In making this analysis I have consulted Pierre D'Ailly's Abbreviatio (Ian Murdoch, Critical Edition of Pierre D'Ailly's "Abbreviatio dyalogi okan", Ph D thesis Monash University, 1981).
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Links in the "Contents" list (immediately below) are to the body of the summary. In the body of the summary asterisks link back to the content list (so that the reader can check how some part of the discussion fits into the overall structure).
The main course of discussion is reported stripped of the circumstances of dialogue. Sometimes, however, arguments are introduced with "Student:" and "Master:", to avoid such things as "Reply to reply to objection:".
Pink highlight marks editorial comments.
SHOULD ONE EMPEROR RULE THE WORLD?
Opinion 1: It would be best for humanity for one emperor to rule the world
Opinion 2: It would not be best for one emperor to rule the world
Opinion 3: It would be best one to rule the world, an ecclesiastic
Opinion 4: It would be best if the world were ruled by a college of rulers
Opinion 5: Government should vary with the circumstances
Answers from viewpoint of opinion 5 to the arguments for the other opinions
To arguments for Opinion 1
To arguments for Opinion 2
To arguments for Opinion 3
To arguments for Opinion 4
What should be the qualities of a world ruler?
What is the source of the Roman Empire?
Opinion C: The true Roman Empire was established by the pope
Arguments and discussion of the arguments.
How opinion C is rejected
Opinion A: The Roman Empire was established by God, not men
Opinion B: The Roman Empire was established by God through the Roman people
It was established by the people
Arguments to show that the Empire was not from the pope
Can the Roman Empire be transferred? If so, how and by whom?
Did the Romans transfer the Empire to the pope?
Can the Roman Empire be destroyed?
THE RIGHTS AND POWER OF THE ROMAN EMPEROR
Are the powers of the Emperor and the pope distinct powers?
The opinion that the pope has power in spiritual matters, the emperor in temporals
Examples of the distinction between temporal and spiritual matters
Definition of spiritual and temporal powers
The emperor's power in temporal matters
Are all parts of the world subject to the Roman Emperor in temporal matters?
Opinion 1: affirmative
Opinion 2: The Roman Emperor is not now lord of all nations
The Emperor's power over persons.
The Emperor's power over the wicked: Can he punish every secular crime?
Opinion 1: He cannot
Opinion 2: The Emperor (and only a secular judge) should punish the secular crimes of those subject to secular judges
Opinion 3: an intermediate opinion
The Emperor's power over the good: Are they bound to obey him in everything?
The Emperor's power over things: Is he lord of all temporal things not belonging to the Church?
Opinion 1: He is not
Opinion 2: The Emperor is lord of all temporal things
Opinion 3: an intermediate opinion
Does the Emperor have fullness of power in temporal things?
Opinion 1: The emperor has power to do anything not contrary to divine or natural law, and all his subjects must obey
Opinion 2: The Emperor has power only for the common good
Should the emperor-elect administer at once, or wait to notify the pope?
Does the emperor have any power in spiritual matters?
Does the Emperor have any power over spiritual persons?
Does (or can) the Emperor have any power in relation to the pope?
Can the right of electing the pope belong to the Emperor?
Opinion 1: The Emperor cannot have the right to elect a pope
Opinion 2: The Emperor can have the right to elect a pope
How can the Emperor have the right to elect a pope?
Opinion 1: From the pope
Opinion 2: As a Christian Roman
Christian Romans have the right by divine law, extending the term to include all kinds of natural law
Three modes of natural law
Why can every natural law be called divine law?
How divine law (in the extended sense) gives the Romans the right to elect the pope.
Answer to arguments for opinion 1.
If the Romans transfer the right of election to the pope, when does it revert to the Romans?
Opinion 1: The right reverts to the Romans only if the Pope and Cardinals are heretics
To which of the Romans does it revert?
Opinion 2: The right reverts to the Romans also if the Cardinals are supporters of heresy
Opinion 3: Or if the Cardinals support some heretic (including a dead pope)
Opinion 4: Or if the cardinals are in schism
Opinion 5: Or if the Cardinals will not act, or dangerously defer election of a true pope
Reply from viewpoint of Opinion 1 to the arguments for opinions 2-5.
Can the Emperor have power over a pope in office?
Is the Emperor ever the pope's regular judge?
Opinion 1: The Emperor is never the pope's regular judge by virtue of his imperial dignity
Opinion 2A: The Emperor can judge any crime, ecclesiastical or secular, and hence can depose a pope
First argument for this opinion: every community needs a single supreme judge
Does the Christian community, to be best governed, need one supreme judge of all crimes?
Alternative to opinion 2A: There need not be any supreme judge of all crimes, ecclesiastical and secular
Various versions of this alternative
Objections against each of these versions
Against version 1
Against version 2
Against version 3
Against version 4
Against version 5
Two points basic to objections against alternatives to Opinion 2A
(i) The unity of a community requires one head
(ii) The supreme head is not the pope
Appeal from secular judges to the pope
Second argument for opinion 2A: Christ was subject to the Emperor
Power to make accusations against Christ
Third argument for opinion 2A: Christianity did not deprive anyone of his rights.
[The work is unfinished]
Topics of 3.2 Dial.:
Book 1: Should there be one emperor over the whole world? What should be the emperor's qualities? From whom the Roman Empire proceeded? Can it rightly be destroyed or annulled, diminished, divided, or transferred?
Book 2 What are the emperor's rights in temporal matters?
Book 3 Does the emperor have any power in spiritual matters? Is he capable of power over spiritual matters?
Book 4 What are the emperor's duties to defend the rights of the empire, especially against the Church?
Book 5 will treat of rebels, traitors, destroyers, dividers and usurpers of the Roman Empire or of any part of it.
The master has only Bible and Canon Law, and not the books of theology, law and history that would be needed for such an inquiry. So the work will be imperfect, but it may stimulate others to do better. Those who rule, advise rulers and teach are ignorant of many truths about the above matters. The Master will report judgments or opinions that are true and false, solid and fantastical, with strong arguments, without indicating which of the reported opinions he thinks should be approved.
Argument  The form of government most beneficial to the whole world is that by which the bad are best restrained and the good live more quietly among the bad, since it is chiefly for this that government exists (1 Pet. 2:14, Rom. 13:3-4, Augustine in 23, q. 5, c. Non frustra. Laws are made so that the audacity of the bad may be restrained and the good live safely, dist. 4, Factae sunt leges, and Extra, prologue, Ideoque lex proditur). A world empire best achieves this aim, since it is more powerful, oppressors are fewer, there would be fewer rebellions and wars.
 Just as spiritual matters are controlled by priests and ecclesiastics, so are temporal matters by secular rulers and laymen. In 11, q. 1, c. Sicut enim, c. Te quidem, 1 Corinthians 6:4, dist. 96, c. Cum ad verum, dist. 10, c. Quoniam idem, c. Imperium, c. Certum and c. Suscipitis, dist. 96, c. Denique, c. Duo sunt, and c. Si imperator, and dist. 88, c. Episcopus, etc. Even if the whole world were converted to the faith, it would be beneficial to the Chrisitan community to be under one highest pontiff in spiritual matters, therefore in temporal matters also it is beneficial to the human community to be under one secular ruler.
 A similar judgment must be held concerning whole and part, Extra, De Appellationibus, c. De appellationibus; 14, q. ult., c. ult., and Extra, De praebendis et dignitatibus, c. Maioribus. But it is beneficial to every particular kingdom to be subject to one secular ruler; therefore it is beneficial for the whole world to be subject to one secular ruler.
 All who have, or can have, community with one another in temporal matters, so that each can alike help and harm the other, are not best governed unless they are subject in temporal matters to one highest ruler: Proverbs 11[:14], John 10:16, and Matthew 26:31. Also, because all who have, or can have, community with one another, become, or can become, one body, one city, one college, one nation, one kingdom, and unless they are well unified they are not at all well ordered; but a body that has no head or several is a monstrous body. Romans 12:5, Proverbs 18, Wisdom 6:3
 That form of government is best by which discord is removed and taken away from the totality of mortals most effectively and most perfectly, as far as is possible for the present life, and concord and justice chiefly preserved. Matthew 12:25: one particular kingdom divided against itself by discord will be made desolate.
 That form of government is beneficial to the totality of mortals by which quarrels and litigations, to which the nature of mortals is inclined, are decided more equitably and more suitably. If litigants are subject to several kings or rulers without a superior, justice can easily be endangered, and it is not clear under which judge it is safe for both parties to litigate. See Extra, De officio iudicis delegati, c. Causam quae, and c. Insinuante. "It is in a way natural to avoid the snares of suspect judges," 3, q. 5, Quia suspecti.
 If all kings and rulers are subject to one emperor, then not only inferiors, but also superiors, can lawfully be corrected if they do wrong.
 There should be such connection among all mortals that any of them, in relation to another, is an inferior or a superior, or both of them are inferiors in relation to the same person, dist. 89, c. Ad hoc.
 The form of government that God does not permit among mortals, but takes away, because of the sins of the multitude is better than that which God introduces to punish the sins of the multitude. But God ordains that not one but many should have lordship over the totality of mortals to punish the sins of mortals, Proverbs 28:2.
 If it is not beneficial to the totality of mortals to be under one emperor, this will be either because no one can be found who is adequate to ruling the whole world, or because he would be too powerful. But inadequacy is no objection: just as human inadequacy is also no objection why one man should not preside in spiritual matters over the whole world, even if the totality of mortals were converted to the faith. And excessive power is no objection, because the whole world can, in proportion, resist the cruelty of one emperor of the whole world just as one particular kingdom can resist a king.
 It is not wicked for one to rule over all others, because if it were wicked it would be against either natural law or positive law. But not against natural law, because then it would always have been wicked, and thus no one would ever have been a true emperor of the world. And not against positive law, because a positive law by which it is decreed that no one should be emperor of the whole world could not be established except by the totality of mortals; but the totality of mortals never established this, but rather the opposite. Therefore it is not wicked for one to have empire over the whole world; it must therefore be regarded as beneficial.
Argument  A division of kingdoms so that they are under different kings with no superior is from God; 3 Kings, 12 and 13.
 The same right exists in great and in little, in whole and in part. But that any one secular ruler should preside over a part of mortals, even the part that uses the justest laws, is not beneficial. It was displeasing to God that the Israelite people should be subject to one secular ruler was displeasing to God, 1 Kings 8:7.
 That form of government is more beneficial to the totality of mortals in the state of fault that is more like the form of government that would have existed if mankind had remained in the state of innocence, but then one man would not have been emperor.
 For all mankind to be under one ruler or emperor conflicts with the law of nations: First, because "wars and captivities" belong to the law of nations, dist. 1, Ius gentium. Also, the law of nations forbids intermarriage with foreigners.
 Believers should not bear the same yoke with unbelievers, 2 Corinthians 6:14. See Matthew 10:34. Deuteronomy 7 believers are explicitly commanded to strike unbelievers to death and not enter into any treaty with them nor marry their women. 2 Corinthians 6:14: "For what share has justice with injustice? Or what fellowship has light with darkness? And what concord has Christ with Belial? Or what part has the believer with the unbeliever?" Ecclesiasticus 13:22. In 1 Corinthians 6:5, Paul rebukes believers litigating before unbelievers.
 No one man can take due care of all mankind.
Argument: Greater wisdom is found in ecclesiastics than in seculars. Objection: The wisdom required is in secular business. Some reply that according to the Bible, the king should be more expert not only in worldly wisdom but also in divine wisdom and in God's law.
Argument: If many wise and virtuous govern there will be fewer errors and sins in ruling, Proverbs 13 and 24:6
Argument  Rule exists for the common advantage. But sometimes the common advantage would be best served by one form of government and sometimes by another, depending on whether people will best tolerate universal rule by monarchy or aristocracy, or division of the world into particular provinces.
 But God had the Israelite people ruled sometimes by one secular ruler, sometimes by one priest, sometimes by several kings none of whom was subject to another.
 Sometimes the world was justly and permissibly ruled by one ruler and by many.
Although it is the rule, and happens more often, that when one secular ruler is lord over all mortals the bad are restrained more strictly and the good live more quietly among the bad, yet this fails in particular cases. One case is when some faction stirs up dangerous seditious, from which they would desist if different secular rulers with no superior governed the different provinces of the world. Another case is when the monarch would rule tyrannically. In such cases the appointment of an emperor should be deferred.
 Sometimes someone is lord of the whole world by right and not in fact (because many rebel against him), it can therefore happen that the lord and ruler of the whole world has less power to restrain the bad and protect the good than many against whom none, or not as many, try to rebel. It need not always be true that there are fewer oppressors and fewer wars because it can happen -- from the particular wickedness of some great multitude, or from the wickedness, ignorance, and negligence of the ruler -- that there are more oppressors and wars, which would sometimes cease if many presided with no superior.
 Two answers. First, that the cases of a president in spiritual matters and a president in temporal matters are not altogether similar, because for one man to preside in spiritual matters over all the faithful (even if the whole world were converted to the faith) is immediately from a particular divine ordinance, and not from human ordinance (dist. 21, c. Quamvis, and dist. 22, c. Omnes and c. Sacrosancta, etc). But that one secular ruler should preside over the whole world in temporal matters is from human ordinance, which (because it is not of divine law or natural law) can licitly be changed by men. Therefore, before there was one secular ruler some could licitly not consent, for when there is a loss to the liberty or power or right of some, "the consent of all must be sought" and had, dist. 54, c. 1. If after there had been one ruler it became detrimental to appoint a successor, then then for that time no one should be promoted to empire.
Second, Christ's ordinance was affirmative and not negative and therefore obliges always but not for always. Although all the faithful should always be ready to obey one highest pontiff, yet the election of a highest pontiff when the see is vacant can, for a reasonable cause, be deferred for a time, perhaps for two hundred years or more; and the like could be said of appointment to world empire.
Christians cannot ordain that there will never again be a pope. Could mankind ordain that there could never be a world emperor? Answer: No, because it is not permissible to make any permanent enactment against something that is beneficial to the common good as a rule though it can harm the common good occasionally.
 A like judgment need not always be made of the whole and of the part, but when there is the same reason concerning whole and part and concerning great matters and small, then a similar judgment must be made. But there is not always the same reason concerning the whole world and one particular kingdom, because it can happen, because of wicked sedition or because of the inadequacy of the person to be appointed, a world ruler would not benefit the common good, while a single ruler for a particular kingdom may be beneficial.
Also, it is often not beneficial that one king should rule a kingdom. It would sometimes be beneficial for several kingdoms to be united when there was not one world ruler, if some just man were to govern them for the common advantage and not for his own benefit.
 On occasion (because of wicked sedition or the inadequacy of the one to be appointed ) it is not beneficial for all to be subject to one emperor. Sometimes mankind cannot be governed in the best way.
 As a rule discords are taken away more effectively by the government of one man than by several, but not always.
 As a rule conflicts and litigations are decided more fairly if all mortals have one supreme judge, but not always.
 As a rule an emperor can correct even kings, if they do wrong, but on occasion this fails.
 All mankind, if they were disposed in the best way, so far as the condition of mortals permits, should be subject to one ruler, but such a connection is often obstructed by wickedness.
 The lordship of one ruler over the whole world is better than the lordship of many rulers with no superior, but such rulership cannot always be had.
 It might not happen for either of the reasons given, but because of the unusual and particular wickedness of subjects, or because for some determinate time it is not certain that someone suited to such an office could be found.
 Some natural commandments (1) are absolute and without any condition, qualification, specification, or determination, others (2) have some condition etc. It cannot be against natural law in the first sense for one emperor to preside over all mortals, because no emperor could ever rule licitly over all mortals. But it can be against natural law in the second sense, because natural reason says that one emperor should not rule over all mortals when such lordship would be to the detriment of the common good. Such lordship is as a rule just and expedient and in harmony with natural law, but on occasion it can be wicked and contrary to natural law in the second sense.
 God does some things to punish the sins of the bad, and those things are beneficial when the bad should be punished; but often, when the bad are not to be punished, they are not beneficial but the contrary. And the division of kingdoms was from God to punish the sin of the bad; and therefore, when kings were not to be appointed to punish the sins the wicked have committed, but for the advantage of the good and to preserve them from evil deeds, it would be beneficial for all kingdoms to be subject to one supreme ruler.
 (a) The people's request displeased God, not because they requested something bad, but because they asked with a bad will and a bad intention, to be in this respect like the unbelievers, and to avoid the rule of Samuel, who had ruled them most justly. (They alleged the wickedness of his sons only to hide their bad will, because they intended chiefly to throw off Samuel.)
(b) When kingship is beneficial and when not, though often hidden from men, is never hidden from God. Those petitioners displeased God because, without questioning him who had ordained that they should not be ruled by a king because he knew it would not be beneficial to them to have a king, they unwisely and impudently and unseasonably asked for a king -- though having a king is not as a rule bad, indeed it is good as a rule and bad on occasion.
 Because of the difference between the state of innocence and the state of fallen nature, the form of government more like the form of government that would have existed in the state of innocence is not always better in the state of fallen nature.
 Although what is against the law of nations is sometimes wicked, it is not always wicked: sometimes, indeed, it is equitable as a rule and wicked on occasion. (See above.) The law of nations is not the absolute natural law without any condition, qualification, determination, or specification, but is the natural law conditioned, qualified, or with some specification or determination. Therefore, even if one emperor is lord over all, wars, captivities, and intermarriages between foreigners may sometimes be in accordance with the law of nations and can therefore pertain to the natural law that is conditioned or qualified or with some specification or determination.
 (a) It would be permissible for believers to bear the yoke of believers with unbelievers and to have community and peaceful fellowship with them if they attempt nothing bad, and to have recourse with them to a believing judge to receive judgment; and therefore, even if it were not permissible for believers to be under an unbelieving emperor, it would be permissible for both unbelievers and believers to be under one believing emperor. (b) Second, because even if believers should not bear the same spiritual yoke with unbelievers, they can licitly bear with unbelievers the same temporal yoke. Believers can also licitly have community and peaceful society with unbelievers, as many saints did have, though not in sin and against God's honor. It is permissible also on occasion for believers to have recourse to an unbelieving judge to undergo judgment, on the example of many saints who did this. And thus it could on occasion be beneficial that even an unbelieving emperor should preside over all mortals. (c) Third, because it is accidental that some are believers and some unbelievers, for all mortals were believers once, and it could happen still.
 Although no one is adequate to the care of all without any danger, loss, and inconvenience to any subject, nevertheless many have a sufficiency for this care as much as the condition of fallen nature permits. For this reason it is more useful to the totality of mortals to be under one than under many. And thus, although no one is adequate to rule one kingdom, even a small one, without any shortcoming, it is more useful to a particular kingdom to be subject to one lord than to several.
The command to the king to meditate on divine law "all the days of his life" means "at suitable times". A king is not obliged to be as expert as a priest.
