Disciple Let what was said above be enough about the first way; describe now a second way by which someone can be convicted of pertinacity.
Master He who says that some part of the New or Old Testament asserts something false or should not be accepted by catholics should be regarded as pertinacious and heretical. It was for this reason that the Manichees, who rejected the Old Testament and accepted the New Testament only in part, were condemned as heretics.
Disciple Should some layman be considered a heretic if he has never heard any mention of the book of, say, Joshua and were to say that the book of Joshua does not belong to the Old Testament?
Master There is a difference between one saying that some writing does not belong to the Old or the New Testament and one saying that some part of the New or the Old Testament should not be accepted.
In the first case, if it is a layman or someone unlearned, he should not immediately be considered a heretic but should be carefully examined and even instructed. If he were not to correct himself after appropriate teaching he should be regarded as pertinacious. If, however, he is learned and knows what books the church regards as integral to the New and Old Testament and yet, notwithstanding this, were to say that the book of Joshua, or some other, does not belong to the Old Testament he should be condemned immediately as heretical and pertinacious; nor should there be any waiting so that once corrected he might then correct himself, but he should be held at once to be incorrigible.
However, in the second case, namely someone who says that some part of the New or Old Testament should not be accepted or that it asserts something false, he should be condemned immediately as pertinacious, whether he is learned or unlearned, unless perhaps he is so simple that he does not know what is meant by "New and Old Testament" and, led astray by others, says that the New or Old Testament or some part of it should not be accepted even though he firmly believes that the whole faith of the church should be accepted. For such a person should not be counted among the heretics but should be absolved by simplicity and ignorance. It is about such simple people that Augustine speaks, as we read in 24. q. 3. c. [28] hereticus [vol.1,col.1428]: "He who believes men of this kind," that is heretics, "has been deceived by some fancy of truth." It does not seem, therefore, that he should be condemned as pertinacious unless he believes that the faith of the church is false or is convicted as pertinacious in another way.
Disciple I do not want particularly to pursue that way of convicting of pertinacity because I do not hear that those who are now engaged in controversy attribute any such thing to each other, nor does anyone to someone else. You have, however, referred to one thing which I want to be explained because it will be beneficial perhaps to many [problems], in that it can be applied, it seems, to many kinds of heretics. For you said that if someone were to know what books the church regards as integral to the New and Old Testament and yet, notwithstanding this, were to say that any one of them does not belong to the New or Old Testament he should be condemned immediately as pertinacious and heretical and there should be no waiting on whether, once corrected, he would be prepared to correct himself but he should be held at once to be incorrigible. I wonder about this last point, how such a person should be regarded at once as incorrigible; for he who can be corrected is not incorrigible; but such a person can be corrected; he should not be regarded, therefore, as incorrigible.
Master In the judgement of many people you have said truly that what you seek is beneficial to many [problems] because some people try to prove a great deal by an explanation of it. And so it is said that just as "impenitent" is taken in two ways - in one way for him who can not do penance, in another way for him who has no intention of doing penance - so "incorrigible" is meant in two ways: in one way, he who can not be corrected - and in this life no one is like that, especially if he is not insane (alienatus a sensu) - and in another way he is said to be incorrigible who has no intention of correcting himself, although he can be corrected. Everyone like this should be regarded as incorrigibly pertinacious. Consequently such an incorrigible person can be called pertinacious, contumacious, obstinate and hardened (induratus). It is not, therefore, as you take it, that he who can not be corrected is incorrigible; rather many are incorrigible who have no intention of correcting themselves although they can, nevertheless, be corrected; and often those who are incorrigible are corrected, because no one who is incorrigible should be wholly despaired of in this life, just as no one who is impenitent should be despaired of as long as he is alive.
Disciple Describe another way by which someone can be convicted of pertinacity.
Master Some say that he who holds that the universal church errs or has erred since the christian church began to gather together ought to be condemned as pertinacious, even if he believes that the christian faith handed down by Christ and the apostles contains nothing which is false. For they say that such a person should not be examined about whether he is prepared to be corrected but, by the very fact that he says this, he should be regarded as pertinacious.
Disciple Do all the learned think this way?
Master Some hold the contrary, saying that out of simplicity and ignorance someone can say without pertinacity and heretical wickedness that the church errs or has erred. And one who says this, therefore, should be examined punctiliously about whether he is prepared to be corrected; and if indeed he is prepared to be corrected he should not be condemned as pertinacious or heretical; if he refuses to be corrected, however, he should be numbered among the pertinacious and heretical.
Disciple Because some people attribute to the lord pope John XXII the power to say and assert that the universal church errs, about which I will sometime have a discussion with you, would you bring forward some arguments for the assertions to the contrary mentioned above?
Master For the first assertion it can be argued as follows. The christian faith is the faith of the universal church and no difference can be found between the christian faith and the faith of the universal church. He who says, therefore, that the universal church errs or has erred is saying that the christian faith is erroneous; he who says that the christian faith is erroneous, however, should be regarded immediately and without further examination as pertinacious and heretical; he who says that the universal church errs or has erred, therefore, should be condemned immediately and without any examination as pertinacious and heretical.
For the contrary assertion it is argued as follows. He who says or holds some assertion the contrary of which he is not bound explicitly to believe should not be condemned immediately as pertinacious or heretical, because by whatever argument someone can hold, without being condemned as pertinacious and heretical, an heretical assertion the contrary of which he is not bound explicitly to believe, by the same argument he can also assert and hold any other heretical assertion the contrary of which he is not bound explicitly to believe without his being bound to be condemned immediately as pertinacious and heretical. But not every christian is bound explicitly to believe that the universal church does not err and has not erred. Even if someone has said, therefore, that the universal church errs or has erred he should not be condemned immediately as pertinacious and heretical but should be examined about whether he is prepared to be corrected.
The major [premise] of this argument seems to be obvious.
The minor is proved because no one is bound explicitly to believe a conclusion unless he is bound explicitly to believe the antecedent or the premises on the basis of which the conclusion is maintained. But that the universal church does not err and has not erred is a conclusion, which should be believed because Christ said, in the last chapter of Matthew [28:20}, "I am with you all days, even to the end of time", and because he asked on behalf of Peter that his faith not fail. Many are not bound explicitly to believe these words from which it is inferred that the universal church has not erred and does not err because many are unlearned and have never heard them. They are not bound explicitly to believe, therefore, that the universal church does not err and has not erred.
This argument is confirmed because if any christian is bound explicitly to believe that the universal church does not err and has not erred he is bound to believe this either because it is asserted in divine scripture or because it pertains to the teaching of the universal church or because it is obviously concluded from the teaching of the universal church or from divine scripture or because it has been explicitly approved by the universal church or because it has been published among all christians as catholic. It is not so for the first reason, because many things which not every christian is bound explicitly to believe are asserted in the holy scriptures, nor for the second for the same reason, nor for the third or fourth for the same reason, nor even for the fifth because this truth that the universal church can not err has not been published among all christians, those who are simple and others. For there are many who have not heard anyone at all speak about it.
Disciple If this argument were valid it would seem that publication among christians would be of greater authority than divine scripture because all christians would be bound as a result of such publication to assent explicitly to some truth to which nevertheless they would not be bound explicitly to cling because of divine scripture.
Master To this it is said that publication among all christians is not of greater authority than divine scripture but is known to more people than divine scripture is. And that all christians are bound explicitly to believe a truth published among all christians, even the simple, and are not all bound explicitly to believe all the truths contained in divine scripture is therefore not because the authority of such publication is greater than that of divine scripture but because such publication has by now come to the notice of more people. This is the reason why everyone is bound explicitly to believe that the christian faith is true, because that truth has been published among everyone, as has [the truth that] the faith which Christ taught is true and sound.
Disciple Describe how reply is made to the argument for the contrary assertion.
Master It is replied that it is mistaken through the fallacy of "figure of speech" (fallaciam figurae dictionis) because although the christian faith and the faith of the universal church, when the church does not err, are the same, yet, they say, "universal church" consignifies or signifies christians in the nominative case (in recto), and "christian faith" does not signify them in this way. And therefore, they say, that this [argument] does not follow: "Every christian is bound explicitly to believe that the christian faith is true"; therefore, "he is bound explicitly to believe that the universal church does not err and has not erred."
Disciple Do not expatiate on matters that pertain to formal knowledge (rationalem scientiam) but describe say how reply is made to the argument to the contrary.
Master To that argument it is said that sometimes one is more bound explicitly to believe a conclusion than the premises from which it is inferred, on the grounds that the conclusion has been more widely published among catholics than the premises. It is so about [the conclusion] "the universal church does not err and has not erred". For it has been published among all catholics in those words or equivalent ones. For every christian thinks that to be the universal church which agrees with him in faith; and just as everyone believes explicitly that he holds the true faith and not a false faith, therefore, so everyone believes explicitly that the universal church preserves the true and catholic faith and not a false faith. Wherefore, just as it has been published among all christians that "the christian faith is the true faith", and everyone is bound, therefore, explicitly to believe this, so it has been published among all christians that "the faith of the universal church is the true faith". Wherefore every christian is bound explicitly to believe this; and whoever denies it, therefore, should be regarded immediately and without additional questioning as pertinacious and heretical.
Disciple They seem to distinguish between the universal church and the multitude of christians. Do they grant, therefore, that everyone is bound explicitly to believe that the multitude, or the greater part, of christians does not err or has not erred in faith?
Master The reply is that it is not necessary to believe explicitly or implicitly that the multitude, or the greater part, of christians does not err and has not erred in faith, on the grounds that the catholic faith can be preserved in a few people - indeed some say that it could endure in one person alone, because through one person alone Christ's promise to the apostles that the catholic faith would last until the end of time could be safeguarded.
Disciple Is there any other way by which someone can be convicted of pertinacity?
Master The fourth way, some say, by which someone is immediately condemned pertinacious and heretical is if any Christian, who is capable of reason - and, most of all, has understanding - denies any catholic assertion which is published as catholic among all the catholics and the faithful with whom he has been living and is publicly preached by those who preach the word of God. It is, for instance, widely published among all catholics that Christ was crucified - and thus the crucified one is on show in every church and those who preach the word of God publicly announce and affirm this fact - and if anyone brought up among christians, therefore, were to deny that Christ was crucified, he should be condemned immediately as pertinacious and heretical. And the more that he had lived among christians, the more churches he had entered, the more expositions of the word of God he had heard, the more learned he were to become in the page of scripture and the canon law, so much the more strongly should he be condemned immediately as pertinacious and heretical.
Disciple Since, as you know, some people think that the lord John is a heretic, for the reason that he denies that the souls of the wicked are in hell, that the souls of the saints in heaven see God, and that the devils are even now being punished, which they say are catholic truths published among all catholics - they say, moreover, that even though he has not published his words in a bull he should be condemned nevertheless as pertinacious and heretical - I ask you to try to fortify with stronger arguments that way of convicting of pertinacity so that I have material for pondering how I can reply in defence of our lord the pope to those and other [allegations].
Master That someone denying some assertion published as catholic among all catholics should be reckoned immediately, without any questioning or discussion, among the pertinacious and heretical is shown first of all as follows.
Just as it is not licit for anyone to be ignorant of those things which are done publicly - we clearly gather this from the sacred canons, dist. 16. quod dicitis [vol.1, col.68; see especially the Gloss where the point is made more clearly] and 12. q. 2. qui [et divinis et] humanis [vol.1, col.991] - so it is not licit for anyone to be ignorant of those things which are widely published, affirmed and preached as catholic. He who denies a catholic assertion which it is not licit for him to be ignorant of should be condemned as pertinacious and heretical. He who denies a catholic assertion that has been so widely published, among all catholics that is, should be immediately condemned, therefore, as pertinacious and heretical.
