|
Explicit liber quintus prime partis dialogorum, docens quis potest
heretica labe maculari. Incipit liber sextus partis eiusdem, de
punitione hereticorum et specialiter pape effecti heretici investigans. |
Here ends the fifth book of the first part of the dialogues, teaching
who may be defiled by heretical stain. The sixth book of the same
part begins, investigating the punishment of heretics and especially
of the Pope who has become a heretic |
De punitione hereticorum et specialiter pape effecti heretici |
On the punishment of heretics and especially of the Pope who
has become a heretic |
Capitulum 1 |
Chapter 1 |
Discipulus: Solutiones predictarum rationum per
memetipsum satagam invenire et ideo qui possunt hereticari te
interrogare desistam, nonnulla de puniendis hereticis amodo
quesiturus. Porro quia istud opus volui fieri principaliter propter
dissensionem inter sanctissimum patrem et dominum, dominum Ioh. papam
22-um et quosdam qui ipsum de heretica pravitate diffamant, cum
quibus in hoc convenio quod papa potest heretica labe respergi licet
predictum dominum virum catholicum reputem et fidelem, ideo
principaliter in hoc libro sexto qualiter et a quo sit papa si
efficiatur hereticus feriendus investigare curabo. Verumptamen quia
papa valet de heresi tam mendaciter quam veraciter infamari, primo
inquiram de papa super crimine heresis mendaciter diffamato, secundo
de papa vere heretica labe fedato. In primis autem cupio scire an
papa habeat iudicem superiorem in terris, unde de hac re unam vel
plures assertiones cum suis motivis velis michi referre. |
Student: I shall endeavour to discover the solutions
of the preceding arguments by myself and therefore I shall cease to
question you about potential heretics. I now duly intend to raise
questions concerning the punishment to be inflicted on heretics.
Moreover, since I wanted this work to be composed principally on
account of the discord between the Most Holy Father and Lord, the
Lord Pope John XXII, and certain persons who are spreading rumours of
his heretical wickedness (I agree with them that a pope may be
spattered with heretical stain but consider the aforementioned Lord
to be a faithful and catholic man), I shall consequently in this
sixth book undertake above all to investigate in what manner and by
whom a pope is to be struck down should he become a heretic. However,
since a pope may be defamed of heresy both falsely and truthfully, I
shall initially inquire about a pope mendaciously slandered of the
crime of heresy, and secondly of a pope truly polluted by heretical
stain. But first of all I would like to know whether the pope has a
superior judge on earth. Would you then report to me one or more
positions on this issue along with their supporting argumentations. |
Magister: Circa interrogationem tuam discrepant
literati, quibusdam dicentibus quod papa non habet superiorem in
terris, aliis dicentibus quod licet nulla persona in terris sit
superior papa universalis tamen ecclesia et etiam concilium generale
est supra papam. Asserentium autem papam non habere superiorem in
terris quidam dicunt quod qui semel est canonice ad papatum assumptus
nisi renuntiaverit spontanea voluntate papatui nunquam poterit nisi
per divinam potentiam papatu iuste privari etiam si efficiatur
hereticus. Alii dicunt quod quamvis papa non habeat superiorem in
terris quamdiu est papa si tamen efficiatur hereticus ipso facto iure
divino non humano est papatu privatus et inferior factus catholicis. |
Master: The learned disagree about your question.
Some say that the pope has no superior on earth. Others contend that
while no specific person is the pope's superior on earth, the
universal church and also the general council are nevertheless above
the pope. Now of those who claim that the pope has no superior on
earth, some say that once a man has been canonically elevated to the
papal office he may never (save by divine power) be justly deprived
of the papacy, even if he becomes a heretic, unless he resigns of his
own free will. Others say that although a pope has no superior on
earth so long as he remains pope, should he happen to become a
heretic he is instantly deprived of the papacy by divine law (not by
human law) and becomes inferior to catholics. |
Discipulus: Allega primo pro assertione in qua
diversi conveniunt scilicet quod papa non habet iudicem superiorem in terris. |
Student: Begin with representations for the
assertion with which these [latter] opposite parties agree, namely,
that the pope has no superior judge on earth. |
Magister: Hoc auctoritatibus et rationibus nonnulli
probare conantur. Hoc enim Innocentius papa ut habetur 9 q. 3 c. Nemo
sentire videtur, ait enim: "nemo iudicabit primam sedem
iustitiam temperare desiderantem, neque enim ab augusto neque ab omni
clero neque a regibus neque a populo iudex iudicabitur". Ex
quibus verbis datur intelligi quod etiam universalis ecclesia non est
papa superior cum clerus et populus qui secundum predicta verba
Innocentii papam nequeant iudicare ecclesiam universalem constituant.
Ex quo sequitur quod etiam concilium generale non est supra papam.
Item, Symachus papa ut habetur eisdem causa et questione c. Aliorum,
ait: "aliorum hominum causas Deus voluit terminare per
homines sedis istius presulem suo sine questione reservavit
arbitrio". Ex quo habetur quod solus Deus est superior presule
sedis apostolice. |
Master: Many attempt to prove this by authorities
and arguments. Indeed, Pope Innocent seems to hold this view for he
states in 9 q. 1 c. Nemo [col. 610] that "no one is to
judge the first see when it is establishing justice; the judge will
be judged neither by the emperor, nor by all the clergy, nor by kings
nor by the people". One gathers from these words that even the
universal church is not the pope's superior, since it is made up of
the very clergy and people who, according to the cited words of
Innocent, are not competent to judge the pope. From which it follows
that the general council is likewise not above the pope. Again: Pope
Symachus states (we have it in c. Aliorum [col. 610] of the
same canon law context): "God willed that the cases of other men
were to be decided by men; He reserved without question the head of
this see for His own judgment". From this one concludes that God
alone is superior to the head of the Apostolic see. |
Discipulus: Dicerent alii quod Symachus papa
loquitur de aliis causis quam de causis heresis, et ideo, non
obstantibus verbis eiusdem, papa habet superiorem in causis heresis. |
Student: Others would say that Pope Symachus is
speaking of cases other than cases of heresy and therefore,
notwithstanding his words, the pope has a superior in cases of heresy. |
Magister: Ista responsio impugnatur quia sicut ex
dictis sanctorum patrum colligitur, ubi canon non excipit nec nos
debemus excipere, cum ergo canon Symachi pape causam heresis
nequaquam excipiat nec nos causam heresis debemus excipere. Hoc etiam
patet quia verba indistincte prolata generaliter debent intelligi, ut
papa in omni causa divino servetur arbitrio. Tertia auctoritas ad
predictam assertionem est Antheri pape qui ut in predictis causa et
quaestione c. Facta , ait: "facta subditorum
iudicantur a nobis, nostra vero a Domino iudicantur". Papa ergo
superiorem iudicem non habet in terris. Quarta auctoritas est
Constantini imperatoris qui, ut legitur 12 q. 1 c. Futuram
"presidens sancte synodo que apud Nicenam congregata est, cum
querelam quorundam coram se conspiceret deferendam ait: 'vos a nemine
diiudicari potestis quia Dei solius iudicio reservamini, dii etenim
vocati estis et idcirco non potestis ab hominibus iudicari'". Ex
quibus verbis datur intelligi quod clerici non possunt a laicis
iudicari et per consequens multo fortius caput clericorum scilicet
summus pontifex nequit ab alio iudicari. |
Master: This response is challenged because, as one
gathers from statements by holy fathers, where a canon makes no
exception neither must we. Since the canon of Pope Symachus by no
means excepts the case of heresy, we cannot except this case either.
The same point is evident from the dictum that words stated
indistinctly must be understood comprehensively, and hence the pope
is to be reserved for divine judgment in every case. The third
authority in support of the aforecited assertion is that of Pope
Antherius (in the same context [col. 610-611] at c. Facta)
who declares: "the deeds of subjects are judged by us, but our
deeds are judged by the Lord". Therefore the pope has no
superior judge on earth. The fourth authority is that of Emperor
Constantine. We read in 12 q. 1 c. Futuram [col. 682] that
"presiding over the holy synod which was gathered at Nicea, when
he [Constantine] noticed that a dispute between some [bishops] was on
the verge of being brought before him for judgment, he said: 'you may
be judged by no one, because you are reserved for the judgment of God
alone, for you are called 'gods' and thus you cannot be judged by
men'". From these words we understand that clerks cannot be
judged by laymen, and consequently all the more strongly the head of
the clerks, namely the supreme pontiff, cannot be judged by another. |
Quinta auctoritas ad idem est Gelasii pape qui ut habetur 9 q. 3 c. Ipsi
loquens de apostolica sede ait: "ipsi sunt canones qui
appellationes totius ecclesie ad huius sedis examen voluerunt
deferre, ab ipsa vero nunquam prorsus appellare debere sanxerunt, ac
per hoc illam de tota ecclesia iudicare, ipsam ad nullius commeare
iudicium nec de eius umquam preceperunt iudicari iudicio". Ex
quibus verbis datur intelligi quod de summo pontifice non licet toti
ecclesie iudicare sed ipse habet de tota ecclesia iudicare. Cum ergo
nec persona nec aliqua congregatio in terris sit superior tota
ecclesia, nec papa qui est supra totam ecclesiam potest aliqua
congregatio vel persona superior reperiri. Sexta auctoritas est
Nicholai pape qui, ut habetur causa et questione predictis c. Patet,
ait: "patet profecto sedis apostolice cuius auctoritate maius
non est iudicium a nemine fore retractandum, neque cuiquam de eius
liceat iudicio iudicare". Ex quibus habetur quod nemini licet de
summo pontifice iudicare et per consequens non habet superiorem in terris. |
The fifth authority in favour of the same assertion is that of Pope
Gelasius. Speaking of the Apostolic see (we have this in 9 q. 3 c. Ipsi)[col.
611] he states: "these are the canons which willed the referral
of appeals from the entire church to the scrutiny of this see, while
decreeing that at no time was it ever allowed to appeal therefrom,
and thereby these [canons] ordered that this see was to judge the
whole church, while being called to the judgment of no one, nor was
its own judgment ever to be subject to judicial review". From
these words we understand that the whole church is not allowed to
judge the pope, but it is his function to judge the whole church.
Therefore since neither a person nor some congregation on earth is
superior to the entire church, it is impossible to find a person or
some congregation which is superior to the pope, who is himself above
the entire church. The sixth authority is that of Pope Nicholas (we
have it in the same context at c. Patet) [col. 609] who
states: "It is unquestionably clear that the judgment of the
Apostolic see (there is no greater authority) is to be reviewed by no
one, nor is anyone allowed to judge its decision". From this we
gather that no one has the right to judge the supreme pontiff, and
consequently that he has no superior on earth. |
Discipulus: Puto quod qui posset ad istas
auctoritates rationabiliter respondere omnes alias eandem sententiam
pretendentes sine difficultate dissolveret. Ideo ista sufficiant.
Signa tamen ubi poterunt alie inveniri que sonare videntur quod papa
non habet iudicem superiorem in terris. |
Student: I think that one who could reasonably
respond to these authorities would be able, without difficulty, to
solve all the others claiming the same point. Therefore these are
sufficient. Indicate however where additional authorities might be
found which appear to suggest that the pope has no superior judge on earth. |
Magister: Ad hoc poterit allegari auctoritas
Nicholai pape di. 21 c. Nunc autem, et di. 22 c. Qua
traditione et 2 q. 7 Petrus. |
Master: The authority of Pope Nicholas in di. 21 c. Nunc
autem [col. 71], and di. 22 c. Qua traditione [col.
75], and 2 q. 7 Petrus [col. 496], might be adduced to this end. |
Discipulus: Pro eadem assertione rationes adducas. |
Student: Provide arguments in favour of the same assertion. |
Magister: Prima ratio talis est. Ille a quo non
licet appellare non habet superiorem in terries, quia ab omni
inferiori ad superiorem licite est appellare (2 q. 7 Placuit).
Sed a papa appellare non licet (9 q. 3 c. Ipsi et c. Cuncta),
ergo papa non habet iudicem superiorem in terris. Secunda ratio
talis est. Ille qui est omnibus superior non habet superiorem quia
non potest respectu eiusdem vel eorumdem esse superior et inferior.
Sed papa est omnibus catholicis superior cum sit omnium caput, igitur
non habet iudicem superiorem in terris. Tertia ratio talis est. Qui
non potest ab aliquo accusari non habet iudicem superiorem. Sed papa
non potest ab aliquo accusari quia pastor ab ovibus accusari non
potest (6 q. 1 Oves et 2 q. 7 Petrus). Omnes autem
catholici sunt oves cure et regimini pape commisse. Igitur ipsum
accusare non possunt et per consequens a nemine potest iudicari. |
Master: The first argument is this. He from whom it
is not permitted to appeal does not have a superior on earth, because
one is allowed to appeal from any inferior to a superior (2 q. 7 c. Placuit)[col.
501]. But it is not permitted to appeal from the pope (9 q. 3 c. Ipsi
[col. 611]and c. Cuncta [col. 611]). Therefore
the pope has no superior judge on earth. The second argument is
this. He who is superior to everyone does not have a superior,
because one cannot be both superior and inferior with respect to
another. But the pope is superior to all catholics since he is the
head of all, therefore he does not have a superior on earth. The
third argument is this. He who cannot be the subject of someone's
accusation does not have a superior judge. But the pope cannot be
accused by someone, because the shepherd cannot be accused by the
sheep (6 q. 1 Oves [col. 555] and 2 q. 7 Petrus
[col. 496]). Now all catholics are sheep entrusted to the care and
the rule of the pope. Hence they cannot accuse him and consequently
he may be judged by no one. |
Capitulum 2 |
Chapter 2 |
Discipulus: Noli multiplicare rationes pro hac
parte, sed motiva dicentium quod papa habet superiorem in terris enarra. |
Student: Do not multiply arguments in favour of this
view, and propound the reasons of those who say that the pope has a
superior on earth. |
Magister: Quod papa etiam manens papa habeat iudicem
superiorem in terris nonnulli multis rationibus probare nituntur.
Modi tamen ponendi sunt diversi. Quidam enim dicunt quod imperator
vel aliquis alius iudex et princeps secularis aut populus seu
multitudo aliqua est iudex ordinarius pape. Alii vero dicunt quod nec
ecclesia universalis nec aliqua alia congregatio aut persona habet
potestatem requirendi vel cohercendi papam nisi in duobus casibus.
