Part 1, Book 6, chapters 16-35

Capitulum 16

Chapter 16

Discipulus: Audivi rationes quibus ostenditur quod catholici potestatem habent inquirendi de papa super crimine heresis diffamato, occasione quarum accedit michi voluntas specialiter indagandi an propter appellationem aliquorum contra papam pro causa heresis interiectam catholici habeant potestatem inquirendi de summo pontifice. Cum enim talis appellatio sit diffamatoria pape, videtur, quod si prelati habent potestatem inquirendi de papa super crimine heresis diffamato, quod etiam propter talem appellationem eandem obtinent potestatem. Unde de hoc quid sentiant literati indicare digneris.

Student: I have heard the reasons by which one shows that catholics have power to inquire about a pope defamed of the crime of heresy. I now would want to investigate specifically, in connection with these reasons, whether catholics have power to inquire about the supreme pontiff because some of them have issued an appeal against him alleging heresy. Indeed, since such an appeal slanders the pope, it would appear, if prelates have the power to inquire about a pope defamed of the crime of heresy, that they also obtain the same power because of such an appeal. Therefore be so good as to indicate what the learned think about this.

Magister: Circa hoc sunt assertiones contrarie, quibusdam dicentibus quod in nullo casu est appellationi contra summum pontificem deferendum nec propter eam aliquid est agendum, aliis dicentibus quod appellationi pro causa heresis contra summum pontificem interiecte debent prelati deferre et propter eam oportet eos de iure de tali appellatione cognoscere.

Master: There are contrary assertions on the issue. Some say that under no circumstance must one defer to an appeal against the supreme pontiff, nor must anything be done on its account. Others claim that prelates must defer to an appeal alleging heresy issued against the supreme pontiff, and that the nature of the cause requires them to legally acknowledge the appeal.

Discipulus: Motiva prime assertionis allega.

Student: Present the arguments for the first assertion.

Magister: Prima assertio auctoritatibus et rationibus videtur posse probare. Prima auctoritas est Gelasii pape et ponitur 9 q. 3 c. Ipsi, qui ait: "ipsi sunt canones qui appellationes totius ecclesie ad huius sedis examen voluerunt deferre. Ab ipsa vero nunquam prorsus appellare debere sanxerunt". Secunda est eiusdem c. sequenti qui ait: "cuncta per mundum novit ecclesia quod sacrosancta romana ecclesia fas de omnibus habet iudicandi, neque cuiquam de eius liceat iudicare iudicio. Siquidem ad illam de qualibet mundi parte appellandum est, ab illa autem nemo est appellare permissus". Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod in nullo casu a papa appellare licet, quia canones supradicti absolute sine omni distinctione affirmant quod a romana ecclesia appellari non licet, ergo nec nos debemus distinguere.

Master: Authorities and reasons, it seems, can prove the first assertion. The first authority is that of Pope Gelasius (and it is expressed in 9 q. 3 c. Ipsi) [col. 611] who states: "these are the canons which willed the referral of appeals from the entire church to the scrutiny of this see, while decreeing that at no time was it ever allowed to appeal therefrom". The second authority is of the same pope (expressed in the next chapter) [col. 611] who states: "the entire church throughout the world knew that the sacrosanct Roman church has the right to judge all matters, and that no one is allowed to legally question its judgement. For one must appeal to it from any part of the world, while no one is permitted to appeal from it". One gathers from these words that in no case is it allowed to appeal from the pope. Because the aforementioned canons affirm absolutely, without any distinction, that it is not permitted to appeal from the Roman church, therefore we also cannot make any distinction.

Discipulus: Pro eadem assertione rationes adducas.

Student: Present reasons in favour of the same assertion.

Magister: Prima ratio talis est. Ab illo qui non habet superiorem in terris appellare non licet (2 q. 6 c. Anteriorum), sed papa non habet superiorem in terris cum ipse sit caput et iudex omnium christianorum. Ergo a papa appellare non licet. Secunda ratio est hec. Qui licite pro causa heresis appellat ab aliquo est totaliter a iurisdictione ipsius exemptus, quia omnis appellans in eo super quo appellat est exemptus a iurisdictione illius a quo appellat (Extra, De appellationibus, Cum teneamur et c. Proposuit). Qui autem appellat super causa heresis appellat super tota iurisdictione illius a quo appellat, quia si est hereticus nullam habet iurisdictionem omnino. Ergo qui appellat ab aliquo super causa heresis a iurisdictione ipsius est exemptus omnino. Sed nullus christianus est exemptus omnino a iurisdictione pape, ergo nulli licet appellare ab ipso. Tertia ratio est hec. Ab illo appellare non licet a cuius obedientia non licet recedere, quia appellans recedit ab obedientia illius a quo appellat. Sed nulli christiano licet recedere ab obedientia pape (dis. 12 c. Preceptis), ergo nulli christiano licet a summo pontifice appellare. Quarto sic. Ab illo appellare non licet ad quem est ab omnibus si oppressi fuerint appellandum, quia non licet eidem in eadem causa appellare ab aliquo et ad ipsum. Sed omni christiano in causa heresis si oppressus fuerit licet appellare ad papam (2 q. 6 c. Si quis et c. Omnis et c. Ad romanam 1 et c. Ad romanam 2), ergo nulli christiano licet in causa heresis appellare a papa. Quinto sic. Sicut imperator primatum habet in temporalibus ita papa in spiritualibus primatum noscitur obtinere. Sed nulli pro aliqua causa temporali licet appellare ab imperatore secundum leges. Ergo nulli licet appellare pro causa spirituali a papa, et per consequens pro causa heresis non est a summo pontifice appellandum. Sexto sic. Ab illo ad quem sunt omnes cause fidei deferende non est pro causa fidei appellandum. Sed omnes cause fidei sunt ad summum pontificem deferende (24 q. 1 c. Quotiens et Extra, De baptismo et eius effectu, Maiores et dis. 17 Multis). Ergo pro causa fidei non est a summo pontifice appellandum. Ex quo concluditur quod si contingeret aliquem contra papam temere appellare tali appellationi esset minime deferendum et propter eam non esset de papa aliqualiter inquirendum nec aliquid aliud innovandum.

Master: The first reason is this. One is not allowed to appeal from him who has no superior on earth (2 q. 6 c. Anteriorum) [col.474] . But the pope has no superior on earth since he is the head and the judge of all Christians. Therefore one is not allowed to appeal from the pope. The second reason is this. He who appeals legitimately for cause of heresy from someone is totally exempt from that someone's jurisdiction, because every appellant is exempt from the jurisdiction of the one from whom he appeals with respect to the issue concerning which he is appealing (Extra, De appellationibus, Cum teneamur [col. 415] , and c. Proposuit) [col. 417] . But he who appeals for cause of heresy appeals from the entire jurisdiction of him from whom he appeals, because if the latter is a heretic then he possesses no jurisdiction at all. Therefore he who appeals from someone for cause of heresy is completely exempt from that someone's jurisdiction. But no Christian is totally exempt from the jurisdiction of the pope. Therefore no one is allowed to appeal from him. The third reason is this. An appeal from someone from whose obedience one cannot withdraw is not allowed, because the appellant withdraws obedience from the one from whom he appeals. But no Christian is allowed to withdraw obedience from the pope (dis. 12 c. Preceptis) [col. 27] . Therefore no Christian is allowed to appeal from the supreme pontiff. Fourthly thus: it is not permitted to appeal from someone to whom all must appeal should they be oppressed, because it is not allowed to appeal both to and from someone in the same case. But in a case of heresy every Christian, if oppressed, may appeal to the pope (2 q. 6 c. Si quis [col. 467, 468, 472] , and c. Omnis [col. 467] , and c. Ad Romanam [col. 467] , and c. Ad Romanam 2) [col. 468] . Therefore no Christian is allowed to appeal from the pope in a case of heresy. Fifthly thus: just as the emperor possesses primacy in temporal affairs, so is the pope known to possess primacy in spiritual affairs. But according to the laws no one is permitted to appeal from the emperor for some temporal cause. Therefore no one may appeal from the pope in a spiritual cause, and consequently one must not appeal from the supreme pontiff for cause of heresy. Sixthly thus: one must not appeal in a case of faith from someone to whom all such cases are to be directed. But all cases of faith must be deferred to the supreme pontiff (24 q. 1 c. Quotiens [col. 970] , and Extra, De baptismo et eius effectu, Maiores, [col. 644] and dis. 17 Multis) [cols. 51-52] . Therefore one must not appeal from the supreme pontiff in a case of faith. From which the conclusion is that if someone were to recklessly appeal against the pope, such an appeal ought not to be received, and there would be no obligation on its account to inquire about the pope in any way or to make any other changes in the existing state of affairs.

Capitulum 17

Chapter 17

Discipulus: Iste allegationes pro assertione predicta videntur fortes, quarum virtutes magis advertam si recitaveris quomodo respondetur ad illas et qualiter assertio contraria fulciatur. Unde primo assertionem contrariam munire nitaris, secundo narra quomodo ad rationes prescriptas respondetur.

Student: The arguments in favour of the aforestated assertion appear to be strong. I shall better grasp their merits if you were to recite how one responds to them and how the contrary assertion is supported. Therefore attempt first of all to strengthen this contrary assertion and, secondly, recount how one responds to the aforewritten reasons.

Magister: Assertionem contrariam melius intelliges si tibi fuerit per particulas explicata.

Master: You would understand the contrary assertion better if its constituent parts were explained to you.

Discipulus: Hoc peto ut facias.

Student: I request that you proceed in this manner.

Magister: Assertio contraria medullitus explicata tres continet conclusiones, quarum prima est quod a papa catholico quamvis de heresi publice diffamato pro causa heresis directe appellare non licet, nisi forte aliquis deceptus haberet iustam causam credendi papam esse hereticum. Secunda conclusio est quod a papa heretico licet appellare. Tertia conclusio est quod si aliquis de facto appellaret a papa catholico, antequam constaret appellationem huiusmodi non esse legitimam esset appellationi deferendum eiusdem.

Master: The quintessential explanation of the contrary assertion involves three conclusions. The first is that one is not allowed to appeal directly for cause of heresy from a catholic pope (even a pope publicly slandered of heresy) unless, perhaps, one were deceived into having just cause to believe that the pope is a heretic. The second conclusion is that one is allowed to appeal from a heretic pope. The third conclusion is that is someone were to appeal de facto from a catholic pope, his appeal would have to be legally honoured before it was established that this appeal was not legitimate.

Discipulus: Istas tres conclusiones cupio per ordinem pertractari. Primam autem cupio explicari quia plures partes continere videtur quas non bene intelligo. Ignoro etiam quare illud adverbium "directe" adiungitur.

Student: I want to deal with these three conclusions in proper order. But I want the first conclusion to be explained [further] because it seems to contain a number of distinct parts, which I do not quite understand. For instance, I have no idea why the adverb "directly" is appended here.

Magister: Bene dicis quod predicta conclusio tenet plures partes, quia tres continet explicite vel implicite. Quarum prima est quod qui non est deceptus de fidelitate pape, quia videlicet non habet probabilem causam credendi papam esse hereticum, non debet ab eo directe pro causa heresis appellare sibi videlicet heresim imponendo vel ipsum de heresi accusando aut quomodolibet diffamando. Secunda pars est quod in casu liceret non decepto de fidelitate pape indirecte contra ipsum pro causa heresis appellare, puta si sciret papam de heresi mendaciter diffamatum nolle se purgare vel iudicio submittendo vel alio modo debito scandalum exortum de ipso sedare. Tunc enim talis posset pro causa heresis papam ad iudicium provocare, non sibi heresim imponendo sed allegando quod papa super crimine heresis mendaciter diffamatus exortum scandalum sedare tenetur. Tertia pars est quod deceptus habens iustam causam credendi papam esse hereticum posset licite a papa catholico appellare.

Master: Your statement that the conclusion we are discussing contains a number of parts is well put, since it involves three such, explicitly or implicitly. The first thereof is that one who is not deceived as to the pope's fidelity (namely because he has no probable cause to believe that the pope is a heretic) must not appeal from him directly for cause of heresy, namely by imputing a heresy to him, or by accusing him of heresy, or slandering him in any way. The second part is that occasionally it would be permitted to someone not deceived as to the pope's fidelity to appeal against him indirectly for cause of heresy, for instance if he knew that a pope falsely defamed of heresy refused to clear his name or to abate the scandal created about him either by submitting to judgement or by some other appropriate means. For in such a situation this person might challenge the pope to judgement for cause of heresy, not by imputing a heresy to him, but by alleging that a pope falsely slandered of the crime of heresy is obligated to abate the created scandal. The third part holds that a deceived individual having just cause to believe that the pope is a heretic may licitly appeal from a catholic pope.

Discipulus: Nova quidem et irrationabilia, ut michi videtur, infers auribus meis. Prima enim pars apparet michi vera sed duas sequentes reputo falsas, et tamen pro omnibus allegationes audire desidero.

Student: It surely appears to me that you are pouring into my ears theses both new and unreasonable. For the first part appears to me to be true, but I consider the two parts which follow to be false. Nevertheless, I would like to hear arguments in support of all three parts.

Magister: Pro prima sic arguitur. Appellans directe pro causa heresis ab aliquo heresim imponit eidem. Sed nulli non decepto licet imponere heresim pape catholico, ergo etc. Pro secunda parte sic arguitur. Salus catholice fidei preferenda est summo pontifici quantumcunque sciatur catholicus. Si ergo papa catholicus super heresim diffamaretur, ex qua infamia periclitaretur fides, si nollet se catholicum declarare in favorem fidei christiane, liceret contra papam appellare provocando eum ad iudicium ut videlicet cogeretur pro salute fidei suam innocentiam declarare, et ita indirecte licet pro causa fidei a papa catholico appellare. Pro tertia parte allegatur sic. Cui licet pro aliqua causa appellare si non est deceptus eidem licet pro eadem causa appellare si absque culpa sua est deceptus, sicut iudex deceptus per falsos testes vel falsa instrumenta eandem potest licite proferre sententiam quam liceret sibi proferre si eadem causa esset per testes legitimos vel vera instrumenta probata. Propter quod ecclesia decepta falsam proferendo sententiam non peccat, imo peccaret si, decepta, sententiam que est iniusta ex parte rei non ex parte ferentis non ferret. Sed qui scit papam esse hereticum potest contra eum licite appellare. Ergo deceptus habens iustam causam credendi papam esse hereticum quamvis non sit potest contra eum pro causa heresis licite appellare. Ad probandum autem quod aliquis potest habere iustam causam credendi aliquem esse hereticum quamvis in rei veritate non sit hereticus, quere argumenta libro *** De optimo genere addiscendi.

Master: This is how one argues in favour of the first part. One who appeals directly from someone for cause of heresy imposes heresy on that someone. But it is not permitted to one who is not deceived to impose heresy on a catholic pope, therefore, etc. Here is the argument in favour of the second part. The safety of the catholic faith is to be preferred to the supreme pontiff, no matter how much the latter is known to be a catholic. Therefore if a catholic pope was slandered of heresy (a disgrace endangering the faith), and if he refused to declare himself a catholic in favour of the Christian faith, it would be permitted to appeal against the pope, challenging him to judgement, so that, namely, he would be forced to declare his innocence for the safety of the faith; and thus it is indirectly allowed to appeal from a catholic pope for the cause of the faith. For the third part one argues thus. He who may appeal for some cause if he is not deceived is allowed to appeal for the same cause if he is deceived through no fault of his own, just as a judge who is deceived by false witnesses or false legal documents may licitly render the same decision which he would be allowed to render if the same cause were proved by legitimate witnesses or authentic legal documents. This is why the deceived church does not sin when it pronounces a false judgement; indeed the church would sin if, when deceived, it would not pronounce a judgement, which is unjust as to its substance though not as to its source. But he who knows that the pope is a heretic may licitly appeal against him. Therefore a deceived individual having just cause to believe that the pope is a heretic (though in fact he is not) may licitly appeal against him for cause of heresy. And in order to prove that one may have just cause to believe that someone is a heretic, although in truth that someone is not a heretic, turn to the arguments presented in book ??? of "The best method of learning".[cf. Introduction to 1 Dial. 6.16-35]

Capitulum 18

Chapter 18

Discipulus: Non requiro pro nunc plures allegationes pro tribus assertionibus supradictis, quia de aliquibus earum postea occasionem habebo loquendi. Ideo ad secundam conclusionem principalem te converte et ad probandum quod licet a papa heretico appellare allegare coneris.

Student: I am not at this point asking for additional arguments in support of the three aforementioned assertions, because I shall later have the opportunity to speak about some of them. Proceed therefore to the second main conclusion, and attempt to present arguments proving that one is permitted to appeal from a heretic pope.

Magister: Antequam adducantur allegationes quod a papa heretico liceat appellare expedit tibi, forte ut eas melius intelligas, modum ponendi explicite aperiri.

Master: Before adducing arguments that it is permissible to appeal from a heretic pope, it is perhaps convenient to explain this proposition to you more explicitly, so that you may better grasp the arguments in question.

Discipulus: Hoc volo.

Student: This is what I want.

Magister: Ponentes licere a papa heretico appellare nollent ad strictissimam significationem appellationis artari.

Master: Those who contend that it is permitted to appeal from a heretic pope would not wish to be bound by the most precise understanding of what constitutes an "appeal".

Discipulus: Ergo appellatio habet plures significationes.

Student: Therefore an appeal can mean many things.

Magister: Quod nomen appellationis plures significationes habeat Alexander tertius (Extra, De appellationibus, c. Cum sit romana) aperte insinuat, dicens: "sacri canones etiam extra iudicium passim appellare permittunt, non solent huiusmodi dici appellationes sed provocationes ad causam". Ubi dicit glossa: "loquitur de appellationibus que fiunt extra iudicium ab adversario, ne faciat aliquid in preiudicium appellantis super eo pro quo appellat, et tales appellationes quasi provocationes sunt ad causam, et talibus appellationibus est deferendum (infra eodem, capitulo Bone) et tales appellationes faciunt clerici frequenter in se et in electionibus et pro aliis negotiis ecclesie, supra De electione c. Consideravimus et c. Bone et c. Auditis, infra, De his que fiunt a maiori parte capituli, c. 1." Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod appellatio plures habet significationes. Aliqua enim appellatio est que continet querelam inique sententie et fit a iudice. Aliqua autem est appellatio que non continet querelam inique sententie, que quandoque non est a iudice sed est provocatio quedam ad causam ne aliquid fiat illicite.

Master: Alexander III (in Extra, De appellationibus, c. Cum sit romana) [col. 411] openly suggests that the term "appeal" has many meanings, saying: "the sacred canons allow one to occasionally appeal even outside of the judicial process; such statements are not usually called appeals but challenges to appear in court". The gloss [col. 909] explains this as follows: "he speaks of appeals from an opponent made outside of the courtroom, lest this opponent do something prejudicing the appellant on the substance of his appeal. Such appeals are, so to speak, challenges to appear in court. Such appeals must be legally honoured (see below, same section, c. Bone) [col. 429]. Clerks are frequently involved in such appeals among themselves, in matters of elections and other ecclesiastical affairs (see above, De electione, c. Consideravimus [col. 53], and c. Bone [col. 66], and c. Auditis [col. 74], and below, De hiis que fiunt a maiori parte capituli, c. 1[col. 506] ". One gathers from these words that an appeal has many meanings. For one type of appeal is that which complains of an unjust sentence, and here the appeal is from a judge; while another type of appeal is that which does not complain of an unjust sentence, and which is sometimes not an appeal from a judge, but a kind of challenge to appear in court, so that nothing would be done illegally.

Discipulus: Applica ista ad propositum.

Student: Apply this to the matter at hand.

