William of Ockham, Dialogus
part 3, tract 1, book 1

Copyright (c) 1999, The British Academy

 

The text and translation of 3.1 Dialogus 1 were prepared by John Scott and revised by John Kilcullen. The draft was commented on by George Knysh, who suggested a number of corrections and improvements.

Prologus

Prologue

Discipulus: Salomonis utcumque sequendo vestigia, “proposui in animo meo querere et investigare sapienter de omnibus que fiunt sub sole”, in ecclesia scilicet militante, de qua non omnes Christiani hiis diebus consimiliter opinantur. Quia enim quidam circa fidem catholicam altercantur, se hereticos mutuo appellantes, quidam eorum apud quosdam et alii apud alios veram existimant ecclesiam consistere militantem. Proinde ad terciam partem nostri dialogi, quam ab inicio “De gestis circa fidem altercancium orthodoxam” volui appellari, nostram intencionem vertamus, quantum nostre occupaciones et studia presentis congruant temporis qualitati (quia, ut beatus asserit Augustinus ad Bonifacium comitem, et habetur 23a, q. 4a, c. Si ecclesia, omnia debent suis temporibus convenire), quam in novem tractatus volo secari, quorum unumquemque in diversos libros censeo dividendum. Primi autem duo erunt preparatorii et preambuli ad sequentes, in quibus de gestis diversorum Christianorum scrutabimur:  primus quidem disputando de potestate pape et cleri; secundus de potestate et iuribus Romani imperii, in quo quamplurima de iuribus regum ac principum ac eciam laicorum aliorum tractabimus; tercius de gestis Iohannis 22i, quem nonnulli putant propter hereticam pravitatem diu antequam de hoc mundo migraret omni dignitate ecclesiastica fuisse privatum, alii ipsum fuisse catholicum et in vero papatu finisse dies suos existimant; quartus de gestis domini Ludowici de Bavaria, quem aliqui verum imperatorem non reputant, alii contrarium arbitrantur; quintus de gestis domini Benedicti, quem multi, sed non omnes, tamquam verum summum pontificem venerantur; sextus de gestis fratris Michaelis de Cesena, septimus de gestis et doctrina fratris Giraldi Othonis, quorum unum quidam, alii alium, verum generalem ordinis fratrum minorum affirmant; octavus de gestis et doctrina fratris Willelmi de Ockham; nonus de gestis aliorum Christianorum — regum, principum et prelatorum ac subditorum, laicorum ac clericorum, secularium et regularium, fratrum minorum et aliorum — qui alicui (vel aliquibus) de prenominatis personis adherent, obediunt, consenciunt, communicant, favent vel quomodolibet prebere consilium aut auxilium dinoscuntur, vel ipsos (aut eorum aliquem) persequuntur, impugnant, molestant vel reprehensibilem aut reprehensibiles arbitrantur.

Student: Following in some way the footsteps of Solomon, "I have proposed in my mind to inquire about and to investigate wisely everything that is being done under the sun" [Ecclesiastes 1:13], that is in the church militant, concerning which not all Christians these days think in the same way. For since some people quarrel about the catholic faith, calling each other heretics, some of them think that the true church militant exists among certain people, others that it exists among others. Let us therefore turn our attention -- so far as our occupations and studies are in accord with the quality of the present time (because, as blessed Augustine asserts [in his letter] to Count Boniface, as found in 23, q. 4, c. Si ecclesia, "Everything should be suitable to its times") -- to the third part of our dialogue, which from the beginning I have wanted to be entitled, "Of the actions of those who are quarrelling about the orthodox faith". I want it to be divided into nine tractates, each of which I believe should be divided into various books. The first two will be preparatory and a preamble to those that follow, in which we will examine the deeds of various Christians,

  • the first, therefore, discussing the power of the pope and the clergy;
  • the second the power and rights of the Roman Empire, and in this we will consider many things about the rights of kings and princes and also some laymen;
  • the third the deeds of John XXII, who some people think was deprived for heretical wickedness of all ecclesiastical dignity long before he departed this world, and others that he was a Catholic and ended his days as a true pope;
  • the fourth the deeds of the lord Lewis of Bavaria, whom some people do not regard as a true emperor, while others think the opposite;
  • the fifth the deeds of Benedict XII, whom many people, but not all, reverence as a true supreme pontiff;
  • the sixth the deeds of brother Michael of Cesena,
  • the seventh the deeds and teaching of Guiral Ot, one of whom some affirm to be the true general of the order of Friars Minor and others the other;
  • the eighth the deeds of brother William of Ockham;
  • the ninth the deeds of other Christians -- kings, princes and prelates and their subjects, laity and clergy, secular and religious, Friars Minor and others -- who adhere to, obey, agree with, are united with, favour or are known in any way to offer advice or help to, any one or ones of the above named people, or who persecute, attack, harass or condemn them, or some of them, as blamable.

Magister: Tam tua instancia quam desiderium proficiendi predicta aggredi michi suadet, sed timor calumpniam incurrendi illorum qui forsitan dicent me audere illicite disputare de potestate summi pontificis dissuadet, presertim cum leges eciam canonice et civiles videantur asserere quod sacrilegium incurrit qui presumit de auctoritate principis disputare. Ideo, si tibi videtur, de prefatis me nullatenus intromittam, maxime cum ad libros necessarios non valeam, ut estimo, pervenire.

Master: Both your urgency and a desire to be useful persuade me to undertake the above, but fear of incurring the accusation of those who will perhaps say that I am daring to dispute illicitly about the power of the highest pontiff dissuades me, especially since both canon and civil laws seem to assert that whoever presumes to dispute about the authority of the ruler commits a sacrilege. If it is acceptable to you, therefore, I will not involve myself in the matters above, especially since I can not, I believe, get access to the necessary books.

Discipulus: Timor non te retrahat memoratus, quia sicut videmus catholicos de fide absque periculo iuste calumpnie ad exercicium disputare (doctores enim sacre theologie de fide in scolis publice disputant et, contra veritatem fidei quo sciunt acucius arguentes, nullum crimen incurrunt, licet nec tunc nec umquam postea veritatem questionis disputate determinent; baccalarii eciam et prudentes quantum possunt forcius irreprehensibiliter, immo sepe laudabiliter, contra veritatem arguunt et allegant), sic de potestate summi pontificis ad exercicium contingit laudabiliter disputare. Cum igitur contra potestatem pape neque asserendo neque dubitando aliquid sis dicturus, sed solummodo recitando, sicut pro toto isto dialogo peractum est inter nos a principio, de potestate pape et omnibus aliis que commemoravi tractanda nullatenus metuas indagare, presertim cum sciam te paratum omnem veritatem de potestate pape, et aliam quam teneris explicite credere, opportunis loco et tempore, quando erit expediens, occulte et publice confiteri. Nec librorum carencia te retardet, quia, licet non possis facere opus perfectum, aliquid tamen facere non erit inutile, quia occasionem faciendi opera perfecta copiam librorum habentibus ministrabis.

Student: Do not let that fear hold you back, because just as we see catholics disputing as an exercise about the faith without risk of just accusation (for doctors of sacred theology publicly dispute about the faith in the schools, and arguing as sharply as they know how against the truth of faith they incur no charge, though neither at the time nor ever afterwards do they determine the truth of the disputed question; bachelors also and lawyers bring forward arguments and authorities against the truth as strongly as they can without blame, indeed often praiseworthily), so it is possible praiseworthily to dispute as an exercise about the power of the highest pontiff. Since, therefore, you would not be going to say anything against the power of the pope as an assertion or as an expression of doubt but only as a recital, as has been done between us in the whole of this dialogue from the beginning, you should not be afraid to investigate the power of the pope and all the other things I have mentioned as requiring discussion, especially since I know you are ready to confess in private and in public, at an opportune place and time, when it will be beneficial, every truth about the power of the pope, and any other [truth] that you are bound to believe explicitly. And do not let lack of books hinder you, because even if you can not make a perfect work, yet to produce something will not be useless, because you will give those who have a supply of books occasion to produce finished works.

Magister: Quod absque assercione et dubitacione falsa liceat recitare et in persona dicere aliorum, quodque non sit necesse omni tempore ore veritatem eciam catholicam confiteri (cum cadat sub precepto affirmativo, quod semper obligat sed non pro semper), multis modis posset ostendi. Ideoque, malignorum parvipendens calumpnias, tue instancie acquiescam, et ad exercitandum studiosorum ingenia, tam circa potestatem pape quam circa alia que duxeris inquirenda, eciam sentencias et opiniones quas reputo erroneas, immo hereticas, recitabo. Pro quibus, quo valuero, forcius allegabo, quod eciam tu poteris interdum facere, si tibi videbitur. Incipe igitur sine mora primum tractatum.

Master: It can be shown in many ways that it is permissible to recite falsities without assertion or doubt and to state them in the person of others, and that it is not necessary on every occasion to confess with one's mouth even catholic truth (since this falls under an affirmative precept, which always obliges but not for always). And therefore, disregarding the calumnies of the wicked, I will acquiesce in your urging and, to exercise the wits of the studious both about the power of the pope and about the other matters which you have considered should be inquired into, I will recite even views and opinions which I regard as wrong, even heretical. I will argue for these as strongly as I can, and you can also do this sometimes if you see fit. So begin the first tractate without delay.

Capitulum 1

Chapter 1

Discipulus: Claves regni celorum esse datas a Christo Romano pontifici, id est beato Petro, Christianorum non ambigit, ut estimo, multitudo; quare non dubitat quin sit a Christo aliqua concessa potestas. Plures eciam auctoritates sanctorum patrum videntur asserere quod aliquam ex humana ordinacione acceperit potestatem. De quarum utraque, si utramque habeat, interrogabo quamplura: quam videlicet et quo iure, divino scilicet an humano, habeat potestatem super spiritualia et ecclesiasticas personas? quam et quo iure super laicos in spiritualibus? quam et quo iure super res et iura temporalia que ad solam Romanam spectant ecclesiam? quam et quo iure super res et temporalia iura que ad alios clericos pertinere noscuntur? quam et quo iure super personas, res et iura temporalia fidelium laicorum? quam et quo iure super res infidelium et eciam personas ipsorum?

Student: The multitude of Christians does not doubt, I believe, that the keys of the kingdom of heaven were given by Christ to the Roman pontiff, that is to blessed Peter: they do not doubt, therefore, that some power was granted by Christ. Many texts of the holy fathers also seem to assert that he received some power by human decree. About both of these powers, if he does have both, I will ask many questions: Namely, what power does he have, and by what right [or law] (divine or human), over spiritual matters and ecclesiastical persons? What power, and by what right, over the laity in spiritual matters? What power, and by what right, over the possessions and temporal rights that pertain to the Roman church alone? What power, and by what right, over the possessions and temporal rights known to pertain to other clerics? What power, and by what right, over the persons, possessions and temporal rights of the believing laity? What power, and by what right, over the possessions of unbelievers, and even over their persons?

Postea autem nonnulla similia de potestate cleri perscrutare propono. Ante omnia autem interrogare decrevi an potestas pape ad omnia que non sunt contra legem divinam neque contra ius nature se extendat. Hec enim interrogacio videtur comprehendere omnia predicta de potestate pape, et forte ex sentenciis et opinionibus circa ipsam quas recitare studebis dabitur michi occasio de singulis in speciali querendi.

Later, moreover, I propose to examine some similar [questions] about the power of the clergy. First of all, however, I have decided to ask whether the power of the pope extends to everything which is not against divine law or natural law, for this question seems to comprehend all the questions above about the power of the pope, and the judgments and opinions about it which you will strive to set forth will perhaps give me occasion to inquire about each of them in particular.

CAN THE POPE DO WHATEVER IS NOT AGAINST DIVINE OR NATURAL LAW?

Magister: Circa hanc interrogacionem diverse et adverse inveniuntur sentencie. Una est quod papa, tam in spiritualibus quam in temporalibus, talem ex ordinacione Christi habet plenitudinem potestatis ut, regulariter et in omni casu, omnia possit que non sunt expresse contra legem dei neque contra ius nature. Alia est quod talem plenitudinem potestatis habet ex iure divino in spiritualibus, non in temporalibus. Tercia opinio est quod talem plenitudinem potestatis habet partim ex ordinacione Christi, partim ex ordinacione humana. Quarta est quod talem plenitudinem potestatis non habet, nec a iure divino nec a iure humano, neque regulariter neque casualiter sive in casu; et circa hanc sunt diversi modi ponendi. Quinta est quod talem plenitudinem potestatis simpliciter et regulariter neque a iure divino neque a iure humano habet, sed casualiter sive in casu habet talem plenitudinem potestatis a iure divino sive ex speciali ordinacione Christi.

Master: On this question we find diverse and conflicting opinions.

  • One is that the pope has by Christ's decree such fullness of power, both in temporal and spiritual matters, that he can do anything, regularly and in every case, which is not expressly against the law of God or against natural law.

  • Another [opinion] is that by divine law he has such fullness of power in spiritual matters but not in temporal matters.
  • A third opinion is that he has such fullness of power partly by Christ's decree and partly by human decree.
  • A fourth [opinion] is that he does not have such fullness of power, either by divine law or by human law, either regularly or occasionally or in some case; and there are different ways of putting this [view].
  • A fifth [opinion] is that he does not have such fullness of power simply and regularly, either by divine law or by human law, but by divine law or by a special decree of Christ he does have such fullness of power occasionally or in some case.

Capitulum 2

Chapter 2

Discipulus: Istas discuciamus sentencias ut acucius et profundius valeamus intelligere veritatem. Pro prima igitur aliquas allegaciones adducas.

Student: Let us discuss those opinions so that we can understand the truth more sharply and profoundly. So bring forward some arguments for the first.

Opinion (1): The pope has such power regularly, in spirituals and temporals, immediately from Christ

Magister: Prima sentencia in verbis evangelii, immo ipsius Christi, fundari videtur, qui, ut legitur Matthei 16o, dixit Petro: “Tibi dabo claves regni celorum; et quodcumque ligaveris super terram, erit ligatum et in celis, et quodcumque solveris super terram, erit solutum et in celis”. Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod Christus dedit beato Petro, et per consequens successoribus eius, absque omni excepcione plenitudinem potestatis ut omnia possit, quia verbo generali omnia debent comprehendi (dist. 19, Si Romanorum, et 1, q. 1, Sunt nonnulli, et 14, q. 3, Putant).

Master: The first opinion seems to be based on the words of the Gospel, indeed of Christ himself, who said to Peter, as we read in Matthew 16[:19]: "I will give you the keys of heaven and whatever you bind on earth will be bound also in heaven and whatever you loose on earth will be loosed also in heaven." From these words we gather that Christ gave to blessed Peter, and so to his successors, fullness of power without any exception, so that he is able to do anything -- because everything should be embraced by a general statement (di. 19, Si Romanorum [Col. 58; cf. Gloss, v. dicendo, col. 81; cf. Brev. ii.2.7] and 1, q. 1, Sunt nonulli [Col. 402; cf. Gloss, v. ab omni, col. 556] and 14, q. 3, Putant [Col. 735].)

Discipulus: Ista allegacio impugnari potest, ut videtur. Nam sepe verbum generale non est generaliter intelligendum (Extra, De iureiurando, Ad nostram, et 1, q. 1, Duces).Unde et “verbum generale sepe restringitur”, ut notat glossa, Extra, De appellacionibus, Sua nobis. Cuius exempla quamplurima in scripturis divinis habentur. Matthei enim 3o dicitur quod “exibat ad eum omnis regio trans Iordanem et baptizabantur ab eo in Iordane”, et tamen multi non exibant nec baptizabantur a Iohanne. Et Luce 3o dicitur, “Cogitantibus omnibus de Iohanne, ne forte ipse esset Christus”, et tamen multi hoc minime cogitaverunt, quia nec illi qui non credebant in Christum nec illi qui Iohannem non putaverunt prophetam. Alia exempla innumera possunt adduci in quibus verbum generale non debet generaliter intelligi sed restringi.

Student: It seems that that argument can be attacked, for often a general statement should not be understood generally (Extra, De iureiurando, Ad nostram [Col. 367; cf. Gloss, v. In illis videlicet, col. 814; cf. Brev. ii.14.32-3] and 1, q. 1, Duces [Also referred to as Iudices, col. 367; cf. Gloss, v. Bona, col. 507; cf. Brev. ii.14.33]). Thus also "a general statement is often restricted", as the gloss on Extra, De appellationibus, Sua nobis [Gloss, v. tertio appellare, col. 972; cf. Brev. ii.14.33-4] notes. Very many examples of this are found in the divine Scriptures. For in Matthew 3[:5-6] it is said that "all the trans-Jordan region went out to him and they were baptised by him in the Jordan", and yet many did not go out and were not baptised by John. Luke 3[:15] too says "everyone was thinking about John that perhaps he was The Anointed One", and yet many did not think this, for example those who did not believe in an "Anointed One" and those who did not think that John was a prophet. Numerous other examples can be brought forward in which a general statement should not be understood generally but should be restricted.

Dimittentur tamen ad presens omnia preter quedam pauca que de potestate et subieccione loquuntur, sed et verba Christi premissa. Ait itaque Apostolus ad Ephesios 5o: “Ut ecclesia subiecta est Christo, ita et mulieres viris suis in omnibus”, ubi verbum “in omnibus” non debet generaliter absque omni excepcione eciam quoad licita intelligi, quia uxores non sunt in omnibus licitis subiecte viris, cum quoad multa licita vir et uxor ad paria iudicentur (Extra, De divorciis, c. Gaudemus).

Let us leave aside for the moment, however, all except some few which speak about power and subjection, in addition to the words of Christ set down above. Now the Apostle says in Ephesians 5[:24] that "as the church is subject to Christ, so are wives in all things to their husbands", where the words "in all things" should not be understood generally without any exception even with respect to things that are licit, because wives are not subject to their husbands in everything that is licit, since in respect to many licit things husband and wife are judged equals (Extra, De divortiis, c. Gaudemus [Col. 724]).

Apostolus eciam ad Colossenses 3o ait: “Filii, obedite parentibus per omnia”, et post: “Servi, obedite per omnia dominis carnalibus”; et ad Ephesios 6o ait: “Servi, obedite dominis carnalibus cum omni timore et tremore”; et 1a ad Timotheum 6o: “Quicumque sunt sub iugo servi, dominos suos omni honore dignos arbitrentur”; et ad Titum 2o: “Servos dominis suis subditos esse, in omnibus placentes”. Et  1a Petri 2o sic legitur: “Subiecti estote omni humane creature propter deum”, et post: “Servi, subditi estote in omni timore dominis, non tantum bonis et modestis sed eciam discolis”. Et 1a ad Timotheum 2o ait Apostolus: “Mulier in silencio discat cum omni subieccione”. In quibus omnibus verba generalia non debent generaliter absque omni excepcione intelligi, quia in multis nec mulieres viris nec filii parentibus nec servi dominis nec fideles omnibus hominibus sunt subiecti; ergo consimiliter per hoc, quod Christus dixit Petro: “Quodcumque ligaveris”, et cetera, non potest inferri quod omnes mortales in omnibus absque omni excepcione successoribus beati Petri sunt subiecti, ut in omnes homines, quoad omnia de se licita, plenitudinem tam in temporalibus quam in spiritualibus habeant potestatis.

The Apostle also says in Colossians 3[:20,22], "Sons, be obedient to your parents in everything", and "Slaves, be obedient to your earthly masters in everything", and in Ephesians 6[:5] he says "Slaves, be obedient to your earthly masters with all fear and trembling", and in 1 Tim. 6[:1], "Those who are under the yoke of slavery are to consider their masters worthy of all honour", and in Titus 2[:9], "[Tell] slaves to be subject to their masters, pleasing them in everything", and in 1 Peter 2[:13,18] we read, "Be subject to every human being for God's sake", and "Slaves, be subject in all fear to your masters, not only to those who are good and gentle but even to those who are bad-tempered". And in 1 Tim. 2[:11] the Apostle says, "Let a woman learn in silence with all submission". In all these [examples] the general words should not be understood generally and without any exception, because in many matters wives are not subject to husbands, nor sons to parents, nor slaves to masters nor the faithful to all human beings. Similarly, therefore, from the fact that Christ said to Peter, "Whatever you bind", etc, it can not be inferred that all mortals are subject in everything without any exception to the successors of blessed Peter in such a way that they [Peter's successors] have in all things licit in themselves fullness of power over all men, both in temporal and spiritual matters.

Magister: Ista obieccio duobus modis repellitur. Primo quia si, secundum canones sacros, ubi canon non excipit aut diffinit aut determinat nec nos excipere nec diffinire nec determinare debemus (31, q. 1, Quod si dormierit; 2 q. 5, Consuluisti; di. 55, Si evangelica): multo forcius ubi Dominus non excipit, diffinit vel determinat nec nos excipere, diffinire nec determinare debemus. Sed Christus, concedendo Petro potestatem super omnes, nichil excepit nec diffinivit nec determinavit, sed indistincte et generaliter dixit, “Quodcumque ligaveris”, et cetera; igitur nec nos aliquid debemus ab eius potestate excipere aut eam aliquo modo diffinire vel determinare. Petrus igitur in omnibus temporalibus et spiritualibus accepit a Christo plenitudinem potestatis.

Master: That objection is rejected in two ways. First, because if, according to the sacred canons, we should not exclude, limit or determine when a canon does not exclude, limit or determine (31, q. 1, Quod si dormierit [Col. 1112; cf. Gloss, v. nec nos definiedum est, col. 1586]; 2, q. 5, Consuluisti [Col. 463; cf. Gloss, v. superstitiosa, col. 649]; di. 55, Si evangelica [Col. 218-9; cf. Gloss, v. excepisse, col. 290]), so much more should we not exclude, limit or determine when the Lord does not exclude, limit or determine. But Christ did not exclude, limit or determine anything in granting power over everyone to Peter, but said indiscriminately and generally, "Whatever you bind", etc. Neither should we, therefore, exclude anything from his power, or limit or determine it in any way. Therefore Peter received fullness of power from Christ in all temporal and spiritual matters.

Amplius, beneficium principis largissime interpretandum est  (Extra, De simonia, c. ultimo; Extra, De decimis, Ex parte). Igitur et potestas collata Petro a principe principum Christo largissime interpretanda est, ut ab eius potestate nec in spiritualibus nec in temporalibus aliquid penitus subtrahatur.

Further, a benefit given by a prince should be interpreted very broadly (Extra, De simonia last chapter [Col. 767; cf. Gloss, v. abbates, col. 1646], Extra, De decimis, Ex parte [cf. Gloss, v. conceditur, col. 1229]). The power conferred on Peter by Christ, the prince of princes, should therefore also be interpreted very broadly so that nothing at all is removed from his power, either in spiritual or temporal matters.

Secundo repellitur obieccio suprascripta auctoritate Innocencii 3ii, qui, ut legitur Extra, De maioritate et obediencia, c. Solite, ait: “Dominus dixit ad Petrum, et eciam Petrus dixit ad successores: ‘Quodcumque ligaveris super terram erit ligatum et in celis’, et cetera, nichil excipiens qui dixit: ‘Quodcumque’”.. Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod a potestate data a Christo beato Petro et successoribus eius neque in temporalibus neque in spiritualibus aliquid est excipiendum. Habet igitur papa talem plenitudinem potestatis a Christo.