Primus est si papa fuerit de heresi graviter infamatus licet falso,
secundus est si in aliquo crimine de quo scandalizetur ecclesia sit
notorie deprehensus et ipse incorrigibilem se ostendat. |
Master: Some try to demonstrate that the pope has a
superior judge on earth even when he remains a pope, and they adduce
many arguments. But they have different ways of putting this. For
some say that the emperor or another judge and secular ruler, or the
people or some multitude, is the normal judge of the pope. While
others say that neither the universal church nor any other
congregation or person has the power of summoning or coercing the
pope except in two cases. The first is if the pope were seriously if
falsely slandered of heresy, the second is if he were notoriously
involved in some crime which would scandalize the church and showed
himself to be incorrigible. |
Discipulus: Prosequere primo primam opinionem quia
quamvis putem eam hereticam, qualiter tamen assertores ipsius eam
fundare conantur, et quomodo ad rationes et auctoritates in
contrarium respondere nitantur gratia exercitii ut acutius veritatem
intelligam scire desidero. |
Student: Proceed initially with the first opinion,
for although I believe it to be heretical I would nevertheless like
to know (for the sake of argument and so as to understand the truth
more acutely) how its proponents attempt to underpin it and how they
try to respond to the arguments and authorities which oppose it. |
Magister: Pro predicta assertione potest primo sic
argui. Ille qui nullam habet iurisdictionem
coactivam imperatori aut regi vel alii principi aut populo est
subiectus, quia qui nulli alteri est prepositus alicui est subditus,
aliter enim nullum ordinem ad alios homines nec superioritatis nec
inferioritatis haberet. Vbi autem non est ordo ibi est confusio;
confusio autem inter homines inveniri non debet. Qui ergo quantum ad
iurisdictionem coactivam nulli est prepositus quantum ad
iurisdictionem coactivam alicui est subiectus. Sed papa ex
ordinatione Christi super alios nullam habet iurisdictionem
coactivam. Igitur quantum ad iurisdictionem coactivam alicui est
subiectus et nonnisi imperatori aut regi vel principi. Igitur alicui
predictorum est papa subiectus et ita aliquis predictorum est iudex
ordinarius pape. |
Master: One may first argue for
the aforestated opinion in this way. He who possesses no coercive
jurisdiction is subject to the emperor, to the king, or to another
prince or people, because whoever does not rule over another is
subject to someone. For otherwise he would have no order of status
(either of superiority or inferiority) with respect to other men. But
where there is no order of status confusion reigns; and confusion
must not exist among men. Therefore he who is the coercive ruler of
no one is subject to someone as to coercive jurisdiction. But the
pope by Christ's dispensation has no coercice jurisdiction over
others, therefore in this matter he is subject to someone, and only
to emperor, king, or prince. Therefore the pope is subject to one of
these, and hence one of them is the normal judge of the pope. |
Capitulum 3 |
Chapter 3 |
Discipulus: Quamvis asserere quod papa super alios
non habet iurisdictionem coactivam sit hereticum reputandum, ut
arbitror, dic tamen quomodo predicti assertores hoc probare nituntur. |
Student: Although it must be considered heretical, I
believe, to assert that the pope does not have coercive jurisdiction
over others, state nevertheless how the aforementioned theorists
attempt to prove this. |
Magister: Hoc auctoritatibus scripture divine et
sanctorum moliuntur ostendere. Primo autem auctoritate Christi
dicentis apostolis Matth. 20: "scitis quia principes gentium
dominantur eorum et qui maiores sunt potestatem exercent in eos, non
ita erit inter vos, sed quicumque voluerit inter vos maior fieri sit
vester minister et qui voluerit inter vos primus esse erit vester
servus". Ex quibus verbis datur intelligi quod maioritas et
primitas illius qui est maior et primus inter omnes discipulos
Christi cuiusmodi sunt omnes christiani in ministrando et serviendo
consistit et per consequens iurisdictionem coactivam super alios
nullatenus habet. |
Master: They try to point this out by the
authorities of holy writ and of saints. And indeed to begin with by
the authority of Christ saying to the apostles in Matthew 20(:25-27):
"Ye know that the princes of the gentiles exercise dominion over
them, and they that are great exercise authority upon them. But it
shall not be so among you: but whosoever will be great among you, let
him be your minister; and whosoever will be chief among you let him
be your servant". [Marsilius of Padua, Defensor Pacis,
II.iv.13] From these words we understand that the greatness and
primacy of him who is great and first among all the disciples of
Christ (all Christians are such disciples) consists in ministry and
service, and that consequently he in no way possesses coercive
jurisdiction over others. |
Discipulus: Ministerium et servitium pape consistit
in regendo et gubernando gregem sibi commissum, quod nequaquam facere
posset nisi iurisdictionem coactivam haberet, nec obviat quod papa
debet esse minister et servus nam etiam iudex temporalis puniendo
malefactores minister est iuxta sententiam Apostoli ad Rom. 13. |
Student: The ministry and service of the pope
consists in ruling and governing the flock entrusted to him, which he
could by no means do unless he possessed coercive jurisdiction. Nor
is the pope's duty to be minister and servant an obstacle, for even a
temporal judge when punishing wrongdoers is a "minister"
according to the pronouncement of the Apostle in Romans 13[:4]. |
Magister: Hanc responsionem dicunt Christum
excludere, cum sic ministerium et servitium imponit maiori et primo
inter suos discipulos quod ei exercendi potestatem in alios
interdicit dicens: "qui maiores sunt potestatem exercent in eos,
non ita erit inter vos etc." Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod
Christus ministro et servo aliorum christianorum potestatem exercendi
in alios interdicit et ita ab eo iurisdictionem coactivam excludit, quia
inutilis et superflua est iurisdictio coactiva que non debet
potestatem in maleficos exercere. Cum vero dicis quod iudex
temporalis est minister secundum Apostolum respondetur quod male
allegas Apostolum quia non dicit Apostolus quod potestas est minister
subditorum sed dicit quod est minister Dei. Christus autem voluit
quod primus inter christianos esset minister non solum Dei sed etiam aliorum. |
Master: They say that Christ excludes this
explanation since he assigns ministry and service to the greater and
first among his disciples in such manner as to forbid him the
exercise of power over others, saying "they that are great
exercise authority upon them, but it shall not be so among you
etc." From these words one infers that to the minister and
servant of other Christians Christ forbids the exercise of power over
others, and thus excludes coercive jurisdiction from him, because
coercive jurisdiction which must not exercise power over wrongdoers
is useless and superfluous. Moreover when you say that a temporal
judge is a minister according to the Apostle, the answer is that you
misunderstand the Apostle, because the Apostle does not say that
"power" is the minister of subjects, he rather says that it
is the minister of God. But Christ wanted the first among Christians
to be not only a minister of God but also of others. |
Discipulus: Probantne aliter quod papa non habet
iurisdictionem coactivam super alios. |
Student: Do they prove in some other way that the
pope does not possess coercive jurisdiction over others? |
Magister: Hoc etiam probant sic. Papa non habet
maiorem iurisdictionem coactivam quam habuit Christus cuius est
vicarius. Sed Christus non habuit in quantum homo mortalis
iurisdictionem coactivam. Tum quia iurisdictio coactiva sine divitiis
vel adiutorio habentium divitias convenienter exerceri non potest et
per consequens inutiliter retineretur. Christus autem omnes divitias
necessarias ad iurisdictionem coactivam exercendam quo ad dominium
penitus abdicavit, victu et vestitu contentus. Adiutorio etiam
divitum ad eandem iurisdictionem exercendam minime utebatur. Ergo
coactivam iurisdictionem in quantum homo mortalis non habuit. Tum
quia, ipso testante, ministrare venit non ministrari ergo non venit
iurisdictionem coactivam exercere ergo eam non habuit, tum quia
Christus opus quod sibi Pater imposuit, consummavit, ipso testante
qui ait Ioh. 17: "opus consummavi quod dedisti michi ut
faciam". Christus autem iurisdictionem coactivam nequaquam
exercuit ergo iurisdictionem coactivam a Patre non accepit inquantum
erat homo mortalis, quia si eam accepisset et nequaquam exercuisset
de malitia vel negligentia fuisset merito arguendus quia officium
sine opere tenuisset. |
Master: They also prove it as follows. The pope does
not have greater coercive jurisdiction than did Christ whose vicar he
is. But Christ as a mortal man did not have
coercive jurisdiction, since, to begin with, coercive jurisdiction
without an abundance of riches or the assistance of the wealthy
cannot be adequately exercised and consequently would be uselessly
retained. Christ, however, completely abdicated ownership of all
possessions necessary for exercising coercive jurisdiction, and was
content with bare access to food and clothing. Nor did he use the
help of the rich to exercise such coercive jurisdiction. Therefore he
did not have coercive jurisdiction as a mortal man. Furthermore, as
he himself witnessed, he came to ministrate and not to be ministrated
to, therefore he did not come to exercise coercive jurisdiction and
thus he did not possess it. And finally, Christ
completed the task which God the Father had entrusted to him, as he
witnesses when he states in John 17[:4] : "I have finished the
work which Thou gavest me to do". Yet Christ by no means
exercised coercive jurisdiction, therefore he did not as a mortal man
receive coercive jurisdiction from God the Father, because had he
received it and never exercised it, he might justly have been accused
of wicked conduct or negligence, since he would have held an office
without performance. |
Discipulus: Hic errant aperte quia evangelica
testatur historia quod Christus iurisdictionem exercuit coactivam cum
Christus de templo vendentes et ementes violenter eiecit ut legitur
Matth. 21 Mar. 11 Luc. 19 et Joh. 2. |
Student: In this instance they are clearly wrong,
because the Gospel story witnesses that Christ exercised coercive
jurisdiction when he violently expelled buyers and sellers from the
temple, as we read in Matthew 21[:12], Mark 11[:11], Luke 19[:45],
and John 2[:15]. |
Magister: Ipsi asserunt te hic errare propter duo.
Primo quia eiicere vendentes et ementes de templo et alia facere que
tunc Christus exercuit ad iurisdictionem coactivam non pertinent, nec
Christus tunc officium prelati vel summi sacerdotis exercuit sed
officium hostiarii tunc assumpsit teste Magistro Sententiarum qui ut
habetur libro 4 di. 24 ait: "hoc officium, scilicet
hostiariorum, Dominus in sua persona suscepit quando flagello de
funiculis facto vendentes et ementes de templo eiecit. Ipse enim se
hostiarium significans dicit 'ego sum hostium, per me si quis
introierit etc.'". Predictum ergo officium quod Christus tunc
exercuit ad hostiarios spectat. Hostiarii autem ex officio suo nullam
iurisdictionem coactivam noscuntur habere. Ergo per illud exemplum
probare non potes quod Christus iurisdictionem habuit coactivam.
Secundo dicunt te errare quia Christus in quantum summus sacerdos si
habuit iurisdictionem non habuit eam nisi respectu fidelium et in eum
credentium quia ad eum de hiis qui foris erant in quantum summus
sacerdos non pertinuit iudicare. Christus autem tunc eiecit infideles
de templo, igitur hoc non fecit in quantum sacerdos sed in quantum
hostiarius cuius est absque iurisdictione non solum malos fideles sed
etiam infideles de templo eiicere. Ex hiis concludunt quod Christus
in quantum sacerdos nunquam iurisdictionem exercuit coactivam, ergo
non habuit. |
Master: They contend that it is you who are wrong
here, and for two reasons. First: because to expel buyers and sellers
from the temple and to do the other things which Christ performed at
that time are matters not relevant to coercive jurisdiction. On
that occasion Christ did not exercise the function of a prelate or
high priest but assumed the office of a janitor, as witnesses the
Master of the Sentences [Peter Lombard] who states in book 4 chapter
24 [of the Sentences]: "this office, namely that of janitors,
the Lord assumed in his person when, having made a whip of thin
cords, he expelled the buyers and sellers from the temple. Indeed he
explains his janitor function when he says 'I am the door. If someone
enters through me etc. [John 10:9]'" Therefore the aforestated
office which Christ then exercised pertains to janitors. But janitors
are known to possess no coercive jurisdiction by their function. Thus
you cannot prove by this example that Christ had coercive
jurisdiction. Second: they say you are wrong because even if Christ
had possessed jurisdiction as high priest, he would not have had it
except with respect to the faithful and to those who believed in him,
for it would not have been his function as high priest to pass
judgment on religious outsiders. And at the time Christ had [also]
expelled unbelievers from the temple. Therefore he did not do this as
a priest but as a janitor, to whom it pertains (with no jurisdiction
attached) to expel from the temple not only sinful believers but also
those who are not of the faith. From these points they conclude that
Christ as a priest never exercised coercive jurisdiction, therefore
he did not have it. |
Discipulus: Licet Christus habuerit iurisdictionem
coactivam eam tamen nequaquam exercuit quia inter suos discipulos non
erant malefici in quos debuit iurisdictionem coactivam exercere, nec
tamen propter hoc caruit iurisdictione tali, sicut si rex non haberet
subditos nisi bonos non propter hoc iurisdictione careret. |
Student: Although Christ did have coercive
jurisdiction he by no means exercised it, because there were no
wrongdoers among his disciples against whom he would have had the
duty to use coercive jurisdiction. This did not mean that he lacked
such jurisdiction. After all, if a king only had law-abiding subjects
he would not on that account lack jurisdiction. |
Magister: Istud excludunt per hoc quod nonnulli
discipuli Christi graviter deliquerunt apostatantes a fide quam
susceperant. Ioh. enim 6 sic legitur: "multi discipulorum eius
abierunt retro". Non ergo propter defectum materie sed propter
iurisdictionis coactive carentiam Christus in delinquentes potestatem
aut vindictam nequaquam exercuit. Ex hiis concludunt quod Christus in
quantum summus pontifex iurisdictionem non habuit coactivam. Ergo nec
papa iurisdictionem obtinet coactivam, quod etiam auctoritatibus
probare nituntur. Origenes enim super illud Matth. 20 "reges
gentium etc." ait: "scitis quia principes gentium
dominantur eorum, id est non contenti tantum regere suos subiectos
violenter eis dominari nituntur. Inter vos autem qui estis mei non
erunt hec quoniam sicut omnia carnalia in necessitate sint posita
spiritualia autem in voluntate sic et qui principes sunt spirituales
id est prelati principatus eorum in dilectione debet esse positus non
in timore". Ex quibus verbis datur intelligi quod totus
principatus prelatorum ecclesie et per consequens summi pontificis in
voluntate et dilectione non in timore debet consistere. Igitur diligi
debent non timeri. Qui autem iurisdictione coactiva utuntur a malis
timentur, teste Apostolo ad Rom. 13 qui ait: "si autem
malefeceris time" scilicet potestatem. Ergo prelati ecclesiarum
iurisdictione coactiva uti non debent. |
Master: They reject your response in this way. A
number of Christ's disciples gravely misbehaved, becoming apostates
from the faith they had accepted. For we read in John 6[:66] that
"many of his disciples went back". It is therefore not due
to an absence of punishable deeds but because of his lack of coercive
jurisdiction that Christ never exercised power or retribution upon
the delinquents. From which they conclude that Christ as high priest
did not possess coercive jurisdiction. Therefore neither does the
pope obtain coercive jurisdiction. They attempt
to prove this contention by further authorities. Thus, Origen on the
text of Matthew 20[:25-26] "the princes of the gentiles
etc." states: " 'Ye know that the princes of the gentiles
exercise dominion over them', that is to say not satisfied with
merely governing their subjects they attempt to violently dominate
them. 'But it shall not be so among you' who are mine. For just as
all material things are in the realm of necessity while spiritual
things are of free will, so those who are spiritual princes, that is
prelates, must possess a rulership based on love and not on
fear". [Marsilius, II.iv.13] From these words we gather that the
whole rulership of the prelates of the church (and consequently of
the supreme pontiff) must consist in love, not in fear. Therefore
they must be loved, not feared. But those who use coercive
jurisdiction are feared by evildoers, witness the Apostle in Romans
13[:4], who states: "But if thou do that which is evil, be
afraid" namely, of authority. Therefore the prelates of churches
must not use coercive jurisdiction. |
Hoc etiam Chrysostomus ibidem sentire videtur, ait enim:
"principes mundi ideo sunt ut dominentur minoribus suis et eos
servituti subiciant et expolient et usque ad mortem eis utantur ad
suam utilitatem et gloriam. Principes autem ecclesie fiunt ut
serviant minoribus et ministrent eis quecunque acceperunt a Christo
ut suas utilitates negligant et illorum procurent". Ex quibus
verbis patet distinctio inter principes seculares et principes
ecclesiarum, quia principes seculares suis subditis dominantur,
principes autem ecclesie minoribus serviunt et ministrant. Ergo in
eos iurisdictionem coactivam exercere non valent. Hiis etiam
Ambrosius concordare videtur qui, ut recitatur 23 q. 8 c. Convenior
, ait: "dolere potero, flere potero, gemere potero,
adversus arma milites Gothosquoque lacrime mee mea arma sunt, talia
enim munimenta sunt sacerdotis, aliter nec debeo nec possum
resistere". Ex quibus verbis habetur quod sacerdos orationibus
et lacrimis debet malis resistere et non per potentiam temporalem, et
per consequens non habet iurisdictionem coactivam. |
Chrysostomus also appears to express a similar opinion about this
text [Matthew 20:25-27], for he states: "the rulers of the world
exist to dominate their lesser brethren, subject them to slavery,
despoil them, and use them unto death for their own service and
glory. But the rulers of the church are created to serve the small
and ministrate unto them all that they have received from Christ, to
the point of neglecting their own utilities so as to promote those of
the lesser brethren". [Marsilius, II.iv.13] From these words a
distinction between secular rulers and the rulers of churches clearly
emerges, for secular rulers dominate their subjects, while rulers of
churches serve and ministrate to lesser brethren. Therefore they have
no authority to exercise coercive jurisdiction over them. Ambrose too
seems to be in agreement with these views. He states (we have this in
23 q. 8 c. Convenior)[col. 960] : "I may grieve, I may
weep, I may groan, against arms, soldiers, and Goths my tears are my
weapons, for those are the defences of the priest. I neither can nor
ought to resist by other means". [Marsilius, II.v.5] From these
words we learn that a priest must resist evildoers by prayers and
tears, and not by temporal force, and consequently that he does not
have coercive jurisdiction. |
Quod etiam Chrysostomus in libro suo Dialogorum qui De dignitate
sacerdotali intitulatur lib. 2 cap. 3 super illud Apostoli 2 Cor. 1
"non quia dominamur fidei vestre" apertissime sentire
videtur. Ait enim: "hii qui foris sunt iudices malignos quosque
cum subdiderint ostendunt in eis plurimam potestatem et eos invitos a
priorum morum pravitate compescunt, in ecclesia vero non coactum sed
acquiescentem oportet ad meliora converti quia nec nobis a legibus
data est talis potestas ut auctoritate sententie cohibeamus homines a
delictis". Clarius dici non posset quod ecclesia non habet
iurisdictionem coactivam, cum in ecclesia nullus debeat ad meliora
cogi nec aliquis debeat cohiberi per iudicialem sententiam a
delictis. Item, ad habentem iurisdictionem coactivam spectat negotiis
secularibus implicari quia ad ipsum pertinet contentiones et lites
dirimere. Contentiones autem lites et rixe inter negotia secularia
computantur (Extra Ne clerici vel monachi secularibus negotiis se immisceant
c. 1). Sed ad summum pontificem non pertinet secularibus negotiis
implicari, teste Apostolo 2 Tim. 2 qui ait: "nemo militans
implicat se negotiis secularibus". Ergo ad summum pontificem ex
ordinatione Christi non pertinet iurisdictio coactiva. |
Chrysostomus likewise seems to accept this, and most openly too, in
his volume of dialogues which is entitled Concerning the priestly
dignity. In book 2, chapter 3 thereof, commenting on the Apostle's
text from 2 Corinthians 1[:24] "not for that we have dominion
over your faith" he states: "Outsider judges demonstrate
potent authority against their evildoing subjects, and force them
against their will to abandon the wickedness of their prior
behaviour, but in the church it is required that we convert to better
actions a person who is not coerced but consenting, for indeed
neither are we given by the laws such power as to restrain men from
crimes through the authority of a legal judgment". [Marsilius,
II.v.6] It cannot be stated more clearly that the church does not
possess coercive jurisdiction, since in the church no one must be
forced to do better actions nor can someone be restrained from crimes
by a judicial sentence. Furthermore: he who has coercive jurisdiction
needs to be involved in secular affairs, for it is his task to settle
disputes and lawsuits, and disputes, lawsuits and quarrels are
classified as secular issues (Extra, Ne clerici vel monachi
secularibus negotiis se immisceant, c. 1). But is it not the
business of the supreme pontiff to be involved in secular affairs, as
the Apostle witnesses (2 Timothy 2[:4]) who states: "No man that
warreth entangleth himself with the affairs of this life".
[Marsilius, II.v.1] Therefore coercive jurisdiction does not pertain
to the pope by Christ's dispensation. |
Item, papa non habet maiorem iurisdictionem ex ordinatione Christi
quam habuit beatus Petrus. Sed beatus Petrus et alii apostoli
iurisdictionem coactivam a Christo minime acceperunt. Ergo nec papa
habet iurisdictionem coactivam ex ordinatione Christi. Maior est
manifesta. Minor probatur auctoritate beati Bernardi qui in libro ad
Eugenium papam ait: "non monstrabunt, puto, qui hoc dicerent ubi
aliquando quispiam apostolorum iudex sederit hominum", et parum
post: "stetisse denique lego apostolos iudicandos, sedisse
iudicantes non lego, erit illud, non fuit". Ex quibus verbis
datur intelligi quod apostoli iudices hominum non fuerunt. Ergo
beatus Petrus iurisdictionem non habuit coactivam. Hoc etiam quod
apostoli iudices hominum non fuerunt beatus Gregorius sentire
videtur. Tractans enim illa verba Apostoli "secularia igitur
iudicia si habueritis etc." in Moralibus, ait: "hii
terrenas causas examinent qui exteriorum rerum sapientiam
perceperunt, qui autem spiritualibus dotati sunt terrenis non debent
negotiis implicari ut dum non coguntur inferiora bona disponere
valeant bonis superioribus deservire". Cum ergo apostoli maximis
bonis spiritualibus fuerint dotati ipsi non erant circa causas
hominum et lites aliqualiter occupati, quod glossa super illud ad
Cor. "secularia igitur iudicia si habueritis etc." aperte
sentire videtur, ait enim: "contemptibiles id est aliquos
sapientes qui tamen sunt minoris meriti constituite ad iudicandum.
Apostoli enim circumeuntes talibus non vacabant. Sapientes igitur qui
in locis consistebant fideles et sancti non qui huc atque illuc
propter evangelium discurrebant talium negotiorum examinatores esse
voluit". Hiis verbis ostenditur quod apostoli causis hominum
terminandis minime insistebant. Ex quo infertur quod non acceperant
iurisdictionem coactivam a Christo, quia omne officium iniunctum eis
a Christo diligentissime perfecerunt. |
Again: the pope does not possess greater jurisdiction by Christ's
dispensation than did blessed Peter. Yet blessed Peter and the other
apostles did not receive coercive jurisdiction from Christ. Therefore
neither does the pope have coercive jurisdiction by Christ's
dispensation. The major premiss is self-evident. The minor is proved
by the authority of blessed Bernard, who states in the book to Pope
Eugenius: "They will not show, I think, those who would say
this, where at some time any of the apostles sat as a judge of
men", and a little further: "in short I read that the
apostles had stood up to be judged, I do not read that they had sat
as judges, something yet to be, not something that was".