Magister: Dicunt assertores predicti quod largissime uti volunt nomine appellationis, ne videantur concedere quod appellans a papa heretico eo ipso quod appellat habet papam hereticum pro iudice, quia eo ipso quod aliquis appellat a papa heretico habet ipsum pro non iudice, quem tamen ad causam provocare intendit, ne in preiudicium appellantis et omnium catholicorum papali utatur officio.

Master: The aforementioned theorists say that they want to use the term "appeal" in the widest sense, lest they might appear to concede that he who appeals from a heretic pope recognizes the heretic pope as a judge by the very fact of the appeal; because by the very fact that someone appeals from a heretic pope, that someone refuses to recognize him as a judge, intending nevertheless to challenge the heretic pope to appear in court, lest he exercise the papal office to the prejudice of the appellant and of all catholics.

Discipulus: Hoc ultimo dictum contraria videtur includere, nam si licet appellare a papa heretico maxime liceret appellare ab ipso si aliquo litigante coram ipso super questione fidei papa contra fidem diffinitivam proferret sententiam. Puta si aliquis accusans alium quod teneret Christum non fuisse natum de virgine, si papa daret sententiam diffinitivam pro eo, diffiniendo quod Christum non fuit natus de virgine, liceret actori a sententia pape appellare. Talis autem appellatio esset appellatio propriissime dicta, quia esset provocatio inique sententie querelam continens. Ergo isti non tantum debent loqui de appellatione largissime sumpta sed etiam de appellatione strictissime sumpta.

Student: What has just been said appears to involve contradictions. Indeed, if it is permissible to appeal from a heretic pope, an appeal from him would be allowed above all if the pope were to render a definitive judgement against the faith when someone was legally appearing before him on a matter of faith. For instance, were someone to accuse another of holding the view that Christ was not born of a virgin, if the pope gave a definitive judgement in favour of the accused by defining that Christ was not born of a virgin, the accuser would be allowed to appeal from the pope's sentence. And such an appeal would be a most proper one, because it would be a challenge to an unjust sentence involving a complaint. Therefore these theorists should speak not only of an appeal in the widest sense but also of an appeal in the strictest sense.

Magister: Ista obiectio, ut dicunt, est tam frivola quod responsione non eget. Nam quamvis dicant se velle loqui de appellatione largissime sumpta, non propter hoc dicunt se nunquam velle loqui de appellatione stricte sumpta. Porro ex obiectione predicta datur michi occasio explicandi modum ponendi eorum.

Master: They say that this objection is frivolous to the point of not requiring a response. For although they do say that they want to speak of an appeal in the widest sense, they do not for all that say that they never want to speak of an appeal in the strict sense. Furthermore, the stated objection gives me an opportunity to explain their position.

Discipulus: Explica.

Student: Explain it.

Magister: Duo dicunt. Primum est quod a papa heretico in casu licet appellationem stricte sumptam emittere, illam appellationem videlicet que est provocatio inique sententie querelam continens, puta si aliquibus litigantibus coram ipso super questione fidei, pro altero eorum, accusatore vel accusato, diffinitivam contra fidem proferret sententiam. Secundo dicunt quod si papa fiat hereticus ex causa quacunque, etiam ille qui non litigat coram ipso potest appellare contra ipsum, et ista appellatio erit provocatio et non erit proprie dicta appellatio.

Master: These theorists make two statements. The first is that one may occasionally launch an appeal in the strict sense from a heretic pope, that is to say an appeal that challenges an unjust sentence and involves a complaint. This can be done, for instance, if some persons litigate before the pope on a question of faith, and the pope renders a definitive sentence against the faith, which favours one of the litigants (either the accuser or the accused). Secondly, they say that if the pope becomes a heretic for whatever reason, then even someone who is not pursuing the case in the pope's court may appeal against him, and this appeal will then be a challenge rather than an appeal in the proper sense.

Discipulus: Probabilitatem videtur habere quod si papa in preiudicium litigantis coram ipso super questione fidei iniquam contra fidem catholicam diffinitivam proferret sententiam, liceret eidem a tali iniqua sententia appellare, sed alii appellare non liceret quia sua non interest cum contra eum non sit prolata sententia. Item, quamvis de crimine commisso extra iudicium possit aliquis accusari non est tamen contra eum appellandum. Quamvis ergo papa extra iudicium factus hereticus de heresi valeat accusari, non tamen appellandum est ab ipso sicut neque est appellandum a quolibet criminoso, licet quilibet criminosus valeat accusari.

Student: It appears probable that if the pope were to render an unjust definitive judgement against the catholic faith, prejudicing someone litigating before him on a question of faith, it would be permissible for that someone to appeal from this unjust sentence. But the option of an appeal would not be allowed to anyone else: the issue would be none of his business since the judgement is not rendered against him. Furthermore, although someone can be accused of a crime committed outside of the courtroom, one should nevertheless not appeal against him. Therefore although the pope who has become a heretic outside of the courtroom may be accused of heresy, one must nevertheless not appeal from him, just as one should not appeal from any criminal even though any criminal may be subject to an accusation.

Magister: Ad primam istarum obiectionum respondetur quod quia questio fidei est questio communis et ad omnes pertinet christianos (dis. 96 c. Ubinam ubi Nicholaus papa ait: "ubinam legistis imperatores antecessores vestros sinodalibus conventibus interfuisse, nisi forsitan in quibusdam ubi de fide tractatum est, que universalis est, que omnium communis est, que non solum ad clericos verum etiam ad laicos et ad omnes omnino pertinet christianos"), ideo non solum litigantis sed etiam cuiuslibet catholici interest contra iniquam sententiam pape contra fidem prolatam appellare, quia talis sententia cuilibet christiano preiudicium noscitur generare. Ad secundam respondetur quod nonnunquam ad alium finem fit accusatio criminosi et appellatio ab aliquo criminoso. Accusatur enim criminosus ut de commisso crimine puniatur, sed appellatur ab aliquo ne aliquid in futurum in preiudicium appellantis attemptet. Et ideo si papa hereticus omnino cessaret a papali officio renuntiando papatui, posset de heresi accusari sed non esset necesse appellare ab ipso. Sed si papa hereticus a papali non cessaret officio, cum hoc redundet in preiudicium cuiuslibet christiani quilibet christianus ab ipso vel contra ipsum poterit appellare, ipsum ad causam et iudicium provocando.

Master: The answer to the first objection is that a question of faith is a common question, which pertains to all Christians. Pope Nicholas states in dis. 96 c. Ubinam: [col. 338] "where have you read that the emperors, your predecessors, were present at synodal gatherings? Unless perhaps at some where the faith, which is universal, which is the common concern of all, which pertains not only to clerks but also to laymen and to all Christians whatsoever, was being discussed". Therefore it is the business not just of the litigant but also of any catholic to appeal from an unjust sentence of the pope rendered against the faith, because such a judgement is known to prejudice any Christian. The answer to the second objection is that on various occasions the accusation of a criminal serves a different purpose than the appeal from some criminal. For a criminal is accused so that he may be punished on account of the committed crime, while one appeals from someone lest he attempt something in the future which would prejudice the appellant. And thus if a heretic pope were to wholly cease to perform papal functions by renouncing the papacy, he could be accused of heresy but it would not be necessary to appeal from him. But if a heretic pope would not desist from exercising the papal office, then since this would redound to any Christian's prejudice, any Christian might appeal from a heretic pope or against him by challenging him to appear in court and answer for his case.

Discipulus: Ad quid distinguitur inter appellationem que fit post sententiam diffinitivam et appellationem que fit extra iudicium.

Student: What is the point of a distinction between an appeal that is made after a definitive judgement, and an appeal that is made outside of the legal process.

Magister: Ideo distinguitur quia in appellatione que fit post diffinitivam sententiam non oportet in speciali allegare causam sed sufficit dicere sententiam esse iniquam. Unde si duo litigarent coram papa super aliqua certa questione fidei, puta si unus accusaret alium quod esset hereticus quia pertinaciter asseruisset usuram non esse peccatum, vel Christum non contingenter sed necessitate absoluta fuisse passum et crucifixum, aut apostolos nunquam post missionem Spiritus Sancti per unam diem integram duxisse vitam communem cum aliis, aut legem christianam non esse veram et sanctam, vel Christum falsum fuisse prophetam, et papa diffinitivam daret sententiam pro eo quod non esset hereticus quia assertio sua esset catholica, liceret actori appellare a papa, allegando solummodo quod sententia sua esset iniqua et contra fidem catholicam, nec oporteret specialiter explicare in quo sua sententia fidei obviaret. Si autem extra iudicium aut ante sententiam diffinitivam voluerit quis appellare, oportet quod causam talem in speciali alleget, que si esset probata deberet legitima reputari. Non enim sufficit in tali appellatione dicere ad hoc ut legitima reputetur quod papa est hereticus sed oportet exprimere in quo est hereticus, puta quod est hereticus quia pertinaciter docet aut tenet fidem christianam non esse veram, aut Christum non descendisse de David, aut in Christo non fuisse duas substantias, aut aliquid huiusmodi quod fidei obviat orthodoxe.

Master: The distinction is made because in an appeal issued after a definitive judgement one doesn't need to specifically mention the substance of the case; it merely suffices to state that the judgement is unjust. Thus if two people were to litigate before the pope with respect to some identifiable question of faith (for instance, if one of them were to accuse the other of being a heretic because he had pertinaciously claimed that usury was not a sin, or that Christ's passion and crucifixion were not the results of contingent choices but were absolutely determined, or that the apostles had not experienced for a single day a state of common life with others after the arrival of the Holy Spirit, or that the Christian law was neither true nor holy, or that Christ was a false prophet), and the pope were to render a definitive judgement in favour of the accused, confirming that he was no heretic because his assertion was catholic, the accuser would be permitted to appeal from the pope, alleging only that his sentence was unjust, nor would he be required to explain specifically the particulars as to which the pope's sentence clashed with the faith. But if someone wanted to appeal outside of the judicial process or before the rendering of a definitive judgement, he would need to argue the specifics of the case, and that if proved in court the case would be considered legitimate. For in this second type of appeal it does not suffice (in order for it to be considered legitimate) to merely state that the pope is a heretic. One needs to express the particulars of his heresy, for instance that he is a heretic because he pertinaciously teaches or holds that the Christian faith is untrue, or that Christ was not a descendant of David, or that there were not two substances in Christ's nature, or something similar which is opposed to orthodox faith.

Capitulum 19

Chapter 19

Discipulus: Modum ponendi illorum aliqualiter incipio advertere. Ut tamen eum magis intelligam primo probare coneris quod a papa heretico in aliquo casu liceat appellare, et postea plura de eadem materia interrogabo.

Student: The position of these theorists is starting to become somewhat clearer to me. Nevertheless, so that I may understand it even better, do try to prove initially that it is permitted in some case to appeal from a heretic pope. Afterwards I will ask more questions about this topic.

Magister: Quia manifestiora, si aliqui de eis dubitaverint, sunt primo probanda ut per ipsa ad ignotorum perveniatur notitiam, ideo primo supposito casu apertissimo ostenditur quod a papa heretico liceat appellare.

Master: Since those matters which are more obvious (were some to profess doubt about them) must be demonstrated at the outset so that through them one may achieve elucidation of matters yet unknown, let me first show that it is permitted to appeal from a heretic pope by supposing a completely straightforward case.

Discipulus: Pone casum, tamen possibilem.

Student: Lay out the case but do not exceed the bounds of the possible.

Magister: Ponatur quod aliquis accuset alium coram papa quod est hereticus eo quod tenet et asserit fidem christianam esse falsam et legem sarracenorum esse tenendam, et Christum falsum fuisse prophetam et esse dampnatum. Quo accusato et lite contestata, papa proferat diffinitivam sententiam quod accusatus non est hereticus quia omnia predicta que dicit et asserit continent veritatem.

Master: Let us assume that someone accuses another before the pope of being a heretic because the accused supposedly holds and asserts that the Christian faith is false, that the law of the Saracens should be embraced, and that Christ was a prophet both false and discredited. After the accusation and the ensuing judicial process, the pope renders a definitive judgement to the effect that the person accused is not a heretic because all of the aforementioned theses stated and asserted by him are true.

Discipulus: Quamvis iste casus nunquam contigerit et forte nunquam eveniet tamen durum michi videtur asserere quod sit impossibilis. Nam apparet quod neque ex scriptura divina neque ex doctrina ecclesie potest ostendi aperte quod nullus papa futurus erit Antichristus. Cum etiam de tribu Dan, de qua nonnulli Antichristum estimant nasciturum, multi forte christiani mediantibus conversis ad fidem traxerint iam dudum originem, de quibus posset procreari Antichristus. Et adhuc possit forte de illa tribu aliquis fidem christianam suscipere de quo posset nasci filius qui primo valeret eligi in summum pontificem et postea posset se patenter ostendere Antichristum. Et ita nescitur an aliquis christianus futurus papa de tribu Dan tracturus originem erit Antichristus. Constat autem quod Antichristus manifeste docebit quod lex christianorum est falsa et quod Christus fuit falsus propheta. Casus autem predictus non videtur impossibilis quia nescitur quod nullus papa futurus sectam sarracenorum accipiet. Posset enim accidere quod papa etiam qui primo fuisset catholicus inciperet reputare sectam sarracenorum esse meliorem lege christianorum, qui tantam posset primo contrahere amicitiam occultam cum sarracenis quod eorum potentia ad se vocata auderet patenter asserere legem christianam esse falsam et iniquam et ad legem sarracenorum sumendam cogere christianos. Cum enim constet multos christianos etiam clericos et religiosos ad sectam sarracenorum fuisse conversos non videtur quin etiam papa posset ad tantam insaniam devenire, cum enim papa non sit confirmatus in fide sicut nec ceteri idem quantum ad possibilitatem convertendi se ad sarracenos de ipso et de aliis videtur esse tenendum. Posito ergo casu predicto pro assertione prefata satagas allegare.

Student: Although this is a case that never happened and perhaps never will, I find it difficult to assert that it smacks of impossibility. For it seems that one cannot clearly demonstrate either by Holy Writ or by the doctrine of the church that no future pope will be the Antichrist. It is indeed probable that many Christians through their ancestors who were converted to the faith have long established roots to the tribe of Dan, from which some believe that the Antichrist will be born [For a discussion of this tradition see David Burr, Olivi's Peaceable Kingdom, Philadelphia 1993, p. 150]. And even in our time it is quite possible for someone from that tribe to accept the Christian faith, to have a son born to him, that son being subsequently elected pope, and afterwards clearly showing himself to be the Antichrist. And thus it cannot be known whether some Christian and future pope, with roots in the tribe of Dan, will be the Antichrist. It is, however, established that the Antichrist will unambiguously teach that the law of the Christians is false and that Christ was a false prophet. And the described case does not appear impossible because it is not known that no future pope will submit to the sect of the Saracens. For it may come to pass that even a pope who was at first catholic would begin to consider that the sect of the Saracens was better than the law of the Christians. This pope could initially develop such a strong secret friendship with the Saracens, that having summoned their military might to his side he would dare to openly assert that the Christian law was false and unjust, and force Christians to accept the law of the Saracens. Since it is indeed an established fact that many Christians (including clerks and religious) have been converted to the sect of the Saracens, it does not seem implausible that even a pope might arrive at such a huge insanity. For since a pope is not confirmed in faith (just as no others are), the same point must be contended in his case as is in that of others as to the possibility of being converted to the Saracens. Having therefore presented the suggested exemplary case, proceed to argue in favour of the aforementioned assertion.

Magister: Quod a papa predicto modo heretico liceat appellare multis modis ostenditur. Primo sic. A papa ipso iure deposito est licitum pro causa fidei appellare. Sed papa diffinitive pronuntians fidem christianam esse falsam et legem sarracenorum esse tenendam est ipso iure depositus. Ergo a tali licet appellare.

Master: It is shown in many ways that one may appeal from a pope who is a heretic as just described. First of all in this manner. It is legitimate to appeal for the cause of faith from a pope who has been deposed by law itself. But law itself deposes a pope who definitively pronounces that the Christian faith is false and that the law of the Saracens must be embraced. Therefore one is allowed to appeal from such a pope.

Discipulus: De isto modo an scilicet papa hereticus sit ipso iure depositus post inquiram, ideo aliam rationem adducas.

Student: I shall inquire in a later context [see 1 Dial. 6. 68-75] about this manner of proving the point, namely whether a heretic pope is deposed by law itself. Therefore move on to another reason.

Magister: Secunda ratio talis est. Ab omni iudice vel pro iudice se gerente qui iudicem habet superiorem licet contra iniquam sententiam ipsius appellare; sed papa diffinitive pronuntians legem christianam esse falsam habet iudicem superiorem, ergo a tali papa licet appellare. Maior ostenditur auctoritate Iulii pape que ponitur 2 q. 6 c. Placuit, qui ait: "placuit ut a quibuscunque ecclesiaticis iudicibus ad alios iudices ecclesiasticos ubi est maior auctoritas provocatum fuerit, audientia non negetur". Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod a minori auctoritate ad maiorem appellare licet. Minor probatur. Tum quia omnis hereticus habet iudicem superiorem cum sit minor omni catholico (24 q. 1 par. Si autem). Tum quia ecclesia universalis est maior papa sicut orbis est maior urbe (dis. 93 c. Legimus). Tum quia concilium generale est supra papam ut notatur in glossa dis.19 c. Anastasius. Tertio sic. Ab illo licet pro causa fidei appellare qui nec iudex nec testis nec accusator in causa fidei vel alia esse potest. Hoc patet, quia ab illo qui se gerit pro iudice et tamen iudex esse non potest, licet appellare. Sed papa pronuntians legem christianam esse falsam non potest esse iudex nec testis nec accusator quia est hereticus. Heretici autem iudices esse non possunt cum nil habeant potestatis aut iuris (24 q. 1 c. Didicimus) nec possunt esse testes (Extra, De hereticis, c. 1) nec possunt esse accusatores (2 q. 7 c. Alieni et c. Pagani et c. Non potest). Ergo a papa pronuntiante legem christianam esse falsam appellare licet. Quarto sic. Ab omni apostata qui se pro iudice in causa fidei gerit licet appellare, saltem si aliter causa fidei vitiata sublevari non potest. Sed papa diffinitive pronuntians fidem christianam esse falsam est manifestus apostata a fide christiana. Igitur si gerit se pro iudice in causa fidei licet appellare ab ipso.

Master: The second reason is this. It is permitted to appeal against the unjust sentence of any judge (or of someone functioning in that capacity) who has a judge superior to him. But a pope who definitively pronounces that the Christian law is false has a superior judge, therefore it is permitted to appeal from such a pope. The major premiss is demonstrated by the authority of pope Julius (recorded in 2 q. 6 c. Placuit) [col. 468] who states: "it has been approved that a hearing will not be denied when an appeal has been made from any ecclesiastical judge whatsoever to other ecclesiastical judges who are endowed with a greater authority". From these words one gathers that it is permitted to appeal from a lesser to a greater authority. The minor premiss is proved by the fact that every heretic has a superior judge, since a heretic is of lesser status than any catholic (24 q. 1 #Si autem) [cols. 967-968], and by the fact that the universal church is greater than the pope, just as the world is greater than Rome (dis. 93 Legimus) [col. 328], and by the fact that a general council is above the pope, as notes the gloss to dis. 19 c. Anastasius [col. 87]. Here is the third reason. It is permitted to appeal for the cause of faith from someone who can be neither a judge, nor a witness, nor an accuser in a cause of faith or in any other cause. This is evident, because it is permitted to appeal from one who functions as a judge and yet cannot be a judge. But a pope who pronounces the Christian law to be false can be neither judge nor witness nor accuser, since he is a heretic, and heretics cannot be judges since they possess neither authority nor right (24 q. 1 c. Didicimus) [col. 977], nor can they be witnesses (Extra, De hereticis, c. 1) [col. 778], nor can they be accusers (2 q. 7 c. Alieni [col. 488], and c. Pagani [col. 489], and c. Non potest) [col. 467]. Therefore it is permitted to appeal from a pope who pronounces the Christian faith to be false. Here is the fourth reason. It is permitted to appeal from every apostate who functions as a judge in a case of faith, at least if there is no other possibility of remedying a harm done in such a case. But a pope who definitively pronounces the Christian faith to be false is an obvious apostate from the Christian faith. Therefore it is permitted to appeal from him if he functions as a judge in a case of faith.