Another argument: priests (prelates) should excel not only in divine wisdom but also in human wisdom and skill in secular affairs, dist. 39, para. 1, and c. 1, and 16, q. 1, c. Nulli episcoporum. Therefore an ecclesiastic, because of a greater skill even in temporal matters, should rule over mankind.
Answer to this: Although it has often been appropriate, because of the wickedness or negligence of laymen, for ecclesiastics to undertake the management of certain temporal things, and they are therefore then obliged to have knowledge of secular affairs, yet they should not have the highest degree of skill in such affairs; middling skill is enough for them. Hence various canon law texts say that ecclesiastics should not try to master civil law, and 11, q. 1, c. Te quidem forbids entanglement in temporal affairs. Therefore, although on occasion, when a suitable layman is not found, an ecclesiastic could for a time undertake the care of all in temporal matters, this should not be tolerated as a rule.
Errors and faults in ruling come about not only from lack of skill but also from bad will and negligence. A ruler should take the advice of the wise, and no one should be made ruler unless he is likely to take good advice. One ruler is best: if there are several equal rulers there will be conflict among them, since human beings are inclined to conflict and to seek their own interests and not what belongs to the common good. It is easier for the people to correct or remove one ruler, if he goes astray. The one ruler can direct the advisers and impose due manner of seeking and disclosing truth, much better than those advisers could themselves if none of them had power over another; it is useful that one should preside over the deliberation.
Is an emperor of the world obliged to have the true and Catholic faith? That is, can someone be a true emperor who does not have the true and Catholic faith? Question postponed.
If he is a Catholic, is obliged to be skilled in divine Scripture? One opinion is that he should, just as a king in the Old Testament was obliged to have skill in sacred literature and to meditate on the divine law continually. It pertains to a Catholic emperor to defend the Christian faith and punish its attackers, but no one is obliged to defend what he does not know. Another opinion is that, although he it is better that he should be able to read Scripture and understand the literal sense, it is not simply necessary for him to have such skill, since without it he can usefully and justly control temporal matters, which alone pertain to the emperor.
Should the emperor be skilled in the civil laws? One opinion is that he should, since he is the supreme judge. Another opinion is that he need not, though it is very suitable and useful that he have such skill. Many emperors and kings who were just, and even saints, did not have skill in the civil laws, which they would have acquired if it had been obligatory. An emperor or king are not tied by the laws, as the inferior judges are.
Should an emperor or king be a student of Scriptures and the civil laws? It would be praiseworthy in an emperor and in a king to devote himself to such study as far as he could, but not so that he is kept from the care entrusted to him. To neglect his subjects or entrust the government of the empire or kingdom to another to apply himself to such study is reprehensible.
Should an emperor have outstanding knowledge of secular affairs? The requirements are skill in secular affairs, natural sense, discretion, natural activity, and judgment of reason. Natural sense and excellent judgment should generally be preferred to learning, command of language, eloquence, experience, and memory. After appointment an emperor or king should apply himself to skill in secular affairs and to knowledge of natural law (especially of natural law about which it is possible for even the learned to err or doubt), more than to Scripture or secular sciences or the laws.
Natural law "about which it is possible for even the learned to err or doubt": There are three kinds of natural laws (see also above). [a] Some are self-evident principles, or follow or are taken from such self-evident principles of morals; and about such natural laws no one can err or even doubt. Ignorance of such laws does not excuse, because even if we have never before thought of them, they occur to us immediately we are obliged to act in accordance with them, unless we decide without any deliberation and rule of reason, i.e. from negligence or contempt. [b] There are other natural laws that are drawn plainly and without great consideration from the first principles of the law, and ignorance of such natural laws does not excuse. [c] There are other natural laws that are inferred from the first natural laws by few even of the experts, with great attention and study, and through many intermediate propositions, about which even experts sometimes disagree. Ignorance of such a natural laws may excuse, unless it is affected or crass and supine. An emperor should diligently apply himself to acquire knowledge of natural laws of type [c], since the others will easily occur to him when needed. To acquire perfect skill in such laws and in secular affairs, he needs many wise advisers.
Seeking advice: Advice is sought (1) sometimes concerning secret matters dangerous to reveal except to faithful and discreet friends, (2) sometimes about public matters or matters that can be revealed without danger to the unfaithful, to enemies, and to the foolish; (3) sometimes it is sought to get agreement to make the decision more authoritative. (4) Sometimes advice is sought so that the one seeking advice may carry out the decision through the advisers. (5) Sometimes it is sought for information. (6) And sometimes it is sought to test the discretion, prudence, faithfulness, affection or good will of the advisers. In cases (1) and (4) the advisers should be few -- only those who are tested, faithful, friends and discreet. The text quoted above from Ecclesiasticus is to be understood of these two cases. In the other cases, the advisers should be many. Indeed it may not be absurd to seek advice even from the unskilled or malevolent, since sometimes a wise ruler will see what should be done from their answer, even when they are unwilling and intend to deceive.
Should an emperor be rigourous in enforcing justice? It is answered that an emperor should sometimes pass over justice completely, or defer it for a time; sometimes temper the rigor of justice with mildness; but sometimes carry out the rigor of justice. Can he inflict whatever penalty he chooses? Some say that he can, because the emperor is above all positive laws. Others say that although he is above positive law he is not above natural equity, and is bound to inflict a penalty in accordance with what is required by the common good and the safety of subjects.
Should the emperor keep promises? Some say he should not fulfill things promised badly and should rescind promises that turn out to be harmful, but should not in any way revoke other promises or postpone them without manifest reason. He should also take care not to assert or promise anything quickly or lightly unless he is certain that it should be asserted or promised.
Must the emperor be rich? Some say that the emperor must be able to coerce, and this requires riches because wealth secures supporters. Riches must be dispensed liberally, but not with prodigality.
Must the emperor have courage? The courage that is a virtue of the soul should be outstanding in an emperor, but physical strength is not so necessary and ranks after wisdom, justice and other virtues.
[Cf. Breviloquium, lib. IV]
Three opinions: (A) The Roman empire was established by God and not by men. (B) It was from men, that is from the Roman people. (C) A third is that the true Roman empire was from the pope, since it was legitmised when Constantine surrendered an illegitimate empire to the pope and received true empire back again.
*Opinion C: The Roman empire is from the pope.
[Cf. Octo quaestiones, q. 2]
 The pope can depose the emperor, according to gloss on dist. 96, Cum ad verum, the pope "deposes the emperor (15, q. 6, c. Alius and c. Iuratos".
Discussion of argument :
(a) Objection: 15, q. 6, c. Alius does not speak of the Roman emperor but of the king of the Franks. Student: If the kingdom of the Franks is from the pope the Roman empire is from the pope, because it is not a stronger argument for the kingdom of France than for the Roman empire. Master: Some say that the kingdom of France is more subject to the pope than is the Roman empire, since from ancient times the kingdom of France has been subject to the Roman empire. The Roman emperor could have committed jurisdiction for crime over the king of France to the Pope. Others say that by his papal authority the pope can depose neither the emperor nor the king of France except for heresy, yet with the authority of the Romans he could depose the emperor for certain other reasons and with the authority of the Franks he could depose the king of France for certain other reasons. The gloss on 15, q. 6, c. Alius on the word deposed says, "he is said to have deposed because he agreed with those who were deposing", that is by receiving the power of deposing from them. Others say that Pope Zacharias usurped a power that did not belong to him.
(b): Objection: 15, q. 6, c. Iuratos does not mention an emperor but a knight named Hugh, and the pope did not depose Hugh from his dignity or power but only ordered that his knights be enjoined not to serve him.
(c): Objection: Some say that the pope has no right to depose an emperor, because he has no greater power over the emperor than over kings [and he has no right to depose kings]. No greater power was given him by divine law. No greater power could be given by human law -- no authority less than the emperor could give it, and an emperor who gave it would have destroyed the empire, which no emperor has power to do.
 The keys of the heavenly and earthly empire were given to Peter and consequently to his successors: according Pope Nicholas, dist. 22, c.1, Christ "entrusted the rights over both the earthly and heavenly empire to blessed Peter".
Discussion of argument :
Objection: If the text of Nicholas is understood as those who adduce it understand it, absurdities and errors follow:
(a) Since Scripture does not say that Christ entrusted to Peter more power over the empire than over kingdoms, it would follow that all kingdoms are from the pope and no one is a true king unless he receives his kingdom from the pope, so most kings are not true kings. Student: It is enough if a king would resign his kingdom if the pope wanted. Master: According to Extra, Qui filii sunt legitimi, c. Per venerabilem, the king of France "does not recognise a superior in temporal affairs", so by argument 2 is not a true king. Some who believe that kings must recognise the pope's temporal superiority regard as heretics the King of France and other kings who do not, if they are pertinacious.
(b) It would follow that the heavenly empire is from the pope, because that text affirms that Christ entrusted to blessed Peter rights over the heavenly empire. If the text proves that the earthly empire is from the pope, it proves that the heavenly empire is from the pope.
Other interpretations of dist. 22, c.1: By heavenly empire Nicholas means the good people in the church militant and by earthly empire he means wicked people, over whom the pope is known to have power. Or it may be said that "rights over" does not mean lordship, and while the pope does have some right in the earthly empire when it is governed by a christian (because he has spiritual power and has the right of obtaining material things from the emperor to whom he ministers spiritually), the empire is not held from the pope.
 According to the gloss on dist. 10, c. Quoniam idem, the pope transferred the empire from the Greeks to the Germans, Extra, De electione, c. Venerabilem. The Roman empire, therefore, is from the pope.
Discussion of :
Objection: As certain people understand it, that argument implies the absurdity that the pope can transfer any kingdoms at all, of christians and others, from house to house and from people to people, just as he transferred the Roman empire from the Greeks to the Germans.
A basic point: Christ gave blessed Peter no special power over the Roman empire which he did not give him over any other kingdom. [Cf. Contra Benedictum, VI.xiii, p. 295.] First, in scripture wherever there is mention of power granted to blessed Peter there is no mention of special power over the Roman empire and no kingdom is excepted from his power. Second, when Christ gave Peter papal power, the kingdom of France and other kingdoms were parts of the Roman empire or subject to the Roman empire. Against: Perhaps some would say that while the kingdom of France was subject to the Roman empire, the pope had all the power over the kingdom of France that he had over the Roman empire, but not now that the kingdom of France is not subject to the Roman empire. Reply: (i) the pope should not be deprived of any power by the rebellion or exemption of the kingdom of France, (ii) the power which the pope has by Christ's decree can not be changed or removed from him by anyone inferior to Christ, (iii) and he who was pope after the rebellion or exemption of the king of France would not have been equal in power to the pope who preceded him and so would not have been a true successor.
Reply to argument : The basis of the pope's transfer of the empire was the same as the basis of his deposition of the king of France -- not by authority given by Christ, but (i) either by the authority of the Franks, who gave him such authority and power on that occasion (ii) or, as the gloss on the chapter Alius says, "because he agreed with those who were deposing". Similarly the pope did not transfer the empire from the Greeks to the Germans through authority given by Christ but (iii) either by the authority of the Romans who gave such power to him, or (iv) because he agreed with those who were transferring.
Student: To say that something has been done by the apostolic see means that it is done by power entrusted to the pope by Christ, not by some other power. But Venerabilem says that "the apostolic see" transferred the empire from the Greeks to the Germans, and therefore by the authority of the office entrusted to him by Christ. Master: Often what is done by the pope as a person [in whatever capacity] is said to be done by the apostolic see, and therefore because a pope exercising power granted by the Romans transferred the empire, the apostolic see is said to have transferred the empire.
 After he is elected the Roman emperor is examined, confirmed, anointed, consecrated and crowned by the pope and to him he swears an oath (Extra, De electione, c. Venerabilem, and dist. 63, Tibi domino.
Discussion of : One elected as emperor is examined by the pope not so that the pope may confer the empire on him but so that the pope, and others, do not treat as emperor someone not elected legitimately and not the true emperor. They say that in former times the emperor was not confirmed by the pope. If later on any emperor was confirmed by the pope, this resulted from the emperor's simplicity and humility, but he could not impose this law on his successor. Anointing, consecration and coronation do not show that the empire is from the pope, since other kings are anointed, consecrated and crowned by archbishops and bishops of their kingdoms and yet they do not have their kingdoms from them. The oath made by the emperor Otto was not the oath of fidelity and subjection which a vassal offers to his lord for the fief which he receives from him. Not all fidelity is that of vassal to lord. Although Otto gave the pope various undertakings, he did not swear the fidelity a vassal owes his lord, because the oath does not say that he will be faithful to him against every man until the last day of his life, as a vassal swears to his lord. Otto calls the pope "lord" not because the pope is his temporal lord but on account of the prerogative of office and dignity, just as secular lords often call even mendicants religious lords on account of the prerogative of sanctity and religion, not because they regard themselves as their vassals. Otto swore to Pope John of his own free will, and could not have been forced to an oath of that kind. The king of France and many other kings are not bound to swear to the pope unless they want to, and the emperor is no more bound than they are -- whereas a vassal is bound to swear to his lord, especially if it is demanded of him.
 The pope makes good the deficiency in the empire when there is a vacancy, Extra, De foro competenti, c. Licet.
Reply: The pope does not have authority from Christ to intervene in the temporal affairs in other kingdoms when there are vacancies and he is not the guardian of the under-age heirs. Similarly with the Roman empire. If he rightly intervenes, it is not by Christ's authority but by the authority of the Romans or of the electors.
 The pope has both swords, that is, the material and the spiritual one. Therefore, the empire is from him.
Reply: The pope does not have both swords -- 33, q. 2, c. Inter haec: "He only has the spiritual sword. He does not kill but restores to life." Student: The church only has the spiritual sword "with respect to execution", but has the material sword hidden as it were in its sheath and bestows it on the emperor to use it. (Christ said, "Put your sword back into its sheath.") The material sword belongs to the church but is deployed by the emperor, who at his coronation receives a sword sheathed and then draws it. Master: (i) The king of France and very many other kings do not receive the power of the sword from the pope. Therefore the emperor too does not receive the power of the sword from the pope. (ii) The power of the sword exists outside the church, for otherwise no pagan would have been a true prince. (iii) When Christ said to Peter, "Put your sword back in its sheath", Peter was not pope, for he became a shepherd after the resurrection. (iv) Other kings receive from archbishops or bishops the crown of their kingdoms by which royal authority and even temporal power are designated, but they do not have it from the archbishops and bishops, for they have all the power of the sword and of temporal administration before their coronation that they have after it. (v) The emperor-elect is crowned as a king before he is crowned as emperor by the pope. Every king, however, has the power of the material sword. Therefore before the emperor receives from the pope the sword held in its sheath he has the material sword, even with respect to its use.
 Christ gave Peter the power to bind and loose everything. Peter, therefore, could do everything, and consequently he could give the empire to the emperor. Innocent III says (Extra, De maioritate et obedientia, c. Solite), "the Lord said to Peter, and in Peter said to his successors, 'Whatever you bind on earth will also be bound in heaven' etc, excepting nothing in saying, 'Whatever'".
Reply: Many regard it as a heresy to say that the pope can do anything without any exception, even speaking about those things which can be done by man. This is because he can do nothing which is against divine law or natural law and because there are many things which are not against divine law or natural law that the pope can not do, many of which indeed can be done by others. For example, (i) he can not appoint the successor who is pope after him, (ii) he can not compel unbelievers to receive the faith, (iii) he can not (except for fault) compel anyone to enter religion or (iv) order anyone to maintain virginity. (v) He cannot command anything supererogatory. (vi) He cannot give a monk permission to have his own goods or marry. (vii) Without a reason the pope can not grant an exemption from a vow. (viii) He cannot alienate the estates and possessions of the church except for a reason and in the due manner. (ix) Pope Gregory rejected a constitution of his predecessor Pelagius, which ordered sub-deacons to promise chastity, as being ultra vires. What Pelagius commanded was not contrary to the gospel, but it was contrary to the gospel for him to impose it. Gregory's opinion implies that a pope can do nothing against the freedom and right of any christian, even in spiritual matters, except by reason of fault or for some clear cause. (x) A pope cannot force anyone to accept an office. (xi) He can not decree that he not be accused of heresy or of some other crime, since for heresy or crime he may be deposed. (xii) According to some people he can not compel someone to confess a sin which he has confessed to someone else who could absolve him. (xiii) The pope can not force someone to contract marriage. (xiv) The pope can not legitimate in temporal affairs, as is noted in Extra, Qui filii sunt legitimi, c. Per venerabilem, (xv) Outside the lands subject to his temporal jurisdiction the pope can not do those things which a temporal lord can do to his slaves, in so far as they are slaves.
Human beings are not all the pope's slaves, as they would be if the pope could do anything permitted by divine and natural law. Arguments: (i) Kings, princes and other laymen have ownership of temporal things, whereas a slave has no property. (ii) there is a difference between slaves of the church and of others. (iii) The pope does not have all the same power in the lands subject to his jurisdiction and in the others not subject to his temporal jurisdiction. (iv) There are some men who do not have principal lords. (v) If all men were pure slaves of the pope, the pope could at his pleasure alienate any temporal thing at all, but he cannot alienate the estates of the Church. (vi) The pope should not domineer over the clergy, who are therefore not his slaves.
 The empire was from Christ because he was not only a priest but he was also king of all temporal affairs, in token of which he did some things in so far as he was emperor and some in so far as he was a priest (gloss on dist. 10, c. Quoniam idem). The empire, therefore, is from the pope who is the vicar of Christ on earth.
Reply: (i) It is heretical to say that Christ, in so far as he was a mortal man, was a king in temporal affairs. (ii) A vicar does not always have all the power which the one whose vicar he is has.
 A priest of the old law was over kings (Jeremiah 1:10, "See I have set you this day over nations and over kingdoms"); much more, therefore, is the highest priest of the new law over the empire.
Reply: (i) The priest of the old law was not over the kings except in spiritual matters. (ii) The highest priest of the new law is unlike the highest priest of the old law. (iii) Jeremiah was priest, but not the highest priest, so it can not be proved from that text that the empire is from the highest priest of the new law without also proving that the empire is from a priest inferior to the highest pontiff, which is not true.
 Genesis 1:16, "God made the two great lights": Just as the moon receives light from the sun, therefore, so the emperor receives power from the pope.
Reply: The relationship between the empire and the highest priesthood is not the same in every way as that between the moon and the sun. (i) just as the moon is not from the sun but both are from God, so the empire would not be from the highest priesthood but both would be from another. (ii) Just as the moon has some strength and power which it does not have from the sun, namely over waters and fluids, so the emperor would have some power which he would not have from the pope. The similarity is that just as the sun is worthier and nobler than the moon, so the highest priesthood is worthier and more noble than the empire, just as spiritual matters are worthier than temporal ones. And just as the moon receives light from the sun, so the emperor, in many matters, in God's causes for instance, ought to receive direction from the pope, when he is catholic, good and wise.