[Marsilius, II.v.3] From these words we understand that the apostles
were not judges of men. Therefore blessed Peter did not possess
coercive jurisdiction. That the apostles were not judges of men also
appears to be the opinion of blessed Gregory. For commenting on these
words of the Apostle, viz. "if then ye have judgments of things
pertaining to this life" [1 Corinthians 6:4], he states in the
Ethics: "those who have acquired the wisdom of external things
examine earthly causes, but those spiritually gifted must not be
involved in worldly affairs, so that by not being forced to manage
inferior goods, they may devote themselves to superior ones".
[Marsilius, II.v.2] Therefore as the apostles were gifted with the
greatest of spiritual goods, they were not in any way occupied with
the causes and lawsuits of men. This appears to be the evident
opinion of the gloss on the following passage in Corinthians "if
then ye have judgments of things pertaining to this life", which
states: " 'set them to judge who are least esteemed' that is to
say, some wise and yet less worthy men. For the apostles on their
rounds did not concern themselves with such matters. Thus he [Paul]
wanted wise, holy and faithful men who were local residents to be the
scrutineers of such affairs, and not those who traveled hither and
thither for the sake of spreading the gospel". [Marsilius,
II.v.2] These words show that the apostles did not focus on settling
the worldly affairs of men. From which one deduces that they did not
receive coercive jurisdiction from Christ, because they carried out
with utmost diligence every office imposed on them by Christ. |
Discipulus: In scriptura divina habetur aperte quod
beatus Petrus iurisdictionem habuit coactivam cum ex potestate
officii Ananiam et Saphiram morti tradiderit, teste beato Gregorio in
Dialogo qui, ut recitatur 23 q. 8 c. Petrus ait: "Petrus
qui Tabitam mortuam orando suscitavit, Ananiam et Saphiram
mentientes morti increpando tradidit, neque enim orasse in eorum
extinctione legitur sed solummodo culpam quam perpetraverant
increpasse.Constat ergo quod aliquando talia ex potestate exhibentur
aliquando ex postulatione dum et istis increpando vitam abstulit et
illi reddidit orando". Ex quibus verbis habetur quod beatus
Petrus ex potestate usus est iurisdictione coactiva. |
Student: Holy writ clearly informs us that blessed
Peter possessed coercive jurisdiction, since he inflicted death on
Ananias and Sapphira by official authority, as blessed Gregory
witnesses in the Dialogue (this is recited in 23 q. 8 c. Petrus)[col.
956-957] where he states: "Peter who resuscitated the late
Tabita by praying, cursed the lying Ananias and Sapphira to their
deaths. Nor do we read that he prayed for their end but only that he
inveighed against the fault they had committed. And so it is plain
that sometimes such effects are the result of power and sometimes of
prayer, since he both took away the life of the latter by harshly
complaining and gave it back to the former by praying". From
these words we gather that blessed Peter used coercive jurisdiction
with authority. |
Magister: Ad hoc respondent quod verba Gregorii male
intelligis. Non enim asserit Gregorius quod beatus Petrus ex
potestate officii sui predictos Ananiam et Saphiram morti tradiderit.
Tunc enim iudex in causa sanguinis extitisset, quod universis
clericis noscitur interdictum. Sed beatus Petrus non ex potestate
officii sed ex potestate faciendi miracula, quam Deus persone non
officio papatus concesserat, morti tradidit supradictos. Nonnunquam
autem facit quis absque oratione miracula. Et ita ex hoc probari non
potest quod Petrus iurisdictionem habuit coactivam. |
Master: To this they answer that you misunderstand
the words of Gregory. For Gregory does not claim that blessed Peter
procured the deaths of the aforesaid Ananias and Sapphira by the
power of his office. In that case he would have become judge in a
capital case which is known to be forbidden to all clerks. But
blessed Peter procured the deaths of the aforesaid not through the
power of office but through the power of effecting miracles, which
God had granted to his person and not to the papal office. For
sometimes one may effect miracles without prayer. And therefore it
cannot be proved from this that Peter possessed coercive jurisdiction. |
Capitulum 4 |
Chapter 4 |
Discipulus: Circa hanc rationem primam te nimium
dilatasti, ideo compleas alias rationes, nam
de potestate pape in tractatu secundo de doctrina domini pape magis
diffuse tractabimus. |
Student: You have spent too much time on this first
argument. Therefore complete the other ones, for
we shall be examining papal authority more extensively in the second
treatise, which will deal with the doctrine of the Lord Pope [John XXII]. |
Magister: Secunda ratio ad probandum quod imperator
vel princeps alius secularis aut populus sit iudex ordinarius pape
talis est. Papa non est magis exemptus a iurisdictione imperatoris
quam fuit Christus in quantum fuit homo mortalis, sed Christus in
quantum fuit homo mortalis subiectus fuit iurisdictioni imperatoris,
ergo et papa modo similiter, et per consequens imperator est iudex
ordinarius domini pape. Maior istius rationis
probatione videtur nullatenus indigere, quia vicarius non est maior
illo cuius est vicarius, sicut nec servus maior est domino nec
discipulus est maior magistro. Minor probatur auctoritate Christi
dicentis ad Pilatum Ioh. 19: "non haberes potestatem adversum me
ullam nisi tibi esset datum de super, propterea qui tradidit me tibi
maius peccatum habet". Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod Pilatus
iurisdictionem habuit coactivam super Christum, quia de potestate
coactiva intelliguntur verba Christi cum ad verba Pilati dicentis
"mihi non loqueris, nescis quia potestatem habeo crucifigere te
et potestatem habeo dimittere te" respondit. Constat autem quod
Pilatus loquebatur de potestate coactiva ergo Christus locutus est de eadem. |
Master: Here is the second argument proving that the
emperor or some other secular prince or people is the normal judge of
the pope. The pope is not more exempt from the emperor's jurisdiction
than Christ was in his capacity as mortal man. But Christ in so far
as he was a mortal man was subject to the jurisdiction of the
emperor, therefore the pope is similarly subject, and consequently
the emperor is the normal judge of the lord pope. The major of this
argument hardly seems to require proof, since a vicar is not greater
than the one whose vicar he is, just as a servant is not greater than
his lord nor a disciple greater than his master. The minor is proved
by the authority of Christ who states to Pilate in John 19[:11]:
"thou couldest have no power at all against me except it were
given thee from above: therefore he that delivered me unto thee hath
the greater sin". [Marsilius, II.iv.12] From these words we
gather that Pilate had coercive jurisdiction over Christ, because
Christ's statement must be understood as referring to coercive power,
since he is replying to the utterance of Pilate who had said [John
19:10]: "speakest thou not unto me? Knowest thou not that I have
power to crucify thee, and I have power to release thee?" But it
is plain that Pilate spoke of coercive power, therefore so did Christ. |
Discipulus: Duplex est potestas cohercendi, scilicet
ordinata et usurpata. Christus autem concessit Pilatum habuisse
potestatem usurpatam quam tamen Pilatus forte credidit ordinatam sed
in hoc erravit. |
Student: The power to coerce is twofold, namely
lawful and usurped. And Christ conceded that Pilate possessed the
latter. It is possible indeed that Pilate may have believed his power
to be lawful, but he was mistaken on this point. |
Magister: Istam responsionem nituntur excludere.
Primo auctoritate beati Augustini qui super verba predicta ait:
"discamus ergo quod dixit quod et Apostolum docuit, quia non est
potestas nisi a Deo, et quia plus peccat qui innocentem occidendum
potestati livore tradidit quam potestas ipsa si eum timore alterius
potestatis maioris occidit. Talem quippe Deus dederat illi potestatem
ut esset etiam ipse sub Cesaris potestate". Ex quibus verbis
colligitur quod sub tali potestate Cesaris et Pilati erat Christus in
quantum homo mortalis, de quali potestate loquitur Apostolus ad Rom.
13 cum dicit : "non est enim potestas nisi a Deo". Sed
Apostolus non loquitur de potestate usurpata sed ordinata cum dicat
aperte "qui resistit potestati Dei ordinationi resistit",
que verba de potestate ordinata non usurpata debent intelligi. Nam
qui potestati usurpate resistit nequaquam Dei ordinationi resistit,
quia tunc secundum Apostolum sibi dampnationem acquireret quod est
erroneum, tunc enim nec invasori papatus nec alicui tyranno liceret
resistere. Loquitur ergo Apostolus de potestate ordinata non
usurpata, ergo Christus sic locutus est de potestate et ita concessit
quod Pilatus super ipsum potestatem habuit ordinariam. Insinuat tamen
quod ista potestate ordinaria abutebatur cum dicit "qui tradidit
me tibi maius peccatum habet" quasi diceret "tu habes
peccatum dando sententiam in me neque confessum neque legitime
convictum de crimine digno morte, quia tamen ex timore hoc facis et
alii me tibi ex malitia et invidia tradiderunt ideo illi maius
peccatum habent". Et ita Pilatus potestatem ordinariam super
Christum in quantum erat homo mortalis habuit. |
Master: They attempt to exclude this response. First
by the authority of blessed Augustine who, commenting on the cited
words, states: "Let us therefore understand what Christ said,
which he also taught the Apostle, that 'there is no power but of God'
and that someone who maliciously delivers to authority an innocent to
be killed commits a greater sin than the man in authority, who put
such an innocent to death because he feared another's stronger power,
inasmuch as God gave him the kind of power that would also maintain
him under the power of Caesar". [Marsilius, II.iv.12] We infer
from these words that Christ as a mortal man was under the very power
of Caesar and Pilate of which the Apostle speaks in Romans 13[:1]
when he says "there is no power but of God". Yet the
Apostle does not speak of usurped but of lawful power, since he
clearly states "whosoever therefore resisteth the power,
resisteth the ordinance of God"[Romans 13:2]. These words must
be understood of a power which is legitimate and not usurped. For one
who resists usurped power by no means resists the ordinance of God,
since he would then according to the Apostle "receive" to
himself "damnation"[Romans 13:2], which is untrue. Under
such circumstances one would not be allowed to resist a usurper of
the papal office, nor indeed any tyrant. Therefore the Apostle does
speak of legitimate and not of usurped power. Therefore Christ [also]
spoke of power in this way and thus conceded that Pilate possessed
normal authority over him. But when Christ states "he that
delivered me unto thee hath the greater sin" he implies that
Pilate was misusing this normal authority, as if he were saying
"you are sinning in condemning me when I have neither confessed
nor been legitimately convicted of a crime worthy of death. But
because you are doing this out of fear, while others have delivered
me to you out of malice and envy, theirs is the greater sin".
And thus Pilate possessed normal authority over Christ in so far as
the latter was a mortal man. |
Quod Theophilus super illud Ioh. 18 "a temetipso hoc dicis an
alii tibi dixerunt de me" sentire videtur, dicens: "ac si
diceret Christus scilicet 'si hoc ex teipso loqueris pande signa mee
rebellionis aut si ab aliis percepisti inquisitionem fac
ordinariam'". Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod Pilatus
potestatem habuit ordinariam inquirendi de criminibus Christo
impositis. Qui autem habet potestatem inquirendi ordinarie de aliquo
infamato habet iurisdictionem coactivam super eundem. Ergo Pilatus
habuit super Christum iurisdictionem coactivam. Item, Bernardus in
epistola ad archiepiscopum Senonensem ait: "cum",
inquit, "Romani presidis potestatem Christus super se quoque
fateatur celitus ordinatam etc." Ex quibus verbis elicitur quod
potestas Pilati non fuit usurpata sed celitus ordinata. Et ita super
Christum iurisdictionem habuit coactivam, quam tamen in Christum
exercere minime potuisset iuste nisi Christus coram eo legitime,
quantum iudici constare potest, fuisset convictus de crimine. Si
autem Christus per testes qui secundum leges repelli non possunt
fuisset de crimine dampnationis dignissimo ordine iudiciario servato
convictus, Pilatus Christum condempnando non peccasset, quia fuisset
per falsos testes deceptus. Iudex autem iudicans secundum allegata
amore iustitie non peccat, licet condempnet innocentem. |
Theophilus appears to hold this opinion. Commenting on the text of
John 18[:34] "Sayest thou this thing of thyself, or did others
tell it thee of me?" he states: "it is as if Christ were
saying 'if you are uttering this of yourself, reveal the evidence of
my rebellion, but if you have been informed by others, proceed to a
normal inquisition'". [Marsilius, II.iv.5] From these words we
gather that Pilate possessed a normal authority to investigate the
crimes imputed to Christ. But he who possesses a normal power of
investigation with respect to someone who has been slandered in this
way, has coercive jurisdiction over him. Therefore Pilate had
coercive jurisdiction over Christ. Furthermore: Bernard in his letter
to the archbishop of Sens states: "since", he says,
"Christ acknowledges that the authority of the Roman ruler over
him has likewise been legitimized by heaven etc." [Marsilius,
II.iv.12] From these words we deduce that the power of Pilate was not
usurped but legitimized by heaven. And he thus possessed coercive
jurisdiction over Christ, which, however, he could not have justly
exercised over Christ unless Christ were legitimately convicted of a
crime in his presence, as far as this could have been apparent to a
judge. For if Christ had been convicted of a crime most worthy of
condemnation in the context of a formally correct trial, and on the
basis of evidence given by witnesses unimpeachable under the laws,
Pilate would not have sinned in pronouncing a sentence of
condemnation against Christ, since he would have been deceived by
false witnesses. And a judge who rules on the basis of the evidence
and is motivated by the love of justice does not sin even if he
condemns an innocent person. |
Capitulum 5 |
Chapter 5 |
Discipulus: Pro ista ratione que adduxisti ad
presens sufficiant, et ideo aliam rationem adducas. |
Student: What you have advanced in support of this
argument suffices for the moment, therefore present another one. |
Magister : Ad probandum quod imperator est iudex
ordinarius pape tertia ratio talis est. Ille est iudex ordinarius
pape a quo papa habet super alias ecclesias principatum. Sed hoc
habet papa ab imperatore, quod probant per privilegium Constantini
imperatoris concessum Romano pontifici, quod est superius allegatum.
Ergo imperator est iudex ordinarius summi pontificis. Quarta ratio
talis est. Imperator fuit iudex ordinarius beati Petri, ergo est
iudex ordinarius pape. Consequentia est evidens quia papa non est
magis exemptus quam fuit beatus Petrus. Antecedens probatur quia
omnes apostoli quantum ad hoc quod essent subiecti vel non subiecti
iurisdictioni imperatoris fuerunt pares, sed beatus Paulus fuit
subiectus iurisdictioni imperatoris quia ad Cesarem tanquam ad
superiorem appellavit, ergo beatus Petrus fuit subiectus eidem. |
Master: Here is the third argument which proves that
the emperor is the normal judge of the pope. The pope's normal judge
is one from whom the pope has rulership over the other churches. But
the pope has this from the emperor, a fact they prove by the
privilege conceded to the Roman pontiff by Emperor Constantine (this
was argued in a prior context)[1 Dial. 5.18] Therefore the emperor is
the normal judge of the pope. The fourth argument is this. The
emperor was the normal judge of blessed Peter, therefore he is the
normal judge of the pope. The consequence is obvious, because the
pope does not enjoy a greater exemption than did blessed Peter. The
proof of the antecedent is that all the apostles were equal on the
issue of their subjection or lack of subjection to the emperor's
jurisdiction. Since blessed Paul was subject to the jurisdiction of
the emperor (he did appeal to Caesar as to a superior)[Acts 25:11],
it follows that blessed Peter was [also] subject to it. |
Discipulus: Dicetur istis quod Paulus appellavit non
quia erat subiectus iurisdictioni imperatoris sed quia volebat caute
insidias Iudeorum evadere. |
Student: One can say to them that Paul appealed not
because he was subject to the jurisdiction of the emperor but because
he wished to circumspectly evade the snares of the Jews. |
Magister: Hoc impugnatur sic. Secundum beatum
Ambrosium ut habetur 22 q. ultima c. Cavete "non solum
in falsis verbis sed etiam in simulatis operibus mendacium est",
ubi notat glossa quod "factis mentitur sicut verbis".
Beatus Paulus igitur si non erat vere subiectus imperatori facto
mentiebatur cum simulaverit se subiectum iudicio Cesaris appellando.
Tale autem crimen est beato Paulo minime imponendum. Ergo beatus
Paulus vere fuit imperatori subiectus. Hanc etiam conclusionem per
exemplum ostendunt. Nam sicut legitur in cronicis Iohannes 12
"erat venator et totus lubricus, adeo quod etiam publice feminas
tenebat. Propter quod quidam cardinalium et Romanorum scripserunt
occulte Ottoni principi Saxonum ut scandalo ecclesie compatiens sine
mora Romam properaret. Hoc papa percipiens Iohanni diacono cardinali
tamquam huius facti consiliario nasum et alteri Iohanni subdiacono
qui literas scripserat manum amputari fecit. Hic cum frequenter per
imperatorem et clerum de sua correctione fuisset monitus, non
correctus, presente imperatore de papatu destitutus, communi voto Leo
papa eligitur". Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod imperator est
iudex ordinarius pape. Aliter enim imperator predictum papam
nullatenus deposuisset. |
Master: Here is how one attacks this last point.
According to blessed Ambrose (we have it in 22 q. 5 c. Cavete)[col.
888] "the lie resides not only in false words but also in
pretended actions", where the gloss notes that "one lies by
deeds as well as by words"[s.v.operibus col.1282]. Therefore if
blessed Paul was not in truth subject to the emperor, he was lying in
deed when he pretended to be a subject appealing to the judgment of
Caesar. But such a crime is hardly to be ascribed to blessed Paul.