A second point is this. Someone denying a catholic assertion can be absolved of heretical wickedness only through simplicity or ignorance; but someone denying a catholic assertion published among all catholics can not be absolved by (a) simplicity or (b) ignorance.
That he can not [be absolved] by (a) simplicity is clear because it was assumed that the one denying is capable of reason and has understanding (for if he lacked the use of reason or were insane he would rightly be absolved) but an active (industrius) person who has understanding can not be absolved by simplicity.
Nor can he be absolved by (b) ignorance, because ignorance of a divine law that has been made known among everyone does not absolve, just as ignorance of natural law does not absolve, as we read in 1. q. 4. notandum [really 1.q.4. turbatur of which notandum is a paragraph; see gloss also; vol.1, col.587]. If the assertion denied has been made known among all catholics, therefore, the one denying it can not be absolved of pertinacity and heretical wickedness.
Disciple What if, in truth of fact, he were ignorant that such an assertion pertains to catholic faith? Would he be absolved by God if he were to deny it without pertinacity?
Master The reply is that he would be absolved by God, and by the church too if he could prove that he had not known that the assertion he denied was published among catholics as catholic. For example, if someone had been brought up from childhood always in some one house among certain christians and afterwards were to say out of ignorance that Christ had not been crucified and were not to cling to this pertinaciously, the church ought not to regard him as pertinacious and heretical if all those with whom he had lived were to present testimony that none of them had ever spoken to him about the crucifixion of Christ.
Disciple Do not enlarge on cases like this, which perhaps have never occurred, but let us talk about those christians who live in a community with christians, go into churches and often hear people discussing matters which pertain to the christian faith. Offer further proof, if you can, that if such people deny an assertion published among all catholics as catholic they should be condemned immediately as pertinacious and heretical.
Master It is proved in a third way, as follows. He who denies a catholic assertion which he ought and is bound explicitly to believe should be regarded as pertinacious and heretical; every christian is bound explicitly to believe every assertion published among all catholics as catholic; whoever, therefore, denies such an assertion should be condemned as pertinacious and heretical.
The major [premise] is clear from the description of pertinacious, because "he is pertinacious who persists in that which he should put aside". [[See chapter 1]] He who denies a catholic assertion which he is bound explicitly to believe, however, is such a person, because from the fact that he is bound explicitly to believe it he is bound to put aside its denial; if he does deny it, therefore, he is pertinacious.
The minor [premise] is proved because if anyone is bound explicitly to believe some catholic assertion, he is so bound either (a) because such an assertion has been published among all catholics as catholic or (b) because it is clearly shown to him by divine scripture or by the teaching or decree of the universal church that it should be considered catholic. If the first (a) is granted, the point is won (intentum habetur) because every christian is bound explicitly to believe every catholic assertion that he knows has been published as catholic among all catholics - if he says that he does not know [that it has been so published] it is up to him to prove this, if he ought to be absolved by the church. The second (b) can not be granted because then no one would be bound explicitly to believe that Christ was born of a virgin or had been crucified or any other article of faith before it was proved to him from divine scripture. And so any layman could with impunity deny every article of faith until it was shown to him in the book that such an article is contained in the bible. This argument is confirmed because anyone who denies that the christian faith is true or that the sect of the Saracens is false and bad should be condemned immediately as pertinacious and heretical; but this is so only because it is published among all catholics as catholic that the christian faith is the true faith and the faith of the Saracens a false faith; by the same argument, therefore, he who denies any assertion published among all catholics as catholic should be regarded immediately as pertinacious and heretical and can not be absolved by the church in any way unless he proves that he had not known that the assertion he denies was published in this way.
Master If it is not known of someone denying catholic truth whether he is prepared to be corrected by the rule of faith, that is by holy scripture, he should not be condemned as pertinacious. This is quite clear from the text of Augustine cited above and found at 24. q. 3. dixit apostolus [vol.1, cols. 1428-9]. Hence the Gloss on [the words ad recipiendam] dist. 17. c. nec licuit [vol.1, cols.69-70] says: "In the case of anyone who errs, he is not said to be a heretic if he is prepared to be corrected." But it is possible for someone to deny an assertion published among catholics as catholic although it may not known whether he is prepared to be corrected by the rule of faith, that is by sacred scripture. For anyone can deny such an assertion and yet present himself as being prepared to be corrected if it is shown to him that that assertion is contained on the sacred page or in a decree of the church. Such a person, therefore, should not be condemned immediately as pertinacious and heretical but should be questioned about whether he is prepared to be corrected.
Disciple That argument seems strong and adequately absolves the lord John even if he errs.
Master Others regard that argument as invalid because it would follow from it, as was touched on above, that it would be permissible for any christian to deny that Christ was a true man or that he was crucified. For, according to that argument, he could without pertinacity say: "I deny that Christ was crucified; I am prepared to be corrected, however, if it is shown to me from sacred scripture or a decree of the church that Christ was crucified."
Disciple Why can not such a person be absolved since he is prepared to be corrected?
Master Many say that such a person should not be absolved because, granted that it were possible that any such person would be prepared to be corrected, nevertheless, against such a person, however much he says that he is prepared to be corrected, there is so violent a presumption that he is pertinacious and not prepared to be corrected, because he is not ignorant that the assertion he denies has been publicly preached and asserted by the church, that he should not be believed when he says that he is prepared to be corrected. For there are many people in whose words no trust should be placed. Hence Pope Stephen, as we find in Extra De hereticis. c.1. [Dubius in fide], [vol.2, col. 1669] says of someone like this who denies an assertion publicly preached as catholic that "those who do not know the truth of faith should not be believed at all." For such people should not be believed at all whether they strive to testify against other christians or present testimony about themselves. Although they say that they are prepared to be corrected, therefore, they should be regarded as pertinacious and heretical.
Disciple If there is another way of convicting of pertinacity someone erring against the faith I am prepared to listen to it.
Master Some say that he should be condemned immediately as pertinacious and heretical of whom there is a violent presumption that he denies some assertion which he knows is contained in divine scripture or a decree of the church; if it can be proved, for example, that he has previously read and understood in divine scripture or a decree of the church the assertion he denies, or if it can be proved that previously he had purposefully taught or, even, publicly or secretly affirmed the assertion he denies. For if it is not probable that such a person has forgotten what he had previously learnt there is a violent presumption that he knowingly denies catholic truth. And he should, as a consequence, be considered pertinacious and heretical.
Disciple Would you offer an example of that way [of convicting]?
Master Out of many recent examples, some people offer that of all those who at first taught that Christ and the apostles did not have ownership of anything, saying that this truth is clearly taken from divine scripture and a decree of the church, and later denied that same truth. Since it is not probable that they forgot divine scripture and that decree of the church, they say that those people should for that reason be considered pertinacious and heretical.
Disciple That example touches on the teaching of the lord Pope John XXII which I will carefully discuss with you on another occasion. Putting that example aside, therefore, prove, if you can, that those who deny that a catholic truth which they had previously considered catholic should be considered pertinacious and heretical immediately and without more questioning.
Master This is proved firstly, as follows. He who knowingly denies a catholic truth should be regarded as pertinacious and heretical; but such a person does knowingly deny catholic truth - for he can not absolve himself by ignorance since he has previously learnt that that truth pertains to catholic faith and has not forgotten the things that he learnt; since he denies a truth that he had previously learnt and held, therefore, he should be regarded as pertinacious and heretical.
[It is proved] secondly as follows. Every apostate from catholic truth should be regarded as pertinacious and heretical because he is an apostate from the faith and an apostate from the faith is reckoned among the heretics; but he who denies a catholic truth which he had previously regarded as catholic is an apostate from catholic truth because he casts aside catholic truth; he should be reckoned, therefore, among the pertinacious and heretical.
[It is proved] thirdly as follows. A faithless christian is reckoned among the pertinacious and heretical; but a christian who denies a catholic truth that he had previously regarded as catholic is faithless; he should be condemned, therefore, as pertinacious and heretical. The major [premise] seems certain. The minor is proved: he who denies a catholic truth which he previously knew to be catholic is worse than an infidel who has never known catholic truth - Innocent III testifies to this when he says, as we find in Extra De apostatis c. [4]. quidam [vol.2, col. 1690-1661 (really 1691)], "it is a lesser evil not to know the way of the Lord than to turn back after it has been known." Hence blessed Peter says in the second chapter of his second letter (2 Peter 2:21): "For it was better for them not to know the way of justice than to turn back after knowing it." Now catholic truth is the way of justice. It is a greater evil, therefore, to go back after having known catholic truth than never to have known it. But this is only a greater evil by reason of worse faithlessness. He who denies a catholic truth that he previously knew to be catholic, therefore, is faithless and as a consequence should be considered pertinacious and heretical.
Disciple Those arguments do not seem to be conclusive. On the one hand, someone can deny a catholic truth that he previously thought to be catholic, although he did not know that it is catholic; the foregoing arguments, however, seem to be valid about someone who denies a catholic truth which he not only thought but also knew to be catholic. On the other hand, such a person can be prepared to be corrected, or rather he can present himself as prepared to be corrected; although he errs, therefore, he should not be reckoned among the heretics.
Master Those two objections both seem to be excluded by the fact that in this situation such a person should not be believed, either when he says that even though he previously thought the truth that he now denies is catholic yet he did not know this, or when he says that he is prepared to be corrected. That he should not be believed in saying the first of these is shown because he who is found to contradict himself should not be believed, at least with respect to the second thing he says. Innocent III testifies to this when he says, as we find in Extra de Probationibus. c. [10] per tuas [vol.2, col. 693-4], "that it would be quite intolerable - according to lawful decrees - that what anyone has clearly proclaimed in his own voice he can in the same case invalidate by his own testimony." And the gloss on [the word purgavit in] chapter [14] literas in Extra de Presumptionibus [vol.2, col. 794] says, "it is noteworthy that we should always stand by the first saying of someone if he later says the opposite even in another court"; [the gloss from Panormia cited] above Extra de testibus. [c. 14] cum in tua [vol.2, col.744] [adds] also outside court; as above also Extra de probationibus. [c. 10] per tuas [vol.2, cols.693-4]. It is clear from these and very many others that what is said second by someone who is found to contradict himself should not be believed. But he who denies a catholic truth which he previously thought to be catholic is found to contradict himself because while he thought that the said truth is catholic he said or indicated by deed or word that he knew that that truth is catholic. If he later says, therefore, that he did not know that the said truth is catholic he should not be believed and so he can not be absolved in this way but should be now regarded as pertinacious and heretical.
Moreover that he should not be believed if he says that he is prepared to be corrected is shown as follows. Of no one erring should it be believed that he is prepared to be corrected unless it is presumed that he departs ignorantly from catholic truth; but that person is not presumed to depart ignorantly from truth which is catholic; rather it should be presumed of him that he has entirely abandoned the foundation on the basis of which he clung to the earlier assertion; now the foundation on the basis of which he clung to that assertion is either sacred scripture or the teaching of the church. It should be presumed, therefore, that he now regards sacred scripture or the teaching of the church as false, just like those who at first thought, held and taught, on the basis of the teaching passed down in the decretal of Nicholas III which begins Exiit qui seminat, that Christ and the apostles renounced all ownership of temporal goods, and now hold the contrary assertion, regarding the teaching handed down in that decretal Exiit as false. And if they were to say that they think that that teaching is true they should not be believed because they would be proved to be contradicting themselves. It should be presumed, therefore, that one denying that a catholic truth which he at first asserted to be catholic now regards divine scripture or the teaching of the church as false. Such a person, however, should not be believed however much he says that he is prepared to be corrected; and one denying that a truth is catholic which he at first held to be catholic, therefore, should not be believed even if he says that he is prepared to be corrected; and he should be considered, as a consequence, among the pertinacious and heretical. And so the earlier arguments stand untouched.
