William of Ockham, Dialogus,
part 3, tract 1, book 3

CAP. I. Discipulus Quamvis regulariter minime expediret totam universitatem fidelium uni capiti fideli sub Christo subesse, tamen videtur quod nullus catholicus debeat dubitare quin -- pro necessitate temporis, vel propter excellentiam beati Petri, vel ex alia causa speciali nobis fortassis ignota, aut de potentia absoluta -- Christus potuit constituere beatum Petrum caput, principem et praelatum aliorum apostolorum et universorum fidelium. Ideo specialiter nunc scrutemur an de facto Christus tantam beato Petro contulit {trs.4231 Fr[1]} dignitatem.	Chapter 1 Student Even if it would not regularly be advantageous for the whole totality of the faithful to be under one believing head under Christ, it seems nevertheless that no catholic ought to doubt that Christ was able to appoint blessed Peter head, ruler and prelate of the other apostles and all the faithful -- because of the necessity of the time, or on account of blessed Peter's excellence, or from some other special cause perhaps unknown to us, or out of his absolute power. Therefore let us now examine in particular whether Christ did in fact confer so great a dignity on blessed Peter.
Verum quia istius inquisiti, et aliorum {om. Fr[2]} complurium {*quamplurium FrLmMzPz[3]} discutiendorum inferius, nec una pars nec alia aliter quam per scripturas vel auctoritates potest ostendi, circa scripturas autem recipiendas sunt diversae opiniones et adversae, quibusdam dicentibus quod solummodo scripturae canonicae et generalium conciliorum debent de necessitate salutis admitti, aliis aliter sentientibus, ideo, licet qualis fides scripturis aliis {add. que Fr[4]} quam canonicis debeat adhiberi in prima parte [[lib. 2 Fr adds in margin [5]]] huius {istius Mz[6]} dialogi, in qua {*in qua: ubi FrMz[7]} quaesivimus quae assertio catholica quae haeretica est censenda, disservimus aliquantulum exquisite, sed {*hic FrMz[8]} tamen, propter dicta quorundam quae tunc non habuimus, non taedeat nos aliqualiter tangere de eodem. Circa hoc ergo diversas opiniones cum motivis earum non te pigeat recitare.	But since neither one side nor another of this inquiry and the many others that are to be discussed below can be shown except through writings or authoritative texts, and there are different and opposing opinions about the writings that ought to be accepted -- with some people saying that only the canonical scriptures and the writings of general councils ought to be admitted as necessary for salvation, and others thinking otherwise -- therefore, although in the first part of this Dialogue (where we sought to learn what assertion should be considered catholic and what heretical) we examined fairly carefully what kind of trust should be placed in other writings than those that are canonical, yet, on account of the remarks of some people that were not available to us at the time, it would not weary me to touch in some way on the same issue here. So would you mind setting out the different opinions about this and the reasons for them.
WHICH WRITINGS ARE AUTHORITATIVE FOR CHRISTIANS?
OPINION 1: The Bible and general councils and nothing else
Magister Una {*add. est FrLmMzPz[9]} opinio tenens quod nullam scripturam irrevocabiliter veram credere vel fateri tenemur de necessitate salutis aeternae nisi eas quae canonicae appellantur vel eas {*eis Marsilius} quae ad has de {*ex FrLmMzPz[10]} necessitate sequuntur aut scripturarum sanctarum sensum dubium habentium eas {eis Marsilius} interpretationes {interpretationibus Marsilius}seu determinationes {determinationibus Marsilius} quae per generale fidelium seu catholicorum concilium essent factae, in his praesertim in quibus error damnationem aeternam induceret. Quales sunt articuli fidei Christianae {christianis Fr[11]}.	Master One is the opinion which holds that we are bound from necessity for eternal salvation to believe or confess as irrevocably true no writing except those that are called canonical or things that follow from these by necessity, or those interpretations or judgements of holy scriptures of uncertain meaning that have been made by a general council of faithful catholics, particularly in connection with those [issues] where a mistake would lead to eternal damnation, such as are the articles of the christian faith. [Cf. Marsilius, Defensor Pacis, II.xix.1.]