The above objection is rejected in a second way by an authoritative text of Innocent III, who says, as we read in Extra, De maioritate et obedientia, c. Solite, "The Lord said to Peter, and Peter also said to his successors, 'Whatever you bind on earth will also be bound in heaven', etc. He who said 'Whatever' excepted nothing"  [Col. 198]. From these words we gather that nothing in either temporal or spiritual matters should be excepted from the power given by Christ to blessed Peter and his successors. The pope has such fullness of power, therefore, from Christ.

Capitulum 3

Chapter 3

Discipulus: Super premissam auctoritatem Salvatoris postea revertemur. Ideo alias allegaciones adducas.

Student: We will return later to this saying of the Saviour. Would you, therefore, bring forward some other arguments?

Magister: Quod papa habet in temporalibus et spiritualibus talem plenitudinem potestatis probatur. Ille cui ex precepto divino est in omnibus obediendum et in nullo penitus resistendum habet immediate a deo huiusmodi plenitudinem potestatis. Pape autem ex precepto divino obediendum est in omnibus et in nullo resistendum penitus, teste Gregorio qui, ut habetur dist. 12a, c. Preceptis, ait: “Preceptis apostolicis non dura superbia resistatur, et per obedienciam que a sancta Romana ecclesia et apostolica auctoritate iussa sunt salutifere impleantur”; et infra: “Cuius auctoritatis sanccionem omnes teneant sacerdotes qui nolunt ab apostolice petre, super quam Christus universalem ecclesiam fundavit, soliditate divelli”. Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod propter auctoritatem concessam a Christo Romane ecclesie est ei in omnibus obediendum et in nullo penitus resistendum.

Master: It is proved [as follows] that the pope has such fullness of power in temporal and spiritual matters. That man who should by divine precept be obeyed in everything and not resisted at all in anything has fullness of power of this kind immediately from God. The pope, however, should by divine precept be obeyed in everything and not resisted at all in anything, as Gregory attests, saying in di. 12, c. Preceptis, "Let not apostolic precepts be resisted with unbending pride, and, through obedience, let those things that by the holy Roman church and apostolic authority are commanded salutarily be carried out"; and later, "Let all priests who do not want to be separated from the strength of the apostolic rock upon which Christ founded the universal church maintain the decree of its authority" [Col. 27]. We gather from these words that because of the authority granted by Christ to the Roman church it should be obeyed in everything and not resisted at all in anything.

Hoc eciam Stephanus papa, ut habetur dist. 19a, c. Enimvero, videtur asserere cum ait: “Enimvero in speculum et exemplum sancta Romana ecclesia, cui nos Christus preesse voluit, [posita est]; <ab> omnibus quicquid statuit et quicquid ordinavit perpetuo et irrefragabiliter observandum est”,  et cetera. Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod propter ordinacionem Christi Romane ecclesie obediendum est in omnibus..

Pope Stephen seems to assert this too, as we read in di. 19, c. Enimvero, when he says, "For indeed, the holy Roman church, which Christ wished us to rule over, [has been put forward] as a mirror and an example; whatever it has enacted and whatever it has ordained should be observed perpetually and inviolably by everyone"  [Col. 61], etc. We gather from these words that because of Christ's decree the Roman church should be obeyed in everything.

Hinc Leo papa, ut habetur eadem distinccione, c. Ita dominus, ait: “Huius muneris sacramentum ita Dominus ad omnium apostolorum officium pertinere voluit, ut in beatissimo Petro apostolorum omnium summo principaliter collocaret, ut ab ipso quasi a quodam capite dona sua velut in corpus omne diffunderet”; et infra: “Hanc petre istius sacratissimam firmitatem, Deo, ut diximus, edificante constructam, nimis impia vult presumpcione violare, quisquis eius potestatem temptat [infringere]”. Ex quibus verbis datur intelligi quod qui potestati Petri et successorum eius aliquo modo inobediens invenitur dei ordinacionem infringit; quare ex ordinacione Christi est quod pape obediendum est in omnibus.

Hence, as we read in the same distinction, c. Ita dominus, Pope Leo says, "The Lord wanted the sacrament of this gift so to pertain to the office of all the apostles that he located it chiefly in most blessed Peter, the highest of all the apostles, so that through him, as head, he [the Lord] might pour out his gifts on the whole body"; and later, "If anyone tries to infringe its power, he is intending with most impious presumption [to violate] the most sacred strength of this rock, built up as we have said by God's work" [Col. 62]. We are given to understand by these words that anyone who is found disobedient in any way to the power of Peter and his successors is infringing a decree of God. It is by the decree of Christ, therefore, that the pope should be obeyed in everything.

Quod eciam racione probatur, quia illi ex ordinacione Christi obediendum est in omnibus cuius omnia precepta accipienda sunt tamquam divina voce prolata; sed omnia precepta pape, sicut et sancciones eius, accipienda sunt tamquam divina voce prolata (dist. 19a, Sic omnes). Ergo ex ordinacione dei est ei obediendum in omnibus.

This is also proved by argument, because that person should by Christ's decree be obeyed in everything whose every teaching should be received as if uttered by the divine voice; but all the precepts of the pope, just as also his laws, should be received as if uttered by the divine voice (di. 19, Sic omnes [Col. 60]); by God's decree, therefore, he should be obeyed in everything.

Amplius, illi ex precepto dei est in omnibus obediendum qui absque heresi non potest esse scismaticus, et omnes alii possunt esse scismatici tamquam ab illo divisi; sed papa non potest esse scismaticus nisi fiat hereticus; omnes autem alii possunt esse scismatici, licet non statim sint heretici. Ergo pape ex precepto dei est in omnibus obediendum.

Further, by God's precept that person should be obeyed in everything who without heresy [i.e., without his being a heretic] cannot be a schismatic while all others can be schismatic by being divided from that one. But the pope can not be schismatic unless he becomes a heretic, whereas all others can be schismatic even if they are not immediately heretical. By God's precept, therefore, the pope should be obeyed in everything.

Maior probatur per hoc, quod ille cui non est obediendum ex precepto dei in omnibus potest multa precipere in quibus alii sibi obedire non tenentur. Quare propter precepta huiusmodi, in quibus sibi non tenentur obedire, potest inter precipientem et illos quibus fiunt precepta huiusmodi oriri discordia, divisio, dissensio et scissura et, per consequens, scisma, quia scisma, quod Grecum nomen est, scissuram notat (24a, q. 1a, c. Scisma). In illo igitur casu vel precipiens, vel illi quibus fiunt huiusmodi precepta, est scismaticus vel scismatici. Sed illi quibus fiunt precepta huiusmodi non sunt scismatici, cum non sint, non obediendo, aliquo crimine irretiti, ex quo nullatenus obedire tenentur. Quare precipiens est scismaticus reputandus propter iniusta precepta, licet non fiat hereticus.

The major [premise] is proved by this, that someone who does not by God's precept have to be obeyed in everything can command many things in which others are not bound to obey him. On account of commands of this kind, therefore, in which they are not bound to obey him, there can arise between the one giving the orders and the ones to whom they are given discord, division, dissension and tearing, and, as a result, schism, because schism, which is a Greek word, denotes tearing (24, q. 1, Scisma [Col. 979]). In such a case, therefore, either the one giving the commands or those to whom commands of this kind are given are schismatic; but those to whom such commands are given are not schismatic because they are not entangled in any crime by not obeying, since they are not bound to obey. The one giving the commands, therefore, must be regarded as schismatic because of unjust commands, even if he does not become a heretic.

Minor quoad primam partem, scilicet quod papa absque heresi non possit esse scismaticus, probatur per hoc, quod scismaticus dicitur ille qui ab ecclesie universalis unitate recedit (24, q. 1, Scisma, et c. Loquitur dominus, et c. Alienus, et c. Quia ex sola). Sed papa, nisi fiat hereticus, ab universalis ecclesie unitate non recedit, cum ab ipso, quamdiu manet in fide Petri, unitas universalis ecclesie incipiat (24a, q. 1a, Loquitur dominus). Ergo papa, nisi fiat hereticus, scismaticus esse non potest.

The first part of the minor [premise], that is that the pope cannot be schismatic without heresy, is proved by the fact that a schismatic is defined as one who withdraws from the unity of the universal church (24, q. 1, Scisma [Col. 979], c. Loquitur dominus [Col. 971], c. Alienus [Col. 972] and c. Quia ex sola [Col. 974]). But unless he becomes a heretic the pope does not withdraw from the unity of the universal church, since, as long as he remains in the faith of Peter, the unity of the universal church begins from him (24, q. 1, Loquitur dominus). Unless he becomes a heretic, therefore, the pope cannot be schismatic.

Secunda pars minoris patet, quia omnis alius a papa absque heresi, saltem in principio, non obediendo universali ecclesie in hiis in quibus tenetur potest fieri scismaticus.

The second part of the minor [premise] is quite clear because everyone other than the pope can become schismatic without heresy, at least in the beginning, by not obeying the universal church in those matters in which he is bound.

Ex hiis colligitur quod, ex precepto dei seu ex ordinacione Christi, Petro et successoribus eius est in omnibus obediendum et in nullo penitus resistendum. Igitur ex ordinacione Christi papa habet tam in temporalibus quam in spiritualibus plenitudinem potestatis, ut omnia possit que non sunt de se illicita, ita ut per solam humanam ordinacionem vel voluntatem non possunt fieri illicita.

From these [points] we gather that by God's precept or by the decree of Christ Peter and his successors should be obeyed in everything and not resisted at all in anything. By the decree of Christ, therefore, the pope has in both temporal and spiritual matters fullness of power to be able to do all things not of themselves illicit, so that these things cannot be made illicit solely by human decree or will [i.e. be made illicit for him by the will of others].

Discipulus: Priusquam ad alias allegaciones procedas, refer quare dicitur quod papa ex ordinacione Christi omnia potest “que non sunt de se illicita”, et cetera.

Student: Before you go on to other arguments, relate why it is said that by the decree of Christ the pope can do all things "not of themselves illicit", etc.

Magister: Hoc dicitur propter vota, iuramenta, promissiones, pacta et alia quecumque per que homines se obligant ad illa ad que alias minime obligantur, quia per talia in nullo penitus derogatur potestati pape quin, talibus quibuscumque non obstantibus, omnia possit et in omnibus sit obediendum ei, eo quod in omnibus talibus potestas et auctoritas pape intelligitur semper excepta  (Extra, De iureiurando, Veniens; Extra, De eleccione, Significasti).

Master: This is said on account of the vows, oaths, promises, pacts and any other means by which men bind themselves to things to which they are otherwise not bound, because by such means there is no derogation of the power of the pope at all, but rather, not withstanding all such things, he can do anything and should be obeyed in everything, because in all such cases the power and authority of the pope are understood always to be excepted (Extra, De iureiurando, c. Veniens [Col. 64], Extra, De electione, c. Significasti [Col. 49; cf. Gloss, v. excipiatur auctoritas, col. 112]).

Capitulum 4

Chapter 4

Discipulus: De ista materia in speciali tangemus in diversis locis. Ideo alias allegaciones adducas.

Student: We will touch on that matter in particular in various places. so would you bring forward some other arguments?

Magister: Quod papa habeat ex ordinacione dei talem plenitudinem potestatis probatur. Quia ille qui omnibus legibus positivis est solutus habet talem plenitudinem potestatis, quia qui non habet talem plenitudinem potestatis aliqua lege humana potest constringi, eo quod non habet potestatem supra omnes leges humanas. Papa autem legibus est solutus ita quod est supra omnes leges humanas, cum eciam leges imperiales possit dissolvere, sicut plures canones videntur asserere (di. 19, Quicumque). Ergo papa habet ex ordinacione dei talem plenitudinem potestatis.

Master: That the pope has such fullness of power by God's decree is proved. For anyone who is freed from all positive laws has such fullness of power, since someone who does not have this fullness of power can be restrained by some human law, because he does not have power over all human laws. The pope, however, is freed from laws so that he is above all human laws since he can dissolve even imperial laws, as many canons seem to assert (di. 9, c. 1. para. Quicumque  [Rather, dist. 9, c. 1, para. Quicumque, col. 16]). Therefore by God's decree the pope has such fullness of power.

Amplius, vicarius Christi habet plenitudinem potestatis ex ordinacione eiusdem Christi, cum Christus habuerit huiusmodi plenitudinem potestatis et, in committendo Petro vices suas, nichil in talibus sibi interdixit. Ergo papa habet talem plenitudinem potestatis ex ordinacione Christi, cum sit Christi vicarius.

Further, the vicar of Christ has fullness of power by the decree of Christ himself, since Christ had such fullness of power and, in commissioning Peter as his substitute, forbad him nothing in such matters. The pope has such fullness of power, therefore, by Christ's decree, since he is Christ's vicar.

Rursus, papa habet plenitudinem potestatis, et non habet aliquam potestatem ab homine; ergo ex sola ordinacione dei habet plenitudinem potestatis. Maior colligitur et habetur ex diversis canonibus sacris  2, q. 6, c. Decretoet c. Qui se scit. Eciam diversi canones sacri videntur asserere [minorem]. Unde Innocencius 3us, ut habetur Extra, De iudiciis, Novit, ait: “Cum enim non humane constitucioni sed divine pocius innitamur, quia potestas nostra non est ex homine sed ex deo, nullus qui sit sane mentis ignorat quin ad officium nostrum spectet de quocumque peccato mortali corripere quemlibet Christianum”. Et beatus Anacletus, ut habetur dist. 22a, c. Sacrosancta, ait: “Hec vero apostolica sedes caput et cardo, ut prefatum est, a Domino et non ab alio constituta”, et cetera. Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod papa nullam potestatem habet ab homine. 

Again, the pope has fullness of power and does not have any power from man; therefore he has fullness of power from the decree of God alone. The major [premise] is gathered and established from various sacred canons (2, q. 6, c. Decreto [Col. 469] and c. Qui se scit [Col. 469]). Diverse sacred canons also seem to assert [the minor]. Thus Innocent III says, as we find in Extra, De iudiciis, Novit: "For since we rely not on a human constitution but rather on a divine one, because our power is not from man but from God, no one who is of sound mind does not know that it pertains to our office to correct any Christian for any mortal sin" [Col. 243]. And, as we read in di. 22, c. Sacrosancta, blessed Anacletus says, "This apostolic see, the head and the hinge [of all churches], was indeed constituted, as has been said before, by the Lord and not by anyone else", etc [Col. 74] . From these words we gather that the pope has no power from man.

Quod eciam racione videtur posse probari. Nam nullus est dicendus hereticus propter hoc, quod negat a quocumque potestatem quam a solo homine habere dinoscitur, quia talis, licet erret, non tamen errat contra scripturam sacram, que non est ab homine sed a deo. Sed qui negat a papa potestatem suam est hereticus reputandus, ut testatur Nicolaus papa secundum quod habetur dist. 22a, c. 1o. Ergo papa a solo deo recipit potestatem.


This also seems provable by argument. For no one should be called a heretic because he denies to anyone power he is known to have from man alone, because even if such a person errs yet he does not err against sacred Scripture, which is not from man but from God. But anyone who denies the pope his power should be regarded as a heretic, as Pope Nicholas attests, as we read in di. 22, c. 1 [Col. 73]. The pope, therefore, receives his power from God alone.

Item, quod papa a deo habeat plenitudinem potestatis ostenditur. Nam ab eodem habet Romanus pontifex plenitudinem potestatis et potestatem concedendi indulgencias, ut innuitur Extra, De penitenciis et remissionibus, Cum ex eo, in fine. Sed Romanus pontifex habet a solo deo, et non ab homine, potestatem concedendi indulgencias. Ergo a solo deo habet plenitudinem potestatis.
 

Again, that the pope has fullness of power from God is shown. For it is from the same [source] that the Roman pontiff has fullness of power and the power of granting indulgences, as is intimated in Extra, De penitentiis et remissionibus, Cum ex eo, near the end  [Col. 889]. But the Roman pontiff has the power of granting indulgences from God alone and not from man. Therefore he has fullness of power from God alone.

Item, ille habet a deo plenitudinem potestatis de cuius iudicio et potestate non est licitum iudicare nec eciam disputare, in dubium revocando potestatem eiusdem. Quia de potestate eius qui non habet a deo plenitudinem potestatis licet hominibus disputare et inquirere, dubitando quam potestatem habet et quam non habet; de cuius eciam iudicio licet iudicare, si non secundum potestatem sibi concessam sed usurpatam presumpserit iudicare. Sed nemini licet iudicare vel eciam dubitando de iudicio et potestate summi pontificis disputare. Ergo a deo habet plenitudinem potestatis.

Again, anyone whose judgement and power it is not permitted to judge, or even to dispute by calling his power into doubt, has fullness of power from God. For men are permitted to dispute about the power of someone who does not have fullness of power from God and to examine as a matter of doubt what power he has and does not have; about a judgement of such a person it is also permitted to judge whether he has presumed to judge not according to the power conceded to him but according to power he has usurped. But no one is permitted to judge or even to dispute as a matter of doubt the judgement and power of the highest pontiff. Therefore he has fullness of power from God.

Maior videtur evidens, minor per auctoritates diversas ostenditur. Ait enim Nicolaus papa, ut habetur 9a, q. 3a, Patet: “Patet profecto sedis apostolice, cuius auctoritate maius non est, iudicium a nemine fore retractandum; nec cuiquam de eius liceat iudicare iudicio”. Et Gelasius papa, ut habetur  eadem causa et quescione, c. Ipsi, ait: “Nec de eius umquam preceperunt iudicari iudicio, sentenciamque eius constituerunt non oportere dissolvi, cuius pocius sequenda decreta mandaverunt”. Et 17a, q. 4a, Qui autem, sic scribitur: “De iudicio summi pontificis alicui disputare non licet”; et ibidem sic legitur: “Committunt eciam sacrilegium qui contra divine legis sanctitatem aut nesciendo committunt aut negligendo violant et offendunt, aut qui de principali iudicio <certant et> disputant”. Et eadem causa et questione, c. Nemini, <ubi> dicit Nicolaus papa: “Nemini de sedis apostolice iudicio iudicare aut illius sentenciam retractare permissum est, videlicet propter ecclesie Romane primatum Christi munere in beato Petro apostolo divinitus collocatum”. Ex hiis atque aliis multis colligitur quod propter potestatem concessam a Christo Romane ecclesie nemini licet iudicare aut disputare de eius iudicio aut potestate. Ergo habet a Christo plenitudinem potestatis.

The major [premise] seems evident, the minor is shown by various authorities. For as we read in 9, q. 3, Patet, Pope Nicholas says, "It is perfectly clear that a judgement of the apostolic see, than whose authority there is none greater, should not be reviewed by anyone; nor is anyone permitted to judge one of its judgements"  [Col. 609]. Pope Gelasius also, as we find in the same Cause and Question, c. Ipsi, says, "And they have ordered that its judgement should never be judged and they have decreed that its sentence must not be dissolved; rather they have commanded that its decrees should be followed" [Col. 611]. And in 17, q. 4, Qui autem it is written as follows, "No one is permitted to dispute the judgement of the highest pontiff" [Gratianus, post c. 29, col. 823]; and in the same place we read thus, "They also commit a sacrilege who either commit something against the holiness of divine law through not knowing it, or violate and offend it by neglect, or contend and dispute about the ruler's judgement" [ibid., col. 822-3]. And in the same Cause and Question, c. Nemini, Pope Nicholas says, "No one is permitted to judge a judgement of the apostolic See or review its sentence, and this because the primacy of the Roman church was by a gift of Christ divinely located in Peter, the blessed apostle" [Col. 823]. We gather from these and many other [canons] that no one is permitted to judge or dispute a judgement or the power of the Roman church because its power was granted to it by Christ. Therefore it has fullness of power from Christ.

Quod adhuc tali racione probatur. Ab eodem habet papa plenitudinem potestatis a quo habet claves regni celorum; sed claves regni celorum habet a Christo; ergo et plenitudinem potestatis habet a Christo. Minor ex verbis Christi, cum dixit Petro, Matthei 16o, “Tibi dabo claves regni celorum”, habetur aperte. Maior probatur, quia omnis potestas quam habet papa spectat ad claves, eo quod omnis potestas pape aut est ordinis aut iurisdiccionis. Potestas autem quam habet racione ordinis spectat ad claves secundum omnes. Potestas eciam quam habet racione iurisdiccionis spectat ad claves, teste Augustino, qui scribens ad Bonifacium, ut habetur dist. 50a, c. Ut constitueretur, ait: “Ut constitueretur in ecclesia ne quisquam post alicuius criminis penitenciam clericatum accipiat vel ad clericatum redeat vel in clericatu maneat, non desperacione indulgencie sed rigore factum est discipline. Alioquin contra claves datas ecclesie agitur, de quibus dictum est: ‘Quodcumque solveris super terram erit solutum et in celis’”. Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod potestas puniendi criminosos, que competit ecclesie racione iurisdiccionis, non ordinis, spectat ad claves ecclesie. Ergo racione consimili omnis alia potestas que competit ecclesie racione iurisdiccionis spectat ad easdem claves.

This is proved again by the following argument. The pope has fullness of power from the same person as the one from whom he has the keys to the kingdom of heaven. But he has the keys to the kingdom of heaven from Christ. Therefore, he also has fullness of power from Christ. The minor [premise] is clearly established by the words of Christ when he said to Peter, "I will give you the keys of the kingdom of heaven." (Matt. 16[:19]) The major [premise] is proved because all the power which the pope has pertains to his keys, in that all the pope's power is by reason of order or of jurisdiction. The power which he has by reason of order, however, pertains according to everyone to the keys. The power which he has by reason of jurisdiction also pertains to the keys, as Augustine attests, who writes to Boniface, as we find in di. 50, c. Ut constitueretur, "That it was established in the Church that after penance for some crime no one should receive, return to or remain in holy orders was not done from despair of pardon but out of firmness of discipline; otherwise action is taken against the keys given to the Church, about which it was said, 'Whatever you bind on earth will also be bound in heaven'" [c. 25, col. 187]. We gather from these words that the power of punishing criminals which belongs to the Roman Church by reason of jurisdiction, not order, pertains to the keys of the Church. By a similar argument, therefore, every other power which belongs to the Church by reason of jurisdiction pertains to those same keys.

Adhuc, quod papa habeat a Christo immediate plenitudinem potestatis probatur. Quia cui ab aliquo concessum est maius, ab eodem et minus concessum esse videtur (Extra, De decimis, Ex parte; 27, q. 2, Sunt qui dicunt). Sed maius est dispensare contra Dominum et contra Apostolum quam posse ea que nec sunt contra legem divinam nec contra ius nature. Papa autem habet a Christo potestatem dispensandi contra Dominum et contra Apostolum, teste glossa, que 25a, q. 1a, super capitulum Sunt quidam, ait: “Satis potest sustineri quod papa contra Apostolum dispensat, non tamen in hiis que pertinent ad articulos fidei; et eodem modo dispensat in evangelio interpretando ipsum, ut Extra, De testibus, Licet, in fine”. Hoc eciam probat[ur] exemplis. Nam papa dispensat contra Dominum in iuramento et in voto. Nam dicit Dominus per prophetam, “Vovete et reddite”, et Matthei 5o, “Redde autem Domino iuramenta tua”; et tamen in hiis dispensat papa (15, q. 6, Iuratos; Extra, De voto in multis capitulis). Ergo multo forcius papa potest omnia que non sunt contra legem dei nec contra ius nature.

