William of Ockham, Dialogus,
part 3, tract 2, book 3, chapters 8-23.

Text and translation by John Scott.

Copyright (c) 1999, The British Academy

CAP. VIII. Discipulus Quia res de facili ad naturam suam {*trs.34512 &NaRe} revertuntur {revertitur &Pe} interrogare {interrogo &Pe} decrevi, {om. &Pe} si Romani potestatem {pontificem &NaRe} ordinandi de electoribus Romani episcopi {pontificis &Pe} in summum pontificem {pontifex &Mz} transtulerunt, an {aut &Pe} in aliquo casu et in quo ius eligendi et potestas ordinandi de electoribus papae secundum istam opinionem revertatur ad Romanos {de electoribus papae ... Romanos om. &NaRe}.	Chapter 8 Student Because things easily revert to their nature, I have decided to ask you whether, if the Romans have transferred to the supreme pontiff the power of making arrangements about the electors of the Roman bishop, in any case, and in what case, the right to elect and the power to make arrangements about the electors of the pope reverts, according to that opinion, to the Romans.
When does the right of election revert to the Romans?
Opinion 1: The right reverts to the Romans if the Pope and Cardinals are heretics
Magister Ad hoc diversimode respondetur. Uno modo dicitur quod solummodo in uno casu ius eligendi et potestas ordinandi de electoribus revertitur {revertatur &Pe} ad Romanos, puta si papa et electores omnes {fuit add. &Pe} infecti fuerint {fuerunt &Re} {vel essent &Pe} haeretica pravitate. {maculati add. &Pe} Unde si papa et omnes cardinales efficerentur haeretici et {om. &Pe} Romani remanerent catholici, de fide et bono communi in quantum spectaret ad ipsum {*ipsos &NaPeRe} curam {*sollicitudinem &NaRe} {om. &MzPe} [[ponere add. margin Pe]] competentem habentes, eo ipso Romani haberent ius eligendi et etiam {*om. &NaPeRe} potestatem de electoribus ordinandi. Si {sed &Pe} {*etiam add. &NaPeRe} {et add. &Mz}, quando imperator solus habuerit {*habuit &NaPeRe} ius eligendi, {papam add. &Pe} [[interlinear]] papa et etiam {*om. &NaPeRe} imperator fuissent facti haeretici, Romani eo ipso recuperassent ius eligendi et potestatem de electoribus ordinandi.	Master Different replies can be made to this. In one way it is said that in only one case does the right to elect and the power to make arrangements about electors revert to the Romans, that is if the pope and all the electors have been infected with heretical wickedness. If, therefore, the pope and all the cardinals were to become heretics and the Romans were to remain catholic, having suitable care for the faith and the common good in so far as it pertained to them, by that fact the Romans would have the right to elect and the power to make arrangements about electors. If the pope and the emperor had become heretics when the emperor alone had the right to elect, the Romans for that reason would have recovered the right to elect and the power to make arrangements about electors.
Discipulus Istam opinionem volo quod aliquantulum tractemus diffuse. Ideo antequam alleges pro ipsa, ut magis addiscam {*advertam &NaPeRe} an aliquid veritatis contineat, opto ut aliqua circa ipsam declares. Primo igitur dic quare {quando &Pe} innuit opinio ista quod ius eligendi non revertitur ad Romanos nisi Papa efficeretur {*efficiatur &NaRe} haereticus. Videtur {*enim add. &NaPeRe} quod si soli cardinales vel {*omnes add. &NaMzPeRe} alii {om. &Pe} electores - si alii essent - efficerentur haeretici reverteretur {revertetur &Mz} ius eligendi ad Romanos quia eo ipso quod cardinales {Romani &Pe} vel alii electores {sive cardinales add. &Pe} efficerentur haeretici essent privati iure eligendi. Sed eo ipso quod aliqui privantur electione sive potestate eligendi ius eligendi devoluitur ad alios ad quos spectat de iure. Ergo non oportet quod {oportet quod om. &Pe} papa efficiatur {efficitur &Pe} haereticus ad hoc quod ius eligendi revertatur ad Romanos.	Student I want us to consider that opinion at some length. So that I better perceive whether it contains some truth, therefore, I want you, before you bring forward arguments for it, to make some things about it clear. First, therefore, tell me why that opinion implies that the right to elect does not revert to the Romans unless the pope becomes a heretic. For it seems that if the cardinals alone or all the other electors --- if there were others --- became heretics, the right to elect would revert to the Romans because the cardinals or other electors would be deprived of the right to elect by virtue of the fact that they became heretics. But by the fact that some are deprived of the election or of the power to elect, the right to elect devolves upon others to whom it pertains by right. It is not necessary, therefore, that the pope become a heretic for the right to elect to revert to the Romans.
Magister Ista opinio intelligit quod papa superstite ius eligendi non revertitur ad Romanos quamvis cardinales vel alii electores - si essent alii, sicut aliquando {alii &Na} fuerunt alii - efficerentur haeretici nisi etiam papa efficeretur haereticus, quia licet cardinales eo ipso quod efficerentur haeretici essent privati iure eligendi tamen papa catholicus superstes non esset propter hoc {propter hoc om. &Pe} {propter hoc: papa &Mz} privandus {*privatus &NaPeRe} potestate ordinandi de electoribus. Sed si papa esset mortuus, eo ipso quod cardinales efficerentur haeretici, ius eligendi illa vice {illa vice om. &Pe} reverteretur ad Romanos.	Master That opinion means that as long as the pope survives, the right to elect does not revert to the Romans even if the cardinals or other electors --- if there were others, as there sometimes have been --- were to become heretics, unless the pope too were to become a heretic, because although the cardinals would be deprived of the right to elect by the fact that they became heretics, yet the pope, surviving as a catholic, would not for this reason be deprived of the right to make arrangements for electors. But if the pope were dead, by the fact that the cardinals had become heretics, the right to elect would on that occasion revert to the Romans.
Discipulus Quare dicitur quod ius eligendi illa vice revertitur {*reverteretur &NaPeRe} {revertetur &Mz} ad Romanos?	Student Why is it said that on that occasion the right to elect would revert to the Romans?
Magister Ideo {*Hoc &NaRe} dicitur quia {quod &Re} postquam post mortem papae vel etiam post infectionem papae haeretica pravitate eligendus {*electus &NaMzPeRe} esset papa catholicus, qui etiam {*qui etiam om. &NaMzPeRe} {*ille papa catholicus add. &NaPeRe} [[margin Pe]] haberet potestatem ordinandi de electoribus {*trs.231 &NaRe} sicut et alii praedecessores {praecessores &Mz} sui posito quod {*posito quod: si &NaMzPeRe} Romani transtulerint {*transtulerunt &NaPeRe} ius et potestatem suam in papam ratione officii et non ratione personae {Christi add. &Pe}.	Master This is said because after, on the death of a pope or also his infection with heretical wickedness, a catholic pope should be elected [accepting eligendus]. That catholic pope would have the same power to make arrangements about electors as his other predecessors, if the Romans transferred that right and power of theirs to the pope by reason of his office and not by reason of his person.
Discipulus Quare dicit ista {*illa &MzPe} opinio quod in isto {*illo &NaPeRe} {nullo &Mz} casu reverteretur {revertitur &Na} {revertetur &Mz} {*ad Romanos add. &NaRe} non solum ius eligendi sed etiam {et &Mz} potestas ordinandi de electoribus?	Student Why does that opinion say that in that case not only does the right of choosing revert to the Romans but also the power of making arrangements about electors?
Magister Hoc dicitur quia {quod &Mz} saepe aliqua multitudo habet ius eligendi et tamen non expedit quod omnes eligant quia multi moverentur malo zelo et saepe non possent in personam idoneam convenire, aliquotiens {aliquoties &Na} etiam non possent in unum locum congruum {*congrue &NaPeRe} convenire, et ideo expedit quod ordinent qui {quid &Mz} debeant eligere committendo uni personae vel personis paucis respectu totius multitudinis distinctis {*discretis &NaRe} {discrete &Pe} et zelum fidei ac boni communis habentibus {eorum add. &Pe} ius eligendi. Propter hoc enim ab antiquo electiones praelatorum concessae fuerunt clericis, quia, licet omnes clerici et laici habuerunt {habuerint &Pe} ius eligendi, de consensu tamen laicorum, propter hoc quod clerici erant sapientiores et sanctiores {scientiores &Na} laicis, ordinatum fuit quod ipsi soli haberent ius eligendi. Et ideo quando laici essent discretiores et meliores clericis ius eligendi deberet auferri a clericis et dari laicis quia illa quae spectant ad bonum commune et {om. &Pe} non competunt aliquibus ratione ordinis aut officii divini cui mancipati existunt {essent &Na} per sapientiores et meliores et per quos potest bonum commune melius prosperari sunt tractanda. Et ista fuit causa quare plures Romani pontifices in quantum Romani una cum aliis Romanis quibusdam imperatoribus, licet essent laici, dederunt ius eligendi summum pontificem.	Master This is said because some multitude often has the right to elect without its being expedient that everyone elect, because many would be inspired by an evil zeal and often they could not agree on a suitable person, at different times they could not even agree suitably on one place, and therefore it is expedient that they make arrangements about who should elect by committing the right to elect to one person or to a few persons separate from the whole multitude and having a zeal for the faith and the common good. For it was on account of this that the elections of prelates were conceded from of old to clerics, because, although all clerics and laymen had the right to elect, yet it was arranged with the agreement of laymen, because of the fact that clerics were wiser and holier than laymen, that they alone [the clerics] were to have the right to elect. And therefore when laymen were wiser and better than clerics the right to elect should have been removed from clerics and given to laymen, because those things that pertain to the common good and do not belong to anyone by reason of their order or the divine office to which they are vowed should be managed by wiser and better men and those through whom the common good can best prosper. And that is the reason why many Roman pontiffs, in so far as they were Romans, together with other Romans gave the right to elect the highest pontiff to some emperors, although they were laymen.
Discipulus Quare dicit {dicitur &Re} ista opinio quod in casu praedicto ius eligendi reverteretur {revertetur &Mz} ad Romanos si Romani remanerent catholici {*etc add. &NaMzPeRe}?.	Student Why does that opinion say that in the above case the right to elect would revert to the Romans if the Romans were to remain catholic, etc?
Magister Hoc dicunt {*dicit &Re} {dicitur &Na} quia {quod &Na} si Romani cum papa et electoribus efficerentur haeretici vel de electione summi {Romani &Pe} pontificis ex qua {quo &Pe} pendet bonum commune Christianitatis essent in detrimentum Christianae religionis negligentes vel desides {desidentes &MzPe} ius eligendi non reverteretur {revertetur &Mz} ad Romanos.	Master It says this because if the Romans together with the pope and the electors became heretics or, in connection with the election of the highest pontiff, on which hangs the common good of christianity, were negligent or idle to the detriment of the christian religion, the right to elect would not revert to the Romans.
Discipulus Ad quos revertetur {*reverteretur &NaPeRe} vel devolvetur {*devolveretur &NaPeRe}?	Student To whom would it revert or upon whom would it devolve?
Magister Dicitur quod devolvetur {*devolveretur &NaRe} {dicitur quod devolvetur om. &Pe} ad alios Christianos catholicos debite de electione facienda sollicitos.	Master It is said that it would devolve upon other catholic christians who were duly solicitous about making an election.
Discipulus Hoc videtur irrationabiliter {*videtur irrationabiliter: non videtur rationabiliter &NaMzPeRe} dictum, quia alii catholici sunt in tanta multitudine quod non possent in aliquem unum locum *{trs. &NaRe} convenire ad tractandum de electione {summi add. &Pe} futuri pontificis.	Student This does not seem to be a reasonable statement, because there is so great a number of other catholics that they could not come together in any one place to deal with the election of the future pontiff.
Magister Respondetur quod in tali casu provinciae vel dioeceses aut {*parochie vel alique alie multitudines que convenire non /om. NaRe\ valerent deberent eligere aliquas personas et eis committere vices suas que nomine absentium cum aliis de electione tractare deberent. Quecumque autem provincie vel dioceses aut add. &NaPeRe} multitudines et quaecunque personae diligentiam quam deberent minime adhibentes {*adhiberent &NaMzPeRe} ad eligendum summum pontificem eo ipso essent iure eligendi et potestate de electione facienda ordinandi {*trs.4123 &NaRe} privatae, {privati &NaMzPeRe} et ius eligendi {ordinandi &Pe} devolveretur ad alios, ita quod {ita quod: itaque &Re} si unus solus clericus vel laicus remaneret qui ut deberet esset {esse &NaRe} solicitus de electione facienda ius eligendi devolveretur ad ipsum. [[ita quod ... ad ipsum is written twice in Re; the first time, which is crossed out, reads ita quod for itaque, esset for esse and alios for ipsum.]].	Master The reply is that in such a case the provinces, dioceses, parishes or any other large groups which can not come together ought to elect some persons and commit their duties to them, who in the name of those who are absent ought with others to manage the election. Whatever provinces, dioceses or large groups, however, and whatever persons were not to employ the care which they owe in choosing the highest pontiff, would for that reason be deprived of the right to elect and of the power to make arrangements for the holding of the election, and the right to elect would devolve upon others, so that if only one cleric or layman were to remain who was solicitous as he should be about making the election, the right to elect would devolve upon him.
Discipulus Quid si nullus esset sollicitus ut deberet?	Student What if no one were solicitous as he should be?
Magister Respondetur quod, sicut nunquam usque ad finem mundi fides deficiet, ita semper aliquis erit in gratia et debito modo sollicitus de his quae sunt necessaria Dei ecclesiae {*trs. Re} {Dei ecclesiae: in ecclesia Dei Na}. Si autem nullus esset sollicitus sed omnes essent {*om. &NaPeRe} negligentes circa electionem summi pontificis necessario faciendam omnes essent extra gratiam et in peccato mortali quod nunquam {deo concedente add. &Pe} eveniet {evenient &Re} {in hoc mundo add. &Pe}.	Master The reply is that just as until the end of the world faith will never be lacking, so there will always be someone in grace and duly solicitous for those things which are necessary for the church of God. If no one were solicitous, however, but all were careless about the necessary election that had to be made of a supreme pontiff, all would be outside grace and in mortal sin, but this will never happen.
CAP. IX. Discipulus Quantum volo explicasti vel {*explicasti vel om. &NaRe} explicare curasti opinionem praedictam. Ideo nunc incipe allegare pro ipsa. aut primo {*aut primo: Primo autem &NaPeRe} conare respondere {*ostendere &NaPeRe} quod electores quicunque summi pontificis sive {om. &Pe} cardinales sive imperator sive aliqui {*alii &NaMzPeRe} quicunque clerici vel laici si efficerentur haeretici eo ipso essent privati iure eligendi summum pontificem.	Chapter 9 Student You have attended as much as I want to an explanation of that opinion. Now, therefore, begin to bring forward arguments for it. First, however, try to show that if any electors of the supreme pontiff, whether cardinals, the emperor or any other clerics or laymen, were to become heretics, they would by that fact be deprived of the right to elect the supreme pontiff.
Magister Hoc videtur multipliciter {non &Pe} posse probari. Primo sic: illi qui non sunt de corpore ecclesiae {om. &Pe} non possunt eligere caput ecclesiae quia caput ecclesiae a membro vel membris ecclesiae solummodo eligi debet. Sed haeretici quicunque sive {*fuerint add. &NaRe} cardinales sive alii non sunt de corpore ecclesiae quia omnes haeretici per haeresim exeunt ecclesiam, teste beato Cypriano qui, ut legitur 1, q. 1, c. Si quis, ait, "Si quis de ecclesia haeretica praesumptione {eximi add. &Na} [[unclear]] exierit a semetipso damnatus est." Ergo haeretici non habent ius eligendi summum pontificem.	Master This seems provable in many ways. First as follows: those who are not [part] of the body of the church can not elect the head of the church, because the head of the church should be chosen only by a member or members of the church. But no heretics, whether they were cardinals or others, are [part] of the body of the church, because all heretics depart from the church because of their heresy. Blessed Cyprian attests to this when he says, as we read in 1, q. 1, c. Si quis [c. 70, col.382, "If anyone departs from the church with heretical presumption, he himself condemns himself." Therefore heretics do not have the right to elect the supreme pontiff.
Amplius illi {*ille &NaRe} cui {quibus &Pe} catholici per praeceptum iuris Dei {*Domini &NaPeRe} communicari {*communicare &NaRe} non debent non habent {*habet &Re} ius eligendi summum pontificem, quia electoribus summi pontificis communicare tenentur catholici quomodo {quem &Pe} elegerunt {legerint &Re} {*elegerint &Na} audiendo. Sed haereticis per praeceptum iuris Dei {*domini &NaPeRe} catholici communicare non debent, teste beato Paulo qui ad Titum {ad Titum: actuum &Pe} tertio [:10] ait, "Haereticum hominem post primam et secundam correctionem {*correptionem &NaVg} devita." Et beatus Iohannes {*in add. &Pe} canonica sua {*2 add. &Mz} [:10-11] {*etiam add. &Re} {et add. &Na} {2 c. add. &Pe} ait, "Si quis venit ad vos et hanc doctrinam non affert, {auffert &Na} {asserit &Pe} nolite recipere eum in domum nec {ne &Pe} Ave ei dixeritis. Qui enim dicit {dixit &Pe} ei {*illi &NaReVg} Ave, communicat eius opinionibus {*operibus &NaPeReVg} malignis." Super quibus verbis dicit Beda, ut legitur 24, q. 1, c. Omnis, "Haec Iohannes de haereticis sive schismaticis {schimatibus &Pe} evitandis {*devitandis &NaReZn} quae {qui &Re} verbis docuit etiam factis exhibuit. Narrat enim de illo {de illo: ille &Pe} auditor {que illa add. &Pe} sanctissimus eius {*trs. &NaReZn} Polycarpus Smyrneorum antistes, quia tempore quodam cum apud Ephesum balneas lavandi gratia fuisset ingressus et {cum &Pe} vidisset ibi Cherinthum {Cherintho &Mz} exire {*om. &NaMzPeRe} continuo discessit non lotus dicens, `Fugiamus hinc ne et {etiam &Mz} balneae ipsae nos {*om. &NaMzPeReZn} corrumpant {*corruant &NaMzPeReZn} in quibus Cherinthus lavatur inimicus veritatis.'" Ex quibus aliisque quam pluribus colligitur quod haereticis catholici communicare non debent. Ergo haeretici cardinales vel alii ius eligendi summum pontificem habere non possunt.	Further, he with whom, by the teaching of the law of the Lord, catholics ought not to communicate does not have the right to elect the supreme pontiff, because catholics are bound to communicate with the electors of the supreme pontiff by listening to how they have chosen. But by the teaching of the law of the Lord catholics ought not communicate with heretics. Blessed Paul attests to this when he says in Titus 3:10, "After a first and second admonition have nothing more to do with anyone who is a heretic." And blessed John also says in his second letter [2 John 2:10-11], "Do not receive into the house or welcome anyone who comes to you and does not bring this teaching; for to welcome is to participate in the evil deeds of such a person." As we read in 24, q. 1, c. Omnis [c. 24, col. 975], Bede says about these words, "These things that John taught with his words about the need to avoid heretics or schismatics he also showed by his actions. For his student, the most holy Polycarp, bishop of Smyrna, says of him that when on a certain occasion he had gone into the baths at Ephesus to wash himself and had seen Cherinthus there, he immediately went out without having washed, saying, `Let us hasten away from here lest the very baths in which that enemy of truth Cherinthus washes himself fall to the ground.'" We gather from these and very many other [texts] that catholics should not communicate with heretics. Cardinals or others who are heretics, therefore, can not have the right to elect the supreme pontiff.
Rursus qui habendus est sicut ethnicus et publicanus ius eligendi summum pontificem habere non potest quia infideles scilicet ethnici non sunt capaces talis {huius scilicet &Pe} iuris, sed haereticus habendus est sicut ethnicus et publicanus {*quia qui ecclesiam dei contempnit - quod facit hereticus - habendus est sicut ethnicus et publicanus add. &NaRe}, teste Hieronymo qui, ut legitur 24. q. 1. c. Omnibus, ait, "Hanc domum," scilicet ecclesiam Dei, "si quis corrigentem corripientemque contemserit, `Sit tibi,' inquit, `tanquam {sicut &Pe} ethnicus et publicanus.'" Ergo haereticus iure eligendi summum pontificem si habuerit {*habuit &NaRe} est privatus.	Again, he who should be considered as a gentile and a tax collector can not have the right to elect the supreme pontiff, because unbelievers, that is gentiles, are not capable of such a right. But a heretic should be considered as a gentile and tax collector because he who defies the church of God - which a heretic does - should be considered as a gentile and tax collector. As we read in 24, q. 1, c. Omnibus [c. 20, col.973], Jerome attests to this when he says, "If anyone defies this house," that is the church of God, "when it corrects and reproves him, it is said, `Let him be to you like a gentile and a tax gatherer.'" If a heretic has possessed the right to elect the supreme pontiff, therefore, he has been deprived of it.
Praeterea qui nihil potestatis ac iuris {nihil potestatis et iuris: nullam potestatem aut ius &Pe} habent {*habet &NaRe} non habet ius eligendi summum pontificem, quod non minimum inter iura ecclesiastica est censendum. Sed haeretici nihil potestatis ac iuris {nihil potestatis ac iuris: nullam potestatem aut ius &Pe} habent, teste beato Cypriano qui, ut legitur 24, q. 1, c. Didicimus {*Dicimus Zn} ait, "Didicimus {*Dicimus Zn} {*omnes add. &ReZn} omnino haereticos et schismaticos nihil potestatis {nihil potestatis: nullam potestatem &Pe} habere {*trs. &NaReZn} ac iuris." Quod de iure ecclesiastico intelligit Cyprianus quia {qui &Na} iura secularia poterant {poterunt &Pe} aliquando habere haeretici. Ergo haeretici {om. &Na} ius eligendi summum pontificem habere non possunt.	Moreover, he who has no power and right does not have the right to elect the supreme pontiff, because it should be considered as not the least of the ecclesiastical rights. But heretics have no power and right, as blessed Cyprian attests when he says, as we read in 24, q. 1, c. Dicimus [c. 31, col.977], "We say that absolutely all heretics and schismatics have no power and right." Cyprian takes this to mean an ecclesiastical right because heretics were sometimes able to have secular rights. Therefore heretics can not have the right to elect the supreme pontiff.
Item {om. &Pe} inimici fidei Christianae et omnium catholicorum {christianorum &Pe} non possunt habere ius eligendi caput omnium catholicorum {christianorum &Pe} per {*om. &NaRe} quod pro fide Christiana etiam morti si oportet {oporteret &Pe} se debent {*debet &NaMzPeRe} exponere. Sed cardinales si sunt {sint &Pe} haeretici sunt inimici fidei Christianae et omnium catholicorum. Ergo cardinales si sunt haeretici {sunt inimici ... heretici om. &Na} non habent ius eligendi summum pontificem.	Again, enemies of the christian faith and of all catholics can not have the right to elect the head of all catholics, who for the sake of the christian faith ought to expose himself even to death if it is necessary. But if cardinals are heretics they are enemies of the christian faith and of all catholics. If cardinals are heretics, therefore, they do not have the right to elect the supreme pontiff.
Praeterea qui habent ius eligendi summum pontificem in terra ubi est {ubi est: et ubi &Pe} electio celebranda sunt tenendi per catholicos et fovendi. Sed cardinales vel alii qui habuissent ius eligendi {ius eligendi om. &Pe} summum pontificem si efficiantur haeretici in nulla terra catholicorum sunt tenendi vel fovendi, perhibente {*prohibente &NaPeRe} concilio Lateranensi testimonium {*om. &NaPeRe} ex quo, ut legitur Extra, De haereticis c. Sicut, sic habetur, "Sub anathemate prohibemus ne quis eos," scilicet haereticos, "in domo vel in terra sua tenere vel fovere {*aut add. &NaMzPeReZn} negotiationem cum eis {cum eis om. &Pe} exercere praesumat." Ergo cardinales si efficiantur haeretici non habent ius eligendi summum pontificem.	Moreover, those who have the right to elect the supreme pontiff should be maintained and supported by catholics in the land where the election should be celebrated. But if cardinals or others who have had the right to elect the supreme pontiff become heretics they should not be maintained or supported in any catholic land, according to the prohibition of the Lateran council from which we find the following, as we read in Extra, De hereticis, c. Sicut [c.8, col.779], "We forbid under anathema anyone to presume to maintain or support them," that is heretics, "in their house or in their land or to carry out any business with them." If cardinals become heretics, therefore, they do not have the right to elect the supreme pontiff.
CAP. X. Discipulus Ex quo secundum istam opinionem cardinales si efficiantur haeretici non habent {*non habent: amittunt &NaPeRe} ius eligendi summum pontificem, sed amittunt huiusmodi ius eligendi {*sed amittunt huiusmodi ius eligendi om. &NaPeRe} nunquid ipsis revertentibus ad catholicam fidem recuperant {recuperare &Na} {recuperarent &Re} [[changed from reuperare]] idem ius?	Chapter 10 Student Because cardinals who become heretics lose the right to elect the supreme pontiff, according to that opinion, do they recover that right when they return to the christian faith?
Magister Respondetur quod si cardinales effficiantur haeretici quantumcunque occulti non recuperant ius eligendi summum pontificem quamvis revertantur ad orthodoxam fidem et culpam haereticae pravitatis per poenitentiam diluant {diluerant &Mz} nisi idem ius de novo conferatur eisdem {eidem &Mz}; et {om. &Pe} idem dicitur de quocunque {*quolibet &NaRe} cardinali si aliquis eorum efficiatur haereticus aliis remanentibus in catholica veritate, quia ex tunc non poterit eligere nisi de novo ius eligendi {ius eligendi om. &Pe} conferatur eidem.	Master The reply is that if cardinals become heretics, however secretly, they do not recover the right to elect the supreme pontiff, even if they return to the orthodox faith and wash away the defect of heretical wickedness by penance, unless the same right is conferred on them anew; and the same thing is said about any cardinal at all if any of them becomes a heretic while the others remain in catholic truth because from that moment he will not be able to elect unless the right to elect is conferred on him anew.
Discipulus Pro ista assertione aliquas allegationes adducas?	Student Would you bring forward some arguments for this assertion?
Magister Haec assertio taliter posse probari videtur. Nulla dignitas ecclesiastica per haereticam pravitatem amissa retineri potest sine dispensatione. Ergo similiter nullum ius ecclesiaticum sive spirituale per haereticam pravitatem amissum poterit recuperari absque nova collatione eiusdem iuris nisi ex sola ordinatione Christi competat; eis {*om. &NaRe} et per consequens si cardinales per hereticam pravitatem {*trs. &NaRe} amittant ius eligendi summum pontificem, idem ius recuperare non poterunt {potuerunt &Pe} [[changed from poterunt]] absque collatione nova eiusdem iuris, cum cardinales immediate ex sola ordinatione Christi non habeant {habent &Pe} ius eligendi summum pontificem sed mediante ordinatione humana.	Master This assertion seems provable as follows. No ecclesiastical dignity lost by heretical wickedness can be retained without dispensation. Similarly therefore, no ecclesiastical or spiritual right lost by heretical wickedness will be able to be recovered, unless it belongs [to its possessor] by Christ's decree alone, without that right being newly conferred; and, consequently, if cardinals lose the right to elect the supreme pontiff by heretical wickedness they will not be able to recover that right without its being newly conferred, since cardinals do not have the right to elect the highest pontiff immediately by Christ's decree alone, but mediately by human decree.
Discipulus Haec ratio non videtur concludere. Nam quod dignitates {dignitas &Pe} ecclesiae per pravitatem haereticam ammittantur {amittatur &Pe} non est ex natura rei sed ex constitutione ecclesiae. Ecclesia enim volens punire haereticos statuit ut ecclesiasticas dignitates amitterent {*amittant &NaMzPeRe} quas possent si non obviaret constitutio ecclesiae retinere, quia potestates spirituales quae non {*om. &NaMzPeRe} sunt maiores {in add. &Pe} dignitatibus ecclesiasticis remanent in haereticis, sicut potestas conficiendi corpus Christi si haereticus est sacerdos et potestas conferendi ordines si est episcopus. Ergo etiam si {om. &Mz} non {*si non: nisi &NaPeRe} obviaret constitutio ecclesiae dignitates ecclesiasticas retinerent. Ex quo infertur quod haeretici retinent iura spiritualia quae prius habuerunt nisi per constitutionem ecclesiae priventur eisdem. Sed nulla invenitur {om. &Pe} constitutio ecclesiae per quam cardinales si efficiantur haeretici priventur {*privantur &NaMzPeRe} iure eligendi summum pontificem. Ergo absque collatione nova recuperant idem ius si ad veritatem redierint orthodoxam.	Student That argument does not seem to be conclusive. For, that the dignities of the church are lost by heretical wickedness is not due to the nature of reality but due to a regulation of the church. For in wanting to punish heretics the church determined that they lose the ecclesiastical dignities which they could retain if the determination of the church did not prevent it, because spiritual powers which are greater than ecclesiastical dignities, such as the power to accomplish the sacrifice of the body of Christ if the heretic is a priest and the power to confer orders if he is a bishop, remain with heretics. Therefore they would also retain their ecclesiastical dignities unless a determination of the church were to prevent it. It is inferred from this that heretics retain the spiritual rights that they had before, unless they are deprived of them by a determination of the church. But we do not find any determination of the church by which cardinals who become heretics are deprived of the right of choosing the supreme pontiff. If they return to orthodox truth, therefore, they recover the same right without its being conferred anew.
Magister Nonnullis apparet {videtur &Pe} quod ista responsio {*trs. &NaRe} non sufficit. Nam, ut dicunt, haeretici non per solam constitutionem ecclesiae sed eo ipso quod sunt haeretici etiam si nulla constitutio ecclesiae {om. &Pe} esset amittunt ecclesiasticas dignitates quantum ad omnia quae a viatoribus amitti possunt. Quod sic probatur. Non est maior ratio de uno spirituali amissibili quod amittatur absque constitutione ecclesiastica per haereticam pravitatem quam de alio quia qua ratione diceretur quod cum haeretica pravitate posset stare unum spirituale amissibile eadem facilitate diceretur hoc de quocumque alio spirituali amissibili. Sed aliquod est spirituale amissibile {eadem facilitate ... amissibile om. &Pe} quod {quia &Re} ex natura rei non stat cum heretica pravitate quamvis nulla esset constitutio {*ecclesie add. &NaPeRe}. Ergo nullum etiam {*et &MzNaPeRe} {*trs. &MzNaPeRe} spirituale amissibile stat cum haeretica pravitate.	Master It seems to some that this response is not adequate. For, they say, it is not by a determination of the church only but by the fact that they are heretics, even if there were no determination of the church, that heretics lose ecclesiastical dignities, in the sense of everything that can be lost by pilgrims. This is proved as follows. There is not a greater argument for any one loseable spiritual [right] which is lost by heretical wickedness without an ecclesiastical determination than there is for any other, because by any argument by which it were to be said that one loseable spiritual [right] could endure despite heretical wickedness it would be said with the same facility about any other loseable spiritual [right]. But something is a loseable spiritual [right] because by the nature of reality it does not endure at the same time as heretical wickedness even if there is no determination of the church. And therefore no loseable spiritual [right] endures at the same time as heretical wickedness.
Maior videtur clara. Minor probatur {minor probatur om. &Pe}. Nam papalis dignitas quantum ad omnia {*spiritualia add. &NaMzPeRe} amissibilia {*om. &NaRe} quae sunt propria dignitati papali absque omni constitutione ecclesiae per haereticam pravitatem amittitur. Quod sic ostenditur. Nullus potest ligari sententia canonis nisi {ubi &Pe}, quamvis non esset lata sententia {*eiusdem add. &NaMzPeRe} canonis, sit minor et inferior conditore eiusdem canonis {sit minor ... canonis om. &Pe}. Sed papa si efficiatur haereticus ligatur sententia canonis conditi a praedecessore suo, teste glossa quae 24, q. 1, c. 1 ait, "Hic est casus in quo papa papam ligare potest, in quo papa {om. &Pe} in canonem {canone &Pe} latae sententiae incidit. Nec {*huic add. &Zn} obviat regula illa: quia {om. &Pe} par {in add. &Pe} parem solvere et {*vel &NaReZn} ligare non potest, quia si papa haereticus est {trs. &NaRe} in eo quod haereticus est minor est {minor est: minorem &Mz} quolibet {quocumque &NaRe} catholico, quia lex factum notat {*etiam add. &NaReZn} {et add. &Pe} sine sententia." Ergo papa effectus hereticus minor est conditore canonis quo ligatur etiam si idem conditor nullam publicet {*tulisset &NaMzPeRe} sententiam. Ex quo infertur quod dignitas papalis {*absque add. &NaMzPeRe} omni constitutione {*ecclesiae add. ??} amittitur per haereticam pravitatem {etc add. &Pe}.	The major [premise] seems clear. The minor [premise] is proved. For the papal office, in the sense of all the spiritual gifts that are proper to it, is lost by heretical wickedness without any determination of the church. This is shown as follows. No one can be bound by the sentence of a canon unless, even if the sentence of that canon were not published, he is less than and inferior to the framer of that canon. But if the pope becomes a heretic he is bound by the sentence of a canon framed by his predecessor, as the gloss on 24, q. 1, c. 1 [col. 1382] attests when it says, "This is a case in which a pope can bind a pope, in which a pope falls under the canon of a sentence that has been published. Nor does the rule that an equal can not loose or bind an equal conflict with this, because if the pope is a heretic, by virtue of the fact that he is a heretic, he is less than any catholic at all, because the law notes the fact even without a sentence." Therefore a pope who has become a heretic is less than the framer of the canon by which he is bound, even if that framer had not published any sentence. It is inferred from this that the papal office is lost by heretical wickedness without any determination of the church.
Discipulus Non videtur verum quod omne ius spirituale amissibile per haereticam pravitatem {*trs. &NaPeRe} amittatur absque constitutione ecclesiae et {om. &NaRe} quod {que &Re} [[contradicat quod: margin Re]] non possit recuperari absque nova collatione eiusdem iuris. Nam ius eligendi summum pontificem est ius spirituale, ut isti dicunt, et tamen si Romani efficerentur haeretici non amitterent illud ius {*trs. &NaPeRe} quia tunc ipsis redeuntibus de haeresi {*trs.231 &NaRe} non recuperarent ius eligendi per rationem praedictam.	Student It does not seem true that every loseable spiritual right is lost by heretical wickedness without a determination of the church and that it can not be recovered without that same right being conferred anew. For the right to elect the supreme pontiff is a spiritual right, they say, and yet the Romans would not lose that right if they were to become heretics, because then, by the above argument, they would not recover the right to elect if they return from their heresy.
Similiter si Romani et cardinales omnes qui habent ius eligendi efficerentur haeretici ius eligendi illa vice devolveretur ad alios catholicos. Quo posito, ponatur {ponitur &Pe} iterum quod omnes alii {om. &Na} Christiani efficiantur haeretici praeter decem. Quo posito, omnes Christiani praeter illos {om. &Pe} decem amitterent ius {om. &Mz} eligendi summum pontificem. Quo posito, de Christianis haereticis {om. &Pe} redeant ad fidem catholicam 20 et illi {*om. &NaMzPeRe} 10 qui prius erant {*soli add. &NaPeRe} catholici {sibi add. &Mz} labantur {labuntur &Pe} in haeresim, tunc quaeritur an isti 20 reversi de haeresi habent {habeant &Pe} ius eligendi summum pontificem aut non habeant {*habent &MzNaRe} {om. &Pe}. Si habent ius eligendi, ergo absque nova collatione recuperaverunt {om. &Pe} ius spirituale quod prius amiserant per haereticam pravitatem {recuperant add. &Pe}. Si non habent ius eligendi, ergo tota ecclesia Dei esset privata iure eligendi summum pontificem, et per consequens Christus non in omnibus necessariis sufficienter {sufficit &NaRe} [[corrected interlinear Re]] providit {*providisset &NaPeRe} ecclesiae.	Similarly, if the Romans and all the cardinals who have the right to elect were to become heretics, the right to elect would devolve on that occasion to other catholics. Given this assumption, let it be assumed further that all other christians except ten become heretics. Given this assumption, all christians except those ten would lose the right to elect the supreme pontiff. Given this assumption, let twenty of the heretical christians return to the catholic faith and let the ten who were previously the only catholics slip into heresy; it is then asked whether those twenty who have returned from heresy have the right to elect the supreme pontiff or do not have [the right]. If they have the right to elect, they have therefore recovered without its being conferred anew a spiritual right which they had lost before by heretical wickedness. If they do not have the right to elect, the whole church of God would therefore be deprived of the right to elect a supreme pontiff, and, consequently, Christ would not have sufficiently provided for the church in everything that was necessary.
