

OCKHAM'S PHILOSOPHICAL THEOLOGY

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Ockham's pre-Avignon writings fill 18 volumes in the modern edition and there is an extensive secondary literature, growing all the time. The following is a sketch, mainly of his theses or conclusions, generally without much discussion of his reasons, with some references to the work of scholars in this field. This sketch gives more detail and will provide further documentation for material included in the Introduction to Ockham, *On Heretics, Books 1-5, and Against John, Chapters 5-16*

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OTHER ACCOUNTS OF OCKHAM'S PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY

Brief accounts:

Spade and Panaccio in the *Stanford Encyclopedia*.

Moody, "William of Ockham".

Courtenay, "Ockham, William".

Keele *Ockham Explained*.

Vignaux, *Philosophy in the Middle Ages: An Introduction*, pp.165ff.

Longer treatments: WO, PWO.

Translations: PWS, QQ, OTT.

REFERENCE CONVENTIONS

References to the Latin text of Ockham's works: William of Ockham, OPh, OTh: *Opera Philosophica et Theologica*, ed. Gedeon Gál et al. (St Bonaventure: The Franciscan Institute, 1967-88). Republished in electronic form: Intelix, Charlottesville, Virginia, 2011.

References to this edition are by volume and page. Line numbers are sometimes given after a dot. E.g. "p.211.14" refers to page 211 line 14.

A page number asterisked (e.g. p.32*) will be found in the frontmatter.

In our references, the numeral after "/" is the page number in the Intelix electronic edition: "p.605/644" refers to p.605 in the print edition, which is p.644 in the electronic edition. A reference to a range of pages gives only the first page in the electronic edition.

Titles of Ockham's works are abbreviated as in Spade, Paul V. (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Ockham* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p.xv.

Translations are ours. Generally we also refer in brackets, to a published translation (if any exists) so that readers can read the passage in context.

UNIVERSALS

The term "human being" can be used to stand for one individual of the species ("I am a human being") or for some individuals ("Some human beings are old") or for all ("All human beings are mortal").¹ Thus "human being" is a "universal", i.e. *a term any occurrence of which can be predicated of one, some or all members of a class of similar things.*²

Does the use of such a term presuppose or imply that the members of the class share some thing, entity, or reality, e.g. “human nature”?

According to Plato, the individual members of a class share an “Idea” or “Form”. According to him, the Form of humanity is something real — more real than any individual human being — that exists separately from the individuals, in which they share.³ Aristotle rejected the separate existence of the Forms.⁴ Medieval thinkers followed him in this, but many of them still attributed some kind or degree of reality to shared natures. A common medieval view can be set out as follows⁵.

(1) Each member of a class of similar things (e.g. human beings) has as one of its constituents something that is in some way real (human nature) that is also present in every other member; this nature is the reason for their common characteristics.

(2) The nature is in some way a unity (e.g. human nature is *one and the same* in every human being).

(3) The nature does not exist separately from the individuals, but

(4) it is in *some way distinct* from each individual.⁶

(5) the mind forms a universal concept by “abstracting” (i.e. “drawing out”) the nature from one or more of the individuals in which it exists and giving it mental existence as a universal; the same nature thus has two kinds of existence, one in the individuals and the other in the mind.⁷

(6) When an individual comes into existence, the common nature is somehow individuated to this particular instance (e.g. by being received into a quantum of matter).⁸

Against all such theories Ockham maintains that every thing, right through, in all its components, is individual “of itself” and does not need to be individuated, and that no part of one individual is also a part of another individual.⁹

Ockham’s alternative account is in terms of signs and likenesses. A universal is *an individual thing* that can be used as a sign standing for other individuals that resemble one another.¹⁰ There are three kinds of universal terms, namely written signs, vocal utterances and concepts.¹¹ A written word or phrase, e.g. “human being”, is an individual, namely a collection of particles of ink on paper, which can stand for you or me or some or all of the individuals that resemble us. The spoken term “human being” is an individual disturbance in the air. A concept is also an individual. Ockham hesitated over what kind of individual a concept is, but, convinced by the arguments of his Franciscan colleague Walter Chatton,¹² he eventually decided that a concept is an individual act of understanding.¹³

A spoken or written sign signifies whatever thing the concept signifies, so that if the concept changes, the signification of the spoken or written word will change.¹⁴ Spoken and written signs are conventional, i.e. they are given meaning by some process of agreement among members of a language community; but the mental act is *natural*, in the sense that it arises in a way we cannot control, without any act of will, and it is what it is irrespective of the language community we belong to.

The thing and the mind jointly cause naturally a knowledge of an individual thing and leave an effect in the mind, a “habit”;¹⁵ this and other similar knowledges of other resembling things naturally (i.e. without any human decision) cause a

universal concept.¹⁶

Individuals are really (i.e. truly, i.e. it is true to say they are) alike and unlike, apart from human interests and human thought, so universal concepts are not arbitrary.¹⁷ Though some signs may not resemble the thing signified (e.g. the verbal utterance “human being” does not resemble a human being), a concept, according to Ockham, does resemble the thing it signifies.¹⁸

In short: there is nothing real that different things share as part of their make-up, yet they do truly resemble one another, and in our thought, speech and writing there are signs that can stand for any or all of the resembling individuals.¹⁹

Ockham’s account has some puzzling aspects. What does it mean for one thing to “stand for” another? How can an act of understanding be also a sign? And how can an act of understanding resemble a thing?²⁰

DISTINCTIONS

According to point (4) of the common theory sketched above,²¹ there is some sort of distinction between the nature and the individual. According to Duns Scotus, the nature is an entity with a “less-than-numerical” unity²² which is present in all the individuals, “contracted” to a given individual by a numerically unique individuating entity (which Scotus sometimes calls its “thisness”, *haecceitas*); between the nature as it exists in the individual and the individuating entity there is a “formal distinction” or “formal non-identity”, meaning that though these two entities cannot exist separately (i.e. it is not possible for one to exist while the other does not), nevertheless they are not simply identical, because they have separate definitions (neither is mentioned in the essential definition of the other).²³ A formal distinction or non-identity is a real distinction, i.e. it is not made by thinking, but it is not a distinction between separately existing things. Formal distinctions figured in several parts of Scotus’s philosophy and theology.²⁴

According to Ockham there are no formal distinctions in creatures. The only distinctions in creatures²⁵ are (1) between thing and thing (between *res* and *res*, a “real” distinction), (2) between thing and concept, (3) between concept and concept (a “distinction of reason”, of *ratio*) produced by the mind, or (4) between aggregates of things and concepts.²⁶ The only way to prove a real distinction between created things X and Y is to show the truth of “X is Z” and “Y is not Z”. If such an argument ever proved a merely formal distinction, there would be no way to prove a real distinction in creatures.²⁷

RELATIONS

Ockham’s account of a universal (as a sign standing for individuals that resemble one another) uses the notion of resemblance, which is a relation. Some of his contemporaries regarded a relation as a reality or entity, a kind of thing,²⁸ but Ockham disagreed,²⁹ for most cases. A statement that two things are alike in being white does not assert the existence of any additional *res parva* (“little thing”) or *res media* (“intermediate thing”)³⁰ that would be their likeness, but simply that there are two substances each with its quality of whiteness.³¹ Nevertheless, things really are related, i.e. it is true to say that they are related: even if no mind existed, things would still be similar and dissimilar, there would still be unity and order in the universe.³²

According to Ockham there are no philosophical reasons to prove that all relations *must* be things,³³ which leaves open the possibility that some may be. For theological reasons connected with the doctrines of Trinity, Incarnation and the Eucharist he acknowledges that some relations are realities additional to the things related.³⁴

INTUITIVE AND ABSTRACTIVE COGNITION

Factual knowledge of individuals is caused by what Ockham calls “intuitive” cognition.³⁵ Intuitive cognitions give us immediately (i.e. not by any process of inference) evident knowledge of present-tense statements about an individual’s existence or non-existence and other contingent facts about it.³⁶ Intuitive cognition can cause evident knowledge³⁷ of affirmative or negative a contingent proposition characterising a subject (“S is P”, or “S is not P”), and it can cause evident knowledge of the subject’s existence and non-existence (“S exists” or “S does not exist”), though intuitive cognition of something that does *not* exist cannot happen naturally, without a miracle.³⁸ Since a cognition is itself an individual mental act distinct from the thing cognised, God could create or conserve an intuitive cognition without the existence or presence of the thing;³⁹ in that case we would know evidently that the thing did *not* exist or is *not* present⁴⁰ (otherwise the cognition would not be true and would therefore not be intuitive — only true cognition counts as intuitive).⁴¹ However, God has power to deceive us; he could cause in us an (abstractive) cognition by which we would believe that a thing exists when it does not.⁴²

Besides intuitive cognitions, Ockham posits abstractive cognitions, that is, cognitions that “abstract from” (meaning “do not relate to”) contingent facts.⁴³ Abstractive cognitions are sufficient to cause knowledge of necessary propositions, i.e. propositions that are true no matter what contingent propositions may be true or false.⁴⁴ There are also “imperfect” intuitive or “recordative” cognitions (which are kinds of abstractive cognitions),⁴⁵ which enable us to assert that some contingent proposition *was* true.⁴⁶ Every intuitive cognition is accompanied by (because it causes)⁴⁷ an abstractive cognition, which generates a habit⁴⁸ that enables us to think about the object afterwards when it no longer exists or is no longer present.⁴⁹ An intuitive cognition does not generate any habit that would facilitate a future intuitive cognition: seeing something does not help you see something else.⁵⁰

SPECIES IN MEDIO

Intuitive cognition is direct perception of a thing, according to Ockham. Many of his contemporaries held that we perceive external objects through an intermediary — that when we see something there is a chain of effects from the thing through the medium to the eye. The intermediate effects were called *species in medio* (“likenesses in the medium”, not to be confused with species as a sub-class of a genus).⁵¹ According to Ockham such intermediaries would not facilitate, but would obstruct, intuitive cognition; sensible and intelligible species should therefore not be posited.⁵² Perception involves “action at a distance”: the object acts on our cognitive faculties directly from a distance, provided the distance is not too great.⁵³ There is however an effect on the sense organ — not a *species* but some other quality — which may persist after the object changes or is removed. If the persistence of this quality makes us think we see what is not really there (e.g. when a burning stick

whirled around seems to make a fiery circle), it is because we make a faulty inference, which further experience and thought may correct.⁵⁴

SCIENCE

Knowledge, including science, begins with intuitive cognitions.⁵⁵ According to Aristotle, science is of universals.⁵⁶ That means, for Ockham (since universals are terms, i.e. parts of statements), that science is of *terms* that stand for things; science is not directly of things. Science is knowledge of propositions, which are complexes of terms including universals. The terms of a science may stand for other terms (as in grammar or logic, which are *scientie sermocinales*), but in the “real” sciences (e.g. physics) they stand for individual things outside the mind.⁵⁷ A science is an ordered collection of statements, arguments, explanations etc. unified not by its concern with a certain nature but by the occurrence in its statements of the same set of interrelated terms.⁵⁸ These collections may overlap; the same truth may belong to more than one science.⁵⁹ One science may be “subalternate” (subordinate) to another (e.g. optics to geometry).⁶⁰

According to some theologians, theology is a science; Thomas Aquinas, for example, held that theology is a subalternate science “because it proceeds from principles established by the light of a higher science, namely, the knowledge had by God and the blessed”.⁶¹ Ockham rejects this. “No one ever knows those conclusions evidently unless he knows them through experience or through premises evidently known. Hence it is nothing to say that *I* know some conclusions because *you* know principles that I believe on your say-so. Similarly it is childish to say that I know theological conclusions because God knows principles that I believe because he reveals them”.⁶² According to Ockham, evident knowledge of contingent truths is given only by intuitive cognition, and in this life we cannot (at least, not without a miracle)⁶³ have intuitive knowledge of God. Therefore contingent propositions of theology (e.g. that God became a human being) cannot be evident to us (without miracle) in this life; they are beliefs, not items of scientific knowledge.⁶⁴ In 1 Dial. 1 Ockham sometimes refers to the science of theology and the science of the canonists, but these are sciences only in a broad sense.⁶⁵

MOTION, TIME AND PLACE

Ockham believed that many moderns⁶⁶ were too ready to posit (i.e. assert the existence of) “things” — little things, realities, formalities, entities. They seemed to suppose that to every term there must correspond some entity; this led them, he thought, to mistakes about motion, time and place.⁶⁷ Some moderns regarded the nouns “motion”, “time”, “the instant”, “place”, etc. as names of things,⁶⁸ whereas in fact these terms are not names and the purported things are not things. He argues in reference to each of the terms “motion”, “time”, etc., that it is not the name of “a thing totally distinct” from a substance or quality.⁶⁹ These terms are not names, but they signify things (i.e. substances and qualities) and convey some information about them. Ockham calls a term of this kind “connotative”:⁷⁰ it “consignifies” or “gives to understand” or “imports” something about the substance or quality that it primarily signifies.⁷¹

Many abstract terms have been introduced for decoration or brevity of speech.⁷² To understand statements in which they are included, we may need to spell out a “short story” (*brevis oratio*) into a “long story” (*longa oratio*). Some words in the short

story may need to be replaced by definitions or descriptions, and single statements may need to be “resolved” (or “expounded”, i.e. laid out) into sets of several statements.⁷³ It will then be possible to accept or reject the short story by considering whether the statements that make up the long story are all true.⁷⁴ Ockham does not propose that we never use the short version,⁷⁵ and he does not insist that there is just one correct resolution.⁷⁶

The only *things*, according to Ockham, are individual substances and their individual qualities, for example Socrates and Socrates’ whiteness. Some substances are bodies (including bodies of air and bodies of water). A bodily substance or quality is one that has “part outside of part”.⁷⁷ Whatever causes a bodily substances and its qualities to come into being cause them to come into being with part outside of part⁷⁸ and cause them to be in a place (if they have a place).

Space or place is not there waiting empty until something is produced into it; space is produced in the production of bodies. A body’s place is the inner surface of the bodies (which may be air or water) that touch it. The world, i.e. the totality of bodies, is not in any place, since there are no bodies outside it.⁷⁹ Causes make some bodies move. The world as a whole does not move into new places, since there is no outside place, but the *primum mobile*, i.e. the outermost sphere of the world, does move,⁸⁰ rotating with the swiftest and most uniform of all motions.

“Motion” (*motus*) in a broad sense includes both successive change (motion in the strict sense) and sudden or instantaneous change; successive change includes acquisition or loss of a quality (e.g. warming, cooling) and local motion, i.e. change of place from here to there.⁸¹ Motion is not an extra reality or thing that comes upon something for the (perhaps brief) time of its movement. Ockham argues that motion is no such transient thing, that the only things involved in motion are permanent,⁸² namely the thing that causes the change, the thing that changes, the quality it acquires or loses, or (in local motion) the places it successively occupies. For continuous local motion, the “long story” is that something causes X to be now *here* and immediately afterwards *there*, and so on without pause while the motion lasts.⁸³ He offers resolutions for various statements about motion.⁸⁴

The local motion of a body can be perceived only because there are minds that can know where the body is from instant to instant. Moving body X *was* there then, it is here now, it *will be* somewhere else in the future. Movement involves past, present and future; past and future do not exist but can be known by mind. A mind can know the earlier state of a moving body and it can know or anticipate its later state, and thus it can comprehend motion.⁸⁵ If mind could not exist things would still move, but their motion would not be perceived.