In addition to this, it is proved that the pope has fullness of power immediately from Christ, because anyone to whom the greater has been granted by someone seems to have been granted by the same person also the lesser (Extra, De decimis, Ex parte [col. 565]; 27, q. 2, Sunt qui dicunt [col. 1067); but it is a greater thing to dispense against the Lord and against the Apostle than to be able to do those things which are neither against divine law nor against the law of nature. The pope has power from Christ, however, to dispense against the Lord and against the Apostle, as the gloss on 25, q. 1, c. Sunt quidam attests when it says, "It can be adequately maintained that the pope dispenses against the apostle -- yet not in those matters which pertain to the articles of faith; and in the same way he dispenses in connection with the gospel by interpreting it, as in Extra, De testibus c. Licet., near the end"  [Gloss, v. Apostoli, col. 1439] The same is proved also by examples. For the pope dispenses against the Lord in the case of an oath and a vow. For the Lord says through the prophet, "Vow and perform" [Psalm 75:12], and in Matthew 5[:33], "Carry out your oaths to the Lord", and yet the pope dispenses in these matters (15, q. 6, Iuratos [Col. 756]; Extra, De voto [Col. 589 ff] in many chapters). Much more is it the case, therefore, that the pope can do anything which is not against the law of God or against natural law.

Preterea, ille habet plenitudinem potestatis ut omnia possit cuius sentencia sive iusta sive iniusta est timenda. Quia cuius sentencia sive iniusta sive iusta est timenda, eiusdem preceptum sive iustum sive iniustum est timendum et servandum; sed sentencia pape sive iusta sive iniusta est timenda (11a, q. 3a, Sentencia); ergo papa omnia potest.

Moreover, someone whose sentence should be feared whether it is unjust or just has fullness of power so that he is able to do all things; for if his sentence should be feared whether it is unjust or just, his command should be feared and kept, whether it is just or unjust. But the sentence of a pope should be feared, whether it is just or unjust (11, q. 3, Sententia [Col. 642]); the pope, therefore, can do all things.

Adhuc, ille qui a nemine debet reprehendi pro quocumque facto habet plenitudinem potestatis a Christo ut omnia possit. Quia si non haberet talem plenitudinem potestatis posset excedere potestatem suam et per consequens in talibus peccare. Quilibet autem peccator, eciam prelatus, potest et debet corripi et reprehendi de omni peccato, maxime si non timetur probabiliter quod ex correccione fiet deterior, iuxta illud evangelii: “Si peccaverit in te frater tuus, vade et corripe eum inter te et illum solum”, et cetera, quod ad omnes extenditur, ut ex sacris canonibus colligitur. Papa autem a nemine debet reprehendi seu corripi (dist. 40a, Si papa). Ergo papa habet plenitudinem potestatis ut omnia possit; sed non habet talem plenitudinem potestatis ab homine; ergo habet eam a Christo.

Further, he who ought not be rebuked by anyone for any deed at all has fullness of power from Christ so that he is able to do all things. For if he did not have such fullness of power he could exceed his power and consequently sin in such matters. Any sinner, however, even a prelate, can and should be corrected and rebuked for every sin, especially if there is no probable fear that he will become worse because of the correction. This follows from the words of the gospel, "If your brother has sinned against you, go and correct him when the two of you are alone", etc. [Matthew 18:15], which extend to everyone, as we gather from the sacred canons. The pope, however, should not be rebuked or corrected by anyone (di. 40, Si papa [Col. 146]). Therefore, the pope has fullness of power so that he is able to do all things. But he does not have such fullness of power from man. He has it, therefore, from Christ.

Amplius, qui non potest contra fidem errare habet plenitudinem potestatis a deo ut omnia possit. Quia qui non potest contra fidem errare non potest errare contra bonos mores et, per consequens, quicquid fecerit irreprehensibile est et licite factum; et ita omnia potest que vult. Papa autem non potest errare contra fidem, ad quod probandum adducte sunt allegaciones plures in prima parte huius dialogi, libro 5o, c. 4o. Ergo papa habet a Christo plenitudinem potestatis.

Further, he who can not err against the faith has fullness of power from God so that he is able to do all things, because he who can not err against the faith can not err against good morals and, consequently, whatever he does is beyond blame and done permissibly, and so he can do anything he wants to do. The pope, however, can not err against faith. Many arguments were brought forward to prove this in chapter 4 of book 5 of the first part of this dialogue. The pope, therefore, has fullness of power from Christ.

Preterea, qui habet a Christo plenitudinem potestatis super concilium generale habet eciam multo forcius a Christo plenitudinem potestatis super omnes alios. Papa autem habet a Christo plenitudinem potestatis super concilium generale. Talem autem potestatem non habet a concilio generali, cum unum concilium non possit alii legem vel subieccionem imponere, quia non habet imperium par in parem. Ergo si habet eam, habet ipsam ab aliquo superiori concilio generali; superior autem non est nisi Christus. Ergo si papa habet talem plenitudinem potestatis super generale concilium habet ipsam a Christo.

Moreover, he who has from Christ fullness of power over a general council also has, a fortiori, fullness of power from Christ over all others. The pope, however, has from Christ fullness of power over a general council. Yet he does not have this power from a general council, since one council can not impose a law or obedience on another because an equal does not have power over an equal. If he has it, therefore, he has it from someone who is superior to a general council. It has no superior, however, except Christ. If the pope has such fullness of power, therefore, over a general council, he has it from Christ.

Restat ergo probare quod papa habeat talem potestatem super concilium generale, quod per auctoritates manifestas videtur ostendi. Ait enim Pascasius papa, ut habetur Extra, De eleccione, Significasti: “Cum omnia concilia per ecclesie Romane auctoritatem et facta sint et robur acceperint, et in eorum statutis Romani pontificis patenter excipiatur auctoritas”. Et Gracianus, 25a, q. 1a, Si ergo, ait: “Sacri canones ita aliquid constituunt, ut sue interpretacionis auctoritatem sancte Romane ecclesie conservent. Ipsi namque soli canones valent interpretari qui ius habent condendi eos. Unde in nonnullis capitulis conciliorum, cum aliquid observandum determinetur, statim subinfertur ‘Nisi auctoritas Romane ecclesie [aliter imperaverit]’, vel ‘salva tamen in omnibus apostolica auctoritate’”. Ex quibus aliisque quam multis colligitur quod papa habet super generale concilium plenitudinem potestatis. Ergo multo forcius habet plenitudinem potestatis super omnes alios.

It remains to prove, therefore, that the pope has such power over a general council, and this seems to be shown by clear authorities. For, as we read in Extra, De electione, c. Significasti, Pope Paschasius says, "... since it is by the authority of the Roman church that all councils have been held and have received their strength, and [since] in their statutes the authority of the bishop of Rome is clearly excepted" [Col. 50]; and Gratian says in 25, q. 1, Si ergo, "The sacred canons establish something in such a way that they keep to the holy Roman church the authority to interpret them, for they alone can interpret the canons who have the right of making them. Hence in some chapters of the councils when it is determined that something should be observed it is immediately added, 'Unless the authority of the Roman church [has commanded otherwise]', or 'Saving, however, in all things, the apostolic authority'" [Col. 1010]. We gather from these and very many others that the pope has fullness of power over a general council. A fortiori, therefore, he has fullness of power over all others.

Preterea, qui habet potestatem a Christo super ista que sunt contra naturalem equitatem multo magis habet potestatem a Christo super omnia licita que naturali non obviant equitati, quia, sicut prius tactum est, cui concessum est maius eciam minus concessum esse videtur. Sed papa habet potestatem super illa que naturali obviant equitati; ergo habet a Christo plenitudinem potestatis ut omnia possit que sunt licita et naturali equitati non obviant.

Moreover, anyone who has power from Christ over those things which are against natural equity a fortiori has power from Christ over everything licit which is not opposed to natural equity, because, as was touched on before, anyone to whom the greater has been granted seems also to have been granted the lesser thing. But the pope has power over things that are opposed to natural equity; therefore he has fullness of power from Christ so that he is able to do anything which is licit and not opposed to natural equity.

Maior videtur probacione minime indigere. Minor probatur, nam pueros qui seipsos nesciunt regere habere curam et regimen animarum naturali obviat equitati. Quia racio naturalis dictat quod qui nescit se regere non debet alios gubernare – immo et veritas evangelica hoc insinuat, cum Christus dicat Matthei 15o: “Cecus autem si ceco ducatum prestet, ambo in foveam cadunt”. Hoc eciam Alexander 3us, sequens dictamen racionis recte, ut habetur Extra, De etate et qualitate preficiendorum, c. Indecorum, videtur innuere, dicens: “Indecorum est ut hii debeant ecclesias regere qui non noverunt gubernare se ipsos, cum ad ecclesiarum regimen tales persone sint admittende que discrecione preemineant et morum fulgeant honestate”. Cui Gregorius 9us, ut habetur Extra, De eleccione, Cum in magistrum, concordare videtur dicens: “Cum in magistrum assumi non debeat qui formam discipuli non assumpsit, nec sit preficiendus qui subesse non novit”, et cetera. Ex quibus aliisque quampluribus patet quod equitas naturalis exigit quod pueri, qui nec se nec alios regere sciunt, ad regimen et curam animarum assumi non debeant. Et tamen contra hanc naturalem equitatem potest papa precipere, teste glossa, que, ut habetur Extra, De etate et qualitate preficiendorum, super capitulum Eam te, ait: “Si ex certa sciencia scriberet papa pro minori, eius mandato esset obediendum, quia sacrilegii instar obtinet dubitare an is sit dignus quem princeps elegerit, 17a, q. 4a, § Qui autem et C., De crimine sacrilegii, l. 2a”. Hoc eciam Alexander 3us mandasse videtur, ut habetur Extra, De etate et qualitate preficiendorum, Ex racione, qui pueros infra decennium constitutos non removet ab ecclesiis que erant eis concesse per episcopum Conventrensem sed scienter tollerat eos et mandat ut tollerentur.

The major [premise] does not seem to need proof. The minor is proved, because it is opposed to natural equity for boys who do not know how to rule themselves to have the care and rule of souls. For natural reason directs that no one who does not know how to rule himself should govern others. Indeed gospel truth also suggests this, when Christ says in Matthew 15[:14], "If the blind leads the blind, however, they both fall into a ditch". Alexander III, following a direction of right reason, seems to imply this as well, as we read in Extra, De etate et qualitate preficiendorum, c. Indecorum, where he says: "It is shameful that those who have not learnt to govern themselves should rule churches, since those admitted to the rule of churches should be persons of outstanding discretion and conspicuous honesty of life"  [Col. 126]. Gregory IX seems to agree with this when he says, as we read in Extra, De electione, Cum in magistrum, "... since no one should be appointed to mastership who has not taken on the role of disciple, and no one should be set above others who has not known what it is to be under another", etc [Col. 91]. It is clear from these and very many other [authorities] that natural equity demands that boys, who do not know how to rule themselves or others, should not be appointed to the rule and care of souls. And yet the pope can issue orders against this natural equity, as the gloss on Extra, De etate et qualitate preficiendorum c. Eam te testifies when it says, "If the pope should write with certain knowledge on behalf of a minor, his mandate should be obeyed, because it is a kind of sacrilege to doubt whether someone the ruler has chosen is worthy (17, q. 4, para. Qui autem and Code, De crimine sacrilegii, law 2" [Gloss, v. Litterarum, col. 266]. Alexander III also seems to have commanded this, as we read in Extra, De etate et qualitate preficiendorum, Ex ratione, since he does not remove the boys appointed under ten years old from the churches granted to them by the bishop of Coventry, but knowingly tolerates them and orders that they be tolerated [Col. 126].

Capitulum 5

Chapter 5

Discipulus: Pro predicta opinione allegaciones tetigisti, ut estimo, forciores; ideo pro ea ad presens alias non adducas, quia iste solventur patenter et ad alias posset forsitan leviter responderi. [Itaque explica quomodo ad istam opinionem potest responderi.]

Student: You have touched on arguments, very strong ones I think, for the above opinion. For the moment, therefore, do not bring forward any others in support of it, because those will be clearly refuted and perhaps the others could easily be answered. [So explain how that opinion can be answered.]

That the first opinion is dangerous and heretical:
The Christian law is a law of freedom

Magister: Sunt nonnulli qui opinionem prescriptam falsam, periculosam, perniciosam ac hereticalem estimant, quod multipliciter probare conantur. Lex enim Christiana ex institucione Christi est lex libertatis respectu veteris legis, que respectu nove legis fuit lex servitutis. Sed si papa haberet a Christo talem plenitudinem potestatis ut omnia possit que non sunt contra legem divinam nec contra legem nature, lex Christiana ex institucione Christi esset lex intollerabilis servitutis, et multo maioris servitutis quam fuerit lex vetus. Ergo papa non habet a Christo talem plenitudinem potestatis tam in spiritualibus quam in temporalibus.

Master: There are some who regard the above opinion as false, dangerous, pernicious and heretical, and they try to prove this in many ways. For Christian law is, by Christ's institution, a law of freedom with respect to the old law, which was, with respect to the new law, a law of servitude. But if the pope had from Christ such fullness of power that he can do anything not contrary to divine law or the law of nature, the Christian law would be, by Christ's institution, a law of unbearable servitude, and of much greater servitude than the old law was. The pope therefore does not have from Christ such fullness of power in both spiritual and temporal matters.

Maior auctoritatibus apertissimis scripture divine videtur posse probari. Beatus enim Iacobus in canonica sua, c. 1o , eam vocat legem perfecte libertatis dicens: “Quicumque perspexerit in lege perfecte libertatis et permanserit in ea, non auditor obliviosus factus sed factor operis, hic beatus erit in facto suo”. Et Apostolus ad Galatas ait: “Neque Titus, qui mecum erat, cum esset gentilis, compulsus est circumcidi; sed propter introductos falsos fratres, qui introierunt exploraturi libertatem nostram quam habemus in Christo Iesu, ut nos in servitutem redigerent, quibus nec ad horam cessimus subieccioni ut veritas evangelica permaneat apud vos”. Ex quibus verbis datur intelligi quod lex evangelica est lex libertatis per quam Christiani a servitute sunt erepti, ultra in servitutem minime reducendi. Quod eciam Apostolus c. 5o videtur asserere dicens: “Utinam et abscindantur qui vos conturbant. Vos enim in libertatem vocati estis, fratres, tantum ne libertatem in occasionem detis carnis, sed per caritatem succurrite invicem”.

The major [premise] seems provable by very clear texts of divine Scripture, for blessed James in his letter (1:25) calls it the law of perfect freedom when he says, "Whoever looks into the law of perfect freedom and perseveres in it, being not a hearer who forgets but a doer who acts, will be blessed in his doing." And the Apostle says in Galatians (2:3-5), "Nor was Titus, who was with me, being a gentile, forced to be circumcised. But because of false brothers who were brought in and came to spy on the freedom we have in Christ Jesus in order to bring us back into servitude -- we did not submit to them for a moment, so that the gospel truth would remain with you." By these words we are given to understand that the law of the gospel is a law of freedom by which Christians have been snatched from servitude, not to be led further into slavery. The Apostle also seems to assert this in [Galatians] 5[:12-13], when he says, "I wish that those who unsettle you were cut off. For you, brothers, were called into freedom; only do not use your freedom as an opportunity for the flesh, but in love help one another."

Item, beatus Petrus, ut habetur Actuum 15o, ait: “Quid temptatis deum imponere iugum super cervices discipulorum quod neque patres nostri neque nos portare potuimus?” Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod Christianis non est tam grave iugum servitutis impositum sicut positum fuit super Iudeos. Unde et beatus Iacobus,  ibidem post verba Petri, dixit, “Ego iudico non inquietari eos qui ex gentibus convertuntur ad deum, sed scribere ad eos ut abstineant se a contaminacionibus simulacrorum et fornicacione et suffocato et sanguine”; et hec sentencia Iacobi ab apostolis et senioribus, immo a Spiritu sancto, extitit approbata. Unde et ibidem subiungitur: “Tunc placuit apostolis et senioribus cum omni ecclesia eligere viros ex eis et mittere Antiochiam cum Paulo et Barnaba, Iudam qui cognominabatur Barsabas, et [Silam], viros primos in fratribus, scribentes per manus eorum” epistolam continentem hec: “Apostoli et seniores fratres”; et post, “Visum est Spiritui sancto et nobis nichil ultra imponere vobis oneris quam hec necessaria: ut abstineatis vos ab immolatis simulacrorum et sanguine et suffocato et fornicacione, a quibus custodientes vos bene agetis”. Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod Christiani per legem evangelicam sunt a servitute multiplici liberati, et quod lex evangelica est lex minoris servitutis quam fuerit lex vetus. Quod Augustinus ad inquisiciones Ianuarii, ut habetur dist. 12a, c. Omnia, videtur innuere manifeste, dicens de quibusdam qui Christianam religionem servitute nimia oppresserunt: “Quamvis enim neque hoc inveniri possit quomodo contra fidem sint, ipsam tamen religionem, quam paucissimis et manifestissimis celebracionum sacramentis misericordia dei voluit esse liberam, servilibus oneribus premunt, adeo ut tollerabilior sit condicio Iudeorum, qui, eciam si tempus liberacionis non agnoverint, legalibus tamen sacramentis, non humanis presumpcionibus, subiciuntur”.

Again, as we read in Acts 15[:10], blessed Peter says, "Why are you putting God to the test by placing on the neck of the disciples a yoke which neither our fathers nor we have been able to bear?" From these words we gather that not so heavy a yoke of servitude has been put on Christians as was put on the Jews. Thus also blessed James said, just after the words of Peter in the same place (Acts 15:19-20), "I judge that we should not trouble those gentiles turning to God, but should write to them to abstain from the pollutions of idols, from fornication, from what has been strangled and from blood." And this opinion of James was approved by the apostles and the elders, indeed by the Holy Spirit. Whence there follows, in the same place [Acts 15:22-3], "Then the apostles and elders, together with the whole church, decided to choose men from among themselves to send to Antioch with Paul and Barnabas. They sent Judas, surnamed Bersabas, and Silas, leaders among the brethren, who carried a letter that began "The brothers, both the apostles and the elders", and continued further down: "It has seemed [good] to the holy spirit and to us to impose no further burden on you than these essentials, that you abstain from things sacrificed to idols, from blood, from what has been strangled and from fornication. If you keep yourself from these you will do well" [Acts 15:28- 29]. We gather from these words that Christians have by gospel law been freed from manifold servitude and that gospel law is a law of less servitude than was the old law. Augustine seems clearly to imply this when, as we read in di. 12, c. Omnia, he says in response to the questions of Januarius about people who had oppressed the Christian religion with excessive servitude: "Now although it can not be found that they are against the faith, yet they oppress that religion, which God's mercy willed to be free and to have the fewest and most easily celebrated sacraments, with servile burdens, so much that the condition of the Jews is more bearable: for even if they have not recognised the time of liberation, yet it is the sacraments of the Law to which they are subject, not human presumptions"  [Col. 30].

Item, Apostolus ad Galatas 4o: “Non sumus ancille filii sed libere, qua libertate Christus nos liberavit. State et nolite iterum iugo servitutis contineri”. Et Apostolus 2a ad Corinthios 3o: “Ubi autem spiritus Domini, ibi libertas”. Ex quibus omnibus colligitur quod maioris libertatis est lex nova quam vetus.

Again, the Apostle [writes] to the Galatians, "We are children not of the slave but of the free woman. By this freedom Christ has set us free. Stand firm and do not be curbed again by the yoke of servitude" [4:31-5:1]. And the Apostle [writes] in 2 Corinthians 3[:17], "Where the spirit of the Lord is, there is freedom." We gather from all these that the new law is of greater freedom than the old law.

Minor autem predicte allegacionis — quod scilicet lex nova sive evangelica esset intollerabilis servitutis, et maioris quam fuerit lex vetus, si papa haberet ex institucione Christi talem plenitudinem potestatis tam in spiritualibus quam in temporalibus — videtur probacione nullatenus indigere. Si enim hoc esset, omnes Christiani essent servi, et nullus esset libere condicionis. Omnes enim essent servi summi pontificis, ut summus pontifex tantam potestatem in temporalibus haberet super imperatorem et reges et principes et laicos universos ac omnes omnino Christianos, et quantum ad personas et quantum ad res ipsorum, quantam umquam aliquis dominus temporalis habuit, vel habere potuit, super quemcumque servum, ita quod papa libere posset privare reges et principes ac omnes alios Christianos regnis et omnibus rebus suis et retinere sibi vel alteri ferre, possetque reges et principes quibuscumque aliis subdere et constituere eos servos ipsorum. Hec enim et similia non sunt contra legem divinam nec contra legem nature, quia si essent contra legem divinam vel contra legem nature ipsismet regibus et aliis Christianis essent illicita; et per consequens nulli liceret res suas alteri dare vel se alterius subicere potestati. Et ita constat quod lex Christiana esset maioris servitutis, quoad temporalia, quam lex vetus, si papa in temporalibus haberet huiusmodi plenitudinem potestatis, quia illi qui erant sub lege Mosaica nulli mortali erant in temporalibus tali modo subiecti, quia tale dominium nec rex nec summus pontifex habebat; unde et Naboth Iezrahelite laudabiliter denegavit dare et vendere vineam suam regi cupienti emere ipsam.

The minor [premise] of the above argument -- namely that the new or gospel law would be of more unbearable and greater servitude than the old law was, if the pope by Christ's institution had such fullness of power in both spiritual and temporal matters -- seems to need no proof. For if this were so, all Christians would be slaves and no one's condition would be free. For all would be slaves of the highest pontiff, with the result that the highest pontiff would have as great a power in temporal matters over the emperor, kings, princes, all the laity and over absolutely every Christian, both as to their persons and as to their possessions, as any temporal lord ever had or could have over any slave, so that the pope could freely deprive kings, princes and all other Christians of their kingdoms and all their possessions and could keep them himself or confer them on another, and he could subject kings and princes to anyone else at all and make them slaves of those people. For these and similar things are against neither divine law nor the law of nature, because if they were against divine law or the law of nature, they would not be permitted to kings themselves or other Christians and, as a result, no one would be permitted to give his goods to another or submit himself to the power of another. And so it is certain that with respect to temporal matters Christian law would be of greater servitude than the old law, if the pope were to have in temporal matters fullness of power of this kind. For those who were under the Mosaic law were not in such a way subject to any mortal in temporal matters, because neither the king nor the chief priest had such lordship; and thus Naboth praiseworthily refused to give and sell his vineyard to the king who wanted to buy it. [See 3 Kings 21.]

Esset eciam lex evangelica maioris servitutis, quoad spiritualia sive quoad illa que pertinent vel pertinere possunt ad exteriorem cultum divinum, quam fuerit lex Mosaica. Quia papa haberet talem plenitudinem potestatis in spiritualibus; ergo posset papa de plenitudine potestatis plures et graviores huiusmodi observancias corporales imponere regibus et principibus ac omnibus Christianis quam fuerint in lege veteri ordinate, nec cuicumque Christiano liceret in huiusmodi non obedire, si papa haberet talem plenitudinem potestatis.

Also with respect to spiritual matters, or with respect to those things that pertain or can pertain to outward divine worship, the gospel law would be of greater servitude than was the law of Moses. For the pope would have this kind of fullness of power in spiritual matters; out of this fullness of power the pope could therfore impose on kings, princes and all Christians more and heavier corporal observances of this kind than were ordained in the old law, and no Christian would be permitted not to obey him in matters of this kind, if the pope had such fullness of power.