Item ius patronatus est {ius add. &Mz} ecclesiae et {*ecclesiae et om. &NaRe} ius spirituale et tamen quamvis amittatur per haereticam pravitatem absque nova collatione poterit recuperari. Nam si aliquis patronus fiat haereticus amittit ius patronatus. Sed si retineat rem ratione cuius est patronus et redierit ad fidei veritatem recuperat ius patronatus quod amiserat, quia, {*si add. &NaMzPeRe} ius patronatus transit cum universitate, multo magis revertitur ad illum penes quem remanserat {*remanserit &NaPe} {remansit &Re} dominium rei ratione cuius erat patronus.	Again, the right of patronage is a spiritual right, and yet even if it is lost through heretical wickedness it will be able to be recovered without its being conferred anew. For any patron who becomes a heretic loses the right of patronage. But if he retains the possession with respect to which he is a patron and returns to the true faith, he recovers the right of patronage which he had lost, because, if the right of patronage passes with the corporation, much more is it the case that it reverts to him in whose power the lordship of the possession, with respect to which he was patron, has remained.
Item dignitates ecclesiae {om. &NaRe} per haereticam pravitatem amissae recuperantur absque nova electione {*collatione &PeRe}. Ergo et iura spiritualia propter haereticam pravitatem amissa recuperari poterunt absque nova {electione ... nova om. &Na} collatione eorundem iurium. Consequentia videtur aperta {aperte &Re} quia eadem ratio videtur {*est &NaRe} de uno et de alio.	Again, dignities of the church lost by heretical wickedness are recovered without being conferred anew. Therefore spiritual rights lost on account of heretical wickedness will also be able to be recovered without those rights being conferred anew. The consequence seems clear because the same argument applies to the one as to the other.
Antecedens auctoritatibus manifestis videtur posse probari. Ait enim Augustinus, ut habetur 23. q. 4. c. Ipsa pietas, loquens de Donatistis haereticis {loquens de Donatistis hereticis om. &NaRe}, "Habeant ergo {om. &NaMzPeRe} de praeterito detestabili errore, sicut Petrus habuit de mendacii timore, amarum dolorem, et veniant {et veniant: inveniant &Re} ad ecclesiam Christi veram, id est catholicam matrem: sint {sunt &Pe} {sicut &NaRe} in illa clerici, sint {sicut &NaRe} in illa {*in illa om. &NaReZn} episcopi utiliter {om. &Na} {utilem &Pe}, qui contra eam fuerunt {fuerint &Pe} hostiliter. Non invidemus {videmus &Re}, imo amplectimur, hortamur, optamus." religiosissime {*om. &NaRe} {religiosissimum &Pe}	The antecedent seems provable by plain texts. (1) For as we find in 23, q. 4, c. Ipsa pietas [c.24, col.909], Augustine, speaking about the Donatist heretics, says, "Let them therefore have bitter grief about their aforesaid detestable error, as Peter had about his fear of untruth, and let them come to the true church of Christ, that is our catholic mother; let them be clerics in her, let them to her advantage be bishops, they who were like an enemy to her. We do not refuse them, rather we embrace, encourage and desire them."
Item ex sexta Synodo, ut legitur 1, q. 7, c. Convenientibus, sic habetur, "Religiosissimi monachi dixerunt, `Sicut receperunt {sicut receperunt om. &Pe} universales {universalem &Pe} sex {trs. &MzNaPeRe} synodi ab haeresi revertentes, ita et nos recepimus {*recipimus &NaMzPeZn}.' Sancta {sexta &Pe} synodus dixit, `Placet omnibus nobis et iussi sunt Basilius episcopus Anichirii {*Anichire &NaMzPeReZn} et Theodorus episcopus Mireae civitatis et Theodosius sedere {sedentes &Pe} in gradibus et sedibus suis.'" Et infra, "Constantinus episcopus Cypri dixit, `Sufficienter {sufficit MzRe} ostensum est quod ab haereticis venientes recipiendi sunt."	Again, (2) as we read in 1, q. 7, c. Convenientibus [c.4, cols.428], we find the following from the sixth synod, "Most devout monks have said, `Just as all six synods have accepted those who turn back from heresy, so we also accept them.' The holy synod has said, `It pleases all of us and Basil, bishop of Anichira, Theodorus, bishop of the city of Mirea, and Theodosius, bishop of Amorius, have ordered them to remain in their grades and their sees. ... Constantinus, bishop of Cyprus said, `It has been adequately shown that those coming back from heretics should be accepted."
Item Gregorius, ut habetur dist. 12, c. Nos consuetudinem, loquens de Donatistis episcopis revertentibus ad fidem ait, "Sufficiat autem illis," {*scilicet add. &NaRe} episcopis Donatistis venientibus ad catholicam fidem, "commissae sibi plebis curam gerere."	Again, (3) as we find in dist. 12, c. Nos consuetudinem [c.8, col.28], Gregory, speaking about the Donatist bishops returning to the faith, says, "Let it be enough for them, however," that is the Donatist bishops coming back to the catholic faith, "to take care of the people committed to them."
Propter ista videtur {videntur &NaRe} quod praedicta {*non add. &NaMzPeRe} sunt {*sint &NaPeRe} consona veritati. Tu vero dic quomodo respondetur {om. &NaRe} ad illa {*ipsa &NaRe}.	It seems from these [objections] that the things said above are not in accord with the truth. Now tell me how reply is made to them [the objections].
Magister Ad primum istorum dicitur {respondetur &Pe} quod si Romani omnes efficerentur haeretici ius eligendi summum pontificem amitterent, et secundum quorundam {*quamdam &NaMzPeRe} assertionem non recuperarent ius eligendi licet {sed &Pe} ab {de &Pe} haeresi reverterentur ad fidem; sed {*om. &NaPeRe} secundum aliam recuperarent idem ius propter hoc quod immediate ex ordinatione Christi et iure gentium habent ius eligendi.	Master To the first of them it is said that if all the Romans were to become heretics they would lose the right to elect the supreme pontiff; and according to one teaching they would not recover the right to elect even if they were to turn back from heresy to the faith; according to another [teaching] they would recover the same right because of the fact that they have the right to elect directly by Christ's decree and by the law of nations.
Discipulus Ubi ordinavit Christus quod Romani haberent ius eligendi summum {romanum &NaRe} pontificem?	Student Where did Christ decree that the Romans were to have the right to elect the supreme pontiff?
Magister Respondetur {om. &Mz} quod tunc hoc ordinavit quando fecit beatum Petrum caput et pontificem omnium Christianorum, dans ei potestatem eligendi sibi locum ubi poneret sedem suam, et non privavit illos, quorum {*beatus Petrus add. &NaPeRe} eligeret {elegerit &Mz} esse episcopus quodammodo {quodam &Pe} proprius {proprio &Pe} iure eligendi et ibi {*et ibi: sibi &NaPeRe} praeficiendi {*praeficiendum &NaPeRe}, quod eis competit ex iure gentium, quamvis non sic quin {qui &Pe} licite posset {*possit &NaPeRe} {*trs. &NaRe} ordinare {*ordinari &NaPeRe} etiam {*et &NaPeRe} fieri contrarium.	Master The reply is that he decreed this at the time when he made blessed Peter head and pontiff of all christians, giving him the power to elect for himself the place where he would establish his seat, and he did not deprive those whose, to some extent special, bishop blessed Peter chose to be, of their right to elect someone to be set over them, [a right] which belongs to them by the law of nations, although not in such a way that the opposite can not licitly be ordained and determined.
Discipulus Dic quomodo respondetur ad secundam obiectionem {rationem &Pe} quam feci.	Student Tell me how one may reply to the second objection that I made.
Magister Quibusdam apparet quod ista {*illa &NaPeRe} obiectio sit {*est &NaPeRe} {om. &Mz} [[gap left in Mz]] {*tam add. &NaPeRe} fantastica ut {*omni add. &NaRe} {tamen add. &Pe} {cum add. &Mz} responsione censeatur indigna. Ponit {posuit &Pe} enim casum qui nunquam evenit {convenit &Na} nec est probabile quod unquam debeat evenire.	Master It seems to some people that that objection is so fantastic that it is considered undeserving of any reply. For it posits a case that has never occurred, and it is not likely that it ever should occur.
Discipulus Videtur aliis quod illa {*ista &NaRe} {alia &Pe} obiectio non est ita fantastica quod {*quia &NaRe} quamvis casus ille nunquam evenerit, posset tamen accidere {evenire &Pe}, et temerarium est dicere quod nunquam eveniet. Ideo {*non add. &NaMzPeRe} videtur utile {*inutile &NaPeRe} ipsum discutere, quia ex discussione {discutione &Na} illorum quae nunquam vel raro accidunt profundius et subtilius intelliguntur ea {*illa &NaMzPeRe} quae saepe eveniunt. Sive ergo illa obiectio {*trs. &NaRe} fuerit fantastica sive non, dic qualiter respondetur ad ipsam quia, sicut {sic &Pe} scire mala saepe {frequenter &Pe} est utile et discutere falsa frequenter {*om. &NaRe} ad cognitionem confert plurimum veritatis, ita discutere fantastica multotiens valet {om. &Pe} ad cognoscendum illa quae vera et solida dinoscuntur.	Student It seems to other people that that objection is not so fantastic because although that case has never occurred, nevertheless it could happen, and it is rash to say that it never will occur. It does not seem useless, therefore, to discuss it, because from a discussion of those things which never or rarely happen, those things that occur often are more profoundly and subtly understood. Whether that objection was fantastic or not, therefore, tell me how reply is made to it, because, just as to know evil is often useful and to discuss falsities brings us to a greater understanding of truth, so to discuss fantastic things is often effective in the learning of those things that are known to be true and solid.
Magister Respondetur ad ipsam quod si omnes Christiani efficerentur haeretici praeter 10 qui non essent Romani, illi immediate ex speciali ordinatione Christi haberent ius eligendi summum pontificem; et si postea 20 {*non add. &NaRe} romani redirent ad catholicam veritatem et illi 10 efficerentur haeretici, {*illi add. &NaRe} 20 redeuntes ad fidem immediate ex speciali ordinatione Christi recuperarent ius eligendi summum pontificem quod prius amiserant propter {per &Pe} haereticam pravitatem.	Master The reply to this is that if all christians were to become heretics except ten who were not Romans, the latter would have directly by the special decree of Christ the right to elect the supreme pontiff; and if later twenty non-Romans were to return to catholic truth and those ten were to become heretics, the twenty returning to the faith would by the special decree of Christ recover the right to elect the supreme pontiff which they had earlier lost through heretical wickedness.
Discipulus Ubi ordinavit Christus ista?	Student Where did Christ decree these things?
Magister Dicitur quod Christus specialiter ista {*om. &NaRe} ordinavit et providit {*promisit &NaPeRe} {*ista add. &NaRe} ecclesiae quando specialiter dixit {dicit &Pe} Mat. ult. "Vobiscum sum omnibus diebus usque ad consummationem seculi." Tunc {*enim add. &PeRe} promisit quod nusquam {*numquam &MzPeRe} usque ad consummationem seculi {tunc promisit ... seculi om. &Na} in necessariis {non add. &Mz} deficeret ecclesiae suae. Et ideo, quia habere potestatem eligendi summum pontificem est necessarium ecclesiae Dei, tunc insuper {*quod semper &NaPeRe} catholici vel omnes vel aliqui qualescunque fuissent antequam {an &Na} {*ante &PeRe} haberent potestatem {*et ius add. &NaRe} eligendi summum pontificem ordinavit pariter {*et promisit add. &NaPeRe}. Quare si essent solummodo 20 {2 &Pe} catholici, et {*etiam &NaRe} laici et non Romani, qui ante fuissent haeretici, illi viginti catholici {etiam laici et non romani qui ante fuissent heretici illi 20 catholici add. &Na} immediate ex speciali ordinatione et promissione Christi haberent ius eligendi summum pontificem quia {qui &Na} non esset {est &Pe} maior ratio quod unus illorum 20 {duorum &Pe} [[interlinear]] haberet ius eligendi quam {plusquam &Pe} alius et ita {om. &Pe} omnes haberent {*idem add. &NaPeRe} ius.	Master It is said that Christ regulated and promised these things to the church when he specifically said in the last chapter of Matthew [28:20], "I am with you always until the end of the age." For at that time he promised that in anything necessary he would never until the end of the age fail his church. And therefore, because to have the power to elect the supreme pontiff is necessary to the church of God, he arranged and also promised at that time that catholics, whether all of them or some, whatever kind they had been before, would have the power and right to elect the supreme pontiff. If there were only those twenty catholics, therefore, even if they were laymen and not Romans, who had been heretics before, those twenty catholics would have directly by a particular regulation and promise of Christ the right to elect the supreme pontiff, because there is no better reason for one of those twenty to have the right to elect than for another [to have it], and so all would have the same right.
Discipulus Ista prioribus repugnare videntur quia secundum ista cardinales effecti haeretici possent recuperare ius eligendi summum pontificem absque nova collatione eiusdem iuris. Ponatur enim quod cardinales primo efficiantur haeretici et postea {*omnes add. &NaPeRe} vel aliqui eorum redeant ad catholicam fidem et omnes alii efficiantur haeretici. Tunc quaeritur an isti cardinales redeuntes de haeresi habent ius eligendi aut non habent. Si habent ergo recuperaverunt ius eligendi absque nova collatione eiusdem iuris eo ipso quod redierunt ad orthodoxam fidem. Si non habent ius eligendi et non sunt alii catholici per casum illum ergo tota ecclesia Dei caret {*careret &NaPeRe} iure eligendi summum pontificem.	Student That seems to conflict with earlier points, because according to it cardinals who had become heretics could recover the right to elect the supreme pontiff without that right being conferred anew. For it was posited first that the cardinals become heretics and later all or some of them return to the catholic faith while all others become heretics. Then it is asked whether or not the cardinals returning from heresy have the right to elect. If they do have [the right], they have therefore recovered the right to elect without that right being conferred anew because they have returned to orthodox faith. If they do not have the right to elect and there are no other catholics in that situation, the whole church of God would as a result lack the right to elect the supreme pontiff.
Magister Respondetur ad hoc quod cardinales ius eligendi quod habent ex ordinatione humana, puta ex concessione Papae vel romanorum, in nullo casu recuperant eo ipso quod revertuntur ad fidem {catholicam add. &Pe} absque nova collatione eiusdem iuris et sic intelliguntur illa quae prius dicta sunt de hoc. Sed ius eligendi quod competit eis ex ordinatione Christi possunt, saltem in casu quando {quo &Pe} non essent alii catholici, recuperare eo ipso quod redirent ad veram fidem.	Master The reply to this is that in no case, without that right being conferred anew, would cardinals recover a right to elect which they have by human decree, for example by a grant from the pope or from the Romans, because of the fact that they return to the faith; and what was said above about this is understood in that sense. But a right to elect which belongs to them by Christ's decree they can recover because of the fact that they returned to the true faith, at least in the case where there were no other catholics.
Discipulus Quare plus recuperant ius eligendi quod habent ex ordinatione Christi eo ipso quod redeunt {redeant &Pe} ab {de &Pe} haeresi ad catholicam fidem quam {illud add. &Pe} ius quod non {*om. &NaMzPeRe} habent nisi {*om. &NaMzPeRe} ex ordinatione humana?	Student Why do they recover a right to elect which they have by Christ's decree because of the fact that they return from heresy to the Christian faith more than a right which they have by human decree?
Magister Huiusmodi {huius &Pe} ratio assignatur: quia ab eodem est {*debet &NaRe} idem {*om. &NaRe} ius primo esse {om. &Pe} collatum et post {om. &Pe} amissionem {amissioni &Pe} restitutum; et ideo quia Christus ordinavit et promisit quod nullum unquam necessarium {*trs. &NaRe} deficeret ecclesiae suae, ideo ordinavit quod haeretici in tali casu quando non sunt alii catholici eo ipso quod redeunt ad {catholicam add. &Pe} fidem restituatur eis ius eligendi. Sed per {secundum &Pe} nullam ordinationem humanam habetur quod si cardinales efficiantur haeretici eo ipso quod {om. &Na} revertantur {*revertuntur &NaPeRe} ad fidem recuperent ius eligendi, et ideo non habent tale ius absque nova collatione; posset tamen inveniri {*ordinari &NaPeRe} quod eo ipso recuperarent ius eligendi {*quod efficerentur add. &NaPeRe} [[gap left in Mz at this point]] catholici.	Master The following reason is offered: because a right should first be conferred and restored after its loss by the same person; and therefore because Christ decreed and promised that his church would never lack anything necessary, he did as a result decree that in the sort of case where there are no other catholics the right to elect is restored to heretics because of the fact that they return to the faith. But we do not find in any human decree that cardinals who become heretics would recover the right to elect because of the fact that they return to the faith, and therefore they do not have such a right without its being conferred anew. It could be decreed nevertheless that in this case [[For eo ipso?]] they would recover the right to elect because they became catholics.
Discipulus Dic quid dicitur {om. &Pe} de iure patronatus amisso propter haereticam pravitatem.	Student Tell me what is said about the right of patronage lost because of heretical wickedness.
Magister Dupliciter dicitur. Uno modo quod recuperatur {recuperat &Pe} idem ius quia hoc {*est add. &NaPeRe} per ordinationem {constitutionem &Pe} humanam concessum est {*om. &NaPeRe} quia, sicut ius {om. &Pe} patronatus transit cum universitate, ita recuperatur, recuperata re ratione cuius habet aliquis {quis &Pe} ius patronatus. aliqui {*Aliter &NaPeRe} dicunt {*dicitur &NaPeRe} quod ius patronatus non recuperatur sed {*nisi &NaMzPeRe} specialiter datur {*detur &NaMzPeRe} illi qui rem recuperat.	Master Two things are said. One is that the same right is recovered because it is granted by human decree, because, just as a right of patronage passes with the corporation, so it is recovered, if the possession by reason of which someone has the right of patronage is recovered. In another way it is said that a right of patronage is not recovered unless it is specifically given to him who recovers the possession.
Discipulus Dic quid dicitur de dignitatibus ecclesiasticis propter haereticam pravitatem amissis quae dicuntur recuperari absque nova collatione vel {*collatione vel om. &NaRe} electione {*vel electione om. &Pe}.	Student Tell me what is said about ecclesiastical dignities lost due to heretical wickedness which are said to be recovered without a new election.
Magister Dicitur quod episcopatus et aliae ecclesiasticae dignitates si propter haereticam pravitatem {*trs. &NaRe} amittantur non recuperantur absque nova electione {collatione &Pe} vel aliquo aequivalenti novae electioni {collationi &Pe}. Cuiusmodi {cuius &Pe} est dispensatio qua aliquando dispensabatur cum {om. &Pe} haereticis ut reciperent {recipiant &Pe} dignitates nec {*quas &NaRe} propter haereticam pravitatem amiserant {amiserunt &Pe}. in illis {*in illis: Talis &NaRe} enim dispensatio aequivalet electioni. Omnes autem auctoritates inductae intelligi debent ita {*om. &NaPeRe} ut {*quod &NaRe} {sicut &Pe} haeretici ad dignitates {ecclesiasticas add. &Pe} amissas {*dispensative add. &NaRe} {dispensatione add. &Pe} recipiuntur et non aliter, teste Leone papa {*om. &NaPeRe} qui ut habetur 1, q. 1, c. Si quis haereticae ait, "Si quis haereticae {heretici Pe} communionis contagione se maculaverit, hoc in magno beneficio habeat si adempta omni spe promotionis in quo invenitur ordine permaneat."	Master It is said that if an episcopate and other ecclesiastical dignities are lost due to heretical wickedness they are not recovered without a new election or without something equivalent to a new election. An example of this is the dispensation by which heretics were sometimes exonerated, so that they regained the dignities that they had lost due to heretical wickedness. For such a dispensation is equivalent to an election. All the texts brought forward, however, should be understood in this way, that heretics are taken back into dignities lost as a dispensation and not otherwise. As we find in 1, q. 1, c. Si quis hereticae [c.42, col.374], Leo attests to this when he says, "If anyone has defiled himself by the pollution of heretical participation, let him hold it as a great benefit if, giving up all hope of promotion, he remain in the order in which he is found."
CAP. XI. Discipulus Assertio supra capitulo 8 {om. &Re} {*trs. &Na} recitata tenet quod cardinales pro crimine haeresis potestate eligendi papam privantur {privatur &Re} et non pro alio crimine, de quo nunc esset videndum. Sed quia hoc ex sequentibus apparebit, ideo nunc {non &Pe} excipe {*incipe &NaMzPeRe} ostendere {qualiter add. &Pe} secundum assertionem illam quod si cardinales omnes qui soli nunc habent electionem efficiantur {fiant &Pe} haeretici ius eligendi revertitur ad Romanos.	Chapter 11 Student The assertion recorded in chapter 8 above holds that cardinals are deprived of the power to elect the pope for the crime of heresy and not for another crime, and we should look at this now. But because this will be clear from what follows, begin now to show that, according to that assertion, if all the cardinals who alone now have the power of election become heretics, the right to elect reverts to the Romans.
Magister Hoc videtur diversis rationibus posse probari, quia si {scilicet &Na} papa et omnes {om. &Pe} cardinales efficiantur haeretici aut ius eligendi est penes alios {*aliquos &MzNaRe} catholicos aut in tota ecclesia Dei nulli catholici habent ius eligendi summum pontificem. Si penes alios {*aliquos &Pe} {*catholicos add. &NaRe} est ius eligendi et {est ius eligendi et: aut &Pe} {alia ... est ?sue verbum et add. Re} [[margin]] nulli alii quam Romani habent ius eligendi quia minus videtur de aliis quod ius eligendi {om. &Pe} devolvatur ad ipsos quam de Romanis. Ergo Romani habent in hoc casu ius eligendi summum pontificem. Si autem nulli catholici habent ius eligendi, ergo tota ecclesia Dei esse {*esset &NaMzPeRe} privatat {*privata &NaMzPeRe} potestate eligendi summum pontificem et ita non esset in necessariis sufficienter provisum ecclesiae Dei.	Master This seems provable by various arguments, because if the pope and all the cardinals become heretics either the right to elect is in the power of some catholics or no catholics in the whole church of God have the right to elect the supreme pontiff. If the right to elect is in the power of some catholics, then no others than the Romans have the right to elect [[illegible marginal addition in Re]] because it seems less [likely] of others than of the Romans that the right to elect devolves to them. In this case, therefore, the Romans have the right to elect the supreme pontiff. If, however, no catholics have the right to elect, the whole church of God in that case would be deprived of the power to elect the supreme pontiff and so sufficient provision in necessities would not have been made for the church of God.
Amplius non videtur aliquo modo credendum quod minus {unus &Mz} per iura divina vel humana sit provisum ecclesiae Romanae si electores et {*om. &MzNaRe} praelati ipsius priventur potestate eligendi quam {et &Mz} aliis ecclesiis inferioribus si electores {electorum &Na} ipsorum {*ipsarum &NaRe} praelatorum {*trs. &MzNaPeRe} ex aliquo casu priventur {*privarentur &NaRe} {privantur &Pe} potestate eligendi {om. &Na}. Sed huiusmodi {*aliis &MzNaRe} inferioribus ecclesiis {*trs. &MzNaRe} est provisum {*trs. &MzNaRe} {sed huiusmodi ... provisum om. &Pe} {*quomodo prelati ipsarum prefici debeant si electores priventur potestate eligendi add. &MzNaRe} Extra, De electione {*c. add. &Pe} nec {*Ne &NaMzPeRe} pro defectu. {*Ergo add. &NaRe} credendum est quod per iura divina vel humana sit provisum {promissum &Mz} Romanae ecclesiae quomodo praelatus {*ipsius add. &NaMzPeRe} eligi {ecclesie &Pe} debeat si, sede vacante, electores ipsius potestate eligendi priventur {privantur &Pe}. Quod accideret si {super &Mz} omnes cardinales una cum papa, {*vel papa add. &NaMzPeRe} mortuo, in haereticam pravitatem caderent {*trs. &MzNaRe}. Non autem aliter {alicui &Pe} est provisum {promissum &Mz} nec per iura humana nec per iura divina nisi quod {om. &Na} electio revertitur {*revertatur &NaMzPeRe} ad Romanos, qui similiter {*simul &NaMzPeRe} ex iure divino et iure gentium habuerunt ius eligendi, quia {quod &Pe} electio ad superiorem devolvi non potest, sicut contigit {*contingit &NaMzPeRe} per iura humana de aliis ecclesiis. igitur {*Ergo &MzNaRe} in hoc casu electio summi {*Romani &MzNaRe} pontificis ad Romanos revertitur.	Further, it does not seem that it should be at all believed that less provision by divine or human laws has been made for the church of Rome if the electors of its prelate are deprived of their power to elect than for other lesser churches if the electors of their prelates are deprived in any case of the right to elect. But provision has been made for other lesser churches about how their prelates should be set over them if the electors are deprived of their power to elect, (Extra, De electione, c. Ne pro defectu [c.41, col.88]). It should be believed, therefore, that by divine or human laws provision has been made for the Roman church about how its prelate should be elected, if its electors are deprived of the power to elect and the see is vacant. This would happen if all the cardinals, together with the pope or with the pope dead, were to fall into heretical wickedness. No other provision has been made, however, either by human laws or by divine laws, except that the election reverts to the Romans, who had the right to elect both by divine law and by the law of nations, because the election can not devolve upon a superior as happens by human laws with other churches. In this case, therefore, the election of the Roman pontiff reverts to the Romans.
Discipulus Ista ratio non videtur concludere. Nam iura ad ea quae frequentius eveniunt aptantur, quia ex his quae forte uno casu accidere possunt iura non constituunt {*constituuntur &NaMzPeRe}. Quod ei {*enim &MzNaRe} {autem &Pe} semel aut bis sit {*fit &NaMzPeRe} contemnunt legislatores, ut leges sacrae testantur. Sed quod electores praelatorum aliarum ecclesiarum priventur potestate eligendi saepe contingit. Quod autem {aut &Mz} electores summi pontificis potestate eligendi priventur {privantur &Pe} nunquam accidit {*evenit &MzNaRe} vel raro. Ergo quamvis per iura debeat provideri per quem vel per {om. &Pe} quos {vel per quos: per quosve &Na} sunt {*sint &NaMzPeRe} praeficiendi {alii add. &Na} praelati aliis ecclesiis si illi {ibi &Mz} {illis &Pe} quibus concessa est {*trs. &MzNaRe} electio potestate eligendi priventur, non tamen oportet quod iura provideant {prevideant &Mz} qualiter eligi debeat Romanus pontifex {debeat romanus pontifex: debeant romani pontifices &Pe} licet {*si &Pe} illi quibus concessa {*data &MzNaRe} est electio potestate eligendi priventur.	Student That argument does not seem conclusive. For laws are adapted to things that occur quite frequently, because laws are not established on the basis of those things that can perhaps happen on one occasion. For as sacred laws attest, legislators disdain what is done once or twice. But it happens often that the electors of the prelates of other churches are deprived of their power to elect. It never, or rarely, occurs, however, that the electors of the supreme pontiff are deprived of their power to elect. Although provision should be made by the laws, therefore, about by whom prelates should be set in authority over other churches if those to whom election has been granted are deprived of their power to elect, it is nevertheless not reasonable that laws make provision for how the Roman pontiff should be elected if those to whom election has been given are deprived of their power to elect.
Magister Ista obiectio multos non movet propter duo. primo {*om. &NaRe} Nam licet iura saepius {*trs. &MzNaRe} aptentur ad ea quae frequentius accidunt, tamen quandoque {quotienscumque &Pe} iura aptantur {*adaptantur &NaMzPeRe} ad ea quae raro contingunt et maxime ubi periculum spirituale {speciale &Pe} totius communitatis fidelium vertitur nisi ius subveniat; sed si, privatur {*privatis &NaRe} {privatus &Pe} potestate eligendi illis quibus data est electio summi pontificis, nullo iure neque divino neque humano subveniatur {*subvenitur &MzNaRe} ecclesiae ut possit habere summum pontificem, spirituale periculum immineret {*imminet &NaMzPeRe} toti ecclesiae. Ergo {igitur &Na} si {*iste add. &MzNaRe} casus contingat {*contigerit &MzNaRe} {contigeret &Pe} aliquo iure subvenitur ecclesiae. Cum igitur {*ergo &MzNaRe} super hoc {super hoc om. &Mz} non inveniatur ius humanum, recurrendum est ad ius divinum, ut scilicet revertatur electio ad Romanos qui similiter {*simul &MzNaPeRe} ex iure divino et iure gentium habent ius eligendi summum pontificem.	Master For two reasons that objection does not move many people. For although laws are more often applied to those things which happen quite frequently, they are nevertheless sometimes applied to those things which happen rarely, especially where the whole community of the faithful is threatened with spiritual danger unless the law helps; but if neither divine nor human law helps the church so that it can have a supreme pontiff, when those to whom the election of the supreme pontiff has been given have been deprived of the right to elect, [then] spiritual danger threatens the whole church. If that misfortune occurs, therefore, the church is helped by some law. Therefore since no human law is found concerning this matter recourse must be had to divine law, namely that election reverts to the Romans who have the right to elect the supreme pontiff both by divine law and the law of nations.
Secundo quia, sicut notat glossa dist. 28, c. De Syracusane {om. &Re} [[gap left in ms]] cautela, {c. add. &Mz} "Debet adhiberi {*debet adbiberi: Not. caveri debere &Zn} ex {om. &Na} eo quod solet aliquid fieri, ut 93 c. {*93 c: 98 dist. &NaMzPeReZn} {*c. add. &Zn} Affros et ex {*om. &Zn} dist. 23 {*63 &Zn} c. In nomine {*in nomine: Nosse &Zn}" potest colligi manifeste. Sed saepe accidit quod electores summi pontificis propter haereticam pravitatem fuerunt potestate eligendi privati. Igitur {*Ergo &MzNaRe} saltem tunc de {*om. &NaMzPeRe} iure humano debuit provideri qualiter esset eligendus summus pontifex, si hoc non fuit provisum {permissum &Mz} nisi {*om. &NaMzPeRe} iure divino; {iure divino om. &Pe} quia {*sed &NaMzPeRe} tunc {om. &Na} super hoc non fuit editum aliquod ius humanum. igitur {*Ergo &MzNaRe} ex iure divino et ratione evidendi {*evidenti &NaMzPeRe} colligitur {*colligi &MzPe} {collationi &NaRe} [[aliter colligi: margin Re]] {*debet add. &MzNaRe} {potest add. &Pe} qualiter sit eligendus summus {romanus &Na} pontifex si electores priventur potestate eligendi {potestate eligendi: iure eligendi et potestate &Mz} et non sit papa qui valeat aliis electionem concedere. Hic {hoc &Pe} non videtur aliud {*aliquid &NaMzPeRe} probandum nisi quod saepe accidit quod electores summi pontificis propter haeresim fuerunt {fuerint &Re} potestate eligendi privati. Quod probatur per hoc quod saepe imperatores habuerunt potestatem {potestates &Mz} eligendi summum pontificem qui postea propter pravitatem haereticam {*trs. &MzNaRe} fuerunt eadem potestate privati, teste Gratiano qui dist. 63, c. {* para &MzNaRe} quia quae {*quia quae om. &NaMzPeRe} Verum ait, "Frequenter etiam in haereticorum perfidiam prolapsi," scilicet imperatores, "catholici {*catholice &NaMzPeReZn} matris ecclesiae unitatem impugnare conati sunt, ideo {*om. &NaMzPeRe} sanctorum statuta patrum adversus eos prodierunt, ut {et &Mz} semet electioni {electores &MzPe} non insererent."	Secondly because, as the gloss on dist. 28, c. De Syracusane cautela [col. 140] notes, "Note that one should be on one's guard from the fact that something is customarily done, as" can be clearly gathered "in dist. 98, c. Affros and dist. 63, c. Nosse." But it has often happened that the electors of the supreme pontiff have been deprived of their power to elect because of heretical wickedness. At that time at least, therefore, provision should have been made by human law for how the supreme pontiff should be elected, if provision had not been made for this in divine law. But at that time no human law was promulgated on the subject. It should be gathered, therefore, from divine law and by evident reason how the supreme pontiff should be elected if the electors are deprived of the power to elect and there is no pope who can grant election to others. This does not seem to be something that has to be proved, except that it has often happened that the electors of the supreme pontiff have been deprived of their power to elect because of heresy. This is proved by the fact that emperors have often had the power to elect the highest pontiff and later have been deprived of the right because of heretical wickedness. Gratian attests to this when he says in dist. 63, para Verum [c.28, col.244], "[Because ... ] having fallen frequently even into the treachery of the heretics, they," that is emperors, "have attempted to attack the unity of our catholic mother the church, the statutes of the holy fathers have come out against them so that they would not involve themselves in any election."
Discipulus Videtur quod imperatores {prelati add. &Mz} privati non fuerunt {*trs.231 &NaRe} potestate et iure eligendi summum pontificem {*summum pontificem: papam &NaMzPeRe}, sed quod renunciaverunt huiusmodi {huius &NaRe} iuri quod {*quia &MzNaRe} dicit idem {*om. &NaMzPeRe} Gratianus eadem dist. c. {*para &MzNaRe} sanctorum quia {*sanctorum quia om. &NaMzPeRe} Ex his {*quod "Ex add. &NaMzPeReZn} {*his add. &Zn} constitutionibus {imperatorum add. &MzNaRe} deprehenditur imperatores {imperator &Pe} {*illis add. &NaMzPeReZn} renunciasse privilegium quod {*privilegium quod: privilegiis que &NaMzPeReZn} de electione summi pontificis Adrianus Papa Imperatori Carolo {*trs. &NaReZn} et ad imitationem eius Leo Papa {om. &Mz} Othoni primo regi Theutonicorum fecerat {fecerunt &Mz}."	Student It seems that the emperors were not deprived of the power and right to choose the pope, but that they renounced any such right, because in the same distinction, para. Ex his [c.34, col.246] Gratian says that, "We discern from these constitutions that the emperors renounced those privileges which Pope Hadrian had issued to the Emperor Charles, and in imitation of him Pope Leo had issued to Otto I, king of the Teutons, about the election of the supreme pontiff."
Magister Respondetur quod plures imperatores etiam de quibus non legitur in decretis habuerunt ius eligendi summum pontificem, quorum aliqui perdiderunt idem ius propter haereticam pravitatem, aliqui renunciaverunt eidem iuri, et ita utrumque dictum Gratiani continet veritatem pro diversis imperatoribus.	Master The reply is that many emperors of whom we do not read in the decretals also had the right to elect the supreme pontiff; some of these lost that right because of heretical wickedness, some of them renounced it; and so each of the quotations from Gratian is true for different emperors.
CAP. XII. Discipulus Si ius eligendi Romanum episcopum revertitur ad Romanos, electoribus privatis iure eligendi et non existente papa qui de electione valeat ordinare, ad quos Romanos {om. &Pe} revertitur, utrum scilicet ad omnes vel ad aliquem et {*vel &NaMzPeRe} {ad add. &Pe} aliquos tantum?	Chapter 12 Student If the right to elect the Roman bishop reverts to the Romans once the electors have been deprived of their right to elect and there is no pope who can make arrangements for the election, to which Romans does it revert, is it, namely, to all of them or only to some of them?
To which of the Romans does it revert?
Magister Circa hoc sunt diversae opiniones {*assertiones &NaRe} {*trs. &NaRe}. Una est quae {*quod &NaMzPeRe} revertitur ad imperatorem Romanorum. Cuius ratio assignatur quoniam {*quia &NaRe} quando aliqui electores {*trs. &MzNaRe} privantur iure eligendi electio revertitur ad illum vel {*illum vel om. &NaRe} illos qui ante immediate habuerunt ius eligendi summum pontificem {*summum pontificem om. &NaMzPeRe}; sed antequam {*ante &NaRe} cardinales qui post imperatorem {*imperatores &NaMzPeRe} habuerunt ius eligendi, immediate habuit imperator {*trs.312 &MzNaPeRe} ius eligendi summum pontificem. igitur {*Ergo &MzNaRe} si cardinales propter haereticam pravitatem privantur iure eligendi Romanum episcopum, ius eligendi revertitur ad imperatorem.	Master Various assertions are made about this. One is that it reverts to the emperor of the Romans. The reason given for this is that when some electors are deprived of their right to elect, the election reverts to those who had the right to elect immediately before; but before the cardinals, who had the right to elect after the emperors, the emperor directly had the right to elect the supreme pontiff. If the cardinals are deprived because of heretical wickedness of their right to elect the Roman bishop, therefore, the right to elect reverts to the emperor.