Quod enim interpretationibus concilii generalis sit talis praestanda credulitas {crudelitas Lm[12]} patet, quia pie tenendum est quod tales interpretationes sunt nobis ab eodem spiritu revelatae. Quod ex scriptura {scripturis Fr[13]} ostenditur. Nam veritas ipsa Matth. ultimo dicit, "Ecce ego vobiscum sum omnibus diebus usque ad consummationem seculi." Unde Rabanus ait: "Ex hoc intelligitur quod usque in finem seculi non sunt defuturi {futuri Lm[14]} in mundo qui divina mansione et inhabitatione sunt digni", quibus scilicet ad fidei conservationem Spiritum Sanctum pie tenendum est semper adesse. Unde Hieronimus: "Quod {*qui Marsilius} igitur usque ad consummationem seculi cum discipulis se esse promittit et illos ostendit semper esse victuros et se nunquam a credentibus recessurum" {recessurus Fr[15]}. Idem aperte convincitur {*ex added Marsilius} Actuum 15[:28] dicente apostolorum et fidelium congregatione post ambiguitatem {*ambiguitatis Marsilius} illius et terminationem {*et terminationem: determinationem Marsilius, FrMz[16]}, "Visum est enim Spiritui Sancto et nobis." Asseruerunt enim et asserit scriptura ipsorum determinationem in dubietate illa circa fidem factam esse a Spiritu Sancto. Cum igitur fidelium congregatio seu concilium generale per successionem vere representet congregationem apostolorum et seniorum ac reliquorum fidelium, in determinandis Scripturae dubiae {*dubiis Marsilius} sensibus, in quibus maxime periculum aeternae damnationis induceret error, verisimile, quinimo certum est, deliberationi {deliberationis Mz[17]} {add. universitas Fr[18]} universalis concilii Spiritus Sancti dirigentis et revelantis adesse virtutem. Hoc autem (*etiam Marsilius} deductione infallibili (ut asserunt) ex Scriptura vim sumente patere potest, quoniam frustra dedisset Christus {deus Fr[19]} legem salutis aeternae si eius verum intellectum et quem credere fidelibus est necessarium ad salutem non aperiret eisdem hunc quaerentibus et pro ipso {christo LmPz[20]} invocantibus simul, si {*sed FrLmMzPz[21]} circa {contra LmMzPz[22]} ipsum pluralitatem fidelium errare sineret. Quinimo talis lex non solum foret ad salutem {*trs.231 FrMz[23]} inutilis sed in hominum aeternam perniciem tradita videretur. Et ideo pie tenendum est determinationes conciliorum generalium in sensibus scripturae dubiis a Spiritu Sancto {*add. sue veritatis /virtutis FrMz\ Marsilius, FrMz]} originem sumere.	For it is clear that such belief should be offered to the interpretations of a general council, since it ought to be held as a matter of piety that such interpretations have been revealed to us by the same Spirit. This is shown by Scripture. For the truth himself says in the last chapter of Matthew (28:20), "Behold I will be with you always, until the end of time." Hence Rabanus says: "From this it is understood that until the end of time the world will not be without those who are worthy of divine immanence and indwelling", those, that is, to whom, we must piously hold, the Holy Spirit is always present for the preservation of the faith. Hence Jerome says: "He [Christ] promises therefore that he will be with his disciples until the end of time, and shows that they will always live, and that he will never abandon those who believe in him". The same point is clearly demonstrated by Acts 15:28 where after deciding the point of doubt the gathering of the apostles and the faithful says, "For it has seemed to the Holy Spirit and to us". For they asserted, and Scripture asserts, that their judgement in that uncertainty about the faith was made by the Holy Spirit. Since, therefore, a gathering of the faithful or a general council truly represents by succession the gathering of the apostles, the elders and the rest of the faithful, it is likely, indeed it is certain, that in the definition of doubtful senses of Scripture, particularly where a mistake might lead to the danger of eternal damnation, the power of the holy spirit is present to the deliberation of a universal council, guiding and revealing. This can also be clear from an infallible deduction (as they assert) that takes its force from Scripture, since Christ would have given the law of eternal salvation in vain if he did not reveal its true meaning, one that it is necessary for the faithful to believe for their salvation, to those seeking this meaning and together calling on him for it, but instead permitted the greater number of the faithful to make a mistake about it. Indeed such a law would not only be useless for salvation but would seem to be handed on for the eternal destruction of men. It should be held as a matter of piety, therefore, that the judgements of general councils about uncertain meanings of Scripture have the origin of their truth from the Holy Spirit. [Cf. Marsilius, II.xix.2, 3]
CAP. II. Discipulus Opinionem aliam recitare non differas {deferas Fr[25]}.	Chapter 2. Student Do not defer setting out another opinion.