Disciple They prove only that such a person is presumed to be pertinacious and heretical; on account of a presumption, however, no one should be condemned or severely punished.
Master A sentence, even a definitive sentence, is often pronounced solely on the basis of a violent presumption. And thus Solomon, as we read in 3 Kings 3:[16-27], gave a definitive sentence on the basis of a presumption alone when two women were arguing before him over a child. So some people say in the present case that one denying that a catholic truth which he had previously affirmed as catholic should, on the basis of a violent presumption, be condemned and punished as a heretic.
Disciple Go on to other ways of convicting of pertinacity and heretical wickedness those erring.
Master Another way of convicting of pertinacity is said to be when someone knowingly denies the teaching of the saints. For some people assert that such a person should be regarded immediately as pertinacious and heretical, while others say that even if he refuses to be corrected he should not be condemned as pertinacious or heretical.
Disciple That difficulty depends on the [question] which we discussed above, namely, whether it is necessary to salvation to hold to the assertions of the saints. I do not want you to follow that up here, therefore, but hurry on to another way of convicting someone of pertinacity.
Master He is openly convicted of pertinacity who does not correct himself once he has been corrected legitimately and does not free himself from his fault, namely by retracting his heresy. This is clearly gathered from the words of Augustine cited above and quoted in 24. q. 3. c. [31] qui in ecclesia [vol.1, col.1429]. That such a person should also be condemned as pertinacious is clearly proved because he who is not prepared to be corrected should be regarded as pertinacious; he who does not retract his heresy once he has been legitimately corrected, however, is not prepared to be corrected; such a person should be regarded, therefore, as pertinacious.
Disciple Because I have often heard about that way of convicting of pertinacity and the others are quite new to me I want that way investigated more carefully. I want you to discuss two [questions] about this way, namely to whom does it belong to correct someone erring and what kind of correction should be regarded as sufficient and legitimate.
Master We should see about correction first and secondly about the one correcting.
Disciple Proceed in whatever order you wish.
Master With respect to correction it is said that only that correction should be considered legitimate and sufficient by which it is openly shown to the one erring that his assertion conflicts with catholic truth, so that in the judgement of those who understand he can not deny in any evasive way that it has been sufficiently and openly shown to him that his error is contrary to catholic truth. An example would be if someone ignorant of the text of the Gospel were to say out of ignorance, as indeed someone in Avignon did publicly preach, so I have heard, that soldiers broke Christ's legs, and the contrary were shown to him from the text of the Gospel of John 19:[32-3] where we read: "So the soldiers came and broke the legs of the first and then of the other who had been crucified with him. When they had come to Jesus, however, they saw that he was already dead and did not break his legs." That correction ought to be regarded as sufficient because on the judgement of anyone at all who understands, such a person could not deny in any evasive way that it had been clearly proved to him that his assertion conflicts with the truth of the Gospel.
Also if anyone were to dogmatise out of ignorance that there had been two persons as two substances in Christ and it were shown to him from the text of the Synod of Ephesus that this is the heresy of Nestorius condemned by that synod, he could not deny in any evasive way that it had been openly proved to him that his assertion is a condemned heresy and that it is as a consequence opposed to catholic truth. And such correction, therefore, should be regarded as sufficient and legitimate.
Secondly we should see about the one correcting and this is distinguished as follows. Some people correct by rebuking and punishing with the due penalty, some by warning charitably and only disapproving of an error. In the first way [correction] pertains to prelates and those having jurisdiction to correct those who err; in the second way this pertains to any christian at all.
Student From this I understand what, according to many, should be regarded as sufficient and legitimate correction and I am thinking about a distinction concerning one who corrects someone erring. I want to know whether all the learned believe that someone erring, who has been corrected by his prelate or someone having jurisdiction over him, is bound to retract his error, even if it has not been clearly shown to him by that person that his error conflicts with catholic truth, whether, that is, he ought to retract his error solely on the advice or rebuke of his prelate.
Master On this question different people have different views. For some say that no one corrected by a prelate or one having authority over him is bound to retract his error before it has been clearly shown to him in the aforesaid way that his error is contrary to the truth.
They prove this first as follows: those who, in the exposition of divine scripture, and consequently in the passing on of those matters that pertain to orthodox faith, are preferred to prelates and those having jurisdiction, are not bound and ought not, if they have erred unknowingly, to retract their opinions as heretical - although they may in point of fact be erroneous - even if they have been corrected by prelates or others, unless it has been clearly shown to them that their opinions conflict with orthodox truth. This is because whoever is of greater authority in some matter is not subjected in this matter to one of lesser authority.
Those who are preferred to prelates in the exposition of divine scripture, therefore, are not subjected to them in this; but scholars and commentators on divine scripture are preferred, in the exposition of divine scripture, and consequently in the handing down of those matters that pertain to orthodox faith, to prelates and those having jurisdiction. If scholars have been corrected by their prelates, therefore, they are not bound to renounce their opinions, even if they are erroneous, unless it has been clearly proved to them that their opinions conflict with the truth.
The major [premise] is certain; the minor is proved (a) in the first place on the authority of Gratian in the decretals, Dist. 20. para. 1 [para. sed aliud] [vol.1, col.88]. He says: "It is one thing to impose an end to cases, it is another carefully to expound the holy scriptures." And further on: "It is clear that commentators on the divine scriptures, especially if they surpass bishops in knowledge, are put before them in expositions of the sacred scriptures, although they have not acquired their high office. They rank second to them, however, in defining cases." From these words we clearly find that scholars are preferred to bishops in the exposition of the scriptures.
This is also shown (b) by an argument of the same Gratian which he expresses in these words [dist 20. # 1. para decretales; vol.1, col.88]: "Where anyone relies on stronger reason, his words seem to be of greater authority. But many commentators, surpassing others in ampler knowledge, just as they do in fuller grace of the holy spirit, are proved to have adhered more to reason. Whence it seems that the sayings of Augustine, Jerome and other commentators should be preferred to the constitutions of some bishops." These words show that in matters that pertain to the faith scholars should be preferred to bishops and so, unless they have been legitimately corrected by them in the previously explained way, they are not bound to retract their opinions if they are erroneous.
Student That argument seems deficient in two ways.
First because Gratian is speaking about scholars approved by the church, like Augustine, Jerome and others like them, not about modern scholars. Although those saints should be put ahead of bishops in expositions of the scriptures, therefore, modern scholars ought not be preferred to bishops and those enquiring into heretical wickedness.
Second it seems deficient because this [argument] does not follow: scholars ought not retract their opinions at the correction of someone having jurisdiction unless they have been legitimately corrected in the aforesaid way; others, therefore, simple people corrected by prelates ought not retract their errors unless they have been legitimately corrected in the way often mentioned.
Master It is easy to reply to those objections, as is clear from what has been said.
So to the first they say that Gratian is speaking not only of scholars approved by the church but also of others, just as he is also speaking of bishops other than those who lived in the times of the scholars who are now approved by the church. For he is comparing in general the status of scholars with the status of bishops. And just as of old scholars should have been preferred to bishops in the handing on of those matters which pertain to the faith so also now, therefore, scholars should be preferred to modern bishops, as long as the scholars have been raised to their teaching post by virtue of their excellent knowledge and praiseworthy life, not by virtue of gifts and demands or human favours. And thus, to make their intention quite clear, they say that Gratian is not speaking of scholars, as the word "scholar" is taken these days, but is speaking of perceptive commentators on divine scripture, whether they be called masters or students. For many who are called students should be preferred to masters in the exposition of divine scripture and should also be preferred, therefore, to bishops in matters of this kind. And thus Gratian's argument is as conclusive about learned moderns as about ancient commentators on the scriptures because the learned in these times excel in greater knowledge; in matters of this kind, therefore, they should be preferred to bishops and inquisitors, to the unlearned and simple.
To your second objection they say that as with the argument by which the knowledgeable corrected by prelates or those having jurisdiction are not bound to retract their erroneous opinions unless they have been legitimately corrected by them in the aforesaid way, so by that same argument the simple followers of the knowledgeable are not bound to retract in any way opinions which they have received from those who are more knowledgeable unless they have been legitimately corrected. From this it follows that other simple people too are not bound to retract their erroneous opinions unless they are legitimately corrected, because all simple people are seen to be assessed by an exactly similar law.
Student If you have more arguments for the above conclusion, please adduce them.
Master The same conclusion is proved in a second way as follows.
Whoever is not bound to demonstrate undoubting trust in another in matters that pertain to the faith is not bound to retract an erroneous opinion solely on the assertion, advice or chiding of that person, because whoever retracts an erroneous opinion ought to hold the contrary assertion with firm faith and, for the same reason it seems, to cling firmly to catholic truth and to dissent from an opposing falsity.
But subjects are not bound in matters that pertain to the faith to demonstrate undoubting trust in their prelates both because then the faith of subjects would take its stand on the wisdom of men and because prelates can err against the faith as much from simplicity or ignorance as from pertinacity. Subjects are not bound to retract their erroneous opinions, therefore, solely on their [prelates'] assertion, advice or chiding. But if they are bound to retract them, it is fitting that the prelates clearly show them by the rule of faith that their opinions conflict with orthodox faith.
(iii) A third (argument proceeds) thus. At the correction of that person who ought to be prepared to satisfy someone asking for an argument for faith, no one is bound to retract his erroneous opinion unless that same person has given a reason why such an opinion should be retracted as erroneous. For if someone were bound to retract his opinion as erroneous without a reason being given, the other would not be bound to give a reason why an opinion should be retracted. But prelates correcting their subjects for errors against faith ought to be prepared to satisfy someone asking for an argument for faith, and consequently ought to be prepared to satisfy someone asking for an argument for retracting those things that they say are opposed to the faith. The blessed Peter, writing individually to his prelates in chapter 3 of his first letter [1 Peter 3:15], testifies to this when he says: "Reverence the Lord Christ in your hearts, always prepared to satisfy everyone asking you for a reason for the faith [[Vlg. hope]] that is in you." Subjects are not bound, therefore, to retract their erroneous opinions that are against catholic truth because of any correction at all by prelates, unless the correction is legitimate in the aforesaid way.
(iv) A fourth (argument proceeds) thus. At the correction of their prelates, subjects are not bound in the following case to retract opinions which they do not know to be erroneous, namely in a case in which it is licit for them to appeal against the sentence of their prelates, because whoever is able licitly to appeal against some sentence is not bound to obey that sentence. But it is licit to appeal against a prelate correcting someone of error and not showing by the rule of faith that the said error is contrary to the truth. No one is bound because of such correction, therefore, to retract an opinion which he does not know to be erroneous.
The major [premise] is obvious. The minor is clearly proved by sacred canons. For, as we find in 2. q. 6. c. [7] Si quis [vol.1, col.657], Victor says: "If anyone thinks that he has been oppressed by his own metropolitan, he may be judged by his patriarch or diocesan primate or in the presence of the seat of the pope of the universal church." We gather from these words that if someone thinks that he has been unfairly convicted of an error by his prelate it is licit for him to appeal. This could also be proved copiously from many other sacred canons, but I pass them over for the sake of brevity.
Student By that argument it is proved that someone legitimately convicted of error is not bound to retract his error because it is licit for him appeal.
Master The answer to this is that if someone legitimately convicted by his prelate of an error appeals deceptively or frivolously he ought to be punished by the church. He also sins before God, who sees how maliciously he appeals, because he has been legitimately corrected.
Student: An objection occurs to me which seems to strike against the whole preceding argument. For when these people say that someone corrected legitimately by his prelate is bound to retract his error, and otherwise is not, one can ask of them whether the one erring holds an explicitly condemned heresy or holds an error condemned only implicitly.
If he holds an error condemned explicitly he is bound to retract it at once, otherwise his prelate could subject him to due punishment. If he holds a heresy condemned only implicitly, however, he is not bound to retract it on account of any correction by a prelate inferior to the pope.