Therefore blessed Paul was truly subject to the emperor. They also
demonstrate the same conclusion by an example. For as we read in the
Chronicles: "John XII was an utterly lascivious womanizer to the
point of public involvements with them. Because of that some
cardinals and Romans secretly wrote to Otto prince of the Saxons that
he should hurry to Rome without delay out of commiseration for the
scandal of the church. When the pope learned of this, he ordered the
amputation of cardinal deacon John's nose (as he had counseled this
recourse to Otto) and the amputation of another John's hand (this one
was a subdeacon who had written the letter). The pope did not correct
himself although he had been frequently warned about his correction
by emperor and clergy. He was deprived of the papacy in the presence
of the emperor, and by a common vote Pope Leo is (sic)
elected".[MGH SS XXII, Martini Chronicon, 431] One
gathers from these words that the emperor is the normal judge of the
pope. Indeed the emperor would otherwise never have deposed the
aforementioned pope. |
Discipulus: Dicerent aliqui quod imperator iniuste
processit nec dictus papa fuit vere depositus sed de facto fuit
papatu tantummodo spoliatus. |
Student: Some might say that the emperor acted
unjustly and that the said pope was not truly deposed, but merely
stripped of the papacy as a matter of fact. |
Magister: Hec responsio impugnatur, quia si papa
Iohannes remansisset verus papa ille qui sibi successit ipso vivente
non fuisset verus papa sed papatus invasor, ex quo sequitur quod
omnia que egit nullius fuissent roboris vel momenti sed debebant
omnia in irritum revocari, quod tamen minime fuit factum. Imo quod
successor ipsius Iohannis ipso vivente fuit verus papa tota tenet
ecclesia. Ergo papa Iohannes 12 vere fuit depositus. |
Master: This response is challenged, for if Pope
John would had remained a true pope, the one who succeeded him in his
lifetime would not have been a true pope but a usurper of the papacy,
from which it follows that everything which he did would have lacked
firmness or significance, and everything would have required
annulment. But this was not done. To the contrary: the entire church
holds that the person who succeeded John in the latter's lifetime was
a true pope. Therefore Pope John XII was truly deposed. |
Capitulum 6 |
Chapter 6 |
Discipulus: Puto quod fortiores rationes
pro opinione predicta fecisti, ideo ad assertionem contrariam te
converte, et quod nec imperator nec aliquis secularis sit iudex
ordinarius pape nitaris ostendere. Hanc enim assertionem puto
consonam veritati. |
Student: I think you have produced rather strong
arguments for the aforementioned opinion. Apply yourself therefore to
the contrary assertion, and try to show that neither the emperor nor
any secular person would be the pope's normal judge, for I believe
this assertion is consonant with the truth. |
Magister: Quod nec imperator nec aliquis secularis
sit iudex ordinarius pape auctoritatibus et rationibus nonnulli
probare nituntur. Est autem prima ratio talis. Imperator non est
iudex ordinarius illius qui non habet superiorem in
terris, sed papa non habet superiorem in terris ergo etc. Maior
probatione non indiget quia iudex est superior illo cuius est iudex.
Minor est probata superius per plures auctoritates et rationes. |
Master: Many attempt to prove by authorities and
arguments that neither the emperor nor any secular person would be
the pope's normal judge. And this is the first argument: the emperor
is not the normal judge of one who has no superior on earth; but the
pope has no superior on earth, therefore etc. The major requires no
proof because a judge is superior to the person who's judge he is.
The minor was proved above[1 Dial. 6.1] by many authorities and arguments. |
Discipulus: Prius ostensum est generaliter quod papa
non habet iudicem superiorem in terris. Nunc autem specialiter proba
quod imperator vel aliquis laicus vel populus non est iudex
ordinarius ipsius. |
Student: Earlier it was declared in general that the
pope has no superior judge on earth. Now however demonstrate
specifically that the emperor, or some layman or people, is not the
normal judge of the pope. |
Magister: Quod specialiter imperator non sit iudex
ordinarius pape ostenditur primo sic. Inferior non est iudex
ordinarius sui superioris, sed imperator est inferior papa et eius
iurisdictioni subiectus, ergo etc. Maior est manifesta, unde dicit
Nicholaus papa ut habetur di. 21 c. Inferior: "sole
clarius exhibuimus non posse quemquam qui minoris auctoritatis est
eum qui maioris est potestatis iudiciis suis addicere aut propriis
diffinitionibus subiugare". Minor vero sanctorum auctoritatibus
comprobatur. Ait enim Gregorius Nazianzenus ut habetur di. 10 c. Suscipitis,
scribens imperatoribus Constantinopolitanis: "suscipitis ne
libertatem verbi libenter accipitis quod lex Christi sacerdotali vos
subiicit potestati, atque istis tribunalibus subdit. Dedit enim et
nobis potestatem, dedit principatum multo perfectiorem principatibus
vestris". Item Felix papa ut habetur eadem di. c. Certum
ait: "certum est hoc rebus vestris esse salutare ut cum de
causis agitur Dei iuxta ipsius constitutum regiam voluntatem
sacerdotibus Christi studeatis subdere non preferre", et infra:
"neque eius sanctionibus velle dominari cuius Deus voluit
clementie tue pie devotionis colla submittere". Hoc idem habetur
di. 96 c. Duo sunt et c. Si imperator. Ex
quibus et multis aliis habetur quod imperator est inferior papa. |
Master: That the emperor specifically would not be
the normal judge of the pope is shown first of all in this manner: an
inferior is not the normal judge of his superior; but the emperor is
inferior to the pope and subject to his jurisdiction, therefore etc.
The major is obvious whence Pope Nicholas states (we have it in dis.
21 ch. Inferior)[col. 70]: "We have shown with more
clarity than the light of the sun that one of lesser authority cannot
sentence by his judgments or bind by his own definitions someone who
is of greater power." The minor on the other hand is confirmed
by the authority of saints. For Gregory of Naziance says, writing to
the Constantinopolitan emperors (we have it in di. 10 c. Suscipitis
)[col. 20]: "Do you not acknowledge the freedom of the Word ?
Accept freely that the law of Christ places you under priestly power,
and subjects you to these tribunals. For he also granted a power to
us, granted a rulership far more perfect than your own." Again:
Pope Felix states (we have it in the same di. c. Certum
)[col. 20]: "When God's causes are broached it is certainly
advantageous to your interests that, in accordance with His command,
you strive not to make the royal will paramount but to subject it to
the priests of Christ", and further down: "nor should there
be a wish to override the sanctions of one to whose clemency God
willed to subordinate the neck of your pious devotion." The same
point is made in di. 96 c. Duo sunt[col. 10] and in
c. Si imperator[col. 11]. From these canons and
many others we have it that the emperor is inferior to the pope. |
Quod etiam multis rationibus nonnulli probare nituntur. Primo quia
qui iurat alii fidelitatem est inferior illo cui iurat. Imperator
prestat iuramentum fidelitatis pape (di. 63 Tibi Domino)
ergo etc. Secundo quia imperator est inferior illo qui habet
potestatem transferendi imperium de gente in gentem. Hanc potestatem
habet papa (Extra De electione Venerabilem) igitur
etc. Tertio quia imperator est inferior illo qui potest eum
excommunicationis sententia innodare. Hoc autem papa potest (di. 96 Duo
sunt) ergo etc. Quarto quia qui potest deponi ab alio est
inferior eo. Imperator autem potest deponi a papa (15 q. 6 c. Alius)
ergo etc. Quinto quia imperator est inferior illo qui in
temporalibus et spiritualibus potest subditos imperatorum et regum
legitimare. Hoc potest papa (Extra Qui filii sint legitimi
c. Per venerabilem) igitur etc. |
And some attempt to prove this by numerous arguments [OP
II, 687. John of Paris, De potestate regia et papali, ch. 11].
First: because he who swears fealty to another is inferior to the
one he swears to; but the emperor provides an oath of fealty to the
pope (di. 63 c. Tibi domino)[col. 246], therefore
etc. Second: because the emperor is inferior to one who has the power
of transferring the empire from nation to nation; and this power the
pope possesses (Extra, De electione c. Venerabilem)[col.
79], therefore etc. Third: because the emperor is inferior to one
who can bind him by a sentence of excommunication; and this the pope
can do (di. 96, c. Duo sunt)[col. 10], therefore
etc. Fourth: because he who can be deposed by another is that
person's inferior; but the emperor may be deposed by the pope (15 q.
6 c. Alius)[col. 756], therefore etc. Fifth: because the
emperor is inferior to one who can legitimize the subjects of
emperors and kings in temporal and spiritual affairs; and this the
pope can do (Extra, Qui filii sint legitimi
c. Per venerabilem)[col. 714], therefore etc. |
Capitulum 7 |
Chapter 7 |
Discipulus: Omittas istam materiam et alias rationes
adducas ad probandum quod imperator non est iudex ordinarius pape. |
Student:Ignore this material and bring in other
arguments to prove that the emperor is not the normal judge of the pope. |
Magister: Secunda ratio principalis ad hoc talis
est. Imperator non est iudex ordinarius illius qui imperialibus
legibus est solutus, quia leges superioris subiectos astringunt nisi
specialiter per superiorem sint exempti. Papa autem legibus
imperialibus minime est astrictus (di. 10 c. 1 et c. Quoniam)
ergo imperator non est iudex ordinarius pape. Tertia ratio est haec.
Imperator non est iudex ordinarius aliorum clericorum inferiorum ergo
multo magis non est iudex ordinarius pape. Consequentia est evidens.
Antecedens vero per innumeros sacros canones posset ostendi. Vnde in
concilio Carthaginensi ut habetur 11 q. 1 c. Placuit, sic
legitur: "placuit ut quicumque ab imperatore cognitione
publicorum iudiciorum petierit honore proprio privetur". Ex
quibus verbis colligitur quod imperator non est iudex ordinarius
clericorum igitur etc. Quarta ratio est haec. Ille non est iudex
ordinarius pape ad quem a papa appellare non licet. Sed non licet
appellare a papa ad imperatorem (9 q. 3 c. Ipsi et c. Cuncta).
Igitur imperator non est iudex ordinarius pape. Quinta ratio est
haec. Imperator non est iudex illius cui Christus iura imperii
commisit.Christus autem commisit iura imperii beato Petro et eius
successoribus (di. 22 c. 1) ergo imperator non est iudex ordinarius pape. |
Master: Here is the second main argument to this
effect. The emperor is not the normal judge of one who is unfettered
by imperial laws, since the laws of a superior constrain the subjects
unless they are specifically given immunity by the superior. But the
pope is not at all bound by imperial laws (di. 10 c. 1[col. 19] and
c. Quoniam)[col. 21]. Therefore the emperor is not the
normal judge of the pope. The third argument is this: the emperor is
not the normal judge of other clerks of inferior rank; therefore all
the more is he not the normal judge of the pope. The deduction is
obvious, while the antecedent may be shown by countless holy canons.
From which we read thus in [the acts of] the council of Carthage (we
have it in 11 q. 1 c. Placuit)[col. 629]: "It was
resolved that whoever should petition of the emperor a decision in
public lawcourts will be deprived of his particular office." One
gathers from these words that the emperor is not the normal judge of
clerks, therefore etc. The fourth argument is this: he to whom an
appeal from the pope is not permitted is not the normal judge of the
pope; but it is not allowed to appeal from the pope to the emperor (
9 q. 3 c. Ipsi[col. 611] and c. Cuncta[col. 611]),
therefore the emperor is not the normal judge of the pope. The fifth
argument is this: the emperor is not the judge of one to whom Christ
entrusted the rights of the empire. Christ however entrusted the
rights of the empire to blessed Peter and to his successors (di. 22
c. 1)[col. 73], therefore the emperor is not the normal judge of the pope. |
Capitulum 8 |
Chapter 8 |
Discipulus: Licet non dubitem nullum mortalium esse
superiorem summo pontifice, tamen cupio scire quomodo ad rationes hoc
probantes adversarii respondere conantur. |
Student: Although I would not doubt that none among
mortals is superior to the supreme pontiff, I want to know all the
same the manner in which opponents attempt to answer the arguments
which demonstrate this. |
Magister: Non omnes qui tenent imperatorem esse
superiorem et iudicem ordinarium pape in modo ponendi concordant, et
ideo non eodem modo ad rationes prescriptas respondent. |
Master: Not all who hold that the emperor is the
pope's superior and his normal judge agree on how to formulate the
point and therefore they do not reply to the aforewritten arguments
in the same way. |
Discipulus: Dic illos diversos modos ponendi. |
Student: State those various formulations. |
Magister: Sunt quidam dicentes quod papa in
spiritualibus imperatori minime est subiectus sed quantum ad
iurisdictionem temporalem est sibi subiectus quantum est ex
ordinatione Christi, quia, ut dicunt, Christus quantum ad temporalem
iurisdictionem nullum apostolum a iurisdictione temporali imperatorum
exemit sed omnes voluit in huiusmodi principibus secularibus esse
subiectos, in cuius signum ipse solvit pro propria persona tributum. Alii
autem dicunt quod imperator in quantum gerit personam populi
christiani in omnibus tam spiritualibus quam temporalibus est
superior papa et iudex ordinarius eius. |
Master: There are some who say [John
of Paris, ch. 13] that the pope is in no way
subject to the emperor in spiritual affairs yet is subject to him as
to temporal jurisdiction on the basis of Christ's dispensation,
because, they say, Christ, as to temporal jurisdiction, did not
exempt any apostle from the emperor's temporal jurisdiction, but
wanted them all to be subordinated in such matters to secular rulers,
indicating this [Matthew 17:23-26] by his own personal payment of
tribute. Others however say [Marsilius, I.xv.4;
II.viii.7-8; II.x.8] that the emperor, in so far as
he represents the Christian people, is the pope's superior and his
normal judge in all areas, spiritual as well as temporal. |
Discipulus: De
iurisdictione pape et imperatoris pertranseas quia in tractatu De
dogmatibus Joh. 22-i de hoc plures tibi questiones movebo. |
Student: Move right through this
discussion of the temporal jurisdiction of pope and emperor, for I
shall raise a number of questions with you about the issue in the
treatise Concerning the doctrines of John XXII. |
Magister: Tu forsitan aliter accipis iurisdictionem
temporalem quam isti. |
Master: Perhaps you construe
temporal jurisdiction differently from them. |
Discipulus: Accipio iurisdictionem temporalem pro
illa cui aliquis est subiectus ratione prediorum que de imperatore tenet. |
Student: I understand temporal jurisdiction to mean
what someone is subject to by reason of the estates which he holds
from the emperor. |
Magister: Aliter accipiunt ipsi. |
Master: These opponents interpret it differently. |
Discipulus: Quomodo. |
Student: In what way ? |
Magister: Dicunt quod iurisdictio temporalis non
solum respicit predia et temporales divitias sed etiam personas, quia
omnes persone in dominio alicuius principis commorantes sive sint
divites sive pauperes iurisdictioni principis sunt subiecte ita quod
si deliquerint eos debet condigna animadversione punire nisi per
principem vel superiorem alium sint exempte. |
Master: They say [Marsilius, I.xvii]
that temporal jurisdiction affects not only properties and wordly
riches but also persons; for all persons who reside within the
dominion of some ruler, whether they be rich or poor, are subject to
the ruler's jurisdiction, so that if they break the law he has the
duty to punish them with appropriate measures, unless they have been
exempted by him or by some other superior. |
Discipulus: Video quid per iurisdictionem temporalem
intelligunt sed ignoro que spiritualia vocant. |
Student: I see what they understand by temporal
jurisdiction but am ignorant of what they refer to as spirituals. [See
also 3.2 Dial. 2.4] |
Magister: Spiritualia vocant ea que religioni
christiane sunt propria, que in nulla alia secta sunt reperta nec ad
legem nature sunt spectantia, sicut que pertinent ad sacramenta
ecclesiastica dispensanda et ad causas fidei terminandas, et in
criminibus que directe contra christianam religionem committuntur. De
huiusmodi enim imperator nisi sicut ceteri christiani se intromittere
non debet, quia imperator christianus ratione sue dignitatis maiorem
potestatem vel iurisdictionem nullatenus habet quam habuerunt
imperatores pagani, illis enim imperatores christiani successerunt,
et ideo idem ius cum illis et non aliud ratione imperii possidere
noscuntur. Quia igitur de huiusmodi spiritualibus se intromittere ad
imperatores paganos minime pertinebat, nec ad imperatorem christianum
in quantum imperator est talia spectant. |
Master: They call spirituals those matters which are
particular to the Christian religion, which are found in no other
sect nor belong to the law of nature, such as what pertains to the
administration of ecclesiastical sacraments and to final decisions
about causes of faith , and what is associated with crimes that are
committed directly against the Christian religion [John
of Paris, ch. 12]. The emperor ought not to involve
himself in such issues save to the extent that other Christians do.
For a Christian emperor does not at all on the basis of his office
enjoy greater power or jurisdiction than pagan emperors did.