 The church is one body; therefore it has one head. But the emperor is not the head. The pope, therefore, is the head of the church.
Reply: The pope is the head of the church, which is the congregation of the faithful, and therefore in spiritual matters the emperor submits to the pope. But the pope is not head in temporal matters.
*How opinion C is rejected
That opinion says two things. (i) the empire is from the pope, (ii) no empire can be a true one unless it is from the pope. Some people say that the first is false and the second heretical.
Why is (ii) heretical? It is contrary to scripture, since it is certain from divine scripture that many pagans were true emperors (e.g. Matthew 22:21 "Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's"). Unbelievers sometimes abuse such legitimate power, but it can not be inferred from this that the power is less true (Augustine 14, q. 5, c. Neque enim). Other scripture texts showing that there was true temporal lordship and true power of the material sword among unbelievers: Genesis 23:8-16 (Abraham buys a cave), Genesis 31:32,37,38 (Jacob denies taking Laban's property), Genesis 39:5 (God blessed an Egyptian's property), Genesis 41:35 (Joseph refers to pharaoh's authority), Genesis 47:20-1, 23 (a reference to Pharaoh's possessions), Deuteronomy 2:4-6, 9, 17-9 (God has given lordship over lands to certain unbelievers), 3 Kings 9:11 (Solomon gave cities to Hiram king of Tyre, which he would not have done if Hiram had been incapable of lordship), 3 Kings 19:15 (God ordered Elijah to anoint the infidel Hazael as king over Syria), 2 Chronicles 36:22-3 and 1 Ezra 1:2 (God moved Cyrus to proclaim that God had given him kingdom; cf. Isaiah 45:1), Tobit 2:20-1 (Tobit does not want to eat a kid stolen from his unbelieving neighbours), Daniel 2:37-8, 5:18 (Daniel says that God had given kingdom to Nebuchadnezzar), Matthew 2:1, Luke 1:5 (Herod was king of Judea), Matthew 17:25 (foreigners owe tribute to infidel kings), Luke 3:12-3 (tax collectors licitly received what was prescribed for them, although it had been prescribed by unbelievers), Matthew 3:14 (soldiers to receive wages from infidel princes, who must therefore have had lordship of what they were giving), John 19:11 (Pilate had power given from above), Romans 13:1 ("Let every person be subject to the governing authorities"), Romans 13:6,7 (Christians should pay their taxes to Caesar), 1 Corinthians 7:20-1, 1 Timothy 6:1-2 (acknowledge ownership of slaves on the part of unbelieving masters), Acts 16:37 and 22:25-7 (Paul claims the Roman citizenship granted by the Romans, so acknowledges their right), Acts 24:10 (Paul acknowledges the authority of a pagan judge), Acts 25:10-1 (Paul regarded Caesar as a true judge), 1 Peter 2:13-14 ("For God's sake accept the authority of every human being, whether of a king, as supreme, or of dukes, as sent by him"), 1 Peter 2:18 ("Slaves, accept the authority of your masters)
Testimonies of saints: 11, q. 3, c. Iulianus (Ambrose, "Although the emperor Julian was an apostate he nevertheless had under him Christian soldiers"), 11, q. 3, c. Ita corporis (Augustine, Christian soldiers recognised Julian as temporal lord).
Excursus on Julian: Objected that heretics and apostates like Julian can have no property, and Julian was merely tolerated. Answer: Heretics are deprived of property by a human law, which did not exist in Julian's time. The Church tolerated Julian as a true emperor, though it did not tolerate his attacks on Christians.
More testimonies of saints: the legend of St. Mauritius (who acknowledged that the unbeliever Maximianus as true emperor), the legend of Paul and John (who put God before Julian, but not another secular lord).
*Opinion A: The Roman empire was established by God, not by men.
Argument  Dist. 96, c. Si imperator, "He," that is the emperor, "has the privileges of his power which he acquired from heaven for the administration of public laws." The gloss on the words "from heaven" here says, "Not therefore from the pope. For the empire is from God alone, as in 23, q. 4, Quaesitum. For he has the power of the sword 'from the heavenly majesty' (Justinian, Codex, I.17.1), which I concede of a true emperor".
 Dist. 96, c. Si imperator, "... lest he strive to burst against him," that is God, "from whom he acquired his own power."
 Cyprian, dist. 10, c. Quoniam idem, and Pope Nicholas, dist. 96, c. Cum ad verum: "Jesus Christ... separated the duties of each power by its own acts and distinct dignities." The gloss says that Christ himself undertook both offices to show that "they came from the same source. For the law says that the highest gifts, that is the priesthood and the empire, have been granted to us by God".
 Pope Innocent, 23, q. 4, c. Quaesitum, "these powers were granted by God". Romans 13:1, "There is no power except from God."
Answer to these arguments: None of these texts excludes the possibility that God established the empire through men.
*Opinion B: The Roman Empire was established by God through the Roman people
*It was established by the people:
Argument  Gloss on dist. 17, para. Hinc etiam, "The emperor from the people". Gloss on dist 2, Lex est constitutio populi, "the people ... have transferred this power [of making laws] to the emperor."
 The Roman people subjected other nations to the Roman empire, chose the rulers of these subjugated people, changed the ways of ruling (1 Maccabees 8:1, 1 Maccabees 8:14,16). In trustworthy writings we read that they had sometimes kings, sometimes consuls, finally an emperor.
Student: The Roman's empire was not true but usurped. Master: (i) The Romans knew that it was necessary for the common good of the whole world that one emperor rule all people. As hinderers of the common good, opponents were therefore deprived of the power of making arrangements about the emperor, which fell to the Romans. (ii) Or, although for a long time the Romans unjustly forced others to be subject to them, nevertheless later others began to agree to the lordship of the Romans, and then the Roman empire became legitimate. (Did everyone have to agree? No, majority agreement was enough. Extra, De constitutionibus, c. Cum omnes, gloss.) Student: If the Roman empire was legitimate, whcy did Augustine censure them for their love of dominating? Master: If in making arrangements for the empire the Romans were moved solely by love of the common good and not by a love of dominating and vain glory or wealth or other corrupt intention, they would have been without sin, and perhaps some of them did not sin. Those whose intentions were corrupt deserved Augustine's censure. Student: An empire acquired with a corrupt intention was not a true empire. Master: A corrupt intention does not prevent the acquisition of true lordship.
Augustine says (23, q. 7, c. 1), "The lordship of all temporal belongs to the just". Some people say that this is sometimes misunderstood. Augustine does not mean that no sinner can have true lordship, so that whenever some king or other lord sinned mortally, true lordship of all his goods would pass to the just. Augustine means that only the just are worthy of lordship, and sinners possess unworthily.
Objection: Everything outside the Church builds toward hell (Romans 14:23, "Whatever does not proceed from faith is sin"), so before Constantine resigned it to the pope, the Roman empire was not a true empire. Constantine would not have resigned the empire to the pope unless he had perceived that he did not have before that a true empire. Answer: It is not true without exception that everything outside builds to hell, and unbelievers do not sin mortally in every act. "Whatever does not proceed from faith is sin" means that what is outside conscience is sin, whether it is done by a believer or an unbeliever. As for Constantime's resignation, they say that this is not found in ancient writings, although certain writings imply that Constantine gave imperial honour to the apostolic see. Out of piety and imperial munificence Constantine granted certain things to the pope, who did not have any of those temporalities except by Constantint's gift, not by the resignation of something previously held unjustly. Constantine never said that he did not have a true empire before his baptism.
*It was not established by the pope:
 A gloss on dist. 10, c. Quoniam idem: "It is argued that the empire is not had from the pope and that the pope does not have both swords. For the army makes the emperor, as in dist. 93, c. Legimus." This implies that the pope does not make the emperor because he is made by the army. (The army makes the emperor by the authority of the Roman people.)
 A gloss on Extra, Qui filii sunt legitimi, c. Causam: "There was an emperor before he began to receive his crown from the pope... because the empire existed before the apostolate."
Objection: These arguments may prove that the empire was not originally from the pope, but they do not prove that the empire is not now from the pope. Answer: Some people say that the arguments prove that the empire is not from the pope in so far as the pope is the vicar of Christ and the successor of blessed Peter.
 A gloss on dist. 10, c. Quoniam idem: "If it," that is the empire, "were had from him," that is the pope, "it would be licit to appeal to him in temporal matters. Alexander forbids this".
Objection: By that argument it has always been possible to appeal from the emperor, because the emperor has always had the empire from someone. Answer: Though it is usually not permitted to appeal from the emperor, it has always been permissible in some cases, just as it is possible to appeal from the pope if he is a heretic.
 A gloss on quonian idem: "Again, churches owe tribute to the emperor, as in 11, q. 1, c. Magnum". If the pope owes tribute to the emperor, the empire is not from the pope.
* Can the Roman Empire be transferred? If so, how and by whom?
It was transferred from the Romans to the Greeks, then to the Franks, then to the Teutons. It could be transferred in various ways, e.g. (i) so that it is no longer the Roman empire and the Romans have no particular right in the empire more than other nations, or (ii) so that it remains the Roman empire and the Romans have some particular right; (iii) so that the empire is given to someone whose descendants possess the Roman empire by right of succession, or (iv) so that the emperor is to be elected from a certain nation or people, or (v) so that the right to elect an emperor from any nation at all is given to some person or persons.
Principally the power of establishing and transferring the empire belongs to the totality of mortals. (Though the rest of the world could not transfer the empire from the Romans against their will without some fault of theirs or some clear reason.) Secondarily transfer is, according to one opinion, in the power of the Romans, because anyone can cede his right to another. But some think that the Romans could not transfer the empire from themselves so that they retain no particular right over the empire, because they cannot deprive future Romans of their right. Others think they could: although an agreement among individuals does not modify a public right, yet by the agreement and consent of the whole community the public right is modified, provided it is a positive and human right, not a divine or natural right.
Transfer of the empire to the pope: According to one opinion, the Romans transferred every right to the pope, and from then on the empire was from the pope and he had the material sword, though not "in execution": thus the apparent contrariety of many canons and very many glosses on the decrees and decretals is solved. But the Roman community could not transfer the rights of particular Roman persons or colleges, and it was the emperor who had the execution of the sword. Therefore the Roman community was not able to transfer to the pope the execution of the material sword. According to this opinion the pope does not have fullness of power.
The right the Romans did transfer to the pope was the power of electing the emperor or committing to others the power of electing him. What other rights they transferred can be discovered only by historical study. Unless he produces authenitic writings or other proofs, the pope should not be believed if he claims that the Romans transferred to him all their right over the empire.
Does custom prove his rights? Only in matters which the pope's interventions have been legitimate.
* Can the Roman Empire be divided or made smaller or even ruined or destroyed?
(i) Can it be simply ruined, so that the empire which now is the Romans' would by law remain neither with the Romans nor with others? No, since no one can decree that there should never again be an empire, even if it would be beneficial to the common good.
(ii) Can it be permanently transferred so that it would never come back to the Romans? One opinion is that it can, if they commit such a great fault that they can be deprived, themselves and all their descendants. Another opinion is that the descendants cannot be deprived for ever, since one day it might benefit the common good to transfer the empire back to the Romans.
(iii) Can the Roman empire be taken from the Romans, but so that it might come back to them? Yes.
Can the Roman empire be divided or made smaller? Some say not without the agreement of the whole human race, since the Roman empire belongs principally to the total community of mortals (just as the lordship of temporal goods does). If the empire were made smaller or divided some part of it would be alienated from the human community.
Can some part of the community of mortals be deprived of the right which it has in common over the empire? Yes, for fault. Some people say that through the fault of heretics, Jews and other unbelievers all rights in the empire fell to Christians, with the result that christians can freely dispose of the whole empire, just as the whole community have always been able to.
Is it permissible to renounce every right one has in common over the empire? Some say yes, just as the Friars Minor have licitly renounced every such right, because it is permissible to renounce every human and positive right. Others say no, because it is not permissible to renounce a public right, and a right of this kind which is held in common is a public right.
Arguments that they are: Many decrees and decretals and glosses seem to assert clearly that those powers are distinct; neither gets his power from the other.
 Dist. 96, c. Cum ad verum, "Since the truth has come, the emperor has not seized the rights of the pontificate for himself nor has the pontiff usurped the imperial name for himself." Here the gloss [on the word usurped col.466] says, "Argument: since those powers are separate, the emperor does not have his sword from the pope."
 Dist. 96, c. Duo sunt, "There are indeed, august emperor, two [powers] by whom this world is principally ruled, the sacred authority of bishops and royal power." Here the gloss on the word authority [col.468] says, "Neither depends on the other."
 Gloss on "quod ad regem" in Extra, Qui filii sunt legitimi, c. Causam, "Thus it is clear that temporal and spiritual jurisdiction are separate and distinct."
 Gloss on the word "administrationibus" in dist. 10, c. Imperium, "For their power is distinct from pontifical power."
 Extra, De privilegiis, c. Sicut, "Just as we do not want to disturb the privileges of the laity in their courts, so we want to resist with moderate authority those who are prejudicial to us." On which the gloss says, "There is an argument that the church does not want to arrogate to itself the rights of the other because its jurisdiction should be distinct."
 Extra, De iudiciis, c. Novit, "Let no one think that we intend to disturb or diminish the jurisdiction of the illustrious king of the Franks, since the latter neither wants nor ought to hinder our jurisdiction." If the power of the French king is distinct from the pope's, so much more the emperor's, because the emperor's power is greater, and because in Scripture no power is given to the pope over the emperor and not over the French king. Hence the gloss: "... neither the church nor the pope has both swords. ... Therefore the pope should not involve himself in temporal jurisdiction except ... when a secular judge is negligent."
 Dist. 10, c. Quoniam, Christ distinguised the duties of each power "by its own acts and distinct dignities". The gloss here on the word "distinguished" says, "Since those powers are distinct, therefore, there is here an argument that the empire is not obtained from the pope. ... I believe that those powers are distinct, although sometimes the pope assumes both powers to himself."
*The pope has power in spiritual matters, the emperor in temporal matters.
 Extra, De maioritate et obedientia, c. Solitae, "... in temporal matters the emperor rules ... the pope is superior in spirtual matters".
 Dist. 10, c. Quoniam idem, and dist. 96, c. Cum ad verum say that the powers were distinguished "so that christian emperors needed pontiffs for eternal life and pontiffs made use of imperial laws in the course of temporal affairs only, so that spiritual acts were separate from carnal".
 Dist 10, c. Denique, speaks of "people allowed to command human affairs only and not divine affairs" and those "by whom divine matters are managed".
 Dist. 10, c. Suscipitis, Gregory Nazienzanus writing to the emperors in Constantinople says, "... the law of Christ has subjected you to priestly power... he gave us a rule more perfect than your sovereignty. ... heavenly affairs ... earthly affairs, ... human affairs ... divine affairs"
 Extra, De maioritate et obedientia, c. Solitae, "For the Church... God... established two dignities, pontifical authority and royal power. [the former] over spiritual affairs... [the latter] over carnal affairs
*Examples of the distinction between temporal and spiritual matters
Some distinctions: (i) Some men are spiritual, some carnal or natural (1 Corinthians 2 and 3. "The man who is natural, however, does not perceive those things which are from God's spirit ... He who is spiritual judges all things and is himself judged by no one"). (ii) Some people are ecclesiastical and some are secular (Jerome, 12, q. 1, c. Duo sunt, "There are two kinds of christians. There is one kind who are devoted to the divine office and for whom it is appropriate, since they are dedicated to contemplation and prayer, to stand back from all the din of temporal affairs, namely those who are clerics and those who are faithful to God as monks. ... The other kind of christians is the laity. For laity is Greek for people. It is permissible for them to possess temporal goods"). (iii) Some goods are ecclesiastical, some are secular (12, q. 1, c. Episcopus c.23, "Let the bishop have power over ecclesiastical goods"). (iv) Some cases are ecclesiastical and some are secular (11, q. 1, para. 1, in the gloss). (v) Some offences are ecclesiastical and some are secular (ibid.). (vi) Some penalties are ecclesiastical or canonical, others are secular or legal. (vii) Some judges are secular and some are ecclesiastical. (viii) Some affairs are secular and some are spiritual (2 Timothy 2:4, "No one serving as a soldier of God gets entangled in secular affairs"). (ix) Some dignities are secular, some ecclesiastical. (x) Some laws are secular and some are ecclesiastical (dist. 3, para. 1, "one constitution is civil, another ecclesiastical") (xi) Some jurisdiction is temporal and some spiritual (see chapter 1 above).
*Definition of spiritual and temporal powers
These are examples. What is the difference? Some say that when we speak of the power of clergy and laity, temporal affairs mean the matters that pertain to the rule of the human race considered purely naturally without any divine revelation, spiritual affairs mean matters that pertain to the rule of the faithful in so far as that rule is drawn up by divine revelation. Whatever under pagan rulers pertains to the worship of false gods and to wickedness is neither temporal nor spiritual, but superstitious.
*Are all parts of the world subject to the Roman Emperor in temporal matters?
Opinion 1: Affirmative
[For "some glosses on the decrees and decretals which maintain that opinion" we are referred to chapter 3.2 Dial. 1.26, but nothing relevant has been found there, or elsewhere.]
[a] Dist. 63, c. Hadrianus, gloss on per singulas provincias: "Therefore there is one emperor in France and in Spain [and by equal reason in all other countries]... since they do not prove that they are exempt... Let us confess therefore that the emperor is lord of the world". All kingdoms of both believers and unbelievers are therefore subject to the emperor de iure, although not de facto.
[b] Extra, De electione, c. Venerabilem, gloss on in Germanos: "There is an emperor over all kings ... and all nations are under him... For he is the prince and lord of the world... And even the Jews are under him... and all provinces... And everything is in the power of the emperor".
[c] Dist. 1, c. Ius Quiritum, gloss: "The Jews use Roman law and are called Romans ... For the emperor is prince of all the world".
[d] 23, q. 8, c. Convenior, gloss on omnia: "everything belongs to the emperor".
It is clear that many people have the opinion that the emperor of the Romans is the lord and prince of the whole world. Argument for that opinion:
 The whole world was once subject to the Roman empire and the Roman empire has not been deprived of any lordship over any kingdom which was subject to it.
That the whole world was subject is attested by Luke 2:1: "A decree went out from Emperor Augustus that all the world should be registered." Also Constantine, dist. 96, c. Constantinus [the Donation]: "We decree that" the see of Rome "should have rule over all the other churches of God throughout the whole world. ... until the end of the world. We call on ... all people throughout the whole world, now and forever"; all people were subject to him de iure, though not de facto.