Master They reply that no one is bound to retract immediately an explicitly condemned heresy when he does not know that it has been explicitly condemned. But if it is shown to him that it has been explicitly condemned he is bound to retract it immediately. Now when you say that a prelate can subject such an erring person to due punishment, this is true provided due order is observed. For example, by the rule of faith he may first show someone erring that his error conflicts with catholic truth; and if he does not then retract his error, he (the prelate) may strike him with the appropriate punishment.
Student I wonder that they say that someone holding an explicitly condemned heresy does not have to retract that heresy at once even if he has been condemned by a prelate. This seems to be contrary to (i) divine scripture; (ii) sacred canons; (iii) the custom of the church; and (iv) reason.
(i) For that this is contrary to divine scripture is proved. For every heretic is bound to revoke his heresy; he who holds an explicitly condemned heresy, however, is a heretic; such a person is immediately bound, therefore, of necessity for salvation to retract his heresy.
The major [premise] is obvious because whoever is not bound to retract his heresy is not bound to put it aside (dimittere) and as a consequence does not sin, at least mortally, by clinging to such a heresy; from this it follows that he is not a heretic.
The minor [premise] is proved because he who holds an explicitly condemned heresy should more be regarded as a heretic than he who does not hold to catholic teaching. But he who does not hold to catholic teaching is a heretic because he should be avoided. The blessed John testifies to this, saying in his second letter (2 John 10-11): "If anyone comes to you and does not announce this teaching, do not receive him into your house or even greet him. For he who greets such a person becomes a partner in his wicked works." It is clear from these words that he who does not hold to catholic teaching should be avoided by the faithful. He who holds an explicitly condemned heresy, therefore, should be avoided. But no one should be avoided because of a heresy before he is a heretic. He who holds an explicitly condemned heresy, therefore, is a heretic.
(ii) Again it is shown that the said assertion is opposed to the sacred canons. For, as we find in 24, q. 1, c.1 Achatius [vol.1, col.1382], Pope Gelasius says: "Whoever falls into a heresy that has once been condemned, involves himself in its condemnation." We clearly gather from these words that he who has fallen into an explicitly condemned heresy is condemned. Gelasius also in the same case and question, c.[2] maiores [vol.1, col.1382] and Pope Felix c. Achatius secundo clearly assert this; but someone condemned because of heresy is a heretic. He who has fallen into an explicitly condemned heresy, therefore, is a heretic. A heretic, however, is bound to retract his heresy immediately. Someone holding an explicitly condemned heresy, therefore, is bound to retract it immediately.
(iii) This is also made clear by the custom of the church. For once anyone is convicted of holding an explicitly condemned heresy, inquisitors into heretical wickedness proceed against him immediately, as if against a manifest heretic, and regard him as a heretic, even if he is prepared to be corrected. If he is a heretic, however, he is bound to retract his heresy. Therefore etc.
(iv) This is also proved by reason. For if someone holding an explicitly condemned heresy is not bound to retract his heresy immediately this is only because he is able to excuse himself through ignorance by saying that he does not know that such an assertion is explicitly condemned. But such ignorance does not excuse him (a) because ignorance of the law does not excuse, as we find in 1, q. 4, [c.12] para. Notandum [vol.1, col.587] and (b) because after a constitution of the apostolic see has been published it is binding on everyone and after two months no one can be excused through ignorance, as we find in the last chapter [ch. 13. Quoniam constitutio] of Extra, de constitutionibus [vol.2, cols.28-9] and as the Gloss on the chapter cognoscentes of the same title [vol.2, col.15] explains. In a similar way, therefore, an explicit condemnation is binding on everyone, at least after two months. [It does not excuse] (c) because no one can claim ignorance of those things that are done publicly, as is clearly gathered from the sacred canons. Since an explicit condemnation of any heresy is made publicly, therefore, no one holding an explicitly condemned heresy can excuse himself through ignorance. And he is bound, as a consequence, to retract it immediately and can in no way be excused, but should be considered a heretic.
What astonishes me is that learned men say that someone can hold an explicitly condemned heresy, although he is not a heretic, and that he is not, therefore, bound to retract that heresy immediately. Would you not delay but explain how they would reply to these (arguments)?
Master The aforesaid assertion was argued for in book 3 above, because it was proved there that not everyone erring against the faith should be regarded as a heretic. Those arguments brought forward there conclude, moreover, that even someone holding an explicitly condemned heresy should not be condemned as a heretic immediately. It follows from this that he is not bound to retract his heresy immediately.
Student If they rely on some particular argument to prove that someone holding an explicitly condemned heresy should not be counted among the heretics immediately, I would be pleased to hear it.
Master One of their arguments is this. No one should be regarded as a heretic more because of a heresy explicitly condemned by the church than because of a heresy the contradiction of which is found in the meaning or words of divine scripture, unless such a condemnation has been more widely published among christians than the truth of holy scripture. But there are many heresies explicitly condemned by general councils which have not been more widely published than divine scripture. And someone should not always be immediately regarded as a heretic if he holds some heresy the contradiction of which is found in the sacred writings, but he should be examined about whether (he holds it) knowingly or unknowingly, and, if unknowingly, whether he holds the heresy pertinaciously or without pertinacity. In a similar way, therefore, even if someone holds an explicitly condemned heresy he should not always be regarded immediately as a heretic, but it should be examined first whether he can be convicted of pertinacity by witnesses or other legitimate proofs. If it can not be proved that he has been pertinacious he should be examined about whether he is prepared to correct himself if it is clearly shown to him that his heresy has been explicitly condemned.
A second argument is this. No one should be immediately regarded as a heretic if he holds a heresy the contradiction of which he is not bound explicitly to believe. For this is the reason why someone who denies some truth contained explicitly in divine scripture is not thereby immediately regarded as a heretic. But no one or few people are bound to believe explicitly all the truths which contradict explicitly condemned heresies because many do not have, nor can have, the books which contain the explicit condemnations. Even if someone unknowingly holds an explicitly condemned heresy, therefore, he should not immediately be condemned as a heretic.
Student How can someone deny a truth explicitly contained in sacred scripture unless he is a heretic?
Master It is enough to believe every truth of divine scripture implicitly. For just as the blessed Augustine unknowingly denied some truths contained in scripture and was not on that account a heretic, so also the blessed Jerome seems to deny the truth of the gospel when, speaking of our redeemer in one of his homilies, he says: "And he began to question his disciples asking them `Who do men say the son of man is'; he did not say `Who do men say that I am' lest he were seen to ask about himself boastfully." Yet in chapter 9:[18] of his gospel Luke expressly reports that Jesus asked his disciples, "Who does the multitude say that I am?" Note that Jerome says that Christ did not say "Who do men say that I am?" while Luke says that he did say "Who does the multitude say that I am?" A clear contradiction is thereby found between Jerome and the blessed Luke, and yet Jerome should not be regarded as a heretic, because he did not pertinaciously deny the truth of the gospel, but at the time he did not remember the text of Luke's gospel.
Student Run through the objections that I made.
Master The answer to your first objection is that not everyone holding an explicitly condemned heresy should be regarded as a heretic, even if many people holding explicitly condemned heresies can be proved by other proofs to be heretics, that is if they can be convicted of pertinaciously holding an explicitly condemned heresy.
When you say that someone who holds an explicitly condemned heresy should more be regarded as a heretic than someone who does not hold to catholic teaching, this (if it ought to be granted) is true of him who holds pertinaciously an explicitly condemned heresy. If he holds an explicitly condemned heresy unknowingly and without any pertinacity, however, it is not true, speaking, that is, in comparison to one who does not consider christian teaching to be true. The blessed John, in the words you adduced is speaking of such a one. For the blessed John is not speaking of someone who out of ignorance does not hold some particular catholic truth, because such a person should not be avoided by catholics, unless he were to be convicted of pertinacity in some other way.
A brief reply to the decretals which you adduce is that they all speak about people who knowingly slip into an already condemned heresy.
To the practice of the inquisitors which you bring forward, some people say that inquisitors and some prelates often proceed unfairly and unjustly. For many, as they say, are unlearned and simple men blinded by greed and avarice who try to condemn those accused of heresy in order to acquire their goods. As a result no assertion should be based on their practice.
To [the argument from] reason, which seems to be more forceful, they say that some people who hold explicitly condemned heresies can excuse themselves by ignorance, others, on the other hand, can not, because certain people can be convicted of manifest heresy in different ways - as is clear from what has been said and will be even clearer later if you follow up with questions on this matter - those, that is, who knew beforehand that the heresy was condemned, and who forced others in any way at all to hold it and who were proclaiming that they would irrevocably defend it, and many others who have been spoken about above and will be spoken about below if you wish. Those who can not in any way be convicted of pertinacity, however, and are prepared to be corrected can excuse themselves by ignorance and say: "We did not know that these are condemned as heresies, indeed we did not know that they are opposed in any way to catholic truth."
Disciple Before you proceed further would you say whether those who are well informed about the sacred page and canon law can excuse themselves by ignorance if they hold explicitly condemned heresies.
Master The answer is yes, because the well informed are not bound to have knowledge of every heresy that has been explicitly condemned. They should not be regarded as heretics, therefore, if they hold them in ignorance and are prepared to be corrected.
Disciple How is reply made to those [arguments] by which I proved that ignorance does not excuse?
Master To the first it is said that ignorance of the law is two-fold. For one ignorance is of a law which it is necessary to know and that [ignorance] does not excuse. Another ignorance is of a law which it is not necessary to know and that does excuse one of sin, although in certain other cases it may not excuse. He who holds heresies the contradictions of which it is necessary for him explicitly to believe, therefore, can not be excused by ignorance. Anyone brought up suitably among christians, therefore, who was to hold that the christian faith is false or that Christ was not crucified or was not made flesh or something of this kind of which no christian ought to be ignorant can not be excused by ignorance, because he is bound explicitly to believe that the christian faith is true and that Christ was crucified and things of this kind which it is easy to know and which are published among all catholics. He who holds heresies the contradictions of which he is not bound explicitly to believe, however, could be excused by ignorance as long as he did not add pertinacity.
To the second, about a constitution of the apostolic see, it is said that it does oblige everyone after it has been so widely published that no one can claim ignorance. If it has not been widely published in this way, however, it does not oblige those who do not know it, if they are not labouring under a crass and lazy ignorance. The statement that it obliges everyone after two months is true, therefore, of all who know it and all who do not know it because of the burden of their reprehensible ignorance. It does not oblige others, however, in such a way that those acting contrary to it sin before God, though perhaps it may sometimes bind them to a punishment imposed by the church. For it seems hard to some to say that all christians are bound to know all the decretals of the popes, when some people who study them, sometimes for 20 years and more, do not know many of them. Many can not even obtain a copy of them.
To your third they say that even in connection with those things that are done publicly it is possible sometimes to claim ignorance, according to what is clearly gathered from the sacred canons, 9, q. 1, c.[5] Ordinationes [vol.1, col.866; see especially gloss on nisi probare], 1, q. 1, c.[108] Si qui a simoniacis [vol.1, cols.552-3] and others. Sometimes too an oath alone is sufficient to prove ignorance of this kind. And so they say, on the present topic, that even if some heresies have been publicly condemned in the past, even the learned can, nonetheless, claim ignorance now by saying that they do not know that such heresies have been condemned; and if proof of their ignorance is sought from them it is enough for them to swear that they do not know; and in this way they are excused of heretical wickedness by ignorance.
Disciple Would you discuss one further difficulty about this matter? Whether, that is, someone who knows some heresy has been condemned which he thinks is ambiguous and has two significations can be excused of heretical wickedness through ignorance if he holds it in the condemned signification but does not think that it is condemned?