Quinto sic. Omnis causa vitiata est per appellationis remedium sublevanda, teste Fabiano papa qui, ut habetur 2 q. 6 c. 1, ait: "liceat appellatori vitiatam causam appellationis remedio sublevare", et c. Liceat ait: "liceat etiam in criminalibus causis appellare nec vox appellandi denegetur ei, quem in supplicio sententia destinaverit". Sed papa diffinitive pronuntians pro reo legem christianam esse falsam, causa fidei est apertissime vitiata, ergo licet actori a tali iniqua sententia lata contra fidem catholicam appellare.

Here is the fifth reason. Every impaired case must be assisted through the remedy of an appeal, witness Pope Fabian who states (we have this in 2 q. 6 c. 1): "let it be permitted for an appellant to assist an impaired case through the remedy of an appeal", and in c. Liceat [col. 472] he states: "let it be permitted to appeal even in criminal cases; nor may one deny the utterance of an appeal to someone whom a sentence would have destined for punishment". But when a pope pronounces definitively in favour of a defendant that the Christian law is false, the cause of faith is most evidently harmed. Therefore the plaintiff is allowed to appeal from such an unjust sentence rendered against the catholic faith.

Discipulus: Per istam rationem liceret a papa pro quacunque iniqua sententia in aliis causis quam in causa fidei appellare, si omnis causa vitiata per appellationis remedium poterit sublevari.

Student: On the basis of this reason, if every impaired case could be assisted by the remedy of an appeal, it would be permitted to appeal from the pope with respect to any unjust sentence whatever, in cases other than a case of faith.

Magister: Respondetur quod omnis causa vitiata per appellationis remedium poterit sublevari quando ferens iniquam sententiam habet iudicem superiorem. Papa autem hereticus habet iudicem superiorem ergo etc.

Master: The answer is that the remedy of an appeal may assist every impaired case when the one rendering an unjust sentence has a superior judge. A heretic pope surely has a superior judge, therefore etc.

Discipulus: Video quod hec ratio fundatur in aliis rationibus, unde alias rationes adducas.

Student: I notice that this reason derives from other arguments. Proceed with the presentation of further reasons.

Magister: Sexta ratio talis est. Ab illo est licitum pro causa heresis appellare qui potest de heresi accusari, sed papa potest de heresi accusari, ergo licet a papa pro heresi appellare.

Master: Here is the sixth reason. One is allowed to appeal for cause of heresy from someone who can be accused of heresy. But the pope may be accused of heresy, therefore it is permitted to appeal from the pope for cause of heresy.

Discipulus: Ista ratio equaliter probat quod a papa licet pro omni heresi appellare et non solum in casu predicto.

Student: This reason equally proves that it is permitted to appeal from the pope for every heresy, and not only in the specific case we are reviewing.

Magister: Omnes rationes allegate et allegande secundum rei veritatem concludunt quod a papa heretico licet appellare qualicunque heresi fuerit maculatus, unde ille casus non est positus nisi ut rationes patentiores et probabiliores videantur.

Master: All the reasons so far argued, and those that will be argued, conclude in truth that it is permitted to appeal from a heretic pope no matter what heresy besmirches him. Hence the case we are focusing on is only suggested so that the reason proving the general point might appear both more obvious and probable.

Discipulus: Alias rationes adducas.

Student: Present another reason.

Magister: Septima ratio est talis. Ab illo licet appellare a cuius obedientia et communione licet recedere. Sed a communione et obedientia pape heretici pronuntiantis legem christianam esse falsam licet recedere, exemplo illorum romanorum qui pro minori excessu, quia pro fautoria hereticorum dampnatorum, a communione et obedientia Anastasii secundi laudabiliter se abegerunt, ut habetur dis. 19 Anastasius. Ergo a papa pronuntiante diffinitive legem christianam esse falsam licet appellare. Octavo sic. Ab illa sententia licet appellare quam licet publice impugnare, quia appellare videtur esse quidam modus specialis impugnandi iniquam sententiam. Sed sententiam pape pronuntiantis fidem christianam esse falsam et Christum falsum fuisse prophetam licet illi contra quem lata est sententia sicut et omnibus christianis publice impugnare. Sicut enim omnibus licet publice confiteri Christum, ipso dicente Matth. 10 "omnis ergo qui confitebitur me coram hominibus confitebor et ego eum coram patre meo qui est in celis", sic licet omnibus blasphemos Christi impugnare. Papa autem pronuntians legem christianam esse falsam et Christum fuisse falsum prophetam est blasphemus Christi. Ergo licet cuilibet ipsum impugnare et per consequens licet ab ipso appellare. Nono sic. Ab illo appellare licet si in causa fidei se pro iudice gesserit qui in causa fidei iudex esse non debet. Sed papa diffinitive pronuntians Christum fuisse falsum prophetam nullam debet exercere potestatem in christianos, ergo ab eo licet appellare. Maior videtur certa. Minor probatur, quia nullus blasphemus Christi debet exercere potestatem in christianos, teste Innocentio tertio qui in concilio generali, ut habetur Extra, de Iudeis, Cum sit, ait: "cum sit nimis absurdum ut blasphemus Christi in christianos vim potestatis exerceat etc." Sed papa diffinitive pronuntians Christum falsum fuisse prophetam est blasphemus Christi, ergo in christianos vim potestatis exercere non debet.

Master: The seventh reason is this. One is allowed to appeal from him from whose obedience and communion it is permitted to withdraw. But it is permitted to withdraw from the communion and obedience of a heretic pope who proclaims the Christian law to be false, following the example of those Romans who laudably removed themselves from the communion and obedience of Anastasius II, and for a lesser misdeed than what we are discussing, namely for his support of condemned heretics (the account is in dis. 19 Anastasius) [col. 64]. Therefore it is permitted to appeal from a pope definitively proclaiming that the Christian law is false. Here is the eighth reason. It is permitted to appeal from a judgement which one may publicly oppose, because the act of appealing appears to be one specific method of opposing an unjust sentence. But it is permitted to the one against whom such a sentence is rendered, as well as to other Christians, to publicly oppose the sentence of a pope who proclaims that the Christian law is false and that Christ was a false prophet. For just as it is permitted to all to publicly acknowledge Christ (he said himself in Matthew 10(:32-33) "whosoever therefore shall confess me before men, him will I confess also before my father which is in heaven"), so is it permitted to all to oppose the blasphemers of Christ. But the pope who proclaims that the Christian law is false and that Christ was a false prophet is a blasphemer of Christ. Therefore it is permitted to anyone to oppose this pope, and consequently it is permitted to appeal from him. Here is the ninth reason. It is permitted to appeal from someone (if he were to function as a judge in a case of faith) who must not be a judge in such a case. But a pope who definitively proclaims that Christ was a false prophet must exercise no authority over Christians, therefore one may appeal from him. The major premiss seems certain. The minor is proved as follows. No blasphemer of Christ must exercise power over Christians, witness Innocent III who states in a general council (we have this in Extra, De Iudeis, Cum sit) [col. 777]: "since it is exceedingly absurd that a blasphemer of Christ should exercise power of authority over Christians, etc." But a pope definitively proclaiming that Christ was a false prophet is a blasphemer of Christ, therefore he must not exercise the power of authority over Christians.

Discipulus: Ista ratio non videtur concludere quia Innocentius in illo capitulo loquitur de iudeis. Papa autem licet pronuntiaret Christum falsum fuisse prophetam non esset propter hoc iudeus. Ergo per dictum capitulum non potest probari quod non possit in christianos vim potestatis exercere quamdiu ab ecclesia toleratur.

Student: This reason does not seem conclusive, because in the cited chapter Innocent is referring to Jews. But the pope, even if he were to proclaim that Christ was a false prophet, would not on that account be a Jew. Therefore it cannot be demonstrated by the cited chapter that such a pope would not be entitled to exercise the power of authority over Christians so long as the church tolerated him.

Magister: Hec tua responsio per hoc excluditur quod licet Innocentius loquatur in illo capitulo de iudeis, statuens quod eis officia publica nullatenus commitantur, statuti tamen sui rationem assignans asserit manifeste quod nullus blasphemus Christi debet in christianos vim potestatis exercere, et quod ideo iudeis non sunt officia publica committenda. Ubi autem est eadem ratio debet esse idem ius. Cum ergo papa diffinitive pronuntians Christum falsum fuisse prophetam sit manifeste blasphemus Christi, sequitur evidenter quod sicut iudei propter hoc quod sunt blasphemi Christi non debent in christianos vim potestatis exercere ita papa diffinitive pronuntians Christum falsum fuisse prophetam propter hoc quod est blasphemus Christi non debet in christianos vim potestatis exercere. Decimo sic. Ab illo pro causa heresis licite appellatur si se gerit pro iudice et iniquam contra fidem profert sententiam, ad quem in causa fidei non licet provocare, quia ad illum se gerentem pro iudice licite provocatur a quo appellare non licet, sicut ad imperatorem pro temporalibus licite provocatur quia ab illo appellare non licet. Sed ad papam diffinitive pronuntiantem legem christianam esse falsam et legem sarracenorum esse tenendam nequaquam licite provocatur, cum sit alterius fidei quam catholici. Ad iudicium autem hominis alterius fidei catholicis non licet provocare, testante concilio Carthaginensi quod, ut habetur 2 q. 6 c. Catholicus, ait: "catholicus qui causam suam sive iustam sive iniustam ad iudicium alterius fidei iudicis provocat, excommunicetur". Ergo ad papam pronuntiantem diffinitive legem sarracenorum esse tenendam provocare non licet, et per consequens licet appellare ab ipso. Undecimo sic. Ab excommunicato pro iudice se gerente licet appellare. Sed papa pronuntians diffinitive legem christianam esse falsam est excommunicatus sicut et ille qui incidit in heresim iam dampnatam, teste glossa 24 q. 1 c. 1 que ait: "hic est casus in quo papa papam potest ligare, in quo papa in canonem late sententie incidit". Ergo ab ipso appellare licet. Duodecimo sic. Contra illam sententiam appellare licet que nec est tenenda nec servanda nec timenda, quia illa sententia a qua appellare non licet est timenda. Sed sententia diffinitiva qua papa pronuntiat legem christianam esse falsam nec est tenenda nec servanda nec timenda, quia sententia contra legem divinam prolata non est timenda, sicut nec aliquod preceptum contra legem Dei est timendum. Ergo a tali sententia appellare licet. Tertiodecimo sic. Ab illo est licitum appellare qui potest licite recusari. Sed papa pronuntians legem christianam esse falsam in omni causa fidei potest licite recusari quia inimicus potest licite recusari. Talis autem papa esset omnium christianorum et totius legis christiane inimicus manifestus. Ergo a tali papa licet in causa fidei appellare.

Master: This response of yours is excluded by the following consideration. Although Innocent does speak of Jews in that chapter and decrees that public offices should in no wise be committed to them, he nevertheless assigns a reason to his statute when he clearly asserts that no blasphemer of Christ must exercise the power of authority over Christians, this being therefore the motive for denying the granting of public offices to Jews. But where the reason is the same the law must be the same. Therefore since a pope who definitively proclaims that Christ was a false prophet is an obvious blasphemer of Christ, it follows evidently that, just as Jews must not exercise the power of authority over Christians because they are blasphemers of Christ, for the same reason a pope who definitively proclaims that Christ was a false prophet must not exercise the power of authority over Christians because he is a blasphemer of Christ. Here is the tenth reason. One appeals legitimately for cause of heresy from someone (if he functions as a judge and renders an unjust sentence against the faith) to whom it is not permitted to appeal in a case of faith, because one may legitimately appeal to someone who functions as a judge if this is someone from whom an appeal is not allowed. Thus, one may legitimately appeal to the emperor as to temporal matters because one is not permitted to appeal from him in this regard. But one can in no way legitimately appeal to a pope who definitively proclaims that the Christian law is false and the law of the Saracens is to be embraced, since such a pope would profess a faith different from that of catholics. And catholics are not allowed to appeal to the court of a person professing a different faith, witness the Council of Carthage which states (we have it in 2 q. 7 Catholicus) [col. 478]: "a catholic who appeals his case, be it just or unjust, to the court of a judge who is of another faith shall be excommunicated". Therefore it is not permitted to appeal to a pope who proclaims definitively that the law of the Saracens must be followed, and consequently one is allowed to appeal from him. The eleventh reason is this. It is permitted to appeal from an excommunicated individual functioning as a judge. But a pope who definitively proclaims that the Christian law is false becomes excommunicated, just, as is someone who falls into a heresy already condemned. The gloss [col. 1382] to 24 q.1 c.1 witnesses as much when it states: "here is a case where one pope may bind another, namely where the latter falls under the jurisdiction of an established sentence". Therefore it is permitted to appeal from such a pope. Here is the twelfth reason. It is permitted to appeal against a judgement, which is neither to be maintained nor observed nor feared, because a judgement from which one may not appeal is to be feared. But a definitive sentence whereby the pope proclaims that the Christian law is false is neither to be maintained nor observed nor feared, because a sentence rendered against the divine law is not to be feared, just as no command against the law of God is to be feared. Therefore one is allowed to appeal from such a judgement. The thirteenth reason is this. It is permitted to appeal from someone who may be subject to a lawful demurrer. But a pope who proclaims that the Christian law is false may be lawfully demurred against in every case of faith, because an enemy may be lawfully demurred against, and such a pope would be an obvious enemy of all Christians and of the entire Christian law. Therefore it is permitted to appeal from such a pope in a case of faith.

Capitulum 20

Chapter 20

Discipulus: Videtur quod argumentis abundas pro assertione predicta, ideo non multiplices amplius argumenta sed quomodo, ad quandam instantiam quam faciam contra predicta, secundum assertionem predictam debeat responderi, indagare digneris. Videtur itaque quod omnia argumenta predicta nichil concludant quia papa pronuntians diffinitive legem christianam esse falsam est inter infideles indubie numerandus. Ab infideli autem fideles appellare non debent. Nusquam enim legitur quod sancti martyres cum cogerentur negare fidem ab iudicibus infidelibus appellassent, nec etiam apostoli contra principes sacerdotum cum protulissent contra fidem sententiam appellaverunt. Ergo a papa pronuntiante diffinitive legem christianam esse falsam non debent catholici appellare.

Student: It appears that you have very many arguments in support of the assertion we are discussing, therefore do not accumulate arguments any further, but kindly investigate how one ought to respond on the basis of the assertion we are reviewing to a certain objection which I will be making against the aforesaid. Here it is. It seems that all of the stated arguments are inconclusive, because a pope who definitively proclaims that the Christian law is false must without any doubt be included among the unbelievers. And the faithful must not appeal from an unbeliever, for nowhere does one read that the holy martyrs appealed from unbelieving judges when they were being pressured to deny the faith, nor did the apostles appeal against the high priests when the latter had rendered a sentence against the faith. Therefore catholics must not appeal from a pope who definitively proclaims that the Christian faith is false.

Magister: Ad istam instantiam potest dari duplex responsio. Prima est quod non est necessarium absolute appellare a papa iniquam contra fidem proferente sententiam, propter quod multi fideles contra infideles et hereticos inveniuntur minime appellasse. Sed sufficit in multis casibus sententiam pape vel alterius contra fidem simpliciter impugnare, detestari, et horrere quemadmodum sancti patres absque appellatione hereticorum assertiones iniquas per sacras litteras impugnarunt. Verumptamen aliquando expedit appellare exemplo beati Pauli qui ad Cesarem appellavit.

Master: A double response may be given to this objection. The first is that it is not absolutely necessary to appeal from a pope who renders an unjust sentence against the faith. This is why we find that many believers failed to appeal against unbelievers and heretics. For in many cases it is sufficient to simply oppose, detest and abhor a sentence rendered against the faith by the pope or by someone else, just as the holy fathers used Holy Writ to oppose the unjust assertions of heretics without bothering to appeal. Nevertheless, from time to time it is expedient to issue an appeal, following the example of blessed Paul who appealed to Caesar.

Discipulus: Non videtur quod beatus Paulus appellaverit pro causa fidei sed pro aliis criminibus que sibi imponebantur mendaciter a iudeis, ergo per exemplum beati Pauli probari non potest quod expediat pro causa fidei a papa heretico appellare.

Student: It does not appear that blessed Paul appealed for a cause of faith, but rather for other crimes that were being falsely imputed to him by the Jews. Therefore one cannot use the example of blessed Paul to prove that it is expedient to appeal from a heretic pope for a cause of faith.

Magister: Nonnullis apparet quod beatus Paulus pro causa fidei appellaverit, quod ex serie Actuum Apostolorum videtur posse probari, nam 22 c. Actuum Apostolorum sic legitur scripsisse tribunus Claudius presidi Felici de Paulo: "virum hunc comprehensum a iudeis et incipientem interfici ab eis superveniens cum exercitu eripui cognito quia Romanus est, volensque scire causam quam obiiciebant illi, deduxi eum in concilium eorum, quem inveni accusari de questionibus legis ipsorum nichil vero dignum morte aut vinculis habentem crimen". Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod super causa fidei inter iudeos et Paulum questio vertebatur. Pro ista autem causa Paulus postea appellavit, ergo super causa fidei appellavit ad Cesarem. Rursus 24 c. habetur expresse quod Paulus de causa fidei accusabatur a iudeis, unde et orator eorum accusans Paulum dixit: "invenimus hunc hominem pestiferum et concitantem seditiones omnibus iudeis in universo orbe et auctorem seditionis secte Nazarenorum qui etiam templum violare conatus est". Ex quibus verbis apparet quod Paulus accusabatur de fide. Et quod pro illa causa appellaverit patet cum 25 c. sic legatur: "Paulo autem rationem reddente quoniam neque in legem iudeorum neque in templum neque in Cesarem quicquam peccavi. Festus autem volens iudeis gratiam prestare, respondens Paulo dixit 'vis Hierosolymam ascendere et ibi de hiis iudicari apud me', dixit autem Paulus 'ad tribunal Cesaris sto, ubi me oportet iudicare. Iudeis non nocui sicut tu melius nosti. Si enim nocui aut dignum morte aliquid feci non recuso mori, si vero nichil est eorum que hii accusant me nemo potest me illis donare. Cesarem appello'". Et post Festus loquens de iudeis accusantibus Paulum ait: "Cum ergo huc convenissent sine ulla dilatione sequenti die sedens pro tribunali iussi adduci virum de quo cum stetissent accusatores nullam causam deferebant de quibus ego suspicabar malum. Questiones vero quasdam de sua superstitione habebant adversus eum et de quodam Iesu defuncto quem affirmabat Paulus vivere. Hesitans autem ego de huiusmodi questione dicebans si vellet ire Hierosolimam et ibi iudicari de istis. Paulo autem appellante ut servaretur ad Augusti cognitionem iussi servari eum donec mittam eum ad Cesarem". Ex hiis colliguntur duo. Primum est quod pro illa questione que vertebatur inter iudeos et Paulum Paulus Cesarem appellavit. Secundum est quod super fide Christi inter ipsos questio vertebatur. Ex quibus sequitur quod pro causa fidei Paulus Cesarem appellavit.