Alia assertio est quod si cardinales efficiantur haeretici et non {om. &Mz} sit {om. &Pe} papa qui de electoribus valeat ordinare, ius eligendi {ecclesie &Mz} revertitur ad canonicos ecclesiae ubi est sedes papae, quia {qui &Pe} cessante privilegio recurrendum est ad ius commune; sed cardinales non habent ius eligendi nisi ex privilegio speciali. igitur {*Ergo &MzNaRe} si privilegium illud propter pravitatem haereticam {*trs. &MzNaPeRe} perdiderint {*perdiderunt &NaRe} recurrendum est ad ius commune. Est autem ius {om. &Pe} commune quod canonici ecclesiarum cathedralium {*trs. &MzNaRe} habent ius eligendi episcopos. igitur {*Ergo &MzNaRe} in hoc casu ad canonicos ecclesiae ubi est sedes papae revertitur ius eligendi summum pontificem.	Another assertion is that if the cardinals become heretics and there is no pope who can make arrangements about electors, the right to elect reverts to the canons of the church where the pope's see is, because when a privilege ceases there should be recourse to the common law; but the cardinals have the right to elect only by a special privilege. If they have lost that privilege because of heretical wickedness, therefore, recourse should be had to the common law. The common law, however, is that the canons of cathedral churches have the right to elect bishops. In this case, therefore, the right to elect the supreme pontiff reverts to the canons of the church where the pope's see is.
Alia est assertio quod in hoc casu electio summi pontificis {*revertitur /revolvitur Pe\ vel add. &MzNaPeRe} devolvitur ad totum clerum Romanam {*Romanum &NaMzPeRe}, quia quod soli clerici cathedralis ecclesiae habent {*habeant &MzNaRe} [[habent: margin Re]] ius eligendi summum pontificem {*summum pontificem: episcopum &NaRe} est {om. &Re} ex privilegio papali {*speciali &NaRe}; ius autem commune est quod totus clerus habeat ius eligendi. igitur {*Ergo &MzNaRe} ex quo ius eligendi summum pontificem {*vel non add. &MzNaRe} sit {*fuit &NaRe} ex privilegio papali {*speciali &MzNaRe} concesso {*concessum &NaRe} ecclesiasticis {*clericis &MzNaRe} ecclesiae ubi est sedes papae, vel, si fuit eis concessum {ecclesiasticis ... concessum om. &Pe}, postea fuit eis {*om. &NaRe} ablatum quando fuit cardinalibus datum {*trs. &MzNaPeRe}, et cessante privilegio recurrendum est ad ius commune, relinquitur quod si cardinales efficerentur {*efficiantur &MzNaRe} haeretici electio ad totum clerum Romanum revertitur. Quod autem sit ius commune {relinquitur ... commune om. &Pe} quod totus clerus habeat ius eligendi videtur testari Gratianus {*trs.321 &MzNaPeRe} qui, ut legitur dist. 63, para. {c. &Pe} Ex his ait, "Sicut electio {electioni &NaRe} summi pontificis non a cardinalibus tantum, imo etiam {et &Mz} ab aliis religiosis et ecclesiasticis {*et ecclesiasticis: clericis &MzNaReZn} auctoritate Nicolai Papa est facienda, ita est {si &?NaRe} {*om. &MzZn} et {t'/c' &Re} episcoporum electio non a {om. &Re} canonicis tantum sed {*etiam add. &MzNaReZn} ab aliis religiosis {et ecclesiasticis ... religiosis om. &Pe} clericis, sicut {sunt &Mz} {similiter &Pe} in generali synodo Innocentii {*pape add. &NaMzPeReZn} habita Romae {*trs. &NaRe} constitutum est." Unde idem {*et &NaMzPeRe} Innocentius c. {trs. &MzNaPeRe} Obeuntibus {inobeuntibus &MzPe} {*ibidem allegat quod tale est, "Obeuntibus add. &NaMzPeReZn} sane episcopis, quando {*quoniam &NaPeReZn} {quod non &Mz} ultra tres {om. &Pe} menses vacare {vacante &Pe} ecclesiam sacrorum {*sanctorum &NaMzPeReZn} patrum prohibent {prohibeant &Pe} sanctiones {sancti omnes &Pe}, sub anathematis vinculo interdicimus ne canonici de {om. &Na} sede episcopali ab {de &Pe} electione episcoporum {episcopali &Mz} excludant religiosos viros, sed eorum consilio honestam et idoneam personam in episcopum eligant. Quod si exclusis religiosis viris {*om. &MzNaReZn} electio facta fuerit, quod absque eorum consensu {consilio &NaRe} {*et conniventia add. &MzNaReZn} factum fuerit {fuerat &MzNaRe} irritum habeatur et vacuum." Ex quibus {*verbis add. &MzNaRe} apparet {*colligitur &NaMzPeRe} quod secundum ius commune ad totum clerum spectat electio.	Another assertion is that in this case the election of the supreme pontiff reverts to or devolves upon the whole Roman clergy, because it is by a special privilege that only the clerics of the cathedral church have the right to elect their bishop; the common law, however, is that the whole clergy have the right to elect. Because the right to elect the supreme pontiff, therefore, either was not granted to the clerics of the church where the pope's see is by a special privilege, or, if it was granted to them, it was taken away when it was given to the cardinals, and because when a privilege is null recourse should be had to the common law, the conclusion is left that if the cardinals become heretics, election reverts to the whole Roman clergy. Gratian seems to attest, however, that the common law is that the whole clergy has the right to elect. As we read in dist. 63, para. Ex his [c.34, col.246], he says, "Just as the election of the supreme pontiff should be carried out not only by cardinals but indeed also, on the authority of Pope Nicholas, by other religious clerics, so is the election of bishops also not to be carried out by canons only but also by other religious clerics, as was determined at the general synod held at Rome by Pope Innocent." Whence Innocent too in the same place in his c. Obeuntibus [c.35, col.247] argues that this is the case: "Indeed, since when bishops die the decrees of the holy fathers forbid a vacancy of more than three months in that church, we prohibit under a penalty of anathema the canons of the episcopal see from excluding religious men from the election of bishops; rather, with their advice they should elect an honest and suitable person as bishop. But if the election has been made with religious men excluded, let it be considered invalid and void because it had been carried out without their advice and agreement." We gather from these words that according to the common law election belongs to the whole clergy.
Alia est assertio quod si cardinales efficiantur {efficiant &Re} haeretici electio revertitur {revertetur &Mz} ad populum et clerum Romanum, ita quod ad omnes Romanos revertitur, non quod omnes eligant quia nisi essent valde pauci hoc absque confusione quae est vitanda {*trs. &NaMzPeRe} in huiusmodi {*nequaquam add. &NaMzPeRe} fieri non {*om. &NaMzPeRe} posset, sed ut de {*communi add. &NaMzPeRe} consensu omnium {om. &Pe} expresso vel tacito ordinatur {*ordinetur &MzNaRe} quod {*om. &NaMzPeRe} quis vel qui vicem {*vice &NaMzPeRe} omnium impleat {*debeat &MzNaRe} vel impleant {*debeant &NaMzPeRe} episcopum suum eligendo {*eligere &NaMzPeRe}. Possent {*enim omnes add. &NaMzPeRe} Romani in hoc casu committere vices suas imperatori catholico qui vice omnium eligeret Romanum episcopum.	Another assertion is that if the cardinals become heretics the election reverts to the Roman clergy and people, that is that it reverts to all Romans; not that all elect, because, unless there were very few of them, this could not be done without confusion, which in such a case should be avoided, but so that arrangements are made with the common consent, whether express or tacit, of all about what person or persons should elect their bishop on behalf of all. For in this case all the Romans could entrust their duty to the catholic emperor who on behalf of all would elect the Roman bishop.
Pro hac assertione sic arguitur: si aliquis {*Romanus add. &NaMzPeRe} vel aliqui a {*om. &NaMzPeRe} Romanis {*Romani &NaMzPeRe} {*specialiter add. &NaMzPeRe} posset vel possent iure divino solo vel iure humano solo {*iure divino solo vel iure humano solo om. &NaMzPeRe} in {*hoc add. &MzNaRe} {aliquo add. &Pe} casu sibi {*trs.4123 &MzNaPeRe} vendicare ius eligendi summum pontificem aut hoc posset vel possent {sibi in hoc casu add. &Mz} iure divino solo {*trs.312 &MzNaRe} aut {*vel &NaMzPeRe} iure humano solo {*trs.312 &MzNaRe} vel simul iure divino et humano; non solo iure divino, quia hoc ex scripturis sacris probari non potest; nec solo iure humano, quia omnia iura humana de hoc propter {*praeter &MzNaPeRe} canonica {*trs.4123 &NaRe} vel {*om. &NaRe} illud quod concessum fuit cardinalibus quando fuit solum {*solis &NaRe} cardinalibus concessum {*trs.2341 &NaRe} ius eligendi abrogata fuerunt; nec iure gentium potest ab aliis {*aliquo &NaRe} vel ab {*om. &NaPeRe} aliquibus Romanis specialiter vendicare {*vendicari &MzNaRe} {iudicari &Pe} tale ius, quia {quod &Pe} secundum ius gentium ad omnes spectat eligere praesidem {*praeficiendum &NaMzPeRe} eis vel ordinare quem {*quomodo &NaRe} eligere {*eligi &NaRe} debeant {*debeat &MzNaRe}, quia {quod &Pe} secundum ius gentium quod omnes tangit per omnes tractari debet. Relinquitur ergo {om. &Re} quod ad omnes Romanos tam clericos quam laicos ius eligendi revertatur {*revertitur &NaMzPeRe} ut si {*om. &NaMzPeRe} de consensu omnium tacito vel expresso {*trs.321 &MzNaRe} ordinatur {*ordinetur &NaMzPeRe} qualiter summus pontifex eligi debeat.	It is argued as follows for this assertion: If any Roman or Romans in particular were able in this case to appropriate to themselves the right to elect the supreme pontiff, he or they could do so either by divine law only or by human law only or by divine and human law at the same time; [they could not do so] by divine law only, because this can not be proved from the sacred scriptures, nor by human law alone, because all canonical human rights concerning this matter, except the right that was granted to the cardinals when the right to elect was granted to the cardinals alone, have been abrogated; nor by the law of nations can such a right be appropriated by any one Roman or by some Romans in particular, because according to the law of nations it belongs to everyone to elect someone to be set over them or to make arrangements about how he should be elected, since according to the law of nations what touches all should be managed by all. [The conclusion] is left that the right to elect reverts to all Romans both clerical and lay, so that how the supreme pontiff is elected is arranged with the express or tacit consent of all.
Amplius quando potestas {*aliqua add. &MzNaRe} non habetur ex solo iure divino, deficiente iure civili tam {et &Pe} ecclesiastico quam seculari {quam seculari om. &Pe}, recurrendum est ad ius gentium quod est antiquius et communius quam ius civile et {*sive &NaRe} ecclesiasticum sive seculare. Sed omnes Romani {*trs. &MzNaPeRe} non aliqui habuerunt {*om. &NaMzPeRe} {*specialiter simul add. &MzNaRe} {specialiter add. &Pe} ex iure divino et iure gentium {*habuerunt add. &NaMzPeRe} ius eligendi Romanum episcopum. Ad quod probandum probationes {*allegationes &NaMzPeRe} sunt adductae {*trs. &MzNaRe} prius. Ergo si circa electionem {circa electionem: totus clerus &Pe} summi pontificis omnia iura civilia canonica et secularia defecerint, quod accideret {*accidit &NaMzPeRe} si omnes cardinales {om. &Pe} efficierentur {*efficiantur &NaMzPeRe} haeretici, virtute iuris divini et iuris gentium simul potestas eligendi Romanum episcopum reverteretur {*revertitur &NaPeRe} {revertetur &Mz} ad Romanos.	Further, when some power is not possessed by divine law only and the civil law, both ecclesiastical and secular, is wanting, recourse should be had to the law of nations which is more ancient and universal than civil law whether ecclesiastical or secular. But all Romans, not some in particular, had the right to elect the Roman bishop by divine law and the law of nations at the same time. Arguments were brought forward earlier to prove this. Therefore, if all the civil laws, canonical and secular, concerning the election of the supreme pontiff were wanting, which happens if all the cardinals become heretics, the power to elect the Roman pontiff reverts by virtue of divine law and the law of nations at the same time to the Romans.
Discipulus Videtur quod ista ratio non procedit, nisi {*quia &NaMzPeRe} virtute iuris abrogati quod nullo modo {*quod nullo modo: nulla potestas /om. Pe\ &NaMzPeRe} reverti potest, quod {*quia &NaMzPeRe} si ad {*om. &MzNaRe} aliquod ius {*trs. &MzNaRe} {om. &Pe} abrogatur perinde est ac si nunquam fuisset, sed ius gentium quo Romani aliquando potuerunt {poterunt &Re} eligere Romanum episcopum quoad eos abrogatum est. Ergo virtute illius {om. &Mz} iuris potestas eligendi Romanum episcopum non revertitur ad Romanos.	Student It seems that that argument is not valid because no power can revert by virtue of a right that has been repealed, since if some right is taken away it is just as if it had never existed; but the law of nations by which the Romans have sometimes been able to elect the Roman bishop has been taken away with respect to them. The power to elect the Roman bishop, therefore, does not revert to the Romans by virtue of that law.
Magister Respondetur quod virtute iuris penitus abrogati nulla potestas revertitur; sed ius gentium cum {*quo et &NaRe} iure divino simul quo {*om. &NaRe} Romani poterant eligere Romanum episcopum {*pontificem &MzNaRe} non potest penitus abrogari {abrogare &Re} {*quia non potest abrogari /abrogare Re\ add. &MzNaRe} nisi pro tempore quo secundum ius canonicum alii habent ius eligendi. Et ideo cessante illo iure {*trs. &MzNaRe} civili et {om. &NaRe} ecclesiastico statim ius gentium tale revertitur, sicut quia de iure naturali {*nature &NaRe} {om. &MzPe} est quod omnia sunt {*sint &NaRe} communia. Ideo cessante iure gentium et civili quibus aliquid sit proprium statim revertitur ius naturale {*nature &MzNa?Re} ut omnia sint communia, sicut fuerunt ante omnem ordinationem humanam.	Master The reply is that no power reverts by virtue of a law that is completely repealed; but the law of nations by means of which - in conjunction with divine law - the Romans were able to elect the Roman pontiff can not be completely repealed, because it can not be completely repealed unless at that time others have the right to elect according to canon law. And when the civil and ecclesiastical law is null, therefore, such a law of nations immediately comes back, just as, because it is the case from the law of nature that all things are common, so when the law of nations and the civil law by which something may be property are null, the law of nature that all things are common comes back immediately, just as they were before any human decree.
CAP. XIII. Discipulus Quia ista {illa &Pe} assertio aliquam apparentiam habere videtur {videre &Mz}, dic qualiter secundum eam ad allegationes pro assertionibus contrariis respondetur.	Chapter 13 Student Because that assertion seems to have some plausibility, tell me how, according to it, reply is made to the arguments for the opposed assertions.
Magister Ad allegationem pro prima assertione dicitur quod non semper quando electores privantur iure eligendi ius eligendi revertitur ad eos {*illos &MzNaRe} qui immediate ante {antea &Pe} {*eos add. &MzNaRe} habuerunt ius eligendi, quia saepe in tali casu ius eligendi ad superiores {*superiorem &NaMzPeRe} devolvitur, nonnunquam etiam revertitur ad eos qui ex antiquiori et communiori iure habuerunt ius eligendi. Et ideo licet imperator immediate ante cardinales habuisset ius eligendi, si cardinales efficiantur haeretici ius eligendi non revertitur nec revolvitur {*devolvitur &NaMzPeRe} ad imperatorem solum {*trs. &MzNaRe} sed revertitur ad ipsum et alios Romanos simul, ut ipse cum aliis Romanis debeat {*habeat &NaMzPeRe} ordinare quomodo debeat eligi Romanus pontifex {*episcopus &MzNaRe}. In hoc tamen habet quandam praerogativam {*trs.231 &MzNaPeRe} imperator super alios Romanos quo ad electionem summi pontificis, ut sine eo, saltem si eius praesentia convenienter haberi potest {*possit &NaMzPeRe} {*trs. &MzNaRe}, Romani non debeant ad eius summi {om. &MzPe} pontificis {*eius summi pontificis om. &NaRe} electionem procedere nec de electoribus {electionibus &Mz} ordinare.	Master In response to the argument for the first assertion it is said that when electors are deprived of the right to elect, that right does not always revert to those who had it immediately before them, because in such a case the right to elect is often allotted to their superior, sometimes it even reverts to those who had the right to elect by a more ancient and general law. And although the emperor had the right to elect immediately before the cardinals, therefore, that right does not revert or is not allotted to the emperor alone if the cardinals become heretics, but reverts to him and other Romans together, so that he, together with other Romans, has the power to make arrangements about how the Roman bishop should be elected. In this matter, nevertheless, the emperor does have a certain prerogative over other Romans with respect to the election of the supreme pontiff, so that the Romans should not proceed to an election or make arrangements about electors without him, at least if his presence can be obtained conveniently.
Discipulus Quid si imperator vellet impedire electionem summi pontificis quando cardinales effecti essent {sunt &Mz} haeretici vel si {*om. &NaMzPeRe} nollet etiam {*om. &MzNaRe} se intromittere etiam requisitus per Romanos?	Student What if the emperor wanted to hinder the election of the supreme pontiff when the cardinals had become heretics or did not want to involve himself even if asked by the Romans?
Magister Respondetur quod in hoc casu Romani possent et deberent {debent &Mz} absque imperatore ad electionem prodecere, quia, sicut dictum est prius, potestas eligendi summum pontificem non competit imperatori in quantum imperator iure divino vel {*et &NaMzPeRe} iure gentium simul sed competit sibi {om. &Pe} in quantum catholicus et Romanus in quibus secum convenirent {*conveniunt &NaMzPeRe} Romani alii {*trs. &NaPeRe} et {*om. &MzNaRe} Ideo sicut alius Romanus non potest impedire Romanos quin in hoc casu debeant ad electionem procedere {trs.312 &Na}, quia sicut dictum est prius potestas eligendi summum pontificem etc {*quia sicut ... etc om. &NaRe}. {et add. &MzPe} ita nec imperator poterat {*poterit &MzNaRe} eos {trs. MzRe} impedire.	Master The reply is that in this case the Romans could and should proceed to the election without the emperor because, as was said earlier, the power to elect the supreme pontiff does not belong to the emperor by divine law and the law of nations as emperor but as a catholic and a Roman, and other Romans join him in this. Just as no other Roman, therefore, can hinder the Romans, who ought rather proceed to election in this case, so neither will the emperor be able to hinder them.
Discipulus Si imperator non habet ius eligendi virtute iuris divini et iuris gentium nisi in quantum catholicus et Romanus, igitur {*ergo &MzNaRe} in hoc alii Romani pares sunt ei. Ex quo infertur quod quo ad hoc non plus est vocandus vel requirendus aut expectandus imperator quam alii Romani.	Student If the emperor does not have the right to elect by virtue of divine law and the law of nations except as a catholic and a Roman, therefore, other Romans are equal to him in this. We infer from this that in this respect the emperor ought no more be called or asked or waited on than other Romans.
Magister Ad hoc respondetur quod quamvis imperator et alii Romani sunt {*sint &MzNaRe} quodammodo pares quo {*quantum &NaRe} ad hoc quod qualem potestatem et quale ius habet imperator in electione summi {*Romani &MzNaRe} pontificis talem potestatem et tale ius habent alii Romani, tamen quando deberent {*debent &MzNaRe} eligere vel de electione vel de electoribus tractare alii Romani deberent {*debent &NaRe} {dicunt &Mz} in multis imperatori deferre {om. &Mz}, quemadmodum in aliis electionibus sapientioribus et {*om. &MzNaRe} potentioribus {*et add. &NaMzPeRe} melioribus et {*ac &NaRe} dignioribus est in multis ab aliis deferendum. Et ideo sine imperatore, quando zelat debito modo pro religione Christiana, alii Romani, si convenienter potest haberi eius praesentia, non debent ad eius {*om. &MzNaRe} electionem procedere, imo in casu debent {*deberent &NaMzPeRe} omnes alii sibi soli ius eligendi committere, quemadmodum, sicut allegatum est prius, quidam {*aliqui &NaMzPeRe} summi pontifices et alii Romani quibusdam imperatoribus totum {om. &Pe} ius eligendi dederunt. Et tunc imperator vice omnium deberet {debent &Mz} eligere Romanum {summum &Pe} pontificem.	Master The reply to this is that although the emperor and the other Romans are to a certain extent equal, in so far as the sort of power and right the emperor has in the election of the Roman pontiff other Romans also have, yet when they ought to elect or to investigate the election or the electors, other Romans should in many ways defer to the emperor, just as in other elections others should in many ways defer to those who are wiser, more powerful, better and worthier. And therefore other Romans ought not proceed to election without the emperor, when he is duly zealous for the Christian religion and his presence can be obtained conveniently, but rather in such a case all the others ought to have committed to him alone the right to elect, just as some supreme pontiffs and other Romans have given the total right to elect to certain emperors, as was argued above. And then the emperor ought to have elected the Roman pontiff on behalf of everyone.
Discipulus Dic qualiter respondetur ad allegationem pro secunda assertione {opinione &Pe} adductam {*inductam &MzNaRe}.	Student Tell me how reply is made to the argument brought forward for the second assertion.
Magister Respondetur quod licet modo sit commune {communius &Mz} ius {*trs. &MzNaPeRe} canonicum quod clerici {canonici &Pe} cathedralis ecclesiae habent {*habeant &NaRe} ius eligendi episcopum, tamen aliquando non fuit ius commune, sed ius commune fuit quod clerus et populus haberent ius eligendi, et illud ius est communissimum {*communius &MzNaRe} et antiquissimum {*antiquius &MzNaRe} {*trs.321 &Mz}; et ideo cessante omni privilegio et iure speciali ad ius communissimum et antiquissimum est recurrendum {*est recurrendum: oportet recurrere &MzNaRe}. Quamobrem si omnes cardinales efficerent {*efficiantur &NaMzPeRe} haeretici ad ius communius et antiquius est recurrendum et non ad aliquod speciale {*specialius &MzNaRe} ius {*trs. &MzNaPeRe} aliarum {illarum &Mz} ecclesiarum. Hoc autem {*ius add. &NaMzPeRe} est ius divinum et ius gentium, virtute cuius vel {*cuius vel om. &MzNaRe} quorum iurium Romanis, scilicet clericis et laicis, competit ius eligendi summum pontificem.	Master The reply is that although now the common canon law is that the clerics of a cathedral church have the right to elect their bishop, once this was not the common law, but the common law was that the clergy and people had the right to elect, and that law is the more common and ancient one; and therefore if every special privilege and law is void, it is necessary to have recourse to the most common and ancient law. Wherefore, if all the cardinals become heretics, recourse should be had to the more common and ancient law and not to some more special law of other churches. This law, however, is divine law and the law of nations, and it is by virtue of these laws that the right to choose the supreme pontiff belongs to the Romans, that is clergy and laymen.
Et per hoc respondetur ad allegationes {*allegationem &NaMzPeRe} pro tertia assertione, quia, licet aliquando fuerit {fuit &Re} ius commune {communius &Mz} quod episcopi electio {*trs. &MzNaRe} spectaret ad totum clerum et non ad solos clericos cathedralis ecclesiae, sicut probant auctoritates inductae, non tamen semper fuit ius {om. &Pe} commune, nec fuit ius communissimum {*nec fuit ius communissimum om. &NaPeRe} sed per solam institutionem {*constitutionem &NaRe} {iustitiam &Pe} humanam {per add. &Re} [[in margin]] ecclesiasticam fuit tantum {*factum &NaRe} ius commune, {*nec fuit ius communissimum add. &NaPeRe}. Et ideo {*cum add. &MzNaRe}, si cardinales efficiantur haeretici et {om. &Pe} quod {*om. &MzNaRe} papa sit haereticus vel mortuus, deficiant omnia iura humana instituta de electione Romani pontificis, recurrendum est ad ius divinum et {ad add. &Mz} ius gentium, virtute quorum electio ad plebem humanam scilicet {*plebem humanam scilicet om. &MzNaRe} clerum et populum Romanum {trs.312 &Mz} reducitur {*redit MzNa} {reddit &Re}.	And in this way is response made to the argument for the third assertion, because although it once was the common law that the election of a bishop pertained to the whole clergy and not to the clerics of the cathedral church only, as the texts brought forward prove, yet this was not always the common law, but it was made the common law solely by human ecclesiastical decree and it was not the most common law. And when therefore, if the cardinals become heretics and the pope is a heretic or is dead, all the human laws established for the election of the Roman pontiff fail, recourse should be had to the divine law and the law of nations, by virtue of which the election returns to the clergy and people of Rome.
CAP. XIV. Discipulus Supra capitulo octavo {om. &Re} quaesivi an in {om. &Na} aliquo casu et in quo {et in quo om. &Re} [[in quo written but crossed out]] ius eligendi Romanum episcopum revertatur ad Romanos, et tu dixisti quo {*quod &NaMzPeRe} ad hoc {*ad hoc om. &NaRe} diversimode respondetur. Recitasti autem unum modum respondendi {ostendendi &Pe}. Nunc autem {*om. &NaMzPeRe} recita {?ostende &Pe} alium.	Chapter 14 Student I asked in chapter 8 above whether on any circumstances, and on what circumstances, the right to elect the bishop of Rome reverts to the Romans. You have reported one way of replying. Now report another.
Opinion 2: The right reverts to the Romans if the Cardinals are supporters of heresy
Magister Aliter respondetur quod non solum pro haeretica pravitate sed etiam pro fautoria haereticae pravitatis, si videlicet omnes cardinales sint fautores {factores &Re} [[aliter fautores: in margin Re]] haereticae pravitatis et papa sit mortuus vel haereticus {*trs.321 &MzNaPeRe} ius eligendi summum pontificem revertitur sic {*om. &NaMzPeRe} ad Romanos. .	Master Another reply is that the right to elect the supreme pontiff reverts to the Romans not only because of heretical wickedness but also because of the supporting of heretical wickedness, if, that is, all the cardinals are supporters of heretical wickedness and the pope is dead or is a heretic.
Pro hac opinione taliter allegatur. Qui favet haereticae pravitati videtur sic {*om. &NaMzPeRe} haereticam pravitatem defendere. Non etiam {*enim &NaMzPeRe} videtur quod alius favor quam defensio possit ei {trs. &Mz} impendi. Sed defendens {defendere &Mz} haereticam pravitatem damnabilior {damnabilius &Mz} est haeretico {*hereticis &MzNaRe} {hereticus &Pe}, teste Urbano papa, qui, ut habetur 24, q. 3, c. Qui aliorum, ait, "Qui aliorum errorem defendit multo et {*om. &NaMzPeReZn} amplius damnabilior est {*trs. &MzNaPeReZn} illis {aliis &NaRe} {hiis &Mz} qui errant, quia non solum ille errat, sed etiam {et &Mz} aliis offendicula erroris praeparat et confirmat. Unde quia magister erroris {errorum &Mz} est, non tantum haereticus sed etiam haeresiarcha dicendus est." Ergo defendens haereticam pravitatem {om. &Mz} dignus est omni poena qua digni sunt haeretici {*cum sit hereticus. Sed cardinales si efficiantur /efficerentur Pe\ heretici iure eligendi privantur /privarentur Pe\. Ergo /igitur Pe\ etiam /et Mz\ si sint fautores hereticae pravitatis eodem iure privantur add. &NaMzPeRe}	It is argued as follows for this opinion. He who supports heretical wickedness seems to defend it. For it does not seem that any other support apart from defence can be attributed to him. But someone defending heretical wickedness is more worthy of condemnation than heretics, as Pope Urban attests. As we find in 24, q. 3, c. Qui aliorum [c.32, col.999], he says, "He who defends others' errors is much more worthy of condemnation than those who err, because he does not only err himself but also prepares and confirms stumbling-blocks of error for others. Because he is a master of error, therefore, he should be called not only a heretic but even a heresiarch." Someone defending heretical wickedness, therefore, deserves every penalty that heretics deserve, since he is a heretic. But if cardinals become heretics they are deprived of the right to elect. If they are supporters of heretical wickedness, therefore, they are also deprived of that right.
Item qui favet erroribus haereticorum inter credentes eorum erroribus est merito numerandus et per consequens haereticus est censendus, teste Gregorio 11 {*9 &NaRe}, qui ut habetur Extra, De haereticis, c. Excommunicamus 2 {?11 &NaRe}, ait credentes {*autem add. &MzNaRe} eorum erroribus haereticos similiter {*trs. &MzNaRe} iudicamus. Ergo si omnes cardinales faveant haereticae pravitati, tanquam haeretici iure eligendi Romanum pontificem sunt privati.	Again, he who supposrts the errors of heretics should deservedly be reckoned among those who believe their errors, and, consequently, should be considered a heretic, as Gregory IX attests, He says, as we find in the eleventh part of Extra, De hereticis, c. Excommunicamus [c.13, col.787], that we judge those who believe their errors, however, similarly as heretics. [[This is not an exact quotation.]] If all the cardinals support heretical wickedness, therefore, they are deprived of their right to choose the Roman pontiff as though they were heretics.
Opinion 3: Or if the Cardinals support some heretic and the pope is a heretic or dead
Aliter respondetur quod cardinales non solum si faveant haereticae pravitati sed etiam si sint {sunt &Na} fautores papae haeretici vivi vel mortui vel aliorum haereticorum iure eligendi privantur et electio ad Romanos revertetur {*revertitur &MzNaRe}, etiam {*om. &MzNaRe} si papa est haereticus vel mortuus aut de iure depositus.	Another reply is that not only if the cardinals support heretical wickedness but even if they are supporters of a heretical pope, living or dead, or of other heretics, they are deprived of their right to elect and the election reverts to the Romans, if the pope is a heretic, or is dead, or has been deposed by law.
Pro hac opinione taliter allegatur. Pro quocunque crimine papa ipso facto seu iure a papali dignitate deponitur, pro eodem crimine cardinales cardinalatu privantur {privatur &Re}, et per consequens ius eligendi quod eis competit ratione cardinalatus amittunt. Sed papa si est fautor haereticorum ipso facto seu iure a papatu deponitur. Ergo et {om. &Na} cardinales propter favorem haereticorum iure eligendi privantur.	It is argued for this opinion as follows. Cardinals are deprived of their cardinalship for the same crime, of any kind at all, for which the pope is deposed in fact or in law from his papal dignity, and as a consequence they lose the right to elect which belongs to them by virtue of their cardinalship. But if the pope is a supporter of heretics he is in fact or in law deposed from the papacy. Cardinals too, therefore, are deprived of their right to elect because of support for heretics.
Maior videtur probatione minime indigere. Minor {om. &Mz} [[gap left]] exemplo probatur. Nam Anastasius secundus propter favorem haereticorum fuit depositus. Non enim legitur de ipso nisi quod faverit Fotino et Achacio haereticis. Nam in decretis 19 {?3 &Re} dist. {*trs. &NaRe} Anastasius {om. &MzNaRe} sic habetur, "Anastasius secundus {om. &MzNaRe}, natione Romanus, fuit temporibus Theodrici regis. Eodem tempore multi clerici se a communione ipsius abegerunt eo quod communicasset sine consilio episcoporum vel {prelatorum vel add. &Mz} presbyterorum et clericorum cunctae {occasione &Mz} ecclesiae catholicae diacono Thessalonicensi, nomine {om. &NaRe} Fotino, qui communicaverat Achatio, et {om. &NaRe} quia voluit occulte revocare Achatium et non potuit nutu divino {trs. &MzNaRe} percussus est." In quibus verbis non habetur nisi quod Anastasius favit Fotino et Achatio, et tamen fuit depositus. Ergo propter favorem haereticorum papa deponitur.	The major [premise] does not seem to need proof. The minor is proved by an example. For Anastasius II was deposed because of support for heretics. For all we read about him is that he supported the heretics Fotinus and Achacius. For we find the following in the decretals at dist. 19, c. Anastasius [c.9, col.64], "Anastasius II, of Roman stock, lived in the times of King Theodoric. At that time many clerics withdrew from communion with him because without consultation with the bishops, priests and clerics of the whole catholic church he had communicated with a deacon of Thessalonica named Fotinus, who had communicated with Achatius, and, because he wanted secretly to recall Achatius and could not do so, he was struck by divine command." We find nothing in these words except that Anastasius supported Fotinus and Achatius, and yet he was deposed. Therefore a pope is deposed because of support for heretics.
Opinion 4: Or if the cardinals are in schism
Aliter respondetur quod cardinales non solum propter haeresim et favorem haereticae pravitatis vel {*et &NaRe} haereticorum sed etiam propter schisma privantur iure eligendi summum pontificem.	Another reply is that it is not only because of heresy and the support of heretical wickedness and heretics that cardinals are deprived of the right to elect the supreme pontiff, but also because of schism.
Hoc taliter videtur posse probari. quia {*om. &NaRe} Qui nihil potestatis aut iuris habet non habet potestatem {*ius &NaRe} eligendi summum pontificem. neque ius {*neque ius om. &NaRe}. Sed {om. &Mz} cardinales si efficiantur schismatici nihil iuris aut potestatis habent, teste beato Cypriano qui, ut habetur 24, q. 1, c. Didicimus {*Dicimus sicut allegatum est prius, ait, "Didicimus {dicimus Zn} {*omnes add. &NaReZn} omnino haereticos et schismaticos nihil potestatis habere et {*ac &MzNaReZn} iuris." Ergo cardinales schismatici non habent ius eligendi summum pontificem.	This seems provable as follows. He who has no power or right does not have the right to elect the supreme pontiff. But if cardinals become schismatics they have no right or power, as Cyprian attest. We find in 24, q. 1, c. Dicimus [c.31, col.977] that he says, as was brought forward earlier, "We have learnt that absolutely all heretics and schismatics have no power and no right." Schismatic cardinals, therefore, do not have the right to elect the supreme pontiff.
Item qui sunt {*est &NaRe} extra ecclesiam non habent {*habet &NaRe} ius eligendi summum pontificem. Sed cardinales {*effecti add. &NaRe} schismatici sunt extra ecclesiam, teste beato Cypriano qui, ubi {*ut &NaRe} prius, ait, "Si autem foris cuncti schismatici et haeretici {*trs.321 &MzNaReZn} non habent spiritum sanctum, et ideo apud nos manus eis {*trs. &MzNaReZn} imponitur, ut hic accipiatur quod illic non est, nec dari potest; manifestum est nec remissionem peccatorum per eos dari posse quos constat spiritum sanctum non habere {manifestum est ... habere om. &MzNaRe}." Ex quibus verbis {om. &Mz} evidenter videtur haberi {*trs. &MzNaRe} quod omnes schismatici sunt extra ecclesiam. Unde et beatus Cyprianus Novacianum extra ecclesiam et inter adversarios et antichristos reputavit computandum solummodo {*om. &NaRe} quia fuit schismaticus dicens, ubi prius, "Novacianus nec debet nec potest excipi quominus ipse quoque {trs. &MzNaRe} extra ecclesiam consistens et contra pacem ac dilectionem Christi faciens inter adversarios et antichristos computetur." Ergo omnes schismatici sunt extra ecclesiam. Ergo si omnes {*om. &NaRe} cardinales efficerentur {*efficiantur &NaRe} schismatici tanquam extra ecclesiam existentes ius eligendi amittunt. Et per consequens in hoc casu ius eligendi revertitur ad Romanos. Sed cardinales si efficiantur haeretici iure eligendi privantur. Igitur etiam si sint fautores haereticae pravitatis eodem iure privantur {*Sed cardinales si ... privantur om. &MzNaRe}. {Item qui favet erroribus ... privantur om. &Pe} [[very long omission of 4 paragraphs in Pe]]	Again, he who is outside the church does not have the right to elect the supreme pontiff. But cardinals who have become schismatic are outside the church, as blessed Cyprian attests. He says, in the place quoted earlier [24, q. 1, c. Didicimus c.31, col.977], "If, however, all heretics and schismatics outside do not have the Holy Spirit, and so our hand has been placed on them, so that what is not there is here received, and it can not be given ... ." It seems clearly to be found from these words that all schismatics are outside the church. Whence blessed Cyprian also considered that Novatian should be reckoned as outside the church and among its enemies and the antichrists because he was a schismatic. He says in the place cited above [col.977], "Novatian should not and can not be excepted, as one existing outside the church and acting against the peace and love of Christ, from being reckoned among his enemies and the antichrists." Therefore all schismatics are outside the church. If cardinals become schismatics, therefore, they lose, as those remaining outside the church, the right to elect. And, as a consequence, in these circumstances the right to elect reverts to the Romans.