Master The reply to this is that if someone who knows a heresy has been condemned is not bound to know what signification of it has been condemned, he should not be condemned as a heretic immediately even if he holds to the condemned signification. If he is bound to know what signification of it has been condemned, however, he can not be excused through ignorance.
The first is proved as follows. When some assertion has been condemned, no one is obliged by that condemnation to deny another assertion unless it can be inferred solely from that condemned assertion; but from an ambiguous assertion which has several significations a fixed signification can not be inferred. If an ambiguous assertion has been condemned, therefore, no one is obliged to deny any fixed signification because he can with probability doubt what signification of it has been condemned. If anyone out of ignorance and without any pertinacity, therefore, holds an ambiguous condemned heresy in that signification which its condemners intended to condemn, he should not be condemned as pertinacious and heretical immediately, if they have not described that signification; but it should first be clearly shown to him not only that the ambiguous assertion has been condemned but also that with its signification defined in that way it conflicts with orthodox truth.
Disciple They seem to err when they say "an ambiguous assertion has been condemned" because an ambiguous assertion ought not be condemned, especially if it has a catholic signification.
Master You are answered that it is you plainly err. For sometimes an ambiguous assertion with some catholic sense has been condemned. Indeed sometimes even assertions that are literally (secundum vocem) contradictory have been condemned; yet because they are literally (secundum vocem) contradictory one or other of them has a true signification.
Disciple Would you give an example of that if you can?
Master Isidore seems to bring forward an obvious example of this, as we find in 24, q. 3, c.[39] quidam autem [vol.1, col.1434], when he clearly implies that each of [the assertions] "God creates evil", "God does not create evil" has been condemned as a heresy. And thus he regards those who assert each as manifest heretics, saying: "The Coliciani, named after a certain Colicius, who say that God does not create evil, against the words `I the Lord who creates evil'. The Floriani, from Florianus, who say on the other hand that God created evil, against the words `God made everything good'". From these words we gather that each of those [assertions] "God creates evil", "God does not create evil" has been explicitly condemned as a heresy. And yet the [assertion] "God creates evil" is ambiguous and has a catholic signification, namely that God creates the evil of punishment (mala poenae); similarly that [assertion] "God does not create evil" has a catholic signification, namely that God does not create the evil of fault (mala culpae).
Disciple According to this they seem to grant that someone can without heretical wickedness hold that God creates the evil of fault, because they say that someone can without heretical wickedness hold, in that signification in which it was condemned, an ambiguous assertion that has been condemned.
Master They say that you argue badly because you are arguing from a particular, or an indefinite equivalent to a particular, to a determinate singular. For they do not say that someone can without heretical wickedness always hold, in that signification in which it was condemned, an ambiguous assertion that has been condemned, but sometimes, because, as they say, if someone is bound to know that the signification in which an assertion has been condemned is heretical and holds the assertion with that signification he should be condemned as heretical immediately; if he is not bound to know this, on the other hand, he should not be regarded as heretical.
Disciple How, therefore, should action be taken about such a person?
Master This has been answered above because, they say, it is not enough to show to such a person that the ambiguous assertion has been condemned but it is necessary also to show clearly that their signification is contrary to catholic truth.
Disciple According to these people, as I understand it, bishops and inquisitors correct in vain those who err unless they prove that they are clearly opposed to apostolic teaching. But I still do not know what they think about the pope, whether, that is, those who err unknowingly are bound to retract their heresies as the result of simple correction by the pope, without the sort of correction they call legitimate.
Master They say, "no". This is because (i) the pope is often unlearned and simple, because (ii) the pope can err from the faith against the faith, because (iii) the pope is bound to offer a reason from faith - since, as the Gloss Extra de rescriptis, c. [5] si quando [vol.2, col.35] notes, "a reason ought to be offered for everything if it can be" - because (iv) in a case concerning the faith it is licit to appeal from the pope, and because (v) our faith does not rest on the wisdom of the pope. For no one is bound to believe the pope in matters of faith unless the latter demonstrates the reason for his statement by the rule of faith.
Disciple That seems to be contrary to the custom of the church. For the pope sometimes condemns heresies without offering any reason for his condemnation; general councils too have composed creeds, distinguishing articles which they do not prove by the rule of faith. It does not seem, therefore, that the pope is always bound to offer a reason for his condemnation of heretical wickedness.
Master They reply to these points that the pope has never been found to have condemned some heresy and not offered a reason for his condemnation; but sometimes this [is found] outside the condemnation, sometimes in the condemnation itself. For this is what Alexander III did, as is clear from Extra de hereticis c. [7] cum Christus [vol.2, col.1671], as also did Innocent III, Extra de summma trinitate et fide c. [2] damnamus [vol.2, cols.11-14]. If he does not offer a reason in the condemnation itself, however, he ought to offer a reason for that condemnation in other assertions of his.
To the question of general councils composing creeds, the response is that although in the creeds themselves they may not prove the articles of the creeds by the rule of faith, they are nonetheless clearly proved outside those creeds because either those who compose the creeds prove the articles or they approve tacitly or expressly the proofs of others.
Disciple What if someone were to defend a heresy before the pope and wer to say that he thinks that it is consistent with catholic faith?
Master They say that if he were to defend unknowingly a heresy a thousand times, with an explicit or tacit declaration that he is prepared to be corrected when he learns that his opinion conflicts with catholic faith, he would not be condemned as heretical even before the pope unless he were proved to be heretical by other legitimate proofs because, just as it is licit for him to defend an erroneous opinion unknowingly in this way the first time, so it is licit a second time and a third, and always until it has been clearly proved to him that his opinion should be reckoned among the heresies.
Disciple Perhaps someone defending his opinion in this way will say, even after his opinion has been proved heretical, that it has not been shown to him that his opinion conflicts with orthodox faith, and so he could never be convicted.
Master It is not enough for him to deny that his opinion has been proved heretical, but he will be forced to stand by the judgement of the knowledgable. If they think that it has been sufficiently proved to him that his opinion is heretical, he is bound to retract it; otherwise he should be considered among the pertinacious and heretical.
Disciple What if the knowledgable and all the masters of theology, together with the pope, err.
Master They will in fact condemn an innocent person. The remedy of appeal could, however, according to the laws assist his cause. If his legitimate appeal is not honoured, however, nothing remains for him but to commit himself to divine grace and not to be afraid of being separated from human society by an iniquitous judgement. Wicked knowledge does not annihilate him from the book of the living. [[Not clear]]
Disciple What if he defends an obvious heresy in writing?
Master They say that he is not to be regarded as pertinacious or heretical on this account, because with respect to this it does not matter whether he holds or defends an erroneous opinion in speech or in writing. For the blessed Cyprian has left behind an heretical opinion in his writings, yet because he did not defend it pertinaciously he has not been condemned as a heretic. In the same way the abbot Joachim also wrote an heretical opinion, as Innocent III testifies in Extra de summa trinitate et fide c. [2] damnamus [vol.2, cols.11-14], yet he has not been condemned as heretical, as the Gloss on the [word corrigenda in] that chapter damnamus says about Joachim: "Because he was prepared to be corrected and did correct himself so that it follows that he ought not be called a heretic even if he sometimes erred in faith." [vol.2, col.34] So too, although the opinions which Peter John [Olivi] left in his writings have been condemned as heretical, he was, nevertheless, not condemned as either pertinacious or heretical. In the same way, although the blessed Jerome also wrote heretical opinions which we do not read of his revoking, he is not regarded as heretical.
Disciple It seems from this that no one could be accused of heresy after his death; the sacred canons, however, openly assert the opposite of this.
Master The reply to this is that no one should be accused of heresy after his death solely because he held a heresy in speech or writing. But if it can be proved in any way at all that he pertinaciously held a heresy in speech or writing he can be accused of heresy after his death, because if he could be shown to have been pertinacious in some other way than by speeches or writings expressing just a heresy - by speeches, writings or deeds expressing pertinacity, for instance - he should be condemned.
Disciple Would you give an example of this so that I may understand better what is said.
Master If it is proved of someone after his death that he held in speech or writing that there were two persons in Christ he should not be regarded as heretical solely on account of this, but he could be excused by simplicity or ignorance. If it is proved, however, that he knew that that assertion was condemned and that afterwards he held it in speech or writing he should be condemned for pertinacity and heretical wickedness.
Disciple As I understand it, it is appropriate, according to these people, to proceed in the same way against the living and the dead accused of heresy; it is enough for inquisitors, however, that it is only proved that someone dead held a heresy in speech or writing.
Master They say that inquisitors often proceed wickedly and that they are very harmful to the church of God, concentrating, as it were, entirely on their temporal gains.
Disciple Would you speak now about someone corrected by a companion or another person who is known to hold no jurisdiction over him at all.
Master These people say that someone legitimately corrected of heresy by a companion, a subject or anyone else at all is bound to put aside his heresy immediately and without delay, so that if, after this correction, he is convicted of holding that same heresy in speech or writing or of claiming in any way that it is true he should be regarded as pertinacious.
They prove this first as follows. Our faith does not rest on the wisdom of men, according to the apostle in 1 Corinthians 2[:5]. With respect to anyone being bound to put aside his heresy, therefore, it does not matter by what person it may be shown to him by the rule of faith that his opinion conflicts with orthodox faith; but if it is clearly shown to anyone by his prelate that his opinion conflicts with orthodox faith he is bound to put it aside immediately, or else he should be considered pertinacious. He is bound to act the same, therefore, whoever demonstrates it to him.
[It is proved] secondly as follows. He who is not prepared to be corrected if he errs is pertinacious; but that person who has been corrected legitimately by anyone at all - that is, if it has been clearly shown to him that his opinion conflicts with orthodox faith - and does not put aside his opinion immediately is not prepared to be corrected; that person, therefore, should be condemned as pertinacious and heretical.
[It is proved] thirdly in this way. No one is less bound to put aside his error if he has discovered the truth by the teaching of anyone else at all than if he has discovered it by himself. He who has discovered the truth by himself, however, is bound to put aside his error immediately, on the example of the venerable Anselm, who says in Cur deus homo book 1 ch. 18, "I am certain, if anything I say contradicts sacred scripture without doubt, that it is false and I do not want to hold it once I have learnt this." If he has discovered a truth consistent with sacred scripture, therefore, through the teaching of any other person at all, whether a companion or a subject, he ought to put aside without delay an error opposed to it.
Disciple There seems to be no difference, according to that, between someone corrected by his prelate or by someone else not his prelate, even by his subject.
Master The reply is that there is no difference with respect to the fact that the error should be put aside, but with respect to many other things a great difference is found. For a prelate and someone having jurisdiction over another can cite him ?to give a reason?, compel him to listen to his teaching, force him to recant publicly and, if he has been found to be contumacious and rebellious in these matters and others pertaining to his duty, can punish him with a wholly appropriate punishment. He who does not hold jurisdiction over one erring, however, can not exercise any of these against him.
Student Do they lay down any difference between the pope and other prelates correcting those who err?
Master They say similar things about the pope and other prelates with respect to explicitly condemned heresies, but a great difference is found with respect to heresies condemned only implicitly, because over those holding heresies condemned only implicitly prelates inferior to the pope are known to have no jurisdiction that enables them to punish them or compel them to do anything. But if in their own conscience they think that they are pertinacious they ought to accuse or denounce them before the pope. The pope, however, can examine them and condemn them if he finds them pertinacious.
Student I long to know whether another way of convicting of pertinacity someone erring is designated.
Master In the judgement of some there is an eighth way by which someone should be convicted of pertinacity and that is if he endeavours to force others by commands, threats, punishments, promises, oaths or in any other way at all pertinaciously to defend his error. That such a person should be considered pertinacious and heretical they try to prove by many arguments.
