing.

**139**. On the formal distincition see above, note 23 . “Because a formal distinction or formal non-identity is very difficult to posit anywhere,… it should not be posited except where it evidently follows from beliefs handed down in sacred Scripture or the determination of the Church and the sayings of the Saints,… [and since these] can be saved without positing it [i.e. a formal distinction] between the [divine] essence and the [divine] wisdom, therefore I simply deny that such a distinction is possible there, and I deny it universally in creatures… Because one [viz. a formal distinction in God] is expressed in Scripture and the other [a formal distinction in creatures] is not, and it seems repugnant to reason, therefore the one is to be posited and the other denied”; Ord.1 d.2 q.1, OTh II, p.17-18/50.

**140**. Ord.1 d.2 q.1, OTh II, p.17/50.

**141**. Ockham answers Yes to the question: Whether the identity of the divine essence (and in every manner of identity *ex natura rei*) with the attributal perfections, and of those perfections with one another, is as great as the identity of the divine essence with the divine essence (Ord.1 d.2 q.1, OTh II, p.3/36). God is identical with God, any thing is identical with itself: God’s wisdom is *just as identical as that* with God’s goodness and with God himself.

\*Ord 1 d.2 q 2, p.58

Thom: Besides, I ask: what is it for the understanding to cause a distinction between these *rationes*? Either this is [1] just to understand that thing – whether in one act or in several, so that in the end nothing is understood except the thing itself; or [2] it is to compare the same thing to itself; or [3] it is to compare the thing to another thing or other things; or [4] to form something or some things that are not there in the nature of things but only through the operation of the understanding. Not in [1] the first way, because from the fact that it is always just the same thing and nothing else that is understood, it follows that no multitude is caused there unless perhaps of acts of understanding (supposing it is understood through many acts). Therefore in God will never be a multitude of attributes that are many attributes and yet are really god himself. Similarly, for the same reason in Socrates and anything that I can understand I could cause such a multitude – which is absurd. Not in [2] the second way, because by such a comparison nothing is caused except perhaps a conceptual relationship, according to these people; but a conceptual relationship is not really god himself. Not in [3] the third way, for the same reason. Similarly in the same way anything can be compared to itself and to other things such as the divine essence; therefore every such distinction that the understanding can produce about the divine essence can equally be made about anything. If you say [4] "in the fourth way", the point is established that there may be there many things none of which is in the nature of things, and consequently none of them is in reality got himself.

Ord. 1 d.2 q.1 p.17

Thom:

And so for this reason I say that the divine wisdom is the same as the divine essence in every way in which the divine essence is the same as the divine essence; and so on for divine goodness and justice; nor is there any distinction at all the nature of things, or even a non-identity. The reason for which is that even if such a distinction could equally easily be posited between the divine essence and divine wisdom as between essence and relation, yet because positing it is most difficult everywhere, and I do not believe it easier to hold than is a Trinity of persons together with the unity of essence, so it ought not to be posited except where it obviously follows from beliefs contained in holy Scripture or the church's prescriptions, on account of whose authority all argument is held captive. And so since all the things contained in holy Scripture and the church's prescriptions and the sayings of the saints can be preserved without positing such a distinction between essence and wisdom, quite simply I deny that it is possible in this case.

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**142**. Ord.1 d.2 q.2, OTh II, p.61-2/94, p.66/100. \*this para needs fixing; see note 141 below\*

**143**. Ord.1 d.2 q.2, OTh II, p.73/106; d.10 q.1, OTh III, p.329/350. Scotus sometimes represents God’s activities in terms of “instants of nature” (cf. Ockham, Ord.1 d.35 q.4, OTh IV, p.467-8/490). Ockham rejects these “instants”, Ord.1 d.9 q.3, OTh III, p.311-2/332; Expos. Praed. c.18, OPh II, p.327-8/358. Whatever God is or does is identically and simply himself. Cf. WO, p.237-9.

**144**. “All attributes either connote some things really distinct or are common to things really distinct”, Ord.1 d.2 q.2, OTh II, p.70/104. “From created wisdom and from deity one concept can be abstracted which is predicable *in quid* of both, and it will be a quidditative concept... And thus there can be many quidditative and simple concepts because of the diversity of extrinsec things, but they will not be convertible because always something is contained under one that is not under the other”; Ord.1 d.3 q.3, OTh II, p.425/458.

**145**. Ord.1 d.43 q.1, OTh IV, p.636-7/660; Cf. WND 95.112ff, pp.643-55.

**146**. “The omnipotent cannot effect *everything* that does not include a contradiction, because he cannot effect God. However the omnipotent can effect every *makeable* that does not include a contradiction”, Ord.1 d.20 q.un., OTh IV, p.36/60. The editors quote a formulation from *De principiis theologiae* that makes the point more clearly: “God can make everything the making of which (*quod fieri*) does not include a contradiction. Note that I do not say that God can make everything that does not include a contradiction, because then he could make himself, since he does not include a contradiction; but he can make everything the making of which does not include a contradiction, that is, everything of which a contradiction does not follow upon the proposition ‘He makes it’”; OPh VII, p.507/540. *De principiis* is not by Ockham, but the editors consider it a faithful compilation of Ockham’s thought, p.26\*. See also WO p.1152ff.