Opinion 5: Or if the Cardinals will not act
Aliter respondetur quod non solum {papa add. &Mz} propter praedicta {om. &Mz} crimina sed etiam si, papa existente haeretico vel mortuo, videlicet {*om. &MzNaRe} cardinales noluerint {voluerint &Mz} eligere, dicentes se non {om. &Pe} velle {*non velle: nolle &MzNaRe} eligere vel etiam per malitiam aut per {*om. &NaMzPeRe} damnabilem negligentiam in notabile detrimentum et periculum Christianae religionis distulerint {distulerunt &Pe} eligere summum pontificem privati sunt {*trs. &MzNaPeRe} iure eligendi et electio revertitur ad Romanos.	Another reply is that the cardinals are deprived of their right to elect, with election reverting to the Romans, not only because of the aforesaid crimes but also if, with the pope a heretic or dead, the cardinals have refused to elect, saying that they do not want to do so, or also if they have, through malice or blameworthy negligence, deferred the election of the supreme pontiff to the extraordinary detriment and danger of the christian religion.
Pro hac opinione taliter allegatur. Non minus provisum est Romanae ecclesiae contra pericula quae pericula {*om. &NaMzPeRe} ei accidere possunt {*trs.312 &MzNaPeRe} quam aliis fidelibus {*ecclesiis inferioribus &NaMzPeRe}. Si enim minus esset ei {eis &MzPe} provisum, quantum ad ea quae ordinanda sunt per rectores ipsius, ipsi rectores essent de negligentia damnabili reprehensibiles {reprobandi &Pe} iudicandi, quia ubi maius periculum vertitur cautius et sollicitius est agendum. Sed ecclesiis aliis {*quam romanae add. &MzNaRe} {quam romanis ecclesiis add. &Pe} sufficienter est provisum si electores qui debent eligere per malitiam vel negligentiam distulerint eligere, quia si infra tres menses non elegerint privantur potestate eligendi ea vice et potestas {eligendi et add. &Pe} providendi ad superiorem devolvitur. igitur {*Ergo &MzNaRe} etiam {*et &MzNaRe} Romanae ecclesiae est provisum qualiter papa eligi debeat si cardinales {vel add. &MzPe} per malitiam {per malitiam: malitia &Pe} vel {per add. &Pe} damnabilem negligentiam in notabile detrimentum et periculum religionis Christianae {om. &Pe} distulerint eligere. Sed non est provisum {alteri add. &Mz} aliter quam {quamquam &Mz} quod electio ad Romanos convertatur {*revertatur &NaMzPeRe} {*trs.312 &MzNaPeRe}. igitur {*Ergo &MzNaRe} saltem pro illa vice cardinales essent privati {et add. &Re} potestate eligendi et ius eligendi revertetur {*reverteretur &MzNaRe} ad Romanos.	It is argued as follows for this opinion. No less provision against the dangers that can befall it is made for the Roman church than for other lesser churches. For if less provision were made for it, with respect to those things which should be arranged by its rulers, those rulers would deserve to be judged as reprehensible for culpable negligence because where a greater danger is ascribed action should be more cautious and careful. But sufficient provision is made for churches other than the Roman church if the electors who ought to elect have delayed through malice or negligence, because they are deprived of the power to elect if they have not elected within three months and the power of so providing is allotted to their superior. Provision, therefore, has also been made for the Roman church about how the pope should be elected if through malice or culpable negligence to the extraordinary detriment and danger of the christian religion they have delayed electing. But no provision has been made other than that election reverts to the Romans. Therefore, at least on that occasion, the cardinals would be deprived of the power to elect and the right to elect would revert to the Romans.
CAP. XV. Discipulus Quomodo {quoniam &Pe} autem {*om. &MzNaRe} ad rationem istam ultimam potest {*poterit &NaRe} responderi et qualiter responsio valeat improbari {*patere add. &NaMzPeRe} potest appetere {*om. &NaMzPeRe} ex his quae tractata sunt superius 10 c. Ideo ad praesens nolo quod de ista responsione {*ratione &NaPeRe} et opinione pro qua adducitur hic amplius te {*trs. &MzNaPeRe} intromittas, sed indica quomodo respondetur secundum opinionem quae recitata {tractate &Pe} est supra c. 8 ad rationes pro opinionibus aliis recitatis capitulo {in &Re} praecedenti et allegationes {*et allegationes om. &NaMzPeRe} adducas {*adductas &MzPe}.	Chapter 15 Student How one can reply to that final argument and how that reply can be rejected can be clear from those things that were dealt with in chapter 10 above. [Nothing seems relevant there. See here.] Therefore I do not want you to involve yourself any further now with that argument and the opinion on behalf of which it is brought forward. But indicate how one replies, according to the opinion recited in chapter 8 above, to the arguments brought forward for the other opinions recited in the preceding chapter.
Magister Ad allegationes {*duas add. &MzNaRe} pro secunda {*prima &MzNaPe} {qua &Re} opinione adductas {*inductas &MzNa} {inducas &Re} respondetur quod pro omni favore haereticae pravitatis, quae {qui &Pe} non est in {om. &Na} favente absque haeretica pravitate {*trs. &MzNaRe} essent cardinales privati iure eligendi summum pontificem et reverteretur ius eligendi ad Romanos. Pro alio favore non essent privati sed privandi iure eligendi summum pontificem. An autem possit {posset &Pe} esse aliquis favor haereticae pravitatis absque haeretica pravitate in favente ex his quae dicta sunt libro 7 primae partis huius Dialogi advertere poterit studiosus {studiosius &Re}.	Master To the two arguments brought forward for the first opinion [i.e. opinion 2] it is replied that for any support of heretical wickedness not [found] in the supporter without heretical wickedness, the cardinals would have been deprived of the right to elect the highest pontiff, and the right to elect would revert to the Romans. For any other support, they would not have been deprived, but should be deprived, of the right to elect the highest pontiff. Whether anyone can be a supporter of heretical wickedness without there being heretical wickedness in the supporter, however, whoever is keen can perceive from what is said in book 7 of the first part of this Dialogue.
Ad allegationem pro tertia {*secunda &MzNaRe} opinione respondetur quod licet papa si efficiatur haereticus sit ipso facto et ipso iure depositus, sicut in prima parte Dialogi huius {*trs. &MzNaRe} libro sexto per quamplurimas rationes probatum existit, et ideo licet {*om. &MzNaRe} pro favore haereticae pravitatis quae {?qui MzNa} {add. non Ki} est absque haeresi in favente sit papa depositus ipso facto, tamen pro solo favore haereticorum absque favore errorum {*erroris &MzNaRe} ipsorum non est papa ipso facto depositus, imo secundum aliquos nec etiam deponendus nisi incorrigibilis appareat et de eo scandalizetur ecclesia.	To the argument for the second opinion it is replied that although a pope is deposed in fact and in law if he becomes a heretic, as is proved by very many arguments in book 6 of the first part of this Dialogue, and therefore is ipso facto deposed for support of heretical wickedness which [does not] exist without heresy in the supporter, yet the pope is not ipso facto deposed solely because of support for heretics without support of their error; indeed according to some he should not even be deposed unless he seems to be incorrigible and the church is caused to stumble because of it.
Cum autem dicitur quod Anastasius secundus non fuit depositus nisi pro favore haereticorum, respondetur quod non est verum; imo fuit depositus pro haeresi et fautoria haereticae pravitatis, quod ex textu dist. 19 et glossa ut videtur colligitur evidenter. Ait enim Gratianus eadem dist. para. Hoc autem, "Anastasius enim secundus {episcopus add. &MzNaRe} favore Anastasii imperatoris quos Achacius post sententiam in se prolatam sacerdotes et {*vel &Zn} levitas ordinaverat acceptis officiis rite fungi debere decrevit" et {*om. &NaRe} erronee {*erronea &NaRe} supple. Unde in {*om. &MzNaRe} para. sequenti dicit Gratianus, "Quia ergo illicite et non canonice, sed contra decreta {dei add. Zn} praedecessorum et successorem suorum haec rescripta dedit, ut probat Felix et Gelasius qui Achacium ante {*Anastasium add. &MzNaReZn} excommunicaverunt et Hormisda qui ab ipso Anastasio tertius eundem Achacium postea damnavit, ideo a Romana ecclesia repudiatur et a Deo percussus fuisse legitur."	When it is said, however, that Anastasius II was deposed only for the support of heretics, it is said that this is not true; rather he was deposed for heresy and for promoting heretical wickedness, which seems to be clearly gathered from the text and gloss of dist. 19. For in the paragraph Hoc autem [c.7, col.62] of that distinction Gratian says, "For Anastasius II with the support of the emperor Anastasius decreed that the bishops or levites whom Achatius had ordained after the sentence published against him should duly discharge the offices they had received" --- understand "erroneously". Whence Gratian says in the following paragraph [Quia ergo c.8, col.645], "Therefore because he issued these rescripts illicitly and not canonically, but contrary to the decrees of his predecessors and successors, as Felix and Gelasius, who excommunicated Achatius before Anastasius, and Hormisda, third in line after Anastasius who later condemned Achatius, prove, he is as a result repudiated by the Roman church and was, we read, struck by God."
Item glossa super c. Anastasius super verbo abegerunt ait, "Hi non recesserunt, scilicet clerici, ab Anastasio ante sententiam, quia inciderat {*inciderunt Zn} in haeresim iam damnatam." Tunc {*Item &NaRe} super verbo communicaverat dicit glossa, "Hic communicavit, scilicet Anastasius, cum {*ei, scilicet &MzNaRe} Achacio haeretico, in maleficio. Unde potuit transire, scilicet excommunicatio, ad tertiam personam." Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod Anastasius fuit haereticus et fautor haereticae pravitatis. Et ideo fuit depositus ipso iure et fuit excommunicationis sententia innodatus.	Again the gloss on the words "drove out" in [dist. 19] c. Anastasius [col. 87] says, "They, that is the clerics, did not withdraw from Anastasius before the sentence because they had fallen into a heresy that was already condemned." Again on the words "had participated" the gloss says, "He, that is Anastasius, participated in wickedness with that one, namely the heretic Achatius. Whence it, that is the excommunication, could pass over to a third person." We gather from these words that Anastasius was a heretic and a supporter of heretical wickedness. And he was, therefore, deposed by that law and was bound by a sentence of excommunication.
Ad allegationem {*allegationes &MzNaRe} pro quarta {*tertia &MzNaRe} opinione respondetur quod {licet papa si efficiatur ... quod om. &Pe} non omnes schismatici sunt omni iure privati. {*Sed omnes schismatici qui sunt heretici quales ut saepe sunt schismatici sunt omni iure privati add. &NaRe} et de illis loquitur beatus Cyprianus. Omnes enim {*etiam &NaMzPeRe} schismatici quamdiu sunt schismatici non sunt capaces ecclesiasticarum {?ecclesiarum &Mz} {aut add. &Mz} dignitatum. Et ideo Novatianus secundum Cyprianum non {om. MzPe} potuit esse papa. Schismatici autem {*etiam &NaRe} non possunt habere executionem alicuius iuris ecclesiastici licet aliqua iura ecclesiastica possunt {*possint &NaRe} habere dummodo non sunt {*sint &NaRe} haeretici. Et ideo cardinales propter solum schisma absque heresi non perdunt ius eligendi summum pontificem quamvis non debeant {debent &Mz} {deberent &Pe} eligere quamdiu in schismate perseverant {perseverarent &Pe}.	To the arguments for the third opinion the reply is that not all schismatics are deprived of every right. But all schismatics who are heretics, as schismatics often are, are deprived of every right, and it is about these that blessed Cyprian is speaking. In addition, no schismatics are fit for ecclesiastical dignities as long as they are schismatic. And therefore according to Cyprian, Novatian could not be pope. Schismatics also can not have the execution of any ecclesiastical right, although they can have some ecclesiastical rights as long as they are not heretics. And cardinals do not lose the right to elect the highest pontiff, therefore, although they should not elect as long as they persist in schism.
Et per idem breviter respondetur ad allegationem pro quarta opinione adductam. Quamdiu enim in tali malitia et negligentia perstiterint constat quod de facto sunt tali iure privati. Si autem resipiscant idem ius eis debetur {*et per idem ... debetur om. &NaMzPeRe}.	By the same means a brief answer is given to the argument given for the fourth opinion. For as long as they persist in such malice and negligence, it is certain that they are deprived de facto of such right, but if they recover, the right is owed to them. [This paragraph is not found in NaMzPeRe and may not be authentic.]
CAP. XVI. Discipulus Quamvis in prima parte nostri Dialogi li. 6 tractaverimus an imperator sit iudex ordinarius summi pontificis, et cum {*tu &NaMzPeRe} ibidem circa hoc {posuisti add. &Pe} opiniones contrarias allegationibus pluribus conatus fueris confirmare, hic tamen de hac materia conferamus ut {et &Pe} excitemus {exitemus &NaRe} [[correct interlinear Re]] alios tractatulum {tractatum &Pe} hunc visuros qui primam partem huius operis forsitan {*trs.312 &NaRe} non habebunt ad solicite perscrutandum {prescrutandum &Re} an {aut &Mz} imperator supra papam iam in summo pontificio constitutum aliquam habeat vel habere valeat potestatem. Investigemus autem primo an imperator ratione {romani imperii aut add. &Pe} imperatoriae dignitatis {*maiestatis &NaRe} sit in aliquo casu iudex ordinarius papae.	Chapter 16 Student Although we considered whether the emperor is the regular judge of the highest pontiff in book six of the first part of our Dialogue, and in that place you tried with many arguments to establish the opposed opinions about this, let us nevertheless confer here about this matter in order to stimulate others, who will see this tract but perhaps will not have the first part of this work, to investigate carefully whether the emperor has or can have any power over a pope already established in his pontificate. Let us first investigate, however, whether by reason of his imperial dignity the emperor is the regular judge of the pope on any occasion.
Can the Emperor have power over a pope in office?
Is the Emperor ever the pope's regular judge?
Magister Circa hoc sunt diversae assertiones {*trs. &MzNaPeRe} et adversae. {opinio add. &Mz} Una est quod imperator ratione imperatoriae dignitatis non est iudex ordinarius in quocunque casu summi pontificis.	Master There are differing and opposed assertions about this. One is that on no occasion is the emperor the regular judge of the highest pontiff by reason of his imperial dignity.
Opinion 1: The Emperor is never the pope's regular judge by virtue of his imperial dignity
Discipulus Pro ista assertione allega.	Student Argue for that assertion.
Magister Pro ista assertione potest taliter allegari. Si imperator inquantum imperator {inquantum imperator om. &Pe} esset iudex ordinarius papae aut esset suus iudex {*trs. &MzNaPeRe} in causa ecclesiastica aut in causa seculari. Non in {*causa add. &NaMzPeRe} ecclesiastica, quia {*causa ecclesiastica add. &NaMzPeRe} solum {*om. &MzNaRe} ad iudicem ecclesiasticum {*solummodo add. &MzNaRe} spectat. Ideo enim dicitur causa ecclesiastica [[quia ... ecclesiastica: margin Pe]] {?nisi add. &Mz} quia debet coram ecclesiastico iudice agitari. Nec in causa seculari quia nec in causa {*om. &NaRe} criminali nec {*in causa add. &NaMzPeRe} civili. Quod non {om. &Mz} in criminali {om. &Na} causa seculari {*om. &NaPe} {causa seculari om. &Re} probatur, quia, sicut legitur dist. 40, c. Si papa, ex gestis Bonifatii papae martyris habetur {*trs.231 &MzNaPeRe}, "huiusmodi {*om. &NaMzPeReZn} {*Huius add. &Zn} culpam {*culpas &Zn} istic {istinc &NaMzPeRe} idem {*om. &PeReZn} {et /est Na\ /om. MzPe\ in hac vita add. &NaMzPeRe} redarguere nullus {om. &Pe} mortalium praesumit {praesumat &NaMzPeRe} {*trs.321 &MzNaReZn}, quia cunctos {est add. &MzNaRe} ipse {in ipsa &Pe} iudicaturus a nemine est {ipse add. &MzPe} [[interlinear Pe]] iudicandus, nisi deprehendatur a fide devians {*devius &NaMzPeReZn}." Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod papa pro sola deviatione a fide est ab aliquo iudicandus; deviatio autem {*a fide add. &NaMzPeRe} non est culpa secularis. Ergo pro nulla culpa seculari est papa ab imperatore vel ab {*om. &NaPeRe} alio iudicandus. Nec imperator est iudex ordinarius papae in causa seculari civili cum etiam in tali causa sicut neque in causa criminali sit iudex ordinarius cuiuscunque episcopi, teste Bonifacio qui, ut habetur 11, q. 1, c. {11, q. 1, c.: dist. 11, c. 1, &Pe} Nullus, ait, "Nullus episcopus neque pro civili neque pro criminali causa apud iudicem quemlibet {*iudicem quemlibet: quemvis iudicem sive &NaMzPeReZn} civilem sive militarem producatur {perducatur &Mz}." Relinquitur ergo {*igitur &MzNaRe} ex praedictis quod imperator inquantum imperator in nulla causa est iudex ordinarius papae.	Master It can be argued as follows for that assertion. If the emperor were the regular judge of the pope as emperor he would be his judge either in an ecclesiastical case or in a secular case. [He is judge] not in an ecclesiastical case because an ecclesiastical case belongs only to an ecclesiastical judge. For it is called an ecclesiastical case because it should be treated before an ecclesiastical judge. Nor [is he judge] in a secular case because he is not one in either in a criminal or a civil case: that he is not one in a criminal case is proved because, as we read in dist. 40, c. Si papa [c.6, col.146], we find in the deeds of Pope Boniface the martyr, "No mortal presumes to contradict his faults because he who is to judge the rest should be judged by no one unless he is detected as being inconsistent with faith." We gather from these words that the pope should be judged by someone only for an inconsistency with faith; inconsistency with faith, however, is not a secular fault. Therefore for no secular fault should the pope be judged by the emperor or by another person. Nor is the emperor the regular judge of the pope in a civil secular case since even in such a case, as in a criminal case, he is not the regular judge of any bishop, as Boniface attests who says, as we find in 11, q. 1, c. Nullus [episcopus] [c.8, col.628], "No bishop is to be brought before any civil or military judge either in a civil or a criminal case." From the above we are left with the conclusion that as emperor, the emperor is in no case the regular judge of the pope.
Discipulus Ut mihi {*detur add. &NaRe} occasio sit {*om. &NaRe} intelligendi profundius istam materiam pro ista assertione multas auctoritates {*trs. &MzNaRe} adducas, etiam illas quas in prima parte {*istius add. &MzNaRe} dialogi tetigisti, quia nolo {*volo &NaRe} {om. &Mz} ut {*quod &MzNaRe} postea mihi {multipliciter &Mz} referas exquisite qualiter assertio contraria ad ipsas nititur respondere. Per hunc enim modum incitabimus alios ad veritatem acutius indagandam et nobis ipsis intellectus auctoritatem {*auctoritatum &MzNaRe} adducendarum clarius {intellectus ... clarius om. &Pe} apparebit.	Student To give me an opportunity to understand that matter more deeply would you bring forward many authorities for that assertion, even those that you cited in the first part of this Dialogue, because I want you afterwards to set forth for me carefully how the opposite assertion tries to reply to them. For in this way we will incite others to explore the truth more intelligently and our own understanding of the authorities brought forward will appear clearer.
Magister Pro ista opinione auctoritates quamplurimae adducuntur {*inducuntur &NaRe}. Gelasius enim papa, ut habetur 9, q. 3, c. Cuncta {per mundum add. &Pe}, ait, "Cuncta per mundum novit {in omni &Pe} ecclesia quoniam {quam &Mz} quorumlibet sententiis ligata pontificum sedes {fide &Pe} beati Petri apostoli ius habeat resolvendi {solvendi &NaRe} {absolvendi &Pe} utpote quae de {om. &Pe} omni ecclesia fas habeat iudicandi."	Master Very many authorities are brought forward for that opinion. For as we find in 9, q. 3, c. [18] Cuncta [c.18, col.611], Pope Gelasius says, "The whole church throughout the world has known that, bound by the sentences of every pontiff, the seat of the blessed apostle Peter has the right to loose, that is, that it has the right to judge every church."
Item Melchiades {*papa add. &MzNaRe} ut habetur 12, q. 1, c. futura {*Futuram &NaRe} ait, "Idem praefatus princeps," scilicet Constantinus, "donaria immensa contulit et fabricam templi primae sedis beati Petri instituit, adeo ut sedem imperialem relinqueret et {etiam &Mz} beato Petro suisque successoribus profuturis {*profuturam &NaMzPeReZn} concederet. Idem {item &Na} vero praesidens sanctae {sancto &Mz} synodo, quae apud Nicenam congregata est, cum {et &Pe} querelam {cum querelam: conquerelam &Mz} quorundam coram se conspiceret {trs.312 &MzNaRe} deferendam ait, `Vos a nemine iudicari {*diiudicari &MzNaReZn} potestis, quia Dei solius iudicio reservamini. Dii etenim vocati estis et idcirco non potestis ab hominbus iudicari.'"	Again, as we find in 12, q. 1, c. Futuram [c.15, cols 682], Pope Melchiades says, "That same prince," namely Constantine, "bestowed immense gifts and constructed the fabric of the temple of the first seat of blessed Peter; moreover, he abandoned his imperial seat and resigned it to the use of blessed Peter and his successors. And presiding over the holy synod that gathered at Nicena and perceiving that the complaint to him of certain people should be deferred the same man said, `You can be judged by no one because you are reserved for the judgement of God alone. For you are called gods and therefore you can not be judged by men.'"
Item Gelasius papa, ut habetur 9, q. 3, c. Cuncta, ait, "Cuncta per mundum novit ecclesia quod {quia &Mz} sacrosancta Romana ecclesia {trs. &Na} fas habeat de omnibus {*trs.231 &MzNaReZn} iudicandi neque cuiquam {quicquam &Mz} de eius liceat {trs.312 &MzNaRe} iudicare iudicio. Siquidem ad illam de qualibet mundi parte appellandum est; ab illa autem nemo est appellare permissus. Sed nec illa praeterimus {praetermittimus &NaRe}, quod apostolica sedes sine ulla synodo praecedente et solvendi quod {*quos &MzNaReZn} synodus inique {*iniqua &Zn} damnaverat {trs. &MzNaRe} et damnandi, nulla existente synodo, actus {*om. &MzNaReZn} quos oportuit habuit {*habuerit &MzNaReZn} facultatem."	Again, as we find in 9, q. 3, c. Cuncta [c.17, col.611], Pope Gelasius says, "The whole church throughout the world has known that the most holy Roman church has the right to judge everyone and that no one is permitted to judge its judgement. Moreover, an appeal can be made to it from any part of the world; however, no one is permitted to appeal from it. But let us not omit the fact that without any preceding synod the apostolic see had the power both of releasing those whom an unjust synod had condemned and of condemning those whom it ought, without there being a synod."
Item Gelasius papa, ut habetur dist. 96. {*c. Duo add. &MzNaRe}, scribens Anastasio imperatori ait, "Nosti itaque inter haec ex illorum te pendere iudicio, non illos ad tuam posse regi {*redigi &MzNaReZn} voluntatem."	Again, as we find in dist. 96, c. Duo [c.10, col.340], Pope Gelasius writing to the emperor Anastasius says, "And so know that, as it concerns these, you depend upon their [priests'] judgement; it is not the case that they can be brought under your will."
Item Innocentius papa, ut legitur 9, q. 3, c. Nemo, ait, "Nemo iudicabit apostolicam {*primam &NaReZn} sedem iusticiam temperare desiderantem. Neque enim ab Augusto, neque ab omni clero, neque a regibus {neque a regibus om. &NaRe}, neque a populo iudex iudicabitur."	Again, as we read in 9, q. 3, c. Nemo [c.13, col.610], Pope Innocent says, "No one will judge the first see when it wants to temper justice. For that judge will be judged neither by Augustus, nor by any clergy, nor by kings, nor by the people."
Item Iohannes papa, ut habetur dist. 96. c. Si {sed &NaRe} imperator, ait, "Si imperator catholicus est, quod salva pace ipsius dicimus, filius est non praesul ecclesiae." Lex autem erubescit filios castigatores esse parentum. Ergo nullo modo imperator {*trs.312 &NaRe} potest esse iudex papae qui pater est omnium.	Again, as we find in dist. 96, c. Si imperator [c.11, col.341], Pope John says, "If the emperor is a catholic, which we say saving his peace, his son is not a priest of the church." The law, however, is ashamed if sons are reprovers of their parents. Therefore the emperor can in no way be the judge of the pope who is the father of all.
Item Symachus papa, ut habetur 9, q. 3, c. Aliorum, ait, "Aliorum hominum causas Deus voluit per homines {hominem &Mz} terminare, {terrarum &Na} sed {*om. &Zn} sedis {sedes &Mz} istius praesulem {praesulis &Zn} suo sine quaestione reservavit {reservabit &Mz} arbitrio. Voluit {etiam id est add. &Mz} beati Petri apostoli successores coelo tantum debere innocentiam, et subtilissimi {om. &Mz} [[gap left in ms]] discussoris indagini inviolatam habere conscientiam. Nolite {noli &MzNaRe} aestimare {*existimare &Zn} eas animas inquisitoris {inquisitorum &Mz} non habere formidinem, quas Deus prae caeteris suo reservavit examini." Et infra: "Sanctorum voce {*patet add. &MzNaRe}, pontificum dignitatem sedis eius {cuius &Mz} factam toto orbe venerabilem, esse {*om. &MzNaReZn} dum illi {ibi &MzNaRe} quicquid fidelium est ubique submittitur, dum totius corporis caput esse designatur."	Again, as we find in 9, q. 3, c. Aliorum [c.14, col.610], Pope Symachus says, "God wanted men to determine the cases of other men; without question he reserved to his own authority the bishop of that see. He wanted the successors of the blessed apostle Peter to owe their innocence only to heaven and to have by the most subtle investigation of the examiner an inviolate conscience. Do not consider that those souls which above all God reserved for his own examination do not have fear of an examiner ... It is clear from the voice of the saints that the dignity of that see of the pontiffs became venerable in all the world, while anything of the faithful is everywhere submitted to it, while it is designated as the head of the whole body."
Item Nicolaus papa, {*ut legitur add. &MzNaRe} dist. 21. c. Nunc {om. &Mz} [[gap left in ms]] autem, ait, quoniam {*om. &MzNaRe} "Prima {primas &Na} sedes non iudicabitur a quoquam." {Item Gelasius papa ... quoquam om. &Pe}	Again, as we read in dist. 21, c. Nunc autem [c.7, col.71], Pope Nicholas says, "The first see will not be judged by anyone."
Item Anterius papa, ut habetur 9, {23 &Pe} q. 3, c. Facta, ait, "Facta subditorum iudicantur a nobis, nostra vero a Domino {divino &Mz} iudicantur {a nobis nostra vero a domino iudicantur add. &Re}.	Again, as we find in 9, q. 3, c. Facta [c.15, col.610], Pope Anterus says, "The deeds of subjects are judged by us; truly, ours are judged by the Lord."
Item Sixtus {om. &Mz} papa, ut habetur 2, q. 5, {6 &Pe} c. Mandastis, cum fuisset {fuisse &Pe} accusatus {*criminatus &NaMzPeRe} a quodam scriba {*scribens &NaRe} {scribere &Pe} episcopis {episcopo &Mz} ait, "Facto consilio, cum magna examinatione satisfaciens omnibus, licet evadere aliter satis potuissem, suspicionem tamen fugiens, coram omnibus me purgavi, et me {*et me om. &MzNaRe} scilicet {me scilicet om. &Pe} a suspicione a {*et &NaMzPeReZn} aemulatione {*me add. &NaMzPeRe} liberans, sed non aliis qui noluerint {voluerint &MzPe} aut sponte hoc {haec &NaRe} non {om. &Pe} elegerint faciendi formam dans." Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod papa in nullo casu tenetur se purgare si fuerit diffamatus. Ex quo infertur quod nullius {nullus PeRe} [[corrected interlinear Re]] tenetur {infertur &Na} subire iudicium. Unde glossa ibidem {om. &Na} super verbo potuissem ait, "Papa autem {*a &NaRe} nullo modo {*om. &NaRe} potest iudicari."	Again, as we find in 2, q. 5, c. Mandastis [c.10, col.458], when Pope Sixtus had been calumniated by a certain person he wrote to the bishops saying, "When the council had met, although I could sufficiently have avoided suspicion in another way, I nevertheless satisfied everyone by a full examination, and took haste to purge myself before everyone, that is freeing myself from suspicion and envy; but not providing a model of acting to others who do not want to do so or who have not chosen it of their own free will." We gather from these words that on no occasion is the pope bound to purge himself if he has been defamed. We infer from this that he is not bound to submit to anyone's judgement. Whence the gloss on that text on the words "could have" says [col.644], "The pope can be judged by no one."
Item Gelasius papa, ut habetur {*legitur &NaMzPeRe} 9, {14 &Pe} q. 3, c. Ipsi {isti &NaRe}, ait {*om. &NaRe} loquens de sede Romana {*ait add. &NaRe}, "Ab ipsa vero nunquam {nusquam &NaMzPeRe} prorsus appellare debere sanxerunt {sanxerint &Pe}," sancti {*scilicet &NaMzPeRe} canones, "ac per hoc illam {nulla &Na} de tota ecclesia iudicare, ipsam ad nullius commeare {remeare &NaMzPeRe} iudicium; nec de eius {numquam add. &Na} unquam praeceperunt {perceperunt &Mz} iudicio iudicari {iudicare &NaMzPeRe} sententiamque eius constituerunt non oportere dissolvi, cuius potius sequenda {sequentia &Pe} decreta mandaverunt {mandaverint &Pe}."	Again, as we read in 9, q. 3, c. Ipsi [c.16, col.611], Pope Gelasius speaking about the Roman see says, "They," that is the canons, "have decreed that on no occasion at all ought there be an appeal from it, and as a result that it is the judge of the whole church and does not come under anyone's judgement; and they have commanded that there be no judgement of its judgement and they have determined that it is not appropriate that its sentence be dissolved, rather they have ordered that its decrees should be followed."
{*Item add. &NaMzPeRe} dist. 27 {*17 &MzNaRe} para. Hinc etiam {et &Mz} {*sic add. &NaRe} legitur {sequitur &Pe}, "Nec antedictae sedis," scilicet Romanae, "antistitem [[PbPcPe MwBa conclude here, omitting the rest of book -- see Scholz, Unbekannte Streitschriften, vol. 2, pp. 143-6.]] minorum subiacuisse iudicio." Et infra: "Episcopi vero in synodo residentes {trs.312 &Na} congregata auctoritate eiusdem Simachi dixerunt, `Simachus papa sedis apostolicae praesul ab huiusmodi {huius &Re} opinionibus {*oppositionibus &Zn} impetitus {impeditus &NaRe} quantum ad homines respicit, {respicitit &Na} {om. &Mz} [[gap left in Mz]] sit immunis et liber cuius causam totam Dei iudicio reservamus."	Again, we read the following in dist. 17, para. Hinc etiam [c.6, col.52], "Nor has the bishop of the afore-mentioned see," that is the Roman see, "lain under the judgement of inferiors. ... Indeed bishops sitting in a synod gathered on the authority of that Symachus said, `Pope Symachus, bishop of the apostolic see, who has been assailed by opposition of this kind, is exempt and free in respect of men because we reserve all his cause to the judgement of God."
Item Nicolaus papa, ut habetur {*legitur &MzNaRe} 9, q. 3, c. Patet, ait, "Patet profecto sedis apostolicae, cuius auctoritate maius non est, iudicium a nemine fore retractandum neque cuiquam de eius liceat iudicare iudicio, iuxta quod Innocentius papa Rufo et caeteris {et ceteris: ceterisque &MzNaRe} episcopis per Thessaliam constitutis scribens ait, `Nemo unquam apostolico culmini, de cuius iudicio non licet retractari manus obvias audacter intulit nemo in hoc rebellis extitit nisi qui de se voluit iudicari.' Et beatus Gelasius papa {*trs. MzReZn}, `Nec de eius {cuius &Mz}, id est Romanae ecclesiae, iudicio {*om. &MzNaReZn} canones unquam praeceperunt iudicari iudicio sententiamque illius constituerunt non oportere dissolvi, cuius potius sequenda decreta {secreta &NaRe} mandaverunt." Ex praedictis {*quibus &NaRe} omnibus {omnibus add. &Na} videtur colligi quod nec imperator nec alius iudex {*om. &MzNaRe} est iudex Romani pontificis.	Again, as we read in 9, q. 3, c. Patet [c.10, col.609], Pope Nicholas says, "It is certainly true that the judgement of the apostolic see, than whose authority there is none greater, should not be revised by anyone, and no one is permittted to judge its judgement. This is according to what Pope Innocent, writing to Rufus and the rest of the bishops appointed throughout Thessalia, says, `No one has ever rashly raised hostile hands against the apostolic crown, whose judgement one is not permitted to revise;' and blessed Pope Gelasius, `The canons have never ordered that its, that is the Roman church's, judgement be judged and they have determined that it is not appropriate that its sentence be dissolved, but rather have ordered that its decrees be complied with.'" We seem to gather from all these that neither the emperor nor anyone else is the judge of the Roman pontiff.
Discipulus Post auctoritates aliquas rationes ad eandem assertionem probandam allega. {Discipulus ... allega om. &Re}	Student Following these authorities, bring forward some arguments to prove the same assertion.
Magister Haec assertio ratione probatur. Nam minor non est iudex maioris, dist. 21. c. Inferior {*et add. &MzNaRe} c. Denique. Imperator {*autem add. &MzNaRe} et quilibet alius est minor Romano pontifice, teste Nicolao papa qui hoc asserit, ut habetur dist. 116. {*96 &MzNaRe} c. Duo, ubi ad idem beatum Ambrosium allegat dicens, "Qui {*etiam add. &MzNaReZn}," scilicet Ambrosius, "in scriptis suis {*trs. &MzNaReZn} ostendit quod aurum non tam preciosius est {*sit &MzNaReZn} plumbo quam regia potestate sit altior ordo sacerdotalis, hoc modo circa principium sui pastoralis scribens, "Honor, fratres, et sublimitas {sublimans &Mz} episcopalis nullis {nullus &Mz} poterit comparationibus adaequari. Si regum fulgori compares et principum {principium &Mz} diademati {diademate &Re} longe erit inferius quam si plumbi metallum ad auri fulgorem conferas {*compares &MzNaReZn}. Quippe cum videas regum colla et principum submitti genibus sacerdotum et osculata eorum dextera orationibus eorum credant se excommunicari {*communicari &NaReZn} vel muniri {*vel muniri om. &MzNaReZn}." Hoc etiam testatur Innocentius tertius qui, ut legi {*legitur &MzNaRe} Extra, De maioritate et obedientia, c. {om. &MzNaRe} Solitae, loquens de pontificali dignitate seu {*dignitate seu om. &NaRe} auctoritate et potestate regali ait, "Illa quae praeest diebus, id est {id est: in &Re} spiritualibus, maior est; quae vero carnalibus {cardinalibus &Na} minor; est {*om. &MzNaRe} ut quanta est inter solem et lunam {trs.321 &MzNaRe} tanta inter pontifices et reges differentia cognoscatur." Ex his aliisque quampluribus {*Ex his aliisque quampluribus: Ex quibus /his Mz\ /verbis add. Na\ et aliis pluribus &MzNaRe} colligitur quod imperator est minor papa. Ergo non est iudex eius.	Master This assertion is proved by argument. For an inferior is not the judge of his superior (dist 21, c. Inferior [c.4, col.70] and c. Denique [c.6, col.71]). The emperor and anyone else at all are inferior to the Roman pontiff, as Pope Nicholas attests, who asserts this, as we find in dist. 96, c. Duo [sunt] [c.10, col.340], when he brings forward blessed Ambrose to this effect, saying, "He," that is Ambrose, "also shows in his writings that as gold is more precious than lead, so much more is the priestly order loftier than royal power, writing in this way about the origin of his pastorship, `The episcopal honour and loftiness, brothers, can not be equalled by any comparisons. If you compare [to them] the splendour of kings and the diadem of princes they will be just as inferior as if you compare the stuff of lead to the splendour of gold. Indeed when you see the necks of kings and princes lowered before the knees of priests and the right hands of the latter kissed, they [the rulers] believe that they are joined to their [the priests'] prayers.'" Innocent III also attests to this, as we read in Extra, De maioritate et obedientia, c. Solitae [c.6, col.196], when he says, speaking about priestly authority and royal power, "That which rules over the days, that is over spiritual matters, is greater; that is lesser [which rules over] carnal matters; as great as is the difference between the sun and the moon, so great is the difference known to be between bishops and kings." We gather from these and many other [texts] that the emperor is inferior to the pope. Therefore he is not the latter's judge.