This is the first. He who forces others to defend a heresy pertinaciously commits no less a fault than he who agrees with someone who errs or does not oppose him when he can, because that person not only agrees and does not oppose but even forces and insists. He who agrees with and does not oppose when he can someone erring and pertinaciously defending a heresy, however, is entangled in the same crime and should be considered, as a consequence, pertinacious and heretical. One who forces or compels others pertinaciously to defend a heresy, therefore, should be regarded as pertinacious and heretical. The major [premise] is obvious. The minor is proved clearly by sacred canons. For, as we find in 2, q. 3, c. [100] qui consentit peccantibus Isidore says "Another father says: If anyone agrees with another's error let him know that he is to be condemned as reprehensible in the same way as that other." [vol.1, col. 957] And Pope Leo, as we find in Extra de hereticis, [c. 2] qui alios [vol.2, col.1669], says, "He who does not call others back from error when he can do so shows that he himself errs." And, as we find in dist. 83. c. [3] error, Pope Innocent says, "An error which is not opposed is approved, and truth is struck down when it is not defended." [vol.1, col.401] It is clearly gathered from these and very many others that he who agrees with heretical wickedness is counted among heretics. He who forces others pertinaciously to defend a heresy or pertinaciously to cling to a heresy, therefore, should be condemned even more to be pertinacious and heretical.
A second argument is this. Those who force others into sin by threats, terror, oaths, commands or menaces do not sin any less than those who order others to commit some crime. But those who order others to commit some crime are caught up in the same crime. Those who force others into any sort of sin, therefore, are bound by the same sin and consequently those who force others pertinaciously to defend heretical wickedness are entangled in the same pertinacity. The major [premise] of this argument is self-evident. The minor [premise] is proved by the authority of Innocent III, who says, as we find in Extra de sententia excommunicationis c. [6] mulieres [vol.2,col.1880], "Since he truly commits a crime on whose authority or order it is proved that it was committed... ." Those who order others to commit a crime, therefore, are caught up in the same crime.
The third argument is this. He is said to do something who does it through another. Thus he is said truly to kill who kills through another, as Clement III attests, who says, as we find in Extra de clericis pugnantibus in duello. c. [2] henricus, [vol.2, col.1719] "There is no doubt that just as a homicide is perpetrated by deed, so also by command, advice or in defence." In a similar way, therefore, he is said pertinaciously to defend a heresy who defends a heresy pertinaciously through another. But he who forces others pertinaciously to defend a heresy, pertinaciously defends that heresy through others. He ought to be called, therefore, a pertinacious defender of heresy.
A fourth argument is this. Someone who forces is said to do more than someone who advises. But he by whose advice some crime is committed is said to commit that same crime, as Augustine attests, saying, as is found in dist. 1. de penitentia c.[23] perniciose: "They deceive themselves wickedly who think that the only murderers are those who kill a person with their hands, and not, even more, those through whose advice, deceit or encouragement people are killed. For the Jews did not kill the Lord with their own hands, as it is written that `we are not permitted to kill anyone', yet the Lord's death is attributed to them because they killed him with their tongue by saying `Crucify! Crucify him'." [vol.1, col.1673] It is much more the case, therefore, that he who forces another to commit a crime, commits that same crime; and so he who forces another pertinaciously to defend a heresy is known pertinaciously to defend that heresy himself.
The fifth argument is this. Those who share in a crime with criminals are caught up in the same crime; but he who forces others pertinaciously to defend a heresy shares in the crime with the one pertinaciously defending the heresy because he grants him help and support; such a person should be regarded, therefore, as pertinacious.
A sixth argument is this. He who is not prepared to be corrected of a heresy he holds should be regarded as pertinacious; but he who forces others pertinaciously to defend his heresy is not prepared to be corrected; he should, therefore, be considered pertinacious.
A seventh argument is this. He who forces others to defend a heresy pertinaciously wants that heresy to be defended and held irrevocably; such a person is pertinacious, however; therefore, etc.
Student Those arguments are valid only of someone forcing others pertinaciously to defend his heresy, but it is possible to defend a heresy without pertinacity. Even if someone forces others by punishments, threats, commands and oaths to defend some heresy, therefore, he should not be regarded as pertinacious or heretical as long as he does not force them to defend it pertinaciously. This seems provable by the following argument. He who forces another, but not to a mortal sin, does not commit a mortal sin; and he should not be regarded as pertinacious and heretical, consequently, on account of this forcing, since every heretic is in mortal sin. But it is not always a mortal sin to defend a heresy, although it is a mortal sin to defend a heresy pertinaciously. No one should be regarded as pertinacious and heretical, therefore, on account of such forcing.
Master The reply to this is that although someone could defend a heresy without pertinacity yet, if he forces another to defend a heresy unrestrictedly, then as far as in him lies he forces that person to defend that heresy pertinaciously, just as he who forces another to swear that he will defend irrevocably and forever some assertion which is heretical forces him as much as he can to defend that assertion pertinaciously even if it is in the power of the one who is so forced not to defend the heresy afterwards. The one so forcing, therefore, ought to be regarded as a pertinacious defender of heresy even if those forced to swear refuse later on to defend that heresy pertinaciously but want to go against their illicit oath. When you say, in fact, that he who forces another, but not to a mortal sin, does not commit a mortal sin this is denied because someone can sin mortally even by forcing another to do something good. For he who forces another to make a vow of chastity or poverty or something else which is a supererogation can sin mortally, because people can be persuaded to do such things, but they can not be ordered. For when he speaks about such matters Augustine says that no one is forced by law to act well but is prohibited from acting badly.
Student Is there another way of convicting someone of pertinacity?
Master Someone can be convicted of pertinacity and heretical wickedness in a ninth way if he forces someone to abjure a catholic truth, or by punishments, threats or commands constrains him to deny a catholic truth. For it is shown that someone forcing others to abjure any catholic truth at all should be considered pertinacious and heretical. For he who forces another to abjure a catholic truth forces that person to cling irrevocably to its opposing heresy; such a person, however, as is clear from the preceding chapter, is pertinacious and heretical. Therefore, etc. It is also shown by the same argument that he who forces others by threats, penalties or commands to deny some catholic truth should be condemned as pertinacious and heretical.
Student Can a person of this kind be excused if he compels through some ignorance, if he believes, for instance, that the assertion which he forces the other to abjure or deny is heretical?
Master It is said that a person of this kind can not be excused by any ignorance because without being rash no one can attempt to force another in any way at all, by an oath, by penalties, threats or commands, to abjure or deny some assertion unless he is with sufficient certitude sure that it is not consistent with the truth; no one, however, can have such certitude that a catholic assertion is not consistent with catholic truth; he rashly forces another, therefore, to abjure or deny the same; in this case, however, rashness is equivalent to pertinacity. A person of this kind, therefore, should be regarded as pertinacious and heretical.
Student Are there additional ways of convicting anyone at all of pertinacity?
Master That person is necessarily convicted of pertinacity and heretical wickedness who abjures a catholic truth or swears that he will forever preserve as catholic any assertion which in truth of fact is heretical. For it is shown by the following argument that such a person should be regarded as pertinacious and heretical. He who declares that he intends to deny an assertion which is catholic or to hold an assertion which is heretical should be considered pertinacious; he who abjures a truth which is catholic or swears that he will preserve an assertion which is heretical, however, is a person of this kind; he should, therefore, be considered pertinacious.
Again, someone who errs against the catholic faith and is not prepared to be corrected should be considered pertinacious and heretical; he who abjures a catholic truth, however, and he who swears he will defend a heresy or he who will cling to an assertion which is heretical is like this, and is not prepared to be corrected; he should be considered, therefore, pertinacious and heretical.
Student Is there some way a person like this can be excused of pertinacity?
Master The answer is that he can be excused of pertinacity and heretical wickedness, but not of a mortal sin, by the fear of death or of severe torture.
Student It seems that ignorance could excuse such a person. For ignorance excuses of lying someone who says something which is false but which he thinks is true, as Augustine asserts, as we find in 22, q. 2, c. [4] is autem [vol.1, col.1252]. In a similar way, therefore, ignorance could excuse someone who abjures a catholic truth which he thinks is heretical and someone who swears that he holds an assertion which is heretical but which he thinks is catholic.
Master The answer to you is that someone can be excused of lying, without, nevertheless, being excused of rashness. Augustine attests to this when he says, in the place you just cited (22, q. 2, c. [4] is autem), "No one should be condemned as a liar who says something which is false but which he thinks is true, because as far as in him lies he does not deceive but is himself deceived. And so someone who incautiously believe falsehoods and holds them to be true should not be accused of lying but, sometimes, of rashness." [vol.1, col.1252 Likewise someone abjuring and also someone swearing, in the way just described, could be excused of lying but is not excused of rashness. Nor, therefore, could he be excused of pertinacity. For pertinacity can be found without lying, as it is found in those who are unknowingly heretical. For since such people think that what they are saying is true they are not lying, and yet they are considered pertinacious because they are not prepared to be corrected.
Student Go on to another way of convicting of pertinacity someone who errs.
Master Someone should be convicted of pertinacity in an eleventh way if he errs against the faith and persecutes, molests or impedes those defending catholic truth or opposing heretical wickedness. For the following argument proves that such people should be regarded as pertinacious and heretical. He who tries to prevent the disclosure of catholic truth and the uncovering of heretical wickedness is not prepared to be corrected and is not seeking the truth with caution and responsibility; as a consequence, he should be considered pertinacious and heretical; now someone erring who persecutes, molests or impedes those defending catholic truth and opposing heretical wickedness is trying to prevent the disclosure of catholic truth and the uncovering of heretical wickedness; such a person, therefore, should be regarded as pertinacious and heretical.
Again, those who err against the faith and culpably resist the truth should be condemned as pertinacious and heretical because those who are worthless in terms of faith should be counted among the pertinacious and heretical. Those who err by culpably resisting the truth are like this, as the apostle attests in 2 Tim. 3:[8], where he says of such people, "As Jannes and Mambres withstood Moses, so men of corrupt mind who are worthless in terms of faith resist the truth." But those who persecute, molest or impede those defending catholic truth and opposing heretical wickedness culpably resist the truth; if they err, therefore, they should be considered heretical and pertinacious.
There is confirmation of this argument in that those who resist catholic truth are more at fault than those who resist the public power. But as the apostle says in Romans 13[:2] "He who resists power, resists the ordinance of God; those who resist, moreover, bring condemnation on themselves." Much more is it the case, therefore, that those who resist catholic truth bring condemnation on themselves; now those who prevent the disclosure of catholic truth and the disapproval of heretical wickedness resist catholic truth; they bring damnation on themselves, therefore, but only through pertinacity, because it does not seem to be culpable to resist the truth in a way that is not pertinacious; such people, therefore, should be considered pertinacious and heretical.
Again, the same argument is confirmed because he who resists catholic truth and believes heretical wickedness does not sin any less than he who does not assent to the truth and believes in iniquity; he who does not assent to the truth and believes in iniquity, however, sins mortally, as the apostle attests when he says in Romans 2:[8-9], "To them that are contentious and do not assent to the truth but believe in iniquity [there will come] anger and indignation, tribulation and anguish"; he who resists catholic truth and believes heretical wickedness, therefore, sins mortally, but not without pertinacity; such a person should be considered, therefore, pertinacious and heretical.
Furthermore, Christians who are worse than those corrupted by carnal impurity, because of the persecution they inflict on those defending catholic truth and opposing heretical wickedness, should be regarded as pertinacious and heretical because the wickedness of their sin can not be reduced to any other kind of sin except lack of faith, heresy or pertinacity; but christians persecuting those who try to defend catholic truth and attempt to oppose heretical depravity are worse than those stained with carnal sins; this is because they are not less evil than those who refuse to listen to preachers of the truth; those who refuse to listen to preachers of the truth are in turn worse than those who have been corrupted by carnal sins. The Truth Himself testifies to this when he says, in Matthew 10:[14-5], to preachers of the Gospel truth, "If anyone will not receive you or listen to your words, then as you leave that house or town shake the dust of it off your feet. I tell you this: on the day of judgement it will be more bearable for the land of Sodom and Gomorrah than for that town." Those who prevent the disclosure of catholic truth and the uncovering of heretical depravity, therefore, should be considered pertinacious and heretical.