Master: It appears to some that blessed Paul did appeal for a cause of faith, and that this is something that can be proved from various passages in the Acts of the Apostles. Thus in chapter 23 (as we read it) here is what the tribune Claudius wrote to the governor Felix concerning Paul: "this man was taken of the Jews, and should have been killed of them: then came I with an army, and rescued him, having understood that he was a Roman. And when I would have known the cause wherefore they accused him, I brought him forth into their council: whom I perceived to be accused of questions of their law, but to have nothing laid to his charge worthy of death or of bonds". [Acts 23:27-29] One gathers from these words that the issue in argument between the Jews and Paul concerned a cause of faith. And it is for this cause that Paul subsequently appealed, therefore he appealed to Caesar about a cause of faith. Further, in chapter 24 we have it explicitly that Paul was being accused by the Jews about a cause of faith, whence their spokesman, accusing Paul, stated: "we have found this man a pestilent fellow, and a mover of sedition among all the Jews throughout the world, and a ringleader of the sect of the Nazarenes, who also hath gone about to profane the temple". [Acts 24:5-6] It appears from these words that Paul was being accused about the faith. And that he appealed for this cause is clear, since one reads the following in chapter 25: "while he [Paul] answered for himself, Neither against the law of the Jews, neither against the temple, nor yet against Caesar, have I offended any thing at all. But Festus willing to do the Jews a pleasure answered Paul and said, 'Wilt thou go up to Jerusalem, and there be judged of those things before me?' Then said Paul 'I stand at Caesar's judgement seat where I ought to be judged: to the Jews I have done no wrong as thou very well knowest. For if I be an offender, or have committed any thing worthy of death, I refuse not to die: but if there be none of these things whereof these accuse me, no man may deliver me unto them. I appeal unto Caesar". [Acts 25:8-11] And afterwards, speaking of the Jews who were accusing Paul, Festus said: "therefore, when they were come hither, without any delay on the morrow I sat on the judgement seat, and commanded the man to be brought forth. Against whom when the accusers stood up, they brought none accusation of such things as I supposed: But had certain questions against him of their own superstition and of one Jesus, which was dead, whom Paul affirmed to be alive. And because I doubted of such manner of questions, I asked him whether he would go to Jerusalem, and there be judged of these matters. But when Paul had appealed to be reserved unto the hearing of Augustus, I commanded him to be kept till I might send him to Caesar". [Acts 25:17-21] From these we gather two things. The first is that Paul appealed to Caesar with respect to the question which was in contention between Paul and the Jews. The second is that the question concerning which they contended was about the Christian faith. From these it follows that Paul appealed to Caesar for a cause of faith.

Capitulum 21

Chapter 21

Discipulus: Stuporem michi predicta ingerunt vehementem, quia pene incredibile michi videtur quod pro causa fidei in quocunque casu ad hominem contrarie secte liceat appellare. Et tamen apparenter ostenditur quod Paulus pro causa fidei Cesarem qui erat secte contrarie appellavit. Ex quo sequi videtur quod non esset inconveniens ad papam hereticum appellare, et per consequens appellare ab eo non licet quia pro eadem causa non est ab eodem et ad eundem appellandum, et ita predicte assertioni que dicit quod licet a papa heretico appellare contrariari videtur. Unde quomodo ad istam contrarietatem respondere contingat enarra.

Student: What you have stated leaves me in utter amazement, because it seems almost unbelievable to me that it might be permissible to appeal for a cause of faith under any circumstance to a person of a contrary religious persuasion. And nevertheless it is apparently shown that Paul appealed for a cause of faith to Caesar, who was of a contrary religion. From which it seems to follow that it would not be inconvenient to appeal to a heretic pope, and consequently that it is not permitted to appeal from such a pope because one must not appeal to and from the same person for the same cause, and so this appears to contradict the aforementioned assertion which states that it is permitted to appeal from a heretic pope.

Magister: Pro dissolvenda contrarietate prefata dicunt quidam esse notandum quod dupliciter contingit ad aliquem pro causa fidei appellare. Uno modo quidem tanquam ad illum qui habet questiones motas de fide iuxta sanam doctrinam ex officio terminare, et isto modo ad nullum hominem alterius secte sive fuerit paganus sive hereticus est pro causa fidei appellandum, quia ad solos summos pontifices catholicos et fideles ac generale concilium catholicorum spectat questiones fidei terminare, sicut ex sacris canonibus patenter apparet. Aliter contingit aliquem ad alium pro causa fidei appellare, non quidem sicut ad illum qui habet causas fidei terminare, sed tanquam ad illum qui ex officio vel ex electione appellantis aut alio quovis modo potest cognoscere an appellans debeat pro causa huiusmodi ab emulis accusari vel in iudicio a quo appellerat conveniri. Sic dicunt quod si aliquis super aliquo dubio fidei quod non est certum esse heresis nec est heresis dampnata explicite licet sit heresis dampnata implicite accusaretur coram episcopo, talis pro questione huiusmodi posset ad metropolitanum appellare. Non quidem tanquam ad illum qui habet tale dubium diffinire, sed tanquam ad illum ad quem spectat scire et iudicare quod talis questio nec per episcopum nec per ipsum metropolitanum debeat terminari, sed quod est summo pontifici vel generali concilio reservanda. Per predicta contrarietas suprascripta dissolvitur, quia pro causa fidei in nullo casu est ad hominem secte contrarie appellandum tanquam ad illum qui questionem fidei habeat diffinire. Nec isto modo Paulus Cesarem appellavit. Sciebat enim quod Cesar fidem Pauli falsissimam reputabat. Aliquando tamen licuit pro causa fidei ad hominem secte alterius appellare tanquam ad illum qui ex officio vel electione appellantis vel alio quovis modo cognoscere potuit quod iudices sui de questione fidei se intromittere minime debuerunt, et hoc modo Paulus Cesarem appellavit. Sciebat enim Paulus quod nulla persecutio adhuc per romanos aut Cesarem contra christianos fuerat excitata, et ideo sciebat quod iudices Cesaris de tali questione secundum leges Cesaris se intromittere non debebant. Propter quod, ut habetur Act. 18, Gallio proconsul Achaie cum Paulus sibi accusaretur a iudeis quod contra legem persuaderet colere Deum, accusationem huiusmodi audire nolebat, dicens: " 'si quidem esset iniquum aliquid aut facinus pessimum, o viri iudei, recte vos sustinerem, si vero questiones sunt de verbo et nominibus et legis vestre vos ipsi videritis, iudex ergo horum nolo esse,' et minavit eos a tribunali". Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod iudices missi a Cesare de hiis que pertinebant ad legem iudicandi potestatem minime habuerunt. Unde et Pilatus, sicut evangelica patefacit historia, propter nullam accusationem que de lege asserebatur contra Christum reputavit se debere iudicare Christum, sicut etiam ex Actibus Apostolorum c. 23 et 24 et 25 et 26 tribunus Lysias, Felix preses, Festus preses, et rex Agrippa propter illa que obiciebantur contra Paulum de lege et de doctrina Pauli iudicabant ipsum minime puniendum. Paulus igitur sciens quod talis questio etiam secundum leges et consuetudines romanorum ad iudices et publicas potestates inferiores Cesare nullatenus pertinebat Cesarem appellavit, tanquam ad illum qui iudicaret talem questionem ad iudices coram quibus Paulus fuerat accusatus minime pertinere.

Master: Some say (in order to resolve this contradiction) that it must be noted that there are two ways in which one can appeal to someone for a cause of faith. A first way is to appeal to him as to someone who has the official function of determining questions raised about the faith; and one must not appeal in this manner for a cause of faith to anyone of a contrary religion (whether pagan or heretic), because the determination of questions of faith belongs only to catholic and faithful supreme pontiffs, and to a general council of catholics, as is clearly apparent from the sacred canons. There is another way in which someone may appeal to another for a cause of faith, not indeed as to an instance which has the right to determine causes of faith, but as to one which (by function of office or by election of the appellant or by any other method) can judicially investigate whether an appellant might be accused by his enemies about such a cause or be legally summoned for a hearing in the court from which he had appealed. And so they say that were someone to be accused before a bishop about a doubtful issue in the faith concerning which there was no certain heresy involved nor a heresy explicitly condemned (even if it was a heresy implicitly condemned), the accused individual would be able to appeal such an issue to the metropolitan: not indeed as to the person having the function of defining such a doubt, but as to one with authority to know and to judge that such a question ought not to be decided either by the bishop or by the metropolitan himself, but was to be reserved for the supreme pontiff or for the general council. These considerations solve the contradiction mentioned above, because in no circumstance may one appeal for a cause of faith to a person of the contrary religious orientation as to someone who has the function of defining a question of faith. Nor did Paul appeal to Caesar in this fashion. For he knew that Caesar considered the faith of Paul to be utterly false. But occasionally it was permitted to appeal for a cause of faith to a person of alternative religious persuasion, as to someone who (by his official function or by the choice of the appellant or by any method whatever) could judicially investigate and declare the legal irrelevance of his judges with respect to a question of faith. It is on the latter basis that Paul appealed to Caesar. For Paul knew that up to this point in time no persecution had been undertaken against the Christians by the Romans or by Caesar, and therefore he knew that Caesar's judges, according to the laws of Caesar, did not have the legal competence to intervene with respect to this question. This is why (we have the account in Acts 18) Gallio the proconsul of Achaia, when Paul was accused to him by the Jews of convincing people to worship God in a manner opposed to the Jewish law, refused to hear this accusation in court, saying: " 'if it were a matter of wrong or wicked lewdness, O ye Jews, reason would that I should bear with you: But if it be a question of words and names, and of your law, look ye to it; for I will be no judge of such matters.' And he drove them from the judgement seat". [Acts 18:14-16] From these words one gathers that the judges sent by Caesar did not have the authority to adjudicate matters pertaining to the Jewish law. Hence Pilate also, as the Gospel account makes clear, did not consider himself competent to judge Christ on the basis of any accusation made against Christ with respect to the Jewish law. In the same way the texts of chapters 23 [Acts 23:29] and 24 [Acts 24:25] and 25 [Acts 25:25] and 26 [Acts 26:31] of the Acts of the Apostles show that the tribune Lysias, governor Felix, governor Festus, and king Agrippa firmly believed that Paul was not to be punished on account of the issues which were objected against him concerning the Jewish law and Paul's doctrine. Therefore Paul, knowing that such a question even on the basis of the laws and customs of the Romans in no way pertained to judges and public authorities inferior to Caesar, appealed to Caesar as to the authority who would judicially declare that such a question did not concern the judges before whom Paul had been accused.

Capitulum 22

Chapter 22

Discipulus: Contra predicta quattuor michi obiectiones occurrunt. Primo quidem videtur quod ex quo preses Festus sciebat quod talis questio ad illum non spectabat non oportuit Paulum propter hoc appellare ab ipso, quia appellatio vel est a gravamine vel est a sententia. Paulus autem non appellavit a sententia Festi quia nullam tulit nec a gravamine quia nullum volebat inferre, nam si Paulus non appellasset volebat ipsum dimittere. Secundo videtur quod Paulus non debuit Cesarem appellare, quia sciebat eum inimicum fidei sue et quod sententiam daret contra Paulum. Tertio apparet quod Paulus de facto mentiebatur recognoscendo Cesarem iudicem suum cum tamen, presertim in causa fidei, non fuerit iudex suus nec superior. Quarto videtur quod ad hominem alterius secte liceat appellare tanquam ad illum qui possit questionem fidei terminare et diffinire. Nam ad illum licet pro causa fidei illo modo appellare qui potest esse iudex in causa fidei habens potestatem diffiniendi quid pertinet ad veritatem fidei orthodoxe. Sed hoc potest homo alterius secte. Nam sicut patet in libro De altercatione Athanasii contra Arium, Athanasius et emuli sui hominem paganum in iudicem pro causa fidei elegerunt. Ergo et ad hominem alterius secte est licitum pro causa fidei appellare. Hec sunt que movent me contra predicta. Tu autem aperi quomodo respondetur ad illa.

Student: Four objections occur to me against what has just been stated. First of all it appears that since governor Festus knew that such a question did not pertain to his jurisdiction, it was inopportune for Paul to have appealed from him on that account, because an appeal is either from a harm or from a judgement. But Paul did not appeal from the judgement of Festus since none was rendered, nor from harm since Festus had no intention to inflict any: indeed had Paul not appealed, Festus wanted to release him. Secondly, it appears that Paul ought not to have appealed to Caesar because he knew him to be an enemy of the faith, who would render judgement against Paul. Thirdly, it appears that Paul was actually lying by recognizing Caesar as his judge, since the latter would have been neither his judge nor his superior, especially in a cause of faith. Fourthly, it appears that one may appeal to a man of different religious persuasion as to someone capable of resolving and defining a question of faith. For one is permitted to appeal in this manner about a cause of faith to someone who can be a judge in a case of faith and who possesses the authority to define what is relevant to the truth of orthodox belief. But this can be done by a man of a different religious persuasion, for as is made clear in the book On the altercation of Athanasius against Arius, [Vigil of Tapsus, Altercatio Athanasii contra Arium coram Probo iudice, in PL 62, cols. 179-238] Athanasius and his enemies selected a pagan individual to be their judge in a cause of faith. Therefore it is likewise permitted to appeal about a cause of faith to a man of different religious persuasion. These are the objections which move me to oppose what was earlier advanced. Do explain to me how one responds to them.

Magister: Ad primam obiectionem respondetur quod Paulus appellavit a Festo ad Cesarem propter gravamina que timebat. Timuit enim quod, quemadmodum Pilatus quamvis nullam causam mortis reputaret in Christo, tamen tradidit Christum iudeis crucifigendum, ita Festus traderet Paulum iudeis accusantibus occidendum, quamvis putaret ipsum Paulum crimen dignum morte nullatenus commisisse. Quod beatus Paulus aperte insinuat cum dicit Festo: "si vero nichil est eorum que hii accusant me, nemo potest me illis donare, Cesarem appello".

Master: The answer to the first objection is that Paul appealed from Festus because of his fear of being harmed. He was afraid that just as Pilate, although he did not consider Christ worthy of death, nevertheless did surrender Christ to the Jews for crucifixion, so Festus, even though he considered that Paul had committed no crime worthy of death, likewise would surrender Paul to the Jews who accused him so that Paul might be killed. This is what blessed Paul openly suggests when he says to Festus: "but if there be none of these things whereof they accuse me, no man may deliver me unto them. I appeal to Caesar". [Acts 25:11]

Discipulus: Unde timuit Paulus quod Festus volebat tradere eum iudeis.

Student: Why did Paul fear that Festus wanted to surrender him to the Jews.

Magister: Ex hoc quod interrogavit Paulum an vellet ascendere Hierosolymam et iudicari apud ipsum de impositis, et ex hoc quod favorabilis esset iudeis accusatoribus Pauli. Ex hoc enim ipso quod volebat Festus se intromittere de questione que ad ipsum etiam secundum leges et consuetudines romanorum minime pertinebat ipsum suspectum habebat et ideo appellavit, quamvis etiam aliud motivum habuerit appellandi, ut, scilicet per appellationem liberatus a persecutione iudeorum in Iudea, deduceretur Romam ut ibi evangelium predicaret iuxta preceptum Christi, ut apparet Act. 23, demandantis et dicentis : "constans esto, sicut enim testificatus es de me Hierusalem, sic te oportet et Rome testificari". Ad secundam dicitur quod Paulus nescivit Cesarem manifestum inimicum doctrine sue quia nondum Cesar persecutus fuerat christianos. Esto etiam quod scivisset eum inimicum, potuisset Cesarem appellare quia ex causa rationabili licet ad inimicum appellare, sicut etiam licet alicui ex causa se iudicio inimici submittere. Paulus igitur volens a iudeis liberari et Romam ad evangelium predicandum adduci, appellavit, et licet scivisset Cesarem fidei inimicum, appellasset. Ad tertiam respondetur dupliciter. Uno modo quod Paulus erat inferior Cesare et Cesar erat iudex suus ordinarius. Aliter dicitur quod licet Cesar non fuerit iudex ordinarius Pauli tamen Paulus potuit se submittere iudicio Cesaris, quemadmodum papa potest se submittere iudicio subditi sui(2 q. 7 Nos), et ideo Paulus appellando Cesarem submisit se iudicio Cesaris infidelis quod sibi licitum erat ex causa rationabili.

Master: From the fact that he had asked Paul if he wanted to ascend to Jerusalem and be judged there before Festus, and from the fact that he favoured the Jews who were accusing Paul. Indeed from the very fact that Festus wanted to interfere with an issue he was not entitled to adjudicate even according to the laws and customs of the Romans, Paul felt suspicious of him, and therefore issued his appeal. To be sure Paul had another reason for appealing, namely that once he was freed from the persecution of Jews in Judaea he might be transported to Rome in order to preach the gospel there, in accordance with the precept of Christ (this appears in Acts 23), who charged him with this duty, and said: "be of good cheer, for as thou hast testified of me in Jerusalem, so must thou bear witness also at Rome". [Acts 23:11] The answer to the second objection is that Paul had not known Caesar to be an obvious enemy of his doctrine, because Caesar had not yet persecuted the Christians. Even had Paul known Caesar to be an enemy, he still could have appealed to him, because one is permitted to appeal to an enemy for a reasonable cause, just as it is likewise permitted to someone to submit himself for cause to the judgement of an enemy. Therefore Paul, who wanted to be liberated from the Jews and to be brought to Rome in order to preach the gospel, proceeded to appeal, and he would have appealed even had he known that Caesar was an enemy of the faith. The response to the third objection is twofold. One way is to say that Paul was inferior to Caesar, and that Caesar was his normal judge. Otherwise one may say that although Caesar was not Paul's normal judge, Paul nevertheless could have submitted himself to Caesar's judgement just as the pope can submit himself to the judgement of his subject (2 q. 7 Nos), [col. 496] and therefore when Paul appealed to Caesar he submitted himself to the judgement of the non-believer Caesar, which he was allowed to do for reasonable cause.

Discipulus: Quomodo licuit Paulo se submittere iudicio Cesaris infidelis cum non liceat clericis se submittere iudicio secularium potestatum fidelium.

Student: How is it that Paul was permitted to submit himself to the judgement of the non-believer Caesar, when it is not permitted to clerks to submit themselves to the judgement of faithful secular authorities.

Magister: Respondetur quod hoc quodclericis non liceat se in multis causis submittere iudicio secularium potestatum non est ex lege divina nec ex ordinatione Christi nec ex lege nature, sed ex iure positivo humano, ad quod ius Paulus minime tenebatur quia nec tunc extitit introductum, et ideo sibi licuit se iudicio Cesaris submittere quod fecit de facto Cesarem appellando. Ad quartam respondetur quod dupliciter potest esse aliquis iudex in causa fidei. Uno modo est aliquis ordinarius iudex in causa fidei habens ex officio potestatem questiones fidei terminandi, et ad talem iudicem licet pro causa fidei appellare, sed talis iudex in causa fidei non potest esse aliquis alterius secte. Alio modo potest aliquisesse iudex quasi arbiter electus et hoc contingit dupliciter, quia dupliciter contingit compromittere in aliquem super causa fidei, vel scilicet promittendo quod illud tenebitur quod ipse secundum conscientiam suam reputaverit esse firmiter tenendum, vel quod illud tenebitur quod ipse iudicaverit esse consonum fidei christiane. Primo modo liceret compromittere in fidelem si nulla humana constitutio obviaret. Secundo modo licuit aliquando compromittere in aliquem infidelem. Sic Athanasius et heretici emuli sui in quendam paganum industrium et literatum compromiserunt, promittendo scilicet quod illud tenerent quod ipse iudicaret esse consonum fidei christiane. Qui auditis allegationibus utriusque partis pro Athanasio tulit sententiam, diffiniendo videlicet quod assertio Athanasii erat consona et necessario sequebatur ex libris christianorum, quos tam Athanasius quam sui adversarii receperunt, quamvis ipse iudex ipsos nullo modo susciperet.