Argument that the Roman empire has not been deprived: If the Roman empire was deprived of the right and lordship which it had over any kingdom or province it was deprived either by right or by a person: not by right, because no one has the right, either divine or human, of such a deprivation; not by a person because no one inferior to the emperor, who was the lord of the world, could deprive the emperor of such right and lordship. Objections: (i) The Roman empire could be deprived of this right and lordship by the power of kingdoms rebelling, just as the Romans' empire was acquired by the power of the sword. (ii) By his negligence and fault the emperor of the Romans could have lost the right and lordship he had over many other kingdoms. If the emperor has treated some kingdoms unjustly, or has not defended them in their necessity, he has justly lost the right and lordship which he had over them. (iii) Rights are removed by prescription. Other kingdoms, therefore, could have prescribed against the empire. Answers: (i) Although a great part of the world was subjugated to the Roman empire by the power of the sword, afterwards they all willingly agreed to be subjected to that same empire. (ii) There does not seem to have been so great a fault that the Roman empire should have been deprived of its right and lordship over any kingdom. If there was, the empire should not have been deprived of its right without the decision of the totality of mortals or of their representatives, and no such decision against the Roman empire has ever been asserted. (iii) It does not seem that anyone ever has prescribed against the Roman empire in this matter, because no one could in good faith remove himself from the Roman empire. Also, no one can prescribe against the lordship of the Roman empire, because prescription is by imperial law, and no emperor has ever made a law or statute that someone could prescribe in this way against the Roman empire.
Argument  What the pope approves we also ought to approve and hold as true (dist. 19, c. Si Romanorum). But the pope seems to approve the assertion of the Franks and others who assert that they are not subject to the Roman empire (Extra, De privilegiis, c. Super specula); he should have rejected their assertion if it is false.
 Saints canonised by the church should not be believed to have given way to mortal sin or blameworthy rebellion or any wrong. But there have been many saintly kings (e.g. St Louis) who have not recognised the emperor as their superior in temporal affairs and have finished their days with this opinion. Student: Perhaps they were ignorant. Master: Kings and princes are bound to know whether they have a superior or not, and ignorance of what one is bound to know does not excuse. They should have sought to learn from others if they did not know themselves. Student: Perhaps they did not find learned men who would instruct them in this, because many learned men desire the destruction of the Roman empire more than its exaltation. They were not obliged to make exceptional inquiries. Master: Kings and princes especially ought to be greatly solicitous of the common good, and the common good of the whole human race depends on the Roman empire.
 The pope should instruct the laity. If all mortals are subject by right to the Roman empire, kings and princes who refuse to be subjected to the Roman empire are acting against justice, and the pope should instruct them. Even many holy popes did not do so. Student: (i) Perhaps the popes did not know that all mortals should be subjected to the Roman empire, since this pertains to civil law, which they are not bound to be learned in or to teach. (ii) Perhaps the popes perceived that kings would not accept the teaching. Master: (i) It is not probable that the popes did not know it, if it is true. Although the pope is not bound to have an excellent knowledge of the civil law, he ought not be wholly ignorant of such an important obligation. (ii) It was not evident that all the laity who did not subject themselves to the Roman empire were so obstinate that they would refuse to be informed of the truth. They should at least have tested whether they would listen. There were many holy kings and princes and many other laity who loved justice and the common good of the church and hated all injustice, who would have been prepared to be informed about any matter of justice.
 Those who are in truth subject in law to the Roman empire but refuse to be subject possess nothing justly--no one subject to the emperor or to a king possesses anything justly except by the law of the emperor or the king (Augustine, dist. 8, c. Quo iure, and 23, q. 7, c. 1). If so, they cannot give alms, and eccleciastics sin if they receive them.
 According to canon law, there are many people who do not have a superior; yet this would not be true if all who are secular were subject to the emperor ((i) Extra, De hereticis, c. Excommunicamus; (ii) Extra, Qui filii sunt legitimi, c. Per venerabilem; (iii) gloss on Extra, De foro competenti, c. Ex transmissa).
Student: The gloss on Per venerabilem asserts that the king of France is by right subject to the Roman empire. Also, someone can have a superior even if he does not recognise this. Master: The text of (ii) implies that the king of France truly and justly does not recognise a superior. The gloss seems opposed to its text.
Answer to argument : (i) Excommunicamus talks about those who do not de facto have principal lords. (ii) Per venerabilem refers to a time when the emperor did not assert his authority over France, and because of the mistake or negligence of the emperor the pope can in such a case exercise jurisdiction over the king of France, not by means of the authority given to him by Christ but by means of that which he obtains from custom. The pope has this power not because the king of France falsely and unjustly does not recognise the lordship of the emperor but because the emperor neglects his own rights or does not know what rights he has over the king of France and all other laymen. For just as an ecclesiastical judge can intervene in secular jurisdiction when a secular judge neglects to do justice (Extra, De foro competenti, c. Ex tenore and c. Licet in the gloss), so in many cases the pope can make good the negligence or ignorance of the emperor towards his subjects.
Student: If the pope can make good the negligence or ignorance of the emperor by exercising temporal jurisdiction over the king of France, by the same argument he could deprive the emperor of the right and lordship which the emperor has over the king of France. Master: The pope cannot deprive the emperor of his right and lordship, just as he can not destroy the empire. Student: Can the emperor release the king of France from subjection to the empire? Master: Not totally, because this would be to destroy the empire.
Answer to (iii): The gloss is talking about a layman who does not have a superior de facto, although de iure every layman, both unbelieving and believing, is under the emperor.
Answers to arguments of chapter 6:
 We should approve what the pope approves using his papal authority in defining and determining it in a just and catholic way, otherwise not. We do not find, however, that any pope in a definition and determination approved the claim that all the provinces of the world should be subject to the Roman empire. If some pope had approve this he would not have approved it justly.
Student: (i) According to that reply we are not more bound to approve what the pope approves than what any bishop or any expert in the sacred scriptures approves, because we ought to approve all justice and everything which is catholic. (ii) If we are not bound to approve what the pope decides, then we could condemn it, contrary to a constitution [Redemptor noster] that forbids anyone to approve or condemn either side of a question referred to the pope -- still more something decided by the pope. Master: (i) We ought to approve what a pope approves more, because when a pope approves something, then, unless we are sure that he is in error, we ought not before others deny or doubt it. (ii) If the pope errs against the faith or good morals or against justice, even if this is in a definition and determination, and this is certain to us, we can and ought to condemn him openly. Even if some question of faith begins to be discussed in the curia anyone who is certain about its truth from scripture or the catholic determinations of the Church can and ought to assert the true side and condemn the false side. Some say that the constitution [Redemptor noster] is the worst of heresies.
Excursus on Redemptor noster: They say that the constitution means that the pope dominates christian faith, that the whole of christian faith which christians are bound to believe depends on papal approval, definition and determination, that no christian should firmly believe anything pertaining to faith before he is certain that the pope at the time holds and approves it. Nothing would be certain and unchangeable in the whole of christian faith, all of it would depend on the will of the pope. He could destroy the gospel and the whole scripture and create a new opposed scripture to which all christians would have to adhere, as long as the pope wished it, all of which afterwards his successor could change. Nothing worse than this could be said against the Christian faith.
 Because the emperor has not demanded recognition by kings, those who would have been prepared to recognise him as their superior if this had been clearly showed to them were sufficiently excused by ignorance. Kings ought to be to the highest degree solicitous for the common good, but they are not concerning things not easily known, especially when wise men do not advise it. Many kings and princes and many other laymen could not easily know that they are subject to the empire, and the emperor did not demand it, and wise men did not advise them to be solicitous about it, and many held to be wise asserted the opposite. So they are excused by ignorance.
 Although the pope should instruct and teach kings and princes about those matters that pertain to the faith, justice and good morals, they are not bound to instruct them about all such matters, because they can not, and no one is under an obligation to the impossible. It was enough to instruct them about things more useful and necessary for their own times. They were therefore not bound in those times to instruct them about subjection to the Roman empire, especially since the emperors did not demand recognition.
 Many who are de iure subject to the Roman empire, but refuse to be subjected to it, possess their possessions justly, because they are possessors in good faith. And when it is said that such people possess nothing by the emperor's law, the reply is that in a certain manner they are possessors even by the emperor's law, because as possessors in good faith they can possess many things even by the authority of imperial laws and as time passes can acquire true lordship.
 The same person should not be punished for the same crime by different judges not answerable to the same ruler, because a dangerous struggle and dissension could arise among the judges, each wanting to drag the criminal to his own court. But it does belong to an ecclesiastical judge to punish some secular crimes (e.g. adultery, regarded as a crime even among unbelievers, which ecclesiastical judges should punish, according to Extra, De officio iudicis ordinarii, c. Perniciosa). Therefore the emperor should not punish the same people for those crimes.
 Extra, De iudiciis, c. Novit, "It pertains to our office to correct every christian for any mortal sin at all and, if he disdains correction, to curb him through an ecclesiastical penalty." We gather from these words that every christian should be punished for any crime by an ecclesiastical judge.
 24, q. 3, c. Si quis Romipetas, "If anyone tries to seize pilgrims to Rome and pilgrims and visitors to the tombs of the apostles and to the oratories of other saints or to despoil them of the goods they are carrying and to annoy merchants with novel exactions of tolls and taxes (which are secular crimes), let him be deprived of christian communion until he has made satisfaction."
 24, q. 3, c. Itaque, "And so we have considered that murderers and false witnesses (secular crimes) should be removed from ecclesiastical communion unless they have cleansed themselves of the crimes committed by the reparation of penance."
 Ecclesiastical judges punish arson (23, q. 8, c. Pessimam), infanticide (Extra, De iis qui filios occiderunt, c. De infantibus), those who engage in tournaments (Extra, De torneamentis c. Felicis, and c. Ad audientiam), and archers (Extra, De sagittariis, c. 1), and debauchery (Extra, De adulteriis et stupro, c. 1) and adultery (Extra, De adulteriis, passim), and abductors (Extra, De raptoribus, c. 1), which are all secular crimes. Secular crimes, therefore, should be punished by an ecclesiastical judge.
This also seems provable from scripture:
 Matthew 18:15-7, "If your brother sins against you... If he refuses to listen even to the church, let him be to you as a gentile and a tax gatherer." It pertains to the Church to correct every christian even for sins which are committed against a neighbour and which are certainly secular.
 1 Cor. 6:3 the apostle rebuked the Corinthians because they were litigating before unbelieving judges who were secular and because they were abandoning the judgement of the church which ought to judge between brother and brother even about secular matters. He said, "Do you not know that we are to judge angels - to say nothing of secular matters?"
That opinion makes two assertions. (i) it pertains to a secular judge to punish criminals of this kind; (ii) this does not pertain to an ecclesiastical judge.
(i) It pertains to a secular judge:
 Speaking of secular powers Paul says, Romans 13:3-4, "For rulers are not a terror to good conduct but to bad. ... if you do what is wrong, you should be afraid, for the authority does not bear the sword in vain."
 Peter 1 Peter 2:13-4, "For the Lord's sake accept the authority of every human institution, whether of the king as supreme, or of dukes as sent by him to punish those who do wrong."
 23, q. 5, c. Incestuosi, "Many committers of incest, parricides and murderers are found among us, but some of these refuse to give their ear to the warnings of priests, wanting to persist in their original crimes. It is fitting that these be restrained from such wicked habits by the discipline of a secular power."
 23,q. 5, c. Rex, "The king should restrain thieves, punish adulteries, eliminate the impious from the land, not permit parricides and perjurers to live, and not allow their sons to act impiously."
(ii) It does not pertain to an ecclesiastical judge:
 Augustine, 23, q. 5, c. Sunt quaedam, "There are some immensely shameful acts which are punished by judges from the world rather than by priests and rulers of churches...".
 All secular crimes should be punished by the same judge. But some secular crimes, which should be punished by death, the cutting off of a limb or the shedding of blood, are not judged by an ecclesiastical judge (as various canons say).
 Punishment of secular crimes is reckoned among secular cares and occupations. But secular cares and occupations are forbidden to ecclesiastical judges (2 Tim. 2:4; dist. 88, c. 3; dist 88, c. 6; 21, q. 3, c. Hi qui; and many others -- dist. 88, c. 6, "Let a bishop... occupy himself only with reading, prayer and the word of preaching.")
 The right order of the judiciary is thrown into confusion if the power of each judge is not preserved. Anyone who judges those who concern another judge is confusing the right order of the judiciary. Canon law abominate this (dist. 96, c. Cum ad verum; Extra, De iudiciis, c. Novit; Extra, De privilegiis, c. Sicut in iudiciis). Therefore, since those who are entangled in secular crimes should be punished by a secular judge, an ecclesiastical judge should not punish them, just as the pope leaves secular cases to secular judges so that he is not seen to detract from their rights (Extra, Qui filii sunt legitimi, c. Causam, and c. Lator; Extra, De foro competenti, various chapters; Extra, De appellationibus, c. Si duobus, on which the gloss says, "And it is clear from this that temporal jurisdiction does not belong to the church, which should not involve itself to the prejudice of a secular judge").
Two kinds of punishment or correction belong to the church, one penetential, the other contentious. The first belongs to an ecclesiastical judge with respect to any christian for any sin; many of the texts should be understood of that, and none of the texts denies it. The second punishment or correction of secular crimes belongs to an ecclesiastical judge in three cases: (i) when criminals are subject to the temporal jurisdiction of an ecclesiastical judge; (ii) when there is no secular judge or the secular judge is negligent; and (iii) when a secular judge cannot impose any penalty but an ecclesiastical judge can (when the transgressor is unknown the secular judge cannot punish but the ecclesiastical judge can excommunicate)
Discussion of case (ii):
Are there other cases when secular crimes are subject to an ecclesiastical judge?
It seems so: Extra, De foro competenti, c. Licet, gloss on "vacante imperio": "... when a superior is not found... when a secular judge neglects to do justice ... when something is doubtful and difficult and there are differences among judges ... in connection with any ecclesiastical crime... when a case is referred to an ecclesiastical judge by denunciation of the crime". And the gloss on De donationibus inter virum et uxorem, c. De prudentia: there are three cases in addition to the ones cited above, that is the third related here and a fifth and sixth.
Reply: In certain cases an ecclesiastical judge can involve himself in secular cases by instructing, advising and even ordering, but can not punish, even if no secular judge is available, and can not even pronounce a definitive sentence. If one understands the gloss thus, it is in accord with the truth; otherwise it contradicts the various canons: Extra, De foro competenti, c. Ex transmissa; Extra, De foro competenti, c. Ex tenore.
Reply to the gloss: In the third case, the truth of which can not be judged except by the scriptures, the pope should not make definitive judgment of the case but should indicate the truth by teaching, advising and even instructing. if the secular judge will do justice. But if the secular judge is unwilling or unable to do so, the highest pontiff can pronounce a just sentence, but in certain cases, namely in cases of blood, he should entrust this to someone else. Innocent III, in Per venerabilem, quotes Deuteronomy 17:8-9, "they shall announce to you the decision in the case." Difficult and doubtful judgement can appear in cases of blood, and recourse should be had to the pope for cases of blood, but not so that he may carry judgement into effect in cases of blood, but so that he may indicate in general what kind of judgement should be carried into effect by secular judges in such cases. In any secular cases, therefore, civil or criminal, that are difficult or doubtful, recourse should be had to the pope so that he may indicate the truth about the judgement -- not by definitive judgment but by teaching, advising and, if it necessary, directing. It would be enough to have recourse to anyone well-informed in scripture, if the secular judge were prepared to do justice once he had learnt the truth about the judgement. But because secular judges may refuse to hear or accept the truth or refuse to do justice, it may be necessary to have recourse to the pope, who has power to direct secular judges and make good their negligence or malice. He has this power either from Christ, or by reasonable and ancient custom.
Student: Per venerabilem seems to say that the pope should not merely teach etc. but may exercise temporal jurisdiction. Master: Just as it seems that some other words of Innocent in that same decretal should be expounded as it were violently so that they may be saved from heretical wickedness, so these words too should be expounded soundly so as not to prejudice the rights of the emperor and other laymen. [There follows an excursus on Innocent's comments on Deuteronomy, "which smack of manifest heresy unless they are violently expounded".]
How opinion 3 answers the texts on the other side:
 Perniciosa means adulterers who are clerics; or it means all adulterers when secular judges are negligent.
Student: The crime of adultery pertains to the same judge to whom matrimonial cases pertain; but matrimonial cases pertain to an ecclesiastical judge (gloss on Extra, De foro competenti, c. Ex tenore). Master: Adultery and matrimony belong in some ways to ecclesiastical judges, in some ways to secular, since matrimony is found among both believers and unbelievers. In so far as matrimony is based on divine law it pertains an ecclesiastical judge, and in so far as it is based on the law of nature, to a secular judge. And if it is not against the law of nature, therefore, that one man should have many wives, but only against divine and ecclesiastical law, second marriages should not be punished by secular judges but only by ecclesiastic.
 In Novit Innocent says that it pertains to his office to reprove any christian for any mortal sin. But it does not always pertain to him to punish any christian for mortal sin in a civil court, because this would totally absorb the power of secular judges. However, when someone reproved for a mortal sin disdains the reproof and there is no secular judge to punish his crime, the pope can restrain him with an ecclesiastical penalty, and it is of this case that Innocent is speaking. Even if there is a secular judge who punishes the crime, the pope can also punish for the disdain.
Student: Even if the pope punished every christian for every mortal sin, the power of secular judges would not be totally absorbed, because there are two kinds of penalty: even if a criminal is punished with a canonical penalty by an ecclesiastical judge, he could for the same crime be punished with a secular penalty by a secular judge. Master: This seems altogether irrational to many people because no one should be crushed with a double penalty when one is enough (Extra, De iudiciis, c. At si clerici).
, ,  hold when secular judges are negligent in punishing such crimes, or when miscreants are concealed so that they can not be convicted in court.
 Various replies are offered: (i) It is understood of when a secular judge is negligent in doing justice. (ii) "Church" here means not clerics particularly but the gathering of believers, comprising clerics and laymen. For it is said that in the whole of divine scripture the word church does not stand particularly for clerics, although it is often taken in that way in canon law. (iii) No power to punish sinners is given to the church by those words, but only the power to reprove, without any other punishment. Argument for this: Believers are not permitted to harm the emperor by usurping his power of punishing the guilty, just as Christ did not want believers to wrong an unbelieving emperor by denying him tax (Matthew 22:21, "Render to Caesar that which is Caesar's").
 Paul does not mean to forbid the Corinthians from being judged by unbelievers in every case, nor is he intending to assert that only believers should judge secular matters, and therefore he is not rebuking all those who in any case at all sought the judgement of unbelievers. He is rebuking only those believers who indiscriminately, maliciously or scandalously want to be judged by unbelievers and enemies. He wants them to attempt conciliation, and if that fails litigate before a mutually accepted arbitrator (a Christian), and only then litigate before an unbelieving judge. Paul himself did not flee from the judgement of Caesar (Acts 25:10-11).