Amplius nemo est iudex iudicis sui. Sed papa est iudex imperatoris cum ipsum valeat excommunicare et imperator ei subsit et sibi debeat obedire, teste beato Clemente qui, ut legitur 2 {*11 &NaRe} {9 &Mz} q. 3, c. Si autem nobis {*vobis &Zn} {*ait, "Si autem vobis add. &MzNaRe} episcopis non obedierint omnes presbyteri et reliqui clerici omnesque principes, tam maioris ordinis quam inferioris, atque reliqui populi non tantum {*solum &MzNaReZn} infames sed etiam {et &Mz} extorres a regno Dei et {*a add. &MzNaReZn} consortio fidelium et a liminibus {a liminibus: alii &Mz} [[gap in ms after alii]] sanctae Dei ecclesiae alieni erunt." Hoc {*etiam add. &NaRe} asserit Gelasius papa {trs.231 &Na} {*qui add. &MzNaRe}, ut habetur dist. 96, c. Duo ait, "Talibus igitur {ergo &NaRe} institutis talibusque {et talibus &MzNaRe} fulti {suffulti &MzNaRe} auctoritatibus plures {*plerique &Zn} {plurium &MzNaRe} namque {*om. &MzNaReZn} pontificum alii reges alii imperatores excommunicaverunt. Nam si {om. &Mz} speciale aliquid {*aliquod &Zn} de personis principum requiritur {*requiratur &NaReZn} exemplum, beatus Innocentius papa Archadium imperatorem, quia consensit {consenserit &NaRe} ut sanctus Iohannes Chrysostomus a sua sede {trs. &NaRe} pelleretur, {depelleretur PeRe} {depelletur &Na} excommunicavit." Ergo nunc {*om. &NaRe} {tunc &Mz} imperator non est iudex papae cum papa sit iudex ipsius. Quod etiam papa sit iudex imperatoris ostenditur. Nam sicut se habet corpus ad animam humanam sic princeps corporis ad principem animarum. Sed corpus animae subest quantum ad regimen. Ergo {et add. &Mz} princeps corporum, scilicet imperator, subest regimini principis animarum, scilicet papae. {Quod etiam papa ... papae om. &NaRe}	Further, no one is the judge of his own judge. But the pope is the emperor's judge, since he can excommunicate him and the emperor is under him and ought to obey him, as blessed Clement attests when he says, as we read in 11, q. 3, c. Si autem vobis [c.11, col.646], "However if all priests, the rest of the clergy, all princes, both of the greater and lesser order, and the rest of the people do not obey you bishops, they are not only of ill repute but are also banished from the kingdom of God and from the fellowship of the faithful and will be inimical to the threshold of the holy church of God." Pope Gelasius asserts this too, as we find in dist. 96, c. Duo [sunt] [c.10, col.340], when he says, "Upheld by such regulations and such authorities many bishops have pronounced excommunications, some against kings, some against emperors. For if some particular example concerning the persons of the emperors is required, blessed Pope Innocent excommunicated the emperor Achadius because he agreed in the expulsion of Saint John Chrisostom from his see." The emperor is not the judge of the pope, therefore, since the pope is his judge. That the pope is the emperor's judge is shown again. For as the body is in relation to the human soul, so is the ruler of the body in relation to the ruler of souls. But with respect to rule the body is beneath the soul. Therefore the ruler of bodies, that is the emperor, is beneath the rule of the ruler of souls, that is the pope.
Rursus imperator non est iudex illius qui legibus imperialibus est solutus et qui mundanis legibus nequaquam astringitur; {*sed papa mundanis legibus non astringitur add. &MzNaRe}, teste beato {*om. &MzNaRe} Nicolao papa qui, ut habetur 23 {*33 &MzNaRe} q. 2, c. Inter haec, ait, beata {*"Sancta &MzNaReZn} dei ecclesia mundanis numquam {non &MzNaRe} constringitur legibus." Et idem, ut habetur dist. 10. c. Lege, ait, "Lege imperatoris {*imperatorum &NaReZn} non {est add. &MzNaRe} in ecclesiasticis omnibus controversiis utendum est {om. &MzNaRe}." Et infra: "Imperiali iudicio non possunt iura ecclesiastica dissolvi." Ex quibus patet quod papa legibus imperialibus nequaquam astringitur. Quod et {*etiam &NaRe} patet ex hoc quod papa non astringitur canonibus papalibus nec etiam canonibus generalium conciliorum. Ergo nec {*non &NaRe} astringitur legibus imperialibus quae sunt sacris canonibus postponendae, teste Gratiano qui 10. dist. {*trs. &MzNaRe} para. 1, ait, "Constitutiones vero principum ecclesiasticis constitutionibus non praeeminent sed obsequuntur." Et eadem dist. para. Ecce ait, "Ecce {ait ecce om. &Re} {*quod add. &MzNaReZn} constitutiones principum ecclesiasticis legibus postponendae sunt." Et idem, ut legitur 2, q. 3, para. Hinc autem {*om. &MzNaRe} colligitur, dicit quod seculi leges non dedignantur sacros canones imitari. Ergo papa legibus imperialibus est solutus. Et per consequens imperator non est iudex papae.	Again the emperor is not the judge of him who is free of imperial laws and is not bound by the laws of the world; but the pope is not bound by the laws of the world, as Pope Nicholas attests when he says, as we find in 33, q. 2, c. Inter haec [c.6, col.1152], "The holy church of God is never bound by the laws of the world." And as we find in dist. 10, c. Lege [c.1, col.19], the same pope says, "Imperial law should not be used in any ecclesiastical controversies. ... Ecclesiastical laws can not be dissolved by imperial judgement." It is clear from these that the pope is not bound by imperial laws. This is also clear from the fact that the pope is not bound by papal canons and not even by the canons of general councils. He is not, therefore, bound by imperial laws, which should be esteemed less than sacred canons, as Gratian attests when he says in dist. 10, para. 1 [col.19], "The constitutions of princes do not surpass but yield to ecclesiastical constitutions." And he says in the same distinction, para. Ecce [col.20], "Note that the constitutions of princes should be esteemed less than ecclesiastical laws." And as we read in 2, q. 3, para. Hinc colligitur [col.453], [[not a direct quote]] the same man says that secular laws do not disdain to imitate the sacred canons. Therefore the pope is free from imperial laws. And consequently the emperor is not the judge of the pope.
Item imperator non est iudex episcoporum inferiorum et clericorum, ut ex innumeris canonibus sacris {*trs. &NaRe} colligitur. Ergo non est iudex papae.	Again, the emperor is not the judge of lesser bishops and clerics, as is gathered from innumerable sacred canons. Therefore he is not the judge of the pope.
CAP. XVII. Discipulus Istae allegationes pro assertione praedicta sufficiant. Ideo ad assertionem contrariam te converte.	Chapter 17 Student Those arguments are enough in support of the above assertion. Therefore turn to the opposite assertion.
Magister Circa assertionem contrariam varii sunt {*trs. &MzNaRe} modi ponendi.	Master There are various ways of putting the opposite assertion.
Discipulus Recita illos modos {*trs. &MzNaRe} varios.	Student Record those various ways.
Opinion 2A: The Emperor can judge any crime, ecclesiastical or secular, and hence can depose a pope
Magister Unus modus ponendi est quod imperator ratione imperatoriae maiestatis {*dignitatis &NaRe} de omni crimine tam ecclesiastico quam seculari habet iudicare et papam {*trs. &MzNaRe} ipsum {primum &Mz} si est probatum contra ipsum crimen dignum depositione deponere.	Master One way of putting it is that by reason of his imperial dignity the emperor has the power to judge any crime, ecclesiastical as much as secular, and to depose the pope himself, if a charge worthy of deposition is proved against him.
Discipulus Aliquas allegationes adducas ad probandum quod imperator debet papam pro omni crimine iudicare.	Student Bring forward some arguments to prove that the emperor ought to judge the pope for any crime.
Magister Ad hoc plures rationes sunt inductae {*in add. &Re} [[interlinear]] prima {qua &Re} [[corrected interlinear]] parte huius dialogi libro 6 c. {*2 et add. &NaRe} 3 {*et add. &NaRe} 4 et 5, quibus {*forte add. &MzNaRe} non facile erit {*trs. &MzNaRe} invenire fortiores. Ideo non videtur necesse quod circa alias rationes adducendas me fatiges {fatigeres &Mz}.	Master Many arguments were brought forward for this in chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5 of book 6 of the first part of this Dialogue, and it will perhaps not be easy to find stronger ones than these. It does not seem necessary, therefore, for you to importune me about bringing forward other arguments.
Discipulus Non est {*erit &NaRe} inutile ut etiam rationes ibi factas aliter quam ibi tractemus. Ideo alias {*illas &MzNaRe} tangas et alias coneris inducere.	Student It will not be useless to consider arguments made there in addition to others. Would you cite those, therefore, and try to bring forward others.
Magister Quod imperator possit et debeat papam pro omni crimine iudicare quampluribus viis ostenditur, quarum una, quae etiam {*tacta add. &NaRe} {tanta add. &Mz} est in prima parte tacta {*om. &MzNaRe} istius Dialogi, sumitur ex unitate summi {*supremi &NaRe} iudicis {*trs. &MzNaRe} quam {quem &NaRe} omnis communitas bene ordinata habere debet {*trs. &NaRe}. Nam omne regnum, omnis civitas, omne collegium et omnis communitas debet habere unum solum iudicem simpliciter supremum vel plures summos {*supremos &NaRe} idem officium habentes {*trs. &MzNaRe} seu gerentes vicem unius a {om. &Mz} quo vel a {*om. &MzNaRe} quibus omnes alii debent iudicari. Ergo tota universitas mortalium, si fuerit bene ordinata et {vel &Na} gubernata, habet {*habebit &MzNaRe} unum simpliciter summum {*supremum &NaRe} iudicem vel plures habentes idem officium {*seu gerentes vicem unius add. &NaRe} a quo vel quibus omnes alii debent {*debeant &NaRe} iudicari. Religio autem Christiana non impedit aut {*nec &MzNaRe} destruit {*trs.321 &NaRe} bonam dispositionem communitatis mortalium. Ergo nihil invenitur in ea repugnans optimae dispositioni universitatis mortalium, {*sed quicquid invenitur in ipsa est conveniens optimae dispositioni mortalium add. &NaRe}. Ex quo concluditur quod in nullo obviat religioni christianae quia quicquid invenitur in ea est conveniens optimae dispositioni {*quia quicquid ... dispositioni om. &NaRe} {*universitatem add. &NaRe} mortalium et per consequens {*et per consequens om. &NaRe} unum habere summum {*supremum &NaRe} iudicem vel plures idem habentes officium {*seu add. &MzNaRe} tenentes locum {*vicem &NaRe} unius a quo vel a {*om. &NaRe} quibus alii omnes {*trs. &MzNaRe} pro omni crimine debeant iudicari non repugnat religioni Christianae {*non repugnat religioni Christianae om. &NaRe}. Sed iste {*ille unus &NaRe} summus {*supremus &NaRe} iudex non est papa nec etiam papa habere potest tale {*trs.321 &NaRe} officium. Ergo ipse papa debet ab illo summo {*supremo &NaRe} iudicari. Ille autem summus {*supremus &NaRe} iudex {om. &NaRe} est imperator qui de iure est princeps et dominus {*trs.321 &NaRe} totius mundi. Ergo imperator habet iudicare papam pro omni crimine.	Master [1] That the emperor can and ought to judge the pope for any crime is shown in very many ways, one of which, cited also in the first part of this Dialogue, is taken from the singleness of the supreme judge which every well ordered community should have. For every kingdom, every city, every college and every community should have one single judge who is plainly supreme, or many who are supreme and hold or manage the same office in place of that one, and all others should be judged by this one or by these. If the whole totality of mortals, therefore, is well ordered and governed it will have one plainly supreme judge, or many holding the same office or acting in place of one, and by this one or these all the others should be judged. The christian religion, however, does not destroy or prevent the good management of the community of mortals. Nothing is found in it, therefore, which is contrary to the best management of the totality of mortals, but whatever is found in it is consistent with the best management of the totality of mortals. We conclude from this that it does not conflict with the christian religion that the totality of mortals have one supreme judge, or many holding or maintaining the same office in place of that one, and that all others should be judged for any crime by that one or by those. But that one supreme judge is not the pope and the pope can not even hold such an office. The pope himself, therefore, should be judged by that supreme one. That supreme judge, however, is the emperor who is by right the prince and lord of the whole world. Therefore the emperor has the right to judge the pope for any crime.
Discipulus Ista {enim add. &Mz} ratio mihi aliqualiter est obscura. Ideo antequam eam {*ea que assumit &NaRe} [[gap in Mz after eam]] probes unum declara. Per hoc enim melius intelligam an aliquid probabilitatis contineat. Dic igitur quid intelligis {*intelligitur &Re} {intelligit &Na} per unum iudicem summum {*supremum &NaRe} vel plures idem officium habentes {*trs. &NaRe}.	Student That argument is somewhat obscure to me. Before you demonstrate those things which it assumes, therefore, make one thing clear. For in this way I will better understand whether it contains any probability. So tell me what is understood by "one supreme judge or many holding the same office".
Magister Hoc dicitur propter diversum modum principandi, scilicet regalem, aristocraticum et politicum, de quibus in morali philosophia tractatur. Nam in principatu regali unus est {om. &Mz} solus {*trs. &NaRe} iudex summus {*supremus &NaRe}; in aliis autem {*vero &MzNaRe} sunt plures summi {*supremi &NaRe}, a quorum nullo seorsum est aliqua referenda {*ferenda &MzNaRe} sententia sed ex deliberatione commune {*communi &MzNaRe} et consensu ipsorum, vel saltem valentioris partis secundum leges ipsorum et consuetudines approbatas, est sententia proferenda. Et ita tunc sunt iudices plures {*trs. &MzNaRe} summi {*supremi &NaRe} idem tamen officium habentes {*trs. &MzNaRe} et eandem penitus potestatem ita ut saepe in omnibus sunt {*sint &MzNaRe} aequales. Et ideo gerunt vicem unius et locum unius tenent.	Master This is said because of the different ways of governing which moral philosophy considers, namely royal, aristocratic and democratic. For in royal government there is one sole supreme judge; in the others, in truth, there are many supreme [judges], by none of whom on his own should any sentence be pronounced, but it should be pronounced after their common deliberation and consent, or at least of the more powerful [valentior] part of them according to their laws and approved customs. [Cf. Marsilius, Defensor pacis, I.xvii.2, Scholz, p. 113, lines 15-17; not verbatim.] And so then there are many supreme judges, yet each holding the same office and having exactly the same power, so that they are often equal in everything. And therefore they act in place of one and hold the position of one.
Discipulus {*Nunc add. &NaRe} rationem tactam perficias.	Student Would you now complete the argument you touched on?
Magister Circa eam non videtur aliquid probandum nisi quod in nullo obviat religioni Christianae unitate {*universitatem &NaRe} mortalium unum habere summum {*supremum &NaRe} iudicem vel plures summos {*supremos &NaRe} idem habentes officium. Quod ex illis quae dicta sunt primo capitulo huius {*trs. &MzNaRe} {*1 add. &MzNaRe} videtur posse probari, quia universitas mortalium nequaquam optime gubernatur nisi uni principi qui dominetur omnibus sit subiecta. Ad quod probandum plures {*11 &NaRe} {enim &Mz} rationes sunt ibidem adductae.	Master It does not seem that anything needs to be proved about that, except that it does not in any way conflict with the christian religion for the totality of mortals to have one supreme judge or many supreme [judges] holding the same office. This seems provable from what was said in the first chapter of the first [book] of this [tractate], because the totality of mortals is only best governed if it is subjected to one ruler who has dominion over everyone. Eleven arguments were brought forward in that place to prove this.
Discipulus Dimittamus ad praesens loqui de universitate mortalium, quorum aliqui sunt fideles et aliqui infideles, et ideo forte nullo modo concordarent in unum iudicem qui omnes alios de omni crimine iudicaret, et loquamur de tota communitate fidelium quorum aliqui sunt laici {*et aliqui clerici add. &NaRe}. Et videamus an ista communitas non possit esse optime ordinata, quantum permittit status vitae praesentis, nisi tota habeat unum iudicem solum {*trs. &NaRe} et {*om. &NaRe} summum {*supremum &NaRe} a quo {*omnes add. &MzNaRe} alii pro quocunque crimine debeant iudicari.	Student Let us give up for the moment talking about the totality of mortals, some of whom are believers and some unbelievers, who would therefore perhaps not agree at all about one judge who would judge all others for any crime, and let us speak about the whole community of believers, of whom some are laymen and some clerics. And let us see whether it is the case that that community can not be best regulated, as much as the condition of this present life allows, unless as a whole it has one sole supreme judge by whom all others should be judged for any crime at all.
Does the Christian community, to be best governed, need one supreme judge of all crimes?
Opinion 1: There need not be one supreme judge of all crimes
Magister Quia {*Quod &MzNaRe} tota communitas fidelium non habet {*habeat &MzNaRe} talem unicum {om. &NaRe} iudicem summum {*supremum &NaRe} potest poni pluribus modis.	Master That the whole community of believers does not have such a single supreme judge can be put in many ways.
Discipulus Explica modos illos ut de aliquibus eorum vel de {*om. &NaRe} singulis conferamus.	Student Explain those ways so that we can discuss some of them or each of them.
Various versions of this opinion
Magister Unus modus ponendi potest esse ut diversa regna vel provinciae habeant diversos iudices summos {*supremos &NaRe} qui {que &NaRe} uni superiori minime sint {sit &NaRe} {sunt &Mz} subiecti {subiecta vel subiecte &NaRe}. Alius est ut respectu eorundem sint diversi iudices summi {*supremi &NaRe} non habentes idem officium secundum modum expositum {*praeexpositum &NaRe} qui eosdem pro eisdem delictis habeant iudicare. Alius est ut una pars habeat unum summum {*supremum &NaRe} iudicem, a quo etiam {*solo &MzNaRe} pro quocunque excessu {*crimine &NaRe} debeat iudicari, et alia pars habeat alium summum {*supremum &Na} iudicem {om. &Na} a quo etiam {et add. &Na} pro quocunque crimine habeat {*debeat &MzNa} iudicari {et alia pars ... iudicari om. &Re}, sicut secundum quosdam omnes clerici habent unum summum {*supremum &NaRe} iudicem talem, scilicet papam, et omnes laici imperatorem. Alius est ut {quod &Re} [[interlinear addition]] una pars habeat unum summum {*supremum &NaRe} iudicem a quo solo vel auctoritate ipsius pro quocunque delicto debeat iudicari, alia autem pars pro aliquibus delictis debeat iudicari ab uno summo {*supremo &NaRe} iudice et pro aliis ab alio, sicut secundum quosdam omnes clerici pro quocunque delicto debent iudicari a papa, {*sed laici pro aliquibus delictis debent iudicari a papa add. &NaRe} et pro aliis a iudice seculari. Alius est ut sit unus summus {*supremus &NaRe} {*iudex add. &NaRe} qui habeat facere iudicium de omnibus, uno vel paucis exceptis, sicut secundum unam assertionem ex lege humana {*christiana &NaRe} solus papa {solus papa add. &Mz} est exceptus {*exemptus &NaRe} a iurisdictione iudicis secularis. Sed omnes alii clerici sola libertate eis concessa {*trs. &MzNaRe} ab imperatoribus et regibus a iudicio secularium iudicum sunt exempti.	Master (1) One way of putting it can be that different kingdoms or provinces have different supreme judges, who are not subject to one superior. (2) Another way is that in regard to the same people there are various supreme judges not holding the same office in the way explained above, who have the right to judge the same people for the same crimes. (3) Another way is that one part has one supreme judge, by whom alone it should be judged for any crime at all, and another part has another supreme judge by whom it too should be judged for any crime at all, just as, according to some people, all clerics have one such supreme judge, namely the pope, and all laymen have the emperor. (4) Another way is that one part has one supreme judge by whom alone, or on the authority of whom, it should be judged for every crime, while another part should be judged by one supreme judge for some crimes and by another [judge] for other [crimes], just as, according to some people, all clerics should be judged by the pope for any crime at all, but laymen should be judged by the pope for some crimes and by a secular judge for other crimes. (5) Another way is that there is one supreme judge who has the power to pass judgement on all, with one or a few exceptions, just as, according to one assertion, by christian law only the pope is exempt from the jurisdiction of a secular judge. But all other clerics are exempt from the judgement of secular judges only because of a liberty granted to them by emperors and kings.
Objections against each of these versions
Discipulus Si sint alii modi ponendi negativam praedictarum assertionum ad improbandum istos {istas &Mz} {*praedictarum ... istos: praedictae assertionis &NaRe} puto quod valeant reduci ad istos. Ideo sufficit {*sufficiat &MzNaRe} adducere motiva quae allegari possunt pro istis vel {*pro istis vel om. &NaRe} ad improbandum istos. Dic ergo quomodo improbatur prima {*primus &NaRe}.	Student If there are other ways of putting the negation of the earlier assertion, I think that they can be reduced to these [just cited]. Let it be enough, therefore, to adduce arguments that can be brought forward to refute them. So tell me how the first [way] is refuted.
Magister Quomodo possit ostendi et allegari {*trs.321 &NaRe} quod non sit expediens diversa regna vel provincias habere diversos summos {*supremos &NaRe} iudices qui nulli superiori sint subiecti ex his quae allegata sunt primo huius cap. 1 potest advertere {*adducere &NaRe} studiosus.	Master Anyone who is zealous can adduce from what was brought forward in chapter one of the first [book] of this [tractate] how it can be argued and shown that it is not expedient for different kingdoms and provinces to have different supreme judges who are not subject to any superior.
Discipulus Converte te ad secundum et indica quomodo potest improbari ille modus dicendi qui tenet quod non est contra dispositionem bonam {*trs. &MzNaRe} communitatis fidelium ut respectu eorundem sint diversi iudices summi {*supremi &NaRe} vel {*om. &NaRe} non habentes idem officium, sicut aliqui ponunt {*trs. &MzNaRe} de papa et imperatore quia {*quod &NaRe} uterque seorsum sine requisitione et consensu alterius potest eundem pro eodem delicto percellere {procellere &Mz}.	Student Turn to the second and indicate how one can refute that way of speaking which holds that it is not against good management of a community of believers for there to be, with respect to the same people, different supreme judges not holding the same office, as some posit about the pope and the emperor that each separately can, without the request or agreement of the other, punish the same person for the same crime.
Magister Hoc multis rationibus improbatur {probatur &NaRe}. Primo sic: delinquentes non possunt debito modo puniri nisi citentur vel capti ducantur ad iudicem; sed si sunt plures iudices quorum quilibet seorsum absque alio potest iudicare reum poterit contingere ut {*quod &NaRe} nec citatus valeat comparere nec captus aut capiendus valeat iudici praesentari. Nam poterit {poterat &Mz} contingere quod uterque iudex suam iurisdictionem cupiens exercere citet reum pro eodem tempore vel quod uterque ad ipsum capiendum mittat familiam. Si autem uterque {*om. &MzNaRe} citetur {*citatur &MzNaRe} ab utroque, aut comparebit coram utroque et hoc est sibi impossibile, aut comparebit coram uno solo et tunc faciet {facit &Mz} alteri {alii &NaRe} iniuriam coram quo non comparet cum non plus tenetur {*teneatur &Re} comparere coram isto quam coram illo, et rursum ab illo coram quo non compareret {*comparet &MzRe} {cum non plus ... compareret om. &Na} absque culpa illius {*ipsius &NaRe} de {*pro &NaRe} {quod &Mz} contumacia punietur, aut coram neutro comparebit et tunc delictum eius {om. &NaRe} erit impunitum. Si etiam uterque illorum iudicum {*trs. &NaRe} mittat familiam ad capiendum reum, aut altera illarum familiarum aut utraque erit inobediens domino suo, aut inter se pugnabunt ut reus per potentiam perducatur ad iudicem. Quibus pugnantibus {*reus add. &MzNaRe} evadet, et sic in populo seu communitate periculosa orietur seditio et remanebunt crimina impunita. Quare communitas in qua {quibus &MzNaRe} talia ex potestate iudicum orirentur {*oriuntur &NaRe} est pessime gubernata.	Master This is refuted by many arguments of which the first is as follows. [1] Those committing a crime can not be duly punished unless they are summoned or led captive to a judge; but if there are many judges, each of whom can separately judge a guilty man without the other, it could happen that he who is summoned can not appear and he who is or should be captured can not be presented before a judge. For it could happen that each judge, wishing to exercise his own jurisdiction, summons the guilty man [to appear] at the same time, or that each sends his retainers to capture him. If he is summoned by both, however, either he will appear before each of them - and this is impossible for him - or he will appear before one only and then will do a wrong to the other before whom he does not appear, since he is not bound to appear before the one more than before the other - and in return without being at fault he will be punished for being contumacious by the one before whom he does not appear - or he will appear before neither and then his crime will remain unpunished. Also if each of those judges sends his retainers to capture the guilty man, either one or the other group of those retainers will be disobedient to their lord, or they will fight among themselves to lead the guilty man back to the judge by force. While they fight the guilty man will escape, and so a dangerous sedition will arise among the people or in the community and crimes will remain unpunished. A community in which such [problems] arise because of the power of judges, therefore, is very badly governed. [cf. Marsilius, I.xvii.3]
Amplius ex huiusmodi {*hac &NaRe} pluralitate iudicum omnis utilitas publica et reorum impeditur punitio {*trs. &NaRe}, quia poterit contingere quod isti iudices voluerint subditos ad diversa loca pro eodem tempore pro criminosis plectendis vel pro {*om. &NaRe} tractandis negociis quibus {*communibus &NaRe} convocare. Non possunt {*autem add. &NaRe} ad diversa loca aut {*om. &NaRe} eodem tempore convenire. Ergo et punitio malefactorum et communis utilitas impeditur {*impedietur &MzNaRe} et de facili seditio orietur. Quare talis communitas est {*esset &NaRe} pessime et periculosissime ordinata.	Further, [2] any public benefit and the punishment of the guilty are hindered by this plurality of judges because it could happen that those judges wanted to assemble their subjects at different places at the same time to punish criminals or to discuss common business. However, they can not assemble in different places at the same time. Therefore both the punishment of wrong-doers and the common benefit will be hindered, and sedition will easily arise. Therefore such a community would be very badly and most dangerously regulated.
Rursus absque necessitate et utilitate est pluralitas fugienda quia frustra fit per plura {*plures &NaRe} quod fieri potest {*trs. &NaRe} per pauciora {*pauciores &NaRe}. Sed pluralitas huiusmodi iudicum omni necessitate aut {*et &NaRe} utilitate caret quia omnia melius disponerentur {*disponentur &NaRe} per unum quam per plures. dicitur {*om. &NaRe} Ergo quod {*quia &NaRe} ex tali pluralitate faciliter orietur {*oritur &NaRe} {oriretur &Mz} guerra et seditio ac discordia tam inter ipsos iudices sua potestate uti volentes quam etiam inter ipsos subditos quorum aliqui ex diversis causis imo innumerabilibus possunt inclinari ut uni obediant et non {alicui add. &Mz} alteri {*alii &NaRe}, alii autem poterunt ad alium inclinari, ideo communitas quae habet diversos iudices summos {*supremos &NaRe} quibus vel {quibus vel om. &NaRe} quorum {trs.321 &Mz} uno {*om. &MzNaRe} {*quilibet add. &NaRe} seorsum absque alio valeat punire eosdem delinquentes pessima et periculosissima est censenda.	Again, [3] if there is no necessity and benefit a plurality should be avoided because what can be done by fewer people is done to no purpose by many. But this sort of plurality of judges lacks any necessity and benefit because everything is better regulated by one than by many. Because such a plurality easily gives rise, therefore, to war, sedition and discord, both among the judges themselves wanting to use their power and among their subjects, some of whom can be inclined for different, indeed for innumerable, reasons to obey one and not another, while others could be inclined towards another, a community which has different supreme judges, any one of whom can without another punish the same transgressors, should as a result be considered very bad and most dangerous.
Quod veritas etiam {*trs. &NaRe} {*ipsa add. &NaRe} apertissime testari videtur quae Matthaei 6:[24] ait, "Nemo potest duobus dominis servire; aut enim unum odio habebit et alterum diliget, aut unum sustinebit et alterum contemnetur {*contemnet &MzNaReVg}." Ex quibus verbis habetur quod nemo debet habere duos dominos vel duos iudices quorum unus non est sub alio.	[4] Truth himself seems very clearly to testify to this when he says at Matthew 6:24, "No one can serve two masters; for he will either hate the one and love the other, or be devoted to the one and despise the other." We find from these words that no one ought to have two masters or two judges, one of whom is not under the other.
Discipulus Ista auctoritas non videtur concludere opinioni {*propositum &NaRe} quia Christus loquitur de dominis contrariis qui actu {*om. &MzNaRe} contraria {communia &Mz} iubent.	Student That text does not seem to demonstrate the proposition because Christ is talking about opposed lords who order opposed things.
Magister Haec responsio ab {*om. &MzNaRe} aliis minime satisfacit quia Deus {*Dominus &NaRe} loquitur non solum de dominis contrariis actu {*trs. &NaRe}, hoc est qui actu contraria {communia &Mz} iubent, sed etiam de illis qui proni sunt ad iubendum contraria et de quibus est probabiliter formidandum quod inter se dissentientes iubebunt contraria. Cum ergo nostra {*om. &NaRe} natura humana sit prona ad dissentiendum non immerito est timendum quod si eadem communitas habuerit duo capita, {*capita add. &MzNaRe} ipsa {om. &Mz} {*illa &NaRe} inter se erunt {*om. &MzNaRe} dissentientia {*dissentient &NaRe}, quia quot capita tot sententiae et opiniones dist. 19. {*dist. 19: De consecratione &MzNaRe}, dist. 10. {*4 &MzNaRe}, Sicut in sacramentis. Quare timendum est quod capita illa sive domini iubebunt contraria {communia &Mz}. Ex quo infertur quod nullus subditus poterit eis servire. Et per consequens ista {*illa &NaRe} communitas quae habet plura capita est pessime ordinata. Ex quo concluditur quod si communitas fidelium habet duos summos {*supremos &NaRe} iudices, scilicet imperatorem et papam, est periculosa societas reputanda. Et consimili ratione infertur quod absque periculis manifestis non possunt in eodem regno vel provincia aut in {*aut in: ac etiam &Re} [[Na illegible]] civitate esse duo iudices supremi super eosdem, ecclesiasticus videlicet et secularis, praesertim in illo regno, provincia vel civitate quod vel quae superiorem de facto in temporalibus non recognoscit.	Master That reply does not satisfy some people, because the Lord is talking not only about lords actually opposed, that is who actually order opposed things, but also about those who are inclined to the ordering of opposed things and of whom it is to be feared with probability that, disagreeing among themselves, they will order opposed things. Since therefore our human nature is inclined to disagreement, it should not without cause be feared that if the same community had two heads, those heads will disagree with each other because there will be as many opinions and points of view as there are heads (De consecratione, dist. 4, c. Sicut in sacramentis [c.151, col.1411]). It should be feared, therefore, that those heads or lords will order opposed things. From this we infer that no subject could serve them. And consequently that community which has many heads is very badly regulated. We conclude from this that if a community of believers has two supreme judges, namely the emperor and the pope, it should be regarded as a dangerous society. And by a similar argument we infer that in the same kingdom or province and even city there can not be without clear dangers two supreme judges, that is an ecclesiastical and secular one, over the same people, especially in that kingdom, province or city which does not in fact recognise any superior in temporal affairs.
Ad haec {*etiam add. &NaRe} roboranda adduci potest assertio veritatis quae Matth. 12:[25] ait, "Omne regnum contra se divisum {*trs.312 &NaReVg} desolabitur, et omnis domus vel civitas {*trs.321 &NaReVg} contra se divisa {*trs.312 &NaReVg} non stabit {sta &Mz}." Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod omnis communitas et congregatio {est add. &Re} propinqua divisioni est propinqua desolationi et ruinae. Cum ergo communitas seu congregatio fidelium sit propinqua divisioni si habeat {*habet &NaRe} duos {om. &NaRe} iudices supremos, quia capita diversa sunt prona ad dissentiendum, sequitur quod communitas seu congregatio fidelium est propinqua desolationi et ruinae, et per consequens contra bonum commune est ut supra se duos habeat iudices {trs. &Na} supremos.	[5] To strengthen this, an assertion of the Truth from Matthew 12:25 can also be adduced, "Every kingdom divided against itself will be made desolate, and no city or house divided against itself will stand." We gather from these words that every community and congregation which is near to division is near to desolation and ruin. Therefore since a community or congregation of believers is near to division if it has two supreme judges, because different heads are inclined to disagreement, it follows that a community or congregation of believers is near to desolation and ruin, and consequently it is against the common good that it have two supreme judges over it.
Ad hoc etiam adducitur auctoritas Hieronimi qui, ut legitur 7, q. 1, c. In apibus, ad Rusticum monachum ait {*trs.4123 &NaRe}, "In apibus princeps unus est; grues unam sequuntur ordine {ordinem &Mz} literato; imperator {imperatori &Mz} unus, iudex unus provinciae. Roma autem condita duos fratres simul reges habere non potuit et fratricidio {*patricidio &MzZn} dedicatur. In Rebeccae utero Esau et Iacob bella gesserunt; singuli {singularum &NaRe} ecclesiarum episcopi, singuli {singuli add. &Re} archiepiscopi, singuli archidiaconi; et omnis ordo ecclesiasticus suis rectoribus nititur {innititur &Re}." In quibus verbis Hieronymus probat aperte per plura exempla quod in eadem ecclesia non debeant {*debent &MzNaRe} esse plures praelati quorum unus non est sub alio. Per quem {*quae &NaRe} aeque aperte {*om. &NaRe} vel apertius potest ostendi quod in eadem communitate non debent esse plures iudices supremi, quia si per universitatem {*unitatem &NaRe} principis in apibus potest ostendi unitas episcopi in una dioecesi et unitas archiepicsopi in uno archiepiscopatu, eadem ratione per unitatem principis in apibus potest ostendi unitas iudicis supremi super {per &Na} unam communitatem seu congregationem. Iterum si ex hoc quod grues unam sequuntur ordine {*om. &NaRe} {ordinem &Mz} ostenditur {ostendatur quod &Mz} unitas episcopi et archiepiscopi, in dioecesi {*in dioecesi om. &MzNaRe} consimili ratione ex hoc ostenditur unitas iudicis supremi super unam communitatem. Consimiliter si ex hoc quod Roma condita duos fratres simul reges habere non potuit sed fratricidio {*patricidio &Mz} extitit dedicata ostenditur unitas episcopi et archiepiscopi et aliorum rectorum {romanorum &Re} ecclesiae, multo fortius ex eodem {eadem &Na} potest probari unitas iudicis supremi super eandem communitatem, ut scilicet non sint duo, scilicet ecclesiasticus et {vel &Mz} secularis, quia non minus praesumendum videtur quod iudex secularis adversabitur ecclesiastico {*etiam add. &NaRe} usque ad interfectionem {interitionem &Mz}, quemadmodum unus fratrum conditorum Romae alium interfecit, quam iudex ecclesiasticus alteri iudici ecclesiastico vel unus episcopus alteri episcopo. Si ergo per exemplum duorum fratrum quorum unus occidit alterum {alium &NaRe} probari potest quod non debent esse duo episcopi in eodem episcopatu, multo fortius per idem exemplum potest ostendi quod super communitatem fidelium non debent esse duo iudices {*supremi add. &NaRe}, quorum unus sit secularis et alius ecclesiasticus. Et propter illud {*idem &NaRe} patet quod si per exemplum de Esau et Iacob qui in utero matris bella gesserunt potest ostendi quod non debent esse duo episcopi in una dioecesi, multo fortius probari potest per idem exemplum quod super communitatem fidelium non debent esse duo iudices summi {*supremi &NaRe}, scilicet ecclesiasticus et secularis. Hoc etiam verba Hieronimi sonare videntur qui vult quod unius provinciae debet esse unus iudex. Non autem dicit quod unius provinciae debet esse unus iudex {non autem ... iudex om. &Re} [[add. margin]] ecclesiasticus vel unus iudex secularis, quasi {quia &Re} vellet solummodo excludere pluralitatem iudicum ecclesiasticorum et non {*om. &MzNaRe} pluralitatem iudicum secularium, sed dicit indistincte quod unius provinciae est unus iudex, volens per hoc pluralitatem omnem {*trs. &MzNaRe} iudicum summorum {*supremorum &NaRe} quorumcunque excludere. Et ita super communitatem fidelium non expedit esse plures {trs. &Na} iudices qualescunque summos {*supremos &NaRe}.	[6] The authority of Jerome is also adduced to this effect. As we read in 7, q. 1, c. In apibus [c.41, col.582], he says to the monk Rusticus, "Among bees there is one ruler; cranes follow one of their number in learned order; there is one emperor and one judge in a province. When Rome was founded it could not have two brothers as kings at the same time and is destined for parricide. [[This word to be broadly interpreted, as the gloss says.]] In Rebecca's womb Esau and Jacob waged war; single bishops of churches, single archbishops, single archdeacons; and the whole ecclesiastical order rests on its rulers." In these words Jerome clearly proves by many examples that in the same church there should not be many prelates, one of whom is not under another. It can equally or more clearly be shown by them that there should not be many supreme judges in the same community, because if by the singleness of the ruler of bees the singleness of a bishop in one diocese and the singleness of an archbishop in one archdiocese can be shown, by the same argument from the singleness of the ruler of bees the singleness of a supreme judge over one community or congregation can be shown. Again, if the singleness of a bishop and archbishop is shown from the fact that cranes follow one of their number, by a similar argument the singleness of a supreme judge over one community is shown from this. Similarly, if the singleness of a bishop, an archbishop and other rulers of the church is shown from the fact that once Rome was founded it could not have two brothers as kings at the same time but was destined for parricide, the singleness of a supreme judge over the same community can much more strongly be proved from this, that is that there not be two, namely one ecclesiastical and one secular, because it seems that it should not be any the less presumed that a secular judge will oppose an ecclesiastical one, even as far as killing him, just as one of the founding brothers of Rome killed the other, than that one ecclesiastical judge [will oppose] the other or one bishop [oppose] the other. If it can be proved, therefore, by the example of the two brothers, one of whom killed the other, that there should not be two bishops in the same episcopate, it can much more strongly be shown by the same example that there should not be two supreme judges, one of whom is secular and the other ecclesiastical, over a community of believers. And for the same reason it is clear that if it can be shown from the example of Esau and Jacob, who waged war in their mother's womb, that there should not be two bishops in one diocese, it can much more strongly be proved by the same example that there should not be two supreme judges, that is one ecclesiastical and one secular, over a community of believers. Jerome's words also seem to signify this since he thinks that there should be one judge of one province. He does not say, however, that there should be one ecclesiastical judge of one province, or one secular judge, as if he was wanting to exclude only a plurality of ecclesiastical judges and of secular judges, but he says without distinction that there is one judge of one province, wanting by this to exclude every plurality of any supreme judges at all. And so it is not appropriate that there be many supreme judges of any kind over a community of believers.