Master: The answer is that the fact that clerks are not permitted in many cases to submit themselves to the judgement of secular authorities is not based on divine law, nor on Christ's ordination, nor on natural law, but derives from positive human law, to which Paul was not obligated since it had not yet been established in his time. Therefore Paul was allowed to submit himself to the judgement of Caesar, which he in fact did by appealing to Caesar. The answer to the fourth objection is that someone may be judge in a case of faith in two distinct ways. The first is that someone is a normal judge in a case of faith, having official authority to determine questions of faith. It is permitted to appeal to such a judge for a cause of faith, but in a cause of faith a judge of this kind cannot be someone of a different religious persuasion. The second possibility is that someone can be a judge in the manner of a chosen umpire, and this can happen in two ways. For there are two ways to submit by agreement to an arbitrator in a cause of faith, namely, either by promising to maintain the view which the arbitrator would in his own conscience consider as needing to be firmly held, or else to maintain the view which the arbitrator would have judged as being in accord with the Christian faith. The first method would allow a believer to act as arbitrator if no human constitution prevented it. The second method allowed at some time in the past to submit by agreement to a given non-believer. Thus Athanasius and the heretics who were his enemies submitted by agreement to a certain diligent and erudite pagan, namely by promising that they would maintain what he would judge to be in accord with the Christian faith. Having heard the arguments of both parties, this arbitrator rendered a sentence in favour of Athanasius, namely by defining that the assertion of Athanasius was in accord with the books of the Christians and necessarily followed therefrom, the same books whose authority both Athanasius and his opponents recognized, although the judge himself in no way recognized the books as authoritative.

Discipulus: Videtur quod Athanasius compromittendo in paganum peccavit mortaliter, se videlicet obligando ad heresim sustinendam si ipse paganus dedisset sententiam quod assertio hereticorum erat consona fidei christiane.

Student: It appears that Athanasius committed a mortal sin by submitting to arbitration by a pagan, since this would have obligated him to maintain a heresy if the pagan had rendered judgement that the assertion of the heretics was in accord with Christian faith.

Magister: Respondetur quod Athanasius non peccavit, quia licet promitteret stare sententie pagani predicti non tamen promisit stare inique sententie eius, et ideo non obligavit se ad heresim sustinendam si diffinisset assertionem hereticorum fuisse consonam fidei christiane, quia iniquum arbitrium nullatenus est servandum (Extra, De arbitris, c. Non sine et c. Exposita.) In tali enim compromisso subintelligenda est talis conditio licet non exprimatur: si arbiter non fuerit arbitratus inique.

Master: The answer is that Athanasius did not sin, because although he had promised to abide by the judgement of the aforementioned pagan, he had not, for all that, promised to abide by this pagan's unjust sentence, and therefore he did not bind himself to support a heresy had the pagan defined the assertion of heretics to be in accord with Christian faith. For an unjust verdict is not to be observed (Extra, De arbitris, c. Non sine [col. 230] and c. Exposita). [col. 236] Indeed in such an arbitration agreement the following condition must be implicitly understood even if it is not explicitly stated: 'if the arbitrator will not have rendered an unjust verdict'.

Discipulus: Videtur quod Athanasius non debuit compromittere in paganum super questione fidei, cum secundum iura canonica etiam super rebus spiritualibus non liceat compromittere in laicum (Extra, De arbitris, c. Contingit.)

Student: It appears that Athanasius should not have accepted arbitration by a pagan on a question of faith, since according to canon law it is not even permitted to accept the arbitration of a layman in spiritual matters (Extra, De arbitris c. Contingit). [col. 235]

Magister: Respondetur. Quod de rebus spiritualibus non potest compromitti in laicum est ex ordinatione ecclesie et non ex lege divina, et ideo Athanasius licite compromisit in paganum, quia tunc non erat prohibitum.

Master: One responds that it is a church ordination and not divine law, which forbade arbitration by a layman in spiritual matters. Therefore Athanasius was allowed to accept a pagan's arbitration because this was not forbidden at the time.

Discipulus: Miror quod Athanasius voluit compromittere in paganum cum pagani etiam testes nequeant esse contra christianos.

Student: I am amazed that Athanasius would have wanted to accept the arbitration of a pagan, since pagans cannot even be witnesses against Christians.

Magister: Respondetur quod ecclesia postquam habuit favorem imperatorum et regum multa statuit contra paganos que nec ex lege divina nec ex ordinatione Christi erant antea constituta, et ideo multa sunt modo illicita que tunc licita errant. Tunc enim licitum erat sub imperatore apostata militare. Unde et multi sancti martyres et alii christiani sub Iuliano apostata militabant et sibi in hiis que non erant contra legem divinam obedierunt sine peccato. Nunc tamen nulli christiano liceret sub imperatore apostata militare. Sic nunc non esset licitum de fide compromittere in paganum. Tempore autem Athanasii non erat illicitum.

Master: The answer is that after the church had acquired the favour of emperors and kings it enacted many regulations against pagans, which did not previously exist either by divine law or by Christ's ordination. Many things are thus forbidden today which were permitted in earlier times. In those days, for instance, it was permitted to wage war under the leadership of an emperor who was an apostate, and so many holy martyrs and other Christians waged war under Julian the Apostate and obeyed him without sin in all matters that were not against the divine law. In our times however it would not be permitted to any Christian to wage war under an apostate emperor. Likewise it would not be permitted today to submit to a pagan's arbitration about the faith, but in the time of Athanasius this was not forbidden.

Discipulus: Que utilitas fuit quod Athanasius compromisit in paganum.

Student: What was the advantage gained by Athanasius' submitting to a pagan's arbitration.

Magister: Respondetur quod multiplex fuit utilitas, quia catholici post sententiam pagani pro Athanasio fidem poterant liberius predicare et heretici multorum amiserunt favorem. Unde autem hoc accidit gesta illorum temporum te poterunt edocere.

Master: The answer is that there were numerous advantages. For after the pagan rendered his decision in favour of Athanasius, the catholics could preach the faith more freely, and the heretics lost the goodwill of many. Indeed the recorded history of those times will teach you how this came to pass.

Discipulus: Videtur quod Athanasius compromittendo in paganum se et fidem catholicam magno periculo exponebat, quod tamen debuit evitare.

Student: It appears that by selecting a pagan arbitrator Athanasius subjected both himself and the catholic faith to great danger, and this he definitely should have avoided.

Magister: Respondetur quod Athanasius periculo probabili se minime exponebat. Sciebat enim paganum illum virum esse magne fidelitatis et constantie ac eximie intelligentie, qua ordinem assertionum quarum una sequitur ex alia vel aliis, et etiam repugnantiam assertionum quarum una alteri adversatur sciebat advertere, et ideo Athanasius sciens predictum paganum virtutibus politicis et rationali scientia illustratum, ipsius iudicio modo predicto absque periculo probabili se commisit, licet non absque omni periculo qualitercunque possibili. Periculum autem qualitercunque possibile nullus vitare tenetur, quia per hoc a bonis impediretur permaximis. Esset enim similis illi de quo dicit Salomon Ecclesiasti 11: "qui observat ventum non seminat, et qui considerat nubes nunquam metet".

Master: The answer is that Athanasius did not expose himself to any probable danger. For he knew that this pagan was a man of great loyalty and firmness of character as well as of outstanding intelligence, a man who knew how to grasp the meaningful relationship between assertions linked in logical sequence, and also the inconsistency of assertions which contradicted each other. And so Athanasius, knowing the aforementioned pagan to be a virtuous citizen and distinguished logician, committed himself to his judgement as earlier described, without probable danger though not without any possible danger whatsoever. But no one is obligated to avoid any kind of possible danger, because this would prevent the doing of very good things. Indeed someone that cautious would resemble the person about whom Solomon stated in Ecclesiastes 11: "he that observeth the wind shall not sow; and he that regardeth the clouds shall not reap". [Ecclesiastes 11:4]

Capitulum 23

Chapter 23

Discipulus: Ad principalem responsionem quam dedisti ad instantiam meam quod non est appellandum a papa pronuntiante diffinitive legem christianam esse falsam volo redire et eam magis discutere. Cupio igitur audire quare assertores predicti asserunt expedire quod a tali sententia pape heretici appelletur.

Student: I want to return to the principal response that you gave to my objection that one is not allowed to appeal from a pope definitively proclaiming the Christian law to be false and to discuss this response somewhat further. I would like, accordingly, to hear why the aforementioned theorists assert that it is expedient to proceed with an appeal from this judgement of a heretic pope.

Magister: Huius dicti inter alias rationes tres assignantur. Prima est ut contra sententiam iniquam in causa fidei adhibeatur remedium quod consuevit contra alias iniquas sententias adhiberi. Secunda est ut cum maiori solempnitate iniqua sententia contra fidem prolata catholicam impugnetur. Tertia est ut satisfaciat simplicibus et iuristis qui forte non crederent aliquam posse licite impugnare sententiam iniquam contra fidem, et huiusmodi impugnantem esse a catholicis defendendum, nisi contra eandem appellaret.

Master: They assign three reasons, among others, for this statement. The first is that a remedy be provided against an unjust sentence in a case of faith similar to the one provided against other kinds of unjust sentences. The second is: so that an unjust sentence rendered against the catholic faith be opposed with greater solemnity. The third is: so that simple people and lawyers might be reassured. Unless an appeal were issued against this sentence, they might perhaps not believe that it is permitted to oppose some unjust sentence against the faith, and that the actual opponent is to be defended by catholics.

Capitulum 24

Chapter 24

Discipulus: Intelligo rationes quare isti dicunt, quod nonnunquam expedit a tali sententia appellare, sed nescio motiva eorum, quare dicunt quod non est absolute necessarium a tali sententia appellare. Ideo qua ratione moventur enarra.

Student: I understand the reasons why these theorists say that sometimes it is expedient to appeal from such a judgement, but I am in the dark as to what moves them to say that it is not absolutely necessary to appeal from such a judgement. Do give an account of the reason that influences them as to the latter view.

Magister: Quod non sit absolute necessarium a tali sententia appellare servando scilicet formam et puncta que in appellationibus secundum iura humana oportet servare sic ostendunt. Non magis est necessarium appellare a sententia prolata contra legem Dei et fidem christianam quam a sententia prolata contra canones et leges humanas. Sed a sententia prolata contra canones et leges humanas non est necessarium appellare, teste Gregorio nono qui, ut habetur Extra, De sententia et re iudicata, c. 1, ait: "sententia contra leges canonesve prolata licet non sit appellatione suspensa non potest tamen subsistere ipso iure". Ubi dicit glossa: "sententia lata contra leges, id est ius constitutionis, ita quod hoc in sententia exprimatur, nulla est ipso iure et citra appellationem rescinditur". Ergo multo magis sententia lata contra fidem nulla est ipso iure absque omni appellatione. Ergo non est necesse absolute appellare a sententia lata contra catholicam fidem. Secundo sic. A sententia que non potest transire in rem iudicatam nec valet firmitatem sententie obtinere non est absolute necessarium appellare. Hec enim ratio assignatur in decretis (2 q. 6 par. Diffinitiva quoque ) quare a pluribus sententiis non est necesse appellare, ubi sic habetur: "si sententia lata fuerit contra res prius iudicatas, a quibus provocatum non est, sententia auctoritatem non obtinebit, et ideo ab ea appellare non est necesse", et infra: "si plures iudices dati fuerint et unus tantum ex hiis pronunciasse proponitur, non videtur appellandi necessitas fuisse, cum sententia firmitatem iure non teneat". Ex quibus colligitur quod a sententia que non potest transire in rem iudicatam nec firmitatem sententie obtinere non est necesse appellare. Sed sententia lata contra fidem non potest transire in rem iudicatam nec valet auctoritatem seu firmitatem sententie obtinere. Ergo ab illa non est necessarium appellare. Tertio sic. In nulla causa contra quam nulla prescriptio currere potest est necesse appellare ab iniqua sententia. Sed contra fidem nulla prescriptio currere potest quin sententia lata contra fidem catholicam revocetur quandocunque veritas fuerit manifesta, quia omne quod est fidei contrarium orthodoxe vanum et irritum est habendum. Ergo a sententia lata contra fidem non est necesse appellare.

Master: Here is how they show that it is not absolutely necessary to appeal from such a judgement, namely by observing the form and the details, which are usually observed in appeals according to human regulations. There is no greater necessity to appeal from a judgement rendered against the law of God and the Christian faith than from a judgement rendered against human laws and canons. But it isn't necessary to appeal from a judgement rendered against human laws and canons, witness Gregory IX (we have this in Extra, De sententia et re iudicata, c. 1) who states: "a judgement rendered against the laws or canons cannot indeed be legally valid even if it is not suspended by an appeal". [col. 393] The gloss states in this context: "a judgement rendered against the laws, i.e. against constitutional order, so that this is expressed in the sentence, is invalid by law itself, and is cancelled without having recourse to an appeal". [col. 876] Therefore all the more is a judgement rendered against the catholic faith invalid by law itself, with no appeal being required. Therefore it is not absolutely necessary to appeal from a judgement rendered against the catholic faith. Here is the second argument. It is not absolutely necessary to appeal from a judgement, which cannot be legally conclusive nor is capable of achieving the firmness of a genuine adjudication. This is indeed the reason proffered in canon law (in 2 q. 6 # Diffinitiva) as to why it isn't necessary to appeal from many sentences, where we have it expounded as follows: "if the judgement was rendered against matters previously adjudicated from which no appeal was made, the judgement will not acquire authority, and therefore it isn't necessary to appeal from it". [col. 482] And further along: "if there were many judges and only one among them was seen to have made a pronouncement, it does not appear that a necessity to appeal would have existed, since the judgement would not be conclusive by law". [col. 482] One gathers from these texts that it is not necessary to appeal from a judgement that cannot be legally conclusive nor is capable of obtaining the firmness of a genuine adjudication. But a judgement rendered against the faith cannot be legally conclusive nor can it possess the authority or the firmness of a genuine adjudication. Therefore it is not necessary to appeal from such a judgement. Here is the third argument. In no case against which no prescription may run is it necessary to appeal from an unjust sentence. But no prescription may run against the faith, and a sentence rendered against the catholic faith would certainly be revoked whenever the truth became manifest, because everything which is opposed to orthodox belief is to be considered false and invalid. Therefore it is not necessary to appeal from a judgement rendered against the faith.

Quarto sic. Iniqua sententia lata contra fidem non potest esse magis privilegiata quam sententia lata contra matrimonium. Sed sententia lata contra matrimonium tale privilegium non obtinet ut ab ea appellare sit necesse, quia licet a sententia lata contra matrimonium non sit appellatum ipsa tamen revocanda est quandocunque fuerit ostensum fuisse iniquam, secundum quod colligitur manifeste ex sacris canonibus Extra, De sententia et re iudicata, c. Lator et c. Consanguinei et quampluribus aliis. Hinc glossa predicto capitulo Lator notat dicens: "contra matrimonium non currit prescriptio (33 q. 5 Quod Deo ) etiam si ab illa sententia non fuit appellatum, quia sententia lata contra matrimonium non transit in rem iudicatam quin revocetur sententia quandocunque error sententie fuerit detectus". Ergo multo magis a sententia lata contra catholicam fidem non est necesse appellare. Quinto sic. Causa fidei est magis favorabilis et per consequens privilegiis debet gaudere maioribus quam causa matrimonii vel quecunque causa civilis. Sed causa matrimonii et nonnulle cause civiles tali privilegio gaudent quod non est necesse ab iniqua sententia appellare. Ergo multo magis causa fidei tali debet gaudere privilegio ut ab iniqua sententia contra fidem non sit appellare necesse.

Here is the fourth argument. An unjust sentence rendered against the faith cannot be more privileged than a judgement rendered against matrimony. But a judgement rendered against matrimony is not privileged to the extent of making an appeal from it a matter of necessity, because even if a judgement rendered against matrimony is not appealed, it must nevertheless be revoked whenever evidence of its injustice comes to light, as we clearly gather from the sacred canons Extra, De sententia et re iudicata, c. Lator, [col. 394] and c. Consanguinei, [col. 395] and very many others. Hence the gloss to the cited chapter Lator makes this statement: "prescription does not run against matrimony (33 q. 5 Quod Deo) [col. 1251] even if there was no appeal from the judgement, because a judgement rendered against matrimony is not legally conclusive, and will be revoked whenever an error in it shall have been detected". [col. 879] Therefore all the more is it not necessary to appeal from a judgement rendered against the catholic faith. Here is the fifth argument. The cause of faith is more significant and consequently must enjoy greater privileges than the cause of matrimony or any other civil cause. But the cause of matrimony and some civil causes enjoy the privilege of it not being necessary to appeal from an unjust sentence respecting them. Therefore all the more must the cause of faith enjoy the privilege of it not being necessary to appeal from an unjust sentence against the faith.

Capitulum 25

Chapter 25

Discipulus: Rationes adverto quare dicitur quod non est absolute necessarium appellare a sententia lata contra fidem, sed ignoro quare ista assertio taliter modificatur, quod non est necesse appellare servando formam et puncta que in appellationibus secundum iura humana oportet servare. Unde rationem istius modificationis assigna.

Student: I have a notion of the reasons why one states that it is not absolutely necessary to appeal from a judgement rendered against the faith, but I do not understand why this assertion is modified by the clause that it is not necessary to appeal by observing the form and the details which are usually observed in appeals according to human regulations. Kindly explain the reason for this modification.

Magister: Ad intelligendum illud quod queris distinguitur, quia appellatio a sententia lata contra fidem quadrupliciter accipi potest. Uno modo pro libello continente formam appellationis que communiter consuevit in aliis appellationibus observari, notante videlicet personam appellantem et contra quam appellat et causam pro qua appellatur vel sententiam a qua appellatur et tempus quo appellatur et alias circumstantias que ad appellationis formam debitam requiruntur. Aliter accipitur appellatio pro voce qua quis absolute in presentia iudicis dicit "appello". Unde glossa 2 q. 6 par. Forma appellationis dicit: "si coram iudice appellat sufficit si dicat 'appello'". Tertio accipitur appellatio pro impugnatione inique sententie late contra fidem, et sic quicunque impugnaret sententiam pape latam contra fidem intelligeretur appellare ab eodem, licet non diceret "appello". Quarto potest dici appellatio a sententia pape lata contra fidem omne factum quo faciens ostendit se pape sententiam reprobare, detestare, seu horrere, et isto modo clerici romani qui se a communione Anastasii secundi, de quo habetur dis. 19 Anastasius, abegerunt, dici poterant appellatores quia facto ipsum tanquam hereticum reprobaverunt.

Master: We must make distinctions in order to answer your question intelligently. An appeal from a sentence rendered against the faith may be verbally understood in four different ways. One way is to mean by this a document containing a formal outline of the appeal, as has been the common practice observed in other appeal situations, namely, an outline mentioning the person who is appealing, and the person against whom one is appealing, and the cause for which one is appealing or the sentence against which one is appealing, and the time frame of the appeal, and all other circumstances which are required to meet the proper formality of an appeal. Another acception of "appeal" is to mean by this the actual spoken expression, namely "I appeal", which someone openly utters in the presence of a judge. Hence the gloss to 2 q. 6 # Forma appellationum [col. 478] states: "if he appeals in the presence of a judge it suffices if he says 'I appeal'". [col. 673] A third acception of "appeal" is to mean by this an active opposition towards an iniquitous judgement rendered against the faith. In this perspective any one who actively opposed a sentence of the pope rendered against faith would be understood to be appealing from the pope, even if he did not utter the words "I appeal". Fourthly, every act whereby the actor demonstrates that he rejects and detests the pope's sentence or is horrified by it may be termed an appeal from a sentence of the pope rendered against the faith. This is the way whereby the Roman clerks who withdrew themselves from the communion of Anastasius II (the account is in dis. 19 Anastasius) [col. 64] might have been designated as appellants, because by their action they rejected this pope as a heretic.