OPINION 2: also papal decrees, the canons of the apostles, doctors approved by the church
Magister Alia est assertio quod non solum scripturis canonicis et determinationibus seu interpretationibus conciliorum generalium est de necessitate salutis praestanda firma {*trs. FrMz[26]} credulitas, sed etiam decretis et decretalibus epistolis summorum pontificum, nec non et {trs.312 Fr[27]} apostolorum canonibus qui in Biblia non habentur, et dictis doctorum ab ecclesia approbatorum est fides absque dubitatione aliqua adhibenda.	Master Another assertion is that for necessity of salvation firm trust should be shown not only in the canonical Scriptures and the judgements or interpretations of general councils but unhesitating trust should also be put in the decrees and decretal letters of the highest pontiffs and also in the canons of the apostles which are not found in the bible and in the sayings of the doctors approved by the church. [[Doctors approved by the church are those canonised as doctors; doctors (otherwise called "masters") in universities are not approved in that sense, though they have a right to teach.]]
Quod enim apostolorum canonibus supradictis sit fides certissima adhibenda videtur asserere Zephernius Papa, qui, ut habetur dist. 16, c. Sexaginta, ait, "Sexaginta sententias apostoli perscripserunt {praescripserunt FrZn[28]} cum aliis quamplurimis epistolis {*episcopis FrMzZn[29]}, et servandas eas esse censuerunt {censerunt FrMz[30]}". Item Leo Papa, ut habetur in eadem dist., c. Clementis, ait, "Clementis librum, id est Petri apostoli itinerarium, et canones apostolorum numerant patres inter apocrypha exceptis 150 {*quinquaginta Zn[31]} {*add. capitulis Zn[32]} quae decreverunt orthodoxae fidei adiungenda." Item, sexta synodus, ut legitur eadem dist., c. Placuit, ait, "Placuit huic sanctae synodo ut amodo confirmata et rata sint canones {*canonum FrMz[33]} apostolorum 85 capitula." Hoc idem testatur Isidorus qui, ut ibidem habetur, ait, "Propter eorum auctoritatem caeteris conciliis praeponimus canones qui dicuntur apostolorum, licet a quibusdam apocryphi dicantur, quam {*quoniam FrLmMzPzZn[34]} plures eos receperunt {*recipiunt FrMzZn[35]} et sancti patres eorum sententias {sententiam FrMz[36]} synodali {synodale Fr[37]} auctoritate roboraverunt et inter canonicas posuerunt constitutiones." Ex his colligitur quod saltem quibusdam canonibus apostolorum est credulitas adhibenda indubia.	For Pope Zepherinus seems to assert that the most certain trust should be put in the above mentioned canons of the apostles. He says, as found in dist. 16, c. Sexaginta [c.2, col.42], "The apostles and very many other bishops wrote down sixty opinions and decreed that they should be observed." Also, as we read in the same dist. c. Clementis [c.3, col.42], Pope Leo says, "The fathers count the book of Clement, that is the account of the journey of the apostle Peter, and the canons of the apostles among the apocrypha, except for 50 chapters which they determined should be added to orthodox faith." Also the sixth synod says, as we read in the same dist. c. Placuit [c.4, col.42], "It is the opinion of this holy synod that the 85 chapters of the canons of the apostles be henceforth established and confirmed." Isidore testifies similarly, saying, as found in the same place [col.42], "Because of their authority we put the canons which are said to be of the apostles before the rest of the councils, even if they are called apocryphal by some people, since many people accept them and the holy fathers confirmed their opinions with synodal authority and placed them among the canonical constitutions." We gather from these [texts] that undoubting belief should be given to at least certain canons of the apostles.
Quod vero decretis et decretalibus summorum pontificum credulitatem ac reverentiam catholici debeant exhibere testantur et Nicolaus papa et Agatho papa, quorum assertiones habentur dist.19, c. Si Romanorum, et c. Sic omnes. Ad quod etiam probandum aliae auctoritates sanctorum patrum possent {add. induci et Fr[38]} adduci {*add. quamplurimae FrMz[39]}, quae abbreviationis causa non allegantur ad prasens.	Both Pope Nicholas and Pope Agatho attest that catholics should indeed show belief in and reverence for the decrees and the decretals of the highest pontiffs. Their assertions are found in dist. 19, c. Si Romanorum [c.1, col.58] and c. Sic omnes [c.2, col.60]. Very many other texts of the holy fathers could also be brought forward to prove this, but for the sake of brevity they are not cited now.