Time is doubly dependent on mind: time is the motion against which a mind measures other motions.⁸⁶ The definition of motion does not refer to mind, but the definition of time does: “Time is the motion by which the soul knows how great another motion is.”⁸⁷ A mind perceives time when it measures one motion against another, for example against the movement of a clock or the movement of the sun, or (in the last analysis) against the movement of the *primum mobile*, the outermost heavenly sphere.⁸⁸ If mind could not exist, there could be no time. The *primum mobile* would move even if no mind were possible, but its motion would not be perceived, and its motion would not be time because no mind would use it to

measure other motions.⁸⁹ The motion of the *primum mobile* is time because of mind, though time is not caused by mind.⁹⁰

Statements about time are to be resolved by substituting references to the motion of the *primum mobile*:

If anyone is in doubt about a proposition in which the noun ‘time’ appears, let them put in its place this whole locution (*oratio*), ‘Something [i.e. the *primum mobile*] moves most swiftly and uniformly, considering which the intellect can ascertain how much or how long something [else] moves, lasts, or rests’, or something similar. And sometimes in place of another term another locution should be put (or sometimes various locutions according to the variety of the other), as in place of ‘Time is continuous’ should be put this whole locution ‘Something moves without rest uniformly and most swiftly’. And so concerning similar cases it must be understood that we use the noun ‘time’ for a long locution, and similarly sometimes we use a short proposition for a long one composed of other terms than those put in the short proposition.⁹¹

Some held that the instant (“now”) is one and the same thing passing rapidly through time (*res raptim transiens*), others held that every new instant is a new thing that exists just at that instant (*res statim desinens*).⁹² In Ockham’s view neither opinion is true, because “now” is not a *res* (thing) at all.⁹³ “Now” refers to a definite position of the continuously moving *primum mobile*, defined by the relation of its parts to other bodies.⁹⁴

Though time and the perception of motion require minds, this does not mean that if there were no minds there would be no motion: bodies would move, some swiftly, some slowly, just as they do now; only no one would know their movement.

Ockham is not trying to get rid of the language of time and space. He uses “outside”, “now”, “here”, “swift” and similar terms. He is trying to get rid of the extra entities.

None of this is mysterious, in his view. Uneducated people are not puzzled by time, space and motion. Philosophers, or rather inadequately-trained philosophers, have been misled by the language that has become customary in their discipline.⁹⁵

For Ockham space and time were not — as they were after Newton for almost everyone⁹⁶ until recently — infinite and eternal and prior to things that come to exist in space and time. According to Ockham, space and time are not entities. Bodies that are caused by God and secondary causes are caused with “part outside part” and thereby occupy and constitute places or space; some bodies are caused to move; minds perceive motion, and when mind measures motion, the motion that is the ultimate standard by which motion is measured is time.

QUANTITY

Ockham’s treatment of motion, time and place is part of his treatment of terms belonging to the category of quantity. He rejects the opinion that quantity, number, point, line, surface, and body are things distinct from substances and qualities.⁹⁷ Ockham argues that each of these terms signifies some substance or quality and connotes some additional information about the thing signified.⁹⁸

On quantity Ockham expresses himself circumspectly, “reciting” what he believes was Aristotle’s opinion without asserting it,⁹⁹ because the opinion he rejects had

been used by many theologians in formulating the Catholic doctrine of transubstantiation. This made his account of the eucharist controversial.¹⁰⁰

CATEGORIES

Relation and quantity are among Aristotle's categories or "predicaments", which are substance, quality, quantity, relation, action, passion, time, place, position and habit.¹⁰¹ These are abstract nouns, but Ockham points out that Aristotle used other parts of speech also.¹⁰² Ockham adopts the suggestion of Averroes that the categories classify answers to the various questions that can be asked about a thing.¹⁰³ According to Ockham, the list of categories is a classification not of things but of terms, only some of which directly stand for things: "It must not be imagined that the ten categories are so many things really and totally distinct among themselves".¹⁰⁴ Terms of substance and quality (though not all qualities),¹⁰⁵ and also a few relations, are the only category terms that directly signify things. Others stand for some substance or quality and convey some information about it, e.g. how big it is, where it is, what it resembles, and so on. A term that stands for something and conveys extra information about it is "connotative", and statements including connotative terms are "exponible", i.e. equivalent to a set of statements in which those terms do not occur.¹⁰⁶

UNNECESSARY PLURALITY NOT TO BE POSITED

Ockham often argues like this: "Some moderns posit such-and-such an entity. Aristotle does not; it does not fit into the framework of Aristotle's philosophy, and positing it has inconvenient or absurd implications; *and anyway we don't need it*, since there is an alternative account (namely...) that explains whatever the former account explains. No unnecessary entities should be posited. Therefore this entity should not be posited."¹⁰⁷

The dictum that no unnecessary entities should be posited is sometimes called (inappropriately)¹⁰⁸ "Ockham's razor". One version reads:

It is vain to do by many what could be done by fewer (*Frustra fit per plura quod potest fieri per pauciora*). This is a principle that should not be denied, because no plurality should be posited unless it can be proved [1] by reason, or [2] by experience, or [3] by the authority of Him who cannot be deceived or err.¹⁰⁹

Point 3 means: by God's revelation, found in the Bible and the teaching of the Church.

The universe may not be as simple as it could be:

God does many things by many that he could do by fewer, and no other reason [besides his will] need be sought; and from the fact that he wills, it is done suitably and not in vain.¹¹⁰

God's freedom is the reason why we may have to recognise some realities which, were it not for experience or divine revelation, there would have been no reason to posit.

Another version of the principle:

When a proposition is verified of things, if two things are sufficient for its truth, it is superfluous to posit a third.¹¹¹

Sometimes the idea is expressed in terms of “saving” something: we should not posit anything more than is sufficient to “save” (i.e. account for or explain) this or that.¹¹² This last version figures in Ockham’s discussion of the Church: Christ’s promise to be with the Church all days (Matthew 28:20) will be “saved” if even one Christian avoids falling into heresy.¹¹³

CAUSES

On efficient causes¹¹⁴ Ockham holds that it cannot be demonstrated that one thing is the efficient cause of another;¹¹⁵ all we know from experience is that when one thing is found something else is found that otherwise is not found.¹¹⁶ It is not true that every change must have an efficient cause distinct from the thing changing.¹¹⁷ On ends or final causes, Ockham held that it cannot be proved that every effect has a final cause; it cannot be proved that an agent that always acts in the same way acts for an end.¹¹⁸

EXISTENCE OF GOD

In some places Ockham says that God’s existence can be proved,¹¹⁹ but in fact his opinion seems to be that the existence of the being Christians call God cannot be demonstrated, though perhaps there are persuasive arguments. “The proposition ‘God exists’ is not self-evident; it cannot be proved from self-evident premises, because every argument assumes something doubtful or some *creditum* [a matter of belief]; nor is it known by experience.”¹²⁰

Philosophers since Plato had tried to prove the existence of a god by way of causation.¹²¹ According to Ockham such proofs fall short of demonstration. It is difficult or impossible to prove that there cannot be a regress to infinity in causes of the same kind one of which can exist without the other (as, for example, a child may continue to exist after its parents die), or that such a series must have a cause external to the series.¹²² Conserving causes might seem to offer a stronger argument for God’s existence: if something is produced it needs to be conserved; conserving causes must exist at the same time as the thing conserved, and (if they form a chain) they must exist at the same time as one another; and (according to Aristotle) there cannot be a simultaneous infinity; therefore there must be at least one unproduced cause at the head of any such finite series.¹²³ But perhaps nothing is (in the relevant sense) produced or conserved. There may not be any effects besides the things caused by celestial bodies or separated substances (that is, the moving causes posited in Aristotle’s account of the machinery of the solar system).¹²⁴ And even if some things are produced and conserved, it still could not be sufficiently proved that there is *only one* unproduced conserving cause.¹²⁵ There may not be a single cause of the totality of things.¹²⁶

An argument like Anselm’s to prove the existence of a nature than which none is nobler or better cannot prove that there is only one such being.¹²⁷

An argument from the purposiveness of nature¹²⁸ will not succeed since we have no reason to think that agents lacking intelligence act for a purpose.¹²⁹

GOD AS CAUSE

If, however, we accept by faith that God does exist, still it cannot be philosophically demonstrated that God’s causation of things is contingent and free.¹³⁰ It cannot be

demonstrated that he is the cause, mediate or immediate, total or partial, of any effect, or that he is able to cause directly, without any co-cause, whatever other causes can cause.¹³¹ It cannot be demonstrated that he knows or wills anything other than himself.¹³² All this is matter of faith.

GOD'S IDEAS

According to Augustine, adapting Plato, God creates individuals in accordance with the Ideas in his mind of their natures.¹³³ Since according to Ockham's account of Universals there are no natures, a different account is needed. "Almost all doctors agree in a common conclusion, namely that an idea is the divine essence really and differs from it only conceptually [*ratione*]"¹³⁴ Ockham rejects this. Nothing real differs from something real by a distinction of reason.¹³⁵ According to him the ideas are not God. Neither are they the natures of the species or genera of creatures, since natures are not realities. According to Ockham, God creates each individual in accordance with his knowledge of the very individual to be created. The ideas are the infinity¹³⁶ of individual things he could create, which are known by God as individuals before they exist (if they ever do)¹³⁷ — he knows them by intuitive knowledge when they are nothing.¹³⁸

GOD'S ATTRIBUTES, FACULTIES

According to Scotus, God's attributes (power, goodness, knowledge, wisdom, etc.) are formally distinct from the divine essence and from one another. Ockham once again rejects a "formal distinction".¹³⁹ God is absolutely simple, without parts of any kind.¹⁴⁰ The attributes are terms. What each of these terms *stands for* is in no way distinct from God himself. God's justice is himself, his wisdom is himself, his justice is his wisdom.¹⁴¹ The attributive terms are many and have different meanings because they also apply to creatures and signify different qualities when applied to creatures: [*Is this correct? OTh vol.2, pp.68-9/102*] the wisdom of Socrates and the justice of Socrates are not Socrates himself.¹⁴²

Likewise terms referring to God's will, volitions, intellect, cognitions, etc., are many but signify the one simple being.¹⁴³ The terms are not synonyms because they have application not only to God but also to creatures, in which the realities they signify are not identical.¹⁴⁴

GOD'S POWER AND FREEDOM

Ockham believes, though he does not think it can be proved, that God's attributes include omnipotence and freedom: that is, God can do anything doable, and he freely chooses to do only some of the things he can do.¹⁴⁵ The Christian creed begins with the affirmation, "I believe in God the father almighty". Ockham takes "almighty" (*omnipotens*) to mean that God is able to do everything the doing of which does not include a contradiction.¹⁴⁶ From that article follows the "famous proposition of the theologians", that whatever God produces by means of secondary causes he can (since he can do anything doable) produce and conserve immediately without them.¹⁴⁷ It follows also that "every absolute thing distinct in place and subject from another absolute thing can by God's power exist with the second thing destroyed";¹⁴⁸ for example, there can be an intuitive cognition of something even after it ceases to exist.¹⁴⁹

Like Duns Scotus and others,¹⁵⁰ Ockham distinguishes between God's "ordinate" and "absolute" power. God's power can be considered "absolutely", i.e. without reference to any decision he has actually made, or "ordinately", i.e. with reference to the decisions he has made. Ockham explains:

This distinction is not to be understood as meaning that in God there are really two powers, one ordinate and the other absolute, because in God there is just one power *ad extra* [i.e. in respect of things other than himself], which is in every way God himself.¹⁵¹ Nor is it to be understood that God can do some things ordinately and others absolutely and not ordinately, because God can do nothing inordinately. But it is to be understood that 'to be able to do something' is sometimes taken in accordance with laws¹⁵² ordained and established by God, and God is said to be able to do those things by ordinate power (*de potentia ordinata*); in another way 'to be able' is taken for to be able to do everything the doing of which does not include a contradiction, whether God ordains that he will do it or not (because God can do many things he does not will to do)... and these things God is said 'to be able' [to do] by his absolute power (*de potentia absoluta*).¹⁵³

So whatever God actually does is done in accordance with his ordinances. (Of course things done *de potentia ordinata* are also possible *de potentia absoluta*.) A miracle is an exception to the "common course" of nature,¹⁵⁴ but it is not an exception to God's ordinances, which allow for miracles. God's power is not narrowed by what he has done in the past.¹⁵⁵ He cannot cause the past not to have happened,¹⁵⁶ but what he did he still has power never to have done.¹⁵⁷

Must God keep his promises? Do his ordinances put him under obligation?¹⁵⁸ Can he change his ordinances, as apparently he did when the Old Testament was superseded by the New, and if so might the present religious, moral and natural order be replaced? Such questions occur to Ockham's modern readers,¹⁵⁹ but they do not seem to have occurred to Ockham himself. It has been suggested that the loving nature that has been revealed in God's actions gives assurance that he will not give us any unpleasant surprises, but it seems to me that in Ockham's theology God's nature puts no constraints upon his treatment of creatures.¹⁶⁰

THE SOUL

Ockham rejects Thomas Aquinas's thesis that the intellectual soul is the one and only substantial form of a human being.¹⁶¹ According to Ockham, a living human being is informed by three forms that are distinct from one another as thing from thing, namely the intellectual soul, the sensitive soul and the form of bodily existence.¹⁶² However, there is no real distinction between the intellectual soul and its powers, viz. intellect and will (though an intellection is not a volition).¹⁶³ Likewise there are no real distinctions among the powers of the sensitive soul.¹⁶⁴ Whereas the sensitive soul is corruptible and extended, with various parts of it in different parts of the body, the intellectual soul is an immaterial and incorruptible form existing as a whole in the whole body and as a whole in each part.¹⁶⁵ According to Ockham it cannot be proved that such an intellectual soul exists or that we have acts proper to such a soul; Christians believe these things by faith.¹⁶⁶

MORALITY

According to Ockham, morality is partly "positive", i.e. "put there" or "laid down"

by authority (*ponere*), and partly non-positive, i.e. not based on any command.¹⁶⁷ Non-positive moral science includes self-evident propositions¹⁶⁸ and also propositions based on experience.¹⁶⁹ Non-positive morality requires that God be loved and obeyed,¹⁷⁰ which is the basis of the positive morality determined by divine laws. Non-positive morality also requires that agreements be kept, which is the basis of the positive morality determined by human law and custom.¹⁷¹ Non-positive morality and divine positive law are mutually reinforcing: natural reason enjoins us to love and obey God,¹⁷² and God commands us to follow reason (even erroneous reason).¹⁷³ God's particular command, however, can override any general rule of morality; such a command could justify particular acts of hate, theft, or adultery (though they should not then be called by those names).¹⁷⁴ Hatred of God could be a right act if God commanded it.¹⁷⁵ Sin does not consist in anything in the sinful act itself¹⁷⁶ but in its being done contrary to one's obligation.¹⁷⁷ Actual performance of a willed act adds nothing of moral goodness or evil, which belong only to acts of will.¹⁷⁸

Ockham's opinion that God's command overrides moral rules and statements that obligations hold "under present ordinances"¹⁷⁹ may suggest that Ockham holds a "divine command" theory of moral obligation, i.e. that something is morally right only because God commands or permits it, and wrong only because God forbids it.¹⁸⁰ But to say that God's command can override any moral rule does not mean that moral rules hold, when they do hold, only because they are imposed by God's command. Like Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus and other Christian theologians, Ockham knew that *transfer to n.148* in some Bible passages God commanded things that would normally be regarded as immoral,¹⁸¹ but all three held a "natural law" theory of morality, which bases morality on "right reason". According to Scotus, moral propositions which "are true by reason of their terms . . . would be true even if, to assume the impossible, no act of willing existed".¹⁸² According to Gregory of Rimini, "if, to assume the impossible, the divine reason or God himself did not exist, or his reason was in error, still, if someone acted against angelic or human right reason or any other (if there were any), he would sin. And *if there existed absolutely no right reason*, still, if someone acted against what some right reason, if it existed, *would* say should be done, he would sin".¹⁸³ Natural morality does not hold only by God's command, but God's command can override natural law because right reason dictates that God must always be obeyed.¹⁸⁴

More on moral theory: virtue; external action.