Ex istis concluditur quod predicta opinio de plenitudine potestatis summi pontificis non solum falsa sed eciam hereticalis est habenda, cum sit manifeste contra scripturam sacram asserentem quod lex Christiana est lex libertatis, et per consequens Christiani non fiunt servi cuiuscumque mortalis per legem Christianam sed liberi sunt quantum est de racione evangelice legis. Est eciam, ut dicunt, perniciosa et periculosa, quia, si papa uteretur tali potestate privando reges et alios Christianos regnis et rebus suis pro sue voluntatis arbitrio et eos subiciendo servituti vel operibus servilibus, orirentur scismata et dissensiones, bella ac guerre inter Christianos, eciam periculum et dispendium tocius Christianitatis.

From these [points] it follows that the above opinion about the highest pontiff's fullness of power should be regarded not only as false but also as heretical, since it is clearly against sacred Scripture, which asserts that the Christian law is a law of freedom, and consequently Christians are not made the slaves of any mortal by Christian law but are free, as far as the nature of gospel law is concerned. It is also, they say, pernicious and dangerous, because if the pope made use of such power by depriving kings and other Christians of their kingdoms and possessions, just on the authority of his own will, and subjecting them to servitude or servile works, then schisms, dissensions, wars and battles would arise among Christians, and peril and cost to the whole of Christianity.

Capitulum 6

Chapter 6

Discipulus: Quia, ut puto, istud est principalius vel de principalioribus fundamentis et motivis quare quidam dicunt quod papa non habet talem plenitudinem potestatis, ideo contra ipsum volo obicere, ut responsionibus quas recitabis ad obiecciones contra ipsum quale sit magis appareat.

Student: Because that [argument] is, I think, the chief basis or reason, or one of the main ones, why some people say that the pope does not have such fullness of power, I want to object against it, so that from the replies you will report to the objections against it, its character will become more clear.

In what sense is the Christian law a law of freedom?

Videtur itaque quod lex Christiana non dicatur in scripturis sacris lex libertatis quia per eam Christiani fiant liberi ne sint subiecti in omnibus summo pontifici, quod innuit precedens motivum, sed dicitur lex libertatis quia per eam Christiani efficiuntur liberi a servitute peccati vel legis Mosaice. Unde et plures auctoritates adducte expresse loquuntur de libertate a servitute legis Mosaice, sicut illa ad Galatas 2o et 5o et illa Actuum 15o et illa ad Galatas 4o. Alie autem auctoritates intelligi possunt de libertate a servitute peccati. Igitur per ipsas probari non potest quod Christiani per legem Christianam efficiuntur liberi a servitute qua tenentur summo pontifici, ne scilicet in omnibus temporalibus et spiritualibus sint sibi subiecti que non sunt contra legem dei nec contra legem nature.

[1] Thus it seems that Christian law is not called a law of freedom in the sacred Scriptures because by it Christians become free in the sense that they are not subject to the highest pontiff in all things, as the preceding reasoning implies, but it is called a law of freedom because through it Christians are made free from the servitude of sin or of the Mosaic law. And thus many of the texts you brought forward speak explicitly about freedom from the servitude of the Mosaic law, for example those from Galatians 2 and 5, from Acts 15 and from Galatians 4. And other texts can be understood as referring to freedom from the servitude of sin. Through these it can not be proved, therefore, that by Christian law Christians are made free from the servitude by which they are bound to the highest pontiff, that is, so as not to be subject to him in all temporal and spiritual matters not against God's law or the law of nature.

Unde et quod auctoritates scripture divine non debeant intelligi de libertate et subieccione qua subduntur Christiani summo pontifici racione probatur. Nam, si lex Christiana esset taliter lex libertatis, nulli liceret se subdere summo pontifici vel alii cuicumque mortali [in hiis] que non sunt contra legem dei nec contra legem nature, quia nulli licet agere contra legem Christianam; 

[2] Thus it is also proved by argument that the texts of divine Scripture should not be understood as referring to the freedom and subjection by which Christians are subject to the highest pontiff. For if Christian law were the law of freedom in this sense, no one would be permitted to subject himself to the highest pontiff (or to any other mortal at all) [in things] that are not against God's law or the law of nature, because no one is permitted to act against Christian law.

et ita, si, ut quidam dicunt, fratres minores per regulam suam tenentur in omnibus obedire summo pontifici, eorum regula esset hereticalis, quia esset contra legem Christianam, que est lex libertatis liberans Christianos ne homini sint subiecti.

[3] And thus if, as some people say, the Friars Minor are bound by their rule to obey the highest pontiff in everything, their rule would be heretical, because it would be against Christian law, which is a law of freedom liberating Christians so that they are not subject to any man.

Amplius, secundum beatum Iacobum, ut allegatum est, lex Christiana est lex perfecte libertatis; perfecta autem libertas omni servituti repugnat; ergo, si lex Christiana est lex libertatis liberans Christianos ne homini sint subiecti, sequitur quod nullus debet esse servus hominis cuiuscumque, et ita reges et principes et alii laici et eciam ecclesia nullos servos haberent, quod legibus civilibus et sacris canonibus obviat manifeste.

[4] Further, according to blessed James, as quoted above, Christian law is a law of perfect freedom. Perfect freedom, however, is opposed to all servitude. If Christian law is a law of freedom, liberating Christians so that they are not subject to any man, it follows therefore that no one should be the slave of any man at all. And so kings, princes and other laymen, and also the church, would have no slaves. This clearly conflicts with the civil laws and the sacred canons.

Propter ista videtur quod motivum prescriptum non probat quod papa non habeat plenitudinem potestatis tam in spiritualibus quam in temporalibus. Tu autem narra quomodo respondetur ad ista.

For these reasons it seems that the above argument does not prove that the pope does not have fullness of power in both spiritual and temporal matters. But would you explain how a reply is made to them?

Capitulum 7

Chapter 7

Magister: Ad primum istorum dicitur, quod quamvis alique auctoritates specialem faciant mencionem de libertate a servitute Mosaice legis, tamen omnes intelligi debent de libertate ab omni servitute tanta quanta fuit servitus Mosaice legis, et hoc, saltem quoad aliqua, negative, ut scilicet nullus per evangelicam legem obligetur ad tantam servitutem quanta fuit servitus veteris legis, licet aliqui Christiani, racione delicti vel ex voluntate seu alia quacumque occasione (non per legem Christianam), tanta servitute vel maiori teneantur astricti.

Master: It is said in response to the first of these that although some texts make special mention of freedom from the servitude of Mosaic law, nonetheless they should all be understood as being about freedom from any servitude as great as was the servitude of Mosaic law. At least with respect to some matters this [is to be taken] negatively, that is, with the meaning that no one is obliged by the gospel law to as great a servitude as was the servitude of the old law, although some Christians, by reason of a fault, or of their own will, or for any other reason -- not by gospel law -- may be held bound by a servitude as great or even greater.

Si enim Christiani quacumque servitute, quoad opera exteriora, tanta vel maiori quanta fuit servitus veteris legis per legem evangelicam tenerentur, non posset lex evangelica magis dici lex libertatis quam lex Mosaica, quantumcumque liberati essent a servitute Mosaice legis. Qui enim liberatur ab una servitute et premitur alia equali vel maiori non est magis liber quam prius extiterat, sicut qui liberatur ab uno vinculo corporali et alio equali vel forciori constringitur non est solutus, sed magis ligatus. Cum vero lex evangelica, secundum veritatem scripture divine, sit magis lex libertatis quam vetus lex, per legem evangelicam Christiani neque servituti legis Mosaice neque cuicumque alii servituti exteriori maiori vel tante quanta fuit servitus veteris legis subduntur. Quare eciam auctoritates ille que occasione servitutis veteris legis de libertate Christianorum loquuntur, de libertate ab omni servitute tanta quanta fuit servitus veteris legis debent intelligi. Quare, cum servitus qua aliquis alteri obligatur in omnibus obedire que non sunt contra legem divinam nec contra legem nature sit maior quam fuerit servitus veteris legis, eciam de libertate ab illa servitute auctoritates prescripte debent intelligi. Et ita, ut dicunt isti, per ipsas probatur aperte quod memorata opinio de plenitudine potestatis summi pontificis est hereticalis, tamquam contraria scripture divine.

For if through gospel law Christians were bound, with respect to exterior works, by any servitude as great as or greater than the servitude of the old law, gospel law could not be said to be more a law of freedom than the Mosaic law, however much Christians had been liberated from the servitude of the Mosaic law. For someone liberated from one servitude and oppressed with another as great or greater is not freer than he had been before, just as someone freed from one bodily bond and bound with another equal or stronger has not been freed but more bound. Now since, according to the truth of divine Scripture, gospel law is more a law of freedom than the old law was, Christians are subjected through gospel law neither to the servitude of Mosaic law nor to any other exterior servitude greater than or as great as the servitude of the old law was. Therefore those texts also which speak about the freedom of Christians in the context of the servitude of the old law should be understood to mean freedom from any servitude as great as the servitude of the old law was. Since the servitude by which someone is obliged to obey another in everything not contrary to divine law or the law of nature is greater than the servitude of the old law was, the texts quoted above should be understood, therefore, to mean freedom also from that servitude. And so, they say, it is clearly proved by those [texts] that the aforesaid opinion about the highest pontiff's fullness of power is heretical, as being contrary to divine Scripture.

Discipulus: Antequam procedas, contra ista obicio, quia non videtur quod, quamvis papa haberet huiusmodi plenitudinem potestatis, Christiani essent pressi maiori servitute vel tanta quanta fuit servitus veteris legis. Nam talem potestatem habent aliqui prelati religiosi super fratres suos, vel possunt habere, quia possunt aliqui religiosi promittere in omnibus obedienciam prelatis suis; et tamen illi religiosi non premerentur tanta servitute quanta fuit servitus veteris legis, quia nec tales religiosi essent servi: non enim religiosi sunt servi prelatorum suorum, nec prelati sunt domini fratrum suorum.

Student: Before you go on, I raise an objection against that. For it does not seem that even if the pope had such fullness of power Christians would be oppressed by servitude greater than or as great as the servitude of the old law was. For some religious superiors have, or can have, such power over their brethren, because some religious can promise obedience to their superiors in everything, and yet those religious would not be oppressed by servitude as great as the servitude of the old law was because such religious would not be slaves -- for religious are not slaves of their superiors, nor are the superiors lords of their brethren.

Magister: Huic respondetur quod, quamvis papa possit habere talem potestatem supra illum qui voluerit fieri servus pape et se in omnibus subdere potestati ipsius, tamen nec papa nec aliquis prelatus religiosus habet talem potestatem super quoscumque religiosos, qui scilicet vovent vel voverunt obedienciam, paupertatem et castitatem, quia religiosi tales quicumque regulam quam vovent servare tenentur. Propter quod nec papa nec alius habet talem plenitudinem potestatis super ipsos, nec ipsi sunt servi pape vel prelati alterius secundum quod nomen servorum in scienciis legalibus frequenter accipitur, quia nec papa nec alius potest eos occupare in operibus servilibus, dimissis illis que spectant ad substanciam regule sue, nec potest eis precipere ut habeant proprium vel contrahant matrimonium, que tamen sunt de se licita, licet facta sint illicita religiosis per votum sponte ab eis emissum.

Master: The answer to this is that although the pope can have such power over someone who wishes to become his slave and subject himself to the pope's power in everything, yet neither the pope nor any religious superior has such power over any religious at all -- that is, over those who vow or have vowed obedience, poverty and chastity. For any such religious are bound to observe the rule that they vow. For this reason, neither the pope nor anyone else has such fullness of power over them, and they are not the slaves of the pope or of any other superior, as the word "slave" is often taken in the legal sciences, because neither the pope nor any other can employ them in servile tasks, abandoning the things that belong to the substance of their rule, or order them to own property or contract marriage; yet these things are licit in themselves, although they have become illicit for religious because of the vow they have voluntarily taken.

Discipulus: De potestate pape super religiosos postea disseremus; ideo de hac materia amplius ad presens non loquaris. Sed narra an secundum istos non solum per hoc, quod auctoritates introducte affirmant legem Christianam esse legem libertatis, sed eciam per alia verba in auctoritatibus eisdem accepta possit probari quod Christiani per legem evangelicam tanta servitute minime constringuntur quanta fuit servitus veteris legis.

Student: We will examine the power of the pope over religious later, so do not speak any more about that at the moment. But say whether, according to them, it can be proved not only through the fact that the texts brought forward affirm that Christian law is a law of freedom but also through other words found in those texts that by gospel law Christians are not bound to as great a servitude as the servitude of the old law was.

Magister: Dicunt quod per omnes auctoritates predictas posset hoc probari, non tamen eque patenter per omnes.

Master: They say that this could be proved through all the aforesaid texts, though not equally clearly through them all.

Discipulus: Dic per quas dicunt isti hoc patencius posse probari.

Student: Tell me through which ones, according to them, this can be proved more clearly.

Magister: Dicunt quod per auctoritatem acceptam de Actuum 15o c. patenter hoc probatur. Nam apostoli inspiracione Spiritus sancti nunciaverunt gentibus libertatem a iugo servitutis ad consolacionem ipsarum et ne dolerent se per servitutem onerosam inquietari. Unde Iacobus, ut allegatum est, dixit: “Ego iudico non inquietari eos qui ex gentibus convertuntur ad deum”; et de ipsis gentibus conversis ad deum, recepta epistola apostolorum [et] seniorum super predicta libertate, sic scribitur eodem capitulo: “Quam cum legissent, gavisi sunt super consolacione”. Sed si conversi ex gentibus liberati fuissent a servitute legis dei et maiori servituti Petri et successorum eius fuissent subiecti, et de inquietacione maiori non immerito doluissent et materiam consolacionis minime habuissent. Ab omni igitur servitute maiori et tanta quanta fuit servitus legis Mosaice liberati fuerunt. Quod in verbis apostolorum insinuatur, cum dicitur: “Visum est Spiritui sancto et nobis nichil ultra imponere vobis oneris quam hec necessaria, ut abstineatis”, et cetera. Si enim nichil ultra oneris voluerunt eis imponere, noluerunt eis imponere servitutem neque maiorem neque tantam quanta fuit servitus veteris legis.

Master: They say that this is clearly proved by means of the text taken from Acts 15. For at the inspiration of the holy spirit the apostles announced to the gentiles freedom from the yoke of servitude, as a consolation for them and so that they would not lament that they were troubled with burdensome servitude. Thus, in a passage quoted, James said [Acts 15:19], "I judge that we should not trouble those gentiles turning to God"; and about those gentiles who had turned to God, when they received the letter from the apostles and elders about the freedom we have been talking about, it is written in the same chapter [Acts 15:31]: "When they had read it they rejoiced at its consolation". But if these gentile converts had been freed from the servitude of God's law and subjected to a greater servitude to Peter and his successors, they would have both lamented justifiably their greater trouble and not had material of consolation. They were freed, therefore, from any servitude greater than or as great as the servitude of the Mosaic law. This is implied in the words of the apostles, when they say [Acts 15:28-9], "It has seemed good to the holy spirit and to us to impose on you no further burden than these essentials: that you abstain", etc. For if they wanted to impose "no further burden" on them they did not want to impose on them either a servitude greater than or a servitude as great as the servitude of the old law.

Discipulus: Videtur quod ista verba “nichil ultra imponere vobis oneris” non debeant tam generaliter intelligi. Nam licet apostoli non imposuerint Christianis onera veteris legis, imposuerunt eis tamen multa preter illa que nominantur in verbis premissis. Multos enim canones condiderunt in quibus preceperunt multa preter illa que enumerantur in verbis predictis, sicut patet in decretis, dist. 16a, c. Propter, et 12a, q. 1a, c. Dilectissimis et c. Sint manifeste et c. Ex hiis. Verba igitur premissa Actuum 15o solummodo debent intelligi de onere legis Mosaice.

Student: It seems that those words, "to impose on you no further burden", should not be understood so generally. For although the apostles did not impose the burdens of the old law on Christians, they did nonetheless impose on them many things besides those named in the above words. For they made many canons in which they commanded many things besides those enumerated in the words above, as is clear in the Decreta di. 16, c. Propter [There is no c. Propter. Perhaps c. 4, para. 1, Propter, col. 42] and 12, q. 1, c. Dilectissimis [Col. 676], c. Sint manifeste [Col. 684] and c. Ex hiis [Col. 684]. The words from Acts 15 quoted above, therefore, should be understood only to refer to the burden of the Mosaic law.

Magister: Ad hoc respondetur quod, licet apostoli plures canones condiderint et preceperint multa preter illa que enumerantur Actuum 15o, nichil tamen preceperunt subditis minime requisitis et non consencientibus, nisi que erant de lege divina et iure naturali et que necessitas vel utilitas publica postulabat et quorum precepcio absque dispendio non poterat pretermitti, in quibus et qualibus nunc summus pontifex obtinet potestatem.

Master: The reply to this is that although the apostles made many canons and commanded many things besides those enumerated in Acts 15, yet they did not command anything to subjects who had not been asked and were not consenting, except things that were of divine law and natural law and things that necessity or public utility demanded, the commanding of which could not be neglected without damage. It is in things of this kind that the highest pontiff has power now.

Discipulus: Istud ultimum dictum, ut puto, non potest ad intencionem dicencium verbis brevibus explicari. Ideo, ipso dimisso ad presens, quia de ipso post tractabimus, dic an per aliquam aliam auctoritatem prius adductam dicant isti patenter posse probari quod scriptura loquens de libertate legis evangelice debeat intelligi eciam de libertate ab alia servitute quam a servitute legis Mosaice.

Disciple That last statement, I think, can not be explained briefly in the meaning of those who make it, so, because we will consider it later, let us put it aside for the moment. Tell me whether they say that it is clearly provable through any other text already brought forward that when Scripture speaks about the freedom of gospel law it should be understood to be referring also to freedom from some other servitude besides the servitude of Mosaic law.

Magister: Hoc dicunt posse ostendi auctoritate Apostoli, cum dicit 2a ad Corinthios 3o: “Ubi spiritus Domini, ibi libertas”. Ibi enim Apostolus non loquitur specialiter de libertate a servitute veteris legis, sed magis generaliter. Igitur intelligit Apostolus quod ubi spiritus Domini, ibi non solum est libertas a servitute veteris legis, sed eciam ibi libertas est ab omni servitute, quoad opera exteriora, que est tanta quanta fuit servitus veteris legis.

Master: They say that this can be shown from the text of the Apostle when he says in 2 Corinthians 3[:17], "Where the spirit of the Lord is, there is freedom." For in that place the Apostle is not speaking about freedom from the servitude of the Old Law in particular, but [is speaking] more generally. The Apostle means, therefore, that where the spirit of the Lord is, not only is there freedom from the servitude of the Old Law but also there is freedom from any servitude with respect to exterior works that is as great as the servitude of the old law.

Quod auctoritatibus sanctorum patrum ostenditur. Nam per illam auctoritatem Apostoli sancti patres probant quod licet clericis, invitis episcopis, monasteria monachorum intrare. Ait enim Urbanus papa, ut legitur 19a, q. 2a, c. Due: “Qui spiritu dei aguntur lege dei ducuntur; et quis est qui possit Spiritui sancto digne resistere? Quisquis igitur hoc spiritu ducitur, eciam episcopo suo contradicente, eat liber nostra auctoritate. Iusto enim lex non est posita, sed ‘ubi spiritus dei est, ibi libertas’, et si spiritu dei ducimini, non estis sub lege”. Et Innocencius 3us, Extra, De regularibus, c. Licet, ait: “Licet quibusdam monachis;” et infra: “Quia tamen ‘ubi spiritus dei est, ibi libertas’, et que spiritu dei aguntur non sunt sub lege, quia lex non est posita iusto, ea racione hoc videtur illis fuisse concessum, ne quis ex temeritate vel levitate in iacturam vel iniuriam sui ordinis sub pretextu maioris religionis ad alium ordinem transvolaret”. Ex quibus colligitur quod per libertatem concessam Christianis probatur quod licet clericis ad religionem, et religiosis ad arciorem, transire, quod tamen probari non posset si per libertatem Christianorum Apostolus intelligeret tantummodo libertatem a servitute Mosaice legis. Hoc eciam per auctoritatem Augustini superius allegatam videtur expresse posse probari. Nam Augustinus in verbis illis per libertatem quam Christiana religio ex misericordia dei consecuta est illos iudicat arguendos qui eandem religionem diversis oneribus opprimebant adeo ut tollerabilior sit condicio Iudeorum quam Christianorum, qui tamen oneribus legis Mosaice Christianos minime deprimebant. Igitur intendit Augustinus ut Christiana religio non solum sit liberata ab oneribus veteris legis, sed eciam ab aliis oneribus que equaliter vel magis premant quam onera Mosaice legis.

This is shown by texts from the holy fathers. For the holy fathers prove by that text from the Apostle that clerics are permitted to become monks even if their bishops are unwilling. For, as we read in 19, q. 2, c. Due, Pope Urban says, "Those who are driven by the Spirit of God are led by the law of God, and who is there who can worthily resist the holy spirit? Let anyone, therefore, who is led by this spirit, even if his bishop opposes him, go free with our authority. For the law has not been laid down for the just. But 'where the spirit of God is, there is freedom', and if you are led by the Spirit of God you are not under the law"  [Col. 840] And Innocent III says in Extra, De regularibus, c. Licet, "It is permitted to certain monks. . . Yet because 'where the spirit of God is, there is freedom' and things driven by the spirit of God are not under the law, and because the law has not been laid down for the just, it seems to have been granted to them for this reason, and not that anyone under the pretext of greater religion should rashly or lightly flit across to another order to the detriment or injury of his own order" [Col. 575-6]. From these we gather that through the freedom granted to Christians it is proved that clerics are allowed to cross over into a religious order and religious to cross to a stricter order. Yet this could not be proved if by the "freedom of Christians" the apostle meant only freedom from the servitude of the Mosaic law. This also seems explicitly provable from the text of Augustine quoted above. For in those words Augustine judges, through the freedom which by God's mercy the Christian religion has acquired, that they should be reproved who were so oppressing that religion with various burdens "that the condition of the Jews is more tolerable" than that of Christians -- yet it was not with the burdens of Mosaic law that they were oppressing Christians. Augustine thought, therefore, that the Christian religion has not only been liberated from the burdens of the old law but also from other burdens that would oppress as much as or more than the burdens of Mosaic law.

Discipulus: Dic quomodo respondetur ad raciones quibus supra c. 6o visus fui probare quod auctoritates adducte c. 5o non debent intelligi de libertate a subieccione qua Christiani, secundum primam sentenciam, summo pontifici sunt subiecti.

Student: Tell me how reply is made to the arguments in chapter 6 above that I used to prove that the texts adduced in chapter 5 should not be understood of the freedom from that subjection by which, according to the first opinion, Christians are subject to the highest pontiff.

Magister: Ad primam ipsarum respondetur, secundum quosdam, quod auctoritates de libertate evangelice legis non debent, quoad omnes, intelligi affirmative sed, quoad multos, negative, sicut tactum est prius, quemadmodum illa verba Apostoli, spiritus sit unus uxoris et viri, et illa Salvatoris, “In ore duorum vel trium stabit omne verbum”, et multe alie, debent intelligi negative. Non enim illi qui erant servi ante conversionem ad fidem per conversionem fiebant liberi, sed per legem evangelicam nullus ducebatur ad maiorem servitutem quam erat servitus veteris legis, et ideo per evangelicam legem nullus fiat servus pape. Absque tamen transgressione eiusdem legis potest quis, si sponte voluerit, se facere servum pape, vel, si ex alia iusta et licita causa fiat servus pape, in nullo derogatur evangelice legi; quia lex evangelica, licet non inducat huiusmodi servitutem, non tamen prohibet.