Christian emperors are their successors and thus are known on account
of the empire to have a right identical to that of their predecessors
and not some different right. Therefore since it in no way pertained
to pagan emperors to involve themselves in spirituals of this kind,
neither are such the concern of a Christian emperor in his capacity
as emperor [ Ockham, De imperatorum et
pontificum potestate, ch. 12]. |
Discipulus: Ergo secundum istos si papa homicidium,
furtum, adulterium, et consimilia crimina que imperatores et reges
pagani punire solebant committeret, imperator ipsum punire valeret. |
Student: Therefore according to these opponents if a
pope were to commit murder, theft, adultery and similar crimes, which
pagan emperors and kings were wont to punish, the emperor would be in
a position to punish him ? |
Magister: Hoc nonnulli concedunt licet dicant quidam
eorum quod non deberet eum deponere nisi incorrigibilis probaretur. |
Master: Many concede this [John of
Paris, ch.13; Marsilius, II.viii.7-8], although some
of them say that the emperor ought not to depose him unless the pope
were proved to be incorrigible [John of Paris, ch. 13]. |
Discipulus: Modo opinionem istorum intelligo quamvis
eam inter hereses reputem numerandam, de qua
tecum in tractatu De dogmatibus Io. 22-i prolixius disputabo. Nunc
autem dic qualiter ad rationes et auctoritates pro assertione
contraria isti respondent. De secundo vero modo ponendi nihil dicas
ad presens. |
Student: Now I understand their
point of view (though I would reckon it should be listed among the
heresies) and propose to debate this opinion with you at length in
the treatise Concerning the doctrines of John XXII. And now state the
manner in which these opponents respond to the arguments and
authorities in favour of the contrary assertion. Say nothing for the
moment however about the second formulation. |
Magister: Ad primam negant minorem cum accipitur
quod imperator est inferior papa et eius iurisdictioni subiectus
quantum ad iurisdictionem temporalem ex ordinatione Christi, et ideo
in huiusmodi papa non est iudex imperatoris licet forte aliquando
fuerit iudex imperatoris in quantum commissarius vel delegatus populi Romani. |
Master: Their response to the first argument is to
deny the minor which holds that by Christ's dispensation, and as to
temporal jurisdiction, the emperor is inferior to the pope and
subject to his jurisdiction. In matters of this kind, therefore, the
pope is not the judge of the emperor; although he could possibly at
some moment have been the judge of the emperor as a trustee or
delegate of the Roman people. |
Discipulus: Ista sunt verba mirabilia at inaudita
nec ea intelligo, sed si potes fac me illa intelligere et tunc de eis
certius iudicabo. |
Student: These words are astounding and unheard of,
nor do I understand them; but make me understand them if you can, and
then I shall appraise them with greater certainty. |
Magister: Ut ea intelligas debes scire quod secundum
istos imperator et quilibet rex temporalis licet a Deo quodammodo
mediate iurisdictionem suam habeat temporalem, quia secundum
Apostolum ad Romanos 13 "non est potestas nisi a Deo",
tamen immediate iurisdictionem suam habet a populo, imperator a
populo Romano, rex Francie a populo suo, rex Castelle a populo suo et
sic quilibet rex a populo suo habet iurisdictionem suam, nisi sit
aliquis rex cuius populus alicui alteri sit subiectus qui possit
populo dare regem quemadmodum imperatores quondam diversis populis
reges dederunt quia illi populi imperatori et populo Romano subiecti
fuerunt. Imperator igitur suam iurisdictionem a populo Romano
obtinuit. Populus autem Romanus ex causa rationabili sicut
imperatorem instituit ita eum potuit destituere eiusque
iurisdictionem minuere et augere. Ex quo sequitur quod populus
Romanus ex causa rationabili potuit imperatorem in aliquo casu
alterius cui committeret iurisdictioni subiicere, quare potuit pape
causam imperatoris delegare, in quo casu papa tanquam delegatus seu
commissarius auctoritate populi Romani super imperatorem
iurisdictionem potuit obtinere, quam iurisdictionem beatus Petrus a
Christo non suscepit et ideo papa in quantum successor beati Petri
eam minime habet. |
Master: In order to understand
these words you must realize that in the view of these opponents the
emperor and any temporal king, even if he somehow holds his temporal
jurisdiction by divine mediation (for according to the Apostle in
Romans 13[:1] "there is no power but of God"), nevertheless
holds his jurisdiction immediately from the people [ Marsilius,
I.ix.2; I.xv.2]: the emperor from the Roman people, the king of
France from his people, the king of Castile from his people; and thus
every king has his jurisdiction from his people unless there is a
king whose people is subject to someone else who has authority to
give the people a king, as emperors once upon a time gave kings to
various peoples because these peoples were subject to the emperor and
to the Roman people. The emperor , therefore, obtained his
jurisdiction from the Roman people; but the Roman people just as it
had appointed the emperor could for reasonable cause have removed him
from office [ Marsilius, I.xv.2; I.xviii], and diminished or
increased his jurisdiction [ Marsilius, I.xii.3]. It follows from
this that the Roman people for reasonable cause could have in some
case subjected the emperor to the jurisdiction of another, to whom it
would have committed this jurisdiction ; the Roman people could
therefore have delegated the cause of the emperor to the pope, in
which case the pope as delegate or trustee could have obtained
jurisdiction over the emperor by authority of the Roman people. This
jurisdiction blessed Peter did not receive from Christ, and thus the
pope in no way possesses it in his capacity as the successor of
blessed Peter. |
Discipulus: Nunc verba predicta intelligo, quamvis
ipsa putem erronea, et ideo ad rationes factas accede. |
Student: Now I understand the aforementioned words
though I would believe them to be wrong. Proceed therefore with the
opponents' responses to the arguments. |
Magister: Propter diversas opiniones antequam narrem
quomodo ad rationes explicite respondetur oportet illas opiniones exprimere. |
Master: Due to the variety of adversarial opinions
it behooves me to express them before outlining how the arguments are
explicitly dealt with. |
Discipulus: Dic que sunt ille opiniones. |
Student: State the nature of these opinions. |
Magister: Sicut tactum est prius sunt quidam
dicentes quod Romanus pontifex nullam iurisdictionem habet vel
potestatem ex ordinatione Christi ultra alios quoscunque presbiteros
sed omnem dignitatem suam et potestatem ultra alios habuit ab
imperatore vel ab ecclesia seu concilio generali. Alii dicunt quod
beatus Petrus pro se et suis successoribus dignitatem papalem et
primatum super omnes alios fideles recepit a Christo, sed ista
dignitas et primatus ut dicunt consistit tantummodo in ordinando et
preficiendo episcopos presbiteros et doctores populo christiano,
nullam habens ex ordinatione Christi iurisdictionem coactivam annexam
sicut nec habet res temporales annexas. Sed sicut papatus temporalia
a fidelibus orthodoxis accepit ita a communitate
fidelium solummodo habuit iurisdictionem coactivam. Omnis enim
communitas potest aliquem sibi preficere qui habeat potestatem
maleficos cohercendi. Ecclesia autem fidelium ad hoc officium papam
sibi prefecit, in nullo tamen iurisdictionem imperatorum diminuendo
etiam paganorum, quia hoc non potuit eo quod omnes catholici tunc
temporis imperatoribus infidelibus subiecti fuerunt. |
Master: As we touched upon
earlier there are some who say that the Roman pontiff has no more
jurisdiction or authority by Christ's ordination than other priests
of whatever category [Marsilius, II.xv; 1 Dial. 5.17], but that he
received every single dignity of his and power beyond that of the
other priests from the emperor [1 Dial. 5.18] or from the church [1
Dial. 5.15]or the general council [Marsilius, II.xxii; 1 Dial. 5.19].
Others say that blessed Peter did receive from Christ for himself and
for his successors the papal dignity and primacy over all the other
faithful; but, they say, this dignity and primacy only consists in
the ordination and appointment of bishops, priests, and doctors for
the Christian people, and has no annexed coercive jurisdiction from
Christ's dispensation just as it has no annexed temporal possessions.
But just as the papacy received temporal goods from the orthodox
faithful so did it obtain coercive jurisdiction exclusively from this
community. For every community may appoint someone over itself with
power to coerce evil-doers; and for that purpose the church of the
faithful appointed the pope over itself, while in no way diminishing
the jurisdiction even of pagan emperors: it could in fact not do this
given that at the time all catholics were subjected to unbelieving emperors. |
Discipulus: Ego omnino vellem exire istam materiam
de iurisdictione imperatoris et ad alium differre tractatum, et tu
semper plus et plus trahis ad ipsam, unde istis omnibus omissis
breviter narra quomodo ad auctoritates et rationes inductas respondetur. |
Student: I should entirely like to move away from
this material concerning the emperor's jurisdiction and defer it
until another treatise, but you consistently pull towards it more and
more. Hence, putting aside all these problems, give a brief account
of the manner in which opponents respond to the authorities and
arguments which have been put forward. |
Magister: Sunt quidam unam
responsionem dantes generalem ad omnes auctoritates asserentes quod
papa habet iurisdictionem super imperatores et reges et quod quantum
ad iurisdictionem est superior eis, dicentes quod tales auctoritates
non continent veritatem et ideo sunt nullatenus admittende. Alii
autem intellectum sanctorum patrum reputant consonum veritati sed
dicunt quod nonnulli clerici ambitione et avaritia excecati verba
eorum nimis large contra mentem eorum interpretati sunt. |
Master: There are some who give a single general
response to all the authorities which claim that the pope has
jurisdiction over emperor and kings, and that he is superior to them
as to jurisdiction. They say that such authorities do not contain the
truth and are therefore in no way admissible. Others however believe
that the understanding of the holy fathers is consonant with the
truth, but they say that many clerks, blinded by ambition and
avarice, have interpreted their words too broadly and against the
fathers' intended meaning. |
Discipulus: Istorum responsiones volo audire. |
Student: These are the people whose responses I want
to hear. |
Magister: Isti ad evidentiam responsionum suarum
dicunt esse sciendum quod penitentia unum est de ecclesiasticis
sacramentis et ideo pertinet ad prelatos. Quare ad ipsos spectat in
foro conscientie penitentium peccata cognoscere et ipsis debitam
penam iniungere. Et propter istam potestatem quam sacerdotes in foro
conscientie habere noscuntur omnes christiani eis sunt subiecti. Extra
autem forum conscientie nullam habent iurisdictionem a Christo
immediate, sed illam habent a communitate fidelium vel ab illo in
quem communitas fidelium suam transtulit potestatem. |
Master: For the purpose of clarifying their
responses they say that one must grasp the fact that penance is
counted among the ecclesiastical sacraments and therefore pertains to
prelates. Consequently it is their function to learn the sins of
penitents in the forum of conscience {the confessional} and to impose
upon them an appropriate penalty. And because of this power which
priests are known to possess in the forum of conscience all
Christians are subject to them; while outside of the forum of
conscience priests have no jurisdiction from Christ immediately, but
they obtain it from the community of believers or from the one to
whom the community of believers has transferred its power. |
Capitulum 9 |
Chapter 9 |
Discipulus: Adhuc tu trahis me ad materiam quam
nollem hic tractari et ideo quomodo ad auctoritates et rationes
inductas respondetur narra succincte. |
Student: Again you are pulling me towards material
which I would be unwilling to have reviewed in the present context.
Give therefore a succinct narration of the manner in which these
opponents respond to the authorities and arguments which have been advanced. |
Magister: Ad primam auctoritatem Gregorii Nazianzeni
respondetur quod per tribunal et principatum prelatorum intelligit
potestatem quam in foro conscientie super penitentes noscuntur
habere. Ista vero potestas quia spiritualis est et ordinatur ad vitam
eternam consequendam multo perfectior est omni iurisdictione
temporali coactiva regum et principum que principaliter instituta est
ad temporalia disponenda. Ad auctoritatem Felicis pape respondetur
quod regia voluntas in fide catholica addiscenda et sacramentis
ecclesiasticis suscipiendis debet sacerdotibus esse subiecta si
sacerdotes fidem retinent orthodoxam nichil contra iustitiam
imperantes. Si vero a catholica deviaverint veritate vel sibi quam de
iure non habent usurpaverint potestatem reges in huiusmodi nullatenus
sunt subiecti. Verba ergo Felicis pape sane intelligenda sunt et non
sunt ex ambitione clericorum cupientium in populis et in clero contra
doctrinam beati Petri apostoli dominari in preiudicium regum et
principum exponenda. Consimiliter respondetur ad c. Duo sunt
et ad c. Si imperator. Nam dicunt isti papam a concilio
generali et universali ecclesia aliquam potestatem habere super
principes ultra illam quam habet a Christo et in quantum est
successor beati Petri. |
Master: The answer to the first authority (that of
Gregory of Naziance) is: that by the tribunal and rulership of
prelates he means the power which they are known to possess over
penitents in the forum of conscience. Indeed this power, because it
is spiritual and ordained for the purpose of acquiring life eternal,
is much more perfect than any coercive temporal jurisdiction of kings
and princes which was primarily instituted for the administration of
wordly affairs. The answer to the authority of Pope Felix is: that
the royal will should be subject to priests in the matter of learning
the catholic faith and receiving ecclesiastical sacraments, if the
priests maintain orthodox faith and do not command anything contrary
to justice. But if priests should deviate from
catholic truth or usurp for themselves a power which they legally do
not possess, in this kings are in no way subjects. Therefore the
words of Pope Felix must be understood sensibly, and are not to be
expounded by reference to the ambition of clerks who wish to dominate
over peoples and clergy contrary to the doctrine of the blessed
apostle Peter [1 Peter 5:2-3] and with prejudice to kings and
princes. A similar answer is given to c. Duo sunt
and c. Si imperator. For these opponents say that
the pope possesses from the general council and the universal church
a certain authority over rulers which goes beyond the one he has
received from Christ and in his capacity as the successor of blessed Peter. |
Ad primam vero rationem inductam ad probandum quod imperator est
inferior papa respondetur primo quod maior non est universaliter vera
sed capit instantiam quando aliquis sponte iurat alii fidelitatem.
Talis enim ante iuramentum non est semper inferior illo cui iurat
quamvis per iuramentum quodammodo seipsum inferiorem illo efficiat.
Ad minorem vero dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo quod imperator nunquam
iuravit fidelitatem pape nisi spontanea voluntate et ideo suis
successoribus legem consimilem per tale iuramentum nequaquam
imposuit. Aliter respondetur quod ex ordinatione Romanorum a quibus
imperator suam habuit iurisdictionem potuit imperator pape iurare et
in hoc tenuisset papa non vicem beati Petri nec in hoc fuit vicarius
Christi sed in hoc fuisset commissarius Romanorum. Ad secundam
similiter respondetur quod papa non transtulit imperium a Grecis in
Germanos in quantum vicarius Christi et successor beati Petri quia
ratione vicariatus illius et successionis huiusmodi non habet maiorem
auctoritatem super imperium quam super regnum Francorum vel Anglorum.
Sicut igitur in quantum vicarius Christi et successor beati Petri non
potest transferre regnum Francorum de una domo ad aliam, ita ratione
vicariatus et successionis non potuit de gente in gentem transferre
imperium Romanorum. Transtulit igitur imperium de gente in gentem
auctoritate Romanorum qui sibi ex causa rationabili potestatem
huiusmodi contulerunt. Ad tertiam respondetur tripliciter. Sunt enim
quidam dicentes quod cum excommunicatio sit potius iurisdictionis
quam ordinis, papa in quantum vicarius Christi et successor beati
Petri neminem excommunicare potest, sed potestatem excommunicandi
habet ab universali ecclesia que in eum talem transtulit potestatem.
Alii autem dicunt quod non papa sed imperator in imperio et rex in
regno suo potestatem habet excommunicandi. |
Now as to the initial argument advanced to prove
that the emperor is inferior to the pope, the answer is, first of
all, that the major is not universally true but becomes relevant when
someone spontaneously swears fealty to another, for prior to the oath
he is not always inferior to the one to whom he swears it, though by
the oath he does in some sense make himself inferior to this other.
While the minor of the argument is addressed in two ways. One
approach is that the emperor never swore fealty to the pope save by
his own spontaneous will, and therefore by such an oath he did not at
all impose upon his successor a similar legal obligation. Another
response is that the emperor could have sworn fealty to the pope by
ordination of the Romans from whom the emperor had received his
jurisdiction, and in this transaction the pope would not have
represented blessed Peter nor been the vicar of Christ, but in this
he would have been the trustee of the Romans. A
similar response is given to the second argument: that the pope did
not transfer the empire from the Greeks to the Romans in his capacity
as the vicar of Christ and the successor of blessed Peter; since by
reason of this vicarship and of the given succession the Pope did not
possess greater authority over the empire than over the kingdom of
the Franks or that of the English. Therefore, just as he cannot
transfer the kingdom of the Franks from one house to another in his
capacity as vicar of Christ and successor of blessed Peter, so by
reason of the vicarship and succession he could not have transferred
the empire of the Romans from nation to nation. He therefore
transferred the empire from nation to nation by the authority of the
Romans who for reasonable cause granted to him a power of this kind. There
is a threefold response to the third argument. For there are some
who say that since excommunication is more a function of jurisdiction
than of order, the pope can excommunicate no one in his capacity as
the vicar of Christ and the successor of blessed Peter, but he has
the power to excommunicate from the universal church which
transferred such power to him. Others say however that it is the
emperor in the empire and the king in his kingdom who has the power
to excommunicate, not the pope. |
Discipulus: Istas opiniones puto erroneas sed tamen
secundam magis abhorreo. De ipsis tamen in alio
tractatu tecum collocutionem habebo. Nunc autem dic tertiam responsionem. |
Student: I consider these opinions to be erroneous,
and find the second one particularly repugnant. Nevertheless I shall
discourse with you about them in a different treatise. Now however
let us have the third response. |
Magister: Tertia responsio est quod papa in quantum
vicarius Christi habet potestatem excommunicandi, sed penam maiorem
nullatenus inferendi. Dicunt enim quod ista est ultima pena quam
possunt ecclesiastici exercere. Isti igitur dicunt quod papa in hoc
est imperatore superior sed tamen in aliis est inferior ipso scilicet
in omni iurisdictione temporali. Ad quartam rationem respondetur quod
papa non potest deponere imperatorem ratione papatus sicut nec
ratione papatus potest deponere regem Francie. Sed sicut Zacharias
papa regem Francorum auctoritate populi regni illius deposuit, et ita
illi principaliter deposuerunt, et ut testatur glossa 15 q. 6 c. Alius:
"dicitur deposuisse qui deponentibus consensit", et ita
papa auctoritate Romanorum posset imperatorem deponere. Ad quintam
rationem respondetur quod papa ratione papatus non potest illegitimos
in temporalibus legitimare. Si autem hoc fecit licite de facto,
ratione alicuius alterius potestatis que non est annexa papatui hoc fecit. |
Master: The third response is that as the vicar of
Christ the pope has the power to excommunicate but in no way that of
imposing a greater penalty. For they say that excommunication is the
final penalty which ecclesiastical persons may inflict [
John of Paris, ch. 13]. In this, say these
opponents, the pope is superior to the emperor, yet in other matters,
namely in any temporal jurisdiction, he is inferior to the emperor.
The answer to the fourth argument is that the pope by reason of his
papal office cannot depose the emperor, just as he cannot in his
capacity as pope depose the king of France. But in the same manner
that Pope [Zacharias] deposed the king of the Franks by authority of
the people of that kingdom and thus it is they who primarily
performed the deposition, and, witness the gloss to 15 q. 6 c. Alius,
Zacharias "is said to have deposed who gave his consent to
those who were deposing" [s.v. deposuit, col. 1083]
just so might the Pope depose the Emperor by authority of the Romans.