**147**. Qdl.6 q.6, OTh IX, p.604-5/644. Cf. 1277 condemnations art. 63, CUP I, p.547.

**148**. Ord.1 prol. 1, OTh I, p.38/80; Qdl.6 q.6, OTh IX, p.605/644.

**149**. See above, note 39 .

**150**. Courtenay, “The Dialectic of Divine Omnipotence”. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, ST 1 q.25 a.5.

**151**. See above, note 1 .

**152**. Whether this means general laws or a plan including some singular events is unclear; WO, p.1198-1207. Miracles are part of the divine plan and likewise the supersession of the Old Law and occasional divine commands that override the moral law.

**153**. Qdl.6 q.1, OTh IX, p.585-6/624 (translated QQ, p.491-2). See also CB 4.3, p.230ff.

**154**. Ockham refers to “laws of God *commonly* ordained” in contrast with events that happen “by special miracle and divine dispensation”; QV q.8, OTh VIII, p.444/470.

**155**. See Courtenay, *Ockham and Ockhamism*, pp.58-9; Courtenay, “John of Mirecourt and Gregory of Rimini on Whether God can Undo the Past”, p.147ff.

**156**. “It is commonly conceded by philosophers and theologians that God cannot make the past not be past so that it is not forever afterwards true to say that it happened”, Ord.1 d.38 q.un, OTh IV, p.578-9/602; Praedest. q.1, OPh II, p.507-8/538.

**157**. \*check this\* Present and past contingent events remain contingent, even though they cannot be undone: “It is contingently true and therefore is true in such a way that it can be false and can never have been true”; Ord.1 d.38 q.un, OTh IV, p.587/610. And, if it had not been done, God would never have known that it was done (since it wasn’t): “He [God] knows contingently and can [*potest*] not know and could [*potuit*] never have known”; Praedest.q.1, OPh II, p.521/552. “The proposition ‘Everything that is, when it is, must be [*necesse est esse*]’ is literally [*de virtute sermonis*] simply false”, Expos. Perih*.* 1 c.6,OPh II, p.420/452. See Qdl.4 q.4, OTh IX, p.315-6/354, line 31ff (translated QQ, p.261).

**158**. Some historians have used the language of contract, agreement or pact to refer to divine ordinances insofar as they promise benefits. Ockham does use this language, but not often: “*foedus*” (Rep.4 q.1, OTh VII, p.6/36), “*ex pactione*” (Rep.4 q.10-11, OTh VII, p.215.15/244). Later theologians often used the language of covenant. “Nominalist covenants... were in no sense made by man as an equal or participating partner” (Courtenay, “Covenant and causality in Pierre d’Ailly”, p.118). If God’s will alone counts, without requiring any volition from human beings, then the language of pact or covenant seems inappropriate.

**159**. See the discussion between E. Sylla, H. Oberman and J. Murdoch in Sylla, “Autonomous and Handmaiden Science”, pp.394-5.

**160**. See below, note 205 . See Courtenay, “Covenant and causality in Pierre d’Ailly”, pp.116-119 (referring to the “Nominalists” generally). According to McGrath, God’s “ordained power refers to that subset of possibilities which he chose to actualise – and having actualised them, abides by them. Thus there was no absolute necessity for God to choose any course of action; however, having finally chosen a particular course of action, there is now a self-imposed conditional necessity in respect to it, in that God has freely chosen to be faithful to a certain ordering of his creation”; McGrath, “The anti-Pelagian structure of ‘Nominalist’ doctrines of justification”, pp.111-2. I have not found any place where Ockham speaks of a self-imposed necessity. It would seem to me that what God has freely chosen he can freely unchoose.

**161**. Qdl.2 q.10-11, OTh IX, p.156-1644/196 (translated QQ, pp.132-39). \*Also also Rep.4 q.7F = q.9, p.161/190\* See above, \*p..

**162**. It is difficult to prove this, but it is persuadable. Rep.4 q.9, OTh VII, p.161/190; Qdl.2 q.10, OTh IX, p.157ff/196 (translated QQ, p.132); Qdl.4 q.14, OTh IX, p.369/408 (translated QQ, p.305).

**163**. Ord.1 d.1 q.2, OTh I, p.396/438, 402/444; Rep.2 q.20, OTh V, p.435/462, 441/468.

**164**.  Rep.3 q. 4, OTh VI, p.136-7/158; Qdl.2 q.11, OTh IX, p.164/204 (translated QQ, p.138). \*\*Qdl irrelevant\*

**165**. Qdl.1 q.10 ad 2m, OTh IX, p.63/102 (translated QQ, p.56); Qdl.2 q.10, OTh IX, p.159/198 (translated QQ, p.134).

**166**. Qdl.1 q.10 ad 2, OTh IX, p.63-4/102 (translated QQ, p.56-7); Qdl.1 q.12 OTh IX, p.68/108 (translated QQ, p.61).

**167**. Qdl.2 q.14, OTh IX, p.177/216 (translated QQ, pp.148-50); the same distinction is implied in 3.1 Dial. 2.24.106-116, p.219. \*What does Adams say on this? See also Osbourne\*