HUMAN FREE CHOICE

According to Ockham, praise and blame assume free choice,¹⁸⁵ and experience shows that we have it.¹⁸⁶ Free will, according to Ockham, following Duns Scotus, is the capacity to choose either X or not-X without being determined one way or the other by any cause other than the will itself.¹⁸⁷ According to Scotus this "power of opposites" exists at an instant; according to Ockham there must be some passage of time.¹⁸⁸ Our choice is free in the sense that we can choose X, and then at a later time not-X, even if otherwise nothing in the universe changes.¹⁸⁹ One choice can constrain another, but only while the former lasts.¹⁹⁰ Habits incline a person to make certain choices, but not inescapably.¹⁹¹

According to Ockham freedom of choice is wider in scope than many others (e.g. Thomas Aquinas) believed. According to Ockham, we can reject (*nolle*) happiness,

the good, our ultimate end, we can reject God even intuitively seen, we can choose to hate God; we can will evil *qua* evil.¹⁹²

GOD'S FOREKNOWLEDGE OF HUMAN CHOICES

Though our choices are free, God knows with certainty what they will be. How this is possible we cannot understand. That he has such knowledge is a matter of faith.¹⁹³ Ockham rejects Aristotle's view that statements about future events that depend on free choice are neither true nor false.¹⁹⁴ Such propositions can be true and God knows them certainly beforehand, though they remain contingent and God's knowledge of them is contingent.¹⁹⁵ "Howevermuch this is true, 'God knows that this side of the contradiction will be true', it is nevertheless *possible* that it never was true."¹⁹⁶ Prophecies inspired by God regarding future contingents are always true, but they are always conditional (even if not explicitly so).¹⁹⁷

PREDESTINATION AND GRACE

Ockham rejects the theory of Peter Aureole that a quality God creates in the soul, called "grace", is necessary and sufficient for salvation. According to Ockham, no quality, natural or supernatural, can require God to confer eternal life on any creature, and he can (*de potentia absoluta*) confer eternal life in the absence of any quality.¹⁹⁸ However, God has *ordained* that salvation does require a quality that God creates in the soul, grace (or charity¹⁹⁹), and according to this ordinance no one can enter heaven unless he or she is in the state of grace at the moment of death. Grace cannot be earned, and it is not given to everyone.

On these topics the western Church generally followed Augustine. Augustine attacked Pelagius²⁰⁰ for preaching that we can all be good and attain salvation if only we choose rightly, which anyone can do. According to Augustine no one can choose rightly without the aid of God's grace, which he does not give to everyone and no one can earn; God gives final grace (i.e. grace possessed at the end of life) to those he has predestined to eternal salvation, and we cannot know who they are or why God has chosen them. Theologians at various times have tried to amend this doctrine to allow more scope for human initiative and to make it seem fairer, and others have attacked such modifications as Pelagian or semi-Pelagian.²⁰¹

An amendment made by some was expressed in the saying "God does not deny grace to those who do what is in them" ("*Facientibus quod in se est deus non denegat gratiam*"), meaning that God will give grace — not as something earned but gratuitously — to those who at every stage do their best, so that they will in the end achieve salvation.²⁰² If this is so, then Pelagius was right in saying that by consistently doing our best we can all attain salvation, and Augustine was also right in saying that to attain salvation we need grace that cannot be earned. As far as I know, Ockham never adopted the *facientibus* idea, though some have attributed it to him.²⁰³

According to Ockham, following the Bible,²⁰⁴ God owes nothing to any creature. Nothing God does can be unjust or unfair or morally bad.²⁰⁵ God could, without injustice, annihilate any person without giving them eternal life;²⁰⁶ he could give eternal life to those who live a naturally good life, without faith or grace;²⁰⁷ he could send good persons to eternal punishment (though "punishment" would not be the appropriate word);²⁰⁸ he could ordain that someone found good on Tuesday will

have eternal life but not someone found good on Wednesday.²⁰⁹ Absolutely speaking (i.e. *de potentia absoluta*) he *could* do such things, i.e. there would be nothing contradictory if he did;²¹⁰ but in fact, in accordance with freely-chosen ordinances, God will give eternal life to all who die in a state of grace.²¹¹

Only by God's gracious acceptance does a morally good act merit eternal life. But even without grace a person can do morally good acts. An act necessarily and intrinsically virtuous is one chosen out of love of God above all things and for God's own sake.²¹² Such love is possible for pagans as well as for Christians; it does not require infused faith or grace.²¹³ Persons not in a state of grace must do good acts as a preparation for grace, but — though they are in some way the reason why God gives them grace — their acts do not *earn* grace,²¹⁴ i.e. there would be no injustice if grace were withheld. The reason for predestination is (in most cases) that God foresees that the person will be in charity at the time of death.²¹⁵

TRINITY

The Church teaches (i) that there is only one God, (ii) that there are three persons — Father, Son and Holy Spirit — each of whom is God, and (iii) that the persons are really distinct, i.e. none of the three is either of the others (so, for example, “The Father is the Son” is false.) Ockham often refers to the one God as “the Divine Essence”. Like other Catholics, he holds that the Divine Essence is numerically singular and absolutely simple, i.e. without parts. He holds that the three Persons are constituted by relations, the Father by paternity, the Son by filiation, the Spirit by passive spiration (i.e. by being “breathed” by Father and Son). For all Christian theologians, the difficulty in the doctrine of the Trinity is to reconcile the plurality of really distinct Persons each of whom is God with the individuality and simplicity of the Divine Essence.²¹⁶ For Ockham there were also difficulties arising from his own philosophical doctrines.

Normally if there are three things, A, B and C, if A is identical with B and C is identical with B, then A and C are identical: in the case of the Trinity this is not so. Again, if A has some characteristic and A and B are identical, then B will have that characteristic: in the Trinity this is not so.

Consider this syllogism: “The Divine Essence is the Father; the Divine Essence is the Son; therefore the Son is the Father”. This seems to be an expository syllogism (i.e. a third-figure syllogism in which the terms are all singular) arguing validly from premisses Christians hold as true to a conclusion they regard as false, viz. that the Son is the Father. According to Ockham this syllogism is not valid and is not an expository syllogism, because the divine essence is *numerically one unique simple thing that is really several things*, distinguished by a formal distinction.²¹⁷ A formal distinction is not merely a *distinction of reason*, because it does not depend on any mind, and it is not a fully *real distinction*, since God is numerically one, unique and simple.²¹⁸ Positing a formal distinction is not an explanation: “I do not believe that a formal distinction is easier to hold than a trinity of Persons with unity of Essence”.

The Persons are constituted by three relations. Normally a relation cannot constitute a subsistent being; a relation presupposes the existence of the *relata*, and relational actions (such as begetting) presuppose the existence of the thing acting. In the case of the Trinity this is not so: despite these arguments, it must be held that the divine Persons are constituted by relations, because (as Ockham understood it) this was the

teaching of the Church.

Duns Scotus had suggested that the divine intellect was the principle of filiation (the relative property constituting the Son) and the divine will of spiration (constituting the Spirit). Ockham defers to the authority of “the saints”, but insists that in God there is no distinction, real or formal, between intellect and will. The position of Scotus is tenable only if intellect and will are taken as terms standing for the Divine Essence in its simplicity.²¹⁹

INCARNATION

According to the teaching of the Church, one of the three divine persons, the Son, while remaining God, became a man, Jesus Christ; Christ unites two natures, divine and human, in one person or *suppositum*, that person being the person of the Son. Christ’s humanity is not another *suppositum*.

As a faithful Catholic Ockham accepted this teaching and tried to fit it into his philosophy, to which he made some adjustments.²²⁰ First, he made an exception to his ordinary position that relations are not entities really distinct from the absolute things related. Since the union of the Son with a human nature took place at a particular time and was not a mere spatial juxtaposition, there must have been at that time a production of some new entity distinct from the Son and Christ’s humanity, namely a relative entity. This relative entity must have come into being in the humanity, since the divine nature is eternally perfect and therefore does not receive new modifications.

Another adjustment was needed to accommodate the point that Christ’s humanity was not itself a person, a *suppositum*. The humanity of Socrates is a man, namely Socrates; the human nature of Socrates is not a reality additional to Socrates. But the humanity of Christ is not a man, because Christ’s person is divine, and there is no human person. In this case, Ockham says, the humanity is “sustained” by the divinity somewhat as an accident is sustained by a substance.

This leads him to adjust the common understanding of *suppositum*. According to Aristotle, a substance, e.g. a man, is something that is not sustained by anything else, whereas something that exists in or is sustained by something else is an accident. Ockham revises this, to say that Aristotle’s conception holds in the ordinary course of events, but by divine power both a substance and an accident can be sustained in existence by something else.²²¹ Though in this special case Christ’s humanity is sustained by his divine Person, it is nevertheless in the same category (substance) and the same species (human being) as other men.

THE EUCHARIST²²²

This is Ockham’s statement of the teaching of the Catholic Church:

Catholic doctors approved by the Roman church who have written about the sacrament of the Eucharist intend to assert this: That the body of Christ — that was received from the Virgin Mary, that suffered and was buried, and also arose and ascended into heaven and sits at the right hand of God the Father, and in which the son of God will come to judge the living and the dead — is truly and really contained under the appearance of bread. And although under the appearance of bread it [i.e. Christ’s body] is really hidden (for it is not seen by us

by our physical eye), the faithful mentally believe and hold that it is concealed by the appearance of bread; into which [i.e. Christ's body] the substance of the bread is transubstantiated, converted or changed, so that the substance of the bread does not remain, but the accidents alone remain, subsisting by themselves without a subject. And when transubstantiation of the bread occurs, not only is Christ's body, which is one part of human nature, really contained under the appearance of bread, but also the whole integral Christ, perfect God and true man, is contained truly and really under the whole host [i.e. the bread] and every part of it at once (though taking "conversion" and "transubstantiation" properly, the substance of the bread is not converted into the deity nor into the rational soul nor into any accident). This is my faith, because it is the Catholic faith. For whatever the Roman Church believes explicitly, this alone, and nothing else, explicitly or implicitly, I believe.²²³

According to Ockham, transubstantiation is the annihilation of the substance of the bread or wine and, by God's power, its immediate replacement by Christ, the accidents of bread and wine remaining (but not inhering in Christ); God has power to effect this.²²⁴ When the bread is consecrated, the formal object of the action is to substitute Christ's body for the bread,²²⁵ and when the wine is consecrated the formal object is to substitute Christ's blood for the wine, but in both cases the whole Christ becomes present.²²⁶

Ockham distinguishes between two ways of being in a place, namely "circumscriptively" and "definitively". To say that bread is in a place circumscriptively means that *each distinct part* of the bread occupies *its own distinct part* of the place.²²⁷ When Christ replaces the bread, he is in its place definitively, meaning that the *whole* Christ is present to *each and every part* of the place previously occupied by the bread.²²⁸ It is not contradictory, and therefore possible to God, to make two bodies exist in the same place, and therefore it is likewise possible to make all the parts of one body to exist in all the parts of a place, i.e. definitively.²²⁹ Christ continues to be present in heaven circumscriptively while he exists on the many altars definitively.²³⁰ The sensible qualities of the bread and wine continue to exist circumscriptively, with the quantity they had before consecration.

When Christ comes to exist on the altar, it is true to say that by consecration Christ is moved, even that he is moved locally; but this is not local motion in the usual sense, since he does not leave heaven and does not pass through successive places on the way to the location of the bread and wine.²³¹

When the substance of the bread and wine is annihilated, their accidents remain; these (the "species", meaning "appearances") are what we see, taste and feel. Ockham thinks that it would have been simpler to suppose that the bread and wine are not annihilated but continue to exist in the same place as Christ,²³² but he rejects this view because it has been rejected by the Church; the Church teaches transubstantiation.²³³ He holds that by God's power the accidents continue to exist without inhering in any substance; they do not inhere in Christ.²³⁴ According to Thomas Aquinas, the sensible qualities of the bread and wine inhere in the quantity of the bread and wine.²³⁵ According to Ockham, quantity is not a thing²³⁶ and qualities never inhere in it: after transubstantiation the qualities of the bread and wine, quantified as before, are sustained, without inhering in any subject, by the power of God.²³⁷

Since Christ is really present in the eucharist, he should have effects on our sense organs and we should be able to perceive him. We do not perceive him, however, because God withholds his concurrence in the production by Christ's body of any sense effects; we perceive only the qualities of the bread and wine.²³⁸ Christ in the Eucharist knows where he is and perceives things around him.²³⁹

When the consecrated host is moved (e.g. when the priest carries the host) Christ is moved.²⁴⁰ However, a human being carrying the host does not feel Christ's weight. No created cause can move Christ's body.²⁴¹ When the host is moved, Christ moves voluntarily, or God moves him.²⁴²

The various actions ascribed to God in this account of the Eucharist do not involve any contradiction, so they are within God's absolute power.²⁴³ Whatever God does is done *de potentia ordinata*: if something can be done without contradiction and is therefore within God's absolute power, it is also within his ordinate power if he chooses to do it. The Eucharist and other sacraments are among God's ordinances.²⁴⁴

LOGIC

*constantly used to disentangle issues in every area of philosophy and theology.

Simple supposition part of his campaign on universals.

I will not attempt an account of Ockham's logic.²⁴⁵ *****

BRINGING EVERY UNDERSTANDING INTO CAPTIVITY TO CHRIST

~~*Maybe this should go to the end, as a general reflection.~~

~~*Some Ockham theses: (1) Whatever the real order would be among things were they really distinct, that is their order according to reason where they are distinct by reason (1a) the signa or instants of nature; (2) Vol.3 p.87/108: nulla res differt ratione ab aliquo reali (prius, 1d2q3 vol.2 p.75-9, 1d5q3 vol.3 p.72) ... impossibile est quod aliqua quae sunt unum realiter distinguantur ratione.~~

~~[As argued previously: 1d2q3 vol.2 p.75-9/108 Utrum aliquid realis possit distingui secundum rationem ab aliquo reali; Vol.3 p.72.22-73.17/94~~

~~rejection of the view that a real thing can generate several distinctions of reason; (3) illud principium aliquorum, quod nihil convenit realiter cum aliquo et differt realiter vel formaliter ab eodem per idem sed per aliud et aliud aliquo modo distinctum, est falsissimum et in Deo et in creaturis~~

~~Sylla p.372; n.115~~

~~"Bringing into captivity every understanding unto the obedience of Christ", 2 Corinthians 10:5.²⁴⁶~~

Ockham affirms as Christian beliefs various theses he does not think can be demonstrated philosophically (e.g. God's existence). For some of these there are persuasive arguments and no objections. Sometimes what is true of creatures is not true of God, and vice versa.²⁴⁷ However, he also affirms several things against which there are philosophical objections. One of these points is the formal distinction, which seems "repugnant to reason".²⁴⁸ Nevertheless, he accepts that the formal distinction is needed in formulating the Christian doctrine of the Trinity.²⁴⁹

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1. Ockham: "A universal is that which is fit (*natum est*) to be predicated of many", *Expos. Perih.* 1 c.5 §3, OPh II, p.399/430; cf. Aristotle, "A universal is that which is apt to be predicated of many", *De Interpr.* 17a 38 -b 3. "Predicated" means to be the predicate in a statement of the form "X is/is not a human being", where "human being" is the predicate. "Apt to be", "*natum est*", means "suited to be": it may not be actually predicated of many — in "Socrates is a human being" it is predicated of only one, but we *could* go on to predicate the term of other individuals.
 2. *Any occurrence* of which: If we say "Socrates is a human being, and Plato is a human being", there are two occurrences of "human being".
 3. Plato explores some of the difficulties of his theory in *Parmenides* 128e-134e.
 4. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 990 b.*?*
 5. Cf. Conti, "Categories and Universals in the Later Middle Ages", p.376.
 6. Ockham writes: "All I have seen agree in saying that the nature, in some way universal (at least potentially and incompletely), is really in the individual, though some say that it is distinguished really, others that it is distinguished only formally, others that it is distinguished in no way in reality [*ex natura rei*] but only according to reason or by consideration of the intellect", *Ord.* 1 d.2 q.7, OTh II, p.225/258. Historians call such theories "moderate realism", i.e. moderate in comparison with Plato's theory in the degree of reality they attribute to the nature. Ockham explains and criticises these theories in *Ord.* 1 d.2 qq.4-7, OTh II, p.99ff/132ff (translated Spade, *Five Texts*, pp.114-231).
 7. See Boethius in Spade, *Five Texts*, p.25. On Thomas Aquinas's version of this theory see PWO, pp.79-80.
 8. For the ancestor of such theories of individuation see Plato, *Timaeus*, 49a-52d.
 9. "In so far as an opinion asserts that there are *additional things besides singulars existing in them*, I regard it as quite absurd and destructive of the whole of Aristotle's philosophy and every science and every truth and reason, and that it is the worst error in philosophy... and that those who hold it are unfit for science", *Expos. Perih.* 1 Proem. § 8, OPh II, p.363/394.
 10. "[J]ust as every spoken word (*vox*), however much it is common by institution, is truly and really singular and one in number because it is one and not many, so an intention of the mind [i.e. a concept] signifying many external things is truly and really singular and one in number, because it is one and not many things, though it signifies many things", SL 1 c.14, OPh I, p.48/126 (translated OTT, p.78). "Every universal is a singular thing, and therefore is universal only by signification, because it is a sign of many", *ibid.*
 11. SL 1 c.1, OPh I, p.7-8/84 (translated OTT, p.49). Some words signify words, some concepts signify other concepts SL 1 c.12, OPh I, pp.43-4/120 (translated OTT, p.74-5).
 12. Boehner, "The Realistic Conceptualism of William of Ockham", pp.315-6; Gál, "Gualteri de Chatton et Guillelmi de Ockham Controversia de Natura Conceptus Universalis".