Student That argument does not seem to have a show of truth except in reference to apostles and preachers performing miracles, because the Truth himself was speaking to the apostles as they were going to perform miracles. Anyone who would oppose those defenders of catholic truth or disapprovers of heretical wickedness whose words and assertions God would confirm with miracles, therefore, should be condemned as worse than outrageous sinners; this is not so, however, of anyone who opposes others not performing miracles.
Master Others try to counter that objection or reply by saying that the confirmation of catholic truth through sacred scripture is of no less authority than [confirmation] through the performing of a miracle, so that he who does not believe divine scripture does not cling firmly in faith to the performance of a miracle either, as Abraham himself testifies. For as we read in Luke 16:[31], he said to the rich feaster who besought the performance of a miracle, namely the resurrection of one dead, in order to induce his brothers to repent, "If they do not listen to Moses and the prophets nor will they believe someone if he rises from the dead." Innocent III also seems to think this since he asserts, as we read in Extra De hereticis, Cum ex iniuncto, that just as the performance of a miracle is enough to prove an invisible mission from God so also is the testimony of scripture. He uses these words: "It is fitting that he confirm that invisible mission by the performance of a miracle or by the special testimony of scripture." [vol.2, col.1678] In a similar way, therefore, for defenders of catholic truth and opponents of heretical wickedness not to be molested they need only confirm their assertions by testimonies from scripture without the performance of a miracle. In the time of antichrist, therefore, the elect will not perform miracles, but will be supported by testimonies of scripture in place of miracles.
Student It seems that all the above arguments can be undermined in another way. For it is part of the duty of Doctors to defend catholic truth and to oppose heretical wickedness, as we read in Extra De hereticis, Cum ex iniuncto. [vol.2, cols.1677-80] But we find in that place that "since the order of Doctors is, as it were, distinguished in the church, no one else should indiscriminately usurp for himself the duty of preaching." [col.1678] It is possible, therefore, licitly to impede those defending catholic truth and those opposing heretical wickedness; and consequently those who do impede in this way should not for that reason be condemned pertinacious and heretical.
(Fr adds: And an argument can be composed as follows. Everyone who usurps an office not properly his commits a sin, is rightly culpable and should be impeded. No one who impedes such a person, therefore, commits a sin or should be condemned as heretical. But anyone who is not a doctor but takes on the office of preaching or of the defence of truth or of opposition to heretical wickedness usurps an office not properly his. Every such person who is not a doctor, therefore, sins in this way, is culpable and should be impeded. Someone who impedes such a person, therefore, should not be condemned as a heretic.)
Master It seems to those who assert the above that you do not understand their arguments. For they do not intend to assert that anyone can indiscriminately assume to himself the office of Doctor, but they affirm that no one should be molested in any way at all because he confesses catholic truth and disapproves of heretical wickedness, although anyone can be molested justly if he confesses catholic truth or opposes heretical wickedness where he ought not or when he ought not or before whom he ought not or in any other way but the way he ought. They have mainly in mind, therefore, persecutors, those who persecute others because they oppose their own false assertions, since any christian ought to have the freedom, provided the due circumstances are observed, to defend and confess catholic truth and to denounce heretical wickedness. He ought not on this account endure any persecution from catholics and anyone who inflicts persecution on him for this reason should be counted among the heretics.
(Fr adds: And so two [points] can be reflected on and considered about the preaching and defence of truth or about the opposition to heretical wickedness also. First, that the demand for the preaching, assertion or admittance of truth or for the hatred of falsity, which is always good in itself, can become a cause of evil for someone. [[The latin as written doesn't seem to make sense]] Second, there is a duty of this preaching of the truth or hatred of heretical wickedness which applies by right to any prelate, and it pertains to doctors as a group by a general commission from God. It is appropriate for others, however, only out of necessity and when the due circumstances are heeded; if they are not then such duties are not properly theirs; indeed they should be called presumptuous by the prelates to whose office it desevedly belongs to drive them away. In this way your second objection is completely removed.) [[This seems to be an answer to the additional point Fr gave the disciple in his last speech.]]
Student I have heard enough about that way of convicting of pertinacity someone erring, and so explain another way.
Master Someone should be convicted of pertinacity in a twelfth way if he errs against the catholic faith and refuses to submit himself to correction and amendment by that person or persons whose concern it is. This is proved by the following argument. A person who evades judgement ought to be held to be culpable, according to the testimony of Pope Boniface who says, as we find in Extra De presumptionibus, c.[4] Nullus dubitat, "No one doubts that he who is culpable evades judgement, just as he who is innocent seeks it in order to be absolved." [vol.2, cols.786-7] Pope Pelagius agrees with this when he says, as we find in 11, q. 1, [c.12] Christianis, "It is clear that he who flees judgement has no confidence in his own justice." [vol.1, col.903] This is clearly gathered also from the text of Pope Boniface, found in 3, q. 9, c.[10] Decernimus, and from the words of Gregory, found in dist. 74, c. honoratus. [vol.1, cols.358-9] Anyone erring against the faith who evades judgement, therefore, should be considered pertinacious and heretical; anyone who refuses to submit himself to the correction and amendment of the person or persons whose concern it is evades judgement; he should be considered, therefore, pertinacious and heretical.
Student That argument seems to be effective for one called to court and absenting himself out of contumacy; it seems to prove nothing about others.
Master They say that the above argument is conclusive for someone hindering the making of a judgement, not only for someone called to court and absenting himself out of contumacy. For just as that person who tries to prevent justice being done is not free from reproach even if he has not been called to court, as we find in Extra, De officio et potestate iudicis delegati, c. 1 [quia quaesitum], [vol.2, col.327] so one who errs against the faith and hinders the passing of judgement on his error can not be excused from reproach. But that reproach seems to be for nothing but pertinacity. Such a person, therefore, should be condemned deservedly as pertinacious.
Again, someone erring against the faith who is not prepared to be corrected and does not seek the truth with cautious responsibility should be condemned as pertinacious and heretical, as is clearly gathered from the words of Augustine found in 24, q. 3, c. [29] dixit apostolus (vol.1, cols.1428-9); but he who refuses to submit himself to correction and amendment by those whose concern it is, and impedes in any way at all the appropriate and legitimate examination of his error, even if he has not been called to court, is not prepared to be corrected and is not seeking the truth with cautious responsibility; he should be considered, therefore, pertinacious and heretical.
Furthermore, as we find in John 3:[20], the Truth Himself testifies that "He who behaves badly hates the light and avoids it so that his deeds will not be made known." From these words we gather that he who avoids the light so that his deeds will not be known behaves badly. For if he were not behaving badly he would do the truth; if he were to do the truth, however, he would come into the light, as the Truth says in the same place [John 3:21] "He who does the truth comes into the light." If one who errs against the faith does not come into the light of strict judgement and open examination by those whose concern it is to enlighten the erring, therefore, he behaves badly; that badness, however, is nothing but pertinacity; such a person, therefore, should be considered pertinacious and heretical.
Student It appears from that argument that everyone who errs should be regarded as pertinacious unless he immediately comes into the light and seeks to have his assertion examined and inquired into by those whose concern it is. This seems too harsh because it would involve many theologians in the charge of pertinacity.
Master Affirmative precepts are always binding, as you know, but not for always. Although someone who errs is bound to come into the light of a just judgement, therefore, he is nevertheless not bound to this on every occasion. But since "not to prevent judgement being made" is a negative precept it is binding on every occasion. He should be said to come into the light, therefore, who is prepared to come into the light when it is appropriate and fitting to do so. And even if he does not on every occasion come into the light by seeking to have his assertion carefully inquired into he should not, therefore, be regarded as pertinacious; but whenever he tries to prevent his assertion being brought to due examination, lest it be reproved, he should be said to hate the light and not to come into the light lest his assertion be reproved; and he is then, therefore, deservedly condemned as pertinacious. They try to infer from the above that if the pope teaches some heresy as doctrine and prevents the celebrating of a general council lest his assertion be examined, he should be considered pertinacious and heretical.
Student Do not hesitate to explain if someone erring can be convicted of pertinacity in another way.
Master Some people say that someone can be convicted as pertinacious in a thirteenth way if he culpably refuses to be instructed about the truth. They make a distinction to explain this, saying that the assertion of someone erring either is censured by the learned as heretical and that a scandal has arisen from its being taught as doctrine, or is not censured by the learned and the faithful are not scandalised by its being taught as doctrine.
Although in the second case the person refusing to be instructed about the truth may sometimes be held by God to be pertinacious and heretical, yet it does not seem that he should be condemned as heretical in the forum of the church, even if that same assertion is later condemned as heretical.
In the first case they say that someone refusing to be instructed about the truth should be regarded as pertinacious and heretical even in the forum of the church. They try to prove this with many arguments. The first of them is this. Someone who errs against the faith and is not prepared to be corrected and does not seek the truth with cautious responsibility should be condemned as pertinacious and heretical, 24, q. 3, c. [28] Dixit apostolus [vol.1, cols. 1428-9]; he who refuses to be instructed about the truth if his error is censured by the learned, however, is not prepared to be corrected and is not seeking the truth with cautious responsibility; he should be considered, therefore, pertinacious and heretical.
Student That argument seems to be conclusive also of someone refusing to be instructed about the truth whose opinion is not censured by the learned and about whose opinion no scandal has arisen, because that person is not seeking the truth with cautious responsibility.
(Fr reads: That argument would be as strongly conclusive, it seems, about the second case as about the first. Everyone erring in the way set out in the example sins against the faith and is considered a heretic by God; and it does not appear from this that he is prepared to be corrected.)
Master The response to this is that that argument is not conclusive about such a person because he is presumed to be prepared to be corrected and even to be seeking the truth with cautious responsibility when it is not clear that he is culpably neglecting to be corrected and it is not clear that he is omitting to seek the truth out of love for his error.
(Fr reads: You have not attended well to the designated difference between those two ways. For even if someone erring in the second way is sometimes considered a heretic before God, yet it is not also so before the forum of the church, where every such person is presumed to be prepared to be corrected and also to be seeking the truth with cautious responsibility.)
A person about whose opinion no scandal has arisen and whose opinion has not been censured by the learned as heretical is like this. If, however, he whose opinion is censured by the learned as heretical and gives rise to scandal does not seek the truth with cautious responsibility when it is fitting, where it is fitting and as is fitting, there is a violent presumption about him that he refuses to have a truth opposed to his opinion made plain but would prefer the truth to be suppressed. For if, as we find in dist. 83. c.[3] Error, Pope Innocent [III] attests "When the truth is not defended it is suppressed", [vol.1, col.401] it is much more the case that when the truth is not sought when it ought to be sought it is suppressed. A suppressor of catholic truth, however, should be considered pertinacious and heretical.
The second argument is this. He is more, or not less, at fault who does not restrain himself from error when he can and should than he who does not restrain others from error when he can and should; but he who does not restrain others from error when he can and should is numbered among those erring culpably, as is reckoned from what the sacred canons clearly testify; he who does not restrain himself from error when he can and should, therefore, is numbered among those erring culpably; but if an errant from whose error a scandal has arisen and who is censured by the learned as heretical refuses to be instructed about the truth, he is not restraining himself from error when he can and should; he should be considered, therefore, among those erring culpably; such a person is, however, pertinaciously an errant, because to err without pertinacity does not make an errant culpable; such a person, therefore, should be considered pertinacious and heretical.