**168**. Examples: “Every *honestum* is to be done”, Qdl.2 q.14, OTh IX, p.177/216 (translated QQ, p.149); there are “many” such principles, line 39. “Everything dictated by right reason on account of a due end (and likewise concerning other circumstances) is to be done”, “Everything dictated by right reason is to be loved”, Rep.3 q.12, OTh VI, p.425/446. “Every indigent person in extreme necessity is to be helped lest he perish”, QV q.8, OTh VIII, p.423.310/448. “Every benefactor is to be benefited”, QV q.6 art.10, OTh VIII, p.281.223/306. “By a natural law which is immutable, when something does me good and you no harm, it is fair that you should not prohibit me”, WND 66.47‑9, p.449. Not to kill a person who never did harm is a principle *per se nota*, 3.2 Dial. 1.15. There are also many natural laws “on supposition”, 3.2 Dial., 3.6 (translated in LFMOW,pp.286-93). It is not clear to me that these are known *per se*.

**169**. Qdl.2 q.14, OTh IX, p.177-8/216, lines 26 and 42 (translated QQ, p.149); QV q.6 art.10, OTh VIII, p.281-2/306.

**170**. Ord.1 d.1 q.4, OTh I, p.447.5-6/488 (“Only God is to be loved above all, because he is the highest good”); Qdl.3 q.14, OTh IX, p.257.87/296, translated QQ, p.214, (“This is to love God above all: to love whatever God wills to be loved”); QV q.7 a.3, OTh VIII, p.358-9/384, lines 413, 416 (“Who rightly loves God, loves God above all”... “Who rightly loves God, loves everything that God wills to be loved”). The principle “No one should be led to act against the precept of his God” is known *per se*, QV q.7 a.3, OTh VIII, p.366.583/392.

**171**. Ockham does not seem to explain the authority of human law in OPh or OTh, but he does in WND 65.55-75, p.437.

**172**. Above, note 170 170. \*

**173**. If the error is invincible: QV q.8, OTh VIII, p.411/436.

**174**. Rep.2 q.15, OTh V, p.352/380. Cf. 3.1 Dial. 2.24.110, p.219.

**175**. Rep.4 q.16, OTh VII, p.352/382.

**176**. Rep.4 q.10-11, OTh VII, p.195-7/224, 223/252.

**177**. Rep.4 q.10-11, OTh VII, p.198/228, 225-6/254.

**178**. Qdl.1 q.20, OTh IX, pp.99ff/138 (translated QQ, p.85-90). See Adams and Wood, “Is To Will It As Bad As To Do It?”, pp.12-14. \*Abelard, Kilcullen, “Bayle on the Rights of Conscience”\* For more on Ockham’s moral philosophy see King\*

**179**. \*\*

**180**. ~~Are things wrong because forbidden, or forbidden because wrong? The question has often been discussed. See Augustine, \*in Aristotle; see Suarez vi.11, III, pp.92-4. See also Plato,~~ *~~Euthyphro~~* ~~10a; Aristotle, EN V.7, 1134b 18-22; Thomas Aquinas, ST 2-2 q.57 a.2 ad 3; Ockham, \*3.1 Dial., 2.20.)~~ On the question whether there really is room in Ockham’s thinking for a “non-positive” morality see Freppert *Basis of morality*, p.171-81; Adams “Ockham on Will, Nature and Morality”, p.265-6. \*OT/ NT not in point, because this is positive morality\* \*Osbourne argues that O has a divine command theory\* \*By God’s absolute power, he could do something inconsistent with his ordinances: But also, he could *ordinately* change the ordinances.\* \*Kilcullen “Natural Law and Will in Ockham” King ethical theory McGrade\*

**181**. \*List; references to Augustine, Thomas, Scotus\*

**182**. (Wolter, p.275\*)

**183**. Gregory of Rimini, *Lectura*, p.235. Cf. St Leger, *The “etiamsi daremus” of Hugo Grotius*. See Kilcullen, “Medieval Theories of Natural Law”.

**184**. McGrade, “Natural Law and Divine Omnipotence”, pp.282-3. (For an account of the role of reason in Ockham’s moral theory see McGrade, “Right(s) in Ockham”, pp.66-70) \*But why does that dictate override others?\*

**185**. Expos. Phys. 2 c.8, OPh IV, p.321/334; Expos. Perih. 1 c.6 §11, 12, 15, OPh II, pp.418-9/450, 422-3/454.

**186**. “It cannot be proved by any reason… But it can be known evidently through experience, by the fact that a man experiences that however much reason dictates something, nevertheless the will can will it or not will it or nill it”; Qdl.1 q.16, OTh IX, p.87-8/126 (translated QQ, p.75).