Master: According to some people the reply to the first of these is that texts about the freedom of gospel law should not, with respect to all of them, be understood affirmatively but, with respect to many of them, should be understood negatively, as was mentioned before, just as the words of the apostle, "Let there be one spirit" in husband and wife [1 Corintians 6:16-17], and the words of the Saviour, "In the mouth of two or three witnesses every word will stand" [Matthew 18:16], and many other [texts] should be understood negatively. For it is not the case that those who were slaves before their conversion to the faith became free because of that conversion. But no one was led by gospel law into greater servitude than the servitude of the old law and, therefore, no one may become the slave of the pope by gospel law. However, without transgressing that law, anyone can make himself the slave of the pope if he wants to do so of his own free will; or if for some other just and licit reason he becomes the slave of the pope, there is no derogation of gospel law. For although the gospel law does not lead one into this kind of servitude, it does not, on the other hand, prohibit it.

Quod autem ibidem accipitur quod fratres minores tenentur in omnibus obedire pape, dicunt isti falsum esse, licet quidam fratres minores, ut fertur, hoc non teneant, dicentes quod liceret eis, et tenerentur, eciam accipere uxores si sola voluntate hoc papa preciperet, de quibus postea in hoc tractatu et eciam in nono tractatu huius tercie partis nostri dialogi tractabimus. Fratres enim minores non tenentur obedire pape precipienti aliquid contra substanciam regule sue, et ideo regula eorum non hereticalis sed catholica est censenda.

They say, moreover, that it is false when it is said in the same place [above] that the Friars Minor are bound to obey the pope in everything -- although certain Friars Minor, it is reported, do not maintain this view, asserting that they would be permitted, even bound, to take wives if the pope at his will alone were to command this. We will treat these matters  later in this tract and also in the ninth tract of this third part of our dialogue. For the Friars Minor are not bound to obey the pope when he orders something against the substance of their rule, and their rule should be considered, therefore, not heretical but catholic.

Ad  quartam racionem quam fecisti respondetur quod lex Christiana non dicitur lex libertatis quia liberat Christianos ab omni servitute, sed quia non premit Christianos tanta servitute quanta pressi fuere Iudei; et ideo licet regibus et aliis Christianis servos habere, licet per legem Christianam nullus Christianus fiat servus cuiuscumque. Ad beatum Iacobum dicitur quod non intendit legem Christianam esse legem perfecte libertatis ut nullus Christianus cuicumque homini sit subiectus. Christiani enim pape sunt subiecti, et multi principibus et aliis Christianis subduntur. Sed ideo eam dicit esse legem perfecte libertatis quia per eam religio Christiana paucis sacramentis et sacramentalibus seu ceremonialibus ex institucione divina subicitur, et per ipsam nullus Christianus servus cuiuscumque mortalis efficitur nec eciam, nisi in hiis que spectant ad necessitatem vel utilitatem ipsius aut reipublice, alicuius hominis subditur potestati. Quare pro se et omnibus apostolis et universis prelatis ecclesie dicit Apostolus, 2a ad Corinthios, ultimo: “Non enim possumus aliquid adversus veritatem, sed pro veritate”; et post: “Hec absens scribo ut non presens durius agam secundum potestatem quam Dominus dedit michi, in edificacionem et non in destruccionem” vestram. Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod apostoli nullam potestatem habuerunt a deo super fidelibus nisi ad utilitatem eorundem fidelium; quare lex Christiana, que nullam subieccionem nisi ad utilitatem subiecti vel communitatis cuiuscumque inducit, eciam paucis divinis est supposita sacramentis. Merito debet dici lex perfecte libertatis, presertim respectu legis Mosaice, que quampluribus sacramentis et ceremoniis vix portabilibus subiectos involvit. Non tamen dicitur lex perfectissime libertatis. In perfeccione enim sunt gradus, quia non omne perfectum est perfectissimum reputandum. Perfectissima autem libertas in hac vita mortali nequaquam habebitur.
 

The reply to the fourth argument you put is that Christian law is not called a law of freedom because it frees Christians from every servitude but because it does not oppress Christians with as great a servitude as that by which the Jews were oppressed; and kings and other Christians, therefore, are allowed to have slaves, though no Christian becomes anyone's slave through Christian law. To blessed James it is said that he does not mean that Christian law is a law of perfect freedom in the sense that no Christian is subject to any man at all, for Christians are subject to the pope and many of them are subject to princes and other Christians. But he says that it is a law of perfect freedom because through it the Christian religion is subject by divine institution to few sacraments, sacramentals or ceremonies, and through it no Christian is made the slave of any mortal and, also, is not subjected to the power of any man, except in those matters which pertain to necessity or to his own advantage or that of the commonwealth. Hence the Apostle says, on behalf of himself and all the apostles and all the prelates of the Church: "For we can not do anything against truth but only for the truth... I write while I am away so that when I am present I will not act severely in using the power the Lord has given me for building up, not for tearing down" (2 Corinthians 13[:8, 10]). From these words we gather that the apostles did not have any power from God over the faithful except where it was to the advantage of those faithful. Hence Christian law, which introduces no subjection except where it is to the advantage of the one subjected or of any community, is also subject to few divine sacraments. Deservedly should it be called a law of perfect freedom -- especially with respect to the Mosaic law which entangles those subject to it in very many sacraments and ceremonies that can scarcely be borne -- yet it is not called the law of most perfect freedom, because in perfection there are grades, since not every perfection should be regarded as the most perfect. The most perfect freedom, however, will not be had in this mortal life.

Capitulum 8

Chapter 8

Discipulus: Adhuc ut intelligatur profundius quale sit motivum precedens, cupio audire aliquas allegaciones preter prescriptas ad probandum quod non omnes homines sunt servi summi pontificis, ex quo isti opinantes inferre nituntur quod papa non habet ex institucione Christi talem plenitudinem potestatis.

Student: So that I can understand the nature of the preceding argument still more fully, I want to hear some arguments besides the ones written above to prove that not all men are slaves of the highest pontiff, from which those of that opinion try to infer that the pope does not have such fullness of power by Christ's ordination.

More arguments against the first opinion
from the proposition that all are not slaves of the pope

Magister: Quod non omnes Christiani sunt servi summi pontificis secundum strictissimam significacionem huius nominis servus, quod tamen secundum istos sequeretur si papa haberet tam in temporalibus quam in spiritualibus huiusmodi plenitudinem potestatis, multis modis ostenditur. Servus enim nullam proprietatem seu dominium cuiuscumque rei temporalis, dum manet servus, potest habere, quia quicquid servus acquirit domino acquirit et ipsius domini est. Reges autem et principes ac alii quamplurimi Christiani habent dominium et proprietatem quamplurium rerum temporalium. Ergo non omnes homines sunt servi pape, secundum illam significacionem nominis servi secundum quam dominus potest vendere, dare et alienare servum suum et ab eo omnem rem temporalem propria voluntate auferre, quod tamen sequeretur, si papa haberet in temporalibus talem plenitudinem potestatis.

Master: It is shown in many ways that not all Christians are slaves of the highest pontiff in the strictest sense of the word "slave" (which nonetheless would follow according to them if the pope were to have this sort of fullness of power in both temporal and spiritual matters). For a slave can have no ownership or lordship of any temporal thing at all while he remains a slave, because whatever a slave acquires he acquires for his lord and it is that lord's. Kings, princes and very many other Christians, however, have lordship and ownership of very many temporal things. Not all men are slaves of the pope, therefore, in that sense of the word "slave" in which a lord can sell, give and transfer his slave and at will take from him every temporal thing. This would follow, however, if the pope were to have such fullness of power in temporal matters.

Discipulus: Quomodo probatur quod reges et principes ac plures alii Christiani habent dominium et proprietatem rerum temporalium?

Student: How is it proved that kings, princes and many other Christians have ownership and lordship of temporal things?

Magister: Hoc multis modis ostenditur. Nam illi habent dominium et proprietatem rerum temporalium per quorum iura temporalia possidentur. [Per iura autem imperatorum et regum temporalia possidentur] (dist. 8a, Quo iure). Ergo imperatores et reges habent dominium et proprietatem rerum temporalium.

Master: This is shown in many ways. For they have lordship and ownership of temporal things by whose temporal laws they are possessed. [But temporal things are possessed by the laws of emperors and kings] (di. 8, Quo iure [Col. 13]). Emperors and kings, therefore, have lordship and ownership of temporal things.

Amplius, illi habent proprietatem et dominium temporalium rerum quorum legibus eciam summi pontifices pro cursu temporalium rerum <legibus imperatorum et regum> utuntur. Sed summi pontifices pro cursu temporalium rerum legibus imperatorum et regum utuntur (dist. 10a, Quoniam idem, et dist. 96a, Cum ad verum). Ergo imperatores et reges habent proprietatem et dominium rerum temporalium.
.

Further, they have ownership and lordship of temporal things whose laws even highest pontiffs use for the course of temporal things. But highest pontiffs use the laws of emperors and kings for the course of temporal things (di. 10, Quoniam idem [Col. 21] and di. 96, Cum ad verum [Col. 339]). Emperors and kings, therefore, have ownership and lordship of temporal things.

Rursus, episcopi interdum preter res ecclesie habent res proprias (12a, q. 1a, c. Episcopi et c. Manifesta et c. Certe et c. Sint manifeste). Ergo alii quam papa possunt proprietatem et dominium rerum temporalium possidere.

Again, bishops sometimes have things of their own apart from things of the church (12, q. 1, c. Episcopi, c. Manifesta, c. Certe and c. Sint manifeste [Col. 684]). Therefore others besides the pope can possess ownership and lordship of temporal things.

Adhuc, reges et principes ac alii fideles laici donant res temporales ecclesiis; ergo habent proprietatem et dominium temporalium rerum.

Besides, kings, princes and other faithful laymen give temporal things to churches. Therefore they have ownership and lordship of temporal things.

Item, Iudei et infideles habent proprietatem temporalium rerum; ergo multo forcius reges et principes Christiani habent huiusmodi rerum proprietatem.

Again, Jews and infidels have ownership of temporal things. Therefore much more do Christian kings and princes have ownership of things of this kind.

Discipulus: Istud est ita divulgatum, tam in legibus civilibus et canonicis quam in communi opinione hominum, quod non curo pro ipso plures allegaciones adduci. De quo tamen possem querere an sit hereticum dicere nullum Christianum habere proprietatem temporalium rerum, quod vero ad tractatum de iuribus Romani imperii reservare propono. Ideo revertere ad probandum quod non omnes Christiani sunt servi pape.

Student: That is so widely known, both in civil and canon law and in the common opinion of men, that I do not care to have more arguments adduced for it. I could ask about it, however, whether it is heretical to say that no Christian has ownership of temporal things,  but I propose to reserve this to the tract about the rights of the Roman Empire. Revert, therefore, to proving that not all Christians are slaves of the pope.

Magister: Hoc aliter sic probatur. Servus non potest habere alium servum, sed plures laici habent servos (dist. 54a, c. 1o et 2o et c. Quicumque, et in multis aliis capitulis). Ergo non omnes homines sunt servi pape.

Master: This is proved in another way as follows. A slave can not have another slave, but many laymen have slaves (di. 54, c. 1. [Nullus] and c. 2. [Nulli] and c. [5] Quicumque  [Col. 206-7] and in many other chapters). Therefore not all men are slaves of the pope.

Amplius, multi ab ecclesia consequuntur libertatem (12a, q. 2a, Si quos de servis ecclesie et c. Episcopus et c.  Liberti  et in multis aliis capitulis); ergo non omnes homines sunt servi summi pontificis. Multi ergo homines sunt liberi. Quod Salvator testari videtur, dicens Matthei 17o: “Filii sunt liberi”; et Apostolus ad Galatas 4o ait: “Quanto tempore heres parvulus est, nichil differt a servo, cum sit dominus omnium, sed sub tutoribus et actoribus est unusquisque, usque ad prefinitum tempus a patre”. Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod cum venerit tempus prefinitum a patre differt a servo, et per consequens tunc nec pape nec alterius est servus.

Further, many obtain freedom from the church (12, q. 2, c. Si quos de servis ecclesie [Col. 705] and c. Episcopus [Col. 705] and c. Liberti [Col. 706] and in many other chapters). Therefore not all men are slaves of the highest pontiff. Therefore many men are free. The Saviour seems to attest to this when he says in Matthew 17[:25], "The children are free." The apostle also says in Galatians 4[:1-2]: "Heirs, as long as they are minors, are no better than slaves, though they are the owners of all the property; but each remains under guardians and trustees until the date set by the father." From these words we gather that he differs from a slave when the date set by the father comes and at that time, as a consequence, he is the slave neither of the pope nor of another.

Capitulum 9

Chapter 9

Discipulus: Puto me advertere quomodo isti per libertatem Christianorum probare nituntur quod papa non habet talem plenitudinem potestatis, presertim in temporalibus. Ideo pro eadem opinione adhuc aliter allegare conare.

Student: I think I perceive how they try to prove by means of the freedom of Christians that the pope does not have such fullness of power, especially in temporal matters. Therefore try to argue again for that opinion in another way.

More arguments against the first opinion

Magister: Hoc aliis modis videtur posse probari. Nam vicarius non habet maiorem potestatem, in quantum vicarius, quam ille cuius est vicarius. Ergo papa, in quantum vicarius Christi, non habet maiorem potestatem in temporalibus quam habuerit Christus in quantum homo passibilis et mortalis. Sed Christus inquantum homo passibilis et mortalis non habuit huiusmodi potestatem in temporalibus, cum non habuerit dominium omnium temporalium, nec alii fuerint servi eius, secundum strictam significacionem nominis servorum, ipso testante qui, ut habetur Iohannis 15o, dixit apostolis: “Iam non dicam vos servos, quia servus nescit quid faciat dominus eius”. Ergo papa non habet huiusmodi plenitudinem potestatis.

Master: This seems provable in other ways. For a vicar, in so far as he is a vicar, does not have greater power than him whose vicar he is. Therefore the pope, in so far as he is the vicar of Christ, does not have greater power in temporal matters than Christ had, in so far as he was a mortal man able to suffer. But Christ, in so far as he was a mortal man able to suffer, did not have power of this kind in temporal matters, since he did not have lordship of all temporal things and others were not his slaves in the strict sense of the word "slaves". He attests to this himself, as we read in John 15[:15], where he said to the apostles, "I will not now call you servants [slaves], because a servant does not know what his lord does." Therefore the pope does not have this kind of fullness of power.

Discipulus: De fundamento istius allegacionis satis poterimus invenire in tractatu quarto secunde partis istius dialogi, ad quem pertinet exquisite disserere de paupertate Christi. Ideo, hac dimissa, adduc alias.

Student: We will be able to find out enough about the basis of that argument in the fourth tract of the second part of the dialogue where it is appropriate to examine carefully the poverty of Christ. Putting it aside, therefore, bring forward some other [arguments].

Magister: Aliter probatur idem sic. Qui non debet se secularibus negociis implicare non debet habere in secularibus talem plenitudinem potestatis. Papa autem non debet se secularibus negociis implicare; ergo non habet nec habere debet talem plenitudinem potestatis in secularibus.

Master: The same point is proved in another way as follows. He who ought not involve himself in secular occupations ought not have such fullness of power in secular matters. The pope, however, ought not involve himself in secular occupations. Therefore he does not have, and ought not have, such fullness of power in secular matters.

Maior probatur, quia frustra datur alicui potestas quam exercere non debet. Unde et reges accipientes a deo potestatem iudicandi ac iusticiam et iudicium faciendi, et non facientes, sepe in sacris litteris arguuntur. Sapiencie 6o sic dicitur regibus perverse vel negligenter exercentibus officium regni: “Data est a Domino potestas vobis et virtus ab altissimo, qui interrogabit opera vestra et cogitaciones scrutabitur, quoniam cum essetis ministri regni illius, non recte iudicastis”, et cetera, ubi dicit glossa: “Nota quod quilibet debet facere ea que sue condicioni conveniunt”. Et per consequens illa potissime debet quis facere ad que facienda ex speciali ordinacione dei accepit potestatem. Qui igitur specialiter ex institucione et ordinacione Christi accepit in secularibus plenitudinem potestatis potissime eciam ultra omnes alios debet se secularibus implicare negociis, ne in commissa sibi potestate negligentem et desidem se ostendat.

The major [premise] is proved because power is given to someone in vain if he ought not exercise it. For this reason too kings who receive power from God to judge and to provide justice and make judgements who do not do these things are often censured in sacred letters. Thus Wisdom 6[:4-5] says to kings who carry out their duty as king wrongly or negligently, "Power was given you by the Lord, and strength by the Most High; he will examine your works and search out your thoughts. Because as servants of his kingdom you did not judge rightly ... etc." There the Gloss says, "Note that everyone ought to do those things which are suitable to his condition" [Gloss on 23, q. 5, Si apud, v. conditioni, col. 1345]; and, consequently, anyone ought especially to do those things for the doing of which he received power by the special ordination of God. Therefore he who specifically received fullness of power in secular matters by the decree and ordination of Christ ought most of all to involve himself in secular occupations even beyond all others, lest he show himself in the power committed to him negligent and idle.

Minor, quod papa scilicet non debet se negociis secularibus implicare, patenter videtur ostendi per Apostolum, 2a ad Timotheum 2o c. dicentem: “Nemo militans deo implicat se negociis secularibus, ut ei placeat cui se probavit”. Cum igitur papa precipue inter omnes deo debeat militare ut ei placeat, ipse minus quam alii debet se negociis secularibus implicare. Hinc ex canone apostolorum, ut legitur dist. 88a, c. Episcopus, sic habetur: “Episcopus aut sacerdos aut diaconus nequaquam seculares curas assumant; sin aliter, deiciantur”; et c. Episcopus nullam sic scribitur: “Episcopus nullam rei familiaris curam ad se revocet, sed leccioni et oracioni et verbo predicacionis tantummodo vacet”; et 21a, q. 3a, c. 2o, sic legitur: “Apostolorum statuta sunt que dicunt: ‘Nemo militans deo implicat se negociis secularibus’; proinde aut clerici sint sine accionibus domorum aut actores sine officio clericorum”. Ex quibus aliisque quampluribus canonibus sacris (qui habentur 16a, q. 1a, Sunt nonnulli, et dist. 88a per totum, et 21a, q. 3a, c. Placuit et c. Ciprianus et c. Molliciis et c. Hii qui et c. Sacerdotum, et Extra, Ne clerici vel monachi secularibus negociis se immisceant per totum, et aliis locis quam multis) colligitur quod clerici [et] episcopi non debent se secularibus negociis implicare, et, per consequens, papa precipue debet a talibus abstinere, tum quia inter episcopos et clericos est precipuus atque primus et maxime debet in spiritualibus occupari, tum quia precipue tenet locum apostolorum et specialiter principis apostolorum, qui hoc docuerunt et fecerunt et quos debet potissime imitari.

The minor [premise], that is that the pope ought not involve himself in secular occupations, seems to be clearly shown by the Apostle, who says in 2 Timothy 2[:4], "No one serving as a soldier of God involves himself in secular occupations, so that he may please him with whom he has enlisted." Therefore since the pope especially, among all men, ought to serve as a soldier of God so that he may please him, he ought to involve himself in secular occupations less than others. Hence, as we read in di. 88, c. Episcopus, we find this taken from a canon of the apostles: "Let not a bishop, priest or deacon, take on secular cares; if they do otherwise, let them be deposed"  [Col. 307]. And it is written as follows in c. Episcopus nullam: "Let not a bishop call back on himself any household care, but let him devote himself only to reading, prayer, and the preaching of the word"  [Col. 307]. And in 21, q. 5, c. 1 we read as follows: "There are statutes of the apostles that say 'No one serving as a soldier of God involves himself in secular occupations'; therefore, let clerics not sue for possession of houses or those who sue not hold clerical office"  [Rather, 21, q. 3, c. 2, col. 856]. From these and very many other sacred canons (found in 16, q. 1, Sunt nonulli  [Col. 767] and the whole of di. 88 [Col. 306-310], and 21, q. 3, c. Placuit and c. Cyprianus and c. Mollitiis and c. Hii qui and c. Sacerdotum  [Col. 856-7] and the whole of Extra, Ne clerici vel monachi secularibus se negotiis immisceant [Col. 657-60], and in very many other places) we gather that clerics and bishops ought not involve themselves in secular occupations. Consequently the pope particularly ought to abstain from such things, both because he is foremost and first among bishops and clerics and ought especially to be occupied with spiritual matters, and because he particularly occupies the place of the apostles, and especially of the leader of the apostles, who taught and did this and whom he principally ought to imitate.

Discipulus: Non oportet summum pontificem se in omnibus vite apostolice conformare, quia apostoli abdicaverunt proprietatem temporalium rerum (Extra, De verborum significacione, li. 6o, c. Exiit), et tamen papa potest habere proprium. Ergo similiter papa potest se implicare multis secularibus negociis quibus se minime implicaverunt apostoli.

Student: It is not necessary for the highest pontiff to conform himself in everything to the apostolic life, because the apostles renounced ownership of temporal goods (Extra, De verborum significatione, Exiit, li. 6 [Col. 1112- 3]) and yet the pope can have property. Similarly, therefore, the pope can involve himself in many secular occupations in which the apostles did not involve themselves.

Magister: Ad hoc respondent isti quod, licet papa non teneatur se in omnibus vite apostolorum conformare, tamen nichil est sibi specialiter iniunctum a Christo quod apostolice vite repugnet; et ideo, cum implicari secularibus negociis repugnet vite apostolice, inferunt isti quod hoc non est specialiter iniunctum pape a Christo. Quare nec sibi data specialiter est a Christo plenitudo potestatis in secularibus, cum teneatur exequi potestatem quam specialiter habet ex ordinacione et institucione Christi.

Master: To this they reply that although the pope is not bound to conform himself in everything to the apostolic life, yet nothing that would be opposed to the apostolic life has been especially enjoined on him by Christ; and since, therefore, involvement in secular occupations is opposed to the apostolic life, they infer that this has not been especially enjoined on the pope by Christ. And therefore fullness of power in secular matters has not been especially given to him by Christ, since he would be bound to exercise power that he has especially by the ordination and institution of Christ.

Discipulus: Aliter nitere allegare pro opinione prescripta.

Student: Would you try to give another argument for that opinion?