The texts of chapter 11 do not seem to be opposed to the third opinion.
Answers to texts of Chapter 12:
They are conclusive when secular judges are not found to be negligent in the punishment of secular crimes. If laymen did their duty, it would be appropriate for clerics to leave everything of this kind, even the arranging of ecclesiastical possessions, to laymen, and fulfil to the letter the canons adduced in chapter 12, and devote themselves only to the preaching of the word, to reading and to prayer.
No one should obey him in unlawful and unjust matters. Even in lawful matters, subjects do not sin if they disobey him in something that does not belong to his office, but in things that pertain to the government of people in temporal affairs, everyone is bound to obey him.
Which should be obeyed in case of conflict, the national government or the emperor? Just as, according to many people, the pope the pope is the direct head of all christians in spiritual matters and is to be obeyed more than any inferior authority, so the emperor is the direct lord of everyone in temporal affairs and should be obeyed before anyone else in matters that pertain to the government of mankind. Augustine holds this.
Student: (i) This would make everyone equally the emperor's slave, or equally free. (ii) It would be lèse-majesté to support one's lord in war against the emperor. Master: (i) This does not follow. Subjects are not bound to obey the emperor in everything, but only in things that pertain to the government of the people, i.e. in things necessary for ruling the people subject to him justly and beneficially. The emperor's slaves and those who are free are not bound to obey him equally; his servants are required to obey even if he cannot allege common benefit, but in some matters (e.g. surrender of property) the free need not obey unless it is necessary to the common good. It would detract from the dignity of the human race if all were slaves of the emperor. (ii) It is true that anyone who takes part in an unjust war against the emperor is guilty of lèse-majesté. Student: According to Augustine, even if a war is unjust one who takes part may not sin, if it is not evident to him that it is unjust (23, q. 1, c. Quid culpatur). Master: True, as long as they are not guilty of a negligent and crass ignorance. But if they go to war with an inferior lord against a superior lord, and especially against the emperor who is their direct lord, they are not excused even if they do not know the war is unjust, because they should presume in the emperor's favour. Unless they are certain that their inferior lord has a just war against the emperor, they are not absolved of the crime of lese-majeste.
Argument  The emperor is not the lord of those things which are not among the goods of anyone and which are granted to the one taking possession of them (dist. 1, c. Ius naturale).
 A lord can sell if he wishes (1, q. 1, c. Eos qui), but there are many temporal things that the emperor can not sell, nor indeed alienate, because then he could sell and alienate the empire, and he can not.
 Emperors have made many gifts to others, and of these the emperor is no longer lord.
 An emperor who captures booty in a just war has a particular portion (dist. 1, c. Ius militare). Therefore the emperor is not the lord of the other portions.
 The things of the fisc are the emperor's property (Extra, De iudiciis, c. Cum venissent, gloss). But the things of the fisc are distinguished from other things, because things of certain people only, and not of all people, are particularly confiscated.
 It is not the case that all things are common; some things are property. But if all things were the emperor's property, no one else would have property -- no one could say "This is mine".
 (i) Divine law does not make everything the emperor's: no where in the scripture do we read that God gave the emperor lorship of everything. (ii) The emperor is not lord of all things by the law of nature, because by the law of nature everything is common; (iii) nor by human law, because human laws are the laws of the emperors (dist. 8, c. Quo iure [c.1, col.12]), and the emperor could not appropriate to himself the lordship of the things that belong to others.
Argument  Since the emperor is the lord of the whole world, he is the lord of everything which is in the world.
 Since the emperor is the lord of all men (except perhaps clerics) he is the lord of their possessions.
 Since everything is in the emperor's power, he is the lord of all temporal things, because temporal things seem especially to lie in the power of a lord.
 The emperor is as much lord as a king. But a king is lord of all the things which belong to those who are of his kingdom (1 Kings 8:10-17, "... you shall be his [the king's] slaves.")
 Further, the emperor is as much a lord as ancient unbelieving kings. But the things within the kingdoms of unbelieving kings were theirs (Genesis 14:16,21-3: Abraham regarded the things he brought back as belonging to the king of Sodom, though many of them belonged to the king's subjects; cf. Ambrose 23, q. 5, c. Dicat).
The emperor is not the lord in the sense that he can do what he wishes with all temporal things, yet he is to a certain extent lord of everything, since he can use all things against anyone's objection for the common benefit, whenever he sees that the common benefit should be preferred to a private benefit.
With (i) things that are particularly the emperor's property, the emperor can do what he wishes with them (sell, give, bequeath, etc.) without being bound to make any restitution. But (ii) some immovable things he can not alienate, just as he can not alienate the empire and kingdoms the alienation of which would redound to the notable detriment of the empire, and if he were in fact to alienate them, such an alienation would not hold in law but everything should be resumed into the right of the empire, and he himself would be bound to make restitution if he could. He is lord of such things to a certain extent, however, in so far as he can appropriate and defend them and use them for the common benefit, and no one else has any right in them. He also has lordship (iii) of others' property, in so far as he can remove their property from them for a reason, for the common benefit or because of an offence committed by those possessing them, and he can appropriate them for himself or can present them to others. But because he can not do this just as he pleases, he does not have as full a lordship and right in them as in (i).
Replies from viewpoint of opinion 3 to arguments for opinion 1.
 After God's the principal lordship of those things that are among no one's goods is in the possession of the whole human race, because God gave lordship of all temporal things to our first parents for themselves and their descendants. The emperor is to some extent the lord of all such things in so far as he can appropriate them to himself for the common benefit, so that they are not granted to the one using them, except at the will of the emperor. He cannot appropriate them simply at pleasure: he must leave to the one using them things which are among no one's goods, unless for some offence or for some reason for the common benefit he sees that he should appropriate them for himself.
 The lord who has fullest lordship and right can sell them if he wants to, and the emperor does not have such lordship with respect to all temporal goods but only some.
 People often give things and yet retain principal lordship for themselves.
 Although the emperor has a fuller right in the special portion assigned to him, he is nevertheless to some extent lord of the other portions in so far as he can take them to himself for the common benefit.
 Although the emperor has a fuller right in the things of the fisc, for the above reasons he has lordship in some way in all other things too.
 The emperor is not lord of all temporal things in the same way. Therefore all things are not common, nor are they the emperor's property. Yet the emperor is to some extent lord of these things in so far as he can remove them from others for the common benefit.
 The emperor is the lord of everything in the above ways by human law. Human laws have sometimes not been the laws of the emperors, because there were human laws before there were laws of the emperors; therefore the emperor is not lord of everything through the law of the emperors, but is to a certain extent lord of everything through the law of the people, by which the people transferred such lordship to the emperor, so that he can use and manage things for the common benefit.
Replies from viewpoint of opinion 3 to arguments for opinion 2.
 The emperor is not lord of the whole world in the sense that he can do whatever he pleases. Everyone is bound to obey him in those matters which pertain to the common good. This does not make him lord of all temporal things, except in the ways referred to above in chapter 23.
 The emperor is to a certain extent the lord of all the things belonging to those subject to him, because he can use them for the common benefit, although not at his own pleasure without reasonable grounds.
 Everything is in the power of the emperor because he can take everything to himself, for the common benefit and not otherwise.
 A king is to a certain extent the lord of all things in his kingdom, because he can take up anything for the common good, not just at his pleasure. Student: The text indicates that a king can take things for his own private benefit. Master: The king's benefit is the common benefit, so when necessary, i.e. when his own resources are not sufficient and the common benefit would be hindered if the king's own affairs were not expedited, he can take others' things -- but not when it is not necessary. Thus in 3 Kings 21:1-4, Naboth refused to sell his vineyard to King Ahab because he saw that the king was not seeking it out of any necessity or for the common good. Student: But the text says, "And you shall be his slaves", and slaves have nothing of their own. Master: They would be slaves in a broad sense, bound in certain cases to serve their lord, but as free subjects.
 Everything in a kingdom is the king's, with respect to his power to use it for the common good, not with respect to his power to dispose of it at his own pleasure without a common benefit. And booty taken in a just war is the king's in this way, and also in another way, that is with respect to his power to divide it and to distribute it to the soldiers who took it -- justly, however, and without partiality.
 Someone bound by no human law can do anything not against divine and natural laws. But the emperor is bound by no human law (ff. de legibus, Extra, De constitutionibus, c. Canonum, gloss).
 Someone whose will has the force of law in temporal matters has fullness of temporal power; but "what pleases a prince", especially the emperor, "has the force of law" [Digest 1.4.1pr].
 A person has fullness of power in temporal matters whose very mistake makes a right. But "the mistake of a prince", namely the emperor, "makes law" in temporal matters; therefore he has fullness of power in temporal matters.
 By what right would someone resist a command of the emperor not contrary to divine or natural law in temporal matters? Not by divine or natural law (since ex hypothesi the command is not contrary to divine or natural law), and not by human law, because "Human laws are the laws of the emperors" (dist. 8, c. Quo iure).
 Human society has bound itself to obey kings generally, and consequently the emperor much more so. Augustine, dist. 8, c. Quae contra: "The general agreement of human society indeed is to obey its kings."
 He does not have fullness of power to be able to do everything whose laws ought to be made for the common benefit not for his private advantage.
 If the emperor had such fullness of power in matters of this kind, all other kings princes and laymen would be his slaves. For the master of slaves does not have greater power over them than to be able to order them to do anything which is not against divine or natural law; indeed perhaps he does not have such great power over them.
 The pope does not have such fullness of power in spiritual matters, because he can not enjoin on anyone what is supererogatory. Much more, therefore, the emperor does not have such fullness of power in temporal matters.
 The emperor does not have more power in temporal affairs than the people had, since the emperor has his power from the people, as was argued above, and the people could not transfer to the emperor greater power or right than they had. But the people did not ever have such fullness of power, because they could not enjoin things that did not have to be done out of necessity (Extra, De constitutionibus, c. Cum omnes, gloss -- in matters that do not have to be done out of necessity "nothing can be done unless everyone agrees"). If the people enjoin something on any one person that does not have to be done out of necessity, therefore, he is not bound to do it unless he wishes to.
To destroy, alienate, give away, sell or bequeath the empire is against neither divine nor natural law, yet the emperor can not do this. Therefore he does not have such fullness of power.
 The emperor does not have power which is dangerous to the common good, but such fullness of power would be dangerous to the common good, for he could reduce all his subjects to poverty.
Power established only for the common good does not extend to everything not against divine or natural law. But imperial power is established only for the common benefit. What the emperor does and does not order to the common benefit he does in a disordered way, and consequently illicitly.
Replies from viewpoint of opinion 2 to arguments for opinion 1.
 The emperor is not bound by necessity to purely civil laws. The emperor is bound to the laws of nations, except in a particular case in which he sees that they detract from the common benefit. It pertains to the law of nations that the emperor should not have power unlimited except by divine and natural law, and also that some men should be free and not slaves. The emperor is bound by this law, which is a human law.
 What pleases a prince, that is the emperor, reasonably and justly because of the common good has the force of law when he explains it clearly. Student: It would follow that he could not grant any privilege, because privileges are private laws not common or general. This seems to detract from his authority. Master: Benefit to an individual or group could redound to the good of the whole community, so if the emperor intends the common good a privilege may be just.
 A reasonable mistake by a prince makes law, in the sense that others are bound to obey unless they are certain that the prince's mistake is against divine or natural law or against the common good.
 Often by the law of nations someone can resist an emperor's order which is not against divine or natural law. In reply to Augustine it is said that he is talking about human civil laws not about the law of nations, because civil laws are the laws of emperors and kings, but the law of nations is not made by emperors and kings.
 The general agreement of human society is to obey its kings in those matters which pertain to the common good.
Opinions: (1) According to those who say that the empire is from the pope, the emperor-elect has no right of administration before he is confirmed by the pope. (2) Others say that election gives the right to administer, unless the Romans (or those to whom the Romans have transferred their authority) have decreed, for some reason for the common good, the that elect should first be presented to the pope.
Argument for opinion 2:
 Reasonable custom should be observed and preserved, but it was a reasonable custom from the beginning that the one who was elected involved himself at once before his election was presented to the pope.
 The emperor is not the pope's vassal in respect of the empire.
 The king of the Romans is no more subject to the pope than any other kings, but many kings, even those who are believers, administer without notifying the pope. Student: By human law the king of the Romans is more subject to the pope, because he is elected by the authority of the pope who establishes the electors. Master: By the law of the emperors the king of the Romans is not more subject to the pope than are other kings. Nor is he by canon law: if he were, the pope would be able to subject other kings; also, the pope cannot nullify imperial law (dist. 10, c. Constitutiones, gloss), and therefore cannot subject the maker of imperial law.
 If the elect does not need confirmation, then election confers full right. (Hence bishops acquire their right to administer by confirmation, the pope acquires his by election, dist. 23, c. In nomine c.1.) But the emperor-election does not need to be confirmed by the pope.
Some say that persons can be called spiritual in two ways. Some are called spiritual because they live virtuously according to the christian law, which is a spiritual law (1 Cor. 2:12-3). Others can be called spiritual, even if they do not live virtuously according to the spirit, because they have been assigned spiritually to spiritual offices, such as clerics and religious. The emperor has power over many persons called spiritual in the first sense. About persons spiritual in the second sense there is disagreement.
Argument  The emperor and other laymen are not entitled to spiritual rights (Extra, De iudiciis, c. Quanto, gloss), and the right to elect the supreme pontiff seems to have first place among spiritual rights.
 Just as the pope presides in spiritual affairs, so does the emperor in temporal affairs. But temporal rights cannot belong to clerics. Rights which are especially spiritual, therefore, among which the right to elect the supreme pontiff seems to be first, cannot belong to the emperor.
 The emperor should be content with secular acts (dist. 10, c. Imperium, "Your empire ... ought not appropriate those things which belong only to the priest of the Lord".)
 Separate powers have separate functions (dist. 96, c. Cum ad verum). The secular power and the ecclesiastical power are separate powers. The act of electing the supreme pontiff belongs to the ecclesiastical power.
 In the body of the church different members should have different functions (dist. 89, c. Singula). Clerics and laymen are different members of the body of the church. To elect the supreme pontiff pertains to clerics (dist. 23, In nomine).
 The emperor and other laymen can not elect patriarchs, archbishops, bishops and the prelates of other collegiate churches (references to many canons); it is much more the case, therefore, that they can not elect the supreme pontiff.
The opposite opinion is that although the emperor specifically does not have by reason of his imperial dignity the right to elect the supreme pontiff or other lesser prelates, yet, in so far as he is Christian, catholic and believing, the right to elect the supreme pontiff can belong to him.
Argument  Some kings have had the power or right to elect the supreme pontiff (dist. 63, c. Adrianus). Therefore such power or right can belong to the emperor.
 Dist. 63, c. In synodo, Pope Leo says:"I ... together with the whole clergy and Roman people grant to the lord Otto I, king of the Teutons, and to his successors in this kingdom forever, the capability... of ordaining the pontiff of the highest apostolic see, and ... no one ... has the capability, without the consent of that emperor, of choosing the patriarch or pontiff of the highest apostolic see or of ordaining any bishop.
 Dist. 63, c. Cum longe, suggests that kings sometimes had the power to elect bishops.
 Emperors and laymen can take part in the elections of bishops (dist. 63, c. Adrianus), therefore the right to elect the supreme pontiff can belong to the emperor, because there seems to be the same reason for the one as for the other.
 Dist 63, c. Valentinianus imply that the emperor was able to choose the bishop of Milan, although he did not wish to do so.
 It seems less for the emperor to choose the supreme pontiff than for the supreme pontiff to have to ask the emperor to grant episcopates to suitable persons, as has sometimes happened (dist. 63, c. Reatina).
 The emperor can order the ordination of a pope (dist. 63, c. Agatho), therefore the right to choose the supreme pontiff can belong to the emperor. Student: It seems to follow from this that the one elected pope should be confirmed by the emperor, because any election should not be placed before someone unless it pertains to him to confirm it. Master: Confirmation does not always pertain to someone before whom the election ought to be placed, just as some people think that the election of an emperor should be placed before the pope but should not be confirmed by him. The election of the pope was placed before the emperor for examination, so that the emperor could consent and command his subject to recognise the elect as pope. Cf. Gratian, dist. 63, para. Principibus:
 If the right to elect the supreme pontiff does not belong to the emperor, this will be because it is prohibited by some irrevocable or indispensable law. But he is not prohibited by divine law, because nowhere in the scriptures do we read that the emperor ought not involve himself in the election of the supreme pontiff.
Student: It seems to be prohibited at least implicitly.If power to elect lesser prelates is granted by divine law only to the Apostles and their successors (dist. 21, c. In novo), much more is power to elect the pope granted only to men of the church. Master: Christ did not restrict election to the successors of the apostles, i.e. bishops: the canons of cathedral churches have the right to elect their bishops, and cardinals, deacons and priests, since they are not the successors of the apostles, could not have the right to elect the supreme pontiff.
Completion of argument : And election by the emperor does not conflict with any precept of natural reason. Nor is it forbidden he prohibited by any irrevocable or indispensable human law, because every canon or civil is revocable or dispensable.
Replies to arguments for opinion 1:
 The emperor and other laymen are capable of many spiritual rights, namely those that belong not by virtue of order or divine office to which the holder is dedicated, but on account of the common benefit of the church. Since the right to elect the pope falls into the latter category, this right can fall to the emperor and other laymen. See Extra, De iudiciis, c. Decernimus, gloss. If laymen cannot now possess such rights it is by virtue of ordinances and customs that could be changed for good reason.
 Just as some secular rights can belong to the pope, although he rules in spiritual affairs, so some spiritual rights can belong to the emperor, although he rules in temporal or secular affairs.
 The emperor, as emperor, should be content with secular affairs, but as a Christian, a Catholic and a Roman he can involve himself in spiritual affairs. The emperor can have the right to choose the supreme pontiff, although as a christian and not by reason of his imperial majesty.
 A person having one power can have an act which another person having another power has; otherwise neither the pope nor any prelate of the church could have any act of secular jurisdiction or power. To elect the supreme pontiff does not belong to a layman by reason of his secular power, and yet he who has secular power can also have the act of choosing the pope.
 Two replies: (i) Just as different members in the human body have some duties that are their own and some that are common, so in the body of the church some duties are common to clerics and laymen and some are proper to clerics and some proper to laymen. To choose a prelate, however, unless it is ordained otherwise by custom or human constitution, is a duty common to clerics and laymen. Or (ii) the analogy between body and church is not complete, because whereas the proper duties of the members of the human body come from nature, so that one member can not make good the defect of another for any necessity at all, the members of the body of the church can, with respect to many duties, even to a certain extent those that are proper, mutually make good each other's defects. Therefore, when the body of the church was ordered as well as possible, different duties were committed to different people, but when the body of the church suffers different defects in different members, it is not unsuitable, indeed it is necessary, that one member discharge the duty of another. If, therefore, to choose the pope is to a certain extent proper to clerics, it will not be inappropriate that in a particular case the emperor, either alone or with others, should choose the supreme pontiff.