**187**. Ord.1 d.38 q.un., OTh IV, p.580-1/604. “I call freedom the power by which I can... cause and not cause the same effect, without there being any diversity elsewhere outside that power”; Qdl.1 q.16, OTh IX, p.87/126 (translated QQ, p.75). Cf. Expos. Phys. 2 c.8 §1, OPh IV, p.319-20/332; Praedest.q.3, OPh II, p.536.92ff/568. Scotus seems to have been the first to maintain that freedom is a power for opposites undetermined by any cause but the will. This idea was rejected by Hume and Mill and many modern philosophers. See Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, bk.2 pt.3 sec.1, 2 (p.399); Hume, *Enquiry concerning Human Understanding*, Section 8; Mill, “Of Liberty and Necessity”; Kilcullen, “Freewill and determinism”.

**188**. Ord.1 d.38 q.un., OTh IV, p.578/602. My comment: If we say that Socrates is sitting but can stand up, we obviously don't mean that he can stand up precisely while he is sitting, doing both simultaneously. We mean that although he is at this time actually sitting, he is quite capable of standing up at any moment. The power to sit and the power to stand are compossible, the *acts* of these opposite powers are not compossible, but the act of one power is compossible with the opposite power. We don't have a power only when we exercise it. We can't stand while we are sitting, but not because when we are sitting we don't have the power to stand.

**189**. Apart from the motion that defines time: this is implied by “later”.

**190**. Rep.3 q.7, OTh VI, p.211/232.

**191**. Rep.3 q.11, OTh VI, p.357-8/378.

**192**. Ord.1 d.1 q.6, OTh I, pp.503-507/544; Rep.4, q.16, VII, p.350ff/380; Adams, “The Structure of Ockham’s Moral Theory”, p.13-14.

**193**. Ord.1 d.38 q.un, OTh IV, p.583-5/606; Praedest.q.1, OPh II, p.517-8/548.

**194**. See Aristotle, *De interpretatione* 18a 28ff, and Ockham’s commentary, Expos. Perih. 1 c.6 §15, OPh II, p.421-2/452.

**195**. Praedest.q.2 art.4, OPh II, p.529ff/560. For more see Adams and Kretzman: William Ockham, *Predestination, God’s Foreknowledge, and Future Contingents*; Craig, *The Problem of Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents*,p.146-168. \*Scotus on contingency: Stanford, Medieval modal\*

**196**. Ord.1 d.38 q.un, OTh IV, p.586/610. “Though the proposition ‘Peter is predestinate’ is now true and could be false, because, however, when it will be false [i.e. if it is in future false \*check transl at the time when] it is true to say that it was never true, therefore it is not changeable from truth into falsity”; Praedest.q.1, OPh II, p.512/544. “He [God] knows contingently and can [*potest*] not know and could [*potuit*] never have known”; Praedest.q.1, OPh II, p.521/552. “It is contingently true and therefore is true in such a way that it can be false and can never have been true”; p.587/610. “There is some proposition that cannot be first true and then false or vice versa, and yet it is not necessary but contingent. The reason is that, however much it is or was true, it is possible that it is not trueand never was true”; Ord.1 d.40 q.un., OTh IV, p.594-5/618.

**197**. Ord.1 d.38 q.un., OTh IV, p.583/606; Praedest.q.1, OPh II, p.518/550. \*Repeats note 181; check appropriateness of references in this section\* In the late 15th century there was controversy in Louvain concerning the obligation to believe as being true prophecies about future contingent events; see Baudry, *La querelle des futurs contingents.* Ockham says that prophecies regarding future contingents are always conditional and if the event does not happen it is because the conditions have not been met, Praedest.q.1, OPh II, p.513/544.

**198**. Ord.1 d.17 q.1, OTh III, p.454-5/476; Qdl.6 q.1 a.2, OTh IX, p.587/624 (translated QQ, p.492). On this point Ockham agrees with Scotus.

**199**. Grace and charity are the same thing: Rep.4 q.3-5, OTh VII p.47.5-7/76.

**200**. Not the Pope Pelagius often quoted in the *Dialogus*.

**201**. Information about these controversies can be searched for under the terms: Congregatio de auxiliis, Molinism, Jansenism, Synod of Dort, Arminianism.

**202**. For the *facientibus* maxim see Alexander of Hales, *Summa theologica*, IV, p.993-6; Thomas Aquinas *De Veritate* q.24 a.1 ad 2; McGrath, *Iustitia Dei,* pp.83-91. I have not found it in Ockham. Oberman, who believes that Ockham does subscribe to *facientibus*, judges that this doctrine is “essentially Pelagian”: God’s ordinances establish a “dome” under which we can live as if Pelagius were right, while Augustine’s doctrine holds *de potentia absoluta*. See Oberman, *Harvest*, pp.176-8, 186, 214. See also Oberman, “Facientibus quod in se est Deus non denegat gratiam: Robert Holcot O.P. and the Beginnings of Luther’s Theology”, section II. Also McSorley, “Was Gabriel Biel a Semi-Pelagian?”

**203**. For more on this topic see Wood, “Ockham’s Repudiation of Pelagianism”. Ockham seems to differ from Augustine (or at least from followers of Augustine in his time) on two points: Ockham holds that a person without grace can do morally good acts, and that the reason for predestination is (in most cases) that God foresees that the person will die in a state of grace. \*What did the Avignon masters say on these points\*

**204**. Cf. Job 41:11, Romans 9:14-24.

**205**. God owes nothing to anyone and can do no wrong: Ord.1 d.17 q.3, OTh III, p.478.19-20/500; Rep.2 q.15, OTh V, p.343.20-3/370; Rep.4 qq.3-5, OTh VII, p.45/74; ibid. p.55/84; Rep.4 qq.10-11, OTh VII, p.198.7-9/228, ibid., pp.225-6/254.