¹³. “Some say [1] that an intention [concept] is simply something made (*fictum*) by the soul, others [2] that it is some quality subjectively existing in the soul, distinct from the act of understanding. Others say [3] that it is the act of understanding. And in their [those who hold 3] favour is the argument ‘in vain is something done by many that can be done by fewer’ (*frustra fit per plura quod potest fieri per pauciora*). But whatever can be ‘saved’ [i.e. accounted for] by positing [i.e. asserting the existence of] something that is distinct from the act of understanding can be saved without such a distinct thing, because, as much as any other sign, an act of understanding can stand for and signify something. Therefore it is not necessary to posit anything besides the act of understanding... it is enough for now that an intention is something in the soul naturally signifying something for which it can stand and that it can be part of a mental proposition”; SL 1 c.12, OPh I, pp.42-3/120 (translated OTT, p.74). According to theory [1] a concept is the thing in “objective being”, i.e. the being of an object of thought, as distinct from its “subjective” being as an extra-mental subject. For a review of Ockham’s treatments of these theories see Boehner, “Realistic Conceptualism of William Ockham”, pp.315-19. The relevant texts include: Ord.1 d.2 q.8, OTh II, pp.266ff/300 (translated Spade, p.215ff); Expos. Perih., proem., OPh II, p.347-371/378; Qdl.4 q.35 a.2, OTh IX, p.472ff/512 (translated QQ, pp.389-90); Qq. Phys. q.1-7, OPh VI, p.397-412/444. See PWS pp.41-5, PWO pp.496-510.

***Perihermeias para.4 [Estne passio qualitas animae distincta ab actu intelligendi?**

¹⁴. SL 1 c.1, OPh I, p.7-8/84 (translated OTT pp.49-50); Expos. Perih. Proem. §2, OPh II, p.347/378. See PWO, pp.16-17. A word does not signify a concept; it signifies the thing that the concept signifies. *explain signifies*

¹⁵. Rep.2 q.12-13, OTh V, p.261ff/288. The habit is caused by the abstractive cognition that accompanies every intuitive cognition; see note below.

¹⁶. “[T]he two incomplex knowledges of singular whitenesses... cause naturally, like fire causes heat, a third knowledge, distinct from them, that produces in objective being the whiteness previously seen in subjective being, without any activity of intellect or will, because such things are caused merely naturally”; Qq. Var. q.5, OTh VIII, p.175/200. (This passage reflects the “fictum” theory, above, note) “Nature works hiddenly in [producing] universals”, Ord.1 d.2 q.7, OTh II, p.261/294. Cf. Aristotle: “The soul is so constituted as to be capable of this process;” Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* 100 a13. Cf. PWO, pp.494-6; WO, pp.525-9. *needs more explanation VI 65/86*

¹⁷. Ord.1 d.2 q.6, OTh II, p.211-12/244 (Socrates and Plato really are more alike than Socrates and an ass: answering the objection that “every universal would be a figment of the intellect”, p.211.14). Cf. Qdl.6 q.25, OTh IX, p.679-80/718, lines 18-26, 50-8 (translated QQ, pp.572-3).

¹⁸. Boehner, “Realistic Conceptualism of William of Ockham”, pp.309-11, suggests that concept resembles thing because effect resembles cause. Ockham does say that the intuitive cognition of an individual is *of* that individual because that individual is its cause (Rep.2 q.12-13, OTh V, p.287.16-289.7/314; Qdl. 1 q.13, OTh IX, p.76, translated QQ p.66). He also says that concepts resemble things signified: “The cognition of a man is not more like one man than another, but by such a cognition is understood a man rather than an ass, because such a cognition, in *some* mode of likeness, is more like a man than an ass”; Qq. Phys. q.6, OPh VI, p.408/456 (my emphasis). Cf. Expos. Perih. 1 Proem. §6, OPh II, p.355/386. But I do not know of any text in which Ockham explains this mode or says that it is due to causation.

(The main texts Boehner refers to are found in the modern edition as follows. Note 4: OTh V, p.287.16-289.7/314. Note 5: OTh V,

p.261ff/288. Note 6: OPh II, p.351ff/382. Note 7: OTh II, p.261/294
Note 8: OTh VIII, p.175/200. Note 9: OTh IV, p.241/264. Note 10:
OTh II, p.283/316.)

¹⁹. For more, see Kilcullen “Ockham on Universals”.

²⁰. See King, “Ockham on the Role of Concepts”, pp.3-6; King, “The Failure of Ockham’s Nominalism”. Also WO pp.121-141 (“I do not see how Ockham can specify, either on the objective existence theory or on the mental act theory [cf. note above], a similarity relation that can constitute the natural signification relation for general concepts”, p.132; neither theory “gives an adequate account of what makes a thought a thought of a given particular”, p.141).

²¹. See above, note .

²². If two individuals share the same nature, then each individual has “numerical unity”, i.e. if they are “numbered” or counted, each counts as one (“one, two”). The nature is one, but it is not as much a unity as the individuals are.

²³. For Ockham’s statement and criticism of Scotus’s account of universals, including criticism of the formal distinction, see Ord.1 d.2 q.6, OTh II, p.161ff/194, translated Spade, *Five Texts* p.153ff (p.156 on the formal distinction). See also SL 1 c.16, OPh I, p.54/132ff, lines 11-18, 66-85 (translated OTT, p.82ff); PWO pp.73-5. See WO pp.22-9, 46-52. *a parte rei?*

²⁴. WO pp.931-9.

²⁵. In creatures: see below, note .

²⁶. Ord.1 d.2 q.3, OTh II, p.78/112.

²⁷. Ord.1 d.2 q.1, OTh II, pp.14-20/48. What sorts of distinctions there are and how they are proved continued to be controversial in philosophy into the seventeenth century. See Alanen, “On Descartes Argument for Dualism”, Ariew, “Descartes and Leibniz as readers of Suarez”.

²⁸. “Many theologians are of this opinion, and I also once believed that it was Aristotle’s opinion, but now it seems to me that the opposite opinion follows from his principles”, SL 1 c.49, OPh I, p.154/232 (translated OTT, p.158). Ockham’s views on relations were an early concern of his colleagues: Etzkorn, “Ockham at a Provincial Chapter”.

²⁹. “Some [including Ockham] say that a relation is not a thing outside the soul distinct really and totally from an absolute thing and from absolute things”, SL 1 c.49, OPh I, p.154/232 (translated OTT, p.158).

³⁰. The terms *res parva* and *res media* are used often in QdI. See for example OTh IX, pp.359/398, 611-6/650, 614/654, 631/670, 635/674, 645/684, 652/692, 674/714, 679/718, 683/722 (or QQ, pp.297, 512-8, 531, 535, 544, etc.). See also Qq. Phys. q.63, OPh VI, p.569/616.

³¹. “Sortes’ likeness to Plato imports nothing except that Sortes is white and Plato likewise...Whoever could understand Sortes and Plato and their whitenesses, without understanding anything else, would straightway say that Sortes is like Plato”; Ord. 1 d.30 q.1, OTh IV, p.310.1-8/334. For arguments against the *res parva*, see Qdl.6 q.8, OTh IX, p.611ff/650 (translated QQ, p.512ff). (“Sortes” or “Socrates” and “Plato” are dummy names, like “Joe Blow” or “John Doe”.)

³². “In one way a relation is said to be ‘real’ because it signifies some little thing outside the mind distinct from absolute things, in another way because it signifies absolute things outside the mind or in the mind that are said to be *such as they are denoted to be* by such a relative term *without any operation of the intellect*. I say that in the first way there are no real relations, because there are no such little things between absolute things... I say that in the second way there are real relations, because they signify absolute things in the way explained (e.g. ‘likeness’ signifies two white things and that each white thing is similar to the other without any operation of the intellect)...”; Qdl.6 q.25, OTh IX, p.678/718 lines 9ff (translated QQ, pp.571-2). “[T]he intellect does nothing to make it fact that the universe is one, or that a whole is composed, or that adjacent causes cause, or that a triangle has three angles, and so on, any more than that Socrates is white or fire hot or water cold”, Ord.1 d.30, q.1, OTh IV, p.316-7/340. Cf. Qdl.7 q.8, OTh IX, p.728/768, lines 45-7, 56-66 (translated QQ, p.614-5). Cf. note above. For more on Ockham’s treatment of relations see SL 1 c.49-51, OPh I, p.153ff/230 (translated OTT, p.158ff); also Ord.1 d.30 q.1, OTh IV, p.281ff/304 (esp. p.306ff/330). See PWO pp.47-53, WO p.215ff.

³³. Ord.1 d.30 q.1 discusses this carefully-formulated question: “Whether — aside from any authority of faith and of certain philosophers — it could more easily be denied than held that every relation is something real somehow distinguished from any absolute?”, OTh IV, pp.281-2/304. Ockham does not say that philosophical arguments show that there cannot possibly be relative entities; only that there is a philosophical answer to every philosophical argument to prove that such entities must exist. This leaves room for theological arguments to prove the reality of some relations.

³⁴. Ord.1 d.30 q.4, OTh IV, p.366-74/390. See Etzkorn, “William of Ockham and the Meaning of the Hypostatic Union”, p.188. Also Adams, *William Ockham*, pp.267-76. As Adams remarks (pp.274-5), “On examination, Ockham’s concessions to the thing-theory of real relation are quite substantial”.

³⁵. Ockham takes over the terms intuitive and abstractive cognition from Scotus, but changes their meaning somewhat. (*See Ord. prol. q.1, OTh I, pp.33-8/74.*) For modern readers “intuitive” may be misleading. In Ockham’s language *intueri* means “to look at”, *cognitio* means knowledge. Looking at the page of the book you are now reading is an example of intuitive cognition. Remembering the look of the page after you have closed the book is “abstractive” cognition. Ockham’s intuitive and abstractive cognitions are the counterpart of Hume’s impressions and ideas.

³⁶. Ord.1 Prol. q.1, OTh I, p.31-2/72; Rep.2 q. 12-13, OTh V, p.256-67/284; Rep.2 q. 12-13, OTh V, p.334-7/362; Qdl.5 q.5, OTh IX, p.495ff/534 (translated QQ, p.413ff). The existence of intuitive cognitions is presumably a hypothesis to explain the assumed fact that we truly have knowledge of things, which we could not have without direct apprehension. This reason is implied here: “And yet it is certain that these [i.e. contingent] truths can be known evidently”, Ord.1 Prol. q.1, OTh I, p.32.16/74.

³⁷. The intuition is not itself knowledge. See the passage quoted in Stump, “The Mechanisms of Perception”, p.189.

³⁸. Ord.1 prol. 1, OTh I, p.70.18/112; Rep.2, q. 12-13, OTh V, p.259/286. See Boehner, “The Realistic Conceptualism of William Ockham”, and Boehner “The Notitia Intuitiva Of Non-Existent.” Perhaps Ockham thinks that normally a judgment of non-existence or absence is not intuitive but an inference, e.g. from the premise: “I would have seen it by now if it were here”.

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39. Ord.1 prol. 1, OTh I, p.38-9/80; Qdl.6 q.6, OTh IX, p.604-5/644 (translated QQ, p.506-8). Ockham differs from Scotus in not specifying in the definition of intuitive cognition that the object must exist and be present, Rep.2 q.12-13, OTh V, p.259/286.
40. Ord.1 Prol. q.1, OTh I p.31.13-16/72.
41. “God cannot cause in us a cognition such that it appears to us *evidently* that a thing is present when it is absent, because this includes a contradiction”; Qdl.5 q. 5, OTh IX, p.498/538 (translated QQ, p.415).
42. “However, God can cause a creditive act by which I believe that an absent thing is present. And I say that that creditive cognition will be abstractive, not intuitive; by such an act of faith [i.e. belief] a thing can appear to be present when it is absent, but not by an evident act”; Qdl.5 q. 5, OTh IX, p.498/538 (translated QQ, p.416). The possibility that God might cause false belief has sceptical implications (Descartes!), but Ockham did not draw any sceptical conclusions. Can God cause a false judgment about an intuited existing thing? Would there then be two conflicting judgments? Stump, “The mechanisms of perception”, pp. 186, 188, says that according to Ockham an intuition need not cause a judgment. But what then determines whether a judgment does occur?
43. “Abstractive” in this context does not have the meaning it has when we speak of abstract nouns or concepts. “Abstractive cognition is taken according as it abstracts from existence and non-existence and from other conditions that contingently happen to a thing or are predicated of a thing”, Ord.1 Prol. q.1, OTh I, p.31.4-6/72. On the two kinds of cognitions see PWS pp.22-5.
44. Ord.1 prol. q.2, OTh I, p.86.21-3/128.
45. “Imperfect intuitive” cognition is in fact abstractive: Rep.2, q. 12-13, OTh V, pp.262.5-6/290, but it differs from other abstractive cognitions, and resembles intuitive, in that it enables a past-tense judgment of existence, p.266-7/294. To remember a particular individual, such as a person, requires a complex of abstractive cognitions covering various characteristics of the individual; Qdl.1 q. 13, OTh IX, pp.77/116 (translated QQ, p.67).
46. On memory see Rep.2, q. 12-13, OTh V, pp.261-2/288; Rep.4 q.14, OTh VII, p.278ff/308.
47. “Positing that an intuitive cognition always necessarily has with it an incomplex abstractive cognition, then the intuitive cognition will be the partial cause of that abstractive cognition, and that abstractive cognition will be the partial cause of a habit inclining one to another incomplex abstractive cognition like the one from which the inclining habit is generated”; Rep.2 q.12-13, OTh V, p.263.7ff/290. (This passage, down to p.264 line 10, is thought to be an addition, which may belong after p.265.7; see Miethke, *Ockhams Weg zur Sozialphilosophie*, p.174 n.147.) “The intuitive cognition is a partial cause of the [abstractive] cognition, though not of the habit generated by the abstractive cognition”; *ibid.*, p.265.5-7.
48. A habit is something in some way accessory to a substance, its clothing, as it were. A habit may be caused in us by some other agent (as when God infuses grace), or it may be formed by repeated acts, or even by a single act. See Baudry, *Lexique philosophique de Guillaume d’Ockham*, p.107.
49. Rep.2 q.12-13, OTh V, p.261ff/288. Alternatively, Ockham suggests (p.265-6/292), the generally-valid principle that a habit is generated by acts of the same kind might not apply here, so that an *intuitive* cognition might itself cause a habit that enables future *abstractive* cognitions.