Discipulus: Duo prima membra istius distinctionis intelligo, sed alia duo non videntur convenienter assignari, quia secundum tertium membrum omnis impugnans verbo alicuius iudicis sententiam diceretur appellare ab eodem, quod nullam verisimilitudinem habet. Secundum vero quartum membrum inobediens sententie iudicis absque omni verbo appellandi diceretur appellans.

Student: I understand the first two elements of the distinction, but the other two do not appear to have been conveniently assigned. For according to the third acception everyone who verbally opposes the sentence of some judge would be said to be appealing from him, which is quite implausible. While according to the fourth acception someone who disobeyed the sentence of a judge would be considered an appellant without having uttered a single word to that effect.

Magister: Ad hec solvenda dicitur esse notandum quod secundum iura dupliciter appellare contingit, scilicet verbo et facto. Quod verbo appellare contingat tu concedis, quod etiam facto valeat quis appellare asserit Innocentius tertius manifeste qui, ut habetur Extra, De appellationibus, c. Dilecti, ait: "cum autem plus sit ad sedem apostolicam facto provocare quam verbo etc." ubi dicit glossa: "plus est factis demonstrare quam verbis dicere" et glossa 11 q. 3 c. Existimant ait: "ipso facto appellamus". Ex quibus verbis patet quod quartum membrum congrue assignatur, quia scilicet facto contingit appellare a sententia pape lata contra fidem. Non autem aliter contingit appellare facto a sententia pape lata contra fidem nisi facto ostendendo quod talis sententia est tanquam heretica reprobanda. Ergo quartus ille modus appellandi congrue assignatur. Quia vel plus vel non minus est manifeste et constanter asserere viva voce vel scripto sententiam pape esse hereticam quam facto innuere eandem sententiam pape esse hereticam, sed, sicut ostensum est, qui facto insinuat sententiam pape esse hereticam facto intelligitur appellare, ergo et qui verbo vel scripto sententiam pape tanquam hereticam constanter impugnat intelligitur appellare licet verbum appellandi non scribat vel proferat.

Master: It is said that in order to solve these points one must note that according to the laws there are two ways of appealing, namely, by word and by deed. You yourself concede that one can appeal verbally. And Innocent III clearly asserts that one may appeal by deed when he states in Extra, De appellationibus, c. Dilecti: "since it is indeed weightier to appeal to the Apostolic see by deeds than by word etc.", [col. 432] where the gloss says: "it is weightier to make a demonstration by deeds than to make verbal statements", [col. 947] and the gloss to 11 q. 3 c. Existimant [col. 666] says: "the deed itself is our appeal". [col. 951] It is clear from these words that the fourth element of the distinction is pertinently assigned, because it does indeed happen that one appeals by deed from a sentence of the pope rendered against the faith. But one does not appeal by deed from a sentence of the pope which was rendered against the faith unless one demonstrates by deed that such a sentence must be rejected as heretical. Therefore this fourth meaning of "appeal" is pertinently assigned. For it is of greater or at least not of lesser weight to assert clearly and continuously in speech or in writing that the sentence of the pope is heretical, than to imply that same sentence to be heretical by deed. But as has been shown, he who implies by deed that the pope's sentence is heretical is understood to appeal by deed. Therefore he likewise who continuously opposes the pope's sentence as heretical by word or script is understood to be appealing even though he neither writes nor utters the word itself.

Discipulus: Dic quomodo secundum ista ad inconvenientia que intuli respondetur.

Student: State how this is used to refute the inconveniences that I have advanced.

Magister: Ut responsiones ad illa percipias duo dicuntur esse notanda. Primum est quod sicut cuilibet christiano interest sententiam pape latam contra fidem catholicam detestari, impugnare, reprobare, et horrere, ita cuilibet christiano licet si voluerit ab iniqua sententia pape contra fidem catholicam lata appellare primo et secundo modo accepta appellatione, quia ab iniqua sententia potest quilibet cuius interest appellare. Secundo dicitur esse notandum quod, quia papale officium est supremum in ecclesia Dei nec est aliquis qui ex officio sit vero papa superior in spiritualibus, ideo quando papa profert sententiam contra fidem, subtilitates iuris que contra prelates inferiores proferentes sententiam contra fidem servantur, non sunt stricte servande, nec etiam littera legum civilium et canonicarum in hoc casu est omnino servanda, sed oportet ad legem divinam et rationem naturalem ac intentionem legislatoris et ad legem quam instituisset si legem specialem de papa proferente sententiam contra fidem constituisset, recurrere. Per hoc respondent ad primum inconveniens. Quia non omnis impugnans verbo alicuius iudicis sententiam dici debet appellans, tum quia non omnis interest appellare a sententia iudicis vel etiam reprobare, tum quia de modo appellandi a sententiis iudicum inferiorum sunt posite leges expresse, et ideo qui in talibus non servat huiusmodi leges non intelligitur appellare. Sed secus est de omni christiano impugnante absque verbo appellandi sententiam pape contra fidem, tum quia cuilibet christiano licet si voluerit a tali sententia appellare, quia talis sententia est preiudicialis omni catholico, et ideo sua interest talem sententiam impugnare, et per consequens sibi licet si voluerit a tali sententia appellare, exprimendo vocabulum appellandi; tum quia de modo appellandi a sententia pape contra fidem non sunt leges speciales institute, imo secundum leges a tali sententia cum in rem iudicatam transire non valeat non est necesse appellare, et ideo quicunque sententiam pape contra fidem latam verbo vel scripto constanter impugnat absque verbo appellandi, intelligitur appellare tertio modo et tantum valet secundum rem acsi verbum appellandi proferret. Per predicta etiam patet ad secundum inconveniens quod intulisti, quia inobediens sententie iudicis inferioris verbum appellandi nequaquam emittens non intelligitur facto appellare, quia cautum est in iure quod in hoc casu ad hoc ut aliquis intelligatur appellans oportet quod infra certum tempus viva voce vel scripto cum debitis circumstantiis vocem appellationis exhibeat. Sed de modo appellandi a sententia hereticali pape nichil est in iure statutum. Ideo eo ipso quod quis facto ostendit se reprobare sententiam pape tanquam hereticam, facto intelligitur appellare.

Master: They say two things must be noted for you to grasp the responses to these inconveniences. The first is that just as it is the concern of every Christian to detest, oppose, reject, and be horrified by a papal sentence rendered against the catholic faith, so is it permitted to any willing Christian to appeal, in the first and second acceptions of the term, from an iniquitous sentence of the pope rendered against the catholic faith, because anyone whose concern this is may appeal from an unjust sentence. The second thing to be noted, they say, is that, because the papal office is supreme within the church of God nor is there anyone who is officially superior in spiritual affairs to a true pope, therefore when a pope renders a sentence against the faith, the legal subtleties which operate with respect to inferior prelates rendering a sentence against the faith are not to be strictly observed, nor, to be sure, must the letter of the civil and canon laws be entirely followed in this case. Divine law, natural reason, the intention of the legislator, and the law, which he would have instituted had he put in place a special law about a pope rendering a sentence against the faith, must rather guide one. They reply to the first inconvenience on this basis. For not everyone who verbally opposes the sentence of some judge must be designated as an appellant, since not everyone is concerned with appealing from or even rejecting the judge's sentence, and because laws have been specifically instituted with respect to the procedure one must follow when appealing from the sentences of inferior judges. Therefore someone who does not observe these laws in the relevant circumstances is not understood to be appealing. But it is a different matter when any Christian opposes a sentence of the pope against the faith without uttering a verbal appeal. Any Christian is permitted to appeal from such a sentence, because this sentence is prejudicial to every catholic and therefore it is his concern to oppose such a sentence. Consequently he is allowed, if he wishes, to appeal from such a sentence by the utterance of a verbal appeal. But since no special laws are instituted concerning the method of appealing from a papal sentence against the faith (indeed according to established laws it is not necessary to appeal from such a sentence since it cannot be legally conclusive), therefore anyone who consistently, in speech or in writing, opposes a papal sentence rendered against the faith without uttering a verbal appeal is understood to be appealing in the third acception of the term, and his appeal has as much substantive validity as if he had uttered the verbal appeal formula. The foregoing also clarifies the second inconvenience you had mentioned. For someone who disobeys the sentence of a lesser judge without uttering a verbal appeal is not understood to be appealing by deed, because there is a provision in the law that in this particular case, in order for someone to be treated as an appellant it is required that he make an appeal in proper terms within a certain time, verbally or in writing and with appropriate formalities. But nothing is established in the law as to the method of appealing from a heretical sentence of the pope. Therefore by the very fact that someone overtly indicates that he is rejecting the papal sentence as heretical, he is understood as appealing by deed.

Capitulum 26

Chapter 26

Discipulus: Quare non est aliquod speciale statutum in iure de modo appellandi a sententia hereticali pape.

Student: Why is there no special statute in the law concerning the method of appealing from a heretical sentence of the pope.

Magister: Huius due cause assignantur. Prima est quia non est necesse a tali sententia appellare primo modo vel secundo accepto vocabuli appellationis eo quod talis sententia in rem iudicatam transire non potest. Secunda est quia leges fiunt de hiis que sepius accidunt. Raro autem accidit papam ferre sententiam hereticalem, ideo non est necesse de hoc legem statuere.

Master: Two causes are alleged for this. The first is that it is not necessary to appeal from such a sentence in the first or second acception of the term "appeal", in that such a sentence cannot be legally conclusive. The second is that laws are made by reference to events which occur more frequently. And it rarely happens that a pope renders a heretical sentence, therefore it is not necessary to enact a law about it.

Discipulus: Leges generaliter facte sunt de modo appellandi. Quare ergo non sunt leges ille servande cum quis vult a sententia pape heretica appellare.

Student: Laws have been made in general terms about the appeal process. Why, then, should these laws not be observed when someone wishes to appeal from a heretical sentence of the pope.

Magister: Ad hoc responsum est prius. Dictum est enim quod quia papa verus non habet superiorem ideo cum sententiat contra fidem non est necesse regulas generales de appellationibus datas servare. Hoc enim posset in periculum fidei redundare.

Master: This has been answered previously. [1 Dial. 6.25] Indeed it was stated that because a true pope has no superior, therefore in the event he lays down a judgement against the faith it is not necessary to observe the general rules established with respect to appeals, for this might result in danger for the faith.

Discipulus: Videtur quod regule date de appellationibus strictius sunt servande cum quis vult a papa appellare quam si vult ab alio appellare quia maior reverentia exhibenda est pape quam aliis inferioribus. Ergo regule que possunt derogare honori pape strictissime sunt servande eo quod nullus debet gaudere maiori privilegio quam papa.

Student: It seems that the established rules as to appeals should be observed more strictly when someone wants to appeal from the pope than if he wants to appeal from somebody else, since a greater respect must be shown to the pope than to others inferior to him. Therefore rules which may lead (if the accusation is true) to an infringement of papal honour should be observed most strictly, in that no one must enjoy a greater privilege here than the pope.

Magister: Respondetur quod leges canonice et civiles secundum diversitates causarum, personarum, temporum et periculi quod imminet ac etiam circa alias circumstantias sunt magis stricte vel minus stricte servande vel penitus non servande, et ideo quia papa ferens sententiam contra fidem gravius peccat quam alius, quia peccatum ex dignitate augetur, facilius est etiam habere iustitiam de inferiori papa si tulerit contra fidem sententiam. Maius etiam periculum imminet omnibus christianis ex sententia hereticali pape, ideo si quis voluerit in communi forma a tali pape sententia appellare in favorem fidei cui magis favendum est quam pape, minus artandus est ad formam appellationis quam si ab alia sententia iudicis inferioris duxerit appellandum. Unde et in hoc casu in favorem fidei quantum ad multa minor est reverentia exhibenda pape et minori debet privilegio gaudere, quemadmodum, si accusetur, minori privilegio gaudet quam nonnulli alii presules qui, ut habetur 2 q. 4 c. Presul nonnisi cum 72 testibus debent dampnari. Papa autem tali privilegio minime gaudet, teste glossa ibidem que ait: "nunquid contra papam duplicabuntur testes. Non. Imo duo sufficiunt et in hoc deterioris conditionis quia ipse sine comparatione aliorum creatus est maior et ideo sine spe venie condempnandus est ut diabolus". Ex quibus verbis patet quod nonnunquam papa propter crimen ipsius minor privilegio gaudet quam inferiores episcopi. Quod precipue servandum est quando ex crimine pape maius periculum imminet christianitati, quod accidit quando papa contra fidem profert sententiam.

Master: The answer to this is that canon and civil laws are to be more or less strictly observed or not observed at all depending on the variety of causes, persons, and times, on the imminent danger, and also on other circumstances. And therefore since a pope who renders a sentence against the faith sins more seriously than another (because the sin grows with the dignity of him who commits it), it is indeed easier to perform justice with respect to the pope's inferior if the latter renders a sentence against the faith. Indeed, a greater danger threatens all Christians from a heretical sentence of the pope. Therefore if someone wanted to issue a standard appeal in favour of the faith from such a papal sentence (and given that the faith is worthier of support than the pope) the appellant in question must be less bound by the formal requirements of an appeal than if he had decided to appeal from some other sentence of a judge inferior to the pope. And so in this particular case, with support for the faith at stake, a lesser respect as to many things is to be shown to the pope, and he must enjoy a lesser privilege. Just as, were he accused, he would enjoy a lesser privilege than do some other spiritual leaders, who (we have this in 2 q. 4 c. Presul) [col. 466] must not be condemned unless 72 witnesses testify against them. But the pope hardly enjoys such a privilege, as is attested by the gloss to the cited passage, which states: "should there be even more witnesses against the pope? No. Indeed two would suffice, and in this the pope's situation is worse, because he was elevated above others without their participation, and therefore he must be condemned without hope of remission, like the devil". [col. 653] It is evident from these words that sometimes the pope enjoys less privilege for his misdeed than do bishops inferior to him. And this must be especially observed when a greater danger threatens Christianity due to the pope's crime, which is indeed the case when the pope issues a decree against the faith.

Capitulum 27

Chapter 27

Discipulus: Applica supradicta ad interrogationem meam. Quare supra dicitur quod a sententia pape heretica non est necesse appellare servando formam et puncta etc.

Student: Apply the aforesaid to my question. Namely, why does one say that it is not necessary to appeal from a heretical judgement of the pope by observing the form and the details etc.

Magister: Ad interrogationem propositam taliter applicantur, quod videlicet non est necesse appellare a tali sententia pape primo modo et secundo accepto vocabulo appellationis, et propter hoc in assertione predicta est addita modificatio memorata. Necesse est tamen appellare tertio modo vel quarto a sententia pape heretica quando scitur esse heretica, quia talis sententia est impugnanda et qui scit eam esse hereticam facto debet ostendere quod reputat eam hereticam.

Master: The aforesaid statements are applied to the proposed question as follows. The point is that there is no necessity to appeal from such a papal sentence in the first and second acception of the word "appeal", and that is why the mentioned modification was added to the assertion we are discussing. It is, however, necessary to appeal in the third or fourth sense of the term from a heretical judgement of the pope known to be such, because such a judgement must be opposed, and he who knows it to be heretical must indicate by some action that he considers it to be such.

Discipulus: Nunquid solus ille contra quem lata est talis sententia tenetur appellare taliter ab eadem.

Student: But is it not a fact that only he against whom such a judgement has been rendered is obligated to appeal from it in the manner described.

Magister: Respondetur quod non solus ille sed quilibet catholicus sciens talem sententiam esse hereticam appellare debet, quia aliter esset fautor pape heretici.

Master: The answer is that not only this individual, but every catholic who knows the judgement to be heretical is obligated to appeal, because otherwise he would be aiding and abetting a heretical pope.

Discipulus: Nunquid tenetur infra certum tempus taliter appellare.

Student: Is he bound to appeal in this manner within a specified time frame.

Magister: Respondetur quod non est tempus sibi determinatum, quia non oportet taliter appellare ne sententia transeat in rem iudicatam sed ne appellans favere heretico videatur.

Master: The answer is that he is not constrained by a specific time frame, because the appeal is not intended to prevent the judgement from becoming legally conclusive. It is rather made so that the appellant will not be seen to be favouring a heretic.

Capitulum 28

Chapter 28

Discipulus: Ex his coniicio quod talis modus appellandi tractari habet cum de fautoribus hereticorum exquisite inquiretur, ideo de hoc supersedeas et indica quomodo aliter respondetur ad instantiam qua probavi quod a papa pronuntiante fidem catholicam esse falsam non est aliquatenus appellandum. Dixisti enim quod ad illam instantiam duplex datur responsio. Cum enim tractaverimus unam, dic aliam.

Student: From this I conclude that this method of appealing is slated for discussion when we extensively inquire about the aiders and abettors of heretics. Therefore abstain from further focus on this issue, and indicate how one responds otherwise to the objection by which I proved that an appeal from a pope who declares the catholic faith to be false must in no way be issued. For you mentioned that two responses are given to this objection. Since we have dealt with one of these responses, proceed to state the other.

Magister: Dicitur quod a tali sententia necesse est appellare in forma communi appellandi et infra tempus statutum a iure, quia aliter non audiretur quis contra sententiam pape si ipsam postea satageret impugnare. Pro hac autem assertione potest taliter allegari. Qui a sententia iniqua infra tempus statutum a iure negligit appellare per interpretationem iuris late sententie parere videtur (Extra, De sententia et re iudicata, c. Quod ad consultationem). Qui autem sententie paret ipsam impugnare non potest, quia quod semel approbatum est postea reprobari non potest (dis. 4 In istis et 8 q. 2 Dilectissimi). Ergo qui non appellat infra tempus statutum a iure postea non auditur, et ita appellare est necesse si quis unquam voluerit sententiam pape hereticam impugnare. Secundo sic. Appellationis remedium est ad presidium innocentie institutum (Extra, De appellationibus, Cum speciali). Ergo quanto magis innocentia impugnatur tanto magis necessarium est appellationis remedium. Sed quando papa pronuntiat diffinitive contra catholicum fidem christianam esse falsam, maxime innocentia impugnatur. Ergo tunc maxime necessarium est ad appellationis remedium convolare, et ita a tali sententia est necesse appellare. Tertio sic. Unoquoque utendum est ad usum ad quem noscitur institutum. Appellatio autem est instituta ut oppressi releventur, 2 q. 6 c.Omnis oppressus et c. Ideo, et in multis aliis sacris canonibus hoc idem habetur. Ergo appellatione est utendum ad relevandum oppressos. Sed catholici maxime opprimuntur si papa sententiat fidem christianam esse falsam. Ergo in hoc casu est precipue utendum appellationis remedio. Ergo a tali sententia est necessarium appellare.