~~SOME OF THESE TEXTS QUOTED BELOW god owes nothing: “eo ipso quod ipse vult, bene et iuste factum est”, Ord.1 d.17 q.3, OTh III, p.478.19-20/500; “ Deus autem nulli tenetur nec obligatur tanquam debitor, et ideo non potest facere quod non debet facere nec non facere quod debet facere”, Rep.2 q.15, OTh V, p.343/370; Rep.4 q.3-4, “Et ideo potest Deus de potentia sua absoluta non remittere culpam, sine omni iniustitia, sicut potest aliquem punire sine omni demerito absque hoc quod dicatur iniustus… Unde sicut Deus potest semper continuare et detinere unum brutum in poenis sine omni peccato vel iniustitia a parte sui, ita eodem modo posset facere cum homine. Si dicatur quod Deus est debitor praemii pro meritis, respondeo dico quod Deus nullius est debitor nisi quia sic ordinavit; de potentia tamen absoluta potest facere contrarium cum creatura sua sine omni iniuria”, Rep.4 qq.3-5, OTh VII, p.45/74; “sicut Deus creat creaturam quamlibet ex mera voluntate sua, ita ex mera voluntate sua potest facere de creatura sua quidquid sibi placet. Sicut enim si aliquis semper diligeret Deum et faceret omnia opera Deo accepta, posset eum Deus adnihilare sine aliqua iniuria, ita sibi post talia opera potest non dare vitam aeternam sed poenam aeternam sine iniuria. Et ratio est quia Deus nullius est debitor, sed quidquid nobis facit, ex mera gratia facit. Et ideo eo ipso quod Deus aliquid facit, iuste factum est.” ibid. p,55/84; Rep.4 qq.10-11, OTh VII, p.198/228, “Nec deus peccare dicitur propter illum actum, quia nullus dicitur peccare nisi quia facit aliquid ad cuius oppositum obligatur vel quia non [facit] illud ad quod obligatur. Deus autem ad nihil faciendum vel non faciendum obligatur... potest Deus aliquem obligare ad poenam aeternam sine omni peccato”; ibid., pp.225-6/254.~~

**206**. Qdl.6 q.2 a.2, OTh IX, pp.591.37-42/630 (translated QQ, p.495).

**207**. God could ordain that “whoever lives according to right reason so that he does not believe anything except what natural reason concludes he should believe” is worthy of eternal life, Rep.3 q.9, OTh VI, p.280-1/302. Such naturally-good acts would not merit eternal life except by God’s free acceptance, Ord.1 d.17 q.2, OTh III, p.470-472/492. Also Qdl.6 q.1 a.2, OTh IX, pp.587-9/626 (translated QQ, p.493).

**208**. Of his absolute power he could send someone having charity to hell but accept another not having charity to eternal life, and he would not from this be an “acceptor of persons” because he is no one’s debtor; QVq.1 a.3 OTh VIII, p.22/48. “Of his absolute power God... could punish someone without any demerit without being said to be unjust (though the punishment would not be properly a penalty...); just as God could always continue and detain a brute in pain without any sin or injustice on his part, he could do the same with man”; Rep.4, q.3-5, OTh VII, p.45/74. “Just as God creates any creature of his mere will, so of his mere will he can do with his creature whatever pleases him. For just as, if someone always loved God and did everything acceptable to God, God could annihilate him without any injustice, so he could after such acts not give him life eternal but eternal pain, without injustice. And the reason is because God is no one’s debtor, but whatever he does to us he does of mere grace, and therefore, by the very fact that God does something, it is done justly”; ibid. p.55/84.

**209**. QVq.1 a.3, OTh VIII, p.25-6/50.

**210**. See above, note 146 .

**211**. Ord.1 d.17 q.3, OTh III, pp.477-8/498; Qdl.6 q.1 a.2, OTh IX, p.588-9/624 (translated QQ, p.493); Qdl.6 q.2 a.2, OTh IX, p.591/630 (translated QQ, p.496).

**212**. Qdl.3 q.14, OTh IX, p.255-6/294 (translated QQ, p.213); De connex. virt, OTh VIII, pp. 335‑6/360.

**213**. Rep.3 q.9 a.1, OTh VI, p.279.18-20/300, 281.14-17/302. See also 1 Dial. 6.79 on the morality of pagans.

**214**. Ord.1 d.41 q.un., OTh IV, p.600/624; Qdl.6 q.2, OTh IX, p.592/632 (translated QQ, p.496). Other medieval theologians also held that we must prepare for grace by doing good works (e.g. Thomas Aquinas, ST 1-2 q.112 a.2, 3), but also did not hold that good works earn grace. See Wood, “Ockham’s Repudiation of Pelagianism”, pp.361-2.