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- ⁵⁰. Rep.2 q.12-13, OTh V, p.264.15ff/292.
- ⁵¹. On theories of Ockham's contemporaries see Tachau, *Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham*.
- ⁵². Ord.1, d.27 q.3, OTh IV, p.241/264; Rep.2 q.12-13, OTh V, p.268-76/296; Rep.3 q.2, OTh VI, p.44ff/66. *the last is the main text*
- ⁵³. Rep.3 q.2, OTh VI, p.48ff/70. "In debita approximatione", Rep.2 q.12-13, OTh V, p.258.15ff/286.
- ⁵⁴. Rep.3 q.3, OTh VI, p.107ff/128; Qdl.6 q.6, OTh IX, p.60652-9/646 (translated QQ, p.507). On intuitive cognition and species see Stump, "The Mechanisms of Cognition".
- ⁵⁵. Ord.1 Prolog. q.1, OTh I, p.32-3/34. On science see PWS p.2-16. ***Livesey
- ⁵⁶. Ockham: "However, there is no science properly speaking of individuals, but only of universals *for* individuals", i.e. *standing for* individuals; Expos. Predic. c.2 §11, OPh II, pp.45.40-2/76.
- ⁵⁷. Expos. Phys. prolog. §4, OPh IV, p.11/24; Ord.1 d.2 q.4, OTh II, p.134-138/168.
- ⁵⁸. SL 3-2 c.20, OPh I, p.537.7-9/614; Ord.1 prolog. q.1, OTh I, p.8-11/50; Expos. Phys. prolog. §2, OPh IV, p.6-10/20, line 55ff, § 3 line 64ff.
- ⁵⁹. Ord.1 prolog. q.1, OTh I, p.10.15/52.
- ⁶⁰. SL 3-2 c.21, OPh I, p.539ff/616 (translated Longeway); Ord.1 prolog. q.1, OTh I, p.10/52, 14/56.
- ⁶¹. ST 1 q.1 a.2. On discussion in 13th century Paris on the possibility of a science of theology see Dumont, "Theology as a Science".
- ⁶². Ord.1 prolog. q.7, OTh I, p.199/240.
- ⁶³. Ord.1 prolog. q.7, OTh I, p.187.17-20/228. Ockham thinks that Paul may have had intuitive vision of God, Qdl.6 q.1, OTh IX, p.587/626 (translated QQ, pp.492-3). Cf. 2 Cor. 12:2. (Such intuition would not be the "beatific vision".)
- ⁶⁴. Ord.1 prolog. q.7, OTh I, p.187ff/228.
- ⁶⁵. Ord.1 prolog. q.7, OTh I, p.200.12-15/242.
- ⁶⁶. By "moderns" Ockham meant theologians of his own time and just before. In their footnotes the editors of OPh and OTh identify the writers Ockham criticises. He is himself a modern, so sometimes he ascribes his own opinion to "some moderns"; cf. Expos. Phys. 3 c.2 §7, OPh IV, p.436.18-9/450.

⁶⁷. “It is the beginning of many errors in philosophy to think that to every distinct vocable there corresponds a distinct significate, so that there is as much distinction of signified things as there is of signifying names or vocables even when those names or vocables are not synonyms”; Sum. phil. nat. 3 c.7, OPh VI, p.270/318. “The making of abstract nouns from adverbs, conjunctions, prepositions, verbs and syncategorematics causes many inexplicable difficulties and leads many people into error. For many imagine that for each distinct noun there is a distinct corresponding thing, ... And therefore in modern times, because of errors arising from the use of such abstractions, it would be better, for the sake of simple people in philosophy, not to use such abstracts”; Expos. Phys. 3 c.2 §6, OPh IV, p.433-4/446. Someone, probably not Ockham himself, gathered together passages from Expos. Phys. into a tract *De successivis*, on motion, time and place, included as an addition volume in the electronic edition of *Opera Philosophica*, after vol.VII

⁶⁸. SL 1 c.45, OPh I, p.145/222 (translated OTT p.151).

⁶⁹. For “a thing totally distinct” Ockham uses a number of apparently equivalent expressions. Of motion or time, etc., he says that it is not a thing “really and totally distinct” from every permanent thing, or “distinct according to its whole self”, it is not “outside the essence of” a permanent thing (Expos. Phys. 3 c.2 §5, OPh IV, p.421/434), or “inhering in it in the way whiteness is something belonging to a white thing” (Expos. Phys. 4 c.20 §2, OPh V, pp.212-3/222), “just as a man and whiteness are two things outside the mind, totally distinct, so that nothing that is one of them or part of one of them is the other or an essential part of the other” (Expos. Predic. c.7 §1, OPh II, p.159/190); “Time is not something absolute really distinct from enduring things and from motion”, Rep.2 q.10, OTh V, p.185/212. For the arguments see Sum. phil. nat., OPh VI, p.261/308 (motion), p.344/392 (the instant), p.347/394 (time), p.391/438 (place). Motion: Rep.2 q.7, OTh V, 103ff/130; Expos. Phys. 3 c.2 §3, OPh IV, p.430ff/444; Qdl 1 q.5 a.1, OTh IX, p.475/514 (translated QQ, p.28). For commentary on the arguments see PWO pp.417-451 and WO pp.799ff.

⁷⁰. SL 1 c.10, OPh I, p.36-8/114 (translated OTT p.70-71). A connotative term primarily signifies a substance or quality and adds information about it secondarily. See below, note .

⁷¹. “Import” covers both [1] referring to and [2] asserting propositions about: “The noun ‘motion’ imports [1] many permanent things, namely the changing thing and what is acquired by the changing thing, and [2] that one [part] is acquired after another;” Expos. Phys. IV c.18 §3, OPh V, p.196/206.

⁷². Nouns derived from verbs, adverbs, conjunctions, prepositions and syncategorematics “were introduced only for brevity or elegance of locution”; Expos. Phys. 3 c.2, OPh IV, p.425/438. Many terms relating to motion “have been invented so that we can have an abundance of words to express elegantly (*ornate*) what we conceive in our minds, and not because they are necessary”; Sum. phil. nat., 3 c.4, OPh VI, p.253/300.

⁷³. Propositions that need to be expounded in this way are called “exponible”; SL 2 c.11, OPh I, pp.279-282/356.

⁷⁴. “And therefore such short propositions must be expounded by other long ones, and by the long ones that are more proper and clearer and plainer we must judge of the others”; Sum. phil. nat., 4 c.10, OPh VI, p.365/412.

⁷⁵. “One must speak as most do”, Expos. Phys. 4 c.18 §3, OPh V, p.199.134/208. “What is said for the sake of elegance, though improperly, is not said in vain (*frustra et vane*) but well. However, such expressions must be understood sensibly (*sane*), and to see whether they are true or false they must be

resolved into the proper words for which the improper have been put"; Sum. phil. nat., 3 c.4, OPh VI, p.253/300.

76. "Such propositions should be expounded in the above way, or in some other more suitable way if one is found. Because it is enough for me that besides permanent things past present and future there is no other thing distinct from them according to its whole self. I care little about the manner of speaking, as long as there is a good understanding"; Expos. Phys. 3 c.2, OPh IV, p.447/460.

77. "Permanent continuous quantity is nothing but one thing that has part situationally distant from part, so that 'continuous permanent quantity' and 'thing having part distant from part' are equivalent in meaning... And therefore, since a substance may have part situationally distant from part, and similarly a quality, some quantity will not be another thing than a substance, and some quantity will not be another thing than a quality"; SL 1 c.44, OPh I, p.137/214 (translated OTT, p.145). De Corp. Christi, c.12, OTh X p.112ff/144 (translated Birch p.107-8).

78. "In being produced by some created agent, they [the parts] are produced in a distinct situation, so that one part stands apart from another in situation and is outside the other"; De quant. q.3 a.2, OTh X, p.53/84. "Whence a quantity is nothing but a thing that has part outside part and has part standing apart in situation from another... It is not necessary to posit some thing that drags one part outside another, but the extrinsic causes of the thing, i.e. efficient and final, suffice to produce diverse parts, one in one situation and another in another situation, without any 'middle thing' between them. Therefore the substance itself is quantified without any other thing applied to it or made at the same time with it. And as I say of substance, so I say proportionately of every bodily quality"; De quant. q.3 a.3, OTh X, p.64/96. Cf. Expos. Predic. c.10 §4, OPh II, 210-11/242; Qdl.4 q.24, OTh IX, pp.412-415/452 (translated QQ, p.340-3). *Beuscher: De corp. Christ, c 28; De corp. Christi, c. 15; Qdl.4 q.26. *

79. "It is Aristotle's opinion that the whole world is not in a place, because it does not have anything outside it that contains the world; but many parts of the world are in a place, namely all parts contained by other parts"; Expos. Phys. 5 c.8 §1, OPh V, p.95/104.

80. It moves in comparison with imagined bodies outside the world: "... the *primum mobile* that does not have any body around it truly and really moves... because if there *were* a surrounding body that did not move, one part of the *mobile* would truly coexist with one part of the surrounding body and afterwards another"; Expos. Phys. 4 c.22 §4, OPh V, p.237/246. The *primum mobile* moves also because its parts vary in distance from given parts of the earth; *ibid.*, lines 110-2. This would be true even if the earth moved; Expos. Phys. 4 c.8 §1, OPh V, p.97.116ff/106.

81. Expos. Phys. 5 c.10 §8, OPh IV, pp.438-9/452.

82. "Permanent" is puzzling. In local motion the cause, the body that moves, and the places, all exist both before and after the motion, but in other motion, viz. the gradual acquisition or loss of a quality, Ockham says that the "permanent" things include past and future things which do not at present exist. Cf. Expos. Phys. 6 c.1 §2, OPh IV, pp.443.124/456, 446.195-6/460, 447.227/460.

83. Local motion means "first to be in one place (no other [transient] thing then posited), afterwards without an intermediate rest to be in another place (without any other thing besides the place and the body and other things that are permanent), and so on. And consequently, besides the permanent things, there is nothing else, but we need add only that the body is not in all those places at once and that it does not rest in those places"; Expos. Phys. 3 c.2 §6, OPh IV, p.433/446.

84. Expos. Phys. 4 c.22 §1, OPh V, p.230/240; 3 c.2 §5, OPh IV, p.425/438; 3 c.2 §6, 435/448 *

85. “For example, while motion lasts, it must be the case that something is in such a way future that it does not have being outside the soul though it can be known by the soul, or it must be that something coexists with something else that does not yet coexist with it outside the soul (which I say on account of the local motion) and yet it can be known by the soul that it will coexist with it”; Expos. Phys. 4 c.18 §3, OPh V, pp.196-7/206. *check translation*

86. Qq. Phys. q.38, OPh VI, p.497/544.

87. Expos. Phys. 4 c.27 §4, OPh V, 291-6/300. “In the definition of time soul should be put, or speaking more properly the noun ‘soul’; because measure is put in the definition of time; but in the definition of measure soul is mentioned, because a measure is that through which the soul should be made certain of some unknown quantity”; Sum. phil. nat. 4 c.15, OPh VI, p.387/434. “Because the noun ‘time’ imports an act of the soul numbering, which the noun ‘motion’ does not import, therefore these nouns do not have the same definitions expressing *quid nominis*, and are not synonyms”; Expos. Phys. 4 c.21 §6, OPh V, p.228/238. “‘Time’ imports, beyond motion, an act of the soul actually measuring, because time is the motion by which the soul knows how great another motion is; and therefore it is impossible that time be time except through the soul”; Qq. Phys. q.40, OPh VI, 504/552.

88. Qq. Phys. q.42, OPh VI, pp.508/556; q.43, pp.510-11/558. The motion of the *primum mobile* is the ultimate standard of comparison since it is the swiftest and most uniform motion: a very swift motion can be measured against the swiftest, the irregularity of an irregular motion can be detected by comparison with the most uniform. But time can also be measured, though with less certainty, by comparison with other motions, such as the motion of the sun or a clock or one’s inner sense of change.

89. “If soul could not exist, nothing could be time, because nothing could be a number or measure. Whence the first movement [i.e. the movement of the *primum mobile*] could be uniform and most swift though soul did not exist, but if soul did not exist, that movement could not be time”; Sum. phil. nat. 4 c.15, OPh VI, p.388/436

90. “Time is really outside the soul and it does not depend really on the soul; however, time could not be time, or *that which is* time could not be time, without the soul, i.e. unless the soul could exist; just as a cause depends in no way on its effect, and yet a cause could not be a cause without an effect”; Sum. phil. nat. 4 c.15, OPh VI, p.389/436

91. Sum. phil. nat. 4 c.10, OPh VI, p.365/412.

92. Expos. Phys. 4 c.18 §4-§6, OPh V, pp.201-3/210; 4 c.22 §4, p.234ff/244. Cf. Aristotle, *Physics* 218a 8-30. Sum. phil. nat. 4 c.1, OPh VI, p.344ff/392.

93. “It should not be granted that the same ‘now’ always remains, as if it were some thing continuously remaining; and it should not be granted that it is other and other, as if there exists some such thing, first one and then another”; Expos. Phys. 4 c.18 §4, OPh V, p.203/212.

94. “An instant is not a thing distinct from permanent things, but it imports the *primum mobile* existing in a determinate place so that immediately before it was in another [place] and immediately afterwards will be in another”; Sum. phil. nat. 4 c.8, OPh VI, p.360/408. See the whole chapter. “And so it is clear how we can assign an earlier ‘now’ and a later ‘now’, by saying first that this part of the mobile is now in this position, and afterwards in another position, yet without any newness of a thing produced: but not without the coexistence of the parts of the mobile with different parts of a stationary ambient body (if there were

such), or also a variation of distance between a given part of the heaven and a given part of the stationary earth. For continually, as the heaven moves, a given part of the heaven changes its distance from another part of the earth before and afterwards, and yet nothing new need be posited in the heaven because of this"; Expos. Phys. 4 c.22 §4, OPh V, p.237/246. *More on the instant see Rep.2 q.10, p.208/236

⁹⁵. "Time is not something hidden to us and unknowable by us, as some say; ... indeed it is known to all who have the use of reason... But time is said to be quite quite unknown because of the many difficulties that come up in treatments of the nature of time from badly-understood texts of philosophers"; Sum. phil. nat. 4 c.3, OPh VI, p.350/398. Cf. SL 1 c.51, OPh I, pp.170-1/248 (translated OTT pp.170-1). On the reality of action see also WND 67.40ff, pp.451-9, especially pp.456, 458-9.

⁹⁶. An exception is Leibniz. See Loemker, pp.1108-9, 1145-9; McDonough, "Leibniz's Philosophy of Physics". On Newton see Rynasiewicz, "Newton's Views on Space, Time, and Motion".

⁹⁷. "It is commonly asserted by modern writers that every quantity is a thing really and totally distinct from substance and quality, so that continuous quantity is an accident intermediate between substance and quality, which is asserted to be in substance as its subject and to be the subject of qualities. Similarly it is posited that discrete quantity is a thing really distinct from substances; and the same is asserted of place and time;" SL 1 c.44, OPh I, p.132/210 (translated OTT, p.142). "... I argue that a point is not another thing than a line, or a line another thing than a surface, or a surface another thing than a body; and by the same argument a body is not another thing than substance and quality, according to him [Aristotle];" SL 1 c.44, OPh I, p.133/210 (translated OTT p.143). "... I say therefore that the intention of Aristotle and of many others was that every quantity is not some thing totally distinct from substance and quality, and that point, line, surface and body are not things wholly (*secundum se totas*) distinct from one another;" SL 1 c.45, OPh I, p.145/222 (translated OTT, p.151). "It is not Aristotle's opinion that quantity is a predicament importing some absolute thing, really and wholly distinct from things in the genus of substance and in the genus of quality, as is commonly held; but it is his opinion that no thing is imported by the genus of quantity that is not really some substance or quality"; Expos. Predic. c.10 §4, OPh II, p.205ff/236.

⁹⁸. For Ockham's treatment of quantity see SL 1 c.44, OPh I, pp.133-153/210ff (translated OTT pp.142-58), and Expos. Predic. c.10, OPh II, 203-238/234ff (where he argues about point, line, surface, body, time, instant, place); De quant., OTh X p.5ff/36; Qdl.4 q.24-34, OTh IX, pp.412ff/452 (translated QQ, pp.340ff).

Beuscher's references: See Ockham. Report. 4, q 4 ; Quodl 4, qq. 23-39; Quodl 6, q 3, Quodl. 7, q 25; Summa totius logicae (Venice. Lazarus de Soardis, 1508), p 1, cc 44-8, fol 17 r -19 v ; Expositio aurea, Super librum praedicamentorum, cc 10-11; De sac alt , passim

⁹⁹. "There is another opinion [besides that of some moderns] about quantity, which seems to me to be in accordance with Aristotle's thinking, whether it is heretical or Catholic, which I wish to recite now, though I do not wish to assert it. And therefore when I have set out this opinion and written on philosophy, I have not written it as mine but as Aristotle's and explained it as it seemed to me, and likewise I will now recite it without assertion"; SL 1 c.44, OPh I, p.136/214 (translated OTT p.145). Ockham distances himself from Aristotle on this topic also in other places: De quant., OTh X, p.5-6/36, p.90/122, p.125/156; Expos. Phys. Prol. §1, OPh IV, p.3-4/16. *check these*

¹⁰⁰. *References, de corp. etc.*

¹⁰¹. “It is difficult to prove that there are only ten predicaments”, *Expos. Predic. c.7 §1*, OPh II, p.161/192. For questions relating to the categories see Qdl.4 q.25-8, OTh IX, p.416ff/456 (translated QQ, p.343ff) and Qdl.6 q.8 up to Qdl.7 q.8, OTh IX, p.611ff/650 (translated QQ, p.512-616).