Master: The second response is that from such a sentence it is necessary to issue a standard appeal within the time frame specified by law, because otherwise a person would not be granted a hearing against the pope's sentence if he were to subsequently attempt to oppose it. And in support of this assertion one may argue as follows. He who neglects to appeal from an unjust sentence within the legally established time frame is deemed in the eyes of the law to have obeyed the proferred judgement (Extra, De sententia et re iudicata, c. Quod ad consultationem). [col. 400] But he who obeys a judgement may not proceed to oppose it because that which has once been approved cannot subsequently be rejected (dis. 4 In istis [col. 5] and 8 q. 2 Dilectissimi). [col. 598] Therefore he who does not appeal within the time frame established by law is not granted a hearing afterwards, and it is thus necessary to appeal if one will ever want to oppose the pope's heretical judgement. The second argument is this. The remedy of an appeal exists for the protection of innocence (Extra, De appellationibus, Cum speciali). [col. 437] Therefore the greater is the assault on innocence, the more is the remedy of an appeal necessary. But when the pope definitively proclaims against a catholic that the Christian faith is false, innocence is assaulted in the highest degree. Therefore that is when the necessity of having recourse to the remedy of an appeal is most intense, and thus it is necessary to appeal from such a judgement. The third argument is this. Each thing must be used for the purpose for which it is known to have been instituted. But the appeal process has been instituted so that the oppressed may be relieved (2 q. 6 c. Omnis [col.467] and c. Ideo, [col. 471] and the same notion is expressed in many other sacred canons). Therefore one must utilize the appeal process for the purpose of relieving the oppressed. But catholics are maximally oppressed if the pope decrees that the Christian faith is false. Therefore in this case above all must one utilize the remedy of an appeal. Therefore it is necessary to appeal from such a judgement.

Capitulum 29

Chapter 29

Discipulus: Tam rationes quibus ostenditur quod non est necesse appellare a sententia pape diffinitive pronuntiantis fidem christianam esse falsam, quam rationes pro assertione contraria allegate apparentes michi videntur. Ideo peto ut referas quomodo respondetur ad utrasque. Primo autem respondeas ad rationes probantes quod non est necesse appellare.

Student: Both the reasons by which one shows that it is not necessary to appeal from the judgement of a pope who definitively proclaims the Christian faith to be false, and the reasons advanced in favour of the contrary assertion, seem apparent to me. Therefore I ask you to outline how both sets of arguments are to be answered. But respond first of all to the reasons proving that it is not necessary to appeal.

Magister: Ad primam istarum dicitur quod non est necesse appellare a sententia lata contra leges et canones quia hoc est cautum in iure. Non est autem cautum in iure quod non est necesse appellare a sententia pape pronuntiantis legem christianam esse falsam. Ad secundam dicitur quod sententiarum que non possunt transire in rem iudicatam duplex differentia reperitur. Quedam enim est sententia talis a qua si non appellat ille contra quem fuerit lata eo ipso ipsi parere censetur. Talis est sententia lata contra fidem, et ideo a tali sententia est necesse appellare ne is contra quem fertur fautor pravitatis heretice reputetur. Alia est sententia que transire non potest in rem iudicatam, cui tamen ille contra quem fertur non censetur parere licet non appellet, et a tali sententia non est necesse appellare et de tali est sermo in decretis 2 q. 6 par. Diffinitiva. Ad tertiam consimiliter respondetur quod in illa causa contra quam non potest prescriptio currere cui si ille contra quem fertur non censetur parere licet non appellet, non est necesse appellare, et talis non est causa fidei. Ideo si feratur iniqua sententia contra fidem necesse est appellare ne non appellans favere heresi iudicetur. Ad quartam respondetur quod causa fidei est magis privilegiata quam causa matrimonii, quia causam fidei debet quilibet contra quem lata est pro viribus defensare, ideo ad defensionem fidei appellare tenetur. Non sic autem tenetur quilibet defendere causam matrimonii, et ideo non semper est necesse appellare. Et per hoc patet responsio ad quintam rationem.

Master: To the first of these the reply is that it is not necessary to appeal from a sentence rendered against human laws and canons because this is provided for in law. But it is not provided in the law that it is not necessary to appeal from the sentence of a pope proclaiming the Christian law to be false. To the second the reply is that one finds two different types of judgements that cannot become legally conclusive. One is such that if the person against whom the sentence is rendered does not appeal from it he would be thought by the very fact of his inaction to have obediently accepted it. A sentence rendered against the faith is of this type, and therefore it is necessary to appeal from this judgement lest the one against whom it is rendered be considered an aider and abettor of heretical wickedness. Another type of sentence that cannot become legally conclusive is the one that the person against whom it is rendered is not thought to be obeying even if he does not appeal. From such a sentence it is not necessary to appeal, and that is the type of sentence which is discussed in the canon law at 2 q. 6 # Diffinitiva. [col. 481] A similar reply is given to the third reason. It is not necessary to appeal in a cause against which prescription cannot run if the person against whom sentence is rendered is not thought to obey the sentence even if he does not appeal from it. But such is not the cause of faith. Therefore if an unjust sentence is rendered against the faith it is necessary to appeal lest the person who does not appeal be judged to favour heresy. The answer to the fourth reason is that the cause of faith is more privileged than the cause of matrimony, because anyone must defend with all his strength the cause of faith when a legal decision has been rendered against him in this connection, therefore he is bound to appeal for the defense of the faith. Anyone is not bound to defend in like manner the cause of matrimony, and therefore it is not always necessary to appeal in the case of the latter. And by reference to this the reply to the fifth reason is evident.

Capitulum 30

Chapter 30

Discipulus: Iste responsiones valde debiles michi videntur, quas tamen pro nunc nolo amplius pertractari. Ideo dic quomodo ad rationes in contrarium respondetur.

Student: These replies appear quite weak to me, but I do not want to have them discussed further at this time. Therefore state how one responds to the reasons for the contrary position.

Magister: Ad primam respondetur quod quando sententia transit in rem iudicatam, nisi fuerit appellatione suspensa, tunc qui a sententia iniqua infra tempus statutum a iure absque causa rationabili neglexerit appellare, per interpretationem iuris late sententie parere videtur. Sed quando sententia iniqua nullo modo potest transire in rem iudicatam, nec aliquo modo potest firmitatem sententie obtinere, ille qui a tali sententia non appellat non intelligitur per interpretationem iuris parere eidem. Talis autem est sententia pape lata contra fidem, quia nullo modo potest transire in rem iudicatam, nec unquam potest aliquis per talem sententiam obligari. Ideo non est necesse appellare, sed sufficit absque verbo appellandi verbo vel facto pro loco et tempore sententiam detestari, et eo ipso intelligitur quis eidem sententie dissentire, et talis dissensus loco appellationis est habendus. Ad secundam respondetur quod remedium appellationis est ad presidium innocentie institutum quando aliter quam per appellationem non potest innocentia esse tuta. Sed quando innocentia potest aliter esse secura quam per remedium appellationis non est simpliciter necessaria appellatio, licet nonnunquam possit esse utilis etiam licet innocentia aliter possit esse tuta. Nunc autem de iure innocentia catholici contra quem papa pronuntiaret legem christianam esse falsam aliter quam per appellationis remedium potest esse tuta, quia de iure talis sententia ipsum nequit aliquo modo ligare, et ideo de iure sufficit catholico absque verbo appellandi talem sententiam verbo vel facto impugnare et ei nullatenus obedire.

Master: The answer to the first is that when a sentence becomes legally conclusive (unless it is suspended by an appeal), then the person who, without reasonable cause, neglected to appeal from an unjust judgement within the time frame specified by the law appears, in the eyes of the law, to be obeying the rendered sentence. But when the iniquitous sentence can in no way become legally conclusive nor acquire by any means the firmness of an established decision, the person who does not appeal from such a judgement is not understood by legal interpretation to be obeying the sentence. And this is the judgement of the pope rendered against the faith, because it can in no way become legally conclusive nor can anyone ever become obligated by such. Therefore it is not necessary to overtly appeal, and sufficient to abhor the judgement by word or deed as time and place require, without uttering the appeal formula. By this very fact someone is understood to be disagreeing with the sentence, and such a disagreement is to be accepted as the equivalent of an appeal. The answer to the second reason is that the remedy of an appeal is instituted for the protection of innocence, when innocence cannot be secured by any other method save that of an appeal. But when innocence can be made safe by a method other than the remedy of an appeal, then an appeal is plainly unnecessary, although it may sometimes be useful even if innocence can be secured in some other manner. At this time, however, the law provides for the innocence of a catholic against whom the pope were to proclaim that the Christian law is false to be protected otherwise than by the remedy of an appeal, since legally such a sentence cannot bind this catholic in any way. Therefore it is legally sufficient for a catholic not to obey such a sentence and to oppose it by word or deed without a formal appeal.

Discipulus: Quid si de facto catholicus non est tutus nisi appellet a tali sententia pape.

Student: What if in fact a catholic is not safe unless he appeals from such a papal sentence.

Magister: In hoc casu tenetur propter defensionem fidei et sue innocentie appellare. Si enim taliter dampnatum a papa alii christiani nollent defendere nisi vocem appellationis emitteret, necesse esset quod appellaret: non quod de iure teneatur, sed quia aliter de facto tutus esse non potest. Ad tertiam respondetur quod si quis debet uti aliquo, utendum est eo ad illum usum ad quem institutum est. Non tamen omni tempore nec in omni casu utendum est quolibet ad illum usum ad quem institutum est. Medicina enim instituta est ad sanitatem consequendam et ideo qui debet uti medicina debet uti ipsa ad sanitatem consequendam. Non tamen debet quis omni tempore uti medicina intentione sanitatis consequende, quia hoc sepe esset impedimentum sanitatis et inductivum infirmitatis. Sic qui debet uti appellatione debet uti ipsa ut ab oppressione relevetur vel ne irrationabiliter opprimatur. Non tamen necesse est semper uti appellationis remedio si alio modo ab oppressione quis valeat relevari. Et ideo ab iniqua sententia pape pronuntiantis fidem christianam esse falsam non est absolute necesse appellare, licet in casu quando oppressus aliter relevari non posset necesse esset appellare.

Master: In that case he is bound to appeal in order to defend the faith and his own innocence. For if other Christians would not want to defend someone condemned in this manner by the pope unless he formally appealed, it would be necessary for him to appeal, not because it was a legal obligation, but because otherwise he would in effect be unable to secure his situation. The answer to the third reason is this. If someone must make use of something, he must indeed use it for its intended purpose. But one need not use something for its intended purpose in every case and at all times. Medicine, for instance, has been instituted for the purpose of achieving health, and therefore he who must make use of it must have this purpose in mind. Yet someone should not utilize medicine at all times for the purpose of achieving health, because such constant use would frequently prevent one from achieving health and would rather cause illness. Similarly, he who must use the appeal process must use it so as to be liberated from harm or to prevent his being unreasonably harmed. But it is not necessary to always utilize the appeal remedy if someone is capable of being liberated from harm in another way. And therefore it is not absolutely necessary to appeal from the unjust sentence of a pope who proclaims the Christian faith to be false, although occasionally it would be necessary to appeal if the person harmed could not find relief in some other way.

Capitulum 31

Chapter 31

Discipulus: Postquam disseruisti quantum volui an ille, contra quem papa diffinitivam ferret sententiam quod lex christiana est falsa, posset appellare a tali iniqua sententia, et ibidem recitasti quod licet cuilibet christiano a tali sententia appellare, sed motiva illius assertionis minime adduxisti, ideo rogo ut eandem assertionem fulcire nitaris.

Student: After you had discussed as much as I wanted whether someone against whom the pope were to render a sentence that the Christian law is false might appeal from this unjust sentence, you had reported in that context that it was permitted to any Christian to appeal from such a judgement, but you did not provide reasons for the assertion. Therefore I request that you endeavour to strengthen this assertion.

Magister: Quod cuilibet christiano a tali sententia licet appellare videtur multis modis posse probari. Primo sic. A sententia lata contra alium licet cuilibet appellare cui per talem sententiam fit preiudicium manifestum (Extra, De sententia et re iudicata, c. Cum super ). Sed per sententiam pape quod lex christiana est falsa latam contra alium fit cuilibet christiano preiudicium manifestum, quia cum, teste Apostolo, una sit fides omnium, sententia lata contra fidem est in preiudicium cuiuslibet christiani. Ergo a tali sententia lata contra alium licet cuilibet christiano appellare.

Master: One may prove in many ways, it seems, that a Christian is permitted to appeal from such a judgement. Here is the first reason. Anyone is permitted to appeal from a judgement rendered against someone else if that judgement generates an obvious prejudice to the former (Extra, De sententia et re iudicata, c. Cum super). [col. 401] But a papal sentence that the Christian law is false which is rendered against another generates an obvious prejudice to every Christian, because ( the Apostle witnessing that faith is common to all) [Ephesians 4:5-6] a sentence rendered against the faith prejudices every Christian. Therefore it is permitted to any Christian to appeal from this sentence rendered against someone else.

Discipulus: Non videtur quod per talem sententiam aliis preiudicium generetur, quia "res inter alios acta aliis non nocet" in multis casibus secundum quod glossa notat Extra, De fide instrumentorum, c. Inter dilectos. Igitur sententia iniqua contra fidem lata contra aliquem aliis catholicis non nocet et per consequens non interest eorum a tali sententia appellare.

Student: It does not appear that a prejudice is generated to others by such a sentence, since a matter in legal dispute between specific individuals does no harm to the rest (Extra, De fide instrumentorum, c. Inter dilectos). [col. 348] Therefore an unjust sentence against the faith which is rendered against someone does no harm to the other catholics, and consequently it is not their concern to appeal from such a sentence.

Magister: Respondetur quod illa regula: res inter alios acta aliis non nocet "fallit in multis casibus" secundum quod notat glossa Extra, De sententia et re iudicata, c. Quamvis. Nocet enim ut ibidem dicit glossa "cum cause sunt connexe", et per consequens multo magis cum causa est una et eadem cuiusmodi est causa fidei que omnibus est communis. Et ideo cum fides catholica condempnatur, omnibus catholicis preiudicium generatur, quare omnibus licet si voluerint a tali sententia appellare.

Master: The answer is that the rule 'a matter in legal dispute between specific individuals does no harm to the rest' "fails in many cases", [col. 903] according to a note in the gloss to Extra, De sententia et re iudicata, c. Quamvis. [col. 409] For there is harm done, as the gloss states in this context, "when cases are linked", [col. 903] and consequently all the more when a cause is one and the same as is the cause of faith, which is common to all. Thus when the catholic faith is condemned a prejudice is generated to all catholics, and therefore it is permitted to them all, if they wish, to appeal from such a sentence.

Discipulus: Alia motiva adducas.

Student: Advance some other reasons.

Magister: Secundo sic arguitur. Cuilibet licet appellando et defendendo suam prosequi iniuriam. Sed per talem iniquam sententiam pape cuilibet catholico fit iniuria. Igitur cuilibet licet a tali sententia appellare. Tertio sic. Unusquisque catholicus magis tenetur defendere fidem catholicam quam filios, consanguineos, vel parentes, quia fides est illis omnibus preferenda. Ergo non minus licet appellare seu provocare pro fide catholica condempnata quam pro parente, filio, vel consanguineo condempnato. Sed mater licet non posset agere pro filio, pro filio tamen condempnato appellare licet, 2 q. 6 c. Non solent, ubi sic dicitur: "sed etsi mater ex pietate provocaverit dicendum est et hanc audiri debet", ubi dicit glossa super verbo "provocaverit": "pro filio condempnato vel pro consanguineo etiam possunt appellare aliqui". Igitur multo magis pro fide catholica condempnata licet cuilibet catholico appellare seu provocare. Quarto sic. Non minus licet appellare a sententia inferente iniuriam, que est a catholicis maxime vindicanda, quam a sententia inferente iniuriam que minus est a catholicis vindicanda, quia appellatio vel est vindicta quedam vel via quedam ad vindictam inferendam. Sed iniuria illata per sententiam iniquam pape diffinitive pronuntiantis legem christianam esse falsam est magis vindicanda a catholicis quam quecunque iniuria propria alicuius illata per sententiam iudicis inferioris. Ergo si licet appellare a sententia iudicis inferioris iniqua qua sententiaretur aliquis esse privandus bonis suis temporalibus vel puniendus in persona, multo magis licet cuilibet catholico appellare a sententia pape pronuntiantis legem christianam esse falsam. Maior istius rationis videtur manifesta. Minor, scilicet quod iniuria illata per talem sententiam pape est magis vindicanda etc., probatur, quia illa est iniuria Christi et Dei directe. Iniuria autem Dei magis est vindicanda quam propria, teste beato Gregorio qui, ut habetur 23 q. 4 c. Si is, ait: "si is qui prelatus est debitori dominico culpas impune dimittit, non mediocriter profecto offendit, qui debita celestis regis et domini sua presumptione resolvit. Ea namque que in nobis committuntur, facile possumus dimittere, ea vero que in Deum commissa sunt, cum magna discretione, nec tamen sine penitentia possumus relaxare". Et Chrysostomus super Mattheum ait: "in propriis iniuriis esse quempiam patientem laudabile est. Iniurias autem Dei dissimulare nimis est impium". Augustinus etiam ut habetur 23 q. 4 c. Si ea ait: "si ea de quibus vehementer Deus offenditur insequi vel ulcisci differimus, ad irascendum utique divinitatis patientiam provocamus". Ex quibus patet quod iniuria Dei est precipue et magis quam propria vindicanda, et ita si licet a sententia inferioris iudicis inferente iniuriam propriam appellare, multo magis licet a sententia inferente Deo iniuriam, cuiusmodi est illa sententia pape qua condempnatur fides catholica, appellare.

Master: The second argument is as follows. Everyone is permitted, by appealing and defending one's self in court, to pursue a cause for harm done. But such an unjust papal sentence does harm to every catholic. Therefore everyone is permitted to appeal from such a sentence. The third reason is this. Every single catholic has a greater obligation to defend the catholic faith than to defend his sons, his blood relatives, or his parents, because the faith must be preferred to all these persons. It is therefore no lesser matter to appeal or to issue a court challenge in support of the condemned catholic faith than to do this in support of a condemned parent, son, or blood relative. But a mother, even if she is not allowed to represent her son in court, is nevertheless permitted to appeal in support of her condemned son. Here is the relevant statement from 2 q. 6 c. Non solent: "but should a mother appeal out of loving concern, let it be said that she must be heard". [col. 477] Here is the gloss's comment in that context on the word "appeal": "some persons may appeal in support of a condemned son as well as in support of a blood relative". [col. 671] Therefore all the more is it permitted to every catholic to appeal or to issue a court challenge in support of the condemned catholic faith. Here is the fourth reason. The right to appeal from a harmful sentence which catholics must punish to the highest degree is not less important than the right to appeal from a harmful sentence that catholics must punish to a lesser degree, since an appeal is a certain kind of punishment or a certain path towards the imposition of punishment. But the harm inflicted by an unjust papal sentence that definitively proclaims the Christian law to be false must be punished by catholics to a higher degree than any personal injury inflicted on someone by the sentence of a lesser judge. Therefore if it is permitted to appeal from the unjust sentence of a lesser judge by which someone would be condemned to lose his temporal possessions or to be punished in his person, all the more is it permitted to any catholic to appeal from the sentence of a pope who proclaims that the Christian law is false. The major premise of this reason appears evident. The minor premises, namely that the harm inflicted by such a papal sentence must be punished to a higher degree etc. is proved by the fact that this is a direct assault on Christ and on God. And a wrong done to God must be punished to a higher degree than a wrong done to one's self, witness blessed Gregory who states in 23 q. 4 c. Si is: "if a prelate absolves someone without penance of sins against God, he assuredly commits no light offense, in that he dismisses by his presumptuousness what is owed to the Heavenly King and Lord. For the misdeeds done to us we may easily forgive, but those committed against God we may only loosen with great discretion and never without imposing a penance". [col. 912] And here is what Chrysostom says in his Commentary on Matthew: "It is praiseworthy to be somewhat patient about harm done to one's self. But it is very impious to ignore wrongs committed against God". [Ps.-Chrysostomus, Opus imperfectum in Mattheum, homilia quinta, in PG 56, col. 668] Augustine likewise states in 23 q. 4 c. Si ea: "if we delay pursuit or punishment of those things by which God is greatly offended, we surely provoke divine patience into righteous anger". [col. 926] It is evident from these texts that a wrong against God must be avenged more strongly than a wrong against our person, and thus if it is permitted to appeal from the sentence of a lesser judge which causes one a personal harm, all the more is it permitted to appeal from a sentence which does wrong to God, and such is a papal sentence which condemns the catholic faith.