**215**.  Ord.1 d.41 q.un, OTh IV, p.606-7/630. In most cases. Some, e.g. the Blessed Virgin, are given a special grace to prevent them from ever falling out of charity.

**216**. “The difficulty in this question [whether the divine unity is consistent with a plurality of persons] arises from the identity of the divine essence with the relation and with the person, because, if the essence, relation and person are simply one thing not distinct in number, it is difficult to see how there are several relations and several persons and not several essences”; Ord. 1 d.2 q.11, OTh II, pp.358-99/392. \*Boehner, “The Medieval Crisis of Logic and the Author of the ‘Centiloquium’ Attributed to Ockham”\*

**217**. A formal distinction can be posited when there is one simple thing that is several things, SL \*2 c.2.124ff, OPh I, p.253/330. Cf. 3-1 c.16, OPh I, p.403/480; Ord.1 Prol. q.7, OTh I, p.202/244. A formal distinction can be posited “when there is *some circumlocution* that enables one of two contradictories to be verified of a thing of which the other is negated”, as for example “paternity is *that thing which is* communicable” is true although “paternity is not communicable” is also true; Ord.1 d.2 q.11, OTh vol.2 p.374-5/408. See Boehner, “Medieval Crisis of Logic”, p.157-167. \*SL II c.27; III-1 c.4-5\* For Ockham’s discussion of the logic of the Trinity see Gelber, *Logic and the Trinity*, pp.177-185, 216-226, and Shank, *Unless You Believe, You Shall Not Understand*, p.65-71.

**218**. \*Scotus prefers “formal non-identity”, Ockham also uses “formal distinction”. Ockham’s theory is like Scotus’s in Logica. Unlike Scotus, he does not hold that there are in God distinct or non-identical “formalities”,1d2q11.\*

**219**. Ord.1 d.10 q.1, OTh vol.3 p.326-30/348. See Friedman, *Medieval Trinitarian Thought*, pp.\*

**220**.

**221**. It then becomes difficult to see what the distinction is between substance and accident. Adams (WO, pp.994-5) suggests that the difference may be that a substance can sustain another substance but an accident cannot.

**222**. The eucharist is also called “the sacrament of the altar”, “the Lord’s supper”, “holy communion”. I am indebted to Buescher, *The Eucharistic Teaching of William of Ockham*, for guidance through this topic.

 \*Rep. 7 qq. 6, 7, 8, 9. \*Adams p.186ff\*

**223**. De Corp. Christi c.2, OTh X p.91/122; translated Birch, *The De Sacramento Altaris of William of Ockham*, p.82. (Birch’s chapter numbers are different from those of the Latin edition.)

**224**. “Transubstantiation is the succession of one substance to another substance, which [i.e. the latter] ceases to exist simply in itself, under certain accidents proper to the preceding substance. The possibility of this is clear, because it is not repugnant to divine power to destroy a substance in itself and conserve its accidents, and that another substance immediately coexist with those accidents (not informing it).” Rep.4 q.8, OTh VII, pp.136-7/166. Though Ockham uses the terms “transubstantiation” and “conversion”, in his theory there is no conversion or changing one thing into another but rather a substitution. See Beuscher, *The Eucharistic Teaching of William of Ockham,* pp.45-51.

**225**. “The first terminus of transubstantiation is what the converter or transubstantiator primarily intends... And that is said to be the terminus *per accidens* that is intended by that agent secondarily, namely because he [the transubstantiator] cannot transubstantiate without the others (especially when they are united), or because he does not wish to do so. Thus it is said that Christ’s body – composed of matter and form preceding the intellective soul, whatever that may be (assuming several forms in a man, as we must because of the article [a reference to Kilwardby’s condemnation] – is the first terminus of this transubstantiation. Because God, who is the principal agent in that conversion, intends primarily to convert the bread into Christ’s body, so that if his soul were separate, as it was in the three days [i.e. between the crucifixion and the resurrection], then the conversion would be into Christ’s body only. The intellective soul is a terminus accidentally, because God secondarily intends to convert the bread into the soul so far as it is united to the body”; Rep.4 q.8, OTh VII, p.142/172. See De Corp. Christi c.5, OTh X p.97/128, translated Birch pp.89-91 (where the distinction is made not in terms of primary and secondary objectives, but in terms of strict and broad senses of “transubstantiation”).

**226**. “Not only is Christ’s body, which is one part of human nature, really contained under the appearance of bread, but also the whole integral Christ, perfect God and true man”; above, note 223 .

**227**. Rep.4 q.6, OTh VII, p.65/94. Cf. Qdl.1 q.4, OTh IX, p.25/64; Qdl.4 q.21, OTh IX, p.400-1/440. Sometimes for “circumscriptively” Ockham puts “quantitatively”, e.g. below at note 239 .

**228**. Cf. the doctrine that the intellective soul is present to the whole body and to each of its parts, above note 165 .