Praeterea ista {*illa &NaRe} ordinatio communitatis non est bona ex qua provenit quod potentior eiusdem communitatis valentis {*valens &NaRe} magnam sequelam habere ad impatientiam et iracundiam provocetur contra alium potentiorem in eadem communitate qui etiam poterit magnam habere {*trs. &NaRe} sequelam, quia ex tali ordinatione sequuntur {sequitur &Mz} {*faciliter add. &NaRe} {facit add. &Mz} dissensiones, seditiones et guerrae. Sed si in communitate fidelium ordinetur quod sint scilicet {*om. &NaRe} duo iudices summi {*supremi &NaRe}, scilicet papa et alius, ex tali ordinatione sequitur {*sequetur &NaRe} [[margin Na]] faciliter quod unus contra alium ad impatientiam et iracundiam provocetur quia, sicut dicit poeta, "Omnis potestas impatiens consortis est." Cui satis videtur alludere Augustinus {*qui add. &NaRe}, ut legitur 23, q. 7, c. Qui {*Quod Zn} a {*autem &NaReZn} nobis, ait, "Quis enim avarus quaerit compossessorem? Quis dominandi cupiditate inflammatus vel fastu dominationis elatus desiderat habere consortem?" quasi diceret, nullis {*nullus &MzNaRe} talis. Ergo ordinatio communitatis non est bona nec laudabilis ubi sunt plures iudices summi {*supremi &NaRe} nullum habentes superiorem {*trs. &MzNaRe}.	[7] Moreover, that regulation of a community is not good by which it comes to pass that a more powerful member of that community who is able to have a large following is provoked to impatience and anger against another of the more powerful members in that same community who is also able to have a large following, because dissension, seditions and wars easily follow from such regulation. But if a community of believers is regulated so that there are two supreme judges, namely the pope and another, it will easily follow from such regulation that one will be provoked to impatience and anger against the other, because, as the poet says, "All power is impatient of a partner." [[Lucan 1, 92-3]] As we read in 23, q. 7, c. Quod autem nobis [c.3, col.951], Augustine seems sufficiently to allude to this when he says, "For what greedy man seeks a joint-possessor? What man inflamed with a desire to rule or puffed up with the arrogance of domination wants to have a partner?" as though to say, there is no such person. The regulation of a community, therefore, is neither good nor praiseworthy when there are many supreme judges having no superior.
Ex quibus {*omnibus &NaRe} supradictis concluditur quod si in communitate fidelium fuerint plures iudices summi {*supremi &NaRe} sive plura capita simpliciter prima, qui vel {*seu &NaRe} quae eosdem pro eisdem criminibus habeant {habent &Mz} coercere et eisdem de eisdem praecipere, sequitur manifeste quod eadem communitas fidelium semper {super &Mz} erit disposita {*exposita &Na} discordiis, dissensionibus, seditionibus, pugnis et guerris tam inter capita ipsa contraria {*conantia &Na?Re} [[corrected unclearly from contraria in Re]] {conativa &Mz} invicem {*se praeferre add. &NaRe} {se potest ferre add. &Mz} quam inter subditos {*subiectos &MzNaRe}, quorum aliqui adhaerebunt uni et alii alteri. Et ideo pauci erunt vel nulli quin unum odio habebunt et alterum diligent. Et per consequens unum sustinebunt et alium {alii &Mz} si poterunt impugnabunt {*et add. &MzNaRe} ita semper erit timendum quod non erit pax in communitate seu congregatione {*fidelium add. &NaRe}.	We conclude from all of the above that if in a community of believers there are many supreme judges or many simply first heads, who have the power to coerce the same people for the same crimes and to command the same things of the same people, it manifestly follows that that same community of believers will always be exposed to discords, dissension, seditions, fighting and wars both between the heads themselves, with each trying to put himself ahead of the other, and among the subjects, some of whom will adhere to one and some to the other. And so there will be few people or none that will not hate one and love the other. And consequently they will uphold one and, if they can, attack the other and so it will always be something to be feared that there will not be peace in the community or congregation of believers.
CAP. XVIII. Discipulus Ut possim videre profundius an ista aliquam verisimilitudinem habeant contra ipsa obiiciam. Videtur enim per ista quod omnis communitas cui praesiderent plures, et {iam add. &Na} idem habentes officium ita {om. &Na} ut nullus {*unus &NaRe} sine consilio et consensu {trs.321 &Na} aliorum aut valentioris partis {*non add. &NaRe} debet {*debeat &NaRe} aliquid praecipere {percipere &Re} vel statuere seu ordinare aut aliquem coercere, non possent {*essent &NaRe} convenienter nec utiliter statuta {*instituta &NaRe} observare {*om. &MzNaRe}, quia omnia inconvenientia quae deducta sunt ex pluralitate iudicum summorum {*supremorum &NaRe} in communitate fidelium super eosdem ex pluralitate praesidentium idem habentium officium seu gerentium vicem unius possunt inferri. poterunt {*Potuerunt &Re} enim tales plures praesidenter {*praesidentes &MzNaRe} reos ad diversa loca citare vel mittere familias diversas ut capiantur et ad diversa loca {citare vel ... loca om. &Na} ducantur, sicut processit ratio prima. Poterit {*Poterunt &NaRe} etiam subditos {subiectos &Na} pro eis {*reis &NaRe} plectendis vel quibusdam {*communibus &NaRe} negociis pertractandis ad diversa loca vocare, sicut processit secunda. Frustra etiam regeretur {*regetur &NaRe} quaecunque communitas per plures huiusmodi {huius &Re} praesidentes cum possit regi per unum secundum quod tertia ratio processit. Nemo etiam poterit taliter {*om. &NaRe} diversis dominis contraria iubere volentibus {*valentibus &NaRe} servire {*deservire &NaRe} iuxta auctoritatem Salvatoris, "Nemo potest duobus dominis servire." Talis etiam communitas propinqua erit desolationi et ruinae propter hoc quod plures huiusmodi praesidentes proni sunt ad sibi {*om. &NaRe} {scilicet &Mz} dissentiendum iuxta auctoritatem aliam Salvatoris, "Omne regnum in {*contra &NaReVg} se divisum {*trs.312 &NaReVg} desolabitur" etc. Per exempla etiam Hieronimi, quae ponit 7, q. {7, q. om. &Mz} 1, {*7, q. 1,: in illo &NaRe} capitulo In apibus, potest ostendi quod non expedit esse plures huiusmodi praesidentes. Per hoc etiam quod omnis potestas impatiens est consortis probari potest quod in nulla {illa &Mz} communitate debent plures tali modo praeesse, sicut nec in aliquo episcopatu debent esse plures episcopi quomodolibet praesidentes {praesidentis &NaRe}. Semper enim videtur quod si fuerint plures qualitercunque in eadem communitate praesidentes timor erit de dissensionibus, contentionibus, seditionibus, rixis, pugnis et guerris, si praedicta concludant quod non debent plures esse {*trs. &NaRe} iudices summi {*supremi &NaRe} in communitate fidelium, scilicet ecclesiasticus et secularis, qui habet {*habeant &NaRe} {habent &Mz} eosdem criminosos pro eisdem sceleribus coercere. Etiam et ista concludere videntur contra modum qui nunc in ecclesia esse videtur {*etiam et ista ... videtur om. &MzNaRe}.	Chapter 18 Student So that I can understand more deeply whether those [arguments] have some likeness to the truth I will object against them. (1) For from them it seems that no community over which many ruled --- even when they held the same office so that without the consent of the others or of the stronger part of them one of them should not command, decree or ordain anything or coerce anyone --- would have been fitly or beneficially set up. Because all the disadvantages deduced from a plurality of supreme judges in a community of believers can be inferred from a plurality of those in charge of the same people holding the same office or acting like one person. For if there were many such men in charge they could summon the guilty to different places or send different retainers to capture them and lead them to different places, just as presented in the first argument. They could also call their subjects to different places to punish them or to deal with common business, just as presented in the second argument. In vain will any community be ruled by many men of this kind in charge when it can be ruled by one man, as the third argument argues. Also, no one will be able in that way to serve different lords wishing to order contary things, according to the Saviour's text, [Matthew 6:24], "No one can serve two masters." Such a community will also be near to desolation and ruin because of the fact that the many of this kind in charge are inclined to disagree with each other, according to the other text of the saviour [Matthew 12:25], "Every kingdom divided against itself will be made desolate" etc. It can also be shown by Jerome's examples in the chapter [7, q. 1,] In apibus [c.41, col.582] that it is not appropriate that there be many of this kind in charge. Because of the fact that all power is impatient of a partner too, it can be proved that in no community should there be many in charge in that way, just as there should not be many bishops ruling in any way at all in any episcopate. For it always seems that if there are many men in charge of the same community in any way at all, there will be fear of dissension, struggles, seditions, quarrels, fighting and wars, if the above [arguments] are conclusive that there should not be in a community of believers many supreme judges, namely an ecclesiastical one and a secular one, who have the power to coerce the same criminals for the same crimes.
Amplius multae {omnes &Na} communitates sunt bene ordinatae in quibus tamen idem subest pluribus rectoribus. Ergo communitas fidelium poterit esse bene ordinata licet in ipsa plures summi {*supremi &NaRe} iudices praesint eisdem {easdem &Na}. Antecedens patet quia videmus quod idem est vasallus plurium dominorum, et {*etiam &NaRe} regum, quorum nullus est sub alio. Idem etiam clericus subest diversis episcopis pro diversis ecclesiis seu beneficiis et in eadem causa eiusdem possunt esse plures iudices tam ordinarii quam delegati et etiam arbitri, Extra, De sententia et remiss. {*re iudicata &NaMzReZn} in {*om. &NaRe} capitulo ultimo et Extra, De rescriptis {rubricis &Na} Cum contingat. ita {*Ista &NaRe} videtur {*videntur &NaRe} ostendi {*ostendere &MzNaRe} quod allegationes praescriptae non concludunt intentum. Tu autem indica quomodo respondetur ad ipsas {*ipsa &NaRe}.	Further, (2) many communities are well regulated in which, nevertheless, the same person is under many rulers. A community of the faithful could be well regulated, therefore, even if many supreme judges in it rule over the same people. The antecedent is clear because we see that the same man is the vassal of many lords, even of kings, none of whom is under another. The same cleric too is under different bishops for different churches or benefices, and in the same case of the same person there can be many judges, both regular and appointed and also arbitrators (Extra, De sententia et re iudicata, last chapter [Duobus iudicibus c.26, col.409], and Extra, De rescriptis, c. Cum contingat [c.24, col.28]) These seem to show that the above arguments are not conclusive in achieving their intention. Would you point out how they are replied to?
Magister Ad primam obiectionem {*tuam add. &NaRe} respondetur quod ubicunque {ubique &Mz} in eadem communitate sunt plures praesidentes et {*etiam &NaRe} idem habentes {*trs. &NaRe} officium seu vicem gerentes unius non est optime disposita sed est ab optima dispositione deficiens, quia optima dispositio communitatis est quod sit unicus {*trs. &NaRe} praesidens summus {*supremus &NaRe} in ipsa. Ab ipsa tamen optima dispositione saepe est necesse recedere propter diversos casus, quia aliquando subditi unum {*unicum &NaRe} nullatenus sustinerent, aliquando nullus posset inveniri qui sufficeret solus praeesse. Unde ex multis causis potest contingere quod melius sit plures praeesse quam unum, licet melius esset disposita communitas si unus praesidens posset convenienter haberi, ita ut quaecunque communitas, praecipue notabiliter magna, quae {om. &MzNaRe} gubernatur a pluribus summis {*supremis &NaRe} in eadem communitate nequaquam optimo regimine gubernatur. Sicut tamen saepe periclitantes in mari optimum modum navigandi coguntur dimittere propter pericula evitanda {*evadenda &NaRe} {evacuanda &Mz} et nonnunquam viatores vias {*viam &MzNaRe} meliores {*meliorem &NaRe} compelluntur {compellentur &Mz} relinquere et longiorem ac deteriorem eligere et frequenter {trs. &Mz} multa bona ex causis necessariis omittuntur et multotiens dispensative qui alias essent indigni multiplici ratione ad diversa officia promoventur, sic nonnunquam ex causa rationabili necesse est optimum modum praeficiendi {*praesidendi &NaRe} relinquere scilicet regimen unius solius et praesidentiam plurium acceptare.	Master The reply to your first objection is that whenever in the same community there are many in charge, even holding the same office or acting like one person, it is not best regulated but falls short of the best regulation, because the best regulation of a community is that there be a single supreme person in charge of it. It is often necessary because of different occurrences, however, to retreat from that best regulation, because sometimes the subjects would not support that single person, sometimes no one could be found who alone would be adequate to rule. So for many reasons it can happen that it is better for many to rule than for one, although a community would be better regulated if one person could suitably be had to be in charge, in the sense that any community at all, especially a large one, which is governed by many who are supreme in the same community, is not governed according to the best form of rule. [[mss seem corrupt here and the addition of `quae' from G seems a good solution.]] Yet, just as often those who are in danger at sea are forced to abandon the most direct route to sail in order to avoid the dangers, and sometimes travellers are forced to leave the best path and to choose and longer and poorer one, and frequently many good things are given up for necessary reasons, and very often by way of dispensation those who would at another time be unworthy are promoted for a multiplicity of reasons to different offices, so sometimes it is necessary for a reasonable cause to abandon the best way of ruling, namely the rule of one person, and to accept the rule of many.
Discipulus Per istam rationem {*responsionem &NaRe} responderi {non add. &Re} [[interlinear]] potest {poterit &Na} ad omnes rationes {*allegationes &NaRe} praecedentis capituli inquantum probant {probat &NaRe} quod in communitate fidelium non debent esse plures iudices summi {*supremi &NaRe}, scilicet {om. &Na} ecclesiasticus et {om. &Re} secularis, quia solummodo probant, ut dicit ista responsio, quod si esset {esse &Mz} communitas fidelium optime disposita unum summum {*supremum &NaRe} caput seu iudicem habere deberet. Non autem est {*trs. &NaRe} necessarium quod communitas fidelium quae obnoxia est variis tribulationibus et pressuris semper sit optime disposita. Poterit {?potest &Na} ergo plures iudices summos {*supremos &NaRe}, scilicet ecclesiasticum et secularem, habere ita ut fideles omnes {*trs. &MzNaRe} sint eisdem pro eisdem delicits subiecti.	Student That reply can be made to all the arguments in the preceding chapter, in so far as they prove that in a community of believers there should not be many supreme judges, that is an ecclesiastical and a secular one, because they only prove, as that reply says, that if a community of believers were to be best regulated it ought to have supreme head or judge. It is not necessary, however, that a community of believers which is subject to various tribulations and afflictions be regulated in the best way. It can therefore have many supreme judges, that is an ecclesiastical and a secular one, so that all the believers are subject to the same people for the same crimes.
Magister Ad hoc respondetur quod propter tribulationes et adversitates quas sustinere posset communitas fidelium ex singulari malitia Christianorum posset contingere quod pro aliquo tempore expediens esset quod tota esset subiecta duobus supremis iudicibus. Tunc tamen nimis {*et add. &NaRe} perculosissime ab optima dispositione recederet, et ideo non debet tale regimen nisi in {om. &Na} casu singularissimo sustineri {*sustinere &NaRe}. Quare quantum potest conari tenetur ut habeat solummodo unum iudicem summum {*supremum &NaRe} qui omnes malefactores pro quibuscunque criminibus per se vel per iudices inferiores ipso a quibus ad ipsum licet {*liceat &NaRe} rationabiliter {rationaliter &Mz} appellare habeat coercere. Iste autem iudex non potest nec debet {*trs.321 &NaRe} esse papa, quia {*cum &NaRe} papa ex ordinatione Christi quantum potest se debet {*debeat &NaRe} a negociis secularibus sequestrare. Ergo si optime sit ordinata communitas fidelium unum {*unicum &NaRe} iudicem secularem summum {*supremum &NaRe} habebit qui non debet esse alius quam imperator Romanus, quando est catholicus.	Master The reply to this is that it could happen because of the tribulations and adversities which a community of believers could undergo from the singular malice of christians that it would be expedient for some time for the whole [community] to be subject to two supreme judges. Yet this would then be to withdraw too far and too dangerously from the best organisation, and so it should not support such a way of rule except in the most extraordinary case. As far as possible, therefore, it is bound to try to have only one supreme judge who has the power to correct all evil-doers for any crimes at all either himself or through judges inferior to him, from whom reasonable appeal is allowed to him. However, that judge can not and should not be the pope, because by Christ's decree the pope should as far as possible remove himself from secular affairs. If a community of believers is ordered in the best way, therefore, it will have one supreme secular judge who should be none other than the Roman emperor, when he is a catholic.
Sane ut intelligeres {*intelligas &NaRe} quod {*quantum &NaRe} allegationes praecedentis capituli concludunt sed {*secundum &NaRe} allegationes {*allegantes &MzNaRe} addunt unum quod nullus Christianus debet negare, ut eis videtur, quod scilicet nec per ordinationem Christi nec per ordinationem apostolorum nec per ordinationem {Christi nec ... ordinationem om. &Re} summorum pontificum Christianae fidei zelatorum nec per ordinationem generalium conciliorum rite celebratorum nec per ordinationem {ordinem &NaRe} quorumcunque iustorum optimus modus {om. &Mz} regendi fideles, quantum permittit status vitae praesentis, qui {quid &Mz} et {*etiam &NaRe} servatus est inter multos fideles et inter {*multos &MzNaRe} infideles laudatur {*laudabiliter &NaRe} secundum rationem vivere cupientes, hoc esse utile communitati {*hoc esse utile communitati: excluditur /om. Mz\ a tota et universali communitate &MzNaRe} fidelium, licet quandoque tota communitas fidelium talem optimum modum regendi propter malitiam {*malitias &MzNaRe} hominum non valeat adipisci. ergo {*om. &NaRe} Ex isto inferunt quod ex ordinatione Christi papa non habet iurisdictionem universalem pro omni crimine super totum populum Christianum. Et per consequens ordinationi Christi non repugnat quod aliquis alius super {*totum add. &NaRe} populum Christianum habeat potestatem. Et hoc concludunt allegationes praescriptae in capitulo praecedenti vel saltem {*hoc add. &MzNaRe} videntur necessario concludere allegationes illae quod tota communitas seu congregatio fidelium non optime regitur si habeat plures iudices {*supremos add. &NaRe} qui eosdem pro eisdem criminibus habeant cohercere, et {*quod add. &MzNaRe} talis modus regendi per diversos huiusmodi summos {*supremos &NaRe} iudices {*trs. &NaRe} non fuit ordinatus a Christo.	So that you truly understand how conclusive the arguments of the preceding chapter are, those who put them forward add one thing that no christian can deny, as it seems to them, namely that neither by Christ's decree, nor by a decree of the apostles, or of the supreme pontiffs zealous for christian faith, or of general councils duly celebrated or of any of the just at all, is the best way of ruling believers, as far as the status of this present life allows --- a way which has indeed been preserved among many believers and among many unbelievers wanting laudably to live according to reason --- forbidden to the whole universal community of believers, although sometimes the whole community of believers can not lay hold of this best way of ruling because of the wickedness of men. They infer from this that by Christ's decree the pope does not have universal jurisdiction over the whole christian people for every crime. And consequently it does not conflict with Christ's decree for some one else to have power over the whole christian people. And the above arguments in the preceding chapter come to this conclusion, or at least this seems to be the necessary conclusion of those arguments that the whole community or congregation of believers is not best ruled if it has many supreme judges who have the power to correct the same people for the same crimes and that such a way of ruling through different supreme judges of this kind was not decreed by Christ.
Discipulus Indica quomodo ad secundam obiectionem {*meam add. &NaRe} respondetur.	Student Point out how my second objection is replied to.
Magister Conceditur quod multae communitates sunt bene ordinatae in quibus idem subest pluribus rectoribus. Sed istae {*illae &NaRe} non sunt optime ordinatae in quibus idem subest pluribus rectoribus non habentibus superiorem. Licet igitur aliquis possit esse vasallus plurium dominorum et in hoc aliquam habeat {habet &Mz} utilitatem quia plura feuda tenet, tamen maiorem utilitatem haberet si pro omnibus feudis illis esset vasallus unius solius, licet in casu utilius sit sibi habere plures dominos quam unum solum. Sed hoc est propter {*aliquam add. &MzNaRe} malitiam domini unius vel aliquorum aliorum inquantum ab optima ordinatione mortalium aliquis vel aliqui recedit vel recedunt. Qualia etiam {*autem &NaRe} {et &Mz} damna patiantur saepe illi qui plures dominos habent magis quam illi qui {*uni add. &MzNaRe} soli domino sapienti et iusto sunt subiecti experientia {*certa add. &MzNaRe} docere videtur {*videretur &NaRe} {*trs. &NaRe}.	Master It is granted that many communities in which the same person is under many rulers are well ordered. But those in which the same person is under many rulers not having a superior are not best ordered. Therefore although someone can be the vassal of many lords and have some benefit from this because he holds many fiefs, yet he would have greater benefit if he were the vassal of only one lord for all those fiefs, although in a particular case it may be more useful to have many lords than to have only one. But this is because of some wickedness in one or other lords, in that some depart from the best arrangement of mortals. Reliable experience would seem to teach, however, what greater harm those who have many lords often endure than those who are subject only to one wise and just lord.
Cum {*vero add. &NaRe} secundo accipis ibi pro exemplo quod idem clericus est subiectus diversis episcopis pro pluribus ecclesiis vel {ecclesiis vel: ecclesiasticis &Re} beneficiis, respondetur quod illud exemplum {exemplare &Na} est ad oppositum quia quod idem clericus sit subditus {*subiectus &NaRe} pluribus episcopis pro diversis beneficiis est contra ius commune et per dispensationem solummodo fieri potest. Quare licet in casu ex aliqua speciali causa cum ordinatione bona clericorum stet quod talis {*alquis &NaRe} sit subditus {*subiectus &MzNaRe} pluribus episcopis, hoc tamen non stat cum optima ordinatione ipsorum, quia melius clerici regerentur si posset semper servari ius commune ut nullus clericus haberet plura {*om. &NaRe} beneficia in pluribus episcopatibus.	Now when you take there as your second example that the same cleric is subject to different bishops for many churches or benefices, the reply is that that example proves the opposite because it is against common law for the same cleric to be subject to many bishops for different benefices and can only be done as a dispensation. Although in a particular case for a special reason, therefore, it may be consistent with the good ordering of clerics that someone be subject to many bishops, this is nevertheless not consistent with their best ordering because clerics are better ruled if the common law could always be preserved and no cleric have benefices in many bishoprics.
Cum autem pro tertio exemplo dicis quod in eadem causa possunt esse plures iudices etc, respondetur quod iudices illi habent superiorem iudicem et non sunt summi {*supremi &NaRe}. Ideo aliquando utile est quod sint {sicut &Re} plures non summi {*supremi &NaRe}, praesertim cum illi iudices non sunt {*sint &NaRe} diversi ut unus pro libito possit absque alio in casu procedere imo vicem unius gerunt, et tamen quod sint plures hoc {*om. &NaRe} accidit ex aliqua causa speciali quae non haberet locum quando litigantes essent optime dispositi quantum permittit {promittit &Mz} conditio litigantium. Propter quod melius disponi {dispositioni &Na} videntur {videretur &Mz} litigantes quando concorditer eligunt {eliguntur &Mz} sive compromittunt {*committunt &NaRe} in unum quam quando in unum {*in unum: ita &NaRe} discordant et quam quando {*et quam quando: quod &NaRe} {et quam quando: quia &Mz} omnino diversos volunt habere. Et sic est de omnibus litigantibus quod illi minus a bona dispositione recedunt qui nisi alia {*aliqua &NaRe} causa specialis impediat sub uno {*unico &MzNaRe} iudice cupiunt litigare.	However, when you say for your third example that there can be many judges in the same case, etc., the reply is that those judges have a superior judge and they are not supreme. It is sometimes useful, therefore, that there are many who are not supreme, especially when those judges are not conflicting, so that one can without the other proceed in a case at his own pleasure, but rather act in unity; and yet that there are many happens for some particular reason, which would not arise when litigants were regulated as well as their condition permits. For this reason litigants seem to be best regulated when they choose harmoniously or commit themselves to the one judge [[or is it just `thing'?]] rather than when they so differ that they want to have completely different judges. And so it is with all litigants that those who want to litigate under a single judge, unless some particular reason prevents that, depart less from good regulation.
CAP. XIX. Discipulus Visum est de secundo modo ponendi communitatem fidelium non habere unum summum {*supremum &NaRe} iudicem qui ponitur {*qui ponitur: positum &NaRe} supra c. 17. Nunc videamus de tertio qui dictus est ibidem.	Chapter 19 Student We have reflected on the second way of putting [the case that] the community of believers does not have one supreme judge which was put in chapter 17 above. Let us now reflect on the third [way] which was set down there.
Magister Qualiter {poterit add. &Na} ille modus discuti {discutere &Mz} valeat ex illis {*hiis &MzNaRe} quae tractata sunt primo huius c. 1 usque ad c. 13 patere poterit studioso.	Master How that way can be investigated can be quite clear to the studious from what was dealt with in chapters 1 to 13 of the first [book] of this [tractate].
Discipulus Hoc non obstante de isto {*illo &NaRe} modo ponendi aliquid specialius videamus, an scilicet optimae ordinationi communitatis fidelium obviet et repugnet ut {*quod &NaRe} clerici pro omni crimine iudicentur a papa vel aliis iudicibus ecclesiasticis inferioribus {*eo add. &NaRe} et etiam {*om. &NaRe} omnes laici a iudice seculari quia contra istum modum ponendi totam communitatem fidelium non habere unum iudicem summum {*supremum &NaRe} rationes c. 17 adductae non videntur concludere, quia {quod &Na} secundum istum modum nec aliquis deberet {debet &NaRe} {*debebit ??} citari aut vocari a diversis ad diversa loca nec aliquis cogetur duobus dominis servire nec super eosdem plures potestatem habebunt nec aliqua potestas consortis erit impatiens secundum quae rationes istae {*illae &NaRe} processisse videntur. Vel ergo declara secundam {*secundum &MzNaRe} opinionem supra c. 17 recitatam quomodo allegationes istae {*illae &NaRe} concludunt contra tertium modum de quo nunc quaero loqui vel aliquas alias allegationes conaris adducere {*inducere &NaRe}.	Student Notwithstanding that, let us see something particular about that way of putting it, whether, that is, it conflicts with and opposes the best regulation of the community of believers for clerics to be judged for any crime by the pope or other ecclesiastical judges inferior to him and for all laymen to be [judged] by a secular judge, because against that way of putting it that the whole community of believers does not have one supreme judge the arguments adduced in chapter 17 do not seem to be conclusive. This is because on that way [of putting it] no one will have to be cited or called by different people to different places, no one will be forced to serve two masters, many men will not have power over the same people and there will be no power impatient of a partner, and it is on the basis of these points that those arguments seem to have proceeded. Therefore either make clear how according to the opinion recorded in chapter 17 above those arguments are conclusive against that third way about which I now wish to speak, or try to bring forward some other arguments.
Magister Licet secundum opinionem supra {sic &Mz} c. 17 recitatam modus regendi communitatem fidelium de quo capitulo praecedenti et c. 17 tractavimus sit multo perniciosior {et periculosior add. &Na} isto modo de quo nunc vis conferre, et ideo istae {*illae &NaRe} allegationes multo patentius concludunt {*concludant &NaRe} contra illum modum quam contra istum, cum {*tamen &NaRe} [[cum in margin but crossed out Re]] eaedem {illae &Re} allegationes {trs. &Re} vel aliquae {aliqua &Re} illarum {*earum &NaRe} convincunt {committunt &Mz}, ut videtur, istum modum regendi communitatem fidelium ab optimo modo {*regendi add. &NaRe} et puniendi reos deficere.	Master Although according to the opinion recorded in chapter 17 above the way of ruling the community of believers which we treated in the preceding chapter and in chapter 17 is much more destructive than that way about which you now wish to confer, and therefore those arguments are more obviously conclusive against the former than against the latter. Yet the same arguments, or some of them, demonstrate, it seems, that that way of ruling a community of believers departs from the best way of ruling and punishing the guilty.
Primae autem duae allegationes contra istum modum inefficaces apparent. Sed tertia contra ipsum aliquam apparentiam habere videtur {videretur &Mz} eo quod tota communitas fidelium posset regi per unum. Frustra autem fit per plures quod fieri potest {*trs. &NaRe} per pauciores. Ergo tales duo rectores, scilicet ecclesiasticus et secularis, illo {illo add. &Na} modo frustra ponuntur.	The first two arguments, however, seem ineffectual against that way [of ruling]. But the third seems to have some plausibility against it due to the fact that the whole community of believers could be ruled by one person; that which can be done by fewer people, however, is done in vain by many; therefore two such rulers, namely an ecclesiastical and a secular one, are proposed to no purpose in that way [of ruling].
Quarta allegatio, fundata in auctoritate Salvatoris Matt. 6, nequaquam videtur concludere contra istum modum. Sed {*quinta add. &NaRe} [[gap left in Mz]] fundata in auctoritate salvatoris Matth. 12:[25], "Omne regnum contra se divisum {trs.312 &NaRe} desolabitur" etc, contra istum modum tali modo adducitur. Non solum illa societas est propinqua desolationi et ruinae quae est contra se divisa sed etiam illa quae ex modo regendi est {*ad divisionem add. &NaRe} disposita {*et add. &NaRe} {est add. &Mz} divisioni propinqua iuxta {*praedictam add. &NaRe} {propinquam add. &Mz} auctoritatem Salvatoris. Sed si communitas fidelium habeat duas partes, quarum una habeat {*unum add. &NaRe} iudicem summum {*supremum &NaRe} et alia alium, communitas illa {*fidelium &NaRe} est disposita ad divisionem et divisioni propinqua, {iuxta praedictam auctoritatem salvatoris. Sed si communitas fidelium habeat duas partes quarum una habeat unum iudicem supremum et alia alium communitas fidelium est disposita ad divisionem et divisioni propinqua add. &Na} [[Re has same repetition but it has been crossed out - suggests same exemplar]] quia propter assiduam {*om. &NaRe} mutuam communionem subditorum et summorum {*supremorum &NaRe} iudicum, qui sicut omnes mortales sunt proni ad dissentiendum, contra se faciliter dividerentur {*dividentur &Na} {videntur &Re} {divideretur &Mz}. Ergo si tali modo regatur communitas fidelium periculosa est censenda.	The fourth argument, based on the text of the saviour in Matthew 6:[24] does not seem to be conclusive against that way of ruling. But the fifth, based on the text of the saviour in Matthew 12:25, "Every kingdom divided against itself will be made desolate" etc, is adduced against that way of ruling in the following way. Not only is that society which is divided against itself near to desolation and ruin, but also, according to the same text of the saviour, that one which, due to its way of ruling, is organised towards division and is near to division. But if the community of believers has two parts, one of which has one supreme judge and the other another, the community of believers is organised towards division and is near to division, because the subjects and the supreme judges, who are prone to disagreement like all mortals, will easily be divided among themselves because of their reciprocal communion. If the community of the faithful is ruled in such a way, therefore, it should be considered dangerous.
Alia {*Sexta &NaRe} autem allegatio, fundata in auctoritate beati Hieronymi, videtur efficaciter concludere contra illum {*istum &NaRe} modum quia per exempla quae adducit Hieronymus non solum probatur unitas prelati super unum populum sive supra unam multitudinem hominum sed etiam probatur unitas praelati super unum locum in quo subiecti {*subditi &NaRe} morantur ut in una dioecesi quae certam regionem comprehendit sit tantum unus episcopus et {om. &Re} in una provincia sit tantum unus archiepiscopus. Ergo per eadem exempla non tantum probatur unitas iudicis summi {*supremi &NaRe} super {*aliquam multitudinem hominum sed etiam probatur unitas iudicis supremi super add. &NaRe} aliquem locum in quo sibi subiecti morantur ut in eodem loco nullus alius sit iudex summus {*supremus &NaRe} quorumcunque in illo loco morantium, sicut in dioecesi Parisiensi est unus solus episcopus et in provincia Mediolanensi est unus solus archiepiscopus {et in provincia ... archiepiscopus om. &Re}.	The sixth argument, however, based on the text of blessed Jerome, seems to be efficaciously conclusive against that way [of ruling] because the examples that Jerome adduces not only prove the singleness of a ruler over one people or over one multitude of people but also prove the singleness of a ruler over one place in which subjects live, so that in one diocese, which comprises a fixed region, there is only one bishop and in one province there is only one archbishop. Therefore the same examples not only prove the singleness of a supreme judge over any multitude of people but also prove the singleness of a supreme judge over any place in which those subject to him live, so that in the same place there is no other supreme judge of anyone living in that place, just as there is only one bishop in the diocese of Paris and only one archbishop in the province of Milan.
Sequens {*Septima &MzNaRe} allegatio {*trs. &NaRe} etiam contra istum modum videtur concludere quod {*quia &NaRe} potestas non solum est impatiens consortis super eosdem subiectos sed etiam impatiens est consortis in eodem loco. Sicut enim iudex aliquis nollet quod subditi sui essent alterius subditi {*trs. &MzNaRe}, ita nollet quod aliquis alius haberet potestatem in loco ubi subditi sui morantur. Ergo non solum est {*erit &NaRe} periculosa societas fidelium si sint plures iudices super eosdem populos vel subditos {*subiectos &NaRe} sed etiam periculosa {*erit add. &NaRe} {est add. &Mz} societas fidelium si in eodem loco etiam super diversos subditos fideles fuerint plures summi {*supremi &NaRe} iudices constituti. Et ita non expedit quod clerici habeant unum summum {*supremum &NaRe} iudicem ecclesiasticum, scilicet papam, et laici unum summum {*supremum &NaRe} iudicem {*secularem add. &MzNaRe}, scilicet imperatorem, cum clerici et laici in eisdem locis simul commaneant.	The seventh argument also seems to be conclusive against that way [of ruling], because power is not only impatient of a partner with respect to the same subjects but is also impatient of a partner in the same place. For just as no judge would want his subjects to be subject to someone else, so he would not want anyone else to have power in the place where his subjects live. Not only will a society of believers be dangerous, therefore, if there are many judges over the same people or subjects, such a society will also be dangerous if many supreme judges are established in the same place over different believing subjects. And so it is not appropriate for clerics to have one supreme ecclesiastical judge, that is the pope, and laymen to have one supreme secular judge, that is the emperor, since clerics and laymen live together in the same places.