Magister: Quod papa non habeat talem in spiritualibus et temporalibus plenitudinem potestatis ostenditur. Nam qui est minor et minister et servus aliorum, in quos non debet exercere potestatem, non habet super eos tam in spiritualibus quam in temporalibus plenitudinem potestatis. Nam qui habet super alios talem plenitudinem potestatis est dominus eorundem; nullus enim dominus maiorem potestatem quam plenitudinem potestatis potest habere super quoscumque. Nullus autem respectu eiusdem est servus et dominus. Qui eciam habet plenitudinem potestatis super alios precipue potest et debet exercere potestatem in eos. Papa autem est minor et minister et servus Christianorum, in quos non debet exercere potestatem, teste Christo qui, ut legitur Matthei 20o, dixit apostolis: “Scitis quia principes gencium dominantur eorum, et qui maiores sunt potestatem exercent in eos. Non ita erit inter vos; sed quicumque voluerit inter vos maior fieri, sit vester minister; et qui voluerit inter vos primus esse, erit vester servus”. Et Matthei 23o dixit Christus: “Qui maior est vestrum erit vester minister”. Et Marci 9o dixit: “Si quis voluerit primus esse, erit omnium novissimus et omnium minister”, et 10o c.: “Scitis quia hii qui videntur principari gentibus dominantur eis, et principes eorum potestatem habent ipsorum. Non ita est autem in vobis; sed quicumque voluerit fieri maior, erit vester minister; et quicumque voluerit primus esse, erit omnium servus”. Et, ut habetur Luce 22o, Christus dixit apostolis: “Reges gencium dominantur eorum, et qui potestatem habent super eos benefici vocantur. Vos autem non sic; sed qui maior est in vobis, fiat sicut minor, et qui precessor est, sicut ministrator”. Ex quibus patet quod primus spiritualiter inter Christianos, scilicet papa, est minor et minister et servus aliorum, in quos potestatem exercere non debet. Igitur non habet talem plenitudinem potestatis.

Master: That the pope does not have such fullness of power in spiritual and temporal matters is shown. For he who is less than and the servant and slave of others, over whom he ought not exercise power, does not have over them fullness of power in both spiritual and temporal matters. For he who has such fullness of power over others is their lord, since no lord can have more power than fullness of power over everyone. And no one is slave and lord with respect to the same person. Also, he who has fullness of power over others especially can and ought to exercise power over them. The pope, however, is less than and the servant and slave of Christians, over whom he ought not exercise power, as Christ attested when he said to the apostles in Matthew 20[:25-7]: "You know that the rulers of the Gentiles lord it over them and their great ones exercise power over them. It will not be so among you; but whoever wishes to become greater among you must be your servant, and whoever wishes to be first among you will be your slave." And in Matthew 23[:11] Christ said: "The greater among you will be your servant." And in Mark 9[:34] he said, "Whoever wants to be first will be last of all and servant of all." And in Mark 10[:42-4]: "You know that those who seem to rule the Gentiles lord it over them and their princes have power over them. But it is not so among you; but whoever wishes to become greater will be your servant, and whoever wishes to be first will be the slave of all." And we read in Luke 22[:25-6] that Christ said to the apostles, "The kings of the Gentiles lord it over them and those who have power over them are called benefactors. But not so with you; the greater among you should become like the lesser and the leader like one who serves." From these it is clear that he who is spiritually first among Christians, that is the pope, is less than and the servant and slave of others, over whom he ought not exercise power. Therefore he does not have such fullness of power.

Discipulus: Ista allegacio in simili tractata est aliquantulum diffuse libro 6o prime partis istius dialogi, c. 3o. Ideo, ipsa omissa, alias cures adducere.

Student: An argument like that one has been considered a little more fully in chapter 3 of book 6 of the first part of this dialogue. Leaving it aside, therefore, would you endeavour to bring forward some others?

Magister: Quod papa non habet talem plenitudinem potestatis sic probatur. Nam qui non est constitutus a Christo iudex secularium non habet in secularibus talem plenitudinem potestatis a Christo. Papa non est constitutus a Christo iudex secularium, teste beato Petro, qui, sicut legitur in  epistola Clementis, ut habetur 11a, q. 1a, c. Te quidem, ait: “Te quidem oportet irreprehensibiliter vivere et summo studio niti ut omnes vite huius occupaciones abicias, ne fideiussor existas, ne advocatus licium fias, neve in aliqua occupacione prorsus inveniaris mundialis negocii occasione perplexus. Neque enim iudicem neque cognitorem secularium negociorum te hodie ordinare vult Christus”. Igitur papa non habet talem, presertim in secularibus, plenitudinem potestatis.

Master: That the pope does not have such fullness of power is proved as follows. For whoever has not been established by Christ as a judge of secular matters does not have from Christ such fullness of power in secular matters. The pope has not been established by Christ as a judge of secular matters, as blessed Peter testifies in the letter of Clement which is found in 11, q. 1, Te quidem. He says, "It does indeed behove you to live unblamably and to strive with the greatest zeal to cast aside all the business of this life: do not be a guarantor, do not become an advocate in law suits and, in short, do not in any occupation be found entangled in the occasion of a worldly court case. For Christ does not wish to appoint you today as either a judge or an advocate in secular cases"  [Col. 634]. Therefore the pope does not have such fullness of power especially in secular matters.

Item, qui non est dominus clericorum non habet super ipsos plenitudinem potestatis. Papa autem non est dominus clericorum, teste beato Petro, qui in canonica sua prima c. 5o ait: “Neque ut dominantes in clero”. Ergo papa non habet eciam super clerum talem plenitudinem potestatis.

Also, he who is not the lord of clerics does not have fullness of power over them. The pope is not the lord of clerics, however, as blessed Peter testifies in the fifth chapter of his first letter. He says: "Not as one lording it over the clergy" [1 Peter 5:3]. Therefore the pope does not have such fullness of power even over the clergy.

Amplius, papa maiorem potestatem habet in terris sue temporali iurisdiccioni subiectis quam in aliis terris que non sunt sue temporali iurisdiccioni subiecte. Ergo non habet in omnibus talem plenitudinem potestatis.

Further, the pope has greater power in lands subject to his temporal jurisdiction than in other lands not subject to his temporal jurisdiction. Therefore he does not in all [lands] have such fullness of power.

Discipulus: Dicerent primi opinantes quod omnes terre temporali iurisdiccioni pape subiecte sunt.

Student: The holders of the first opinion would say that all lands are subject to the temporal jurisdiction of the pope.

Magister: Huic Innocencius 3us obviare videtur qui, ut habetur Extra, De hereticis, Vergentis, terras sue temporali iurisdiccioni subiectas distinguit ab aliis, dicens: “In terris vero temporali nostre iurisdiccioni subiectis bona hereticorum statuimus publicari, et in aliis idem precipimus fieri per potentes et principes seculares”.

Master: Innocent III seems to oppose this. As we read in Extra, De hereticis, Vergentis, he distinguishes the lands subject to his temporal jurisdiction from others. He says, "We decree that the goods of heretics in lands subject to our temporal jurisdiction are confiscated, and in other [lands] we command that the same thing be done by the secular powers and princes"  [Col. 783].

Discipulus: Adhuc aliam allegacionem adducas.

Student: Bring forward yet another argument.

Magister: Aliter probatur quod papa specialiter in temporalibus non habet talem plenitudinem potestatis. Nam omnis potestas in temporalibus est ab illo qui habet in temporalibus plenitudinem potestatis ut omnia possit in temporalibus que nec iuri divino nec iuri nature repugnant. Sed potestas imperialis et regalis potestasque aliorum principum laicorum non est a papa. Unde et rex Francie superiorem in temporalibus non recognoscit (Extra, Qui filii sint legitimi, Per venerabilem). Ergo papa non habet in temporalibus talem plenitudinem potestatis.

Master: It is proved in another way that the pope does not have such fullness of power specifically in temporal matters, because from one who has fullness of power in temporal matters, such that he can do everything in temporal matters that is not opposed to divine law or the law of nature, all power in temporal matters derives. But imperial and royal power and the power of other lay rulers does not derive from the pope -- and thus the king of France does not acknowledge a superior in temporal matters (Extra, Qui filii sint legitimi, c. Per venerabilem [Col. 715]). Therefore the pope does not have such fullness of power in temporal matters.

Discipulus: De distinccione potestatum spiritualis et secularis, et an potestas secularis sit a papa, diffuse tractabimus in secundo tractatu istius tercie partis nostri dialogi. Ideo aliam allegacionem adducas.

Student: We will consider fully in the second tract of this third part of our dialogue the distinction between spiritual and secular powers and whether secular power is from the pope. Would you therefore bring forward another argument.

Magister: Quod papa non habeat in temporalibus talem plenitudinem potestatis ostenditur. Nam contra illum qui habet in temporalibus talem plenitudinem potestatis nulla currit prescripcio. Contra papam autem currit prescripcio, saltem centenaria (Extra, De prescripcionibus, Si diligenti). Ergo papa non habet in temporalibus huiusmodi plenitudinem potestatis.

Master: That the pope does not have such fullness of power in temporal matters is shown, because no prescription runs against one who has such fullness of power in temporal matters. However prescription, at least the one hundred year prescription, runs against the pope (Extra, De prescriptionibus, c. Si diligenti [Col. 389]). Therefore the pope does not have fullness of power of this kind in temporal matters.

Capitulum 10

Chapter 10

Discipulus: Hec ad presens de prima sentencia quam supra c. 1o recitasti sufficiant. Ideo ad secundam sentenciam eodem capitulo recitatam te converte.

Student: Let this be enough now about the first opinion which you recorded in chapter 1 above. Turn, therefore, to the second opinion recorded in that chapter.

Opinion (2): by Christ's decree the pope has such power in spiritual matters but not in temporal

Magister: Sentencia illa duas partes includit, unam scilicet affirmativam et aliam negativam. Prima est quod papa habet ex ordinacione Christi talem plenitudinem potestatis in spiritualibus. Secunda est quod non habet ex ordinacione Christi talem plenitudinem potestatis in temporalibus.

Master: That opinion contains two parts, one affirmative and the other negative. The first is that the pope has by Christ's decree such fullness of power in spiritual matters. The second is that he does not have by Christ's decree such fullness of power in temporal matters.

Discipulus: Allega primo pro prima parte.

Student: Argue for the first part first.

Magister: Quod papa in spiritualibus talem habeat plenitudinem potestatis ex ordinacione Christi probatur. Quia, sicut ea que secularia sunt debent disponi per principem secularem, ita que spiritualia sunt sunt per summum pontificem ordinanda et disponenda. Sed princeps supremus secularis habet in secularibus plenitudinem potestatis. [Ergo papa habet in spiritualibus plenitudinem potestatis.]

Master: That the pope has by Christ's decree such fullness of power in spiritual matters is proved because, just as those things which are secular ought to be managed by a secular ruler, so those things which are spiritual should be ordered and managed by the highest pontiff. But the supreme secular ruler has fullness of power in secular matters. [Therefore the pope has fullness of power in spiritual matters.]

Amplius, Christus dedit Petro plenitudinem potestatis cum dixit, “Quodcumque ligaveris super terram”, et cetera; sed non dedit sibi plenitudinem potestatis in temporalibus; ergo dedit sibi plenitudinem potestatis in spiritualibus.

Further, Christ gave Peter fullness of power when he said to him, "Whatever you bind on earth", etc.; but he did not give him fullness of power in temporal matters; therefore he gave him fullness of power in spiritual matters.

Rursus, qui potest omnem hominem de quocumque peccato corripere et pena debita coercere, habet in spiritualibus plenitudinem potestatis. Papa autem potest omnem hominem de peccato corripere (Extra, De iudiciis, Novit). Ergo papa habet in spiritualibus plenitudinem potestatis.

Again, he who can reprove every man for any sin at all and can restrain them by an appropriate punishment has fullness of power in spiritual matters; but the pope can reprove every man for sin (Extra, De iudiciis, c. Novit [Col. 243]).; therefore the pope has fullness of power in spiritual matters.

Iterum, omnia spiritualia possunt ad causas dei reduci. Sed omnes cause dei spectant ad summum pontificem, quia spectant ad episcopos et clericos (dist. 96a, Si imperator); inter episcopos autem papa est primus; ergo omnes cause dei spectant ad ipsum. Quare in spiritualibus habet plenitudinem potestatis. Hoc Iulius papa sentire videtur, qui, ut habetur dist. 11a, c. Nolite, ait: “Satis enim indignum est quemquam vel pontificum vel ordinum subsequencium hanc regulam refutare quam beati Petri sedem et sequi viderit et docere. Multum convenit ut totum corpus ecclesie in hac sibi observacione concordet, que inde auctoritatem habet ubi dominus tocius ecclesie posuit principatum”. Et Nicolaus papa, eadem dist., c. Consequens, ait: “Consequens est ut quod ab huius sedis rectoribus plena auctoritate sancitur, nullius consuetudinis prepediente occasione proprias tantum sequendo voluntates removeatur”, ubi glossa super hoc verbo “plena” dicit: “Pape auctoritas dicitur plena, aliorum episcoporum est semiplena”. Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod papa habet a Christo, saltem in spiritualibus, plenitudinem potestatis.

Again, all spiritual matters can be reduced to causes [legal actions] of God; but all God's causes pertain to the highest pontiff because they pertain to bishops and clerics (di. 96, c. Si imperator [Col. 341]), and the pope is first among bishops; all God's causes, therefore, pertain to him. Therefore he has fullness of power in spiritual matters. Pope Julius seems to think this. As we read in di. 11, c. Nolite, he says: "For it is quite improper for anyone, whether a bishop or of a lower order, to resist this rule which he sees that the see of blessed Peter follows and teaches. For it is most appropriate that the whole body of the church agree in this observance, which derives its authority from where the Lord placed the rulership of the whole church"  [Col. 23]. And Pope Nicholas says in the same distinction, c. Consequens, "The result is that what is enacted with full authority by the rulers of this see is not removed by the hindering occasion of any custom, [with others] following their own wills alone" [Col. 23]. Here the gloss on the word "full" says: "The authority of the pope is called full; that of other bishops is half-full" [Gloss, col. 36]. We gather from these words that, at least in spiritual matters, the pope has from Christ fullness of power.

Capitulum 11

Chapter 11

Discipulus: Si papa habet talem plenitudinem potestatis a Christo tam in temporalibus quam in spiritualibus, non est dubium quin a Christo habeat in spiritualibus plenitudinem potestatis. Quare allegaciones que supra c. [2o,] 3o et 4o pro prima sentencia sunt adducte pro ista prima parte secunde sentencie eciam possunt adduci, et ideo pro ipsa nolo ad presens plures allegaciones audire. Similiter pro secunda parte eiusdem secunde sentencie possunt allegari plura que tacta sunt supra c. 5o, 7o, 8o et 9o. Quare, sentencia ista dimissa, terciam que tacta est supra c. 1o nitamur discutere. Circa quam primo modum ponendi audire desidero.

Student: If the pope has from Christ fullness of power in both spiritual and temporal matters, there is no doubt that he has from Christ fullness of power in spiritual matters. The arguments that were brought forward for the first opinion in chapters [2], 3 and 4 above can therefore also be brought forward for the first part of the second opinion, and so I do not want to hear more arguments for it at the moment. Likewise for the second part of that second opinion [denying that the pope has fullness of power in temporal matters] many points touched on in chapters 5, 7, 8, and 9 can be adduced. Leaving aside that [second] opinion, therefore, us try to discuss the third one which was touched on in chapter 1 above. About it I wish to hear first the manner in which it is asserted.

Opinion (3): the pope has such power partly by Christ's decree and partly by human decree

Magister: Illa sentencia ponit quod papa habet tam in temporalibus quam in spiritualibus talem plenitudinem potestatis, partim ex ordinacione Christi, partim ex ordinacione humana, dicens quod papa habet immediate a Christo plenam potestatem in foro penitenciali, iuxta illud Matthei 16o: “Quodcumque ligaveris super terram”, et cetera. Habet eciam a Christo potestatem docendi totum populum Christianum, secundum illud Iohannis ultimo, “Pasce oves meas”. Habet eciam a Christo potestatem distribuendi et conferendi ecclesiaticas dignitates, iuxta illud verbum Christi ad Petrum, Iohannis 1o, “Tu vocaberis Cephas”, id est caput: ex hoc enim quod caput est, habet in membra influere, eis diversa officia conferendo. Habet eciam a Christo quod maiora negocia ecclesie sunt ad ipsum referenda, ex hoc ipso quod constituit ipsum caput aliorum. A conciliis autem generalibus habet potestatem quantum ad omnia que spectant ad regimen tocius populi Christiani quorum potestas non est sibi specialiter a Christo concessa.

Master: That opinion asserts that the pope has in both temporal and spiritual matters such fullness of power, partly by Christ's decree, partly by human decree, saying that the pope has directly from Christ full power in the area of penance, according to the words in Matthew 16[:19], "Whatever you bind on earth", etc. He also has from Christ the power of teaching all the Christian people, according to the words in John 21[:17], "Feed my sheep." He also has from Christ the power of distributing and conferring ecclesiastical offices, according to Christ's words to Peter in John 1[:42], "You will be called Cephas", that is head: for from the fact that he is head he has the power to act upon the members by conferring on them different offices. He also has it from Christ, by virtue of the fact that he constituted him head of the others, that the more important business of the church should be referred to him. From general councils, however, he has power with respect to all things pertaining to the rule of all Christian people in which power was not specifically granted to him by Christ.

Discipulus: Circa istam sentenciam essent multa tractanda, que, vel plura eorum, tacta sunt in hiis que dicta sunt circa primam sentenciam, vel tangentur cum discucietur ultima sentencia que supra c. 1o extitit recitata. Unde unum tantummodo quod ista sentencia ponit volo ut aliquibus allegacionibus fulcire coneris, quod videlicet papa aliquam acceperit a conciliis generalibus potestatem. Hoc enim illis auctoritatibus obviare videtur que dicunt quod concilia generalia robur habent et auctoritatem a Romana ecclesia.

Student Concerning that opinion many points would have to be discussed which (or many of which) have been touched on in the things said in connection with the first opinion or will be touched on when we analyse the last opinion set down in chapter one above. I want you, therefore, to try to support with some arguments only one thing that that opinion asserts, namely that the pope has received some power from general councils. For this seems to conflict with those texts which say that general councils obtain strength and authority from the Roman church.

Has the pope received some power from General Councils?

Magister: Quod papa aliquam potestatem acceperit a generalibus conciliis videtur posse tali modo probari. Papa habet potestatem aliquam a canonibus, et non nisi a canonibus generalium conciliorum; ergo a conciliis generalibus habet aliquam potestatem.

Master: That the pope received some power from general councils seems provable as follows. The pope has some power from the canons, and only from the canons of general councils; therefore he has some power from general councils.

Prima diversis auctoritatibus sanctorum videtur posse probari. Ait enim Iulius papa, scribens orientalibus episcopis, ut habetur dist. 17a, c. Regula: “Regula vestra nullas habet vires, nec habere poterit, quoniam nec ab orthodoxis episcopis hoc concilium actum est, nec Romane ecclesie legacio interfuit, canonibus precipientibus sine eius auctoritate concilia fieri non debere”. Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod a canonibus est preceptum quod solus papa habeat auctoritatem congregandi concilia.

The first [premise] seems provable from various texts of the saints. For Pope Julius, writing to the bishops of the east says, as we read in di. 17, c. Regula, "Your rule neither has nor can have any strength, since this council was not held by orthodox bishops nor was there a legate of the Roman church present, despite the canons ordering that councils ought not to be held without its authority"  [Col. 51]. We gather from these words that it has been ordered by the canons that the pope alone has the authority to assemble councils.

Item, Gelasius papa, ut habetur 9a, q. 3a, c. Ipsi, ait: “Ipsi sunt canones, qui appellaciones tocius ecclesie ad huius sancte sedis examen voluerunt deferre. Ab ipsa vero numquam appellare debere sanxerunt, ac per hoc illam de tota ecclesia iudicare, ipsam ad nullius commeare iudicium, nec de eius umquam preceperunt iudicio iudicari sentenciamque eius constituerunt non oportere dissolvi, cuius pocius sequenda decreta mandaverunt”. Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod a canonibus, non a Christo immediate, habet papa ut omnibus liceat appellare ad ipsum, et quod ab ipso appellare non licet, et quod ipse potest de tota ecclesia iudicare, et quod ipse nullius subest iudicio, et quod eius sentencia in omnibus est tenenda et, per consequens, quod eius preceptis est in omnibus et ab omnibus obediendum. Ex quo infertur quod papa a conciliis generalibus habet plenitudinem potestatis quantum ad omnia que non sunt sibi immediate concessa a Christo.

Also, as we read in 9, q. 3, c. Ipsi, Pope Gelasius says, "Those are canons which have willed that appeals from the whole church be brought for examination to this holy see. They have enacted that there ought not be any appeal at all from this see to anywhere else, and, accordingly, that this see should judge the whole church and should fall under no one's judgement. And they have ordered that its judgement should never be judged and they have decreed that its sentence must not be dissolved; rather they have commanded that its decrees should be followed" [Col. 611]. We gather from these words that it belongs to the pope from the canons, not from Christ immediately, that everyone is permitted to appeal to him and that it is not permissible to appeal from him, that he can judge concerning the whole church, that he is subject to no one's judgement, that his sentence should be upheld in all matters, and, consequently, that his commands should be obeyed in everything and by everyone. From this it is inferred that the pope has from general councils fullness of power in respect of everything not granted him directly by Christ.

Item, Gregorius, ut habetur 2a, q. 6a, c. Decreto, ait: “Liceat post audicionem primatum dioceseos, si necesse fuerit, nos appellare et nostra auctoritate, aut ante nos aut ante legatos de nostro latere missos, iuxta decreta patrum suas exercere atque diffinire acciones”. Ex quibus verbis datur intelligi quod a decretis patrum habet papa ut liceat aliis appellare ad ipsum.

Also, as we read in 2, q. 6, c. Decreto, Gregory says, "Let diocesans be permitted, after a hearing by their primate, to appeal, if necessary, to us and by our authority carry on and determine their litigation, in accordance with the decrees of the Fathers, either before us or before legates sent from our side" [Col. 469]. We are given to understand by these words that it is by the decrees of the Fathers that it belongs to the pope that others are permitted to appeal to him.

Item, Pelagius papa, ut habetur dist. 17a, c. Multis, ait: “Maiores vero ac difficiliores questiones, ut sancta synodus statuit et beata consuetudo exigit, ad sedem apostolicam semper deferantur”. Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod a synodo et consuetudine, et non immediate a Christo, habet papa ut maiores cause deferantur ad ipsum.

Also, as we read in di. 17, c. Multis, Pope Pelagius says: "As holy synod determines and blessed custom demands, let greater and more difficult questions always be referred to the apostolic see"  [Col. 52]. We gather from these words that it is from synod and by custom and not directly from Christ that it belongs to the pope that greater cases are referred to him.

Item, Nicolaus papa, ut habetur  2a, q. 6a, c. Arguta, ait: “Privilegia tamen apostolice sedis vos oblivioni tradere nullatenus debuistis, quibus venerandi canones iudicia tocius ecclesie ad hanc deferri iubent”. Ex quibus verbis videtur haberi quod papa a canonibus acceperit potestatem.

Also, as we read in 2, q. 6, c. Arguta, Pope Nicholas says, "You ought not have handed over to oblivion, however, the privileges of the apostolic see, by which venerable canons order that the judgements of the whole church are to be referred to this see"  [Col. 470]. By these words it seems to be established that the pope has received power from the canons.

Item, beatus Petrus potestatem accepit a collegio apostolorum (dist. 21a, In novo; dist. 17a, Hinc eciam ; 3a, q. 6a, Dudum). Ergo et papa potestatem potest accipere a concilio generali.

Also, blessed Peter received power from the college of apostles (di. 21, In novo [Col. 69], di. 17, Hinc etiam [Gratianus, post c. 6, col. 52; cf. Gloss, v. iussione domini, col. 71] and 3, q. 6, Dudum [Col. 521; cf. Gloss, v. voluerunt, col. 739]). Therefore the pope can also receive power from a general council.