**229**. “There is no greater difficulty that two parts of the body exist together than that two bodies exist together; but one can happen by the power of God, therefore the other;” Rep.4 q.6, OTh VII, p.79/108. p.79. “We hold by faith that bodies (the same in species or different) exist together in the same place: this is clear when Christ went in to the disciples with the doors closed, when he was born with the Virgin’s womb closed, when he ascended into heaven without any division of the celestial body. Therefore in the same way it is not a contradiction that two parts of the same body exist in the same place; and, by the same argument, all parts of Christ’s body can without contradiction be in the same place. From these two points I argue the point intended, because if it is possible that all parts of Christ’s body are in the same place by divine power (just as it is possible for two bodies to be together in the same place), and if it is possible that every part of the body of Christ is in different places according to its whole self (just as the soul and an angel are together and at the same time wholly in diverse places), it follows that it is possible for the whole body of Christ to coexist with the whole place of the host and the whole in each part; which is the point mainly intended, namely how Christ’s body is definitively in place under the consecrated host”; Qdl.4 q.31, OTh IX, p.453/492. Cf. De Corp Christi c.7, OTh X, p.103-5/134, translated Birch pp.95-8.

**230**. “Though Christ’s body is of itself limited, yet by God’s power it can be unlimited to many places, as it can be on many altars”; Rep.4 q.6, OTh VII, p.104/134.

**231**. [\*Cf. Thomas Aquinas ST 3 q.75 a.2]

“A body can be in a place where it was not before without being moved to that place or the place to it, because this can happen suddenly without any motion (though not without any change of that body [see above, note 81 ]). For example: the body of Christ in the sacrament of the Eucharist is now present where previously it was not, and yet suddenly and in the same way it can be in different places circumscriptively, but without motion. And when you say ‘if it is moved to another place, it leaves the first’, I say that just as according to the faith Christ’s body is now present where it was not present, and thus is changed, yet *does not leave its place in heaven*, so it can come to be circumscriptively where before it was not and yet not leave the first place”; Rep.4 q.6, OTh VII, p.102/132. Also: “Since therefore Christ’s body passes from not being here to being here, because of which this is a true change, it follows that Christ’s body is truly changed. Therefore I say that Christ’s body is changed locally, because just as through its substance it is immediately here where it previously was not, not through the substance of the bread, so immediately it is changed. But that it is immediately in place, was proved before. Therefore I say that here there is a double mutation: one acquisitive, the other deprivative. The acquisitive is in Christ’s body, because it receives existence here where previously it did not have it, but the deprivative is of the substance of the bread itself, which does not remain where it was previously”; Rep.4 q.8, OTh VII, p.145-6/174. “I say that extending ‘to be changed locally’ to mean existing somewhere really after being elsewhere and not there... so the body of Christ is changed locally when it begins to exist sacramentally under the host, and this mutation is acquisitive of a new place not had before but is *not deprivative of a place had before*. But taking ‘to be changed locally’ strictly, as the Philosopher speaks, for acquisition of one place *and* deprivation of another, thus I say that Christ’s body is not locally changed by beginning to exist sacramentally under the host. I prove this, because if it were so, then it would cease to exist in heaven when it begins to exist on the altar, which is heretical”; Qdl.6 q.3, OTh IX, p.595/634.

**232**. “The third opinion would be very reasonable if there were not a determination of the Church to the contrary, because that opinion saves and avoids all difficulties that follow from the separation of accidents from a subject, nor is its opposite found in the canon of the Bible. Nor does it include any contradiction for the body of Christ to coexist with the substance of the bread more than with its accidents; nor is it repugnant to reason, first because quantity is repugnant with quantity as much as substance with substance, but two quantities can exist together in the same place, as is clear of two bodies existing in the same place, second because Christ’s substance can be in the same place with the quality of the host, therefore by the same argument with its substance. To the argument at the beginning, I say that sometimes more miracles are to be posited concerning something where it could be done by fewer, and this pleases God. And this is certain to the church through some revelation, as I suppose”; Qdl.4 q.30, OTh IX, p.450/490. Cf. De Corp. Christi c.6, OTh X p99/130, translated Birch pp.92-4.

**233**. “But because the determination of the Church is to the contrary (as is clear Extra, *De Summa Trinitate et fide catholica* and *De celebratione missarum*), and commonly all the doctors hold the opposite, therefore I hold that not the substance of the bread but the species remains there, and the body of Christ coexists with it. And that this is possible is clear, because this transubstantiation includes only that the species remain there really and the substance does not remain in itself really, and that the body of Christ is there really, not quantitatively [i.e. not circumscriptively]. But each of these [statements] is possible, therefore et cetera”; Rep.4 q.8, OTh VII, pp.139-40/168.

**234**. De Corp. Christi c.9, OTh X p.107-8/138, translated Birch p.102.

**235**. ST \*3.77.2. [is this suppl? NO. \*In Sent IV d.11 q.1 a.1 qu.3 sol.1 https://www.newadvent.org/summa/4073.htm ff

**236**. See above, note 97 .

**237**. “Concerning the sacrament of the altar they say that after the consecration of Christ’s body one quantity, which preceded, was the same really with the substance of the bread, and that [quantity] does not remain; but, besides that, there remains a quantity which is the same as the quality, but in that quantity no quality exists subjectively, but all accidents remaining after consecration remain, together with Christ’s body, without any subject, because they subsist per se”; SL 1 c.44, OPh I, p.137-8/214 (translated OTT p.145-6); ~~Rep.4 q.9, OTh VII, p.153-65/183ff~~ \*See Adams p.194 n.56. De corp. Christi c.13, OTh X p.115/146, translated Birch p.110-1.