 The emperor and laymen can not now choose the prelates of collegiate churches because this is prohibited by human constitutions, and when it has not been prohibited by human constitutions, such as the canons adduced. And when it is said that by no custom can laymen have a right to choose prelates because such a custom is not reasonable and can not be prescribed, the reply is that it is not in the nature of things that such a custom is not reasonable and can not be prescribed, but is by human regulation.
Two senses of the question: (i) Whence does the emperor have it that he is capable of this power or right?. (ii) Whence does he have this right? The answer to (i) is that he has such a capacity from the very fact that he is Christian, Catholic, of sound mind, and a Roman. Question (ii) is answered in two ways:
Opinion 1: The emperor can have such right from the pope, who could grant the right to elect to anyone he pleased.
Argument  The spiritual head of all Christians has power to determine who is to elect the head, especially since Christ did not specifically and explicitly determine who should elect that head.
 Peter appointed the pope to succeed himself (namely Clement); therefore his successor also could grant to whom he wished the power to elect the highest pontiff.
 In canon law the pope granted the right to elect sometimes to kings and sometimes to others, and not illicitly; therefore no one can have the right to elect the highest pontiff except from the pope.
Opinion 2: By the very fact that he is Christian, Catholic, of sound mind, and a Roman, the emperor has the right and power to elect the pope, unless he himself tacitly or explicitly renounces that right, or unless the election, or the power of granting the right to elect, has been granted with the consent of the Romans to a determinate person or determinate persons. The Romans do not have from the pope the power or right to elect the highest pontiff.
Argument: Christ ordered the Church in such a way that it would never fail in anything necessary. But not least among necessary things is that there should be some who, when the pope dies, have the right to elect the highest pontiff to succeed. In this matter, therefore, Christ did not fail the Church, and he did not put it into anyone's power that he could by his negligence or malice deprive the whole of God's Church of this necessary thing. But if no one had the right to elect the pope except from the pope, then the pope could by his negligence or malice deprive the whole of God's Church of the right to elect the pope, by removing it from the present electors and failing to give it to others. It follows that the right to elect the highest pontiff is not from the pope, and therefore the Romans have the right to elect, not from the pope, but by the very fact that they are Christians and Catholics.
Student: That argument proves that the Romans do not have the right to elect, (1) because then by negligence or malice they could deprive the whole church of it -- by renouncing it and not giving it to anyone, or by falling into heresy or converting to another sect. Further, (2) if they do not have it from the pope, then by what law? Not by divine law (it is not mentioned in scripture), and if by human law, then either by the law of emperors or kings or else by the popes' laws -- but not from the emperors, therefore from the pope alone.
Answer to (1): The present opinion does not say that in every case only the Romans have the right to elect the highest pontiff. The pope is not only the bishop of the Romans, but also bishop of all Christians; and therefore, on occasion, the election could belong to any Catholics whatever. Therefore the malice or negligence of the Romans could not deprive the Church of a pope.
Student: If other Catholics have the right to elect because pope is bishop of all Catholics, then why do they not always elect the pope together with the Romans? And why do the Romans elect more than the others, if the others have the right to elect just as the Romans do? Master: Because the Romans are few in comparison with the other Catholics, and because the pope is in a special way the Romans' own bishop (because they do not have another bishop as other Catholics do), other Catholics, therefore, not unreasonably, do not have the right to elect the highest pontiff except when the Romans have lost the right (because of renunciation or heresy). Other Catholics do not always elect together with the Romans because, although they all have the right to elect, they do not have it for every case, but only for the case when it does not pertain to the Romans.
*Three modes of natural law
(See also 3.2 Dial. 1.10 and 1.15.)
(1) First mode: that is called natural law which is in conformity with natural reason that in no case fails, such as "Do not commit adultery," "Do not lie," and the like.
(2) Second mode: that is called natural law which is to be observed by those who use natural equity alone without any custom and human legislation.
This is called "natural" because its contrary is contrary to the state of nature as originally established. In this second way, and not in the first, all things are common by natural law, because in the state of nature as originally established all things would have been common, and if after the fall all men lived according to reason all things should have been common and nothing owned, for ownership was introduced because of wickedness. Common possession of all things do not exist by natural law in the first way, for then no one could licitly appropriate anything. Natural law in the first way is immutable, invariable, and indispensable. Natural law in the second way is not immutable; rather, it is permissible to enact the contrary.
(3) Third mode: that is called natural law which is gathered by evident reasoning from the law of nations or another law or from some act, divine or human, unless the contrary is enacted with the consent of those concerned.
This can be called natural law "on supposition". For example, "natural law is the return of a thing deposited or of money lent, the repelling of violence by force." Supposing that things and money have been appropriated by the law of nations or by some human law, then it is gathered by evident reasoning that a thing deposited and money lent should be returned, unless for a reason the contrary is decided on by him or those concerned.
They say that the Romans have by divine law the right to elect the highest pontiff, extending "divine law" to every natural law -- if it were extended only to the first mode the Romans would not have the right to elect the highest pontiff from divine law alone.
Objections against this doctrine of three modes:
 Isidore says, dist. 1, c. Ius naturale: "Natural law is common to all nations, because it is everywhere held by an instinct of nature and not by any enactment." These words do not fit the second mode, because things whose contrary can be permissible according to the law of nations are not common to all nations and are not held everywhere by an instinct of nature, because they are not held where the contrary is observed according to the law of nations.
 Isidore says (ibid.): "But this, or anything similar to this, is never regarded as unjust, but as natural and fair." This cannot be true of either the second or third modes. Natural law in the second mode can be unjust, because the contrary can be in accordance with the law of nations, and what is contrary to the law of nations is unjust. And natural law in the third mode can be unjust, because the contrary is in accordance with the law of nature in the second mode: it is in accordance with natural law in the second mode that restitution of money borrowed or of a thing lent should not be made, since it is in accordance with natural law in the second mode that no money should be lent and nothing deposited; because according to the natural law in the second mode all things are common.
These points are answered in two ways: (i) Some words in c. Ius naturale should be understood only of the first mode. (ii) If they refer to every natural law, they should be understood soundly. When Isidore says, "Natural law is common to all nations," etc., he means that the first mode of natural law is common to all nations in that all nations are indispensably obliged to it, and therefore "it is had by instinct of nature," that is, of natural reason, which is never mistaken. Natural law in the second sense is common to all nations in that all nations are obliged to it -- unless on reasonable grounds they decide on the contrary, and therefore it exists "by instinct of nature," that is, of natural reason, until the contrary is enacted by human ordinance; thus reason dictates that all things are common -- unless they are appropriated with the consent of men. Natural law in the third way is common to all nations on supposition -- namely, supposing that all nations enact or do something from which a natural law in that sense is gathered by evident reasoning; and therefore "it is had by an instinct of nature," i.e., of natural reason, on the supposition from which it is thus inferred. Similarly the words "But this, or anything similar to this," etc., can be understood of the second mode, because such a natural law is "never unjust, but is regarded as natural and fair," unless the contrary is, on reasonable grounds, established by some human law. Also, natural law in the third sense is in some way "never unjust, but is" always "regarded as natural and fair," because, supposing that from which it is inferred by evident reasoning, it is never unjust but is always regarded as natural and fair, unless the opposite is decided on by him or those concerned.
*Why can every natural law be called divine law?
(i) Because every natural law is from God, who is the creator of nature. (ii) Because every law that is contained explicitly or implicitly in the Scriptures can be called a divine law; but every natural law is contained explicitly or implicitly in the Scriptures, in which there are certain general propositions from which, either alone or with other premises, can be inferred every natural law, spoken of in each of these three ways, though it may not be found in them explicitly.
*How divine law (in the extended sense) gives the Romans the right to elect the pope
The Romans have the right to elect the pope from natural law in the third mode. On the supposition that someone is to be set over certain persons as their ruler, it is inferred by evident reason that, unless the contrary is decided on by the person or persons concerned, the ruled have a right to elect the ruler.
Argument  For example, no one should be set over the whole body of mortals except by their election and consent.
 What affects all should be dealt with by all; for someone to be set over all affects all, therefore it should be dealt with by all.
 To those whom it concerns to make themselves laws it belongs to elect a head, if they wish; but any people and city can make themselves their own law (dist. 1, Ius civile).
"Unless the contrary is decided on by the person or persons concerned": They may resign their right and transfer their right to another or to others. Or if they have a superior, the superior can assign the right to someone else.
The pope is especially the ruler of the Romans, since they do not have another bishop. Therefore, by natural law spoken of in that way -- that is, by natural law on supposition, namely, on the supposition that they should have a bishop -- they have the right to elect him, unless the contrary is enacted or decided on by the Romans themselves or by some superior. Their superior is Christ, not the pope; but Christ did not assign the right to anyone but the Romans. The Romans themselves could transfer to the pope the right to appoint electors to choose his successor.
Student: Wouldn't it be better to say that the Romans have the right to elect their bishop by the law of nations, since the right to elect is from the law of nations. Master: Many things that belong to the law of nations are natural laws in the third mode. It does not belong to the law of nations to have a Catholic bishop, and, although it belongs to the law of nations that the ruled have a right to elect their ruler, it belongs equally to the divine law, because it can be inferred from premises found in the sacred Scriptures together with other premises. Since the holders of this theory do not care to contend about words, they say that it is enough for them that the Romans have the right to elect their bishop from this, that they should have a bishop, and that that the ruled have a right to elect their ruler. (It seems to some, however, that it is properly said that they have the right to elect by divine law and human law together, extending human law to include the law of nations and not only civil and canon law.)
Answer to arguments for Opinion 1:
 If sufficient and useful provision is made for Catholics by divine law and natural law, the pope does not have power to change anything to the prejudice of any Catholics and to the detriment or danger of the common good; therefore the pope does not have full power to determine and decree by whom the head should be elected, since by divine and natural law the right of election belongs to the Romans.
(On occasion the pope has power, even by Christ's ordinance, to determine who should elect his successor. Christ made sufficient provision for the Church in all necessary matters, and therefore, in entrusting the Church to blessed Peter he gave blessed Peter and his successors fullness of power in spiritual matters in respect of all things necessary to his Church (saving the right of others, when they wish and are able to exercise their right as they ought). In necessary spiritual matters the pope can remedy the failure of others. And therefore, because the Romans have by divine law the right to elect their bishop, the pope does not have power to make decisions about that election to the Romans' prejudice when the Romans would wish and would be able to exercise their right for the common good. Similarly, because on occasion other Catholics have the right to elect the highest pontiff, the pope therefore also would not have power to make decisions about that election when, on such an occasion, the other Catholics wished to exercise that right appropriately. But if the Romans and other Catholics were not willing or were not able to exercise that right, then the pope would have power to make decisions about the election of his successor.
(Holders of this opinion do not say absolutely that the pope has fullness of power in all matters, because they think that Christ gave a law of such perfect liberty that the pope has no power over Christians except in respect of things commanded or forbidden by God and in respect of things to be done of necessity.)
Reply to the premise that Christ did not specifically and explicitly determine who should elect that head: he therefore wished that in this respect all should keep the rights they have by the law of nations, and in this respect he entrusted to the pope no power prejudicial to the Romans.
 The deeds of the saints are not always to be taken as a precedent, and it is therefore often not possible to prove from examples what should be done normally, though they can often be used to show what could be done on occasion. That blessed Peter appointed his own successor cannot prove what the pope can do from Christ's specific ordinance.
Student: If the pope has the same power as blessed Peter had, why can he not replace himself with a successor just as blessed Peter did? Master: Two answers are given: (i) No, because this would be to change the state of the Church, and because he makes a law for a time when he will not be judge. But neither of these arguments is sound. The pope can change the state of the Church in respect of things over which he has power from Christ, just as a king can command something that no king has ever before commanded. The second argument would prove that no bishop could select his successor even with the pope's permission (against 7, q. 1, Petisti). (ii) Peter appointed his own successor by Christ's special revelation or inspiration, or with the consent of the Catholic Romans.
Student: Against (ii), since neither of those things is shown from the Scriptures, this answer is despised as easily as approved. Master: To this it is said that what is not found in the Scriptures either explicitly or implicitly and also is not proved by clear argument is despised as easily as approved; but it is proved by clear argument that one or other of those things happened, therefore both should not be despised.
 Although the Romans had the right to elect the Roman bishop they could have transferred that right of appointing electors to another or to others. The Romans could have granted to the pope the power of appointing electors; they could also have granted the right of election to some few from among themselves. Also the highest pontiff on occasion has power to make decisions about the election of his successor. Also, although the pope himself can have no say in the election of a pope, nevertheless, insofar as he is a Roman, he can together with the other Romans discuss and decide whom the right to elect should be entrusted to. Also, inasmuch as he is a Catholic, the pope can with the Romans and other Catholics, in a general council which represents all Catholic Christians, discuss and decide whom the power to elect the highest pontiff is to be granted to. And thus in many ways the pope can have power to grant to another or others the right to elect the highest pontiff, even though the right to elect belonged to the Romans.
It must be conceded, therefore, that sometimes the pope has granted to certain kings, and sometimes to others, the right to elect the highest pontiff. But he has not done this because he alone always has power to grant such a right, but because the Romans transferred the right to elect either to him alone or to him and others together (namely some Romans who represented the Romans, and others). And therefore, although the emperor has, together with other Romans, the right to elect from the fact that he is a Catholic and a Roman, nevertheless it was sometimes the pope and other Romans who gave him the right to elect alone, without the other Romans. He could also have it from the pope alone, if the Romans transferred their right to the pope, or, also, if in making decisions about the electors of the highest pontiff the Romans proved negligent, to the detriment of the Church. And it is likely enough that the Romans have transferred such right and power to the pope, and therefore from that time the pope alone has been able to grant the power to elect the highest pontiff either to the emperors, or to neighboring bishops, or to the cardinals, or to the Roman clergy, or to the canons of some church in Rome, or to others, as it has seemed to him would further the advantage of the Church.
Student: If the Romans have the right to elect the Roman bishop from divine law, how can they transfer the right to the pope, since it is not permissible for anyone to contravene divine law? Master: To contravene what is from divine law because it is inferred from something contained implicitly in divine law and from natural law spoken of in the second way is permissible, for reasonable cause, just as it is permissible, for a reason, to contravene natural law spoken of in the second way.
Why not if the electors became heretics? Because if the pope survives and is not a heretic, he would still have the right to appoint electors. If he were dead, the right would revert to the Romans, because it would be necessary to elect a Catholic pope. (That pope would then have the right to appoint electors for the next election, if the Romans had transferred their right to a pope by reason of his office and not as an individual.)
Why would the Romans have not only the right to elect, but also the right to appoint electors? Because a multitude often has the right to elect without its being expedient that everyone elect. (This was why elections of prelates were confined to clerics, though all clerics and laymen had the right to elect, with the agreement of laymen, because clerics were wiser and holier than laymen -- if laymen were wiser and holier than clerics, the right to elect should be removed from clerics and given to laymen. Things that pertain to the common good and do not belong to anyone by reason of their order or the divine office to which they are vowed should be managed by the wiser and better.)
If the Romans also, together with the pope and the electors, became heretics or were negligent or idle the right to elect would not revert to the Romans, but would devolve upon other catholic christians. In such a case the provinces, dioceses, parishes or any other large groups which can not meet should elect representatives to take part in the election. Groups or persons not caring enough about choosing the highest pontiff would lose the right to elect and make arrangements for the election, and the right to elect would devolve upon others -- even on a single individual, if only one remained properly solicitous. Until the end of the world faith will never fail, so there will always be someone.
Arguments for opinion 1: heretics cannot have a right to take part in the election of a pope.
 Those who do not belong to the body can not elect the head, and heretics no longer belong to the body of the Church.
 Catholics should not communicate with heretics (Titus 3:10, 2 John 2:10-11, 24, q. 1, c. Omnis) , and there must be communication with the pope's electors.
 Unbelievers cannot take part, but a heretic should be regarded "as a gentile and a tax gatherer" (24, q. 1, c. Omnibus).
 Heretics have no power and right (24, q. 1, c. Dicimus).
 Enemies of the christian faith and of all catholics can not have the right to elect the head of all catholics.
 The electors should be maintained and supported by catholics, but "We forbid under anathema anyone to presume to maintain or support them," that is heretics (Extra, De hereticis, c. Sicut).
If a cardinal who is a heretic (even secretly) returns to the faith his rights as an elector do not revive
Argument: No ecclesiastical dignity lost by heresy can be retained without dispensation, and similarly no ecclesiastical or spiritual right lost by heretical wickedness will be able to be recovered, unless it belongs [to its possessor] by Christ's decree alone, unless that right is newly conferred again.
Student: That ecclesiastical dignities are lost by heresy is due to a regulation of the church. Spiritual powers, which are greater than ecclesiastical dignities (e.g. the power to accomplish the sacrifice of the body of Christ, if the heretic is a priest, and the power to confer orders, if he is a bishop) remain with heretics; therefore they will also retain their ecclesiastical dignities unless a determination of the church prevents it. But we do not find any determination of the church by which cardinals who become heretics are deprived of the right of choosing the supreme pontiff. Master: They lose ecclesiastical dignities not by a determination of the church only, but by the very fact that they are heretics. A spiritual right is lost by heresy because by nature it does not endure at the same time as heretical wickedness. If this is true of one spiritual right it is true of all, and it is true of the spiritual powers of a pope who becomes a heretic: if the pope becomes a heretic he is bound by the sentence of a canon framed by his predecessor (24, q. 1, c. 1, gloss: "Nor does the rule that an equal can not loose or bind an equal conflict with this, because if the pope is a heretic, by virtue of the fact that he is a heretic, he is less than any catholic at all").
Objection: It does not seem true that every loseable spiritual right is lost by heresy without a determination of the church, and that it can not be recovered unless the right is conferred anew. Supporting arguments:
 Heresy does not destroy spiritual right, for if the Romans fall into heresy and then return, their right revives.
 If the Romans and all the cardinals were to become heretics, the right to elect would devolve to other catholics, and if other christians except ten become heretics all christians except those ten would lose the right to elect the supreme pontiff. Suppose that twenty of the heretical christians return to the catholic faith and let the ten who were previously the only catholics slip into heresy. Do the twenty who have returned have the right to elect a pope? If they do, they have therefore recovered their former right without its being conferred anew. If not, the whole church would therefore be deprived of the right to elect a supreme pontiff, and, consequently, Christ would not have sufficiently provided for the church in everything that was necessary.
 The right of patronage is a spiritual right, and a patron who becomes a heretic loses the right of patronage, but if he returns to the faith he recovers the right of patronage.