¹⁰². SL I c.41, OPh I, pp.114-7/192 (translated OTT pp.128-31); Quodl.5 q.22, OTh IX, pp.564-9/604 (translated QQ, pp.471-5).

¹⁰³. SL I c.41, OPh I, p.116/194 (translated OTT p.130), Qdl.5 q.22 a.2, OTh IX, p.567/606 (translated QQ, p.473-4).

¹⁰⁴. *Expos. Predic. c.7 §1*, OPh II, p.159/190.

¹⁰⁵. SL I c.55, OPh I, p.180/258 (translated OTT p.178).

¹⁰⁶. Spade, “Ockham, Adams and Connotation” criticises Ockham on connotative terms, pp.602-8, and on exponible propositions, pp.609-11.

¹⁰⁷. For an example of such an argument, see *Sum. phil. nat. 4 c.1*, OPh VI, p.344-7/391.

¹⁰⁸. Ockham did not invent it. See Wey’s note on Qdl.4 q.27, OTh IX, p.433/472, referring to Aristotle, *Physics* VIII.6, 259a 8-15. Ockham himself refers it to Aristotle, Qq Phys. q.11, OPh VI, p.420.14/468, which the editor takes as a reference to *Physics* I.4, 188a17-18. Other people used it: cf. Thomas Aquinas, ST I q.2 a.3 obj.2.; Duns Scotus *Cross ecclesiology Ord. 4.1.4-5, n. 9 (Wadding, 8:90).). No one in the middle ages called it a razor. For examples of Ockham’s use, see index, OPh VI, p.868/916.

¹⁰⁹. *De corp. Christi, c.29*, OTh X, p.157-8/188, punctuation altered. Cf. Ord. 1 d.30 q.1, OTh IV, p.290.1-3/314.

¹¹⁰. Ord.1 d.14 q.2, OTh III, p.432/454. Cf. d.17 q.3, p.478.18-20/500. “Ad argumentum principale dico quod aliquando ponenda sunt plura miracula circa aliquid ubi posset fieri per pauciora, et hoc placet Deo”; *Qdl.4 q.30, OTh IX, p.450/490.

¹¹¹. Qdl.4 q.24, OTh IX, p.413.15-17/452; cf. Qdl.4 q.35 a.2, p.472.70-2/512 (translated QQ, p.389); “If one thing is sufficient... it is superfluous to posit two”, Qdl.7 q.2, OTh IX, p.707.23-4/746; “If two or three are sufficient... then a fourth thing is superfluous”, Qdl.7 a.1, OTh IX, p.704.17-19/744. On the other hand: “If two things are not sufficient... it is necessary to posit a third”, Qdl.1 q.5, OTh IX, p.31.40-2/70; “When a proposition is true for things, if permanent things are not sufficient for its truth it is necessary to add something further,” Qq. Phys. q.13, OPh VI, p.425.4-6/472. Walter Chatton weakened the requirement: “So great a necessity to plurify things is not required that it be evident that a contradiction follows if they be not plurified... It is enough that all be saved more suitably by many than by few”; quoted Tachau, “The problem of the species in medio”, pp.394-443, n.64, p.412 (my translation). See Maurer, “Ockham’s Razor and Chatton’s Anti-Razor”; Keele, “Walter Chatton”. *Subtle discussion: Qdl.1 q.5 ad 1m, OTh IX, pp.32-3/72 (translated QQ, p.30-1).* *not Anti-razor: Keele, Res, n.21*

¹¹². “But setting aside everything but matter, form, an agent and other permanent things, if the matter first does not have the form and afterwards has it, and not part before part, the matter truly is changed; therefore, to *save* change, it is vain to posit anything besides matter, form, an agent and other permanent

things”; Expos Phys. 3 c.2 §5, OPh IV, p.423/436. “Save” is used in the same way in the phrase (from Simplicius) “saving the phenomena”.

113. Ockham, 1 Dial. 4.10.

114. An efficient cause is that upon the existence of which something else totally distinct from it begins to exist; Sum. phil. nat. 2 c.3, OPh VI, p.218/266. When the cause, apart from anything else, is posited, something else can be posited, and when it is not posited the other cannot naturally be posited; Ord.1 d.45 q.1, OTh IV, p.664-5/688; Rep.2 q.12-13, OTh V, pp.269.10-13/296, 276.19-21/304.

115. God could have ordained that whenever fire is near a combustibile he himself alone would cause combustion to happen. We can never prove from an effect that something is a man, because an angel could produce the same effect, Rep.2 q.3-4, OTh V, p.72.21-73.9/100.

116. Rep.2 q.12-13, OTh V, p.269/296.

117. Expos. Phys. 7 c.1 §1, OPh V, p.598-600/608. This is a rejection of Thomas Aquinas’s dictum that whatever moves is moved by another, ST 1 q.2 a.3.

118. Qdl.4 q.1, 2, OTh IX, 293/332-309/348 (translated, QQ, pp.245-56.) For more on Ockham’s treatment of causation see Moody, “William of Ockham”; Adams, “Was Ockham a Humean about Efficient Causality?”; Courtenay, “The Critique on Natural Causality in the Mutakallimun and Nominalism”.

119. God’s existence is one of the “truths naturally known or knowable”, Ord.1 prol. q.1, OTh I, p.7. “The argument proving the primacy of the efficient is sufficient, and is the argument of practically all philosophers”, *check* Ord.1 d.2 q.10, OTh II, p.354/388. “God’s existence can be demonstrated”, Qdl.1 q.1, OTh IX, p.3.

120. Qdl.1, q.1, OTh IX, p.2/42 (translated QQ, p.6).

121. Plato, *Laws* X 893b-899d.

122. Ord. 1 d.2 q.10, OTh II, p.355.3-11/388; Qq. Phys. q.135, OPh VI, p.765/812.

123. Ord.1 d.2 q.10, OTh II, p.355.12ff/388; Qq. Phys. q.135, OPh VI, p.767ff/814.

124. Qdl.2 q.1, OTh IX, p.107-8/146 (translated QQ, p.93-4). *check: Qdl.1 q.10 ad 2.

125. “There is only one simply first being, though against *protervientes* [last-ditch objectors] it is difficult to prove this.” In an addition he remarks: “This argument seems probable, though it does not demonstrate sufficiently”; Ord.1 d.2 q.10, OTh II, p.356-7/390.

126. Qdl.2 q.1, OTh IX, p.109ff/148, line 61ff (translated QQ, p.94-5); Qdl.4 q.2 OTh IX, p.306-8/346, line 138, line 175 (translated QQ, pp.254-5).

¹²⁷. Qdl.1 q.1, OTh IX, p.3.43/42 (translated QQ, p.6).

¹²⁸. E.g. Thomas Aquinas's "fifth way", ST 1 q.2 a.3: "For we see that some things that lack cognition... operate for an end, which appears from the fact that they always or most often operate in the same way so as to seek what is best."

¹²⁹. See above, note .

¹³⁰. Ord.1 d.43 q.1, OTh IV, p.636.10-14/660; Rep.2 q.3-4, OTh V, p.55.16-18/82; Qdl.2 q.2 OTh IX, p.116/156 (translated QQ, p.99).

¹³¹. Ord.1 d.42 q.un, OTh IV, p.617-21/640; Qdl.2 q.1, OTh IX, p.107-8/146 (translated QQ, p.93-4).

¹³². Ord.1 d.35 q.2, OTh IV, p.441.12-18/464; Qdl.2 q.2 ad 1, OTh IX, p.115/154 (translated QQ, p.98).

¹³³. Augustine, *De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus*, Q.46 De ideis (translation https://academic.mu.edu/taylorr/Reading_Groups/Translations.html). Cf. Plato, *Timaeus* 29. See Rich, "The Platonic Ideas as the Thoughts of God"; Dillon, "The Ideas as thoughts of God".

¹³⁴. Ord.1 d.35 q.5, OTh IV, p.480/504.

¹³⁵. See above, note .

¹³⁶. "God has an infinity of ideas, because infinite things are producible by him"; Ord.1 d.35 q.5, OTh IV, p.493/516.

¹³⁷. "God foreknows the very things that he afterwards produces... He knows what he does perfectly, not only in a universal but also in particular and most distinctly"; Ord.1 d.35 q.5, OTh IV, p.504/528. "God not only has knowledge of universals, as a created craftsman has of things he will make, but has also distinct and particular knowledge of whatever particular is to be made. Therefore for him the very particular is the idea", *ibid.* p.505/528. Cf. Rep.3, q.3, OTh VI, p.121-2/143.

¹³⁸. "God foreknows something that does not actually exist to make what he makes in accordance with it. However he intuitively knows something that is not himself, nor anything real, but which can be real, to make in accordance with it that very thing"; Ord.1 d.35 q.5, OTh IV, p.506/530. A human maker thinks of a thing of a certain kind to be made, without intuitive knowledge of the very thing.

¹³⁹. On the formal distinction see above, note . "Because a formal distinction or formal non-identity is very difficult to posit anywhere,... it should not be posited except where it evidently follows from beliefs handed down in sacred Scripture or the determination of the Church and the sayings of the Saints,... [and since these] can be saved without positing it [i.e. a formal distinction] between the [divine] essence and the [divine] wisdom, therefore I simply deny that such a distinction is possible there, and I deny it universally in creatures... Because one [viz. a formal distinction in God] is expressed in Scripture and the other [a formal distinction in creatures] is not, and it seems repugnant to reason, therefore the one is to be posited and the other denied"; Ord.1 d.2 q.1, OTh II, p.17-18/50.

¹⁴⁰. Ord.1 d.2 q.1, OTh II, p.17/50.

¹⁴¹. Ockham answers Yes to the question: Whether the identity of the divine essence (and in every manner of identity *ex natura rei*) with the attributal perfections, and of those perfections with one another, is as great as the identity of the divine essence with the divine essence (Ord.1 d.2 q.1, OTh II, p.3/36). God is identical with God, any thing is identical with itself: God's wisdom is *just as identical as that* with God's goodness and with God himself.

*Ord 1 d.2 q 2, p.58

Thom: Besides, I ask: what is it for the understanding to cause a distinction between these *rationes*? Either this is [1] just to understand that thing – whether in one act or in several, so that in the end nothing is understood except the thing itself; or [2] it is to compare the same thing to itself; or [3] it is to compare the thing to another thing or other things; or [4] to form something or some things that are not there in the nature of things but only through the operation of the understanding. Not in [1] the first way, because from the fact that it is always just the same thing and nothing else that is understood, it follows that no multitude is caused there unless perhaps of acts of understanding (supposing it is understood through many acts). Therefore in God will never be a multitude of attributes that are many attributes and yet are really god himself. Similarly, for the same reason in Socrates and anything that I can understand I could cause such a multitude – which is absurd. Not in [2] the second way, because by such a comparison nothing is caused except perhaps a conceptual relationship, according to these people; but a conceptual relationship is not really god himself. Not in [3] the third way, for the same reason. Similarly in the same way anything can be compared to itself and to other things such as the divine essence; therefore every such distinction that the understanding can produce about the divine essence can equally be made about anything. If you say [4] "in the fourth way", the point is established that there may be there many things none of which is in the nature of things, and consequently none of them is in reality got himself.

Ord. 1 d.2 q.1 p.17

Thom:

And so for this reason I say that the divine wisdom is the same as the divine essence in every way in which the divine essence is the same as the divine essence; and so on for divine goodness and justice; nor is there any distinction at all the nature of things, or even a non-identity. The reason for which is that even if such a distinction could equally

easily be posited between the divine essence and divine wisdom as between essence and relation, yet because positing it is most difficult everywhere, and I do not believe it easier to hold than is a Trinity of persons together with the unity of essence, so it ought not to be posited except where it obviously follows from beliefs contained in holy Scripture or the church's prescriptions, on account of whose authority all argument is held captive. And so since all the things contained in holy Scripture and the church's prescriptions and the sayings of the saints can be preserved without positing such a distinction between essence and wisdom, quite simply I deny that it is possible in this case.

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¹⁴². Ord.1 d.2 q.2, OTh II, p.61-2/94, p.66/100. *this para needs fixing; see note 141 below*

¹⁴³. Ord.1 d.2 q.2, OTh II, p.73/106; d.10 q.1, OTh III, p.329/350. Scotus sometimes represents God's activities in terms of "instants of nature" (cf. Ockham, Ord.1 d.35 q.4, OTh IV, p.467-8/490). Ockham rejects these "instants", Ord.1 d.9 q.3, OTh III, p.311-2/332; Expos. Praed. c.18, OPh II, p.327-8/358. Whatever God is or does is identically and simply himself. Cf. WO, p.237-9.

¹⁴⁴. "All attributes either connote some things really distinct or are common to things really distinct", Ord.1 d.2 q.2, OTh II, p.70/104. "From created wisdom and from deity one concept can be abstracted which is predicable *in quid* of both, and it will be a quidditative concept... And thus there can be many quidditative and simple concepts because of the diversity of extrinsec things, but they will not be convertible because always something is contained under one that is not under the other"; Ord.1 d.3 q.3, OTh II, p.425/458.

¹⁴⁵. Ord.1 d.43 q.1, OTh IV, p.636-7/660; Cf. WND 95.112ff, pp.643-55.

¹⁴⁶. "The omnipotent cannot effect *everything* that does not include a contradiction, because he cannot effect God. However the omnipotent can effect every *makeable* that does not include a contradiction", Ord.1 d.20 q.un., OTh IV, p.36/60. The editors quote a formulation from *De principiis theologiae* that makes the point more clearly: "God can make everything the making of which (*quod fieri*) does not include a contradiction. Note that I do not say that God can make everything that does not include a contradiction, because then he could make himself, since he does not include a contradiction; but he can make everything the making of which does not include a contradiction, that is, everything of which a contradiction does not follow upon the proposition 'He makes it'"; OPh VII, p.507/540. *De principiis* is not by Ockham, but the editors consider it a faithful compilation of Ockham's thought, p.26*. See also WO p.1152ff.

¹⁴⁷. Qdl.6 q.6, OTh IX, p.604-5/644. Cf. 1277 condemnations art. 63, CUP I, p.547.

¹⁴⁸. Ord.1 prol. 1, OTh I, p.38/80; Qdl.6 q.6, OTh IX, p.605/644.

¹⁴⁹. See above, note .

¹⁵⁰. Courtenay, “The Dialectic of Divine Omnipotence”. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, ST 1 q.25 a.5.

¹⁵¹. See above, note .

¹⁵². Whether this means general laws or a plan including some singular events is unclear; WO, p.1198-1207. Miracles are part of the divine plan and likewise the supersession of the Old Law and occasional divine commands that override the moral law.

¹⁵³. Qdl.6 q.1, OTh IX, p.585-6/624 (translated QQ, p.491-2). See also CB 4.3, p.230ff.

¹⁵⁴. Ockham refers to “laws of God *commonly* ordained” in contrast with events that happen “by special miracle and divine dispensation”; QV q.8, OTh VIII, p.444/470.

¹⁵⁵. See Courtenay, *Ockham and Ockhamism*, pp.58-9; Courtenay, “John of Mirecourt and Gregory of Rimini on Whether God can Undo the Past”, p.147ff.

¹⁵⁶. “It is commonly conceded by philosophers and theologians that God cannot make the past not be past so that it is not forever afterwards true to say that it happened”, Ord.1 d.38 q.un, OTh IV, p.578-9/602; Praedest. q.1, OPh II, p.507-8/538.

¹⁵⁷. *check this* Present and past contingent events remain contingent, even though they cannot be undone: “It is contingently true and therefore is true in such a way that it can be false and can never have been true”; Ord.1 d.38 q.un, OTh IV, p.587/610. And, if it had not been done, God would never have known that it was done (since it wasn’t): “He [God] knows contingently and can [*potest*] not know and could [*potuit*] never have known”; Praedest. q.1, OPh II, p.521/552. “The proposition ‘Everything that is, when it is, must be [*necesse est esse*]’ is literally [*de virtute sermonis*] simply false”, Expos. Perih. 1 c.6, OPh II, p.420/452. See Qdl.4 q.4, OTh IX, p.315-6/354, line 31ff (translated QQ, p.261).