A third argument is this. He who wickedly savours heretical and impious opinions should be regarded as pertinacious and heretical because no one wickedly savours impious opinions without pertinacity. For he who savours impious opinions without pertinacity does not know savour impious matters wickedly, although he does savour them. But he who errs against the catholic faith and refuses to be instructed about the truth wickedly savours impious matters, as Pope Leo attests when he says, as we find in 24, q. 3, [c.30] Quid autem iniquius, "What is more wicked than to savour impious matters and not to believe those who are wiser and more learned? But it is into this madness that they fall who, when they are prevented by some obscurity from learning the truth, have recourse not to prophetic words, nor to apostolic writings, nor to the gospel texts, but to themselves." [vol.1, col.1429] We gather from these words that he who savours impious matters and neither believes the wise nor has recourse to the scriptures should be considered most wicked. But he who refuses to be instructed about the truth neither believes the wise nor has recourse to authentic scriptures. Such a person should be considered, therefore, most wicked and, consequently, pertinacious.
A fourth argument is this. He who, because he does not want to be a disciple of truth, is as a result a master of error should be regarded as pertinacious. For in addition to ignorance of understanding a wickedness of will is found in such a person. That wickedness of will, however, either is pertinacity or is not without pertinacity. But an errant who refuses to be instructed about the truth when he can and should be is a master of error for the reason that he does not want to be a student of truth. For he who does not want to hear the truth does not want to be a disciple of truth. Such a person should, therefore, be considered pertinacious.
(Fr has a different fourth argument: A fourth argument is this. Every errant who refuses to be instructed about the truth when he can and should be is someone who does not want to listen to the truth; and every one who does not want to listen to the truth is not a disciple of truth. Now everyone who is not a disciple of truth is a master of error, from the decretal cited in the immediately preceding third argument and from 2, q. 7, [c.41] nos. [vol.1, cols.702-3] But if every master of error should be considered pertinacious and heretical then [considering every step] from the first to the last every errant against the faith who refuses to be instructed about the truth when he ought to be and can be, should be considered pertinacious and heretical. In the present case the consequence is valid as far as it goes, since from it can be formed many evident syllogistic forms in "barbara", depending on the number of middle terms.
The first form will be this. Every master of error should be considered pertinacious and heretical; but everyone who is not a disciple of truth is a master of error; everyone who is not a disciple of truth, therefore, should be considered pertinacious and heretical.
The second form will be this. Everyone who is not a disciple of truth should be considered pertinacious and heretical; but everyone who does not want to listen to the truth is not a disciple of truth; everyone who does not want to listen to the truth, therefore, should be considered pertinacious and heretical.
The third form will be this. Everyone who does not want to listen to the truth should be considered pertinacious and heretical; but everyone erring against the faith who refuses to be instructed about the truth when he should and can be does not want to listen to the truth; everyone erring against the faith who refuses to be instructed about the truth when he can be and ought to be, therefore, should be considered pertinacious and heretical. This is the conclusion first and principally aimed at, well concluded and true if all the premises of these three forms are true.
This [[that they are true]] will be seen very easily, and first and most of all, concerning the major [premise] of the first form, if by master of error we understand one habituated to error by the putting aside of any habit to the contrary. For every such person is pertinacious, as may be deduced from a description of their habit and of pertinacity. And it is clear from another [argument], for in every such master of error there is found, besides ignorance of understanding, a wickedness of will. That wickedness of will either is pertinacity or is not without pertinacity.
In the remaining premises all the terms are either privatively opposed or are convertible or equivalent or are related as superiors or inferiors. Now because between privative opposites (always supposing constancy of substance and that it concerns an appropriate substance and in a determinate time) no intermediate occurs, so the consequence is always valid from one of the privative opposites affirmed to the other one negated, or from the affirmation of an inferior, converible or equivalent to the affirmation of the superior, convertible or equivalent and from the negation of a superior, convertible or equivalent to the negation of the inferior, convertible or equivalent. Also always truly predicated are: one of the privative opposites not negated, of the other negated, and the negated, of the non-negated; also the superior (or convertible or equivalent), of the inferior (or convertible or equivalent) affirmatively; and the inferior negated (and thus the convertible or equivalent), of the superior (convertible or equivalent) negated.
Student Is there another way of convicting someone erring of pertinacity?
Master Someone can be convicted of pertinacity in a fourteenth way if he bears witness in deeds or words that he will not retract an assertion of his which is heretical, because such a person is not prepared to be corrected. As a consequence he should be considered pertinacious.
Student Tell of another way.
Master Someone erring is convicted in a fifteenth way of pertinacity and heretical wickedness if he prevents the reading of catholic writings out of partiality to heretical wickedness or prevents the preaching or publication of catholic truths, because such a person is a defender of heretical falsity and a suppressor of catholic truth.
Student Is there another way of convicting an errant of pertinacity?
Master Someone is convicted of pertinacity in a sixteenth way who fabricates and defends new errors in defence of heretical wickedness, because such a person is not prepared to be corrected and is not seeking the truth with cautious responsibility. He should be considered, therefore, as pertinacious.
Student I would like to hear of another way.
Master Some people say that in a seventeenth way the pope especially can be convicted of pertinacity and heretical wickedness, if he solemnly defines an error against the faith and asserts that it should be held by christians as catholic. For that such a pope should be regarded as heretical is proved first as follows. He who constrains others to defend an error pertinaciously should be regarded as pertinacious - we clearly gather this from what was said above. But a pope solemnly defining some error to be catholic constrains christians as far as in him lies pertinaciously to defend and preserve an error. For just as a legitimately decreed statute of the apostolic see binds everyone, as we find in the last chapter of Extra. De constitutionibus, [c.13 Quoniam constitutio] [vol.2, cols.28-9], so a pope, or one presenting himself as pope, who pronounces definitively that a heretical assertion should be held binds everyone, as much as in him lies, to hold and defend irrevocably that same assertion. He should be considered, therefore, pertinacious and heretical.
A second [argument] is as follows. He who himself or through others persecutes, punishes or molests those confessing catholic truth and denouncing heretical wickedness should be regarded as pertinacious and heretical - this is based on what was said above. A pope who solemnly pronounces that some assertion which is heretical should be held, however, is, as far as in him lies, by himself and through others persecuting, punishing and molesting those defending the opposing catholic truth and those denouncing heretical wickedness, since by his statute he makes all those who contradict him in this respect worthy of anathema. Pope Nicholas attests to this at a sitting of a universal synod when he says, as we find in 25, q. 2, c [18] Si quis, "If anyone defies decrees, mandates, resolutions, interdicts, or pronouncements which have been promulgated by the head of the apostolic see on behalf of catholic faith or ecclesiastical discipline for the correction of imminent or future evils, let him be anathema." [vol.1, col.1451] As far as in him lies, [such a pope] subjects catholics contradicting his definition to many other penalties too, because those opposing apostolic commands and pronouncements are punished with various penalties, as we clearly gather from the words of Gregory found in dist. 12. c.[2] Preceptis [vol.1, col.41] (Fr adds: and dist 17. c.[4] Nec licuit [vol.1, cols.69-70]) and dist. 19. c.[5] Nulli [vol.1, col.83] and from the words of Pope Hadrian recorded in 25, q. 1, c. [11] Generali [vol.1, col.1441] and from other sacred canons. As far as in him lies he punishes, persecutes and molests catholics who contradict him by means of others too, because as far as he can he obliges lesser prelates to punish those who contradict his assertion with all the penalties which prelates ought to inflict on those who disobey apostolic commands. Someone like this who presents himself as pope, therefore, should be considered pertinacious and heretical.
A third [argument is] as follows. He who errs against the faith should be regarded as pertinacious and heretical if he bears witness by deed or word that he does not want to be corrected by those whose concern it is, because such a person is not prepared to be corrected and should be considered, as a consequence, pertinacious and heretical. He who presents himself as pope and solemnly pronounces that a heresy should be held, however, bears witness by his act and by his words too that he does not want to be corrected by a general council, to which it pertains nevertheless to correct even the pope of heresy. He be considered, therefore, pertinacious and heretical. The major [premise] is obvious, the minor is clearly proved. For since, as far as he can, by his statute he constrains all christians - and consequently a general council since only christians ought to be present in a general council - to hold his assertion, he bears witness and shows by deed that he does not want to retract his assertion because of a general council. He shows this by his word too, when he says at the end of a Bull that no one is permitted to oppose matters defined by him, for it is customary to put such words or their equivalent at the end of papal statutes, and they are tacitly understood even if they are not put there. Such a person should be considered, therefore, pertinacious and heretical.
A fourth [argument is] as follows. Whoever has finally confirmed his [adherence to] some heretical assertion should be considered pertinacious and heretical because such a person is affirming the heretical assertion irrevocably and, consequently, is not prepared to be corrected; but in presenting himself as pope and solemnly pronouncing that a heretical assertion should be held, he affirms by this final decree his [adherence] to that assertion. He should be considered, therefore, pertinacious and heretical.
A fifth [argument is] as follows. He who persists too much in an error is pertinacious; but such a person persists too much in an error because no one can proceed to pronounce that an error should be held without being rash; such a person should be considered, therefore, pertinacious and heretical.
Student Discuss another way of convicting someone of pertinacity.
Master Someone can be convicted of pertinacity and heretical wickedness in an eighteenth way if he agrees with such a definition by the pope, by advising, urging, inducing or asserting that it should be defined in that way. This is proved by the following argument: those acting and those agreeing [with them] are involved in a similar charge, just as an equal punishment restrains them, as the sacred canons clearly affirm. But a pope who offers a definition such that a heretical assertion should be held as catholic should be considered pertinacious and heretical. Everyone agreeing with him, therefore, should also be numbered among the pertinacious and heretical.
Student That argument will be enough for that [position] for the moment. Describe, therefore, another way of convicting of pertinacity.
Master Someone is regarded as pertinacious in a nineteenth way if, being less than the pope, he prescribes in a definitive statement that some heretical assertion should be held, enjoining and imposing it on others that they should think of it and regard it as catholic. Whoever agrees with such a prescription too should be considered pertinacious and heretical. This is clear enough from what was said above because if a pope who prescribes in this way and those who agree with him should be regarded as pertinacious and heretical, it is much more the case that one who is less than the pope and issues such a prescription, thus usurping the papal office, and those who agree with him should be condemned as pertinacious and heretical.
Student Describe another way of convicting an errant of pertinacity.
Master Someone can be convicted of pertinacity in a twentieth way if he does not resist heretical wickedness though he has the power to do so. This seems to be provable in many ways by the sacred canons. For, as we find in dist 83. c.[3] error, Pope Innocent [III] says: "An error which is not resisted is approved". [vol.1, col.401] It seems, however, that he who approves an error should be condemned as pertinacious. He who does not resist an error if he can do so, therefore, should be considered pertinacious. Again, as we find in Extra, De hereticis. c.[2] Qui alios, Pope Leo says: "He who does not recall others from error when he can do so shows that he errs himself." [vol.2, col.1669] From these words we are given to understand that he who can recall heretics from error and does not do so should be numbered among the heretics and, consequently, should be considered pertinacious. Pope John too, as we find in dist. 86. c.[3] facientis, says: "He who neglects to free from error what he can correct has without doubt the fault of the one who acts." [vol.1, col.408] And so he who neglects to free from error pertinacious heretics whom he can correct has the fault of pertinacious heretics and should be held, as a consequence, to be among the pertinacious heretics.
Student I want to know whether all the learned think that such people are heretics.
Master Some people say that more properly they should be called supporters of heretics and of heretical wickedness rather than heretics. According to them, nevertheless, they could also be called pertinacious because pertinacity extends to more vices than to heresy.
[Fr adds: Student Although I see well that those who can, but do not, resist such heretical wickedness should rather be called supporters of heretics, I do not wish to inquire further concerning them. Afterwards, however, when we treat of the supporters, receivers and defenders of heretics I will wish to ask many things about them.]
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