Capitulum 32

Chapter 32

Discipulus: Hec ultima ratio tripliciter videtur deficere. Primo quia auctoritates non loquuntur de omnibus christianis, sed tantummodo de prelatis qui debent Dei iniuriam vindicare. Secundo quia si concluderet, probaretur per illam quod necesse esset cuilibet catholico a tali sententia appellare, sicut quilibet catholicus tenetur iniuriam Dei vindicare. Tertio quia ex ipsa sequeretur quod quilibet criminosus excommunicatus et infamis posset a tali sententia appellare sicut quilibet criminosus excommunicatus et infamis potest propriam prosequi iniuriam, immo etiam inimicus posset a tali pape sententie appellare, quia inimicus potest prosequi iniuriam propriam, ergo multo magis iniuriam illatam Deo si illa ratio procedit. Hec sunt que illam rationem impedire videntur. Tu autem dic qualiter potest ad ipsa responderi.

Student: This last reason seems to fail in three respects. Firstly, because the cited authorities do not refer to all Christians but only to the prelates who have the duty to punish a wrong done to God. Secondly, because if the reason were conclusive it would prove that it was necessary for any catholic to appeal from such a sentence, just as any catholic is bound to punish a wrong due to God. Thirdly, because it would follow therefrom that any criminal, excommunicated and disgraced individual might appeal from such a sentence, just as any criminal, excommunicated and disgraced individual may seek redress for personal injury received, indeed even an enemy might appeal from such a papal sentence, because an enemy may seek redress for personal injury received, therefore all the more might he seek redress for a wrong committed against God, if the reason holds. I ask you therefore to state how one may reply to these objections.

Magister: Ad primam istarum posset aliquis dicere quod auctoritates superius allegate insinuant iniuriam Dei esse vindicandam a prelatis. Etiam manifestant quod omnes catholici quantum licet et expedit pro gradu et officio uniuscuiusque debent iniurie illate Deo occurrere. Et ideo appellare ab iniqua sententia non solum conveniat prelatis sed etiam subditis. Eo enim ipso quod prelati debent iniuriam Dei vindicare, licebit subditis (si plus non possunt vel statui eorum non competit) a tali sententia appellare, quia minus est appellare quam vindictam exercere. Si ergo prelati debent vindictam exercere in illos qui iniuriantur Deo licebit eis a tali sententia appellare. Ad secundam dicitur quod per dictam rationem non probatur quod aliquis teneatur a tali sententia appellare nisi quando non potest convenienter aliter quam appellando tali inique sententie obviare, et in hoc casu conceditur quod necesse est a tali sententia appellare. Nec intendunt illi qui dicunt non esse necesse appellare a tali iniqua sententia quod in nullo casu sit necesse appellare, sed non est regulariter necesse, quia quando regulariter est necesse appellare ab aliqua iniqua sententia, hoc est ne talis sententia transeat in rem iudicatam. Ob hanc autem causam nunquam est necesse appellare a sententia lata contra fidem. Sed ob aliam causam potest alicui incumbere necessitas appellandi, puta si aliter propter malitiam vel negligentiam vel imperitiam aliorum vel ob aliam causam non posset talem iniquam sententiam impugnare. Ad tertiam potest dici quod si non esset alius quam criminosus et infamis qui vellet causam fidei prosequi contra papam pronuntiantem fidem christianam esse falsam, criminosis et infamibus liceret a tali sententia appellare et prosequi suam appellationem, essentque tales audiendi. Idemque posset dici de inimicis in favorem fidei christiane. Tales tamen ad testificandum non essent aliquatenus admittendi. Si autem essent alii bone fame et non inimici, non essent predicti audiendi si a tali sententia appellarent, et tamen essent audiendi si propriam prosequerentur iniuriam, quia non essent alii qui eorum iniuriam prosequerentur.

Master: To the first one someone might respond that the authorities cited above do suggest that a wrong done to God must be punished by prelates. They also show that all catholics have the duty to react towards a wrong committed against God to the extent that this is permitted by and pertinent to the status and office of every single individual. And therefore to appeal from an unjust sentence is not only pertinent to prelates but also to subjects. For by the very fact that spiritual leaders must punish a wrong committed against God it would be permitted to subjects (assuming they can do no more or that doing more is incompatible with their status) to appeal from such a sentence, because it is a lesser matter to appeal than to inflict punishment. Therefore if prelates must inflict punishment upon those who commit a wrong against God, it would be permitted to subjects to appeal from the sentence we are discussing. The response to the second objection is that the reason in question does not prove that someone is bound to appeal from such a sentence except when he cannot conveniently resist this injustice by any means other than an appeal, in which case it is conceded that an appeal from such a sentence is necessary. And the theorists who say that it is not necessary to appeal from such an unjust sentence do not wish to imply that there is no situation where an appeal is necessary, but that it is not necessary to do this as a rule, because when a regular appeal from some unjust sentence is necessary this is done so as to prevent such a sentence from becoming legally conclusive. Indeed for this very motive it is never necessary to appeal from a sentence rendered against the faith. But another circumstance might necessarily impose upon someone a duty to appeal, for instance, if it were not otherwise possible to oppose such an unjust sentence because of the malice or negligence or incompetence of others, or due to some other cause. A possible response to the third objection is that if there was no one save a criminal and disgraced individual who would want to defend the cause of faith against a pope proclaiming that the Christian faith is false, it would be permitted to criminal and disgraced individuals to appeal from such a sentence and to follow up on their appeal, and such individuals would have to be granted a legal hearing. Furthermore, the same point in support of the Christian faith might be made about its enemies. Nevertheless enemies of the faith may not be accepted as witnesses. And if there were others of good reputation and not enemies of the faith, the enumerated categories of people would not have the right to a legal hearing if they appealed from such a sentence against the faith. But these reprobates would have the right to be heard if they sought redress for a personal injury, because there would be no others seeking redress on their behalf.

Capitulum 33

Chapter 33

Discipulus: Satis disputavimus an liceat a sententia pape appellare si diffinitive pronuntiaret contra catholicum fidem christianam esse falsam. Ideo ad interrogationem aliam me converto, an videlicet a sententia quacunque pape qualemcunque heresim continente liceat appellare. Unde de hoc unam vel plures narra sententias.

Student: We have discussed sufficiently whether it is permitted to appeal from a pope if he were to issue a definitive judgement against a catholic that the Christian faith is false. Therefore I now turn to another question, namely, whether it would be permitted to appeal from any judgement of the pope containing any heresy whatsoever. Proceed to outline one or more opinions on this issue.

Magister: Tenentes quod nunquam licet appellare a papa dicerent quod nulli liceret a tali sententia appellare. Alii autem dicerent quod ab omni sententia pape, qualemcunque heresim contineat, sive dampnatam explicite sive solummodo implicite, licet appellare.

Master: Those who hold that it is never permitted to appeal from the pope would say that no one would be permitted to appeal from such a judgement. But others would say that it is permitted to appeal from any judgement of the pope whatever type of heresy it contains, and irrespective of whether the heresy is one condemned explicitly or only implicitly.

Discipulus: Pro ista secunda sententia nitere allegare.

Student: Attempt to argue in favour of the second viewpoint.

Magister: Quod a tali sententia liceat appellare sic probatur. Ab omni sententia pape licet appellare quam est licitum impugnare. Sed talem sententiam licet impugnare quia licet omnem heresim dampnatam explicite vel implicite impugnare. Ergo a tali sententia licet appellare. Secundo sic. Idem iuris est in parvis quod in magnis (Extra, De prebendis, c. Maioribus, et 14 q. ultima, c. ultimo. Ergo idem iuris est in heresi que videtur maxima et in heresi que videtur parva. Sed a papa diffinitive pronuntiante et determinante maximam heresim esse tenendam, quod fides christiana videlicet est falsa, licet appellare. Ergo a papa heresim que videtur minima pronuntiante diffinitive esse tenendam licet appellare, et ita quamcunque heresim sententiaverit esset tenendam, liceret appellare. Tertio sic. Idem iuris est in parte quod in toto. Ergo idem iuris est de heresi que partem fidei catholice videtur destruere et de heresi que totam negat catholicam fidem. Sed a papa pronuntiante totam fidem Christi esse falsam licet appellare. Ergo a papa pronuntiante quamcunque heresim cuicunque veritati catholice adversantem esse tenendam licet appellare. Quarto sic. Ratio quare a papa pronuntiante fidem christianam esse falsam licet appellare est quia talis papa est hereticus et destruit catholicam fidem. Sed papa pronuntians diffinitive quamcunque heresim esse tenendam est hereticus et destruit catholicam fidem. Ubi autem est eadem ratio debet esse idem ius. Ergo a papa quamcunque heresim pronuntiante diffinitive esse tenendam licet appellare. Pro hac assertione possunt adduci rationes supra cap. 18 inducte, quia ille probant quod ab omni papa heretico licet appellare, quamvis patentius quodammodo concludant quod a papa pronuntiante fidem christianam esse falsam licet appellare.

Master: Here is the proof that one may appeal from such a judgement. It is permitted to appeal from every judgement of a pope that one may legitimately oppose. But it is permitted to oppose the judgement we are discussing because it is permitted to oppose every heresy whether condemned explicitly or implicitly. Therefore it is permitted to appeal from such a judgement. The second argument is this. The same legal principle applies to things both great and small (Extra, De prebendis, c. Maioribus [col. 466] and 14 last q. last c.). [col. 744] Therefore the same legal principle applies to a heresy which appears huge as to a heresy which appears tiny. But one is permitted to appeal from a pope who definitively proclaims and determines that the greatest of heresies is a matter of obligatory belief, namely that the Christian faith is false. Therefore it is permitted to appeal from a pope who definitively proclaims that a heresy that appears tiny is a matter of obligatory belief. And thus it would be permitted to appeal no matter what kind of heresy the pope were to decree as obligatory belief. Here is the third argument. The same legal principle applies both to a part and to the whole. Therefore the same legal principle applies to a heresy that appears to destroy a part of the catholic faith as applies to a heresy which negates the entire catholic faith. But it is permitted to appeal from a pope who proclaims that the entire faith of Christ is false. Therefore it is permitted to appeal from a pope who proclaims as obligatory belief any heresy contrary to any catholic truth. The fourth argument is this. The reason why it is permitted to appeal from a pope who proclaims that the Christian faith is false is because such a pope is a heretic and a destroyer of the catholic faith. But a pope who definitively proclaims any heresy as obligatory belief is a heretic and a destroyer of the catholic faith. And where the reason is the same the law must be the same. Therefore it is permitted to appeal from a pope who definitively proclaims any heresy as obligatory belief. The reasons listed earlier in chapter 18 may be advanced in favour of this assertion, because they prove that it is permissible to appeal from any heretic pope, even though they conclude somewhat more evidently that it is permitted to appeal from a pope who proclaims that the Christian faith is false.

Capitulum 34

Chapter 34

Discipulus: Ex predictis adverto quod secundum istos non refert ad hoc quod liceat a papa heretico appellare an papa diffinitive pronuntiet legem christianam esse falsam, vel quamcunque heresim que fidei obviet orthodoxe, quamvis etiam plures tenerent talem assertionem fidei catholice nullatenus repugnare.

Student: I conclude from the aforesaid that according to these theorists in order that one be permitted to appeal from a heretic pope it does not matter whether the pope definitively proclaimed the Christian law to be false or proclaimed any heresy whatever which contradicts orthodox belief, even if many were to hold that this assertion of the pope did not contradict the catholic faith.

Magister: Verum dicis, quia indubitanter tenent quod omnis heresis, quantumcunque a christianis etiam eruditis et in scriptura sacra peritis reputetur catholica, est a quolibet catholico sciente eam veritati contrariari catholice impugnanda, et ideo licet omni catholico a papa pronuntiante diffinitive quamcunque heresim esse tenendam appellare.

Master: What you say is true, since these theorists indubitably hold that every heresy must be opposed by any catholic who knows that it is contrary to catholic truth, no matter how strongly this heresy is considered catholic by [other] Christians, even by those among them who are learned and skilled interpreters of Holy Writ. Therefore it is permitted to every catholic to appeal from a pope definitively proclaiming any heresy whatsoever as obligatory dogma.

Discipulus: Quid si papa non pronuntiat diffinitive aliquam heresim esse tenendam, sed publice docet et predicat aliquam heresim esse tenendam, nunquid licet appellare ab ipso.

Student: What if the pope does not proclaim definitively that some heresy must be held, but publicly teaches and preaches this. Would it be permitted to appeal from him.

Magister: Respondetur quod appellare licet. Qualiter tamen et quando liceat appellare oportet attendere diligenter. Aut enim papa docet, predicat, dogmatizat aut asserit heresim contrariam veritati catholice quam tenetur explicite credere, et tunc statim licet appellare non tantum a doctrina iniqua sed etiam a docente tanquam heretico, quia talis papa statim sine examinatione maiori est hereticus reputandus. Si enim papa assereret non esse in divinis tres personas distinctas cum teneatur explicite credere Patrem et Filium et Spiritum Sanctum esse distinctas personas, statim papa censendus est hereticus. Aut papa predicat vel dogmatizat heresim contrariam veritati quam non tenetur explicite credere, puta si predicaret David non fuisse filium Isay vel Ieroboam non fuisse regem Israel, et tunc non est statim appellandum a papa. Sed si de assertione oritur scandalum, est subtiliter indagandum an paratus sit corrigi suam assertionem revocando. Si autem non est paratus corrigi tunc licet appellare, impugnando videlicet doctrinam hereticam et docentem hereticum si fuerit pertinax deprehensus.

Master: The answer is that one would be permitted to appeal. But one is required to note carefully the time and the quality of this permitted appeal. For either the pope teaches, preaches, indoctrinates or asserts a heresy which is contrary to catholic truth which he is bound to believe explicitly, and in that case one is permitted to appeal immediately not only from the unjust doctrine, but also from him who teaches it as being a heretic, because such a pope is immediately to be considered a heretic without a major inquiry. If indeed the pope were to assert that there are not three distinct persons in God, then because he is bound to believe explicitly that the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit are distinct persons, the pope must instantly be thought a heretic. [see OP III, Epistola 14.21] Or else the pope preaches and indoctrinates a heresy that is contrary to a truth that he is not bound to believe explicitly (for instance, if he were to preach that David was not the son of Jesse, or that Jeroboam was not the king of Israel), and in that case one must not immediately appeal from the pope. But if a scandal develops concerning this assertion, one must ascertain by minute investigation whether the pope is ready to be corrected by revoking this assertion. Indeed if he is not ready to be corrected, then it is permitted to appeal, namely by opposing the heretical doctrine, and its heretical teacher if he is discovered to be pertinacious in his opinion.

Capitulum 35

Chapter 35

Discipulus: Non videtur quod in hoc casu sit appellandum a papa, sed magis apparet quod accusandus est papa. Nam appellatio seu provocatio vel fit a iudice vel se gerente pro iudice, vel fit extra iudicium ne aliquid fiat in preiudicium appellantis super eo pro quo appellat. Sed primo modo non est appellandum a papa si docet aut predicat hereticam pravitatem, quia docendo aut predicando non tenet locum iudicis nec se gerit pro iudice sed gerit se pro doctore vel predicatore aut assertore. Nec secundo modo est in hoc casu appellandum a papa, quia talis appellatio est respectu alicuius futuri ne fiat, sicut quando aliquis appellat ne electio aliqua fiat in preiudicium appellantis, talis appellatio respicit electionem futuram, ne videlicet fiat. Sed assertio pape heretica quam predicavit aut docuit est preterita. Ergo a papa taliter predicante non est appellandum secundo modo.

Student: It does not appear that in the case described one would need to appeal from the pope; it seems more to the point that one would have to accuse the pope. For an appeal or a challenge is made either from a judge (or from someone functioning as a judge), or is made outside of the courtroom so as to prevent the occurrence of something prejudicial to the appellant as to the issue concerning which he is appealing. But in the first instance one must not appeal from a pope if he teaches or preaches heretical wickedness because in teaching or preaching he does not perform a judicial office nor acts as though he were, but he functions rather as a doctor or a preacher or a theorist. Nor does the second instance of the case described obligate one to appeal from the pope, because such an appeal is concerned with the prevention of some future event. For instance, when someone appeals in order to prevent some election from occurring which is prejudicial to the appellant, such an appeal concerns an election yet to be, namely so as to prevent its occurrence. But the assertion of the pope which he preached or taught is an event of the past. Therefore in the second instance one must not appeal from a pope preaching in this manner.

Magister: Dicunt nonnulli, sicut tactum est prius, quod non intendunt loqui de appellatione stricte secundum quod in iure positivo accipitur quando dicunt quod licet appellare a papa docente hereticam pravitatem, sed intendunt loqui de appellatione largissime secundum quod omnis impugnatio facto vel verbo pape docentis hereticam pravitatem potest dici appellatio, et isto modo licet appellare a papa heresim predicante, quia licet cuilibet catholico talem heresim impugnare et papam si fuerit pertinax accusare.

Master: As mentioned earlier, some say that they don't mean to speak of an appeal in the strict sense (as positive law understands this) when they affirm that it is permitted to appeal from a pope who teaches heretical wickedness. What they mean to speak of is an appeal in the widest sense, whereby every opposition by word or by deed to a pope who teaches heretical wickedness may be referred to as an appeal. And this is the way in which one is permitted to appeal from a pope who preaches heresy, because every catholic is allowed to oppose this heresy, and to accuse the pope should the latter prove to be pertinacious.

Discipulus: Isti loquuntur improprie cum dicunt quod omnis impugnatio pape potest dici appellatio, quia manifestum est quod omnis accusatio est impugnatio, accusatio autem distinguitur ab appellatione, ergo non omnis impugnatio est appellatio.

Student: These theorists speak inaccurately when they say that every opposition to a pope may be termed an appeal, because it is obvious that every accusation is an opposition, and an accusation differs from an appeal, therefore not every opposition is an appeal.

Magister: Isti, ut dixi, de proprietate locutionis in hac materia non curant.

Master: As I have already mentioned, these theorists are not concerned in this matter with technical verbal accuracy.

Discipulus: Quare.

Student: Why.

Magister: Quia, ut dixi prius, non reputant necessarium absolute appellare quantum est de iure in quocunque casu a papa heretico vel heresim predicante, vocando appellationem quando verbum appellandi emittitur. Sed si quis voluerit vocare appellationem omnem impugnationem pape heretici, sic dicunt quod necesse est appellare. Si autem dicat quis quod non sit utendum appellatione in isto sensu, de verbis contendere nolunt, et ideo in hoc sistunt quod papa predicans heresim modo predicto est a catholicis impugnandus.

Master: Because, as I have stated earlier, they do not deem it absolutely necessary to issue a legally proper appeal in any case whatsoever from a heretic pope or a pope preaching heresy, if by appeal you mean the uttering of the word itself. But if someone would want to designate as an appeal every opposition to a heretic pope, then they say that an appeal is necessary. And if someone objects that the term "appeal" must not be used in this sense, these theorists refuse to enter into a dispute about words, and for that reason firmly maintain that a pope who preaches heresy in the aforesaid manner must be opposed by catholics.

WILLIAM OF OCKHAM, DIALOGUS
Part 1, Book 6, chapters 16-35

Text and translation by George Knysh
August 2002 (revised May 2004)

WILLIAM OF OCKHAM, DIALOGUS Part 1, Book 6, chapters 16-35

Text and translation by George Knysh August 2002 (revised May 2004)

WILLIAM OF OCKHAM, DIALOGUS
Part 1, Book 6, chapters 16-35

Text and translation by George Knysh
August 2002 (revised May 2004)