¹⁵⁸. Some historians have used the language of contract, agreement or pact to refer to divine ordinances insofar as they promise benefits. Ockham does use this language, but not often: “*foedus*” (Rep.4 q.1, OTh VII, p.6/36), “*ex pactione*” (Rep.4 q.10-11, OTh VII, p.215.15/244). Later theologians often used the language of covenant. “Nominalist covenants... were in no sense made by man as an equal or participating partner” (Courtenay, “Covenant and causality in Pierre d’Ailly”, p.118). If God’s will alone counts, without requiring any volition from human beings, then the language of pact or covenant seems inappropriate.

¹⁵⁹. See the discussion between E. Sylla, H. Oberman and J. Murdoch in Sylla, “Autonomous and Handmaiden Science”, pp.394-5.

¹⁶⁰. See below, note . See Courtenay, “Covenant and causality in Pierre d’Ailly”, pp.116-119 (referring to the “Nominalists” generally). According to McGrath, God’s “ordained power refers to that subset of possibilities which he chose to actualise – and having actualised them, abides by them. Thus there was no absolute necessity for God to choose any course of action; however, having finally chosen a particular course of action, there is now a self-imposed conditional necessity in respect to it, in that God has freely chosen to be faithful to a certain ordering of his creation”; McGrath, “The anti-Pelagian structure of ‘Nominalist’ doctrines of justification”, pp.111-2. I have not found any place where Ockham speaks of a self-imposed necessity. It would seem to me that what God has freely chosen he can freely unchoose.

¹⁶¹. Qdl.2 q.10-11, OTh IX, p.156-1644/196 (translated QQ, pp.132-39). *Also also Rep.4 q.7F = q.9, p.161/190* See above, *p..

¹⁶². It is difficult to prove this, but it is persuadable. Rep.4 q.9, OTh VII, p.161/190; Qdl.2 q.10, OTh IX, p.157ff/196 (translated QQ, p.132); Qdl.4 q.14, OTh IX, p.369/408 (translated QQ, p.305).

¹⁶³. Ord.1 d.1 q.2, OTh I, p.396/438, 402/444; Rep.2 q.20, OTh V, p.435/462, 441/468.

¹⁶⁴. Rep.3 q. 4, OTh VI, p.136-7/158; Qdl.2 q.11, OTh IX, p.164/204 (translated QQ, p.138). **Qdl irrelevant*

¹⁶⁵. Qdl.1 q.10 ad 2m, OTh IX, p.63/102 (translated QQ, p.56); Qdl.2 q.10, OTh IX, p.159/198 (translated QQ, p.134).

¹⁶⁶. Qdl.1 q.10 ad 2, OTh IX, p.63-4/102 (translated QQ, p.56-7); Qdl.1 q.12 OTh IX, p.68/108 (translated QQ, p.61).

¹⁶⁷. Qdl.2 q.14, OTh IX, p.177/216 (translated QQ, pp.148-50); the same distinction is implied in 3.1 Dial. 2.24.106-116, p.219. *What does Adams say on this? See also Osbourne*

¹⁶⁸. Examples: “Every *honestum* is to be done”, Qdl.2 q.14, OTh IX, p.177/216 (translated QQ, p.149); there are “many” such principles, line 39. “Everything dictated by right reason on account of a due end (and likewise concerning other circumstances) is to be done”, “Everything dictated by right reason is to be loved”, Rep.3 q.12, OTh VI, p.425/446. “Every indigent person in extreme necessity is to be helped lest he perish”, QV q.8, OTh VIII, p.423.310/448. “Every benefactor is to be benefited”, QV q.6 art.10, OTh VIII, p.281.223/306. “By a natural law which is immutable, when something does me good and you no harm, it is fair that you should not prohibit me”, WND 66.47-9, p.449. Not to kill a person who never did harm is a principle *per se nota*, 3.2 Dial. 1.15. There are also many natural laws “on supposition”, 3.2 Dial., 3.6 (translated in LFMOW, pp.286-93). It is not clear to me that these are known *per se*.

¹⁶⁹. Qdl.2 q.14, OTh IX, p.177-8/216, lines 26 and 42 (translated QQ, p.149); QV q.6 art.10, OTh VIII, p.281-2/306.

¹⁷⁰. Ord.1 d.1 q.4, OTh I, p.447.5-6/488 (“Only God is to be loved above all, because he is the highest good”); Qdl.3 q.14, OTh IX, p.257.87/296, translated QQ, p.214, (“This is to love God above all: to love whatever God wills to be loved”); QV q.7 a.3, OTh VIII, p.358-9/384, lines 413, 416 (“Who rightly loves God, loves God above all”... “Who rightly loves God, loves everything that God wills to be loved”). The principle “No one should be led to act against the precept of his God” is known *per se*, QV q.7 a.3, OTh VIII, p.366.583/392.

¹⁷¹. Ockham does not seem to explain the authority of human law in OPh or OTh, but he does in WND 65.55-75, p.437.

¹⁷². Above, note 170. *

¹⁷³. If the error is invincible: QV q.8, OTh VIII, p.411/436.

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- 174 . Rep.2 q.15, OTh V, p.352/380. Cf. 3.1 Dial. 2.24.110, p.219.
- 175 . Rep.4 q.16, OTh VII, p.352/382.
- 176 . Rep.4 q.10-11, OTh VII, p.195-7/224, 223/252.
- 177 . Rep.4 q.10-11, OTh VII, p.198/228, 225-6/254.
- 178 . Qdl.1 q.20, OTh IX, pp.99ff/138 (translated QQ, p.85-90). See Adams and Wood, "Is To Will It As Bad As To Do It?", pp.12-14. *Abelard, Kilcullen, "Bayle on the Rights of Conscience"* For more on Ockham's moral philosophy see King*
- 179 .**
- 180 . ~~Are things wrong because forbidden, or forbidden because wrong? The question has often been discussed. See Augustine, *in Aristotle; see Suarez vi.11, III, pp.92-4. See also Plato, *Euthyphro* 10a; Aristotle, EN V.7, 1134b 18-22; Thomas Aquinas, ST 2-2 q.57 a.2 ad 3; Oekham, *3.1 Dial., 2.20.)~~ On the question whether there really is room in Ockham's thinking for a "non-positive" morality see Freppert *Basis of morality*, p.171-81; Adams "Ockham on Will, Nature and Morality", p.265-6. *OT/NT not in point, because this is positive morality* *Osbourne argues that O has a divine command theory* *By God's absolute power, he could do something inconsistent with his ordinances: But also, he could *ordinately* change the ordinances.* *Kilcullen "Natural Law and Will in Ockham" King ethical theory McGrade*
- 181 . *List; references to Augustine, Thomas, Scotus*
- 182 . (Wolter, p.275*)
- 183 . Gregory of Rimini, *Lectura*, p.235. Cf. St Leger, *The "etiamsi daremus" of Hugo Grotius*. See Kilcullen, "Medieval Theories of Natural Law".
- 184 . McGrade, "Natural Law and Divine Omnipotence", pp.282-3. (For an account of the role of reason in Ockham's moral theory see McGrade, "Right(s) in Ockham", pp.66-70) *But why does that dictate override others?*
- 185 . Expos. Phys. 2 c.8, OPh IV, p.321/334; Expos. Perih. 1 c.6 §11, 12, 15, OPh II, pp.418-9/450, 422-3/454.
- 186 . "It cannot be proved by any reason... But it can be known evidently through experience, by the fact that a man experiences that however much reason dictates something, nevertheless the will can will it or not will it or nill it"; Qdl.1 q.16, OTh IX, p.87-8/126 (translated QQ, p.75).
- 187 . Ord.1 d.38 q.un., OTh IV, p.580-1/604. "I call freedom the power by which I can... cause and not cause the same effect, without there being any diversity elsewhere outside that power"; Qdl.1 q.16, OTh IX, p.87/126 (translated QQ, p.75). Cf. Expos. Phys. 2 c.8 §1, OPh IV, p.319-20/332; Praedest. q.3, OPh II, p.536.92ff/568. Scotus seems to have been the first to maintain that freedom is a power for opposites undetermined by any cause but the will. This idea was rejected by Hume and Mill and many modern

philosophers. See Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, bk.2 pt.3 sec.1, 2 (p.399); Hume, *Enquiry concerning Human Understanding*, Section 8; Mill, “Of Liberty and Necessity”; Kilcullen, “Freewill and determinism”.

188 . Ord.1 d.38 q.un., OTh IV, p.578/602. My comment: If we say that Socrates is sitting but can stand up, we obviously don't mean that he can stand up precisely while he is sitting, doing both simultaneously. We mean that although he is at this time actually sitting, he is quite capable of standing up at any moment. The power to sit and the power to stand are compossible, the *acts* of these opposite powers are not compossible, but the act of one power is compossible with the opposite power. We don't have a power only when we exercise it. We can't stand while we are sitting, but not because when we are sitting we don't have the power to stand.

189 . Apart from the motion that defines time: this is implied by “later”.

190 . Rep.3 q.7, OTh VI, p.211/232.

191 . Rep.3 q.11, OTh VI, p.357-8/378.

192 . Ord.1 d.1 q.6, OTh I, pp.503-507/544; Rep.4, q.16, VII, p.350ff/380; Adams, “The Structure of Ockham’s Moral Theory”, p.13-14.

193 . Ord.1 d.38 q.un, OTh IV, p.583-5/606; Praedest. q.1, OPh II, p.517-8/548.

194 . See Aristotle, *De interpretatione* 18a 28ff, and Ockham’s commentary, *Expos. Perih.* 1 c.6 §15, OPh II, p.421-2/452.

195 . Praedest. q.2 art.4, OPh II, p.529ff/560. For more see Adams and Kretzman: William Ockham, *Predestination, God’s Foreknowledge, and Future Contingents*; Craig, *The Problem of Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents*, p.146-168. *Scotus on contingency: Stanford, *Medieval modal**

196 . Ord.1 d.38 q.un, OTh IV, p.586/610. “Though the proposition ‘Peter is predestinate’ is now true and could be false, because, however, when it will be false [i.e. if it is in future false *check transl at the time when] it is true to say that it was never true, therefore it is not changeable from truth into falsity”; Praedest. q.1, OPh II, p.512/544. “He [God] knows contingently and can [*potest*] not know and could [*potuit*] never have known”; Praedest. q.1, OPh II, p.521/552. “It is contingently true and therefore is true in such a way that it can be false and can never have been true”; p.587/610. “There is some proposition that cannot be first true and then false or vice versa, and yet it is not necessary but contingent. The reason is that, however much it is or was true, it is possible that it is not true and never was true”; Ord.1 d.40 q.un., OTh IV, p.594-5/618.

197 . Ord.1 d.38 q.un., OTh IV, p.583/606; Praedest. q.1, OPh II, p.518/550. *Repeats note 181; check appropriateness of references in this section* In the late 15th century there was controversy in Louvain concerning the obligation to believe as being true prophecies about future contingent events; see Baudry, *La querelle des futurs contingents*. Ockham says that prophecies regarding future contingents are always conditional and if the event does not happen it is because the conditions have not been met, Praedest. q.1, OPh II, p.513/544.

198 . Ord.1 d.17 q.1, OTh III, p.454-5/476; Qd1.6 q.1 a.2, OTh IX, p.587/624 (translated QQ, p.492). On this point Ockham agrees with Scotus.

199 . Grace and charity are the same thing: Rep.4 q.3-5, OTh VII p.47.5-7/76.

200 . Not the Pope Pelagius often quoted in the *Dialogus*.

201 . Information about these controversies can be searched for under the terms: Congregatio de auxiliis, Molinism, Jansenism, Synod of Dort, Arminianism.

202 . For the *facientibus* maxim see Alexander of Hales, *Summa theologica*, IV, p.993-6; Thomas Aquinas *De Veritate* q.24 a.1 ad 2; McGrath, *Iustitia Dei*, pp.83-91. I have not found it in Ockham. Oberman, who believes that Ockham does subscribe to *facientibus*, judges that this doctrine is “essentially Pelagian”: God’s ordinances establish a “dome” under which we can live as if Pelagius were right, while Augustine’s doctrine holds *de potentia absoluta*. See Oberman, *Harvest*, pp.176-8, 186, 214. See also Oberman, “Facientibus quod in se est Deus non denegat gratiam: Robert Holcot O.P. and the Beginnings of Luther’s Theology”, section II. Also McSorley, “Was Gabriel Biel a Semi-Pelagian?”

203 . For more on this topic see Wood, “Ockham’s Repudiation of Pelagianism”. Ockham seems to differ from Augustine (or at least from followers of Augustine in his time) on two points: Ockham holds that a person without grace can do morally good acts, and that the reason for predestination is (in most cases) that God foresees that the person will die in a state of grace. *What did the Avignon masters say on these points*

204 . Cf. Job 41:11, Romans 9:14-24.

205 . God owes nothing to anyone and can do no wrong: Ord.1 d.17 q.3, OTh III, p.478.19-20/500; Rep.2 q.15, OTh V, p.343.20-3/370; Rep.4 qq.3-5, OTh VII, p.45/74; *ibid.* p.55/84; Rep.4 qq.10-11, OTh VII, p.198.7-9/228, *ibid.*, pp.225-6/254.

~~SOME OF THESE TEXTS QUOTED BELOW~~ ~~god owes nothing:~~
~~“eo ipso quod ipse vult, bene et iuste factum est”, Ord.1 d.17 q.3, OTh III, p.478.19-20/500; “Deus autem nulli tenetur nec obligatur tanquam debitor, et ideo non potest facere quod non debet facere nec non facere quod debet facere”, Rep.2 q.15, OTh V, p.343/370; Rep.4 q.3-4, “Et ideo potest Deus de potentia sua absoluta non remittere culpam, sine omni iniustitia, sicut potest aliquem punire sine omni demerito absque hoc quod dicatur iniustus... Unde sicut Deus potest semper continuare et detinere unum brutum in poenis sine omni peccato vel iniustitia a parte sui, ita eodem modo posset facere cum homine. Si dicatur quod Deus est debitor praemii pro meritis, respondeo dico quod Deus nullius est debitor nisi quia sic ordinavit; de potentia tamen absoluta potest facere contrarium cum creatura sua sine omni iniuria”, Rep.4 qq.3-5, OTh VII, p.45/74; “sicut Deus creat creaturam quamlibet ex mera voluntate sua, ita ex mera voluntate sua potest facere de creatura sua quidquid sibi placet. Sicut enim si aliquis~~

~~semper diligeret Deum et faceret omnia opera Deo accepta, posset eum Deus adnihilare sine aliqua iniuria, ita sibi post talia opera potest non dare vitam aeternam sed poenam aeternam sine iniuria. Et ratio est quia Deus nullius est debitor, sed quidquid nobis facit, ex mera gratia facit. Et ideo eo ipso quod Deus aliquid facit, iuste factum est.”~~ ~~ibid.~~ p.55/84; Rep.4 qq.10–11, OTh VII, p.198/228, “~~Nec deus peccare dicitur propter illum actum, quia nullus dicitur peccare nisi quia facit aliquid ad cuius oppositum obligatur vel quia non [facit] illud ad quod obligatur. Deus autem ad nihil faciendum vel non faciendum obligatur... potest Deus aliquem obligare ad poenam aeternam sine omni peccato”~~; ~~ibid.~~, pp.225–6/254.

²⁰⁶. Qdl.6 q.2 a.2, OTh IX, pp.591.37-42/630 (translated QQ, p.495).

²⁰⁷. God could ordain that “whoever lives according to right reason so that he does not believe anything except what natural reason concludes he should believe” is worthy of eternal life, Rep.3 q.9, OTh VI, p.280-1/302. Such naturally-good acts would not merit eternal life except by God’s free acceptance, Ord.1 d.17 q.2, OTh III, p.470-472/492. Also Qdl.6 q.1 a.2, OTh IX, pp.587-9/626 (translated QQ, p.493).

²⁰⁸. Of his absolute power he could send someone having charity to hell but accept another not having charity to eternal life, and he would not from this be an “acceptor of persons” because he is no one’s debtor; QV q.1 a.3 OTh VIII, p.22/48. “Of his absolute power God... could punish someone without any demerit without being said to be unjust (though the punishment would not be properly a penalty...); just as God could always continue and detain a brute in pain without any sin or injustice on his part, he could do the same with man”; Rep.4, q.3-5, OTh VII, p.45/74. “Just as God creates any creature of his mere will, so of his mere will he can do with his creature whatever pleases him. For just as, if someone always loved God and did everything acceptable to God, God could annihilate him without any injustice, so he could after such acts not give him life eternal but eternal pain, without injustice. And the reason is because God is no one’s debtor, but whatever he does to us he does of mere grace, and therefore, by the very fact that God does something, it is done justly”; ~~ibid.~~ p.55/84.