The answer to the fifth argument is that in temporal affairs the Pope
as such cannot legitimize those who are illegitimate. Should he
however legally have done this de facto, he would have done it by
reason of some other power which is not connected to the papacy. |
Discipulus: Responde ad secundam rationem principalem. |
Student: Respond to the second main argument. |
Magister: Ad secundam rationem respondetur quod papa
ratione papatus non est solutus legibus imperialibus que divinis
legibus non repugnant licet aliunde forsitan sit solutus. Ad tertiam
rationem principalem respondetur quod clerici nisi sint exempti
auctoritate regum vel concilii generalis pertinent ad forum
secularium potestatum. Ad quartam rationem respondetur quod
in temporalibus licet appellare a papa ad imperatorem nisi per
universalem ecclesiam sit exemptus. Ad quintam dicitur quod Christus
commisit Petro iura imperii terreni, hoc est potestatem super malos
in spiritualibus, non in temporalibus. |
Master: The answer to the second argument is that by
reason of his office the pope is not free of those imperial laws
which are not incompatible with the laws of God, although he may
perhaps have been released therefrom from another quarter. The answer
to the third principal argument is that clerks belong to the forum of
the secular powers unless they have been exempted by the authority of
kings or of the general council. The answer to the fourth argument is
that in temporal matters one may appeal from the pope to the emperor
unless the former has been exempted [from the normal appeal process]
by the universal church. To the fifth argument one says that Christ
did entrust to Peter the rights of the earthly empire, that is to
say, power over the bad in spiritual matters, not in temporal affairs. |
Capitulum 10 |
Chapter 10 |
Discipulus: Michi placet quod expedivisti te
breviter de rationibus supradictis, tum quia in alio tractatu super
ipsas redibo, tum quia non audivi quod frater M. de Cesena et
sequaces sui quorum dicta contra dominum papam principaliter
examinare propono dogmatizant vel sentiunt quod papa non habeat
iurisdictionem coactivam vel quod imperatori subiectus sit. Ideo ad
secundam assertionem quam recitasti in secundo capitulo huius sexti
te converte et motiva illius enarra. |
Student: I am pleased by your abbreviated account of
the aforementioned arguments since I shall be reviewing them again in
another treatise, and because I have not heard that brother M. of
Cesena and his followers (whose statements against the Lord Pope I
primarily intend to examine) officially teach or believe that the
pope does not possess coercive jurisdiction or is subjected to the
emperor. Therefore move on to the second assertion which you recited
in the second chapter of this sixth book and give an account of its foundations. |
Magister: Illa assertio continet duas partes quarum
prima est quod si papa esset de heresi graviter diffamatus ecclesia
universalis et concilium generale et etiam aliqua alia congregatio
vel persona potestatem inquirendi et cohercendi ipsum haberet. |
Master: The assertion in question has two components
of which the first is that if the pope were seriously defamed of
heresy the universal church and the general council as well as some
other congregation or person would have the power to question and to
coerce him. |
Discipulus: Circa hanc partem peto ut disseras primo
an ecclesia universalis si papa esset de heresi graviter diffamatus
super ipsum potestatem haberet. |
Student: With respect to this component I would
request that you initially discuss whether the universal church would
have power over the pope if he were gravely defamed of heresy. |
Magister: Circa hoc ut dixi est una assertio quod
sic, aliorum autem est assertio quod non, scilicet dicentium quod licet
papa effectus hereticus ecclesie sit subiectus (quia eo ipso quod
fit hereticus fit non papa), si tamen falso fuerit de heresi
diffamatus non est subiectus ecclesie nec ecclesia in hoc casu habet
potestatem aliquam super ipsum. |
Master: I have said that on this issue there is an
assertion which is affirmative while the assertion of others is
negative. The latter say that although a pope who becomes a heretic
would be subject to the church, since he would become a non-pope by
the very fact of becoming a heretic, yet should he be falsely defamed
of heresy he is not subject to the church nor does the church in that
case have any power over him. |
Discipulus: Motiva utriusque assertionis auscultabo
libenter. Primo autem allega motiva secunde assertionis. |
Student: I shall gladly listen to the reasons of
each assertion. Lay down first of all the reasons of the second assertion. |
Magister: Primum motivum est tale. Nulla falsa
infamia potest persone vel collegio aut congregationi iurisdictionem
aut potestatem conferre. Sed papa de heresi minime diffamatus non est
de iurisdictione ecclesie nec subest ei. Igitur nec papa falso de
heresi diffamatus ecclesie est subiectus. Secundum
motivum est tale. Ille qui in aliqua causa est aliis superior non est
in eadem causa inferior illis, quia in eadem causa idem respectu
eiusdem vel eorumdem non potest esse superior et inferior. Sed papa
manens verus papa in causa fidei est omnibus aliis superior, quia si
omnes christiani sibi in causa fidei erronee dissentirent omnes de
iure licet de facto non posset cohercere deberet. Ergo papa propter
nullam falsam infamiam fit subiectus ecclesie in causa heresis.
Tertium motivum est tale. Si papa de heresi diffamatus iudicio
ecclesie esset subiectus, ecclesia posset iudicare de ipso. Hoc autem
non potest fieri quia cum ecclesia universalis simul conveniri non
possit oportet generale concilium convocari ad diffiniendum de causa
pape. Sed nullus potest absque papa generale concilium convocare, nec
ipse potest compelli per aliquem generale concilium congregare, quia
si aliquis posset eum compellere generale concilium congregare ille
esset superior papa, et ita aliqua persona esset superior papa quod
non est verum ut dicunt. Ecclesia ergo universalis de papa iudicare
non potest, et ita papa quantumcunque fuerit de heresi diffamatus
ecclesie minime est subiectus. |
Master: The first reason is this. No false
defamation can grant jurisdiction or power to a person, college, or
congregation; but a pope not defamed of heresy does not belong to the
jurisdiction of the church and is not subject to it: therefore a pope
falsely defamed of heresy is not subject to the church either. The
second reason is this. He who is superior to others in some cause is
not inferior to them in the very same cause, since in that one cause
the same person cannot be both superior and inferior in relation to
the identical participant or participants. But a pope who remains a
true pope is superior to everyone else in the cause of faith, for if
all Christians erroneously dissented from him in the cause of faith
he would have the duty in law to coerce them all even if in fact he
could not. Therefore no false defamation makes the pope subject to
the Church in a cause of heresy. The third proof is this. If a pope
defamed of heresy were subject to the judgment of the church, the
church could proceed to judge him. This however cannot come to pass,
for since the universal church cannot be gathered together there is
need to convoke a general council so as to decide the cause of the
pope. Yet no one may convoke the general council without the pope,
nor can the pope be compelled by someone to congregate the general
council. For if someone could compel him to assemble the general
council that someone would be superior to the pope, and thus a
particular person would be superior to the pope, which is not true,
they say. Therefore the universal church cannot pass judgment
concerning the pope, and thus the pope no matter how much he would
have been defamed of heresy is in no way subject to the church. |
Predicta assertio etiam auctoritatibus et exemplis videtur posse
probari. Plures vero auctoritates hoc expresse sonantes supra primo
c. huius sexti sunt inducte. Hoc etiam alia auctoritate simul et
exemplo probatur. Nam prout recitatum est supra ubi inquisitum est an
papa possit hereticari, Nicholaus papa ut legitur di. 21 c. Nunc autem
ait: "tempore Diocletiani et Maximiani augustorum Marcellinus
episcopus urbis Rome qui postea insignis martyr effectus est, adeo
compulsus est a paganis ut templum eorum ingressus grana thuris super
prunes imponeret, cuius rei gratia collecto numerosorum episcoporum
concilio et inquisitione facta, hoc idem pontifex se egisse confessus
est. Nullus tamen eorum proferre sententiam in eum ausus est dum ei
sepissime omnes dicerent 'tuo ore iudica causam tuam non nostro
iudicio' et iterum 'noli audiri in nostro iudicio sed collige in sinu
tuo causam tuam' et rursum 'quoniam ex te' inquiunt 'iustificaberis
aut ex ore tuo condempnaberis' et iterum dicunt 'prima sedes non
iudicabitur a quoquam'". Ex quibus verbis datur intelligi quod
beatus Marcellinus fuit de heresi diffamatus, nec mirum cum actum
hereticalem commiserit. Ex quo enim idolis immolavit fuit de
apostasia perfidie vehementer suspectus, quare potuit de heresi
graviter diffamari. Hoc tamen non obstante nemo episcoporum fuit
ausus in ipsum proferre sententiam. Ergo quantumcunque papa fuerit de
heresi diffamatus nullius est subiectus iudicio. |
It appears that the aforementioned assertion may also be demonstrated
by authorities and examples. Indeed many authorities proclaiming
exactly this are provided above in the first chapter of this sixth
book. This is also proved by another authority together with an
example. For as was recited earlier, where we inquired whether the
pope can lapse into heresy [1 Dial. 5.2], Pope Nicholas states (we
read it in di. 21 c. Nunc autem)[col. 71]: "In
the time of the senior emperors Diocletian and Maximinus, the bishop
of the city of Rome, Marcellinus, who later became a glorious martyr,
was coerced by the pagans to such an extent that he entered their
temple and placed grains of incense upon live coals. A council of
numerous bishops was convened on account of this and an inquiry was
held, whereupon the same Pontiff admitted he had done the deed. While
none of them dared to pass sentence upon him, still they all would
say to him repeatedly 'judge your case from your own mouth, not in
terms of our judgment' and once more 'do not proceed with a hearing
in our court but reserve judgment of your own case' and again 'in
that way (they state) you will be justified by yourself or condemned
from your own mouth' and once again they say 'the first see will not
be judged by anyone'". We are given to understand from these
words that blessed Marcellinus was defamed of heresy, nor was this
surprising since he had committed an heretical act. For having
sacrificed to idols he was strongly suspected of the perfidy of
apostasy and therefore could be gravely defamed of heresy. Yet in
spite of this none of the bishops dared to pass sentence upon him.
Therefore no matter how much the pope has been defamed of heresy he
is subject to the judgment of no one. |
Discipulus: Ista ratio non videtur concludere quod
papa de heresi diffamatus non sit subiectus ecclesie universali et
concilio generali, quia auctoritas Nicholai non loquitur de ecclesia
universali et concilio generali, sed de quibusdam episcopis qui
convenerunt ad inquirendum de causa pape Marcellini. |
Student: This argument does not appear to conclude
that a pope defamed of heresy is not subject to the universal church
and the general council, because the authority of Pope Nicholas does
not speak of the universal church and the general council but of
certain bishops who came together to inquire about the cause of Pope Marcellinus. |
Magister: Dicunt alii quod auctoritas predicta
Nicholai manifeste declarat quod papa de heresi diffamatus etiam
ecclesie universali et concilio generali minime est subiectus, quia
secundum beatum Hilarium "intelligentia dictorum ex causis est
assumenda dicendi". Ad intelligendum ergo verba predicta que
Nicholaus papa recitat recurrendum est ad causam dicendi. Causam
autem quare episcopi qui convenerant ad inquirendum de facto pape dixerunt "tuo
ore iudica causam tuam non nostro iudicio" ipsimet assignant
dicentes "prima sedes non iudicabitur a quoquam". In verbis
istis insinuant aperte quod summus pontifex etiam in casu illo in quo
fuerunt, scilicet si summus pontifex fuerit de heresi diffamatus, a
nullo est penitus iudicandus, et ita nec ab ecclesia universali nec a
concilio generali est papa diffamatus de heresi iudicandus quia ex
quo ipsi quorum verba approbantur a canone minime distinxerunt nec
nos debemus distinguere. Secundo probatur eadem assertio per exemplum
de Symacho papa de quo legitur in decretis di. 17 para. Hinc in
hec verba: "episcopi vero in synodo residentes congregata
auctoritate eiusdem Symachi dixerunt 'Symachus papa sedis apostolice
presul ab huiusmodi opinionibus impetitus quantum ad homines respicit
sit immunis et liber cuius causam totam Dei iudicio reservamus'".
Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod Symachus papa iudicio synodi non
erat subiectus licet fuerit de heresi diffamatus quia ut notat glossa
ibidem iste opiniones quibus fuerat Symachus impetitus causam heresis
contingebant, ait enim: "primo fuit" scilicet Symachus
"accusatus de heresi, sed cum appareret calumnia accusantis
postea fuit absolutus ut hic dicitur". |
Master: Others say that the aforementioned authority
of Pope Nicholas obviously declares that a pope defamed of heresy is
in no way subject even to the universal church and the general
council, because according to blessed Hilary "the meaning of
statements is to be derived from the reasons for uttering them."[Hilary
of Poitiers, De Trinitate ,Bk. iv, ch. 14: PL 10, col. 107]
Therefore in order to understand the aforementioned words which Pope
Nicholas recites reference must be made to the reason for uttering
them. But the reason why the bishops, who had come together to
inquire into the matter of the pope, said "judge your case from
your own mouth, not in terms of our judgment" they explain
themselves by stating that "the first see will not be judged by
anyone." In these words they openly suggest that a supreme
pontiff even in that situation in which they were (namely that of a
supreme pontiff defamed of heresy) is absolutely not to be judged by
anyone. Thus a pope defamed of heresy is to be judged neither by the
universal church nor by the general council because the very persons
whose words are given canonical approval did not make any
distinctions here and therefore neither must we. Secondly, the same
assertion is proved by the example of Pope Symachus concerning whom
we read these words in the Decretum (at di. 17 para. Hinc)[
col. 52]: "The bishops meeting in a synod gathered together by
authority of the same Symachus stated 'Let Pope Symachus the head of
the apostolic see assaulted by such opinions, be exempt and free in
the eyes of men; we reserve his entire cause to the judgment of
God.'" One gathers from these words that Pope Symachus was not
subject to the judgment of the synod even though he had been defamed
of heresy, because as the gloss notes in the same context, the
opinions by which Symachus had been assaulted touched on a matter of
heresy. Indeed the gloss states: "at first he" that is,
Symachus "was accused of heresy, but when the accuser's slander
became apparent Symachus was subsequently declared innocent as is
mentioned here." [ s.v. immunis, col. 72] |
Capitulum 11 |
Chapter 11 |
Discipulus: Ad presens sufficiant iste allegationes
pro assertione predicta et ideo motiva assertionis contrarie non
differas allegare. |
Student: These representations in support of the
aforestated claim are sufficient. Proceed therefore to outline the
reasons for the opposite point of view. |
Magister: Quod papa si de heresi diffametur sit
subiectus iudicio universalis ecclesie nonnulli conantur ostendere.
Primo sic. Ille qui potest accusari et iudicari de heresi est
subiectus iudicio universalis ecclesie si fuerit de heresi
diffamatus. Papa autem potest de heresi accusari et iudicari (di. 40 Si
papa) ergo etc. Secundo sic. Qui potest ab aliquo reprehendi
pro heresi est subiectus in eadem causa iudicio universalis ecclesie.
Sed papa potest pro heresi ab aliquo reprehendi. Hoc probatur per
exemplum de beato Petro quem beatus Paulus quia non ambulabat ad
veritatem evangelii reprehendit ad Gal. 2. Ergo papa si fuerit de
heresi diffamatus iudicio universalis ecclesie est subiectus. Tertio
sic. Minor iudicio superioris est subiectus. Sed papa est minor
universali ecclesia sicut orbis maior est urbe ergo etc.. Quarto sic.
Nulli corpori sufficienter est provisum nisi membra putrida que totum
corpus valent inficere possint abscindi. Sed tota ecclesia militans
unum corpus est teste Apostolo ad Rom. 12. Ait: "unum corpus
sumus in Christo". Istius autem corporis papa est membrum
quoddam. Ergo non est sufficienter provisum ecclesie nisi papa possit
abscindi per ecclesiam si hereticam incurrerit pravitatem. Cum ergo
Christus non defecerit in necessariis ecclesie militanti sequitur
quod per ecclesiam militantem papa si efficiatur hereticus potest
abscindi et per consequens si fuerit de heresi diffamatus iudicio
universalis ecclesie est subiectus. Quinto sic. Ille qui est de
aliquo crimine denuntiandus ecclesie, iudicio universalis ecclesie si
fuerit diffamatus est subiectus. Sed papa potest pro crimine heresis
denuntiari ecclesie, Christo dicenti Matth. 18: "si autem
peccaverit in te frater tuus", et post: "si non audierit
eos dic ecclesie". Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod cum papa
censendus sit frater, ipse potest pro crimine potissime heresis
denuntiari ecclesie, ergo si fuerit de crimine heresis diffamatus
iudicio ecclesie est subiectus. |
Master: Some attempt to show that should a pope be
defamed of heresy he would be subject to the judgment of the
universal church. Firstly as follows. One who can be accused and
judged of heresy is subject to the judgment of the universal church
should he be defamed of heresy. But the pope can be accused and
judged of heresy (di. 40, Si papa)[col. 146] . Therefore
etc. Secondly thus: he who can be censured for heresy by someone is
subject in the same cause to the judgment of the universal church.
But the pope can be censured for heresy by someone. This is proved by
the example of blessed Peter, whom blessed Paul rebuked because
"he was not walking uprightly according to the truth of the
gospel" (Galatians 2[:14]). Therefore should a pope be defamed
of heresy he is subject to the judgment of the universal church.
Thirdly: The inferior is subject to the judgment of the superior. But
the pope is inferior to the universal church, just as the whole world
is greater than a single city, therefore etc. Fourthly thus: No body
has been sufficiently provided for unless decaying members which
might infect the whole body can be amputated. But the whole of the
church militant is one body, as the Apostle witnesses in Romans
12[:5]. He states: "we are one body in Christ". And of this
body the pope is a definite member. Hence the church is not
sufficiently provided for unless the pope may be cut off by the
church should he fall into heretical wickedness. Therefore since
Christ did not fail to secure necessary options for the militant
church, it follows that the pope may be cut off by the militant
church if he becomes a heretic, and consequently he is subject to the
universal church should he be slandered of heresy. Fifthly thus: one
who must be denounced to the church for some crime is subject to the
judgment of the universal church should he be slandered. But the pope
may be denounced to the church for the crime of heresy. Christ stated
in Matthew 18[:15,17]: "moreover if thy brother shall trespass
against thee", and then: "if he shall neglect to hear them,
tell it unto the church". From these words one gathers that
since the pope is to be viewed as a brother, he can be denounced to
the church for a crime, above all that of heresy. Therefore should he
be slandered of the crime of heresy he is subject to the judgment of
the church. |
Capitulum 12 |
Chapter 12 |
Discipulus: De ecclesia universali an sibi summus
pontifex sit subiectus que dixisti sufficiant. Nunc autem sententias
peritorum de concilio generali, an super papam de heresi diffamatum
iurisdictionem vel potestatem obtineat aperire digneris. |
Student: What you have stated about the universal
church (i.e. whether the supreme pontiff is subject to it) is
sufficient. Now, if you please, explain the views of the learned
about the general council, viz., whether it holds jurisdiction or
power over a pope slandered of heresy. |
Magister: Sunt nonnulli dicentes quod concilium
generale super papam de heresi diffamatum nullam habet iurisdictionem
omnino, quod pluribus rationibus nituntur ostendere. Est autem prima
ratio talis. Ecclesia universalis non habet iurisdictionem super
papam de heresi diffamatum, sicut nituntur per rationes prius
adductas ostendere. Ergo multo fortius concilium generale non habet
iurisdictionem super papam de heresi diffamatum. Secundo sic. Nulla
congregatio specialis in quacunque causa habet iurisdictionem super
papam, cum in omni causa quelibet congregatio particularis papa
inferior sit censenda. Concilium autem generale est quedam
congregatio particularis seu specialis, quia omnes christianos minime
comprehendit. Ergo concilium generale non habet iurisdictionem super
papam. Tertio sic. Illa congregatio que potest contra fidem errare
non habet iurisdictionem super papam de heresi mendaciter diffamatum.
Generale autem concilium potest contra fidem errare, sicut nonnulli
per plures rationes probare nituntur, ergo etc. Quarto sic. Illa
congregatio que in causa heresis est inferior papa etiam de heresi
diffamato non est in eadem causa papa superior. Sed totum concilium
generale preter papam est in causa heresis papa inferius, quia si
totum concilium generale preter papam etiam de heresi mendaciter
diffamatum contra fidem erraret ipse omnes de iure punire deberet.
Ergo in causa heresis papa concilio generali est superior. |
Master: There are a few who say that a general
council has no jurisdiction whatsoever over a pope slandered of
heresy, which they attempt to show by multiple arguments. And the
first argument is this. The universal church does not have
jurisdiction over a pope defamed of heresy, a point they attempt to
show by reasons presented earlier [1 Dial. 6.10]. Therefore all the
more compellingly does the general council not have jurisdiction over
a pope defamed of heresy. Secondly thus: there is no case where a
special congregation possesses jurisdiction over the pope, since
whatever congregation is particular must be deemed inferior to the
pope in any case. But the general council is a certain special or
particular congregation because it does not include all Christians.