Discipulus Video qualiter praescriptae allegationes adducuntur contra istum modum ponendi {*om. &NaRe}. Ideo contra eundem modum ponendi coneris alias invenire.	Student I see how the earlier arguments are adduced against that way, so try to find others against the same way of putting it.
Magister Videtur quod contra eundem modum ponendi potest aliter allegari. Nam, ut allegatum est 1 huius c. 1, illud regimen est expediens universitati mortalium, et eadem ratione toti congregationi fidelium, per quod iurgia et litigia ad quae prona est natura mortalium aequius et convenientius deciduntur. Sed iurgia et litigia quae oriri possunt ex causis innumeris inter clericos et laicos aequius et convenientius deciduntur si omnes tam clerici quam laici {*trs.321 &NaRe} habent {*habeant &NaRe} unum summum {*supremum &NaRe} iudicem sub quo omnes debent {*debeant &NaRe} litigare quam si habeant plures iudices tales, scilicet ecclesiasticum et secularem. Nam si orta materia litis inter clericos et laicos coram ecclesiastico iudice qui non sit summus {*supremus &NaRe} iudex laicorum debeant litigare merito laici habebunt eum suspectum. Consimiliter si {om. &Na} debeant litigare coram iudice seculari qui non est iudex clericorum non indigne clerici habebunt eum suspectum. Ergo absque rationabili suspicione {*trs. &MzNaRe} non dirimetur litigium aliquod inter clericos et laicos si non est omnium unus iudex summus {*supremus &NaRe}.	Master It seems that it can be argued in another way against that same way of putting it. For, as was argued in chapter one of the first [book] of this [tractate], that rule is advantageous to the totality of mortals, and by the same argument to the whole congregation of believers, through which quarrels and disputes, to which the nature of mortals is prone, are more equitably and suitably settled. But quarrels and disputes which can arise between clerics and laymen for countless reasons are settled more equitably and suitably if everyone, both clerics and laymen, has one supreme judge under whom all should litigate, than if there are many such judges, that is an ecclesiastical one and a secular one. For if a matter of dispute has arisen between clerics and laymen and they have to litigate before an ecclesiastical judge who is not the supreme judge of laymen, the laymen will justly consider him suspect. Similarly if they have to litigate before a secular judge who is not the judge of clerics, the clerics will not without reason consider him suspect. A dispute between clerics and laymen, therefore, will not be dissolved without reasonable suspicion unless there is one supreme judge of everyone.
Amplius ut communiter maiores et plures occasiones discordiarum, contentionum, seditionum, praeliorum et guerrarum ac rixarum emergunt inter morantes simul quam inter distantes si simul morantes non habent unum iudicem summum {*supremum &NaRe} {*trs. &MzNaRe} cuius metu ab huiusmodi {huius &NaRe} refrenentur. Sed inter distantes, valentes ad {*om. &NaRe} invicem {*tamen add. &NaRe} communicationem {*communionem &NaRe} habere, saepe contingunt occasiones malorum huiusmodi {huius &NaRe}. Ergo multo magis timendum est ne talia inter morantes simul emergant nisi habeant unum summum {*supremum &NaRe} iudicem qui omnes impedientes tranquillitatem et pacem habeat {*habeant &NaRe} coercere.	Further, as is commonly known, more and greater opportunities for discord, strife, sedition, battles, wars and brawls arise among those living together than among those who are distant, if those living together do not have one supreme judge by fear of whom they are restrained from things of this kind. But among those who are distant, yet able to have communion with each other, opportunities for evils of this kind often come to pass. It is therefore much more to be feared that such things will arise among those living together unless they have one supreme judge who has the power to coerce those hindering peace and tranquillity.
Rursus nulla communitas simul viventium vita politica est {trs.312 &Na} optime ordinata nisi sit civiliter una. Unde {*et add. &MzNaRe} fideles, sicut sunt unum corpus in Christo (ad Romanos {ad Romanos: Joh. &NaRe} 12:[5]), ita etiam debent esse unum corpus seu collegium in vita civili. Sed communitas illa quae habet diversos summos {*supremos &NaRe} iudices seu diversa capita sive rectores non est civiliter una, sicut illi qui non habent unum regem non sunt unum regnum {non sunt unum regnum om. &Re}. Sed communitas seu congregatio fidelium vel est optime ordinata vel laborare debet ut sit optime ordinata et civiliter quia vita civilis pro eo quod includit diversas partes et diversos modos ponendi {*vivendi &NaRe} competit religioni Christianae et vitae gratiae non repugnat. Ergo communitas fidelium si non est una quia non habet unum summum {*supremum &NaRe} iudicem qui malefactores omnes per seipsum vel per iudices constitutos ab ipso seu inferiores eo habeat castigare, ad habendum unum huiusmodi {huius &NaRe} {*trs. &NaRe} summum {*supremum &NaRe} iudicem ut sit optime ordinata civiliter etiam {*et &NaRe} civiliter una debet efficaciter laborare. Et ita non expedit ut in communitate fidelium sint plures iudices summi {*supremi &NaRe}, quorum unus clericos {clericus &Re} et alius laicos {laicus &Re} debeat castigare.	Again, no community of those living together is best regulated in its political life unless it is one civilly. Whence also in regard to the faithful, just as they are one body in Christ (Romans 12:5), so also they should be one body or college in civil life. But that community which has various supreme judges or various heads or rulers is not one civilly, just as those who do not have one king are not one kingdom. But a community or congregation of believers either is best regulated or should take pains to be best regulated, especially civilly, because on account of the fact that civil life includes different parts and different ways of living it belongs to christian religion and is not opposed to the life of faith. If a community of believers is not one, therefore, because it does not have one supreme judge who has the power to punish all wrong-doers either himself or through judges established by him or inferior to him, it should strive powerfully to have supreme judge of this kind so that it is best regulated civilly and is one civilly. And so it is not appropriate that in a community of believers there be many supreme judges, one of whom should punish clerics and the other, laymen.
CAP. XX. Discipulus Nunc videamus qualiter impugnatur quartus modus ponendi comunitatem fidelium non habere unum iudicem summum {*supremum &NaRe} sicut {*supra &NaRe} ca. 17. recitatur {*recitatus &NaRe}.	Chapter 20 Student Let us now see how the fourth way of putting [the view] that a community of believers does not have one supreme judge, as recorded in chapter 17 above, is attacked.
Magister Iste {*Ille &MzNaRe} modus tenet sicut dictum est ibi quod una pars fidelium scilicet clericorum habet unum summum {*supremum &NaRe} iudicem a quo solo vel a {*om. &MzNaRe} [[add. interlinear Mz]] iudicibus inferioribus eo debet iudicari {*pro quocumque delicto. Alia pars, scilicet laicorum, habet alium iudicem supremum a quo solo pro quibusdam delictis iudicari debet add. &NaRe}, praesertim si circa iustitiam exhibendam non fuerit negligens aut remissus. Pro quibusdam autem delictis iudicari debet, praesertim si circa iustitiam exhibendam non fuit negligens aut remissus {*praesertim si circa iustitiam exhibendam non fuit negligens aut remissus om. &NaRe}, sicut et iudex {*suus add. &NaRe} summus {*supremus &NaRe}, a summo iudice alterius partis, scilicet a papa vel iudicibus ecclesiasticis inferioribus ipso.	Master As was said there, that way holds that one party of believers, namely the clerics, has one supreme judge by whom, either alone or through judges inferior to him, it should be judged for any crime. The other party, namely laymen, has another supreme judge and by him alone it should be judged for certain crimes, especially if he has not been negligent or remiss in delivering due justice. For certain crimes, however, it should be judged, as also should its supreme judge, by the highest judge of the other party, that is by the pope or ecclesiastical judges inferior to him.
Sed quibusdam apparet quod talis communitas non est optime disposita civiliter quia ista {*illa &NaRe} communitas non est optime civiliter {*om. &Na} ordinata in qua, quantum permittit status vitae praesentis, occasiones discordiarum et litium ac seditionum, rixarum, praeliorum et guerrarum minime amputantur. Sed in communitate fidelium, si praedicto modo fuerit ordinata, non amputantur, quantum est possibile pro statu praesentis vitae {*trs. &NaRe}, occasiones malorum huiusmodi {huius &Re}. Nam non minima occasio talium est si diversi iudices simul et eodem tempore eundem reum, praesertim divitem et potentem, ad diversa loca et iudicia trahere moliantur. Poterit autem contingere quod aliquis laicus potens et dives committat diversa scelera, quorum aliqua ad iudicem secularem et alia ad iudicem ecclesiasticum pertineant punienda; quare poterit evenire quod tam iudex secularis quam ecclesiasticus voluerit ipsum trahere ad suum forum quod pro eodem tempore {*pro eodem tempore om. &MzNaRe} est {*erit &NaRe} impossibile. Ergo ex hoc orietur contentio et seditio, rixa et guerra inter iudices ipsos et per consequens inter subditos {*subiectos &NaRe} ipsorum. Quare tali supposita pluralitate iudicum in {et &Re} communitate fidelium pax et tranquillitas subditorum et {*etiam &NaRe} iudicum erunt {*erit &NaRe} leviter dissipata.	But it seems to some people that such a community is not best regulated civilly, because that community is not best regulated civilly in which, as far as the state of this present life permits, opportunities for discord, quarrels, sedition, brawls, battles and wars are not cut off. But if a community of believers is regulated in the aforesaid way, opportunities for evils of that kind are not cut off, as much as is possible for the state of this present life. For not the least opportunity for such things occurs if different judges try together and at the same time to haul the same guilty person, especially if he is rich and powerful, to different places and courts. It can happen, however, that some powerful and rich layman commits different crimes, the punishment of some of which pertains to the secular judge and others to the ecclesiastical judge; as a result it can come to pass that both the secular and the ecclesiastical judge wants to haul him before his court, and this will be impossible. From this will arise, therefore strife and sedition, brawling and war between the judges themselves and consequently between their subjects. Assuming such a plurality of judges in a community of believers, therefore, the peace and tranquillity of their subjects, even of the judges, will easily be overthrown.
Contra istum etiam modum ponendi videntur concludere omnes allegationes tam primo {*primi &NaRe} huius c. 1 quam in hoc tertio c. 17 inductae ad probandum quod {ut &Mz} est expediens quod {*ut &NaRe} tota communitas mortalium habeat unum principem qui sit dominus omnium et quod est expediens ut {*quod &NaRe} tota communitas fidelium habeat unum summum {*supremum &NaRe} iudicem qui omnes alios fideles habeat si deliquerint {delinquerint &Re} coercere. Quamvis enim plura inconvenientia sequuntur {sequantur &NaRe} [[both unclear]] ad secundum modum ponendi et tertium superius 18 et 19 c. impugnatos quam ad istum, tamen ad istum {tamen ad istum om. &Re} multa {*non /ubi Re\ nulla &NaRe} [[non changed interlinear Re]] sequuntur secundum quod per allegationes illas vel aliquas earum posset ostendi.	Also seemingly conclusive against that way of putting [the view] are all the arguments of chapter one of the first [book] of this [tractate] and chapter 17 of this third [book] which were brought forward to prove that it is advantageous that the whole community of mortals have one prince who is the lord of all and that it is advantageous that the whole community of believers have one supreme judge who has the power to coerce all other believers if they transgress. For although more unsuitable things follow the second and third ways of putting it, attacked in chapters 18 and 19 above, nevertheless some do follow this way, as could be shown by those arguments or by some of them.
Discipulus Breviter tange {*aliquas add. &NaRe} {alias add. &Mz} allegationes per quas alios modos ponendi improbasti {*per quas ... improbasti: supra contra alios modos ponendiadducas &MzNaRe}, quia forte ex deductione earum quam ibi {sibi &Mz} fecisti advertetur {*advertam &NaRe} {adducitur &Mz} an aliquam apparentiam habeant contra istum modum.	Student Briefly touch on some arguments brought forward [[reading adductas??]] above against other ways of putting [the view], because perhaps from the deduction you made from them there I will observe whether they have any plausibility against this way.
Magister {om. &Na} Si laici sint {sunt &Na} subditi {subiecti &Na} tam iudici ecclesiastico quam iudici {om. &Re} seculari {et add. &Re}, quamvis pro diversis casibus, poterit contingere quod uterque istorum iudicum pro casu spectante ad ipsum et pro communibus {omnibus &Na} negociis ad ipsum et laicos spectantibus pertractandis ipsos laicos eodem tempore ad diversa loca vocare voluerint {voluerunt &Mz}. cui {*Qui &Re} ergo {*aut &Re} [[interlinear correction: ergo crossed out]] obedient {*obediunt &NaRe} {*ecclesiastico aut add. &Re} [[marginal addition]] laici {*laico &Re} aut utrique, quod est impossibile, aut neutri, et tunc talis communitas non est {*erit &NaRe} optime ordinata quia illa communitas non est convenienter disposita in qua subditi superiori suo autem {*aut &MzNaRe} non debent aut non possunt obedire. Si obediant uni et non alii {*alteri &NaRe} illi cui non obediunt {*obedient &NaRe} faciunt {*facient &NaRe} iniuriam et ipsum offendunt {*offendent &NaRe} {offenderent &Mz} a quo pro contumacia punientur.	Master [1] If laymen are subject to both an ecclesiastical judge and a secular one, even if for different cases, it can happen that each of those judges wants to call those laymen to different places at the same time for a case which pertains to him or for some common business pertaining to him and to the laymen which has to be investigated. They obey, therefore, either the ecclesiastic or the layman, or both, which is impossible, or neither, and then such a community will not be best ordered, because that community is not suitably regulated in which subjects either ought not or can not obey their superior. If they obey one and not the other, they will inflict a wrong on the one they do not obey and offend him and he will punish them for contumacy.
Amplius per talem pluralitatem iudicii {*iudicum &NaRe} communis utilitas laicorum impedietur quia non poterunt obedire utrique iudici summo {*supremo &NaRe} si pro communibus negociis vocati fuerint {fuerunt &Mz} eodem tempore ad loca diversa.	Further, [2] the common utility of laymen will be hindered by such a plurality of judges because they will not be able to obey both supreme judges if they are called to different places at the same time for common business.
Rursus nemo iuxta sententiam Salvatoris potest duobus dominis servire. Ergo laici iudici seculari et ecclesiastico, qui proni sunt ad dissentiendum, servire non poterunt.	Again, [4] according to the text of the saviour [Matthew 6:24], no one can serve two masters. Therefore they will not be able to serve a secular and an ecclesiastical judge, who are inclined to disagreement.
Item {*Iterum &MzNa} iudex secularis et ecclesiasticus {*trs.321 &MzNaRe} ex causis innumeris poterunt dividi contra se. Quare tota communitas fidelium faciliter desolabitur.	Again, [5] an ecclesiastical and a secular judge will be able to be divided against each other for numberless reasons. Therefore the whole community of believers will easily be laid waste.
Adhuc, sicut testatur Hieronimus, in una dioecesi debet esse unus episcopus et in una provincia unus archiepiscopus cuius {*quia &MzNaRe} utilitatem {*unitatem &NaRe} {universitatem &Mz} per multa exempla {*trs. &NaRe} probat. Ergo super laicos debet esse tantum unus iudex summus {*supremus &NaRe} non tantum de {*pro &NaRe} eisdem criminibus sed etiam pro omnibus ut de omnibus criminibus ab uno solo iudice summo {*supremo &NaRe} et aliis iudicibus inferioribus eo debeant iudicari.	Further, [6] there should be one bishop in one diocese and one archbishop in one province, as Jerome attests, because he proves singleness by many examples. There should be one supreme judge over laymen, therefore, not only for the same crimes but also for all crimes, so that they should be judged for all crimes by one single supreme judge and other judges inferior to him.
Rursus omnis potestas est consortis impatiens et praecipue super eosdem subditos et {etiam &Re} pro causis diversis. Ergo iudex secularis erit impatiens si iudex ecclesiasticus super laicos habeat potestatem, etiam {*et &MzNaRe} {in add. &Mz} eodem modo iudex ecclesiasticus habens super laicos aut clericos {*aut clericos om. &NaRe} potestatem erit impatiens si iudex secularis super eosdem {eodem &Mz} habeat potestatem. Quare cito ad iracundiam et per consequens ad contentionem, rixam et {*om. &NaRe}, bellum et guerram provocabuntur.	Again, [7] all power is impatient of a partner, and especially over the same subjects and for different cases. A secular judge, therefore, will be impatient if an ecclesiastical judge has power over laymen, and in the same way an ecclesiastical judge with power over laymen will be impatient if a secular judge has power over the same men. They will therefore be quickly provoked to anger, and consequently to strife, brawling, war and battle.
Concluditur ergo quod communitas fidelium non erit optime gubernata {*disposita &NaRe} civiliter, etiam {*et &NaRe} quantum ad vitam politicam, nisi tota et omnis pars eius habeat unum iudicem et rectorem supremum de cuius iurisdictione immediata vel mediata, {*sicut add. &NaRe} {fuit add. &Mz} in omni casu ab eo {*ab eo: vel a quo &Re} {ab eo: vel aliquo &Na} {ab eo: a quo &Mz} vel a {*om. &NaRe} iudicibus inferioribus eo, omnis alius pro quocunque delicto debeat iudicari.	The conclusion therefore, is that a community of believers will not be best regulated civilly, and with respect to its political life, unless each and every part of it has one supreme judge and ruler under whose immediate or mediate jurisdiction everyone else should be judged for every crime, that is, in every case either by him or by judges inferior to him.
CAP. XXI. Discipulus Audivi qualiter secundus modus et tertius et quartus ponendi communitatem fidelium non habere unicum {*unum &NaRe} summum {*supremum &NaRe} iudicem, sicut {*supra &NaRe} c. 17 recitati sunt {*om. &MzNaRe}, impugnantur; nunc audire desidero quomodo impugnatur quintus.	Chapter 21 Student I have heard how the second third and fourth ways of putting [the view] that a community does not have a single supreme judge, recorded in chapter 17 above, are attacked; now I want to hear how the fifth is attacked.
Magister Quintus est quorundam qui ponunt quod imperator est iudex in omni casu omnium Christianorum praeterquam papae, quia papa exceptus {*exemptus &NaRe} est totaliter a iurisdictione imperatoris et cuiuslibet mortalis. Omnes autem alii clerici {*trs. &NaRe} solummodo sunt excepti {*exempti NaRe} {*trs.231 &NaRe} per privilegia imperatorum et regum.	Master The fifth is that of some people who maintain that the emperor is in every case the judge of all christians except the pope, because the pope is completely exempt from the jurisdiction of the emperor and of every mortal. All other clerics, however, are exempt only through the privileges of emperors and kings.
Iste autem modus taliter impugnatur. Sicut non absque periculo dissipationis {dispensationis &Re} tranquillitatis et pacis duae multitudines hominum simul in eodem loco morantur si non habent unum summum {*supremum &NaRe} iudicem qui malefactores coerceat, sic non absque periculo dissipationis {dispensationis &Re} tranquillitatis et pacis moratur aliquis non subiectus cum alio vel cum aliis qui potestatem {*potentem &NaRe} et magnam sequelam potest habere. Talis enim propter sequelem quam potest habere est pro multis non immerito computandus; sed papa propter altitudinem officii quo fungitur potest habere maximam sequelem Christianorum. Ergo si non subiectus {*est add. &MzNaRe} summo {*supremo &NaRe} iudici Christianorum non morabitur cum ipso absque periculo dissipationis {dispensationis &Re} tranquillitatis et pacis.	However, that way is attacked as follows. [7] Just as two multitudes of people do not live together in the same place without the danger of the destruction of tranquillity and peace if they do not have one supreme judge who coerces wrong-doers, so it is not without the danger of the destruction of tranquillity and peace that someone who can have a powerful and great following lives with someone else or with others but is not a subject. For on account of the following that he can have, such a person should not unjustly be reckoned as representing many; but on account of the extent of the office that he administers the pope can have the greatest following of christians. If he is not subject to the supreme judge of the christians, therefore, he will not live with him without the danger of the destruction of tranquillity and peace.
CAP. XXII. {XXIII &NaRe} Discipulus Cerno quod ratio quam {allegasti add. &Mz} a 17 c. usque hic {*usque hic: huc usque &NaRe} tractavimus fundatur in duobus, quorum primum est quod nulla communitas seu congregatio mortalium, nec universalis nec particularis, est optime disposita nisi unum caput seu rectorem summum {*supremum &NaRe} habeat, cui omnes nullo excepto {*exempto NaRe} quo ad omnia quae pro communi utilitate sunt necessario facienda sint subiecti. et {*om. &NaRe}	Chapter 22 Student I see that the argument which we have treated from chapter 17 up to here is based on two [points], of which the first is that no community or gathering of mortals, whether universal or particular, is best regulated unless it has one supreme head or ruler, to whom everyone else, with no exception, is subject with respect to everything that has necessarily to be done for the common benefit.
Quod multum apparentiae videtur habere, quia ubi non est unitas non est facile concordiam conservare. Non est autem una congregatio seu multitudo, neque universalis neque particularis, quae non habeat {*habet &MzNaRe} unum caput seu rectorem, quia, ut testatur beatus Cyprianus, prout legitur 24, q. 1, c. Loquitur, ubi est unitas oportet quod eius origo ab uno incipiat quia, ut dicit ibidem, "ab unitate exordium proficiscitur." {*Ergo add. &NaRe} in quacunque communitate seu congregatione est unitas, illa unitas {illa unitas om. &Re} ab uno incipit. Ille autem unus non est nisi caput et rector communitatis. Ergo nulla communitas est vere una nisi illa {*om. &NaRe} cuius caput et {caput et om. &NaRe} rector est unus ita ut omnes alii sint membra ipsius.	This seems to have much plausibility, because where there is not unity it is not easy to preserve harmony. There is not one gathering or multitude, however, whether universal or particular, which does not have one head or ruler, because as blessed Cyprian attests, as we read in 24, q. 1, c. Loquitur [c.18, col.971], where there is a unity it is necessary that its beginning springs from one thing, since, as he says there "the beginning proceeds from oneness." [Cf. 3.1 Dial. 2.21, Letter, p. 178.] In any community or gathering in which there is unity, therefore, that unity begins from one thing. That one thing, however, is nothing but the head and ruler of the community. No community is truly one, therefore, unless there is one head and ruler of it, so that all the others are its members.
Item {iterum &Re} unitas communitatis seu congregatio {*congregationis &NaRe} non est nisi unitas ordinis secundum superioritatem et inferioritatem, ut quilibet respectu alterius sit inferior sive {*vel &NaRe} superior vel plures sint inferiores respectu unius superioris, quia ubi essent {sunt &Na} [[corrected to essent margin]] plures superiores respectu unius inferioris non esset verissia {*verissima &MzNaRe} unitas quae est optima dispositio communitatis. Oportet igitur {*ergo &NaRe} quod summus {*supremus &NaRe} {*superior add. &NaRe} in communitate potissima {*una add. &NaRe} sit unicus, et ita videtur multum {*trs. &MzNaRe} apparens quod nulla communitas, nec particularis nec universalis, est optime ordinata nisi habeat unum caput vel {*seu &MzNaRe} rectorem, cui {*cuius &NaRe} omnes alii sunt {*sint &MzNaRe} subiecti. Unde et una domus non est optime disposita nisi habeat unum patremfamilias, nec una villa nec una civitas nec unum regnum optime gubernatur nisi ab uno summo {*supremo &NaRe} regatur {fungatur &Mz}. Et ideo omnes volentes secundum rationem politice vivere unum caput summum {*supremum &NaRe} constituerent super omnes.	Again, the unity of a community or gathering is nothing but a unity of order [cf. Marsilius, Defensor, I.xvii.11] according to superiority and inferiority, so that everyone is an inferior or a superior with respect to another person or many are inferior with respect to one superior, because where there were many superiors with respect to one inferior there would not be the most genuine unity which is the best regulation of a community. It is necessary therefore that the supreme superior in the one most important [most comprehensive?] community be single, and so it seems quite clear that no community, whether particular or universal, is best ordered unless it has one head or ruler, whose subject everyone one else is. Whence one home also is not best regulated unless it has one head of the family, nor are one village, one town or one kingdom best governed unless they are ruled by one who is supreme. And therefore all who have wanted to live politically according to reason have set up one supreme head over themselves.
Secundum in quo videtur fundari ista {*illa &NaRe} ratio est quod imperator et alii laici non sunt, in omnibus quae spectant ad gubernationem ipsorum et correctionem si deliquerint {delinquerint &NaRe}, subditi summo pontifici. Quod {quia &Mz}, ut {om. &Na} videtur, non habet tantam apparentiam sicut primum. Ideo pro isto alias {*aliquas &NaRe} allegationes {*trs. &Na} adducas.	The second [point] on which that argument seems to be based is that the emperor and other laymen are not subject to the highest pontiff in all matters which pertain to their governing and their correcting if they transgress. It seems that this does not have as much plausibility as the first [point]. Would you therefore adduce some arguments for it?
Magister Pro ista {*isto &MzNaRe} poteris tu colligere allegationes quamplures ex primo huius {huiusmodi &MzNa} ac {*om. &NaRe} pluribus capitulis, specialiter. c. 28, et ex {om. &NaRe} secundo huius {huiusmodi &Na} c. 1 et 12 et {om. &Na} 14 et 15.	Master You will be able to assemble very many arguments for that [point] from many chapters in the first [book] of this [tractate], especially chapter 28, and from chapters 1, 12, 14 and 15 of the second [book] in this [tractate].
Discipulus Pro isto secundo {om. &Re} fundamento praescriptae rationis alias {*aliquas &NaRe} speciales allegationes adducas vel alias {*aliquas &NaRe} prius tactas magis exquisite pertracta.	Student Would you bring forward some particular arguments for that second basis of the above argument, or consider more carefully some already touched on?
Magister Primo huius {huiusmodi &Na} c. 28 tacta est una allegatio quae nonnullis apparet multum fortis, quae talis est. Ille non est inferior alio quoad illa in quibus ab ipso ad istum {*illum &NaRe} alium appellare {apparere &Mz} non licet, quia in omnibus in quibus unus iudex est inferior alio licet appellare {apparere &Mz} ad illum superiorem vel saltem ad {in &Mz} superiorem ipso. Sed in multis causis non licet appellare ab imperatore ad papam. Ergo {*quo add. &MzNaRe} ad multa imperator non est inferior papa. quod {*Maior &NaRe} {quia &Mz} per sacros canones probatur aperte. {*Nam add. &NaRe} Fabianus papa, ut habetur 2, q. 6, c. 1 ait, licet {"Liceat &NaReZn} appellatori viciatam causam remedio appellationis sublevare." {*Et add. &NaRe} idem eadem {*eisdem &NaRe} causa et q. c. Liceat ait, "Liceat etiam in criminalibus causis appellare, nec vox appellandi negatur eo quod {*negatur eo quod: negetur ei quem &NaRe} in supplicio sententia destinaverit." Ex his {*quibus &NaRe} colligitur quod ubicunque {ubique &Mz} habet iudex {*trs. &NaRe} superiorem ad superiorem potest appellare {*appellari &NaRe}. Minor, scilicet quod in multis causis non est appellandum ab imperatore ad papam, multis modis probatur. Hoc enim glossa 2, q. 6, c. {*Omnis add. &Re} [[Na illegible]] super verbo "sacerdotum" videtur asserere dicens, "Ergo a seculari iudice ad papam potest appellari, quod verum est vacante imperio, ut Extra, De foro competenti, {*c. add. Zn} Licet, alias et {*non &MzNaReZn}, Extra, De appellationibus {*c. add. Zn} sed {*Si Zn} duobus."	Master There is an argument touched on in chapter 28 of the first [book] in this [tractate] which seems very strong to some people, and this is it. One person is not inferior to another with respect to those matters in which it is not licit to appeal from the former to the latter, because in all matters in which one judge is inferior to another it is permitted to appeal to that superior, or at least to that one's superior. But in many matters it is not permitted to appeal from the emperor to the pope. With respect to many matters, therefore, the emperor is not inferior to the pope. The major premise is clearly proved by sacred canons. For as we find in 2, q. 6, c. 1, [Liceat col.467] Pope Fabianus says, "An appellant is permitted to alleviate a faulty case by the remedy of an appeal." And in the same causa and quaestio c, Liceat [c.20, col.472], the same pope says, "Even in criminal cases it is permitted to appeal and the voice of appeal is not denied to him for whom a sentence has resolved on punishment." We gather from these that wherever a judge has a superior, appeal can be made to the superior. The minor premise, namely that in many cases there ought not be appeal from the emperor to the pope, is proved in many ways. For the gloss on the word sacerdotum in 2, q. 6, c. Omnis [c.3, col.656] seems to assert this when it says, "Appeal can be made therefore from a secular judge to the pope, which is true with the empire unoccupied, as in Extra, De foro competenti, c. Licet, at other times not, Extra, De appellationibus, c. Si duobus."
Item glossa eodem capitulo super verbo "in commune" ait, primo {idem &Re} {*"Id est &Na} publice, ut secularis iudex audiat seculares causas, ecclesiasticus ecclesiasticas audiat. Et sic planum est quod dicitur in textu, sed {*scilicet &MzNaRe} cum dicit Anacletus, 'coram patriacha aut primate ecclesiastico {*ecclesiastica &NaReZn} et coram patricio secularia negotia iudicentur'." Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod in negotiis secularibus a iudice seculari et per consequens ab imperatore non est appellandum ad papam.	Again, the gloss on the words in commune in the same chapter says, "That is publicly, so that a secular judge hears secular cases and an ecclesiastical judge ecclesiastical cases. And so what is said in the text is plain, when Anacletus says, that is, 'Let ecclesiastical business be judged before the patriarch or primate and secular business before a nobleman.'" We gather from these words that in secular business there should be no appeal to the pope from a secular judge, nor consequently from the emperor.
Discipulus Si secundum glossam primam vacante imperio licet appellare ad papam, ergo papa habet disponere de imperio, et per consequens imperator ratione imperii est inferior papa. Et ita etiam non vacante imperio licet appellare ab imperatore ad {om. &Mz} papam, etiam in secularibus causis.	Student If in accordance with the first gloss it is permitted to appeal to the pope when the empire is unoccupied, the pope therefore has the power to make dispositions for the empire, and consequently the emperor, by reason of the empire, is inferior to the pope. And so even when the empire is not unoccupied it is permitted to appeal from the emperor to the pope, even in secular cases.
Magister Respondetur tibi quod papa vacante imperio nihil habet disponere de imperio nisi auctoritate imperatoris instituentis eum vicarium suum vel auctoritate aliorum, scilicet Romanorum vel principum quibus concessa {*commissa &NaRe} est potestas ordinandi quis debeat gerere vicem imperatoris vacante imperio. Et ideo si vacante imperio contingit appellare ad papam hoc est inquantum papa gerit vicem imperatoris et locum imperatoris tenet. Qui autem gerit vices {*vicem &NaRe} alterius et locum eius tenet est inferior eo in hoc, quia semper vicarius est inferior eo cuius est vicarius. Ergo papa est in hoc {*trs.231 &NaRe} inferior et minor imperatore, et per consequens ab ipso {*om. &NaRe} imperatore non licet appellare ad papam.	Master The reply to you is that when the empire is unoccupied the pope does not have the power to make dispositions for the empire, except by the authority of the emperor appointing him as his vicar or by the authority of others, that is of the Romans or of princes to whom the power of arranging who ought to act in place of the emperor when the empire is unoccupied has been committed. And therefore if it is possible to appeal to the pope when the empire is unoccupied, this is in so far as the pope acts in place of the emperor and occupies the emperor's place. He who acts in the place of another, however, and occupies his place is inferior to him in this, because a vicar is always inferior to him whose vicar he is. Therefore the pope in this is inferior to and less than the emperor, and consequently it is not permitted to appeal from the emperor to the pope.
Discipulus Licet ista instantia apparenter videatur {videtur &Mz} {inclusa vel add. &Mz} exclusa, tamen adhuc videtur posse ostendi quod pro negociis seu causis secularibus liceat ab imperatore et aliis secularibus iudicibus appellare {*ad papam add. &NaRe}. Nam ad illum licet appellare qui potest causam viciatam sublevare. Sed si causa secularis in foro seculari vel coram iudice seculari fuerit {causa add. &Mz} viciata, quia imperator {*scilicet add. &NaRe} vel alius iudex secularis non vult facere iustitiae complementum, papa potest causam taliter viciatam sublevare et ad ipsum vel alium iudicem ecclesiasticum est recurrendum pro iustitia obtinenda, Extra, De foro competenti, c. Ex transmissa et c. Verum et c. Licet et c. Ex tenore. Ergo licet appellare ab imperatore et aliis iudicibus secularibus ad papam.	Student Even if that example seems apparently to be excluded, it still seems showable nevertheless that it is permitted to appeal from the emperor and other secular judges to the pope for secular business or cases. For it is permitted to appeal to him who can alleviate a faulty case. But if a secular case in a secular forum or before a secular judge is faulty, because, that is, the emperor or another secular judge does not want to execute justice, the pope can alleviate a case made faulty like this, and recourse should be had to him or to another ecclesiastical judge in order to obtain justice (Extra, De foro competenti, c. Ex transmissa [c.6, col.249], c. Verum [c.7, col.250], c. Licet [c.10, col.250], c, Ex tenore [c.11, col.251]). Therefore it is permitted to appeal from the emperor and other secular judges to the pope.
Magister Respondetur quod etiam in decretalibus quae maiorem iurisdictionem et auctoritatem papae et iudicibus ecclesiasticis tribuere videntur {videtur &Na} {*trs. &NaRe} nunquam {*nusquam &NaRe} invenitur quod si imperator neglexerit facere iustitiam in causa seculari eo ipso possit papa {om. &NaRe} auctoritate papalis officii et ex ordinatione Christi in eadem causa facere iustitiae complementum, licet ex consuetudine in quantum {*in quantum: quam &NaRe} imperator scit et approbat, vel saltem scit et non prohibet sed tolorans {*tolerat &NaRe}, hoc faciat papa et iudices ecclesiastici in quibusdam regionibus, {*sicut in quibusdam regionibus add. &NaRe} iudicant de aliquibus criminibus pure secularibus, irrequisito omni iudice seculari, quod tamen eis ex {om. &Re} iure divino non competit. Et hinc est quod ex consuetudine obtinent papa et ecclesiastici iudices quod quando iudex secularis negligit facere iustitiam ad ipsos recurritur. Quae quidem consuetudo, si iudices seculares in illis regionibus fuerint notabiliter negligentes, potest ex causa {*ex causa: esse &NaRe} rationabili {*rationabilis et &NaRe} praescribi, {et add. &Mz} praesertim si imperator hoc sciens ipsam {om. &Na} duxerit tolerandam.	Master The reply is that even in the decretals which seem to bestow greater jurisdiction and authority on the pope and ecclesiastical judges we nowhere find that if the emperor has neglected to do justice in a secular case the pope can, by that very fact, execute justice in that case on the authority of his papal office and by the decree of Christ, even if by a custom which the emperor knows and approves, or at least knows and does not prohibit but supports, the pope and ecclesiastical judges do this in certain regions, just as in certain regions they judge purely secular crimes, with no secular judge being sought; nevertheless this does not belong to them by divine right. Hence it is that by custom the pope and ecclesiastical judges acquire [the right] that when a secular judge neglects to do justice recourse is had to them. If the secular judges in those regions are notably negligent, that custom can indeed be reasonable and prescribed, especially if the emperor knows this thinks it should be tolerated.
Cum ergo dicis quod ad illum licet appellare qui potest causam viciatam sublevare, respondetur quod hoc non est generaliter verum, vocando causam viciatam omnem {*causam add. &MzNaRe} quae iusta sententia minime terminatur, quia appellatio semper debet fieri ad maiorem. et {*om. &MzNaRe} Causam {*autem add. &NaRe} taliter viciatam, quae scilicet iuste minime terminatur, potest quandoque minor supplendo negligentiam maioris sublevare, sicut etiam in conferendo beneficio {*conferendo beneficio: conferendis beneficiis &NaRe} et aliis disponendis potest minor supplere negligentiam superioris, Extra, De electione, Cum in cunctis, Extra, De concessione praebendarum, c. Nulla et c. Quia diversitatem, Extra, De institutionibus Grave, et 9, q. 3, Cum simus et 89. dist. Volumus, ubi dicit glossa, "Arg. quod si praelatus non vult vel negligit facere {*ea add. &MzNaReZn} quae debet, tunc {*om. &NaReZn} ea debent supplere subditi {*supplere subditi:suppleri per subditos &NaReZn}." Hoc etiam colligitur ex concilio Sardicensis quod ponitur dist. 65 {trs. &NaRe} c. ultimo ubi dicit glossa, "{*Arg. add. &NaRe} quod si subditi negligunt facere quod {*quae &Zn} debent, debeat {*ea debeant &Zn} {debeatur &MzNaRe} suppleri a maiori, vel per se, vel per alium, et econverso."	When you say therefore that it is permitted to appeal to him who can alleviate a faulty case, the reply is that this is not generally true, calling a faulty case any case which is not concluded with a just sentence, because an appeal should always be made to one who is greater. Someone who is lesser, however, can sometimes alleviate a case faulty in this way, that is one not concluded justly, by making good the negligence of the greater one, just as in conferring benefits and disposing of other things a lesser can also make good the negligence of his superior (Extra, De electione, c. Cum in cunctis [c.7, col.51], Extra, De concessione praebendarum, c. Nulla [c.2, col.488] and c. Quia diversitatem [c.5, col.489], Extra, De institutionibus, c. Grave, [[wrong reference: possibly Extra, De praebendis, c. Grave c.29, col.478]] 9, q. 3, c. Cum simus [c.3, col.607], and dist. 89, c. Volumus [col. 426], where the gloss says, "An argument that if a prelate does not want or neglects to do those things that he ought to do, those things should be made good by his subjects." We gather this also from the Council of Sardinia, found in the last chapter of dist. 65 [Si forte] where the gloss [col.340] says, "An argumetn that if subjects neglect to do what they should, those things ought to be made good by one who is greater, either himself or though someone else, and conversely."