Arguments for opinion (3)

Discipulus: Probare nunc niteris quod papa habet plenitudinem potestatis sive a Christo sive ab humana ordinacione.

Student: Would you now try to prove that the pope has fullness of power either from Christ or by human decree.

Magister: Hoc videtur posse ostendi pluribus auctoritatibus sanctorum patrum. Hoc enim Gregorius testari videtur, 2a, q. 6a, c. Decreto, et Iulius papa eadem causa et questione, c. Qui se. Hoc eciam Innocencius 3us in concilio generali, ut habetur Extra, De penitencia et remissione, c. Cum ex eo, videtur asserere manifeste.

Master: It seems that this can be shown from many texts of the holy Fathers. For Gregory seems to attest to this in 2, q. 6, c. Decreto  [Col. 469] and Pope Julius in the same cause and question c. Qui se [Col. 470]. Innocent III also seems clearly to assert it in a general council, as we read in Extra, De poenitentia et remissione, c. Cum ex eo [Col. . 889].

Quod eciam racione probatur. Quia ille cui est obediendum in omnibus habet vel a Christi ordinacione vel ab ordinacione humana, aut partim ab una et partim ab alia, plenitudinem potestatis. Sed pape obediendum est in omnibus, teste Gregorio qui, ut habetur dist. 19a, c. Nulli, ait: “Nulli fas est vel velle vel posse transgredi apostolice sedis precepta nec nostre dispensacionis ministerium”, et infra: “Sitque alienus a divinis et a pontificalibus officiis qui noluerit preceptis obtemperare apostolicis”. Hoc eciam Stephanus papa, ut habetur eadem dist., Enimvero, ut allegatum est prius, affirmare videtur. Et Iulius papa, ut habetur 25a, q. 2a, c. Amputato, ait: “Ea vero que sunt ab apostolis eorumque successoribus instituta nulla desidia negligantur, nulla dissensione violentur, nulla concertacione turbentur”. Ex quibus colligitur quod pape est obediendum in omnibus. Ergo habet plenitudinem potestatis vel immediate ex institucione Christi vel ab ordinacione humana, aut partim ab una et partim ab alia.

It is also proved by argument, because he who should be obeyed in everything has fullness of power, either by Christ's decree or by human decree, or partly from one and partly from the other; but the pope should be obeyed in everything, as Gregory attests. As we read in di. 19, c. Nulli, he says: "It is not right for anyone either to wish to or to be able to transgress the commands of the apostolic see or the administration of our dispensation ... And let him be deprived of divine and episcopal office who has refused to obey apostolic commands"  [Col. 61]. Pope Stephen seems to assert this too, as we read in the same distinction, c. Enimvero, which was cited above. And as we read in 25, q. 2, c. Amputato, Pope Julius says: "However, let not those things that have been established by the apostles and their successors be neglected out of any idleness, profaned by any disagreement or disturbed by any dispute"  [Col. 1014]. We gather from these [texts] that the pope should be obeyed in everything. Therefore he has fullness of power, either directly by Christ's institution or by human decree, or partly by one and partly by the other.

Capitulum 12

Chapter 12

Discipulus: Contra istam sentenciam nitere allegare.

Student: Try to argue against that opinion [i.e., the third opinion].

Arguments against opinion (3)

Magister: Sunt quidam qui istam sentenciam non reputant hereticalem sicut primam, tamen ipsam falsam et irracionabilem ac perioculosam existimant. Falsam quidem existimant quia ex ipsa, sicut ex prima, sequitur quod omnes Christiani sunt servi summi pontificis, accipiendo nomen servi secundum strictissimam significacionem eius secundum quam in scienciis legalibus accipitur et vocatur. Qui enim habet — sive ex ordinacione divina sive ex ordinacione humana, sive partim ab una et partim ab alia — plenitudinem potestatis tam in spiritualibus quam in temporalibus super omnes Christianos ut omnia possit que non sunt contra legem dei nec contra legem nature, ita ut ab eius potestate per nullum actum humanum se posset quicumque, in quocumque quod non est illicitum de se quantum ad genus operis, subtrahere, habet super omnes Christianos tantum dominium temporale quantum habuit, vel habere potuit, quicumque dominus super servum suum. Si igitur papa haberet super omnes Christianos talem plenitudinem potestatis, papa haberet plenissimum dominium in temporalibus super omnes reges et principes ac alios universos, et omnes essent servi eius, et posset de plenitudine potestatis, sine omni culpa et absque omni causa, privare quemcumque regem regno et dare illud cuicumque pagano; posset regem subicere cuicumque rustico ad sue arbitrium voluntatis, et, si faceret, de facto teneret, nec posset rex quicumque in talibus vel consimilibus sibi licite resistere — quod isti falsum reputant et absurdum.

Master: There are some people who do not regard that opinion as heretical like the first, yet consider it to be false, irrational and dangerous. They consider it false, indeed, because from it, as from the first [see above], it follows that all Christians are slaves of the highest pontiff, taking the word "slaves" in its strictest sense as it is understood and used in the legal sciences. For whoever has -- whether by divine decree or by human decree, or partly from the one and partly from the other -- fullness of power over all Christians in both temporal and spiritual matters, so that he can do anything which is not against the law of God or against the law of nature, so that no one could by any human act withdraw himself from that person's power in any action not of itself illicit in its kind, has as much temporal lordship over all Christians as any lord has had or could have had over his slave. If therefore the pope were to have such fullness of power over all Christians, the pope would have the fullest power in temporal matters over all kings and princes and everyone else and all would be his slaves, and out of the fullness of his power he could deprive any king at all, without any fault [on the king's part] and without any reason, of his kingdom and give it to any pagan; he could make a king subject to any rustic at all just as his own will decided, and if he did so, it would hold de facto, and no king at all would be able licitly to resist him in such matters or similar ones. They regard this as false and absurd.

Discipulus: Dic quare isti non reputant istam opinionem hereticalem, cum ponat omnes Christianos esse servos, et scriptura divina asserat legem evangelicam esse legem libertatis, et per consequens illa opinio scripture divine repugnat; quare videtur quod illa opinio, sicut prima, secundum istos hereticalis debeat estimari.

Student: Tell me why they do not regard that opinion as heretical, since it asserts that all Christians are slaves, and divine Scripture asserts that gospel law is a law of freedom, and consequently that opinion conflicts with divine Scripture. It seems, therefore, that according to them that opinion should be adjudged heretical like the first.

Magister: Dicunt ad istam instanciam tuam esse respondendum per aliqua que dicta sunt prius. Nam auctoritates scripture divine approbantes legem Christianam esse legem libertatis negative debent intelligi, et ideo prima opinio secundum eos est hereticalis quia ex ipsa sequitur quod omnes Christiani per legem evangelicam facti sunt servi summi pontificis, et, per consequens, lex evangelica nec negative nec affirmative posset dici lex libertatis, sed esset lex horrendissime servitutis. Ista autem opinio tercia non ponit quod omnes Christiani sint effecti servi summi pontificis per legem evangelicam, sed ex ipsa solummodo sequitur quod omnes Christiani per voluntariam submissionem facti sunt servi summi pontificis. Tenet enim quod sponte et voluntarie omnes Christiani submiserunt se in omnibus potestati pape que non erant sibi concessa a Christo immediate. Et hoc quidem, saltem in aliquo casu, possent facere Christiani. Unde et rex aliquis posset se facere, saltem in casu, servum summi pontificis, cedendo regnum et subdendo se in omnibus potestati pape. Si essent eciam solummodo decem vel duodecim Christiani vel paulo plures, possent omnes se facere servos pape. Hoc tamen secundum istos numquam fuit factum, et ideo ista opinio non est hereticalis sed falsa. Quod enim hoc numquam fuerit factum et quod hec opinio sit falsa, probatur per leges innumeras, civiles et canonicas, asserentes quod quidam sunt servi et quidam liberi.

Master: They say that your objection should be answered by means of some things said above. For the texts of divine Scripture which establish that Christian law is a law of freedom should be understood negatively, and the first opinion is therefore heretical according to them because it follows from it that all Christians have become slaves of the highest pontiff through gospel law, and gospel law, as a consequence, could not be called either negatively or positively a law of freedom but would be a law of the most horrendous servitude. This third opinion, however, does not assert that all Christians have been made slaves of the highest pontiff by gospel law, but it only follows from it that all Christians have become slaves of the highest pontiff by voluntary submission. For it holds that all Christians have willingly and voluntarily submitted themselves in all things to the pope's power, which was not granted to him directly by Christ. And Christians would indeed be able to do this, at least in some case. Thus any king, too, would be able to make himself the slave of the highest pontiff, at least in some case, by handing over his kingdom and subjecting himself to the pope's power in everything. If, also, there were only ten or twelve Christians or a few more they could all make themselves slaves of the pope. However, according to them this has never been done, and therefore that opinion is not heretical but false. That this has never been done and that this opinion is false is proved by innumerable civil and canon laws which assert that some people are slaves and some are free.

Discipulus: Quare dicunt isti prescriptam opinionem esse periculosam?

Student: Why do they say that the above opinion is dangerous?

Magister: Hoc dicunt quia, si papa haberet huiusmodi potestatem, posset imminere periculum faciliter toti communitati Christianorum. Posset enim papa, si fieret occultus hereticus aut occulte zelaret pro secta Sarracenorum vel aliqua alia infidelium, leviter exponere totam Christianitatem periculo. Posset enim spoliare solo precepto suo omnes Christianos rebus suis, scilicet armis, municionibus et aliis quibus deberent contra inimicos defendi. Quo facto, infideles vocati per papam, occulte primo zelantem pro eis et postea publice assencientem eis, possent leviter omnem terram fidelium occupare.

Master: They say this because if the pope were to have power of this kind danger could easily threaten the whole community of Christians. For if the pope were to become a secret heretic or were to become secretly zealous for the sect of Sarracens or some other [sect] of infidels, he could easily expose the whole of Christianity to danger. For by his command alone he could plunder all Christians of their possessions, that is of their arms, defences and other things with which they might be defended against their enemies. Once this was done, the infidels, called by the pope at first secretly zealous for them and then publicly agreeing with them, could easily occupy all the land of the faithful.

Capitulum 13

Chapter 13

Discipulus: Nunc videamus de quarta sentencia que tacta est supra, c. 1o.

Student: Let us now look at the fourth opinion touched on in chapter one above.

Opinion (4): different versions

Magister: Illa opinio tenet quod papa talem plenitudinem potestatis non habet, neque ab institucione Christi neque ex ordinacione humana, neque regulariter neque casualiter. Sed diversimode ponitur a diversis. Quidam enim dicunt quod papa nullam potestatem habet a Christo ultra alios sacerdotes; habet tamen aliquam potestatem, sicut et alii sacerdotes, super alios, nullam tamen potestatem coactivam extra forum penitencie, sed habet potestatem docendi et informandi laicos, sicut alii sacerdotes. Potestatem autem coactivam aliqualem, non plenam, habet a communitate fidelium, qui sponte et non coacte Romano pontifici et nulli alii sacerdoti aliqualem tribuebant super totam communitatem fidelium potestatem.

Master: That opinion holds that the pope does not have such fullness of power, either by Christ's institution or by human decree, regularly or occasionally. But it is put by different people in different ways. For some say that the pope has no more power from Christ than other priests; however, like other priests, he has some power over others, yet, outside the penitential tribunal, no coercive power, but, like other priests, he has power to teach and inform the laity. He does, however, have some, but not full, coercive power, from the community of the faithful, who willingly, and not by constraint, bestowed on the Roman pontiff and on no other priest some power over the whole community of the faithful.

Aliqui vero dicunt quod papa a Christo immediate habet aliqualem potestatem super omnes Christianos, non tamen plenam in omnibus, neque in spiritualibus neque in temporalibus. Ab hominibus vero fidelibus nullam recepit potestatem, neque plenam neque non plenam.

Some say, on the other hand, that the pope has directly from Christ some power over all Christians, yet not full power in everything, either in spiritual or in temporal matters. From faithful men, on the other hand, he received no power, either full or not full.

Nonnulli vero dicunt quod papa in spiritualibus habet potestatem, non tamen plenam, a solo Christo; in temporalibus vero nullam habet potestatem specialem a Christo, sed a solis fidelibus, non tamen plenam sed limitatam prout fideles limitare voluerunt.

Some say, on the other hand, that in spiritual matters the pope has power from Christ alone, yet not full power. In temporal matters, on the other hand, he has no special power from Christ but from the faithful alone, but though it is not full but limited in the way the faithful have wanted to limit it.

Discipulus: Isti modi ponendi multa continent que, si discuteremus prolixe, oporteret nos forsitan tedium legentibus generare. Ideo breviter transeamus, presertim cum occasione danda omnia tangemus inferius in diversis locis. Dic igitur primo unde moventur primi dicentes quod papa nullam potestatem habet a Christo ultra alios sacerdotes.

Student: Those ways of putting it contain many things which, if we were to discuss them at length, would make it necessary for us to engender boredom, perhaps, in our readers. Let us, therefore, pass over them quickly, especially since when the opportunity arises we will touch on all of them below in different places. First of all, therefore, tell me what motivates the first group who say that the pope has no more power from Christ than other priests.

Some say the pope has no more power from Christ than other priests

Magister: Istud dicunt propter auctoritates [Ieronimi] que ponuntur, dist. 93a, c. Legimus et dist. 95a, c. Olim, quas recitavi supra, prima parte istius dialogi, libro 5o, c. 17o, in quibus Ieronimus asserere videtur expresse quod nullus sacerdos ex ordinacione seu institucione Christi est maior alio, neque in ordine neque in administracione. Hoc eciam videtur posse probari per hoc, quod apostoli fuerunt pares in potestate beato Petro quantum fuit ex ordinacione Christi (dist. 21a, c. In novo; 24a, q. 1a, c. Loquitur; 2a, q. 7a, Paulus), et apostoli a Christo super alios sacerdotes non habuerunt aliquam potestatem. Ergo omnes sacerdotes, quantum est ex speciali ordinacione Christi, sunt pares successoribus beati Petri.

Master: They say that on the basis of the texts [of Jerome] found in di. 93, c. Legimus [Col. 327] and di. 95, c. Olim [Col. 332], which I quoted above in chapter 18 [rather, chapter 17] of book 5 of the first part of this dialogue. In these Jerome seems to affirm expressly that by the decree or institution of Christ no priest is greater than another, either in order or in administration. This also seems provable by the fact that the apostles were equal in power to blessed Peter as far as Christ's decree was concerned (di. 21, c. In novo [Col. 69]; 24, q. 1, c. Loquitur [Col. 971]; 2, q. 7, c. Paulus [Col. 493]), and the apostles did not have from Christ any power over other priests. Therefore, as far as Christ's special decree is concerned, all priests are equal to the successors of blessed Peter.

Capitulum 14

Chapter 14

Discipulus: Dic breviter an aliqui nitantur istam assercionem repellere.

Student: Say briefly whether some people try to reject that assertion.

Magister: Hoc quidam erroneum reputant et sacris canonibus apertissime obviare qui ponuntur dist. 21a, c. Quamvis, et [dist. 22a,] c.  Sacrosancta, et 9a, q. 3a, c. Cuncta, et 24a, q. 1a, c. Cum beatissimus, quos eciam allegavi prima parte huius dialogi, libro 5o, c. 20o. Hec eciam assercio [opinioni] Innocencii 3ii refragari videtur, qui, ut habetur Extra, De maioritate et obediencia, c. Novit, sicut allegatum est prius, dicit se non constitucioni humane sed potestati divine inniti. Ergo papa ex deo immediate habet aliquam potestatem super omnes Christianos.

Master: Some people do regard this as erroneous and as clearly conflicting with the sacred canons found in di. 21, c. Quamvis  [Col. 70] and [di. 22,] c. Sacrosancta [Col. 73] and 9, q. 3, c. Cuncta [Col. 611] and 24, q. 1, c. Cum beatissimus [Col. . 971], which I also quoted in chapter 10 [Rather, in chapter 20] of book 5 of the first part of this dialogue. This assertion also seems opposed to Innocent III who, as we find in Extra, De maioritate et obedientia, c. Solite  [Rather, Extra, De iudiciis, Novit, [Col. 243]], which was quoted above, says that he relies not on human decree but on divine power; therefore the pope has directly from God some power over all Christians.

Quod et racione probatur, quia nulla communitas, precipue magna, est bene et convenienter ordinata que nullum caput habet, quia, teste Salomone, Proverbiorum 11o, “Ubi non est gubernator, populus corruet”. Sed communitas fidelium fuit optime et congruentissime ordinata a Christo; ergo Christus dedit caput communitati fidelium; sed non nisi beatum Petrum. Ergo Petrus fuit constitutus a Christo caput universorum fidelium.

This is also proved by argument, because no community, especially a large one, which does not have a head is well and appropriately ordered, since, as Solomon attests in Proverbs 11[:14], "Where there is no governor the people goes to ruin." But the community of the faithful has been ordered by Christ in the best and most suitable way. Christ therefore gave the community of the faithful a head, and none but blessed Peter. Therefore Peter was appointed by Christ as head of all the faithful.

Amplius, non minus congrue et utiliter est ordinatus a Christo populus Christianus quam fuerit populus Hebreorum. Sed ille populus ex ordinacione divina habuit caput, saltem in spiritualibus, scilicet summum sacerdotem, qui omnibus aliis sacerdotibus fuit superior. Ergo et populus Christianus ex ordinacione Christi habet unum caput, quod est superius omnibus aliis sacerdotibus Christianis. Quod eciam Marcellus papa, ut habetur 24a, q. 1a, c. Rogamus, et Innocencius 3us, Extra, De translacione [c. 1o],  et omnes sancti patres tenere videntur.

Further, the Christian people have not been less suitably and usefully ordered by Christ than were the Hebrew people; but by divine decree that people had a head, at least in spiritual matters, that is the chief priest, who was superior to all other priests. The Christian people too, therefore, have by Christ's decree one head who is superior to all other Christian priests. Pope Marcellus, as we read in 24, q. 1, c. Rogamus [Col. 970], and Innocent III in Extra, De translatione, c. 1 [Col. 96], and all the holy Fathers also seem to hold this.

Capitulum 15

Chapter 15

Discipulus: Dic nunc quare prefati opinantes dicunt papam nullam potestatem coactivam accepisse a Christo.

Student: Say now why the people holding that opinion say that the pope received no coercive power from Christ.

They say the pope has from Christ no coercive power

Magister: Hoc dicunt propter hoc quod, secundum eos, tota communitas fidelium debet uni soli iudici supremo qui potestatem habeat coactivam subesse, a quo omnes alii iudices potestatem coactivam accipiant. Ille autem non debet esse papa, quia tunc periret tota iurisdiccio laicorum. Ergo papa a Christo nullam recepit potestatem coactivam.

Master: They say this because, according to them, the whole community of the faithful ought to be subject to one single supreme judge who has coercive power. All other judges should receive coercive power from him. This person, however, should not be the pope, because then all lay jurisdiction would be lost. Therefore the pope received no coercive power from Christ.

Discipulus: Istam materiam conabor tecum discutere in tractatu de iuribus Romani imperii. Et ideo, isto et eciam quibusdam aliis pretermissis, nitere breviter allegare pro ultimo dicto, quod scilicet papa in temporalibus nullam potestatem specialem habet immediate a Christo sed a suis fidelibus, non tamen plenam sed limitatam prout fideles limitare volebant.

Student: I will try to discuss that material with you in the tract on the rights of the Roman emperor [Dialogus 3.2], and so, leaving that and some other points aside, would you try to argue briefly for the last statement, namely that in temporal matters the pope has no special power directly from Christ, but [has power] from his faithful, yet not full [power] but limited, just as the faithful wanted to limit it.

That the pope has from Christ no temporal power, but from men has some limited temporal power

Magister: Quod papa in temporalibus nullam potestatem habet immediate a Christo videtur diversimode posse probari. Nam sicut imperator se habet ad temporalia, ita papa se habet ad spiritualia inquantum recepit immediate potestatem a Christo; sed imperator nullam potestatem habet in spiritualibus; ergo papa in temporalibus nullam potestatem habet immediate a Christo.

Master: It seems provable in various ways that in temporal matters the pope has no power directly from Christ. For just as the emperor is related to temporal matters, so the pope is related to spiritual matters in so far as he received power directly from Christ. But the emperor has no power in spiritual matters. Therefore in temporal matters the pope has no power directly from Christ.

Amplius, sicut allegatum est prius, 9o c., secundum scripturas sacras et canones papa non debet se secularibus negociis implicare, et per consequens non est sibi specialiter commissum a Christo ut se implicet secularibus negociis. Quare, ut videtur, a Christo immediate nullam recepit in temporalibus potestatem.

Further, as was argued in chapter 9 above, according to the sacred Scriptures and the canons, the pope should not involve himself in secular business, and consequently he has not been specially commissioned by Christ to involve himself in secular business. It seems, therefore, that he did not receive any power in temporal matters directly from Christ.

Discipulus: Quomodo probatur quod papa habet a fidelibus aliquam potestatem in temporalibus?

Student: How is it proved that in temporal matters the pope has some power from the faithful?

Magister: Hoc ponitur propter canones sacros, per quos habetur quod papa in multis casibus se de temporalibus intromittit: Extra, De foro competenti, c. Licet, et Extra, De iudiciis, c. Novit, et Extra, Qui filii sint legitimi, Per venerabilem, et in aliis locis innumeris, habetur quod papa iurisdiccionem temporalem exercet, quam tamen non habet a Christo, sicut dicitur prius esse probatum; ergo habet eam a fidelibus.

Master: This is asserted because of sacred canons which establish that in many cases the pope does intervene in temporal matters. In Extra, De foro competenti, c. Licet [Col. 250], Extra, De iudiciis, c. Novit [Col. 242], Extra, Qui filii sunt legitimi c. Per venerabilem [Col. 714], and in countless other places, we read that the pope exercises temporal jurisdiction. Yet he does not have it from Christ, as is said above to have been proved; therefore he has it from the faithful.

Quod tali racione probatur. Nam papa non habet immediate a Christo maiorem iurisdiccionem in una regione quam in alia; sed de facto et de iure maiorem iurisdiccionem exercet in temporalibus in una regione quam in alia; ergo illam potestatem non habet immediate a Christo; habet ergo eam ab aliquo alio, et non nisi a fidelibus. Ergo ab ipsis fidelibus aliquam habet in temporalibus potestatem — non tamen plenam, sed limitatam, quia fideles tribuendo in temporalibus potestatem nullatenus se constituerunt servos eius; ergo sibi plenitudinem potestatis minime conferebant.
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This is proved by the following argument. The pope does not have directly from Christ greater jurisdiction in one region than in another, but in fact and in law he does exercise greater jurisdiction in temporal matters in one region than in another. He does not have that power directly from Christ, therefore, and so he has it from someone else, and this can only be the faithful. In temporal matters, therefore, he has some power from the faithful -- not full power, however, but limited, because in handing over power in temporal matters the faithful did not make themselves his slaves. Therefore they did not confer on him fullness of power.

Capitulum 16

Chapter 16

Discipulus: Ad sentenciam quintam tactam supra, c. 1o, transeamus. Quam primo satagas explicare, et inde qualiter intelligi debeat explanare.

Student: Let us pass over to the fifth opinion touched on in chapter 1 above. Would you first try to set it out and then explain how it should be understood.