²⁰⁹. QV q.1 a.3, OTh VIII, p.25-6/50.

²¹⁰. See above, note .

²¹¹. Ord.1 d.17 q.3, OTh III, pp.477-8/498; Qdl.6 q.1 a.2, OTh IX, p.588-9/624 (translated QQ, p.493); Qdl.6 q.2 a.2, OTh IX, p.591/630 (translated QQ, p.496).

²¹². Qdl.3 q.14, OTh IX, p.255-6/294 (translated QQ, p.213); De connex. virt, OTh VIII, pp. 335-6/360.

²¹³. Rep.3 q.9 a.1, OTh VI, p.279.18-20/300, 281.14-17/302. See also 1 Dial. 6.79 on the morality of pagans.

²¹⁴. Ord.1 d.41 q.un., OTh IV, p.600/624; Qdl.6 q.2, OTh IX, p.592/632 (translated QQ, p.496). Other medieval theologians also held that we must prepare for grace by doing good works (e.g. Thomas

Aquinas, ST 1-2 q.112 a.2, 3), but also did not hold that good works earn grace. See Wood, "Ockham's Repudiation of Pelagianism", pp.361-2.

215 . Ord.1 d.41 q.un, OTh IV, p.606-7/630. In most cases. Some, e.g. the Blessed Virgin, are given a special grace to prevent them from ever falling out of charity.

216 . "The difficulty in this question [whether the divine unity is consistent with a plurality of persons] arises from the identity of the divine essence with the relation and with the person, because, if the essence, relation and person are simply one thing not distinct in number, it is difficult to see how there are several relations and several persons and not several essences"; Ord. 1 d.2 q.11, OTh II, pp.358-99/392. *Boehner, "The Medieval Crisis of Logic and the Author of the 'Centiloquium' Attributed to Ockham"*

217 . A formal distinction can be posited when there is one simple thing that is several things, SL *2 c.2.124ff, OPh I, p.253/330. Cf. 3-1 c.16, OPh I, p.403/480; Ord.1 Prol. q.7, OTh I, p.202/244. A formal distinction can be posited "when there is *some circumlocution* that enables one of two contradictories to be verified of a thing of which the other is negated", as for example "paternity is *that thing which is communicable*" is true although "paternity is not communicable" is also true; Ord.1 d.2 q.11, OTh vol.2 p.374-5/408. See Boehner, "Medieval Crisis of Logic", p.157-167. *SL II c.27; III-1 c.4-5* For Ockham's discussion of the logic of the Trinity see Gelber, *Logic and the Trinity*, pp.177-185, 216-226, and Shank, *Unless You Believe, You Shall Not Understand*, p.65-71.

218 . *Scotus prefers "formal non-identity", Ockham also uses "formal distinction". Ockham's theory is like Scotus's in Logica. Unlike Scotus, he does not hold that there are in God distinct or non-identical "formalities", 1d2q11.*

219 . Ord.1 d.10 q.1, OTh vol.3 p.326-30/348. See Friedman, *Medieval Trinitarian Thought*, pp.*

220 .

221 . It then becomes difficult to see what the distinction is between substance and accident. Adams (WO, pp.994-5) suggests that the difference may be that a substance can sustain another substance but an accident cannot.

222 . The eucharist is also called "the sacrament of the altar", "the Lord's supper", "holy communion". I am indebted to Buescher, *The Eucharistic Teaching of William of Ockham*, for guidance through this topic.

Rep. 7 qq. 6, 7, 8, 9. *Adams p.186ff

223 . De Corp. Christi c.2, OTh X p.91/122; translated Birch, *The De Sacramento Altaris of William of Ockham*, p.82. (Birch's chapter numbers are different from those of the Latin edition.)

224 . "Transubstantiation is the succession of one substance to another substance, which [i.e. the latter] ceases to exist simply in itself, under certain accidents proper to the preceding substance. The possibility of this is clear, because it is not repugnant to divine power to destroy a substance in itself and conserve its accidents, and that another substance immediately coexist with those accidents (not informing it)." Rep.4

q.8, OTh VII, pp.136-7/166. Though Ockham uses the terms “transubstantiation” and “conversion”, in his theory there is no conversion or changing one thing into another but rather a substitution. See Beuscher, *The Eucharistic Teaching of William of Ockham*, pp.45-51.

225 . “The first terminus of transubstantiation is what the converter or transubstantiator primarily intends... And that is said to be the terminus *per accidens* that is intended by that agent secondarily, namely because he [the transubstantiator] cannot transubstantiate without the others (especially when they are united), or because he does not wish to do so. Thus it is said that Christ’s body – composed of matter and form preceding the intellectual soul, whatever that may be (assuming several forms in a man, as we must because of the article [a reference to Kilwardby’s condemnation] – is the first terminus of this transubstantiation. Because God, who is the principal agent in that conversion, intends primarily to convert the bread into Christ’s body, so that if his soul were separate, as it was in the three days [i.e. between the crucifixion and the resurrection], then the conversion would be into Christ’s body only. The intellectual soul is a terminus accidentally, because God secondarily intends to convert the bread into the soul so far as it is united to the body”; Rep.4 q.8, OTh VII, p.142/172. See De Corp. Christi c.5, OTh X p.97/128, translated Birch pp.89-91 (where the distinction is made not in terms of primary and secondary objectives, but in terms of strict and broad senses of “transubstantiation”).

226 . “Not only is Christ’s body, which is one part of human nature, really contained under the appearance of bread, but also the whole integral Christ, perfect God and true man”; above, note .

227 . Rep.4 q.6, OTh VII, p.65/94. Cf. Qdl.1 q.4, OTh IX, p.25/64; Qdl.4 q.21, OTh IX, p.400-1/440. Sometimes for “circumscriptively” Ockham puts “quantitatively”, e.g. below at note .

228 . Cf. the doctrine that the intellectual soul is present to the whole body and to each of its parts, above note .

229 . “There is no greater difficulty that two parts of the body exist together than that two bodies exist together; but one can happen by the power of God, therefore the other;” Rep.4 q.6, OTh VII, p.79/108. p.79. “We hold by faith that bodies (the same in species or different) exist together in the same place: this is clear when Christ went in to the disciples with the doors closed, when he was born with the Virgin’s womb closed, when he ascended into heaven without any division of the celestial body. Therefore in the same way it is not a contradiction that two parts of the same body exist in the same place; and, by the same argument, all parts of Christ’s body can without contradiction be in the same place. From these two points I argue the point intended, because if it is possible that all parts of Christ’s body are in the same place by divine power (just as it is possible for two bodies to be together in the same place), and if it is possible that every part of the body of Christ is in different places according to its whole self (just as the soul and an angel are together and at the same time wholly in diverse places), it follows that it is possible for the whole body of Christ to coexist with the whole place of the host and the whole in each part; which is the point mainly intended, namely how Christ’s body is definitively in place under the consecrated host”; Qdl.4 q.31, OTh IX, p.453/492. Cf. De Corp Christi c.7, OTh X, p.103-5/134, translated Birch pp.95-8.

230 . “Though Christ’s body is of itself limited, yet by God’s power it can be unlimited to many places, as it can be on many altars”; Rep.4 q.6, OTh VII, p.104/134.

231 . [*Cf. Thomas Aquinas ST 3 q.75 a.2]

“A body can be in a place where it was not before without being moved to that place or the place to it, because this can happen suddenly without any motion (though not without any change of that body [see above, note]). For example: the body of Christ in the

sacrament of the Eucharist is now present where previously it was not, and yet suddenly and in the same way it can be in different places circumscriptively, but without motion. And when you say ‘if it is moved to another place, it leaves the first’, I say that just as according to the faith Christ’s body is now present where it was not present, and thus is changed, yet *does not leave its place in heaven*, so it can come to be circumscriptively where before it was not and yet not leave the first place”; Rep.4 q.6, OTh VII, p.102/132. Also: “Since therefore Christ’s body passes from not being here to being here, because of which this is a true change, it follows that Christ’s body is truly changed. Therefore I say that Christ’s body is changed locally, because just as through its substance it is immediately here where it previously was not, not through the substance of the bread, so immediately it is changed. But that it is immediately in place, was proved before. Therefore I say that here there is a double mutation: one acquisitive, the other deprivative. The acquisitive is in Christ’s body, because it receives existence here where previously it did not have it, but the deprivative is of the substance of the bread itself, which does not remain where it was previously”; Rep.4 q.8, OTh VII, p.145-6/174. “I say that extending ‘to be changed locally’ to mean existing somewhere really after being elsewhere and not there... so the body of Christ is changed locally when it begins to exist sacramentally under the host, and this mutation is acquisitive of a new place not had before but is *not deprivative of a place had before*. But taking ‘to be changed locally’ strictly, as the Philosopher speaks, for acquisition of one place *and* deprivation of another, thus I say that Christ’s body is not locally changed by beginning to exist sacramentally under the host. I prove this, because if it were so, then it would cease to exist in heaven when it begins to exist on the altar, which is heretical”; Qdl.6 q.3, OTh IX, p.595/634.

²³². “The third opinion would be very reasonable if there were not a determination of the Church to the contrary, because that opinion saves and avoids all difficulties that follow from the separation of accidents from a subject, nor is its opposite found in the canon of the Bible. Nor does it include any contradiction for the body of Christ to coexist with the substance of the bread more than with its accidents; nor is it repugnant to reason, first because quantity is repugnant with quantity as much as substance with substance, but two quantities can exist together in the same place, as is clear of two bodies existing in the same place, second because Christ’s substance can be in the same place with the quality of the host, therefore by the same argument with its substance. To the argument at the beginning, I say that sometimes more miracles are to be posited concerning something where it could be done by fewer, and this pleases God. And this is certain to the church through some revelation, as I suppose”; Qdl.4 q.30, OTh IX, p.450/490. Cf. De Corp. Christi c.6, OTh X p99/130, translated Birch pp.92-4.

233 . “But because the determination of the Church is to the contrary (as is clear Extra, *De Summa Trinitate et fide catholica* and *De celebratione missarum*), and commonly all the doctors hold the opposite, therefore I hold that not the substance of the bread but the species remains there, and the body of Christ coexists with it. And that this is possible is clear, because this transubstantiation includes only that the species remain there really and the substance does not remain in itself really, and that the body of Christ is there really, not quantitatively [i.e. not circumscriptively]. But each of these [statements] is possible, therefore et cetera”; Rep.4 q.8, OTh VII, pp.139-40/168.

234 . De Corp. Christi c.9, OTh X p.107-8/138, translated Birch p.102.

235 . ST *3.77.2. [is this suppl? NO. *In Sent IV d.11 q.1 a.1 qu.3 sol.1
<https://www.newadvent.org/summa/4073.htm> ff

236 . See above, note .

237 . “Concerning the sacrament of the altar they say that after the consecration of Christ’s body one quantity, which preceded, was the same really with the substance of the bread, and that [quantity] does not remain; but, besides that, there remains a quantity which is the same as the quality, but in that quantity no quality exists subjectively, but all accidents remaining after consecration remain, together with Christ’s body, without any subject, because they subsist per se”; SL 1 c.44, OPh I, p.137-8/214 (translated OTT p.145-6); Rep.4 q.9, OTh VII, p.153-65/183ff *See Adams p.194 n.56. De corp. Christi c.13, OTh X p.115/146, translated Birch p.110-1.

238 . “It cannot be proved by argument that it is not the case that every action and passion terminating at an absolute form a body can have existing in a place circumscriptively and quantitatively it can also have existing in a place definitively and not quantitatively. I prove this, because no less can a principle of action have an action wholly present to some patient, for example a warm-able, than through one part present to one and through another part present to another. But Christ’s body in the host is wholly present to the whole host and to every part. Therefore the warmth of Christ’s body can act upon the host and make it warm. And by the same argument it can be proved that Christ’s body can be seen in the host by the bodily eye, because it is sufficiently active both on the medium and on the eye, because wholly present to every part of the eye and the medium”; Rep.4 q.7, OTh VII p.118/148. “But the experience we now in fact have of Christ’s body is not conclusive, because God suspends the action of those qualities, not co-acting with them so that they act; and if he did co-act, they would be seen”; *ibid.*, p.119. “I say that it is not from the nature of things repugnant to the intellect of the wayfarer to see Christ’s body in the host, if it were permitted, for example if God co-acted with it, but that does not in fact happen because it is not permitted”; *ibid.* p.135/164.

239 . “I say that Christ in the sacrament of the altar can naturally and intuitively understand everything else as if he were there quantitatively [= circumscriptively]. He can also be understood and seen naturally and intuitively, not only by the angelic intellect or the separated soul but also by the bodily eye (unless there were some special impediment, as explained above [note]). And this is true not only in respect of substantial things but also of accidental. These points are clear, because positing a sufficient active [principle] and a patient disposed and approximate, action follows – or this is not to be denied unless there appear some evident argument to the contrary, or certain experience, or certain authority, none of which appear in the present case, as was said above. This is confirmed, because it is not repugnant to the intellect to be affected by something that does *not* have a quantitative mode, nor by something that *does* have a quantitative mode: for intellect to understand this or that, therefore, it is irrelevant whether it has a quantitative mode or not. For it would be remarkable if Christ existing in the host did not know where he was. Therefore I hold that every action and passion that he can have when he exists circumscriptively in place, he can have in the Eucharist (if nothing else impedes, such as the divine will, as explained above)”; Rep.4 q.7, OTh VII p.124-5/154.

240 . “I say that Christ’s body can be moved really and locally in the sacrament, because it is wherever the host is”; Rep.4 q.7, OTh VII p.120/150. Christ in heaven moves “organically” but in the eucharist “non organically”: “To move organically is to move first one part and afterwards, by means of the part moved, to move another part distant in place and situation from the part first moved, so that to move organically necessarily requires these two: first, that one part be moved locally first and, after that, by means of the first part, the second; second that between the parts of the body moved there be local distance”; Qdl.4 q.15, OTh IX p.370/410.

241 . Qdl.4 q.14, OTh IX p.371/410

242 . “I say that Christ’s intellective soul under the host can move Christ’s body non-organically. For it cannot move organically in the sacrament, because it cannot first move one part and afterwards another part by means of the first, because between the parts of [Christ’s] body, as it is there, there is no local distance, because the whole is in the whole and the whole is in every part, and therefore it cannot move one part before another because each part is together with the other. But non-organically it [Christ’s intellective soul] can move [Christ’s body] locally, because it can *will*. And I believe that it wills in fact that his body be moved with the motion of the host, and this on account of the conformity of his will to the divine will willing that host be moved in that way. And willing thus, if the host is moved, it [i.e. Christ’s intellective soul] then moves his body non-organically, because [it moves] equally firstly the whole and every one of its parts, because the whole [i.e. of Christ’s body] is with the whole and with every part, and there is no distance between parts, which is necessarily required for moving organically. And from this it is clear that when the host is moved, Christ’s intellective soul by means of his will moves Christ’s body under the host non-organically, as a partial cause concurrent with the divine will contingently causing and contingently disposing the body to be moved with the motion of the host. And this whole is because of the conformity of the human will in Christ to the divine will”; Rep.4 q.7, OTh VII p.123-4/152. Cf. Qdl.4 q.15, OTh IX p.371ff/410.

243 . See above, note .

244 . For a discussion of the articles relating to the Eucharist drawn up against Ockham in the Avignon process, see Buescher, *The Eucharistic Teaching of William of Ockham*, pp.145-150.

245 . See King, “William of Ockham: *Summa logicae*”; Moody, *The Logic of William of Ockham*. *Add other references*

246 . Ockham alludes to this text in several places, e.g. De Corp. Christi c.37, OTh X, p.213/244; 1 Dial. 2.1.

247 . ““It is to be posited thus in God, therefore thus in the creature’ does not follow”. That would lead to absurdities. *d.30 q.4, OTh IV, p.373-4/396. Some things must be posited in God that it would be absurd to posit in creatures, Ord.1 d.30 q.4, OTh vol.4 p.374/398.

248 . Above, note .

249 . Ord.1 d.2 q.11, OTh II p.364/397ff.