Ex quibus aliisque quampluribus patet quod inferiores possunt supplere negligentiam superioris {*superiorum &Na} [[MzRe unclear]], cum etiam saepe possunt {*possint &NaRe} {*trs. &NaRe} {*suos add. &MzNaRe} superiores corrigere et {*etiam add. &NaRe} cohercere, teste Egino {*Iginio &NaRe} papa qui, ut legitur 9, q. 3, c. Salvo, ait, "Salvo in omnibus Romanae ecclesiae privilegio nullus metropolitanus absque ceterorum comprovincialium episcoporum instantia aliquorum audiat causas, quia irritae erunt aliter {*actae add. &Zn}, antequam {*quam &Zn} in conspectu omnium eorum erunt {*om. &MzNaReZn} ventilatae, et ipse, si fecerit, coherceatur a fratribus."	It is clear from these and very many others that inferiors can make good the negligence of their superiors, especially since they can often correct their superiors and even coerce them, as Pope Iginius attests when he says, as we read in 9, q. 3, c. Salvo [c.4, col.607], "Saving the privilege of the Roman church in all matters, let no archbishop, except at the insistence of the rest of the bishops of his province, hear the cases of some of them, because the ones dealt with will be void unless they are discussed in the sight of all of them, and let him be coerced by his brothers if he does so."
Cui {qui &Re} concordare videtur Anitius {*Anterus &NaRe} {Altius &Mz} papa qui eadem {*eisdem &MzNaRe} causa {capitulis &Mz} 9 {*et q. &MzNaRe} c. Si autem ait, c. {*om. &MzNaRe} "Si autem aliquis metropolitanorum inflatus fuerit et sine omnium comprovincialium {provincialium &Na} praesentia vel consilio episcoporum vel causas eorum vel eas {*vel eas: aut alias causas, nisi eas causas &MzNaReZn} tantum, quae ad propriam suam pertinent parrochiam, agere aut gravare eos voluerit, ab omnibus districte corrigatur ne talia deinceps praesumere audeat. Si vero incorrigibilis eisque inobediens apparuerit, ad hanc apostolicam sedem, cui {dum &Mz} {omnium add. &NaRe} {*omnia add. &Zn} episcoporum iudicia referri praecepta sunt, eius contumacia referatur ut de eo vindicta fiat." Ex praedictis {*quibus &NaRe} colligitur quod minor potest supplere negligentiam maioris.	Pope Anterus seems to agree with this. In the same causa and quaestio c. Si autem he says, "However, if any metropolitan is haughty and, without all his provincials present or without the advice of his bishops, wants to treat either their cases or other cases, with the exception only of those cases which pertain to his own parish, or wants to oppress them, let him be severely corrected by all of them so that he will not dare to undertake such things thereafter. Certainly if he appears incorrigible and disobedient to them, let his contumacy be referred to this apostolic see, to which all the judgements of bishops have been ordered to be referred, so that punishment may be inflicted on him." We gather from these that a lesser can make good the negligence of a greater.
Et ideo non semper ille qui potest causam vitiatam sublevare est maior, et per consequens non potest semper {super &Mz} appellari ad ipsum. Quare licet papa suppleat negligentiam iudicum secularium, et {*etiam &NaRe} si suppleret negligentiam imperatoris terminando causam quam imperator terminare negligeret {neglexerit &Re}, non posset per hoc ostendi {*nec add. &NaRe} quod ab imperatore liceat appellare ad papam nec quod imperator in talibus sit minor papa.	And therefore it is not always the one who is greater who can alleviate a faulty case, and consequently there can not always be appeal to him. Even if the pope makes good the negligence of secular judges, therefore, even if he were to make good the negligence of the emperor by concluding a case which the emperor neglected to conclude, it could not be shown by this either that appeal is permitted from the emperor to the pope or that the emperor is less than the pope in such matters.
Discipulus Quod minor valeat supplere negligentiam superioris, hoc non est nisi auctoritate canonis conditi a concilio quod est superiius illo inferiori qui potest supplere negligentiam superioris, Extra, De concessione praebendarum, Quia diversitatem. Sed papa auctoritate talis canonis vel legis non supplet negligentiam iudicum secularium vel imperatorum {*imperatoris Re} sed auctoritate propria. Ergo ex officio maior est imperatore in talibus et etiam {*om. &NaRe} omnibus aliis iudicibus secularibus.	Student That a lesser can make good the negligence of his superior is only by the authority of a canon produced by a council which is superior to that inferior who can make good the negligence of his superior (Extra, De concessione praebendarum, c. Quia diversitatem [c.5, col.489]). But it is not by the authority of such a canon or law that the pope makes good the negligence of secular judges or of the emperor, but it is by his own authority. He is, therefore, by virtue of his office greater than the emperor in such things and than all other secular judges.
Magister {om. &Re} Respondetur tibi quod sicut inferiores auctoritate legis supplent negligentiam superioris, ita papa virtute consuetudinis quae {qui &Mz} aequipollet {*aequivalet &NaRe} legi supplet negligentiam iudicum secularium. Et ideo {*et ideo: quare &NaRe} auctoritate officii sui non supplet negligentiam talem. Et ideo non est maior in huiusmodi {huius &Re} causis {*iudicibus add. &MzNaRe} secularibus.	Master The reply to you is that just as inferiors make good the negligence of their superior by the authority of law, so it is by virtue of custom, which is equivalent to law, that the pope makes good the negligence of secular judges. Therefore he does not make good such negligence by the authority of his office. And therefore he is not greater in cases of this kind than secular judges.
Discipulus Cuius auctoritate vel consensu potest introduci talis consuetudo quae tribuat papae huiusmodi {huius &Re} potestatem?	Student By whose authority or consent can such a custom, which bestows on the pope power of this kind, be introduced?
Magister Ad hoc tibi {*tripliciter &NaRe} respondetur: uno modo quod potest introduci huiusmodi {*om. &NaRe} consuetudo auctoritate vel consensu tacito vel expresso imperatoris et iudicum secularium quibus potest placere quod papa negligentiam suppleat eorundem aut possunt scienter tolerare quod hoc faciat papa. Aliter diciter quod potest introduci auctoritate populi qui velint vel consentiant {*velint vel consentiant: velit vel consentiat &NaRe} quod papa huiusmodi habeat potestatem. Aliter dicitur quod potest introduci auctoritate sive ratione {*sive ratione om. &NaRe} naturalis rationis {*trs. &NaRe} quae dictat quod iustitia est nullatenus negligenda quin {quando &Mz} semper in communitate servetur.	Master This is replied to in three ways: in one way, that such a custom can be introduced by the tacit or express authority or consent of the emperor and the secular judges, to whom it can be soothing that the pope makes good their negligence, or they can knowingly tolerate the pope's doing this. In another way it is said that it can be introduced by the authority of the people who want the pope to have or agree to his having power of this kind. In another way it is said that it can be introduced on the authority of natural reason which prescribes that justice should not be neglected but rather is always preserved in a community.
Discipulus Nunquid possent imperator et iudices seculares talem consuetudinem tollere?	Student Could the emperor and secular judges abolish such a custom?
Magister Respondetur quod secundum istam {*illam &NaRe} assertionem quae ponit quod talis consuetudo potest introduci de consensu tacito vel expresso imperatoris et iudicum secularium, imperator posset eam tollere sed non alii iudices seculares. Quia enim praescriptio est a iure imperiali et non {*est add. &NaRe} ab inferioribus iudicibus, ideo enim {*in &MzNaRe} hoc non potest papa praescribere contra imperatorem si expresse et ex certa scientia tolerat {*tollat &NaRe} huiusmodi consuetudinem. Sed contra alios iudices seculares inferiores praescribere potest {trs. &Na} papa. Si tamen imperator revocaret {trs. &Na} huiusmodi consuetudinem aut {*et &MzNaRe} aliquo modo {*aliquo modo om. &NaRe} {aliquo modo: nullo modo &Mz} negligeret facere iustitiam vel {*ac &MzNaRe} etiam permitteret alios iudices inferiores negligere iustitiam et nullatenus sustineret quod papa vel alius suppleret tam perniciosam negligentiam et omnibus {*omnino &NaRe} verisimiliter huiusmodi {omnibus verisimiliter huiusmodi om. &Mz} confusio {*verisimiliter huiusmodi confusio om. &NaRe} incorrigibilis appareret, esset tanquam destructor et perversor iustitiae de dignitate imperiali deponendus.	Master The reply is that according to that assertion which puts it that such a custom can be introduced with the tacit or express agreement of the emperor and secular judges, the emperor could remove it but not the secular judges. For because the prescription is by imperial law and is not from inferior judges, the pope can not as a result prescribe against the emperor in this matter, if the latter expressly and with sure knowledge removes a custom of this kind. But the pope can prescribe against other inferior secular judges. Nevertheless if the emperor were to revoke a custom of this kind and were to neglect to bring justice and were even to permit other inferior judges to neglect justice and were not to uphold [the right of] the pope or someone else to make good so baleful a negligence and were to appear wholly incorrigible, he should be deposed from his imperial dignity as a destroyer and perverter of justice.
CAP. XXIII. {24 &NaRe} Discipulus Diffuse tractata est ratio prima quam incepi {*incepimus &NaRe} c. 1 {*om. &MzNaRe} 17 ad probandum quod imperator est iudex papae et quod papa est inferior eo quoad iurisdictionem coactivam. Ideo nunc {*aliquas add. &NaRe} alias rationes adducas.	Chapter 23 Student The first argument that we began in chapter 17 to prove that the emperor is the judge of the pope and that the pope is inferior to him with respect to coercive jurisdiction has been considered copiously. Would you therefore now bring forward some other arguments?
Second argument for Opinion 2A
Magister Ista {*Alia &NaRe} ratio comprehendit {*comprehendens &NaRe} duas tactas in prima parte istius Dialogi li. 6 c. 4 et 5 talis est {*trs. &NaRe}. Papa non est magis exemptus a iurisdictione coactiva imperatoris et aliorum secularium iudicum quam fuerunt {*fuerint &NaRe} Christus et apostoli. Sed Christus, inquantum homo mortalis, et apostoli fuerunt ab {*sub &NaRe} imperatore quantum ad iurisditionem coactivam iudicati {*om. &NaRe}; ergo consimiliter {*om. &NaRe} et papa.	Master Another argument, which comprises two [points] touched on in chapters 4 and 5 of book 6 in the first part of this Dialogue, is as follows. The pope is not more exempt from the coercive jurisdiction of the emperor and other secular judges than were Christ and the apostles; but Christ, as a mortal man, and the apostles were under the emperor, as far as his coercive jurisdiction was concerned; therefore the pope is also.
Maior est manifesta. Minor probatur quantum ad utramque partem. Quod enim Christus fuerit inferior imperatore et aliis iudicibus secularibus quantum ad iurisditionem coactivam probatur, quia qui potest accusari et contra quem possunt alii testificari iudicari {preiudicari &Mz} potest {*trs. &NaRe}. Sed Christus poterat {malo intellectus add. &Re} accusari, quod ipsemet testatur cum Ioh. 8:[46] dicit, "Quis ex vobis arguet me de peccato?" Quibus verbis concessit Christus {*trs. &NaRe} aliis potestatem accusandi ipsum. Quod etiam testatur Innocentius III Extra, De haereticis, Cum ex iniuncto dicens, "Nec quisquam suae praesumptionis audacia {*audaciam &NaReZn} illo defendat exemplo, quod asina legitur reprehendisse prophetas {*prophetam &NaReZn}, vel quod dominus ait, `Quis ex vobis arguet me de peccato'" et infra: "Rursus aliud est quod praelatus sponte de sua confisus innocentia subditorum se accusationibus supponit, in quo casu praemissum Domini verbum debet intelligi." Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod Christus poterat accusari. Ergo et poterat iudicari ab illo coram quo poterat accusari.	The major [premise] is manifest; both parts of the minor [premise] are proved. For it is proved that as far as coercive jurisdiction was concerned Christ was inferior to the emperor and other secular judges, because he who can be accused and against whom others can testify can be judged. But Christ was able to be accused, as he himself testifies when he says in John 8:46, "Which of you convicts me of sin?" By these words Christ granted to others the power to accuse him. Innocent III also attests to this, saying in Extra, De haereticis, c. Cum ex iniuncto [c.12, col.784], "And let no one defend the rashness of his presumption by that example in which we read that an ass reproved the prophet or that in which the Lord said, `Which of you convicts me of sin?' ... Another again is that a prelate relying willingly on his innocence submits himself to the accusations of his subjects; the above words of the Lord should be understood as such a case." We understand from these words that Christ was able to be accused. Therefore he was also able to be judged by that one before whom he could be accused.
Discipulus Istud non concludit {includit &Mz} intentum, imo contrarium ex ipso colligitur quod {*quia &NaRe} Christus solummodo sponte, sicut innuunt praemissa verba, se supposuit accusationibus subditorum. Et ita Christus non potuit iudicari nisi quia voluit. Et per consequens iudices non erant superiores Christo. Ex quo infertur quod exemplo Christi non potest concludi de papa quod teneatur subire iudicium imperatoris. Sed quod papa sponte potest se subiicere {*submittere &NaRe} {*trs. &NaRe} accusationibus aliorum, ut plures sacri canones {*trs. &NaRe} testantur.	Student That is not conclusive for its purpose; indeed from it we gather the opposite, because, as the above words imply it was only of his own free will that Christ submitted himself to the accusations of his subjects. And so Christ could be judged only if he wanted to be. And consequently the judges were not superior to Christ. From this we infer that from the example of Christ it can not be concluded of the pope that he is bound to submit to the judgement of the emperor, but that the pope can submit of his own free will to the accusations of others, as many sacred canons attest.
Magister Videtur aliis quod verba praemissa probant intentum, scilicet quod Christus poterat accusari, ita quod iudices, qui accusatores audire debebant, non poterant repellere volentes accusare Christum nisi ex causa, puta si non apparerent {apparent &NaRe} legitimi accusatores vel alio modo repellerentur ab accusatione secundum iura, ex quo Christus dedit iure {iura &Mz} {*om. &NaRe} volentibus accusare potestatem accusandi. Et per consequens ex tali potestate data {*a add. &MzNaRe} Christo erant iudices {*trs. &NaRe} superiores Christo, in quantum erat homo mortalis, et Christus sic fuit eis inferior, licet sponte, {*sicut et sponte add. &NaRe} fuit passibilis et mortalis.	Master It seems to others that the above words do establish their purpose, namely that Christ was able to be accused, in this way, that the judges, who were bound to listen to the accusers, could not reject those wanting to accuse Christ unless for a reason, (if, for instance, they did not seem to be legitimate accusers or they were rejected in some other way by an accusation according to the laws) because Christ gave power to accuse to those wanting to accuse him. And consequently, by virtue of that power given by Christ the judges were superior to Christ, in so far as he was a mortal man, and Christ was thus inferior to them, although by his own free will, just as also by his own free will he was mortal and able to suffer.
Et haec de tertia parte Dialogorum pro nunc tibi sufficiant {*Et haec ... sufficiant om. &MzNaRe}.	And let these things suffice you for now. [This sentence is not found in MzNaRe. The text for the rest of chapter 23 is found only in NaRe. See Scholz, Unbekannte Kirschenpolitische Streitschriften, Rome 1914, vol. 2, pp. 392-5.]
Discipulus Quomodo probatur quod alii poterant testificari contra Christum?	Student How is it proved that others were able to testify against Christ?
Magister Hoc asserit ipsemet Christus, ut videtur {dicens add. &NaRe} [[crossed out Re]] danti sibi alapam et male {*om. &NaRe} dicenti, sic respondens pontifici, "Si male locutus sum, testimonium perhibe {perhibere &NaRe} de malo." Ioh. 18:[23] Hoc etiam Gracianus sentire videtur, qui, ut legitur 2, q. 7, para Ecce ostensum est, ait, "Christus, quamvis esset pastor suorum {*suarum &NaReZn} ovium, quas verbo et exemplo pascebat, tamen quantum ad officiorum distributionem, ex qua hodie in ecclesiis {*ecclesia Zn} alii presunt aliis, unde quidam prelati, quidam subditi vocantur, in populo illo pastorale officium non gerebat. Mistica enim et visibili unctione nec in regem nec in sacerdotem unctus erat, que sole in illo populo persone prelati veri {*prelati veri: prelature &NaReZn} nomen sibi vendicabant." Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod Christus, in quantum homo mortalis, erat subditus illis qui preerant {erant &Re} in populo illo.	Master Christ himself asserts this, it seems, to the one who struck his face and spoke to him, speaking as follows to the priest, "If I have spoken wrongly, testify to the wrong." (John 18:23) Gratian also seems to think this. As we read in 2, q. 7, para Ecce ostensum est [c.39, col.495], he says, "Although Christ was the shepherd of his sheep, whom he fed by teaching and example, yet he did not as far as the distribution of offices was concerned carry on a pastoral office among that people, as a result of which [distribution] some people are above others in the church today, with some called prelates and some called subjects. For he had not been anointed with a mystic and visible anointing either as a king or a priest, which persons alone laid claim to the name of a prelature among that people." We gather from these words that as a mortal man Christ was subject to those who were in command among that people.
Discipulus Hoc Graciano repugnare videtur, qui ubi primo {*prius &NaRe} ait, "Christus Iudeos ad se arguendum admisit perfectione humilitatis, non severitate iuris. Si enim legis rigore essent admissi, hac auctoritate criminosi et {etiam &Na} infames in accusatione religiosorum recipiendi essent, cum essent sceleratissimi, qui de morte {*nece &NaReZn} Christi tractantes innocentem condempnare volebant." Ex quibus verbis comprehenditur {om. &NaRe} [[add. interlinear Re]] quod Christus ex rigore iuris accusari non poterat, sed tantummodo ex perfectione humilitatis.	Student This seems to oppose Gratian who says at this same place [col.495], "Christ allowed the Jews to accuse him out of the perfection of his humility, not out of the strictness of the law. For if they had been allowed out of the rigour of the law, the guilty and notorious on this authority would have been accepted in an accusation against the religious, because they were very wicked men who in discussing the death of Christ wanted to condemn an innocent man." We understand from these words that Christ could not be accused out of the strictness of the law, but only out of the perfection of his humility.
Magister Ad hoc respondetur quod Christus non poterat accusari ex severitate iuris, que Christo necessitatem imponeret, quia Christus, in quantum deus, supra omnem talem legem fuit, et tamen, in quantum homo, ex perfectione humilitatis sponte se subdidit huiusmodi iuri, ut posset accusari ab illo, qui erat recipiendus in publico, et ita Christus subdidit erat {*iuri add. &NaRe}, in quantum homo. Quia tamen sponte, etiam in quantum homo, erat subditus huiusmodi iuri {trs. &Na}, ideo quodammodo fuit supra huiusmodi {huius &Re} ius, quia in potestate sua fuit posse accusari et non posse accusari {et non posse accusari om. &Na}; et tamen quamdiu ex perfectione humilitatis voluit, poterat accusari. Ex quo sequitur quod quamdiu voluit ex perfectione humilitatis, fuit subditus iudicibus illis qui erant iudices in populo.	Master The reply to this is that Christ could not be accused out of the strictness of the law imposing its necessity on him, because, as God, Christ was above every such law, and yet, as a man, he willingly subjected himself to such a law out of the perfection of his humility, with the result that he could be accused by him who should have received him in public, and so, as a man, Christ subjected himself to the law. Yet because, even as a man, he willingly subjected himself to a law of this kind, he was as a result to a certain extent above that law because it was in his power to be able to be accused and not to be able to be accused; and yet just as long as he consented out of the perfection of his humility, he could be accused. It follows from this that just as long as he consented out of the perfection of his humility he was subject to those judges who were judges among the people.
Discipulus Istud est multum pro papa; quia sicut Christus fuit subditus, quamdiu voluit, iudicbus illis, qui iudicabant in partibus illis, ita etiam papa potest se submittere, si voluerit, iudicio laicorum. Set non est necessarie, quod se submittat, et ita cum sit vicarius Christi, non est subditus alicuius, nisi sponte vellet {*velit &NaRe}.	Student That is very much for the pope [too], because, just as Christ was subject, just as long as he consented, to the secular judges who used to judge in those parts, so also, if he consents, can the pope submit himself to the judgement of laymen. But he does not submit himself necessarily, and so, since he is the vicar of Christ, he is not subject to anyone unless he consents willingly.
Magister Non est omnino simile de Christo et de papa. Quia enim papa est vicarius Christi, ideo non habet omnem potestatem, quam habuit Christus, etiam in quantum homo. Christus enim etiam in quantum homo instituit sacramenta et sponte instituit, ita quod potuit dispensare contra ipsa quod tamen papa non potest. Papa ergo, cum sit solummodo vicarius Christi, servare tenetur ea que Christus verbo et exemplo docuit servanda. Cum ergo Christus subdens se aliis exemplo docuerit subiectionem exhibendam iudicibus, papa huiusmodi subiectionem servare tenetur.	Master There is not a complete similarity between Christ and the pope. For because the pope is the vicar of Christ, he does not, as a result, have all the power that Christ, even as a man, had. For even as a man Christ established the sacraments and so established them of his own free will that he could make a dispensation against them; yet the pope can not do this. Since the pope is only the vicar of Christ, therefore, he is bound to observe those things which by teaching and example Christ taught should be observed. Therefore since in subjecting himself to others, Christ taught by this example that subjection should be tendered to judges, the pope is bound to observe subjection of this kind.
Discipulus Potestne probari aliter, quod Christus fuit subditus imperatori et aliis iudicibus?	Student Can it be proved in another way that Christ was subject to the emperor and to other judges?
Magister Hoc probatur aliter per hoc, quod Christus fuit subditus matri et patri putativo, sicut legitur Luc 2:[51]. Ergo fuit subditus illis qui fuerunt superiores et domini patris putativi et matris {matres &Na}, quales fuerunt Romani. Unde et Ioseph, ut legitur Luc 2:[4-5], ascendit de Galilea in Bethleem, ut profiteretur et faceret {faceretur &Na} se subiectum imperatori cum Maria desponsata sibi uxore. Ergo Christus fuit subditus, in quantum homo mortalis, imperatori, licet sponte et voluntarie, sicut et sponte fuit portatus a diabolo in montem et etiam in Ierusalem, ubi statuit eum supra propinaculum templi.	Master This is proved in another way by the fact that Christ was subject to his mother and his putative father, as we read in Luke 2:51. Therefore he was subject to those who were the superiors and lords of his putative father and his mother, and the Romans were such people. Whence too, as we read in Luke 2:4-5, Joseph went up from Galilee to Bethlehem to be registered and to make himself and Mary, to whom he was engaged, subject to the emperor. As a mortal man, therefore, Christ was subject to the emperor, although of his own free will and voluntarily, just as of his own free will too he was carried by the devil to a mountain and even to Jerusalem where he stood upon the pinnacle of the temple.
Discipulus Adduxisti aliquas allegaciones ad probandum quod Christus, in quantum homo mortalis, fuit sub imperatore, quantum ad iurisdictionem coactivam. Nunc nitere probare hoc de apostolis.	Student You have adduced some arguments to prove that, as a mortal man, Christ was under the emperor, as far as his coercive jurisdiction was concerned. Now try to prove this of the apostles.
Magister Quod apostoli et omnes alii christiani et discipuli Christi fuerunt sub imperatore, quantum ad iurisdictionem coactivam, multipliciter videtur posse probari. Nam religio christiana et per consequens Christus neminem, eciam secularem et infidelem, privavit iure suo. Sed apostoli {*antequam essent apostoli add. &NaRe} fuerunt subiecti imperatori et aliis potestatibus secularibus et infidelibus; ergo postquam fuerunt apostoli, fuerunt eisdem et in eisdem subiecti.	Master It seems provable in many ways that the apostles and all other christians and disciples of Christ were under the emperor, as far as his coercive jurisdiction was concerned. For the christian religion, and consequently Christ, did not deprive anyone, even someone secular and unbelieving, of his right. But before they were apostles, the apostles were subject to the emperor and other secular and unbelieving powers; after they were apostles, therefore, they were subject to the same people and in the same things.
Minor istius racionis videtur manifesta, quia non plus erant apostoli ante conversionem et apostolatum exempti a iurisdictione imperatoris, quam alii Iudei, qui tamen erant subiecti imperatori et aliis potestatibus secularibus.	The minor [premise] of this argument seems manifest, because before their conversion and their apostolate the apostles were not more exempt from the jurisdiction of the emperor than were other jews; yet the latter were subject to the emperor and other secular powers.
Maior autem multis modis ostenditur. Ait enim Ambrosius super epistolam ad Titum, "Admone illos principibus et potestatibus subditos esse, quasi etsi tu habes imperium spirituale, tamen admone illos subditos esse principibus, scilicet regibus et ducibus et potestatibus minoribus, quia christiana religio neminem privat iure suo."	The major [premise], however, is shown in many ways. For Ambrose says on the letter to Titus [P.L. 17, 530], "Admonish them to be subject to princes and powers, as if, although you have a spiritual empire, yet advise them to be subject to princes, that is kings, dukes and minor powers, because the christian religion deprives no one of his right."
Item Augustinus super Iohannem ait, "Regnum meum non est de hoc mundo, decepti estis, non impedio dominacionem vestram in mundo, ne vane timeatis et seviatis."	Again, writing on John [P.L. 35, 1939], Augustine says, "My kingdom is not of this world; you have been deceived; I am not impeding your domination in the world, so you fear and rage vainly."
Item Leo papa in sermone de Epiphania ait, "Dominus mundi temporale non querit regnum; {qui add. &NaRe} prestat eternum." Item sic canit {ait &Na} eccelsia, "Non eripit mortalia qui regna dat celestia."	Again, Pope Leo in his sermon on epiphany [P.L. 54, 113] says, "The Lord of the world does not seek a temporal kingdom; his eternal kingdom surpasses it." Again, the church sings as follows, "He who gives celestial kingdoms does not snatch at mortal ones."
Ex quibus omnibus colligitur quod nec Christus nec religio christiana alicui etiam infideli tollit ius suum, ut scilicet per hoc quod aliquis christianus efficitur vel efficiebatur tempore Christi, sive apostolus sive alius, imperator et alii sub eo nullum ius quod habebant {habebat &Na} penitus perdiderunt.	We gather from all these that neither Christ nor the christian religion removes anyone's right, even an unbeliever's, that is, neither the emperor nor others under him completely lost any right which they had because of the fact that someone, whether an apostle or someone else, becomes or became a christian in the time of Christ.
Quod in verbis apostoli 1 Timoth. 6:[1] innuitur, cum ait, "Quicumque sunt sub iugo servi, dominos suos omni honore dignos arbitrentur, ne nomen domini et doctrina blasphemetur." Ex his enim verbis videtur haberi quod subiecti dominis infidelibus, quando efficiebantur christiani, ut prius in omnibus dominis suis servire et obedire debebant, ne domini dicerent quod religio christiana esset iniuriosa et iniuriam dominis conversorum facere niteretur.	This is implied in the words of the apostle in 1 Tim. 6:1, when he says, "Let all who are under the yoke of slavery regard their masters as worthy of all honour, so that the name of God and the teaching may not be blasphemed." For these words seem to hold that when those subject to unbelieving masters became christians they had to serve and obey their masters in everything as before, so that their masters would not say that the christian religion was wrongful and was trying to inflict a wrong on the masters of converts.
Quod Augustinus aperte videtur {trs. &Na} asserere exponens verba predicta; ait enim, "Sciendum est quosdam predicasse communem omnibus in Christo esse libertatem; quod de spirituali utique libertate verum est, non de carnali, ut illi intelligebant: ideo contra eos loquitur hic apostolus iubens servos dominis suis subditos esse. Non ergo exigant servi christiani, quod de Hebreis dicitur, ut sex annis serviant et gratis dimittantur liberi, quod misticum est; et quare hoc precipiat apostolus, supponit, ne blasphemetur nomen domini quasi aliena invadentis et doctrina christiana {christi &Na} quasi iniusta et contra leges predicet, sed pocius per obsequia servorum fidelium domini infideles convertantur." Ex quibus verbis concluditur quod per conversionem apostolorum et assumptionem eorum ad apostolatum domini infideles nullum ius in eis quod prius habuerant amittebant, et ita remanebant subditi eis in omnibus, sicut prius.	Augustine seems clearly to assert this when he expounds those words. For he says, "It should be known that certain people preached that in Christ freedom was common to everyone; this is certainly true about spiritual freedom, not about carnal freedom as those people meant; therefore the apostle speaks against them, ordering slaves to be subject to their masters. Christian slaves do not demand what was said of the Hebrews, therefore, that they serve six years and be freely released to freedom. This is mystical, and so the apostle instructs this, he assumes, so that the name of the Lord is not blasphemed as one who takes possession of what belongs to others and so that christian teaching does not preach what is as it were unjust and against the laws, but rather that unbelieving masters are converted by the obedience of believing slaves." We conclude from these words that by the conversion of the apostles and their assumption into the apostolate their unbelieving masters lost no right over them that they had had before, and so they remained subject to them just as before.
Amplius quod omnes apostoli, saltem alii a beato Petro, fuerint subiecti imperatori et aliis dominis secularibus, probatur per illud beati Petri canonica sua 1, 7 {*2 &NaRe}:[13], "Subiecti estote omni creature propter Deum sive regi precellenti sive ducibus tanquam ab eo missis ad vindictam malefactorum, laudem vero bonorum." Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod beatus Petrus voluit omnes subditos suos in spiritualibus esse subditos {subiectos &Na}, sicut ante conversionem, omni creature que super eos ante habuerat potestatem. Nam, ut testatur Innocentius tertius, Extra, De maioritate et obedientia, Solite, beatus Petrus ibidem "scribebat subditis suis et eos ad humilitatis meritum {om. &Na} provocabat"; sed apostoli erant subditi beati Petri; ergo beatus Petrus voluit, quod apostoli essent subditi {subiecti &Na} regibus et ducibus, quibus fuerant, antequam essent christiani, subiecti.	Further, that the apostles, at least those other than Peter, were subject to the emperor and other secular lords is proved by what Peter says in 1 Peter 2:13, "For the Lord's sake accept the authority of every human institution, whether of the emperor as supreme, or of governors as sent by him to punish those who do wrong and to praise those who do right." We gather from these words that blessed Peter wanted all his subjects to be subject in spiritual matters, just as before their conversion, to every authority that had previously had power over them. For as Innocent III attests in Extra, De maioritate et obedientia, c. Solitae [c.6, col.196] blessed Peter at that point "was writing to his subjects and challenging them to the merit of humility"; but the apostles were subjects of blessed Peter; therefore blessed Peter wanted the apostles to be subject to the kings and governors to whom they had been subject before they were christians.
Discipulus Adhuc alias raciones ad probandum quod imperator est iudex adducas?	Student Would you bring forward even more arguments to prove that the emperor is the judge [[of the pope: add??]]?
Third argument for Opinion 2A
Magister Alia racio que in scripturis fundatur adducitur, que talis est. Si religio christiana nullum dominum aut principem infidelem, imperatorem vel alium privat iure suo, sicut ostensum est prius, multo forcius imperatorem fidelem et alios dominos fideles non privat iure suo, quod apostolus 1 Timoth. 6:[1-2] aperte insinuare videtur, qui postquam dixit, "Quicunque sunt sub iugo servi, dominos suos omni honore dignos arbitrentur, ne nomen domini et doctrina blasphemetur," statim subiunxit, "Qui autem fideles habent dominos, non contempnant, quia fratres sunt, sed magis serviant, quia fideles et dilecti." Imperator ergo fidelis per religionem christianam nullum ius perdidit; ergo papa in omnibus est subiectus imperatori, in quibus fuit subiectus ante papatum.	Master We adduce as follows another argument, which is based on the scriptures. If, as has been shown above, the christian religion does not deprive any unbelieving lord, prince, emperor or other [ruler] of his right, it is much more the case that it does not deprive a believing emperor and other believing lords of their right, as the apostle clearly seems to imply in 1 Tim. 6:1-2. After he has said, "Let all who are under the yoke of slavery regard their masters as worthy of all honour," he immediately added, "Those who have believing masters must not be disrespectful to them on the grounds that they are brothers; rather they must serve them all the more since they are brothers and beloved." Therefore a believing emperor lost no right because of the christian religion; the pope is subject to the emperor, therefore, in all those things in which he was subject before his papacy.
Discipulus Papa etiam ante papatum non fuit subiectus imperatori, quia fuit episcopus vel clericus, et ideo imperator non fuit iudex ipsius.	Student Even before his papacy the pope was not subject to the emperor because he was a bishop or cleric, and therefore the emperor was not his judge.
Magister Ista responsio excluditur per hoc primo, quod episcopi sunt subiecti imperatori. Sed de isto forte postea queres. Ideo secundo excluditur per hoc quod purus servus imperatoris, etiam si tonsuram clericalem non haberet, possit {*posset &Re} eligi in papam, et ita cum imperator non debeat privari iure suo per ecclesiam, papa talis remaneret subiectus imperatori, et per consequens papa ratione papatus non est exemptus a iurisdictione imperatoris.	Master That reply is excluded firstly by the fact that bishops are subject to the emperor. But perhaps you will ask about this later. Therefore it is excluded secondly by the fact that a pure slave of the emperor, even if he were not to have the clerical tonsure, could be elected as pope, and so, since the emperor should not be deprived of his right by the church, such a pope would remain subject to the emperor, and consequently the pope is not exempt from the jurisdiction of the emperor by reason of his papacy.
Discipulus Minor dignitas quam sit papatus, liberat a patria potestate et etiam a potestate dominica, ergo multo forcius electus in papam eo ipso est liberatus ab omni iurisdictione imperatoris.	Student A lesser dignity than the papacy frees one from paternal power and even from seignorial power; much more is it the case, therefore, that one elected as pope is by that very fact freed from all jurisdiction of the emperor.
Magister Dicunt alii quod ista obiectio nichil valet. Quod enim minor dignitas quam papatus liberet a patria potestate et dominica, est ex ordinacione humana non ex ordinacione divina, et ita ex ordinacione imperatoris potest electus {electio &Na} in papam eximi a potestate inferiorum iudicum; sed non eximitur ex ordinacione divina.	Master Some say that that objection is not at all valid. For that a lesser dignity than the papacy frees one from paternal and seignorial power is by human regulation, not by divine regulation, and so one elected as pope can by the emperor's regulation be released from the power of inferior judges; but he is not released by divine ordinance.
Quod et {*etiam &Na} tali racione probatur: non magis debet aliquis invitus privari iure suo quod habet in aliquo, ut ei aliqua dignitas ecclesiastica conferatur, sine qua potest salvari, quam aliquis debeat privari iure suo quod habet in filio, ut eidem filio conferatur baptismus, sine quo non potest salvari. Sed Iudei et alii infideles non debent privari inviti iure quod habent in parvulis, ut baptizentur, nec ipsi parvuli baptizari debent, ne patres priventur iure, quod habent in eis. Ergo multo forcius, quandocumque {*quantumcumque &NaRe} aliquis qui erat servus imperatoris vel aliter sibi subiectus fiat papa, imperator non privabitur invitus...[[At this point Na and Re break off.]]	This is also proved by the following argument. No more should someone who is unwilling be deprived of the right which he has in someone because some ecclesiastical dignity, without which he can be saved, is conferred on the latter, than someone should be deprived of the right which he has in his son because baptism, without which he can not be saved, is conferred on that son. But jews and other unbelievers should not be unwillingly deprived of the right which they have in their children, because they are baptised, and those children should not be baptised lest their fathers are deprived of a right which they have in them. It is much more the case, therefore, that whenever someone who was the servant of the emperor or was otherwise subject to him becomes pope, the emperor will not be unwillingly deprived ... .

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