Opinion (5): From Christ the pope has fullness of power in temporals and spirituals, not regularly but on occasion

Magister: Illa sentencia, sicut dixi, tenet quod papa talem plenitudinem potestatis habet in temporalibus et spiritualibus ut omnia, per potenciam ordinatam vel potenciam absolutam, possit que non sunt contra ius divinum nec contra ius naturale. Non habet regulariter et simpliciter, neque a iure divino neque humano, sed ex ordinacione Christi sive iure divino habet casualiter, sive in casu et secundum quid, huiusmodi plenitudinem potestatis, que sic secundum quosdam debet intelligi: papa a iure divino sive ex ordinacione Christi de temporalibus disponendis se intromittere minime debet quamdiu temporalia prout decet et expedit per laicos disponuntur, nisi accipiendo temporalia a laicis pro sua sustentacione et sui officii execucione, et ideo non habet potestatem a Christo regulariter disponendi et ordinandi de temporalibus, que ad reges et principes et alios laicos spectare noscuntur. Casualiter tamen, sive in casu, quando scilicet temporalia per alios in periculum communitatis Christianorum vel ad subversionem fidei Christiane tractarentur, vel in casu consimili, converterentur ad malum, et non esset aliquis laicus qui vellet et posset huiusmodi periculis viam precludere, papa a iure divino haberet potestatem faciendi de temporalibus quicquid pro bono communi et salvacione fidei et ad occurrendum huiusmodi periculis necessario faciendum sibi racio recta dictaret; et ita in tali casu haberet super temporalia, quodammodo et secundum quid, plenitudinem potestatis: non quia tunc temporalia efficerentur sua quoad dominium et proprietatem, nec quod posset ad libitum suum de eis disponere, sed quia nichil potest rex vel alius laicus facere de quacumque re temporali quin tunc idem posset facere papa, si hoc fieri expediret et non esset alius per quem convenienter fieri posset; et ita adhuc in tali casu non haberet plenitudinem potestatis in temporalibus simpliciter, sed tantummodo secundum quid.

Master: That opinion holds, as I said, that in temporal and spiritual matters the pope has such fullness of power that either by ordained power or by absolute power he can do anything that is not against divine law or the natural law. He does not have this regularly and simply, either by divine law or by human law, but by Christ's decree or divine law he has such fullness of power occasionally or in a particular case and conditionally (secundum quid). According to some this should be understood as follows. By divine law or by Christ's decree the pope should not intervene in the management of temporal matters as long as temporal matters are being managed fittingly and appropriately by the laity, except by accepting temporal goods from the laity for his own sustenance and the carrying out of his duty; and therefore he does not have power from Christ regularly to manage and order temporal matters, which are known to pertain to kings, princes and other laymen. Occasionally, however, or in a particular case -- namely when temporal matters were being handled by others to the danger of the community of Christians or to the subversion of faith, or in a similar case were being turned to evil, and there was no layman willing or able to prevent such dangers -- the pope would have by divine law power to do anything in temporal matters that right reason would dictate as necessarily to be done for the common good and the preservation of the faith and to meet dangers of this kind. And thus in such a case he would have fullness of power in a certain way and conditionally (secundum quid) over temporal matters, not because the temporal goods would then be made his with respect to lordship and ownership, nor because he can manage them according to his pleasure, but because there is nothing any king or other layman can do about any temporal matter at all that the pope could not then do, if it were advantageous that this be done and there was no one else by whom it could appropriately be done; and thus even in such a case he would not have in temporal matters fullness of power simply but only secundum quid.

Similiter in spiritualibus non habet a iure divino regulariter et simpliciter huiusmodi plenitudinem potestatis, quia sine culpa et absque causa non potest precipere fidelibus illa que supererogacionis sunt, immo eciam multa alia. Non enim absque causa et sine culpa potest cogere laicum neque quod contrahat matrimonium neque quod voveat virginitatem neque castitatem, et tamen neutrum est contra ius divinum neque contra ius naturale, sed utrumque licite fieri potest. Et sic est de multis aliis licitis que ad spiritualia spectant, super que papa a iure divino regulariter et simpliciter non obtinet plenitudinem potestatis, super que tamen casualiter obtinet plenitudinem potestatis secundum quid, quia in casu vel racione delicti aut propter aliquam notabilem necessitatem vel utilitatem, quando ex precepto eius nullum immineret periculum, potest precipere cuicumque quicquid in spiritualibus non est contra legem dei nec contra legem nature.

In spiritual matters, similarly, he does not by divine law have regularly and simply such fullness of power, because he cannot, without fault [on their part] and without a reason, enjoin on the faithful things that are supererogatory, nor indeed many other things as well. For he cannot, without fault or reason, force a layman to contract a marriage or to make a vow of virginity or chastity, and yet neither of these is against divine law or against the law of nature, rather each can licitly be done; and so it is of many other permissible [acts] that pertain to spiritual matters and over which the pope by divine law does not regularly and simply have fullness of power. Yet over these he does occasionally have fullness of power secundum quid, because in a particular case, either by reason of a crime or on account of some notable necessity or utility, he can, when no danger would be threatened by his command, enjoin on anyone at all anything in spiritual matters which is not against the law of God or against the law of nature.

Et ita secundum istos papa casualiter a iure divino tam in temporalibus quam in spiritualibus habet plenitudinem potestatis, non simpliciter sed secundum quid, que, quamvis non sit plenissima potestas, est tamen grandis, singularis et quam magna. Per ipsam enim potest in casu imperia et regna transferre, reges et principes aliumque laicum quemcumque temporalibus, iuribus et rebus privare aliisque conferre. In spiritualibus eciam omnia potest in casu. Exprimere autem omnes casus [explicite] et in particulari in quibus predicta potest, vel aliquid predictorum, non est facile; nec forte de ipsis potest dari doctrina universalis per quam certitudinaliter et absque errore sciatur, maxime a simplicibus, quando potest talia papa et quando non, et qualia potest in uno casu et qualia in alio; plura enim talia potest in uno casu que in alio casu minime potest.

And so, they say, both in temporal and in spiritual matters the pope occasionally has by divine law fullness of power, not simply but secundum quid. Although this power is not the fullest, it is, nevertheless, abundant, singular and very great. For through it he can in a particular case transfer empires and kingdoms, deprive kings, princes and any other layman at all of temporal rights and goods and confer them on others. In spiritual matters he can also do all things, in a particular case. It is not easy, however, to state, explicitly and in particular, all the cases in which he can do the aforesaid things, or some of them. And perhaps no universal teaching can be given about them by which it may be known with certainty and without error, especially by the simple, when the pope can do such things and when he cannot, and what kind of things he can do in one case and what kind in another -- for there are many such things that he can do in one case but cannot do in another.

Capitulum 17

Chapter 17

Discipulus: Quamvis inter predicta aliqua sint michi obscura, que forsitan postea occasione habita lucidabis, tamen pro nunc prescriptam opinionem quoad illa obscura non cures amplius explanare. Sed cum dixeris breviter secundum illam sentenciam quam potestatem Christus non dederit beato Petro regulariter et successoribus eius et quam dederit ei casualiter sive in casu, nunc breviter narra secundum eandem opinionem quam potestatem aut iurisdiccionem Christus regulariter dederit beato Petro et in ipso successoribus eius.

Student: Although some of the above is unclear to me, and perhaps later when the opportunity arises you will explain it, yet for now do not trouble to explain more fully the unclear points in that opinion. But since you have briefly stated, according to that opinion, which power Christ did not give regularly to blessed Peter and his successors and which he gave him occasionally or in a particular case, briefly relate now, according to that same opinion, the power or jurisdiction which Christ did give regularly to blessed Peter and, in him, to his successors.

What the pope's power is regularly,
according to opinion (5)

Magister: Dicitur quod Christus constituit beatum Petrum caput, principem et prelatum aliorum apostolorum et universorum fidelium, dans ei regulariter in spiritualibus, quoad omnia que regimini communitatis fidelium quantum ad bonos mores et quascumque necessitates spirituales fidelium sunt de necessitate facienda vel de necessitate omittenda, omnem potestatem in talibus que non periculose sed provide et ad utilitatem communem committerentur uni homini, ac libertatem et iurisdiccionem eciam coactivam absque omni detrimento ac dispendio notabili et enormi iurium temporalium imperatorum, regum, principum et aliorum quorumcumque laicorum vel clericorum que eis iure naturali, gencium aut civili, ante vel post institucionem legis evangelice, competebant. In temporalibus autem dedit ei regulariter solummodo ius petendi temporalia pro sua sustentacione et sui officii execucione. Et hanc potestatem, sive in temporalibus sive in spiritualibus, habent nunc regulariter ex iure divino successores beati Petri, scilicet Romani pontifices. Omnem autem potestatem quam regulariter ultra istam habuerunt vel habent summi pontifices ex humana ordinacione, concessione, spontanea submissione, vel ex consensu expresso vel tacito, aut propter impotenciam, negligenciam aut maliciam hominum aliorum, vel ex consuetudine vel quomodocumque ex iure humano obtinuerunt et obtinent.

Master: It is said that Christ established blessed Peter as the head, chief and prelate of the other apostles and of all the faithful, giving to him regularly in spiritual matters, in respect of everything that should of necessity be done or of necessity be omitted for the rule of the community of the faithful as it concerns good customs and any spiritual necessities of the faithful at all, all power in such matters as could be committed to one man not dangerously but prudently and to the common advantage, and [giving him] freedom, and coercive jurisdiction also, without any detriment or notable and significant cost to those temporal rights of emperors, kings, princes and any other laymen at all, or of clerics, that pertained to them, before or after the establishment of gospel law, by the law of nature or by the law of nations or by civil law. In temporal matters, however, he gave him regularly only the right of seeking temporal goods for his own sustenance and the performance of his duties. And this power the successors of blessed Peter, that is the Roman pontiffs, have now, whether in temporal or spiritual matters, regularly by divine law. But any further power that the highest pontiffs regularly have had, or have, they have obtained, and obtain, by human decree, concession or voluntary submission, or by express or tacit consent, or because of the weakness, negligence or evil of other men, or by custom, or in whatever way by human law.

Discipulus: Ista narracio continet multa michi obscura, que, ut melius intelligam an sint vera vel falsa, michi studeas explicare et qualiter distinguitur ab aliis opinionibus declarare.

Student: That account contains many things that are unclear to me. So that I might better understand whether they are true or false, would you strive to explain them to me and make clear how that opinion is distinguished from the others.

Magister: In hoc quod dicit Christum constituisse beatum Petrum “caput, principem et prelatum aliorum apostolorum ac universorum fidelium”, intendit elidere opinionem tenentem quod beatus Petrus non fuit caput ecclesie ex institucione Christi sed solummodo ex eleccione seu institucione apostolorum seu aliorum fidelium.

Master: In saying that Christ established blessed Peter "as head, chief and prelate of the other apostles and all the faithful" it intends to destroy the opinion which holds that Peter was head of the church not by Christ's institution but only by the election or institution of the apostles or the other faithful.

Per spiritualia autem, de quibus facit mencionem, intelligit illa que ex institucione evangelice legis sunt propria evangelice legi, in nulla alia lege, saltem humana, vel secta reperta, sicut sunt dispensacio sacramentorum nove legis, ordinacio sacerdotum et clericorum, institucio vel promocio illorum qui debent regere et instruere populum Christianum, eciam in hiis que spectant ad fidem et cultum divinum, et consimilia.
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And by the "spiritual matters" to which it refers it means those things which by the institution of gospel law are proper to gospel law, being found in no other law (at least no human law) or sect, things such as the administering of the sacraments of the new law, the ordination of priests and clerics, the institution or promotion of those who ought to rule and instruct the Christian people, especially in things that pertain to faith and divine worship, and similar things.

Per hoc autem quod dicit Christum dedisse beato Petro potestatem quoad spiritualia que “sunt de necessitate facienda vel de necessitate omittenda”, intendit excludere a regulari potestate Petri illa spiritualia que supererogacionis sunt, que scilicet sunt consilii et non precepti, et universaliter omnia sine quibus convenienter regi potest populus Christianus et absque quibus, quamvis fiant vel omittantur, nec fides nec boni mores periclitantur. Et ideo non potest papa regulariter precipere Christiano quod servet virginitatem vel contrahat matrimonium aut paupertatem assumat vel divicias retineat et possideat vel, quando non tenetur ex precepto dei, eleemosynam faciat vel non faciat, licet in casu plura talia precipere posset; et si extra casum utilitatis vel multa talia preceperit, preceptum suum non tenet sed est nullum, nec ille cui fit tenetur ei obedire eciam si propter hoc eum excommunicaverit — talis sentencia tamquam continens intollerabilem errorem esset nulla et minime formidanda nec de necessitate servanda.

When it says Christ gave blessed Peter power with respect to spiritual matters "that should of necessity be done or of necessity be omitted", it intends to exclude from the regular power of Peter those spiritual matters that are supererogatory, that is, those which are a matter of advice not command, and, all together, everything without which Christian people can be ruled appropriately and without which, whether they are done or omitted, neither faith nor good customs are exposed to danger. And therefore the pope cannot regularly order a Christian to preserve his virginity, to contract a marriage, to take on poverty, to retain and possess wealth or, when he is not bound by a command of God, to give or not give alms, though in a particular case he could order many such things; and if he orders such things outside of a case of utility, or orders many such things, his order does not hold but is null, and that person to whom it is given is not bound to obey it even if he excommunicates him on that account -- such a sentence would be null as containing an intolerable error and ought not to be feared nor of necessity observed.

Per hoc autem, quod dicit “dans ei omnem potestatem in talibus que non periculose sed provide et ad utilitatem communem committerentur uni homini”, intendit excludere a regulari potestate pape omnem potestatem que, si uni homini committeretur regulariter, posset faciliter periculum notabile toti communitati fidelium imminere, cui non posset absque miraculo vel cum maxima difficultate via precludi. Propter quod, quamvis de necessitate sit aliquis successurus summo pontifici, tamen papa non habet potestatem ordinandi quis debeat sibi succedere. Propter hoc eciam est quedam sentencia tenens quod, quamvis eleccio summi pontificis sit de necessitate facienda, tamen papa non habet a Christo potestatem regulariter ordinandi quomodo et a quibus debeat eligi summus pontifex. Quia si talem potestatem haberet regulariter papa immediate a Christo — cum papa, tamquam homo peccabilis, sicut ceteri, erroribus, pravis affeccionibus, negligenciis ac maliciis et nequiciis valeat irretiri — posset faciliter ex negligencia vel malicia relinquere totam Christianitatem absque potestate eligendi summum pontificem, per quod periclitaretur bonum commune: posset enim, ex causa vel propter culpam, privare cardinales potestate et iure eligendi summum pontificem; quo facto, vel negligendo vel ex malicia differendo, vel tempus sufficiens ordinandi non habendo, posset mori antequam de electoribus summi pontificis ordinaretur, et ita, in periculum et detrimentum boni communis, tota Christianitas sine potestate et iure eligendi summum pontificem remaneret. Et ideo, secundum istam sentenciam, talis potestas non est regulariter concessa a Christo summo pontifici, nec eciam aliqua alia potestas que periculose concederetur uni persone. Propter quod, secundum eos, nullo modo est dominus omnium temporalium, quia tale dominium esset nimis periculosum fidelibus.

And when it says, giving him all power "in such matters as could be committed to one man not dangerously but prudently and to the common advantage", it intends to exclude from the regular power of the pope all power which, if it were regularly committed to one man, could easily threaten a notable danger to the whole community of the faithful that could not be prevented without a miracle or [only] with the greatest difficulty. For this reason, although someone will of necessity succeed the highest pontiff, nevertheless the pope does not have the power of arranging who ought to succeed him. This is also the reason for a certain opinion which holds that although an election of a highest pontiff must be held, nevertheless the pope does not have from Christ the power of regularly arranging how and by whom the highest pontiff should be elected: for if the pope were regularly to have such power directly from Christ he could easily, from negligence or evil -- since the pope, a sinful man like everyone else, can be ensnared by errors, wicked passions, negligence, evil and villainy -- leave the whole of Christianity without the power to elect a highest pontiff, and by this the common good would be endangered. For he could for some reason or for some fault deprive the cardinals of the power and right to elect a highest pontiff, and, having done so, he could, either through neglect or delay due to malice or through not having enough time to arrange it, die before arrangements about the supreme pontiff's electors were made. And thus to the peril and detriment of the common good all Christianity would remain without the power and right to elect a highest pontiff. And therefore, according to that opinion, such power was not regularly granted by Christ to the highest pontiff, nor any other power, either, which it would be dangerous to grant to one person. For this reason, according to them, he is in no way the lord of all temporal things, because such lordship would be too dangerous to the faithful.

Per hoc autem, quod tenet Christum dedisse pape “libertatem absque omni notabili et enormi detrimento et dispendio iurium temporalium imperatorum”, et cetera, intendit asserere quod papa quicumque, quoad personam suam, est liber et nequaquam regulariter subiectus homini cuicumque, eciam si ante eleccionem suam fuisset servilis condicionis vel alio modo imperatori aut regi vel alii Christiano vel non Christiano subiectus, quia libertas unius hominis quoad personam suam non est notabiliter dampnosa imperatori vel alii. Et ideo papa, quantumcumque fuisset servus, eo ipso quod est papa, vel electus in papam, in libertatem eripitur. Casualiter tamen papa, puta si efficiatur hereticus vel in quocumque crimine appareat incorrigibilis et de eo scandalizatur ecclesia, humano iudicio est subiectus et debet per hominem iudicari et penam debitam sustinere de iure.

When it holds that Christ gave to the pope "freedom . . . without any detriment or notable and significant cost to those temporal rights of emperors", etc., it intends to assert that every pope is free with respect to his person and is not regularly subject to any man at all, even if before his election he had been of servile condition or had been subject in another way to an emperor or a king or other Christian or non-Christian, because the freedom of one man with respect to his person is not notably injurious to an emperor or to another. And therefore, however much he had been a slave, the pope is delivered into freedom by the very fact that he is pope or has been elected pope. Occasionally, however -- if, for instance, he becomes a heretic or seems to be incorrigible in any crime and the church is made to stumble because of him -- the pope is subject to human judgement and ought to be judged by man and undergo the due punishment of the law.

Per hoc autem, quod dicit Christum dedisse regulariter beato Petro quoad huiusmodi aliqualem “iurisdiccionem eciam coactivam absque detrimento et dispendio notabili et enormi iurium temporalium imperatorum”, et cetera, intendit dicere quod papa habet a Christo regulariter potestatem puniendi crimina mere ecclesiastica, que scilicet directe committuntur in legem Christianam quoad illa que sunt propria legi Christiane et ab aliis sectis crimina minime reputantur, ita tamen quod talis punicio non sit in notabile dampnum et preiudicium aliorum qui minime peccaverunt. Et si servus alicuius committat crimen ecclesiasticum, papa potest ipsum punire, ita tamen quod dominus servi absque culpa sua notabile dampnum non incurrat.

And when it says that with respect to things of this kind Christ gave regularly to blessed Peter some "coercive jurisdiction also, without any detriment or notable and significant cost to those temporal rights of emperors", etc., it intends to say that the pope has regularly from Christ the power to punish purely ecclesiastical crimes, that is those that are committed directly against Christian law and are proper to Christian law and are not considered crimes by other sects, yet in such a way that the punishment is not to the notable detriment or prejudice of others who have not sinned. And if anyone's slave commits an ecclesiastical crime the pope can punish him, yet in such a way that the slave's master, without blame on his part, does not incur a notable loss.

Per hoc autem, quod dicit Christum dedisse beato Petro et successoribus eius libertatem et iurisdiccionem et potestatem huiusmodi “absque detrimento et dispendio notabili et enormi iurium temporalium imperatorum, regum et aliorum que eis iure naturali, gencium et civili, ante vel post institucionem legis evangelice, competebant”, intendit astruere quod, per hoc quod beatus Petrus et successores eius erant vel erunt ad summum sacerdocium sublimati, imperatores et reges et alii, sive fideles sive infideles, qui fuerunt ante vel post institucionem legis evangelice, suis iuribus temporalibus minime privabantur, sed ipsa retinebant, nec regulariter pape in temporalibus subiciebantur, sed veri imperatores et reges et domini suarum rerum temporalium ac servorum et subditorum sibi sicut antea remanebant, nec efficiebantur servi cuiuscumque, nec regulariter preceptis pape tenebantur quoad temporalia obedire. Nec sentencia pape excommunicacionis vel alia, si fuerit lata contra imperatorem vel alium quia preceptis huiusmodi non obedit aut iura sua defendit, regulariter tenet, sed tamquam continens intollerabilem errorem est nulla penitus reputanda et minime formidanda, quantumcumque non servetur.

And when it says that Christ gave blessed Peter and his successors freedom, jurisdiction and power of this kind without any detriment or notable and significant cost to those temporal rights of emperors, kings and others "that pertained to them, before or after the establishment of gospel law, by the law of nature or by the law of nations or by civil law," it intends to assert that by the fact that blessed Peter and his successors have been and will be raised to the highest priesthood, emperors, kings and others, both believers and unbelievers, whether they lived before or after the establishment of gospel law, were not deprived of their temporal rights, but retained them and were not regularly subject to the pope in temporal matters, but remained, as before, true emperors and kings and lords of their temporal possessions and slaves and of those subject to them, and were not made slaves of anyone, and were not bound regularly to obey the commands of the pope with respect to temporal matters. And a sentence of excommunication or any other [sentence] passed by the pope against the emperor or another because he does not obey such commands or defends his rights does not regularly hold, but, as containing an intolerable error, ought to be regarded as completely null and not to be feared, however much it is not observed.

Per hoc autem, quod dicit Christum dedisse beato Petro in temporalibus “solummodo ius petendi temporalia pro sua sustentacione et officii sui execucione”, vult excludere omnem opinionem tenentem quod papa in temporalibus habet regulariter plenitudinem potestatis vel eciam potestatem de temporalibus disponendi vel quamcumque iurisdiccionem temporalem super imperium vel quamcumque aliam regionem, et eciam opinionem tenentem quod papa non habet aliquod ius exigendi quecumque temporalia.

And when it says that in temporal matters Christ gave blessed Peter "only the right of seeking temporal goods for his own sustenance and for the performance of his duties" it means to exclude every opinion which holds that in temporal matters the pope regularly has fullness of power or also the power of managing temporal matters or any temporal jurisdiction at all over the Empire or any other region, and also the opinion that holds that the pope does not have any right of demanding any temporal goods at all.

Per hoc autem quod dicit ultimo quod “omnem potestatem quam regulariter ultra istam <quam> habuerunt vel habent summi pontifices ex humana ordinacione”, et cetera, intendit quod successores beati Petri, licet non excesserint beatum Petrum in potestate aliqua quam haberent ex sola ordinacione Christi et ex iure divino, tamen magnam potestatem tam in temporalibus quam in spiritualibus obtinuerunt ex iure humano quam non habuit beatus Petrus; et quod potestas pape ex iure humano potest augeri; et quod unus summus pontifex habet, vel habere potest, maiorem potestatem vel meliorem quam alius.

And when it says finally that "any further power that the highest pontiffs regularly have had, or have, [they have obtained] from human decree", etc., it intends that although the successors of blessed Peter have not exceeded him in any power they have had by Christ's decree alone and by divine law, yet they have acquired by human law great power in temporal and spiritual matters which blessed Peter did not have, and that the power of the pope from human law can be increased, and that one highest pontiff has or can have greater or better power than another.

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