 Dignities of the church lost by heretical wickedness are recovered without being conferred anew, and similarly spiritual rights. Text proving that dignities are recovered: 23, q. 4, c. Ipsa pietas ; 1, q. 7, c. Convenientibus; dist. 12, c. Nos consuetudinem.
 If all the Romans were to become heretics they would lose the right to elect the supreme pontiff; and according to one teaching they would not recover the right to elect even if they were to turn back from heresy to the faith; according to another teaching they would recover the same right because of the fact that they have the right to elect directly by Christ's decree and by the law of nations. Student: Where did Christ decree this? Master: He decreed it when he made Peter head of all christians, giving him the power to choose where he would establish his seat, and he did not deprive those whose bishop Peter chose to be of their right to elect their ruler, a right that belongs to them by the law of nations.
 The second argument seems too fantastic to need answer, since it posits a case that is never likely to occur. Student: It could happen. In any case discussion of things that never or rarely happen can illuminated things that occur often. Just as discussing falsities may bring a greater understanding of truth, so discussion of fantastic things may help us learn of things true and solid. Master: The reply to argument 2 is that the twenty who returned would recover the right by the special decree of Christ, viz. in Matthew 28:20, "I am with you always until the end of the age." This is a promise that in anything necessary he would never until the end of the age fail his church, which, since a pope is necessary, implies that there will be Catholics with a right to elect.
Student: Then cardinals who became heretics and then returned could recover the right. Suppose the cardinals become heretics and later return, while all others become heretics. Either the cardinals who return have the right to elect without new conferral, or the whole church would lack the right to elect a pope. Master: The could not recover the right that they have by human decree (e.g. by grant from the pope or the Romans), but they can recover a right belonging by Christ's decree, if there are no other catholics. Student: Why can they recover a right granted by Christ, but not one granted by human decree? Master: Because a right should first be conferred and restored after its loss by the same person, but we do not find in any human decree that the right is recovered. Such a decree could be made.
 (i) The right of patronage is recovered because that is granted by human decree. (ii) Or it may be said that a right of patronage is not recovered unless it is specifically given to him who recovers the possession.
 If an episcopate and other ecclesiastical dignities are lost because of heretical wickedness they are not recovered without a new election or equivalent, such as a dispensation. The texts adduced should be understood as conveying a dispensation.
According to opinion 1, the right reverts to the Romans:
Argument  If pope and cardinals become heretics either the right to elect is in the power of some catholics or none, and if some then no one but the Romans (all others seem less likely). If none, sufficient provision in necessities would not have been made for the church of God.
 It is not true that less provision has been made for the Roman church when the electors lose their right than for lesser churches. But provision has been made for lesser churches (Extra, De electione, c. Ne pro defectu). For the Roman church, however, no other provision has been made, either by human laws or by divine laws, except reversion to the Romans, who had the right to elect by divine law and by the law of nations, because the election can not devolve upon a superior as happens by human laws with other churches. Student: Laws are adapted to frequent cases, no to things that happen perhaps on one occasion. It often happens that the electors of other churches lose their power to elect, but it rarely occurs that the papal electors do. Master: Laws are sometimes made for rare occurrences, especially if they would be dangerous, as inability to elect a pope would be. Since no human law exists for this, recourse must be had to divine law, namely that election reverts to the Romans who have the right to elect the supreme pontiff both by divine law and the law of nations. Anyway, it has often happened that the papal electors have been deprived of their power to elect because of heretical wickedness, e.g. emperors were deprived of the right because of heresy (Gratian, dist. 63, para. Verum). Student: Not for heresy, but by their renunciation (ibid. para. Ex his). Master: Some lost the right by heresy, some renounced it, so each of the quotations from Gratian is true for different emperors.
Opinion 1: It reverts to the emperor of the Romans. When some electors lose their right to elect, the election reverts to those who had the right to elect immediately before; but before the cardinals the emperor had the right.
Opinion 2: The right to elect reverts to the canons of the church where the pope's see is, because when a privilege ceases there should be recourse to the common law. The cardinals' right is a privilege. The common law is that the canons of cathedral churches have the right to elect bishops.
Opinion 3: The election devolves upon the whole Roman clergy, because it is by a special privilege that only the clerics of the cathedral church have the right to elect their bishop; the common law is that the whole clergy have the right to elect (dist. 63, para. Ex his; dist 63, c. Obeuntibus
Opinion 4: The election reverts to the Roman clergy and people, i.e. to all Romans -- not that all elect, because, unless there were very few of them, this could not be done without confusion, which in such a case should be avoided, but so that arrangements are made with the common consent, whether express or tacit, of all about what person or persons should elect their bishop on behalf of all. The Romans could entrust their duty to the catholic emperor.
Arguments for opinion 4
 The claim of any particular Roman or Romans could only be based on (i) by divine law alone, or (ii) by human law alone, or (iii) by divine and human law together. Not (i), because this can not be proved from the scriptures. Not (ii), because all canonical rights in this matter have been abrogated, except the right granted to the cardinals. Not (iii) by the law of nations, because according to the law of nations it belongs to all the Romans.
 Further, when some power is not possessed by divine law only and the civil law, both ecclesiastical and secular, is wanting, recourse should be had to the law of nations which is more ancient and universal than civil law whether ecclesiastical or secular. But all Romans, not some in particular, had the right to elect the Roman bishop by divine law and the law of nations together. Student: No power can revert by virtue of a right that has been repealed, since if some right is taken away it is just as if it had never existed; but the right of nations by which the Romans have sometimes been able to elect the Roman bishop has been taken away from them. Master: No power reverts by virtue of a law that is completely repealed; but the law of nations can not be completely repealed unless at that time others have the right to elect according to canon law. When the civil and ecclesiastical law is null, therefore, the law of nations immediately comes back.
Reply from viewpoint of opinion 4 to arguments for the other opinions
 When electors are deprived of the right to elect, that right does not always revert to those who had it immediately before them, because in such a case the right to elect is often allotted to their superior, sometimes it even reverts to those who had the right to elect by a more ancient and general law. The right does not revert to the emperor alone but to him and other Romans together. He has a certain prerogative with respect to the election of the supreme pontiff, so that the Romans should not proceed without him, at least if his presence can be obtained conveniently. (If he is obstructive or unwilling, the Romans should proceed without him -- the right belongs to them all, so no individual can hinder them.)
Student: If it belongs to them all, other Romans are equal to the emperor in this; the emperor ought no more be called or asked or waited on than other Romans. Master: Though they are to a certain extent equal, other Romans should in many ways defer to the emperor, just as in other elections others should in many ways defer to those who are wiser, more powerful, better and worthier. They should even commit the exercise of their right to him, as happened in the past.
 Now the common canon law is that the clerics of a cathedral church have the right to elect their bishop, but once this was not the common law, but the clergy and people had the right to elect. That law is the more common and ancient one. Therefore if every special privilege and law is void, it is necessary to have recourse to the most common and ancient law.
 Although it once was the common law that the election of a bishop pertained to the whole clergy, this was made the common law solely by human ecclesiastical decree and it was not the most common law. And when therefore, if the cardinals become heretics and the pope is a heretic or is dead, all the human laws established for the election of the Roman pontiff fail, recourse should be had to the divine law and the law of nations, by virtue of which the election returns to the clergy and people of Rome.
Argument  Someone defending heresy is more worthy of condemnation than heretics (24, q. 3, c. Qui aliorum) and is a heretic, and therefore deserves every penalty that heretics deserve.
 A supporter of heretics believes their errors and is a heretic (Extra, De hereticis, c. Excommunicamus). If the cardinals support heresy they lose their right to elect, as heretics.
Argument  Cardinals are deprived of their cardinalship, and lose the right to elect, for any crime for which a pope could be deposed. But a pope who is a supporter of heretics is deposed, de facto or at least de iure. Thus Anastasius II was deposed because of support for heretics (dist. 19, c. Anastasius).
Argument  If cardinals become schismatics they have no right or power (24, q. 1, c. Dicimus)
 Cardinals who have become schismatic are outside the church (24, q. 1, c. Didicimus).
Argument  No less provision against the dangers that can befall it is made for the Roman church than for other lesser churches. But sufficient provision is made for churches other than the Roman church if the electors delay through malice or negligence, because they are deprived of the power to elect if they have not elected within three months. But no provision has been made for the Roman church other than that election reverts to the Romans. Therefore, at least on that occasion, the cardinals would be deprived of the power to elect and the right to elect would revert to the Romans.
Reply from viewpoint of Opinion 1 to the arguments for opinions 2-5.
Student: Opinion 5 can be answered as in chapter 10 above. [Nothing seems relevant there. See here.]
Opinion 2: When support implies heresy, supporters of heretics lose the right to elect automatically. Other support does not destroy the right automatically, but nevertheless it should be taken away.
Opinion 3: Although a pope is deposed in fact and in law if he becomes a heretic, and is therefore deposed ipso facto for support of heresy that implies heresy in the supporter, he is not ipso facto deposed solely because of support for heretics without support of their error, and according to some he should not be deposed unless he seems incorrigible and the Church is scandalised. Anastasius II was not deposed only for the support of heretics, but for heresy and for promoting heresy.
Opinion 4: Schismatics are not always deprived of every right. But all schismatics who are heretics, as schismatics often are, are deprived of every right. Further, no schismatic is fit for an ecclesiastical dignity. Also, schismatics can not have the execution of any ecclesiastical right. Schismatic cardinals do not lose the right to elect the highest pontiff, therefore, although they should not elect as long as they persist in schism.
Argument: The emperor is not judge in ecclesiatical cases, because such a case is called called ecclesiastical because it should be treated before an ecclesiastical judge. Nor is he the pope's judge in a criminal case, because a pope can be judged only for departing from the faith (dist. 40, c. Si papa), which is not a secular crime. Nor is the emperor the regular judge of the pope in a civil secular case, because he cannot judge any bishop (11, q. 1, c. Nullus episcopus).
Authorities in favour of opinion 1:
 9, q. 3, c. Cuncta [c. 18]: "The whole church throughout the world has known that, bound by the sentences of every pontiff, the seat of the blessed apostle Peter has the right to loose, that is, that it has the right to judge every church."
 12, q. 1, c. Futuram: "That same prince," namely Constantine, "... said, 'You can be judged by no one because you are reserved for the judgement of God alone. For you are called gods and therefore you can not be judged by men.'"
 9, q. 3, c. Cuncta [c.17]: "the Roman church has the right to judge everyone ... no one is permitted to judge its judgement. ... no one is permitted to appeal from it."
 Dist. 96, c. Duo [c. 10]: "you [the emperor] depend upon their [the priests'] judgement; it is not the case that they can be brought under your will."
 9, q. 3, c. Nemo [c.13]: "No one will judge the first see when it wants to temper justice. For that judge will be judged neither by Augustus, nor by any clergy, nor by kings, nor by the people."
 Dist. 96, c. Si imperator [c.11]: "If the emperor is a catholic, which we say saving his peace, his son is not a priest of the church." The law, however, is ashamed if sons are reprovers of their parents. Therefore the emperor can in no way be the judge of the pope who is the father of all.
 9, q. 3, c. Aliorum [c.14]: "God wanted men to determine the cases of other men; without question he reserved to his own authority the bishop of that see".
 Dist. 21, c. Nunc autem [c.7]: "The first see will not be judged by anyone."
 9, q. 3, c. Facta [c.15]: "The deeds of subjects are judged by us; truly, ours are judged by the Lord."
 2, q. 5, c. Mandastis [c.10]: "When the council had met, although I could sufficiently have avoided suspicion in another way, I nevertheless satisfied everyone by a full examination, and took haste to purge myself before everyone, that is freeing myself from suspicion and envy; but not providing a model of acting to others who do not want to do so or who have not chosen it of their own free will." We gather from these words that on no occasion is the pope bound to purge himself if he has been defamed. We infer from this that he is not bound to submit to anyone's judgement. The gloss on the words "could have" says, "The pope can be judged by no one."
 9, q. 3, c. Ipsi [c.16]: "They," that is the canons, "have decreed that on no occasion at all ought there be an appeal from it [the Roman see], and as a result that it is the judge of the whole church and does not come under anyone's judgement; and they have commanded that there be no judgement of its judgement and they have determined that it is not appropriate that its sentence be dissolved, rather they have ordered that its decrees should be followed."
 Dist. 17, para. Hinc etiam [c.6]: "Nor has the bishop of the afore-mentioned see," that is the Roman see, "lain under the judgement of inferiors. ... we reserve all his cause to the judgement of God."
[Several MSS lack the rest of the Dialogus, viz. PbPcPe MwBa. D'Ailly's Abbreviatio also ends with chapter 16]
 Again, as we read in 9, q. 3, c. Patet [c.10]: "The judgement of the apostolic see... should not be revised by anyone, and no one is permittted to judge its judgement.
Arguments for opinion 1:
Argument  An inferior is not the judge of his superior (dist 21, c. Inferior [c.4] and c. Denique [c.6]). The emperor and anyone else at all are inferior to the Roman pontiff (dist. 96, c. Duo sunt [c.10]; Extra, De maioritate et obedientia, c. Solitae [c.6]).
 No one is the judge of his own judge. But the pope is the emperor's judge, since he can excommunicate him and the emperor is under him and ought to obey him (11, q. 3, c. Si autem vobis [c.11]; dist. 96, c. Duo sunt [c.10]).
 Again the emperor is not the judge of him who is free of imperial laws and is not bound by the laws of the world; but the pope is not bound by the laws of the world (33, q. 2, c. Inter haec [c.6]; dist. 10, c. Lege [c.1]). The pope is not bound by canons of popes and general councils; therefore he is not bound by imperial laws, which should be esteemed less than sacred canons (dist. 10, para. 1; dist. 10, para. Ecce; 2, q. 3, para. Hinc colligitur).
 Again, the emperor is not the judge of lesser bishops and clerics, as is gathered from innumerable sacred canons. Therefore he is not the judge of the pope.
[These texts and arguments for opinion 1 might have been answered if the work had been completed.]
There are various ways of putting the opposite assertion. One way is that by reason of his imperial dignity the emperor has the power to judge any crime, ecclesiastical as much as secular, and to depose the pope himself, if a charge worthy of deposition is proved against him. [The work breaks off before other ways of putting opinion 2 are stated.]
Many arguments were brought forward for this position 1 Dial. 6, chapters 2 -- 5. These will be restated and others added:
Argument: Every community, including the human race, should have one single judge who is plainly supreme, or many who are supreme and hold or manage the same office in place of that one, and all others should be judged by this one or by these. But Christianity does not destroy or prevent the good management of the human community. Hence it does not conflict with Christianity that the totality of mortals have one supreme judge. That judge cannot be the pope, but is the emperor. The pope himself, therefore, should be judged by the emperor.
Meaning of "one supreme judge or many holding the same office": In royal government there is one sole supreme judge; in aristocracy and democracy there are many supreme judges, but the must act together after common deliberation and consent, or at least of the more powerful [valentior] part of them according to their laws and approved customs. And so then there are many supreme judges, yet each holding the same office and having exactly the same power, so that they are often equal in everything. And therefore they act in place of one and hold the position of one [cf. Marsilius, I.xvii.2].
For argument to show that Christianity is not incompatible with the best way of governing humanity, see the 11 arguments in 3.2 Dial. 1.1. [However, these arguments do not address precisely the question whether Christianity is compatible with the best manner of governing the human community].
Speaking of the totality of Christians, is it true that that community can not be best regulated, as much as the condition of this present life allows, unless as a whole it has one sole supreme judge? Some say that that is not necessary. There are various versions of this opinion:
(1) Different kingdoms or provinces might have different supreme judges not subject to one superior.
(2) In the one kingdom or province, there might be several supreme judges (not holding the same office in the way explained above), who have the right to judge the same people for the same crimes.
(3) One part of the people might have one supreme judge for every crime, and another part another (just as, according to some people, all clerics have one such supreme judge, namely the pope, and all laymen have the emperor).
(4) One part might have one supreme judge for every crime, while another part is judged by one supreme judge for some crimes and by another for others (just as, according to some people, all clerics should be judged by the pope for any crime at all, but laymen should be judged by the pope for some crimes and by a secular judge for others.)
(5) There might be one supreme judge with power to pass judgement on all, with one or a few exceptions (just as, according to one assertion, by christian law only the pope is exempt from the jurisdiction of a secular judge, but all other clerics are exempt from the judgement of secular judges only because of a liberty granted to them by emperors and kings).
*Objections against version 1:
See 3.2 Dial. 1.1.
*Objections against version 2:
[The MS Ar lacks the rest of Dialogus.]
 If there are several judges, several might summon the same person to appear at the same time. The person summoned is not bound to appear before the one more than before the other. The judges' officers may fight among themselves to lead the guilty man back to the judge by force [cf. Marsilius, I.xvii.3. See above, 3.2 Dial. 2.10].
 The judges could call their subjects at different places at the same time to punish criminals or to discuss common business. The resulting confusion will impede the punishment of the guilty and the common good.
 What can be done by fewer people is done to no purpose by many. But this sort of plurality of judges lacks any necessity and benefit, because everything is better regulated by one than by many.
 Matthew 6:24, "No one can serve two masters; for he will either hate the one and love the other, or be devoted to the one and despise the other." Christ is talking not only about lords actually opposed, that is who actually order opposed things, but also about those who are inclined to the ordering of opposed things and of whom it is to be feared with probability that, disagreeing among themselves, they will order opposed things. Since human nature is inclined to disagreement, it should not without cause be feared that if the same community had two heads, those heads will disagree.
 Matthew 12:25, "Every kingdom divided against itself will be made desolate, and no city or house divided against itself will stand." Because different heads are inclined to disagreement, it follows that a community with two supreme judges is near to desolation and ruin
 Jerome (7, q. 1, c. In apibus [c.41]): "Among bees there is one ruler; cranes follow one of their number in learned order; there is one emperor and one judge in a province. When Rome was founded it could not have two brothers as kings at the same time and is destined for fratricide. In Rebecca's womb Esau and Jacob waged war; single bishops of churches, single archbishops, single archdeacons; and the whole ecclesiastical order rests on its rulers." Jerome's examples show that there should not be many supreme judges in the same community.
 A community is not well regulated if a powerful person with a large following is provoked to impatience and anger against another of the more powerful members in that same community also with a large following. Two supreme judges will probaly fall into such conflict, because, as the poet says, "All power is impatient of a partner." Cf. 23, q. 7, c. Quod autem nobis [c.3].
These arguments show that if there are several independent heads with power to coerce the same people for the same crimes and to command the same things of the same people, the community will always be exposed to discords, dissension, seditions, fighting and wars both between the heads themselves, with each trying to put himself ahead of the other, and among the subjects, some of whom will adhere to one and some to the other.