Therefore the general council does not have jurisdiction over the
pope. Thirdly thus: that congregation which can err against the faith
does not have jurisdiction over a pope falsely accused of heresy. But
the general council can err against the faith, as a number [of
scholars] attempt to prove by many arguments [1 Dial. 5.25].
Therefore etc. Fourthly thus: that congregation which is inferior to
the pope in a case of heresy even if he himself is defamed of heresy,
is not superior to the pope in the very same case. But the entire
general council minus the pope is inferior to the pope in a case of
heresy, because if the entire general council minus the pope (even
one falsely slandered of heresy) were to err against the faith, the
pope would have the lawful duty of punishing them all. Therefore in a
case of heresy the pope is superior to the general council. |
Discipulus: Totum concilium generale preter papam
non potest contra fidem errare quia Deus qui promisit fidem
catholicam usque ad finem seculi duraturam non permitteret. |
Student: The entire general council minus the pope
cannot err against the faith, for God, who promised that the catholic
faith would last until the end of time, would not allow it. |
Magister: Ista responsio impugnatur, tum quia esto
quod totum concilum generale preter papam erraret nequaquam fides
christiana desineret, quia salvaretur in papa et in multis aliis.
Fides autem in solo papa posset salvari quemadmodum tempore passionis
Christi in unica muliere remansit. Tum quia unus potest ad se trahere
totum concilium generale, et unus potest toti residuo concilii
generalis contradicere, sicut notatur di. 31 c. Nicena. Ergo
multo fortius papa qui est principalis et caput concilii generalis
potest toti residuo contradicere et per consequens residuo minime est
subiectus. Quinto sic. Illa congregatio que nullam auctoritatem habet
nisi a papa, et que absque papa congregari non potest, nullam habet
iurisdictionem super papam nisi papa sponte eius iudicio se
submittat. Sed concilium generale nullam habet iurisdictionem seu
potestatem aut auctoritatem nisi a papa, nec potest absque eius
mandato aliqualiter celebrari. Igitur papa nisi voluntarie se
submittat iudicio concilii generalis minime est subiectus. |
Master: This answer they impugn. To begin with,
because even if the entire general council minus the pope were to
fall into error, the Christian faith would by no means disappear,
since it would remain in the pope and in many others. Indeed the
faith may be saved in the pope alone, just as it remained in a single
woman at the time of Christ's passion. Further: a single person may
attract to his position the whole of the general council, and a
single person may contradict the entire remainder of the general
council, which is noted in di. 31 c. Nicena[col. 114].
Therefore all the more potently can the pope (who is the head and
mainstay of the general council) contradict the entire remainder
thereof, and consequently he is not subject to this remainder. The
fifth argument is this. That congregation which has no authority
except from the pope, and which cannot come together to meet without
the pope, has no jurisdiction over the pope unless the latter
spontaneously submits himself to its judgment. But the general
council has no jurisdiction or power or authority save from the pope,
nor can it in any way be celebrated without his permission. Therefore
the Pope is not subjected to the judgment of the general council
unless he freely submits to it. |
Capitulum 13 |
Chapter 13 |
Discipulus: Quomodo allegatur in contrarium manifesta. |
Student: Indicate how one might argue for the
contrary position. |
Magister: Quod papa iudicio generalis concilii sit
subiectus quidam moliuntur ostendere. Primo sic. Ecclesia universalis
iurisdictionem obtinet super papam de heresi diffamatum. Igitur et
ista congregatio que vicem gerit universalis ecclesie iurisdictionem
habet super papam de heresi diffamatum. Concilium autem generale
gerit vicem universalis ecclesie, ergo etc. Secundo hoc probatur sic.
Diffamatus de aliquo crimine est iudicio concilii generalis subiectus
si eidem concilio super obiecto crimine respondere tenetur. Papa
autem diffamatus de heresi generali concilio respondere tenetur. Vnde
et in decretis 2 q. 7 para. Item cum Balaam sic legitur:
"Symachus papa in Romana synodo dignitate sua expoliatus, prius
statui pristino reddi decernitur, ut tunc veniret ad causam, et si
ita recte videretur accusantium propositionibus responderet. Digna
res visa est maximo numero sacerdotum atque mereretur effectum. Et
cum postmodum ordinaretur quomodo esset accusandus, prefatus papa, ut
causam diceret, occurrebat, sed ab emulis est impeditus". Ex
quibus verbis datur intelligi quod Symachus papa qui fuit de heresi
accusatus sicut notatur in glossa di. 17 para. Hinc, coram
synodo respondere debebat. Ergo in causa heresis concilium generale
est super papam de heresi diffamatum. |
Master: There are some who strive to demonstrate
that the pope is subject to the judgment of the general council.
First in this way. The universal church holds jurisdiction over a
pope slandered of heresy. Therefore that congregation which
represents the universal church also has jurisdiction over a pope
defamed of heresy. But the general council represents the general
church, therefore etc. Secondly this is proved as follows. A person
slandered of some crime is subject to the judgment of the general
council if he is bound to answer to this same council in the matter
of the crime he stands accused of. But a pope defamed of heresy is
obligated to answer to the general council. Hence we read the
following in the Decretum at 2 q. 7 para. Item cum Balaam[col.
497-498]: "Pope Symachus was stripped of his dignity in a Roman
synod. It was initially resolved that he be reinstated in his
original position, and then deal with his case, and should this be
deemed acceptable he would respond to the points of his accusers.
This was seen as a worthy procedure to a majority of priests and was
carried out. And when it was subsequently being decided how he was to
be accused, this pope presented himself to state his case, but was
impeded by enemies". From these words we understand that
Symachus who was accused of heresy (as noted in the gloss to di. 17
para. Hinc)[s.v.immunis col.72] was obligated to answer
before the synod. Therefore in a case of heresy the general council
is above a pope defamed of heresy. |
Tertio, sic per glossas super decretis hoc probatur. Ait enim glossa
di. 19 c. Anastasius: "papa tenetur requirere consilium
episcoporum quod verum est ubi de fide agitur et tunc synodus maior
est papa". Hiis verbis patenter asseritur quod in causa fidei
synodus maior est papa . Item glossa di. 15 c. Sicut dicit
in hec verba: "videtur ergo quod papa non possit destruere
statuta concilii quia orbis est maior urbe unde requirit papa
consensum concilii (di. 19 c. Anastasius) arg. contra di. 17
para. Hinc etiam et Extra De electione c. Significasti
ubi dicitur concilium non posse pape legem imponere et 35 q. 9 c. Veniam
sed intellige quod hic dicitur circa articulos fidei". Ex quibus
verbis colligitur quod circa articulos fidei synodus maior est papa
et sibi legem potest imponere, et per consequens in causa fidei
synodus iurisdictionem habet super papam. Item glossa di. 21 c. Nunc autem
ait: "queritur quare isti episcopi non deposuerunt papam cum
esset confessus de heresi ut di. 40 c. Si papa, dicit Hug.
quia paratus erat corrigi, licet enim papa vel alius sit hereticus si
tamen paratus est corrigi non deponitur ut 24 q. 3 c. Dixit Apostolus,
vel ideo non debebant ipsum deponere quia coactus fecit". Ex
quibus verbis datur intelligi quod episcopi potestatem habent
deponendi papam de heresi accusatum licet non debeant ipsum semper
deponere quia aliquando non est dignus deponi. Causam tamen pape
habent audire et ita potestatem obtinent super ipsum. |
Thirdly, this is proved as follows by glosses on the canons. For the
gloss on di. 19 c. Anastasius [s.v.concilio col.87] states:
"the pope is obligated to request the advice of the bishops,
which is true where the issue is one of faith, and in that case the
synod is greater than the pope". By these words it is openly
asserted that in a case of faith the synod is greater than the pope.
Further: the gloss on di. 15 c. Sicut [s.v.presumit col.55]
states in the following words: "it appears therefore that the
pope cannot destroy the statutes of the council, because the world is
greater than the city, whence the pope requests the consent of the
council (di. 19 c. Anastasius)[col. 64]. The contrary
argument is found in di. 17 para. Hinc etiam[col. 52-53] and
in Extra De electione, c. Significasti [col. 49-50], where
it is stated that a council cannot impose law on the pope, and in 35
q. 9 c. Veniam [col. 1285], but understand that this is said
here of the articles of faith." From these words we gather that
the synod is greater than the pope on the issue of articles of faith,
and may impose a law upon him, and consequently that the synod has
jurisdiction over the pope in a case pertaining to the faith. Next:
the gloss of di. 21 c. Nunc autem [s.v.Marcellinus col.98]
states: "it is asked why these bishops did not depose the pope
who had admitted to heresy (as in di. 40 c. Si papa)[col.
146]. Huggucio says: because he was ready to be corrected. For
although the pope or someone else is a heretic, if he is ready to be
corrected he is not to be deposed (as in 24 q. 3 c. Dixit Apostolus)[col.
998]. Or at least they should not have deposed him since he had been
acting under duress." From these words we understand that
bishops have the power of deposing a pope accused of heresy, although
they should not always depose him because sometimes he does not
deserve to be deposed. But it is their function to hear the case of
the pope and accordingly they hold power over him. |
Capitulum 14 |
Chapter 14 |
Discipulus: Allegationes prescripte me fere ad
perplexitatem inducunt. Durum enim michi videtur asserere quod oves
super pastorem, membra super caput, filii super patrem, discipuli
super magistrum, subditi super prelatum, iurisdictionem aut
potestatem vel auctoritatem obtineant presertim cum iniqua et falsa
infamia iurisdictionem non debeat nec possit tribuere. Et ideo grave
apparet dicere quod papa de heresi mendaciter diffamatus propter
talem infamiam cuiuscunque vel quorumcunque subdatur iudicio, maxime
cum impossibile minime videatur quod tota fides catholica in papa
solo remaneat saltem pro aliquo tempore brevi. Ex alia parte zelus
fidei christiane me subtiliter angit ne dicam nullam debere fieri
inquisitionem aut iudicium de papa super crimine heresis diffamato,
quia cum probabiliter teneam papam posse hereticam incurrere
pravitatem, si de ipso nulla posset inquisitio fieri tota fides
posset periclitari. Vnde si aliqui istam perplexitatem nituntur
dissolvere mihi revela. |
Student: The aforewritten representations nearly
bring me to confusion. That sheep acquire jurisdiction or power or
authority over the shepherd, bodily members over the head, sons over
the father, students over the master, subjects over the ruler, seems
to me a harsh claim, especially since a malicious and false
defamation must not, indeed cannot, confer jurisdiction. And
therefore it appears momentous to assert that a pope mendaciously
slandered of heresy becomes subject to the judgment of any person or
persons on account of that kind of defamation, above all since it
does not seem impossible that the whole of the catholic faith could
survive in the pope alone, at least for some brief period of time. On
the other hand zeal for the Christian faith makes me feel acutely
distressed to admit that there must be no examination or judgment of
a pope defamed of the crime of heresy, for since I hold the probable
contention that a pope may lapse into heretical wickedness, if no
examination of him were possible the whole faith might be endangered.
Hence reveal to me whether some are endeavouring to clear up this confusion. |
Magister: Est quaedam assertio quod propter nullam
infamiam falsam habet ecclesia iurisdictionem super papam. Si tamen
papa fuerit de heresi taliter diffamatus quod sine scandalo ecclesie
vel periculo fidei tolerari non posset non solum universalis ecclesia
aut concilium generale sed etiam episcopi habent potestatem
inquirendi de ipso, quem si deprehenderint manifeste hereticum ipsum
debent cohercere vel aliis denuntiare pravitatem eiusdem. |
Master: There is a particular contention that no
false defamation grants the church jurisdiction over the pope. If,
however, the pope were to be slandered of heresy in a manner which
could not be tolerated without scandal for the church or danger to
the faith, then not only the universal church or the general council,
but also bishops would have power of inquiry over him. If the latter
were to discover that the pope was an obvious heretic, they would
have the duty to arrest him or to denounce his wickedness to others. |
Discipulus: Ista assertio contradictionem videtur
includere. Vna enim pars alteri apparet repugnare. Si enim nulla
persona super papam de heresi diffamatum habet iurisdictionem nulla
persona valebit de ipso de iure inquirere quia non ad inferiorem nec
ad parem sed ad superiorem iurisdictionem habentem officium
inquisitionis spectare dinoscitur. |
Student: This assertion appears to include a
contradiction. One of its elements seems to conflict with the other.
For if no person possesses jurisdiction over a pope defamed of
heresy, then no person would be competent to legally inquire about
him, for it is known that the office of inquisition pertains to a
superior holding jurisdiction, and not to an inferior or to an equal. |
Magister: Ad illam obiectionem respondetur quod
sicut inquisitio ad superiorem spectat ita etiam citatio pertinet ad
superiorem. Non enim par vel inferior potest regulariter suum
superiorem citare, sed citare est iurisdictionem habentis. Et tamen
hoc non obstante potest in casu quis iurisdictionem minime habens
super alium citare eundem. Si enim probabiliter dubitatur an iudex
habeat iurisdictionem super aliquem ipsum debet et potest citare, et
citatus ire tenetur et ostendere quod citatio non tenet . Quod si non
fecerit poterit ipsum alius excommunicare et propter contumaciam
iudex qui nullam habuit iurisdictionem super ipsum incipit
iurisdictionem super eum habere quantum ad hoc quod ipsum potest
excommunicationis sententia innodare (Extra De appellationibus,
Si duobus). |
Master: The answer to this objection is that a
summons pertains to a superior as much as an inquisition does. Indeed
an equal or an inferior cannot normally issue a summons to a
superior, for summoning belongs to one who has jurisdiction. And yet
this does not prevent someone without jurisdiction over another from
summoning him under certain circumstances. For if there is probable
doubt whether a judge has jurisdiction over someone, the judge must
and can summon him, and the person summoned is obligated to appear
and to show that the summons does not hold. Were the person not to
obey the summons, the other might excommunicate him, and for willful
disobedience to a judicial order a judge who had no jurisdiction over
that person begins to acquire such jurisdiction over him, in that he
can now bind him by a sentence of excommunication (Extra, De
appellationibus, Si duobus)[col. 412]. |
Sic est, ut dicunt, de inquisitione dicendum: quod licet inquirere
regulariter ad superiorem pertineat, si tamen probabiliter dubitatur
de aliquo, qui non potest recurrere ad superiorem an habeat super
alium iurisdictionem et potestatem inquirendi, et non aliter nisi
inquirendo (an scilicet super alium habeat iurisdictionem) ad
veritatem poterit pervenire,licebit sibi de ipso inquirere ut
cognoscat an ille ad eius iurisdictionem pertineat. Sic dicunt esse
in proposito, quia eo ipso quod papa de heresi tam graviter
diffamatus est quod talis infamia absque scandalo ecclesie et
periculo fidei dissimulari aut tolerari non possit, prelati possunt
probabiliter dubitari an papa sit catholicus vel hereticus, quia de
diffamato dubitandum est ante inquisitionem et examinationem cause an
fama veritati innitatur, et per consequens dubitandum est an
diffamatus crimen super quo diffamatur commiserit. Si autem prelati
probabiliter dubitant an papa de heresi diffamatus sit catholicus vel
hereticus, sequitur quod probabiliter dubitant an papa sit de
iurisdictione ipsorum effectus. Nam si fama est falsa non est de
iurisdictione ipsorum, quia papa manens papa propter falsam infamiam
non est de iurisdictione quorumcunque. Falsa enim infamia nullam
iurisdictionem tribuit. Si autem fama continet veritatem papa taliter
diffamatus est vere hereticus. Si autem est vere hereticus est de
iurisdictione catholicorum. Sicut igitur prelati catholici
probabiliter dubitant an papa de heresi diffamatus sit catholicus vel
hereticus, ita dubitant probabiliter an sit de iurisdictione ipsorum
effectus. Ex quo autem probabiliter dubitant an sit de iurisdictione
ipsorum effectus, si ad veritatem aliter quam inquirendo nequeunt
pervenire an papa sit de iurisdictione ipsorum effectus, ipsi
tenentur de ipso inquirere an scilicet papa de heresi diffamatus sit
eorum iurisdictioni subiectus. Hoc autem non possunt inquirere nisi
inquirendo an papa de heresi diffamatus sit hereticus vel catholicus.
Ergo in hoc casu prelati catholici habent potestatem inquirendi de
papa super heresi mendaciter diffamato, licet in rei veritate
iurisdictionem non habeant super ipsum. Sicut potest quis alium
citare cuius tamen in rei veritate non est iudex. |
And they say that a similar view is to be held regarding an
inquisition. That although to inquire normally belongs to a superior,
if there is doubt about some person, then a potential judge (who
cannot have access to a superior to find out whether he possesses
jurisdiction and power of inquiry over the other person, and cannot
discover the truth except through a prior inquisition as to whether
he possesses jurisdiction over the other) will have the right to hold
an inquiry about the other person in order to know whether this
person belongs to his jurisdiction. They say that this perspective
applies to the issue under discussion. Since by the very fact that a
pope is so seriously defamed of heresy that such slander cannot be
tolerated or concealed without scandal to the church or danger to the
faith, prelates may have probable doubt as to whether the pope is a
catholic or a heretic. For one must doubt about someone thus
slandered (before an inquisition and examination of the case) whether
rumour represents truth, and one must consequently wonder whether the
person slandered committed the crime of which he is being defamed.
If, however, prelates have probable doubt whether a pope defamed of
heresy is a catholic or a heretic, it follows that they have probable
doubt as to whether the pope has become subject to their
jurisdiction. Indeed if the rumour is false he is not under their
jurisdiction, because a pope who remains pope does not pertain to
anybody's jurisdiction due to a false rumour. Forsooth a false rumour
conveys no jurisdiction. But if the rumour is truthful, then a pope
thus defamed is truly a heretic. And if he is truly a heretic, he
pertains to the jurisdiction of catholics. Therefore just as catholic
prelates have probable doubt whether a pope defamed of heresy is a
catholic or a heretic, they have probable doubt whether he has become
subject to their jurisdiction. And since they have probable doubt on
this last point, if they cannot arrive at the truth of the matter
otherwise than by an inquisition, they are bound to proceed with his
case and to inquire, namely, whether the pope slandered of heresy is
subject to their jurisdiction. But this they cannot formally
investigate unless they inquire whether the pope defamed of heresy is
a heretic or a catholic. Therefore in this case catholic prelates
have the power to inquire about a pope mendaciously slandered of
heresy, even if in truth they do not have jurisdiction over him. Just
as someone may summon another whose judge in truth he is not. |
Capitulum 15 |
Chapter 15 |
Discipulus: Ex predictis michi est data occasio
multa querendi. Ante omnia tamen expostulo ut ostendas quibus
rationibus vel auctoritatibus possit assertio supradicta muniri. |
Student: The aforesaid has given me the opportunity
to investigate many issues. But before all else, I beseech you to
show by what arguments and authorities the position just outlined may
be defended. |
Magister: Per rationes fundatas in scriptura divina
et dictis sanctorum patrum predicta assertio videtur posse probari,
quam tamen primo exemplo patentissimo, ut nonnullis apparet, quidam
demonstrare nituntur. Nam sicut allegatum est supra, beato Marcellino
papa de heresi diffamato eo quod actum hereticalem idolatrie
videlicet commisisset, plures episcopi convenerunt et inquisitionem
de ipso fecerunt. Inquisitione autem facta quia papam non
deprehenderunt hereticum ipsum iudicare nolebant sicut nec poterant.