**238**. “It cannot be proved by argument that it is not the case that every action and passion terminating at an absolute form a body can have existing in a place circumscriptively and quantitatively it can also have existing in a place definitively and not quantitatively. I prove this, because no less can a principle of action have an action wholly present to some patient, for example a warm-able, than through one part present to one and through another part present to another. But Christ’s body in the host is wholly present to the whole host and to every part. Therefore the warmth of Christ’s body can act upon the host and make it warm. And by the same argument it can be proved that Christ’s body can be seen in the host by the bodily eye, because it is sufficiently active both on the medium and on the eye, because wholly present to every part of the eye and the medium”; Rep.4 q.7, OTh VII p.118/148. “But the experience we now in fact have of Christ’s body is not conclusive, because God suspends the action of those qualities, not co-acting with them so that they act; and if he did co-act, they would be seen”; ibid., p.119. “I say that it is not from the nature of things repugnant to the intellect of the wayfarer to see Christ’s body in the host, if it were permitted, for example if God co-acted with it, but that does not in fact happen because it is not permitted”; ibid. p.135/164.

**239**. “I say that Christ in the sacrament of the altar can naturally and intuitively understand everything else as if he were there quantitatively [= circumscriptively]. He can also be understood and seen naturally and intuitively, not only by the angelic intellect or the separated soul but also by the bodily eye (unless there were some special impediment, as explained above [note 238 ]). And this is true not only in respect of substantial things but also of accidental. These points are clear, because positing a sufficient active [principle] and a patient disposed and approximate, action follows – or this is not to be denied unless there appear some evident argument to the contrary, or certain experience, or certain authority, none of which appear in the present case, as was said above. This is confirmed, because it is not repugnant to the intellect to be affected by something that does *not* have a quantitative mode, nor by something that *does* have a quantitative mode: for intellect to understand this or that, therefore, it is irrelevant whether it has a quantitative mode or not. For it would be remarkable if Christ existing in the host did not know where he was. Therefore I hold that every action and passion that he can have when he exists circumscriptively in place, he can have in the Eucharist (if nothing else impedes, such as the divine will, as explained above)”; Rep.4 q.7, OTh VII p.124-5/154.

**240**. “I say that Christ’s body can be moved really and locally in the sacrament, because it is wherever the host is”; Rep.4 q.7, OTh VII p.120/150. Christ in heaven moves “organically” but in the eucharist “non organically”: “To move organically is to move first one part and afterwards, by means of the part moved, to move another part distant in place and situation from the part first moved, so that to move organically necessarily requires these two: first, that one part be moved locally first and, after that, by means of the first part, the second; second that between the parts of the body moved there be local distance”; Qdl.4 q.15, OTh IX p.370/410.

**241**. Qdl.4 q.14, OTh IX p.371/410

**242**. “I say that Christ’s intellective soul under the host can move Christ’s body non-organically. For it cannot move organically in the sacrament, because it cannot first move one part and afterwards another part by means of the first, because between the parts of [Christ’s] body, as it is there, there is no local distance, because the whole is in the whole and the whole is in every part, and therefore it cannot move one part before another because each part is together with the other. But non-organically it [Christ’s intellective soul] can move [Christ’s body] locally, because it can *will*. And I believe that it wills in fact that his body be moved with the motion of the host, and this on account of the conformity of his will to the divine will willing that host be moved in that way. And willing thus, if the host is moved, it [i.e. Christ’s intellective soul] then moves his body non-organically, because [it moves] equally firstly the whole and every one of its parts, because the whole [i.e. of Christ’s body] is with the whole and with every part, and there is no distance between parts, which is necessarily required for moving organically. And from this it is clear that when the host is moved, Christ’s intellective soul by means of his will moves Christ’s body under the host non-organically, as a partial cause concurrent with the divine will contingently causing and contingently disposing the body to be moved with the motion of the host. And this whole is because of the conformity of the human will in Christ to the divine will”; Rep.4 q.7, OTh VII p.123-4/152. Cf. Qdl.4 q.15, OTh IX p.371ff/410.

**243**. See above, note 153 .

**244**. For a discussion of the articles relating to the Eucharist drawn up against Ockham in the Avignon process, see Buescher, *The Eucharistic Teaching of William of Ockham*, pp.145-150.

**245**. See King,“William of Ockham: *Summa logicae*”; Moody, *The Logic of William of Ockham*.\*Add other references\*

**246**. Ockham alludes to this text in several places, e.g. De Corp. Christi c.37, OTh X, p.213/244; 1 Dial. 2.1.

**247**. “‘It is to be posited thus in God, therefore thus in the creature’ does not follow”. That would lead to absurdities. \*d.30 q.4, OTh IV, p.373-4/396. Some things must be posited in God that it would be absurd to posit in creatures, Ord.1 d.30 q.4, OTh vol.4 p.374/398.

**248**. Above, note 139 .

**249**. Ord.1 d.2 q.11, OTh II p.364/397ff.