Objections against arguments of chapter 17:
Objection 1: Those arguments would also show that no community can be well-governed if it has many rulers, even if they do hold the same office. They could summon suspects to different places or send different retainers to capture them and take them to different places (cf. argument 1). They could also call their subjects to different places at the same time (cf, argument 2). There would be no advantage in plurality (cf. argument 3). Matthew 6:24 and Matthew 12:25 will still apply. So will Jerome's examples. The many rulers would also be impatient of a partner. If there are many men in charge of the same community in any way at all, there will be fear of dissension, struggles, seditions, quarrels, fighting and wars, if the above are sound. [Which is not true.]
Objection 2: There are many communities that are well regulated even though the same person is under many rulers. For example, the same man is the vassal of many lords, even of kings, none of whom is under another. The same cleric is under different bishops for different churches or benefices, and in the same case of the same person there can be many judges (Extra, De sententia et re iudicata, c.26; Extra, De rescriptis, c. Cum contingat [c.24])
Reply to objection 1: Whenever there are many in charge, even holding the same office or acting like one person, the community is not best regulated. It is often necessary because of different occurrences, however, to retreat from that best regulation, because sometimes the subjects would not support that single person, sometimes no one could be found who alone would be adequate to rule. Sometimes it is necessary for a reasonable cause to abandon the best way of ruling, namely the rule of one person, and to accept the rule of many.
Student: That reply can be made to all the arguments in chapter 17. They only prove that if a community of believers were to be best regulated it ought to have supreme head or judge, but it is not necessary that a community subject to various tribulations and afflictions be regulated in the best way. It can therefore have many supreme judges, that is an ecclesiastical and a secular one, so that all the believers are subject to the same people for the same crimes. Master: It could happen from the singular malice of some that it would be expedient for some time for the community to be subject to two supreme judges. But this would be to withdraw too far and too dangerously from the best organisation, and so it should not support such a way rule except in the most extraordinary case. As far as possible it is bound to try to have only one supreme judge. However, that judge can not and should not be the pope, because by Christ's decree the pope should as far as possible remove himself from secular affairs. If a community of believers is ordered in the best way, therefore, it will have one supreme secular judge who should be none other than the Roman emperor, when he is a catholic.
An argument additional to those of chapter 17: No christian can deny (as it seems to them) that neither by Christ's decree, nor by a decree of the apostles, or of the supreme pontiffs zealous for christian faith, or of general councils duly celebrated or of any of the just at all, is the best way of ruling believers, as far as the status of this present life allows forbidden to the community of believers, although sometimes the whole community of believers can not lay hold of this best way of ruling because of the wickedness of men. They infer from this that by Christ's decree the pope does not have universal jurisdiction over the whole christian people for every crime, and consequently it does not conflict with Christ's decree for some one else to have power over the whole christian people. The whole community or congregation of believers is not best ruled if it has many supreme judges who have the power to correct the same people for the same crimes, and such a way of ruling through different supreme judges was not decreed by Christ.
Reply to objection 2: Many communities with several rulers are well ordered, but not best ordered. Although someone can be the vassal of many lords and have some benefit from this because he holds many fiefs, yet he would have greater benefit if he were the vassal of only one lord for all those fiefs.
To the example of a cleric subject to different bishops for many benefices, the reply is that this is against common law and can only be done as a dispensation. Although in a particular case for a special reason, therefore, it may be consistent with the good ordering of clerics that someone be subject to many bishops, this is nevertheless not consistent with their best ordering because clerics are better ruled if the common law could always be preserved and no cleric have benefices in many bishoprics.
To the example of the judges the reply is that those judges have a superior judge and they are not supreme. That there are many happens for some particular reason, which would not arise when litigants were regulated as well as their condition permits. For this reason litigants seem to be best regulated when they choose harmoniously or commit themselves to the one judge.
*Objections against version 3:
See 3.2 Dial. 1.1-13
Student: If clerics are judged for any crime by the pope or other ecclesiastical judges inferior to him and for all laymen to be judged by a secular judge, the arguments adduced in chapter 17 do not seem to be conclusive. No one will have to be cited or called by different people to different places, no one will be forced to serve two masters, many men will not have power over the same people and there will be no power impatient of a partner,
Master: Those arguments, or some of them, demonstrate that that way of ruling a community of believers departs from the best way of ruling. Arguments 1 and 2 are ineffectual, but 3 seems to have some plausibility, since the whole community of believers could be ruled by one person. Argument 4 does not seem to be conclusive against version 3. Argument 5 can be adapted: if the community of believers has two parts, one of which has one supreme judge and the other another, the community of believers is organised towards division and is near to division. Argument 6 seems efficacious: Jerome's examples not only prove the singleness of a supreme judge over any multitude of people but also the singleness of a supreme judge over any place in which those subject to him live, so that in the same place there is no other supreme judge of anyone living in that place, just as there is only one bishop in the diocese of Paris and only one archbishop in the province of Milan. Argument 7 also seems efficacious, because power is not only impatient of a partner with respect to the same subjects but is also impatient of a partner in the same place. And so it is not appropriate for clerics to have one supreme ecclesiastical judge, that is the pope, and laymen to have one supreme secular judge, that is the emperor, since clerics and laymen live together in the same places.
Other arguments against version 3:
 As was argued in 3.2 Dial. 1.1, that rule is advantageous through which quarrels and disputes are more equitably and suitably settled. But quarrels and disputes which can arise between clerics and laymen for countless reasons are settled more equitably and suitably if everyone, both clerics and laymen, has one supreme judge under whom all should litigate.
 More opportunities for discord, strife, sedition, battles, wars and brawls arise among those living together than among those who are distant, if those living together do not have one supreme judge.
 Again, no community of those living together is best regulated in its political life unless it is one civilly. Whence also in regard to the faithful, just as they are one body in Christ (Romans 12:5), so also they should be one body or college in civil life. But that community which has various supreme judges or various heads or rulers is not one civilly.
*Objections against version 4:
 Such a community is not best regulated civilly, because opportunities for discord, quarrels, sedition, brawls, battles and wars are not cut off. If some powerful and rich layman commits different crimes, the punishment of some of which pertains to the secular judge and others to the ecclesiastical judge, both the secular and the ecclesiastical judges may want to sommon him, and from this will arise strife and sedition, brawling and war between the judges themselves and consequently between their subjects.
All the arguments of 3.2 Dial. 1.1 and of chapter 17 above apply. Although more unsuitable things follow from versions 2 and 3, some follow from 4:  If laymen are subject to both an ecclesiastical judge and a secular one, even if for different cases, both judges may call someone to different places at the same time.  The common good of laymen will be hindered because they will not be able to obey both supreme judges if they are called to different places at the same time for common business.  Laymen will not be able to serve two masters, the secular and the ecclesiastical head, who are inclined to disagreement.  An ecclesiastical and a secular judge will be able to be divided against each other for numberless reasons. Therefore the whole community of believers will easily be laid waste.  There should be one bishop in one diocese and one archbishop in one province, as Jerome attests, because he proves singleness by many examples. There should be one supreme judge over laymen, therefore, not only for the same crimes but also for all crimes.  All power is impatient of a partner, and especially over the same subjects and for different cases. The judges will therefore be quickly provoked to anger, and consequently to strife, brawling, war and battle.
The conclusion therefore, is that a community of believers will not be best regulated civilly, and with respect to its political life, unless each and every part of it has one supreme judge and ruler.
*Objections against version 5:
Some people maintain that the emperor is in every case the judge of all Christians except the pope, who is completely exempt from the jurisdiction of every mortal. All other clerics, however, are exempt only through the privileges of emperors and kings. The criticism of this version is as follows:  Just as peace is endangered if two multitudes live in the same place without one supreme judge, so is peace endangered if someone who can have a great and powerful following (as the pope can, being head of the Christians) lives with others but is not a subject.
*Two points basic to objections against alternatives to Opinion 2A
The argument of chapters 17-21 is based on two points: (i) that no community, whether universal or particular, is best regulated unless it has one supreme head or ruler, to whom everyone else, with no exception, is subject with respect to everything that has necessarily to be done for the common benefit. (For (ii) see below.) This seems to have much plausibility, because where there is not unity, it is not easy to preserve harmony.
(i) The unity of a community requires one head:
 There is not one gathering or multitude, however, whether universal or particular, which does not have one head or ruler. Cyprian, 24, q. 1, c. Loquitur [c.18], says that where there is a unity its beginning must spring from one thing -- "the beginning proceeds from oneness." That one thing is nothing but the head and ruler. No community is truly one, therefore, unless it has one head and ruler and all the others are members.
 The unity of a community is nothing but a unity of order [cf. Marsilius, Defensor, I.xvii.11] according to superiority and inferiority, so that everyone is an inferior or a superior with respect to another person, or many are inferior with respect to one superior (because where there were many superiors with respect to one inferior there would not be the most genuine unity which is the best regulation of a community). The supreme superior in the most all-embracing community must therefore be single, and so it seems that no community, whether particular or universal, is best ordered unless it has one head or ruler, whose subject everyone one else is.
(ii) The supreme head is not the pope:
The second point is that the emperor and other laymen are not subject to the pope in all matters pertaining to their governing and being corrected. For arguments for this see 3.2 Dial. 1.28, 2.1, 2.12, 2.14 and 2.15.
Further argument:  (touched on in 1.28) The emperor is not the pope's inferior in respect of matters in which it is not licit to appeal from the emperor to the pope, and there are many such matters: 2, q. 6, c. Omnis [c.3], gloss on sacerdotum, says "Appeal can be made therefore from a secular judge to the pope, which is true with the empire unoccupied, as in Extra, De foro competenti, c. Licet, at other times not, Extra, De appellationibus, c. Si duobus"; also, the gloss on commune says, "That is publicly, so that a secular judge hears secular cases and an ecclesiastical judge ecclesiastical cases. And so what is said in the text is plain, when Anacletus says, that is, 'Let ecclesiastical business be judged before the patriarch or primate and secular business before a nobleman'", showing that in secular business there should be no appeal to the pope from a secular judge, nor consequently from the emperor.
*Appeal from secular judges to the pope:
Student: If in accordance with the first gloss it is permitted to appeal to the pope when the empire is unoccupied, the pope could make dispositions for the empire, and the emperor would inferior to the pope; and so even when the empire is not unoccupied it is permitted to appeal from the emperor to the pope, even in secular cases. Master: When the empire is unoccupied, the pope's power derives from the authority of the emperor appointing him as his vicar, or the authority of others, that is of the Romans or of princes to whom the power of arranging who ought to act in place of the emperor when the empire is unoccupied has been committed. If it is possible then to appeal to the pope, it is because he acts in the emperor's place. A vicar is always inferior to him whose vicar he is.
Student: If in a secular case the emperor or another secular judge does not want to execute justice, the pope can alleviate a case made faulty like this, and recourse should be had to him or to another ecclesiastical judge in order to obtain justice (Extra, De foro competenti, c. Ex transmissa [c.6], c. Verum [c.7], c. Licet [c.10], c Ex tenore [c.11]). Therefore it is permitted to appeal from the emperor and other secular judges to the pope.
Master: We nowhere find in canon law that if the emperor has neglected to do justice in a secular case the pope can, by that very fact, execute justice in that case on the authority of his papal office and by the decree of Christ. The pope's interventions are by a custom which the emperor knows and approves, or at least knows and does not prohibit.
An inferior can sometimes make good the negligence of a superior (Extra, De electione, c. Cum in cunctis [c.7]; Extra, De concessione praebendarum, c. Nulla [c.2] and c. Quia diversitatem [c.5]; 9, q. 3, c. Cum simus [c.3], dist. 89. Cf. 9, q. 3, c. Volumus, gloss: "An argument that f a prelate does not want or neglects to do those things that he ought to do, those things should be made good by his subjects." Cf. also dist. 65, c. Si forte, gloss: "It is argued that if subjects neglect to do what they should, those things ought to be made good by one who is greater, either himself or though someone else, and conversely." Inferiors can make good the negligence of their superiors, especially since they can often correct their superiors and even coerce them (9, q. 3, c. Salvo [c.4]; 9, q. 3, c. Si autem). If the inferior makes good negligence, this does not mean that appeal lies to the inferior.
Student: Ecclesiastical inferiors can make good the negligence of superiors by authority of church councils, which are superior to both (Extra, De concessione praebendarum, c. Quia diversitatem [c.5]). But the pope makes good the emperor's negligence by his own authority, not by authority of canon law. Therefore by virtue of his office he is greater than the emperor in such things and than all other secular judges.
Master: It is by virtue of custom, which is equivalent to law, that the pope makes good the negligence of secular judges, and not by the authority of his office. Such a custom can be introduced (i) by the tacit or express authority or consent of the emperor and the secular judges, to whom it can be soothing that the pope makes good their negligence, or they can knowingly tolerate the pope's doing this. Or else (ii) it can be introduced by the authority of the people who want the pope to have or agree to his having power of this kind. Or (iii) it can be introduced on the authority of natural reason, which prescribes that justice should not be neglected but rather is always preserved in a community. In case (i) the custom could be abolished by the emperor, but not by inferior secular judges. However, if the emperor revoked the custom of this kind but neglected, and allowed his judges to neglect, justice, and did not allow the pope or another to make good this negligence, and were to appear wholly incorrigible, he should be deposed as a destroyer and perverter of justice.
*Second argument for Opinion 2A
Argument: The pope is not more exempt from the coercive jurisdiction of the emperor and other secular judges than were Christ and the apostles; but (i) Christ, as a mortal man, and (ii) the apostles were under the emperor, as far as his coercive jurisdiction was concerned; therefore the pope is also. (See 1 Dial., 6.4, 5.) Argument for both parts of the minor premise: (i) Anyone who can be accused and against whom others can testify can be judged. Christ was able to be accused (John 8:46, "Which of you convicts me of sin?" -- by these words Christ granted to others the power to accuse him; cf. Extra, De haereticis, c. Cum ex iniuncto [c.12].)
Power to make accusations against Christ:
Student: These words imply it was only of his own free will that Christ submitted himself to the accusations of his subjects. They do not prove that the pope must submit to the judgement of the emperor, though he can submit of his own free will. Master: Others think that the words show that Christ could be accused, in the sense that the judges could not reject those wanting to accuse Christ except for a reason, because Christ gave power to accuse to those wanting to accuse him. And consequently, by virtue of that power given by Christ the judges were superior to Christ, in so far as he was a mortal man, and Christ was thus inferior to them, although by his own free will, just as also by his own free will he was mortal and able to suffer. [Only MSS Na and Ve have the rest of Chapter 23] He gave others power to testify against him: "If I have spoken wrongly, testify to the wrong" (John 18:23). According to Gratian 2, q. 7, para. Ecce ostensum est [c.39], Christ did not distribute offices in the Church because he had not been visibly anointed king or a priest so was not a prelate, which implies that as mortal man Christ was subject to those who were in command among that people. Student: But Gratian also says that Christ allowed others to accuse him out of humility, not in the strictness of the law. Master: As God, Christ was above the law, but as a man he willingly subjected himself to the law out of the perfection of his humility. Just as long as he consented out of humility he was subject to those who were judges among the people. Student: Similarly the pope is subject only while he consents. Master: The similarity is not complete. As vicar (only) of Christ, he does not have all the power that Christ, even as a man, had; for example, Christ established the sacraments and could make a dispensation against them, but the pope cannot. The pope is bound to observe what Christ taught by precept and example, including subjection to judges
Christ was also subject to his mother and his putative father (Luke 2:51). Therefore he was subject to those who were the superiors and lords of his putative father and his mother, and the Romans were such people. Joseph went up from Galilee to Bethlehem to be registered and to make himself and Mary, to whom he was engaged, subject to the emperor (Luke 2:4-5).
(ii) The apostles and other Christians were subject to the emperor:
Christ did not deprive anyone, even someone secular and unbelieving, of his right. But before they were apostles, the apostles were subject to the emperor and other secular and unbelieving powers; after they were apostles, therefore, they were subject to the same people and in the same things. Ambrose: "Admonish them to be subject to princes and powers, as if, although you have a spiritual empire, yet advise them to be subject to princes, that is kings, dukes and minor powers, because the christian religion deprives no one of his right." Augustine: "My kingdom is not of this world; you have been deceived; I am not impeding your domination in the world, so you fear and rage vainly." Leo: "The Lord of the world does not seek a temporal kingdom; his eternal kingdom surpasses it." The church sings as follows, "He who gives celestial kingdoms does not snatch at mortal ones." No one lost any right because of the fact that someone, whether an apostle or someone else, becomes or became a christian in the time of Christ. "Let all who are under the yoke of slavery regard their masters as worthy of all honour, so that the name of God and the teaching may not be blasphemed" (1 Tim. 6:1). Cf. Augustine's exposition of those words. ******reference? "For the Lord's sake accept the authority of every human institution, whether of the emperor as supreme, or of governors as sent by him to punish those who do wrong and to praise those who do right" (1 Peter 2:13). Cf. Innocent III, Extra, De maioritate et obedientia, c. Solitae [c.6].
Argument based on the scriptures: If the christian religion does not deprive any unbelieving lord, prince, emperor or other of his right (above), it is much more the case that it does not deprive a believing emperor and other believing lords of their right. After Paul says, "Let all who are under the yoke of slavery regard their masters as worthy of all honour" (1 Tim. 6:1-2), he immediately adds, "Those who have believing masters must not be disrespectful to them on the grounds that they are brothers; rather they must serve them all the more since they are brothers and beloved." Therefore a believing emperor lost no right because of the christian religion; the pope is subject to the emperor, therefore, in all those things in which he was subject before his papacy.
Student: Even before his papacy the pope was not subject to the emperor because he was a bishop or cleric. Master: Bishops are subject to the emperor. Also, a pure slave of the emperor, even if he did not have the clerical tonsure, could be elected as pope. Student: A lesser dignity frees one from paternal and seignorial power; much more is one elected pope by that very fact freed from all jurisdiction of the emperor. Master: Some reject that objection. That some lesser dignity frees a person from paternal and seignorial power is by human regulation, not by divine regulation, and so one elected as pope can by the emperor's regulation be released from the power of inferior judges; but he is not released by divine ordinance.
This is also proved by the following argument. No more should someone be deprived against his will of a right he has in someone when some ecclesiastical dignity, without which he can be saved, is conferred on the latter, than someone should be deprived of the right which he has in his son when baptism, without which he can not be saved, is conferred on that son. But jews and other unbelievers should not be deprived against their will of the right which they have in their children when they are baptised, and those children should not be baptised lest their fathers are deprived of a right which they have in them. It is much more the case, therefore, that whenever someone who was the servant of the emperor or was otherwise subject to him becomes pope, the emperor will not be unwillingly deprived ... .
[The work is incomplete. Presumably the arguments in favour of Opinion 2A would have been criticised if the work had continued, and presumably Ockham's own opinion -- which can be gathered perhaps from OQ3 -- would have been among the other "ways of putting" opinion 2]