Ex quo datur intelligi quod de papa de heresi diffamato catholici
potestatem habent inquirendi et debent inquirere an fama contineat veritatem. |
Master: It seems possible to prove the aforesaid
claim by arguments founded on holy writ and on the declarations of
saintly fathers. And some attempt to initially demonstrate it by what
appears to many as a most obvious example. For as was argued earlier,
when blessed Pope Marcellinus was defamed of heresy because he had
committed a heretical act (namely idol worship), a fair number of
bishops gathered together and performed an inquisition about him.
Once the inquisition had been completed they did not want to judge
him, as indeed they could not, since they had not found the pope to
be a heretic. From which we understand that catholics have the power
to inquire concerning a pope defamed of heresy, and must inquire
whether the rumour reflects the truth. |
Discipulus: Notorium fuit quod beatus Marcellinus
commiserat idolatriam et per consequens quod esset hereticus, et ita
non est simile de beato Marcellino et de papa mendaciter de heresi diffamato. |
Student: That blessed Marcellinus had committed
idolatry and consequently that he was a heretic was a notorious fact,
and there is thus no similarity between blessed Marcellinus and a
pope mendaciously defamed of heresy. |
Magister: Istam responsionem excludunt, dicentes
quod quamvis esset notorium apud infideles et etiam apud quosdam
catholicos quod beatus Marcellinus sacrificasset idolis, tamen hoc
non erat notorium apud episcopos qui ad concilium convenerunt nec
erat notorium apud quoscunque quod ipse erat hereticus, et ideo
dubitabant episcopi an esset hereticus, et forte magis credebant quod
non esset hereticus, sicut nec fuit hereticus. Quia tamen nesciverunt
veritatem et ipse fuit de heresi diffamatus convenerunt catholici et
inquisierunt sollicite veritatem. Si enim veritatem scivissent
superfluo inquisivissent. Inquisierunt enim de facto pape et ita de
papa infamato de heresi est inquisitio facienda. |
Master: They reject this response, saying that
although it was widely known among unbelievers and even among certain
catholics that blessed Marcellinus had sacrificed to idols, it wasn't
at all widely known among the bishops who had gathered in council nor
widely known among anybody that he was a heretic. And so the bishops
were in doubt as to whether he was a heretic; perhaps they leaned
towards the belief that he was not a heretic, as indeed he wasn't.
But since they did not know the truth, and he had been slandered of
heresy, catholics gathered together and anxiously inquired into the
truth. Had they indeed known the truth such inquiry would have been
superfluous. For they inquired about what the pope had done, and thus
an inquisition about a pope slandered of heresy is mandatory. |
Discipulus: Adhuc instatur contra dictum exemplum,
quia beatus Marcellinus non fuit infamatus de heresi sed de idolatria
tantummodo, et ita exemplum propositum nequaquam concludit intentum illorum. |
Student: There is a further point against this
specific example. Blessed Marcellinus was not defamed of heresy but
only of idol worship, and thus the proferred example does not prove
their contention. |
Magister: Istam instantiam excludunt dicentes quod
eo ipso quod fuit diffamatus de idolatria fuit diffamatus de heresi,
quia omnis idolatra de quo nescitur an timore mortis vel sponte
immolaverit idolis de heresi est suspectus, et ita diffamare aliquem
de idolatria antequam constet ipsum idolatrare solummodo timore
mortis est ipsum infamare de heresi. Cum ergo beatus Marcellinus
commiserit idolatriam antequam rediit et penitentiam egerit et
confitebatur se idolatrasse timore mortis tantummodo, nesciebatur an
pravitatem hereticam incurrisset. Et ita constat quod beatus
Marcellinus fuit de heresi diffamatus. Item ut dicunt isti esto quod
beatus Marcellinus non fuerit de heresi diffamatus, habent intentum
per dictum exemplum quod catholici potestatem habent inquirendi de
papa de heresi diffamato, nam non est maior ratio quod catholici
habeant potestatem inquirendi de papa de crimine idolatrie diffamato
quam de papa super crimine heresis diffamato. Cum ergo catholici
habeant potestatem inquirendi de papa super crimine idolatrie
diffamato, sequitur quod habent potestatem inquirendi de papa super
crimine heresis diffamato. |
Master: They reject this point, saying that he had
been defamed of heresy by the very fact he had been slandered of idol
worship, because every idol worshipper concerning whom it is unknown
whether he sacrificed to idols in fear of death or voluntarily, is
suspect of heresy. And thus to slander someone of idolatry before
clarifying that he worshipped idols solely in fear of death is to
defame him of heresy. Therefore since blessed Marcellinus had
committed idolatry, it was unknown (prior to his return to the fold,
performance of penance, and confession that he had worshipped idols
solely in fear of death) whether he had lapsed into heretical
wickedness. And so it is a certain fact that blessed Marcellinus was
defamed of heresy. Further: they claim that even if blessed
Marcellinus had not been defamed of heresy, they can by the proferred
example establish their contention that catholics have the power to
inquire about a pope defamed of heresy. For there is no greater
reason that catholics should have the power to inquire about a pope
defamed of the crime of idol worship than that they should have the
power to inquire about a pope defamed of the crime of heresy.
Therefore since catholics have the power to inquire about a pope
defamed of the crime of idolatry, it follows that they have the power
to inquire about a pope defamed of the crime of heresy. |
Discipulus: Dicerent aliqui quod certum fuit beatum
Marcellinum idolatrasse et ideo potuerint catholici merito inquirere
de facto eius, sed si papa aliquis esset diffamatus de heresi non
esset propter hoc certum ipsum sensisse hereticam pravitatem, et ita
non est simile de beato Marcellino et de papa super crimine heresis diffamato. |
Student: Some might respond that the idol worship of
blessed Marcellinus had been a confirmed fact, and therefore
catholics could justifiably inquire about his deed. But if some pope
were defamed of heresy it would not on this account be certain that
he had endorsed heretical wickedness, and there is hence no
similarity between Pope Marcellinus and a pope defamed of the crime
of heresy. |
Magister: Istam instantiam dicunt esse nullam, quia
inquisitio non debet esse de certis sed de dubiis. Qui enim scit
certiorari non debet et per consequens superfluo inquirit quis nisi
inquirat propter sua vel aliorum dubia excludenda. Sicut ergo fuit
certum et notorium episcopis qui convenerant ad concilium beatum
Marcellinum idolatrasse, de hoc non inquisierunt, sed inquisierunt
quod erat eis ignotum, an scilicet solo timore mortis idolatraverit.
Ita si papa aliquam heresim predicaret et hoc esset notorium de hoc
non esset inquisitio facienda sed esset inquisitio facienda an
pertinaciam errori adiungeret, et ita de papa super crimine heresis
diffamato est inquisitio per catholicos facienda. |
Master: They say that this is a worthless point,
because an inquisition must be of things doubtful not of things
certain. For one who knows does not require to be informed, and
consequently one inquires needlessly unless the purpose is to
eliminate one's doubts or those of others. Therefore, since it had
been certain and well known to the bishops who gathered in council
that blessed Marcellinus had worshipped idols, they did not inquire
about it, but they inquired about what was unknown to them, namely
whether he had worshipped idols solely in fear of death. Thus if the
pope were to preach some heresy and this fact was widely known, the
inquisition should not be directed towards the fact itself, but
should focus on whether the pope had combined obstinacy with error.
And thus catholics must inquire about a pope defamed of the crime of heresy. |
Quam etiam assertionem pluribus rationibus isti confirmare nituntur,
quarum prima talis est. Ad unumquemque prelatum et pastorem spectat
cognoscere que sunt oves sue et qui sunt sibi subiecti. Aliter enim
exempli pastoris summi dicentis Ioh. 10 "ego sum pastor bonus et
cognosco meas" erit nullatenus imitator, nec preceptum Salomonis
implebit dicentis Prov. 27 "diligenter agnosce vultum pecoris
tui tuosque greges considera". Debet ergo prelatus cognoscere
qui sint subiecti sui. Ergo quando dubitatur de aliquo an sit
subiectus alicuius prelati idem prelatus astringitur, ne forte
subditus suus per negligentiam pereat et secum alios pertrahat in
interitum, diligenter inquirere et investigare an ad gregem suum
pertineat. Sed si papa de heresi graviter diffamatus sit prelati
debent probabiliter dubitare an papa taliter diffamatus sit de
iurisdictione ipsorum effectus, quia dubitare habent an sit
hereticus, licet non statim debeant credere ipsum esse hereticum.
Ergo in hoc casu tenentur inquirere an papa taliter diffamatus sit de
iurisdictione ipsorum. Hoc autem nequaquam facere possunt nisi
inquirendo an sit effectus hereticus. Ergo tenentur inquirere an papa
taliter diffamatus hereticam incurrerit pravitatem. |
They also attempt to confirm this statement by many arguments of
which the first is this. It concerns every prelate and pastor to know
which sheep are his own, and who are subject to him. For otherwise he
would in no way imitate the example of the supreme shepherd stating
in John 10[:14]: "I am the good shepherd and know my sheep",
nor would he fulfill the directive of Solomon stating in Proverbs
27[:23]: "be thou diligent to know the state of thy flocks and
look well to thy herds". Therefore the prelate must know the
identity of his subjects. And so when there is doubt as to whether
someone is the subject of a certain prelate, that prelate is bound to
diligently inquire and to investigate whether the person belongs to
his flock, so as to prevent his possible subject from perishing due
to negligence and dragging others into destruction along with
himself. But if the pope is seriously defamed of heresy, prelates
must have probable doubt whether such a slandered pope might not have
become subject to their jurisdiction, for they must wonder if he is a
heretic even if they must not immediately believe that he is a
heretic. Therefore in this case they are bound to inquire whether a
pope thus slandered is under their jurisdiction. But this they cannot
do unless they inquire if he has become a heretic. Therefore they are
bound to inquire whether a pope defamed in this way has lapsed into
heretical wickedness. |
Secunda ratio est hec. Ad illum spectat scire qui sunt subditi sui ad
quem spectat corrigere omnium subditorum suum excessus. Sed ad
prelatos catholicos spectat corrigere omnium subditorum suorum
excessus ut sacri canones protestantur aperte. Ergo ad ipsos spectat
scire de omnibus qui sunt subditi sui. Ergo ad ipsos pertinet
inquirere de illis de quibus dubitatur an sint sibi subiecti utrum in
rei veritate sint subditi sui vel non. Si autem papa de heresi
graviter diffamatur, probabiliter dubitatur an sit subiectus
catholicorum quia probabiliter dubitatur an sit hereticus. Ergo ad
catholicos pertinet inquirere an papa de heresi diffamatus sit eis
subiectus. Tertia ratio est hec. Prelati catholici tenentur ex
officio suo oves suas contra luporum rabiem custodire. Ergo tenentur
subditos suos contra hereticorum insidias conservare, et per
consequens quando nuntiatur prelatis catholicis per publicam famam
quod aliquis nititur gregem suum invadere et corrumpere per hereticam
pravitatem, debent diligenter inquirere veritatem, ipso Domino
precipiente Deut. 13: "si audieris in una urbium tuarum quas
Dominus Deus tuus dabit tibi ad habitandum dicentes aliquos egressi
sunt filii Belial de medio tui et averterunt habitatores urbis tue
atque dixerunt 'eamus et serviamus diis alienis' quos ignoratis quere
sollicite et diligenter, rei veritate perspecta, si inveneris certum
esse quod dicitur et abhominationem hanc opere perpetratam statim
percuties habitatores urbis illius in ore gladii etc." Ex quibus
verbis datur intelligi quod si a providis et honestis papa vel
quicunque alius publice diffamatur quod velit catholicos a fide
avertere orthodoxa, est veritas diligenter inquirenda. Ergo de papa
super crimine heresis graviter diffamato est inquisitio facienda. |
The second argument is this. One who is involved in the correction of
all his subjects' deviations needs to know who his subjects are. But
as the holy canons clearly declare, it is the catholic prelates who
are involved in the correction of all their subjects' deviations.
Therefore it pertains to these prelates to know who are their
specific subjects. It also pertains to such prelates to inquire
whether those who have a doubtful status as their subjects are in
truth their subjects or not. If, however, a pope is seriously defamed
of heresy, there is probable doubt whether he is the subject of
catholics because there is probable doubt whether he is a heretic.
Therefore it pertains to catholics to inquire whether a pope defamed
of heresy is subject to them. Here is the third argument. Catholic
prelates have an official obligation to protect their sheep from the
ferocity of wolves. Therefore they are bound to preserve their
subjects from the snares of heretics. Consequently when public rumour
advises catholic prelates that someone is attempting to invade their
flock and corrupt it by heretical wickedness, they must scrupulously
inquire into the truth of this. The Lord Himself commands it in
Deuteronomy 13[:12-15] : "If thou shalt hear say in one of thy
cities, which the Lord thy God hath given thee to dwell there,
saying, certain men, the children of Belial, are gone out from among
you, and have withdrawn the inhabitants of their city, saying, Let us
go and serve other gods, which ye have not known; then shalt thou
enquire, and make search, and ask diligently; and behold, if it be
true, and the thing certain, that such abomination is wrought among
you; thou shalt surely smite the inhabitants of that city with the
edge of the sword, etc." From these words we understand that if
the pope or anyone else is publicly defamed by provident and
honourable men [saying] that he intends to alienate catholics from
orthodox faith, then the truth must be diligently investigated.
Therefore an inquisition about a pope seriously defamed of the crime
of heresy must take place. |
Discipulus: Prelati non habent inquirere nisi de
illis quos constat esse subditos suos, et ita de papa non habent inquirere. |
Student: It is not the business of prelates to
inquire about any except those who are their confirmed subjects, and
so it is not their business to inquire about the pope. |
Magister: Respondetur tibi quod quilibet prelatus
debet inquirere de omnibus qui gregem suum invadunt, sive sint
subditi sive non, saltem ad resistendum eisdem, quemadmodum rex debet
omnes repellere qui regnum suum invadunt quantumcunque sint de alio
regno, et quilibet etiam nullam habens iurisdictionem debet pro
patria omnes invadentes pro posse repellere quamvis nullam super eis
iurisdictionem obtineat. Et ex hoc quarta ratio sic formatur. Non
minus sollicite debent prelati catholici gregem suum contra
spirituales inimicos defendere et ea que ad defensionem pertinent
exercere quam reges et principes et eorum subditi debent regna sua et
principatus ac patriam contra hostes suos defendere ac tueri. Sed
reges et principes et subditi eorum debent terras suas contra
invadentes iniuste defendere, licet de eorum iurisdictione nequaquam
existant. Ergo multo animosius debent prelati contra inimicos
spirituales greges suos defendere et ea facere que ad defensionem
spiritualem spectare noscuntur. Sed ad defensionem noscitur pertinere
investigare sollicite qui sunt isti hostes spirituales qui gregem
nituntur invadere, maxime si est publica fama per viros honestos et
providos suscitata quod aliqui volunt dominicum gregem invadere. Si
ergo papa per viros providos et honestos de heresi publice diffamatur
catholici debent diligenter inquirere veritatem. |
Master: The answer to your point is that every
prelate must inquire about all those who assault his flock whether
they are his subjects or not, at least for the purpose of resisting
them. By the same token a king must repel all those who attack his
kingdom (even if they are from another kingdom), and anyone (even
someone possessing no jurisdiction) must for the sake of the homeland
resist all invaders as much as he can, even though he has no
jurisdiction over them. And from this there develops a fourth
argument. Catholic prelates must defend their flock against spiritual
enemies, and perform all things relevant to such defense with a care
no less anxious than that which is incumbent upon kings, princes and
their subjects, who must defend and protect their kingdoms,
princedoms and countries against their enemies. But kings, princes
and subjects must defend their lands from unjust invaders even if the
latter are not under their jurisdiction. Therefore much more
vigorously must prelates defend their flocks against spiritual
enemies and perform those activities which are known to be relevant
to spiritual defense. But to investigate with anxious care the
identity of the spiritually hostile forces which are attempting to
penetrate the flock is known to have defensive relevance, above all
if a public rumour has been created by honourable and provident men
that certain individuals want to attack the Lord's flock. Therefore
if the pope is publicly defamed of heresy by provident and honourable
men, catholics must diligently inquire into the truth. |
Quinta ratio talis est. Cui periculosum est renuntiare iuri suo , ei
periculosum est non inquirere ad quos extenduntur iura sua quando
dubitatur de aliquibus an extendantur ad ipsos. Sed prelatis
catholicis est periculosum renuntiare aut cedere iuri suo quod in
causa Dei susceperunt a Deo teste beato Cypriano qui ut recitatur 7
q. 1 c. Quam periculosum ait: "quam periculosum sit in
divinis rebus ut quis cedat iuri suo et potestati scriptura sancta
declarat cum Esau primatus suos inde perdidit, nec recipere postmodum
potuit quod semel cessit". Ergo periculosum est prelatis
catholicis non querere sollicite ad quos extenduntur iura eorum in
causis Dei, quando de aliquibus dubitatur an sint potestati
catholicorum subiecti. Si autem papa publice per viros providos et
honestos de heresi diffamatur probabiliter dubitandum est an sit
potestati catholicorum subiectus. Ergo de hoc in hoc casu debent
catholici diligenter inquirere veritatem, et ita habent de papa
taliter diffamato inquisitionem facere diligentem. |
The fifth argument is as follows. One who courts danger when
renouncing his right is also in danger if he does not inquire to whom
his rights extend when there is doubt as to whether some persons are
included within the purview of these rights. But it is dangerous for
catholic prelates to renounce or to abandon the right which they
received from God to advance His cause, as witnesses blessed Cyprian
who states (this is recited in 7 q. 1 c. Quam periculosum)[col.
569]: "how dangerous it is in matters divine for someone to
renounce his right and power holy scripture declares. For Esau
thereby lost his primacy, nor could he afterwards regain what he had
once abandoned". Therefore it is dangerous for catholic prelates
not to inquire with anxious care to whom their rights extend in the
affairs of God, when there is doubt whether some persons are subject
to the power of catholics. But if the pope is publicly defamed of
heresy by provident and honourable men, doubt must arise as to
whether he is subject to the power of catholics. Therefore under such
conditions catholics have the duty to inquire attentively about the
truth of the matter, and hence they must proceed to a scrupulous
inquisition about a pope defamed in this manner. |