Quod vero {*add. etiam Mz[40]} dictis doctorum ab ecclesia approbatorum oporteat credere dist. 55 {*15 FrLmMzPz[41]}, affirmare videtur, ubi diversorum {*add. sanctorum FrMz[42]} patrum recipienda enumerantur opuscula.	That it is indeed also fitting to believe the sayings of doctors approved by the church seems to be affirmed by dist. 15 [col.34], where the works of various holy fathers are listed as to be accepted.
Hoc etiam ratione probatur, quia assertiones summorum pontificum non solum in diffinitione causarum et negociorum sunt recipiendae sed etiam in expositione scripturarum sanctarum {sacrarum Fr[43]}, quibus in expositione scripturae praeferuntur sancti patres tractatores divinarum scripturarum dist. 10, para. 1. Igitur {*ergo FrMz[44]} expositiones {exponens Lm[45]} huiusmodi tractatorum recipiendae sunt. Quod vero dicta summorum pontificum etiam in expositione seu interpretatione scripturae {om. Fr[46]} sint {*sunt Fr[47]} recipienda Hormisda Papa videtur asserere, qui, ut habetur dist. 15 {10 FrMz[48]} {*50 LmPz[49]}, c. Si ille, ait, "Nemo mihi alia quaelibet contra auctoritatem sedis apostolicae vel contra {*om. Zn[50]} {cum FrLmMzPz[51]} 318 {18 FrMz[52]} episcoporum et {*vel FrMzZn[53]} reliquorum canonum constituta obiciat {?obiciatur Fr[54]}, quia {om. FrMz[55]} quicquid contra {quo FrMz[56]} illorum diffinitionem, in quibus spiritum sanctum {om. FrMz[57]} credimus locutum, dictum fuerit recipere non solum temerarium sed etiam periculosum esse non dubito." Huic consentire videtur Nicolaus Papa, qui, ut legitur 25, q. 2, c. Si quis, ait, "Si quis dogmata, mandata {trs. Lm[58]}, interdicta, sanctiones vel decreta pro catholica fide vel ecclesiastica disclipina, pro correctione imminentium vel futurorum malorum a sedis {sede Fr[61]} apostolicae praesule salubriter promulgata contempserit, anathema sit." Hoc idem per alios canones quamplurimos affirmari videtur.	This is also proved by reason, because the assertions of the highest pontiffs should be accepted not only in the resolution of cases and affairs but also in the exposition of the sacred scriptures, [though] in the exposition of scripture the holy fathers as commentators on the divine scriptures are preferred to them (dist. 10, para. 1) [Constitutiones col.19]. Expositions of such commentators, therefore, should be accepted. Pope Hormisdas seems to assert that the sayings of the highest pontiffs about the exposition or interpretation of scripture should indeed be accepted. As found in dist. 50, c. Si ille [c.58, col.199], he says, "Let no one present to me anything at all against the authority of the apostolic see or against the decisions of the 318 bishops or of the remaining canons, because I do not doubt that to accept anything that is said against a resolution of those, in whom we believe the Holy Spirit has spoken, is not only rash but even dangerous." Pope Nicholas seems to agree with this when he says, in 25, q. 2, Si quis [c.18, col.1016], "If anyone holds in contempt pronouncements, orders, prohibitions, sanctions or decrees that have been advantageously promulgated by the bishop of the apostolic see for the sake of catholic faith or ecclesiastical discipline, or for the correction of imminent or future evils, let him be anathema." This same [point] seems to be affirmed by very many other canons.
CAP. III. Discipulus Estne alia opinio aliquid superaddens praedictae?	Chapter 3 Student Is there another opinion that adds something to the aforesaid one?
OPINION 3: also other doctors when they agree
Magister Est quorundam opinio quod non solum Christiani tenentur praedictis firmiter adhaerere, sed etiam doctoribus qui non sunt ab ecclesia approbati et qui se invicem reprobant, etiam circa illa quae contingunt catholicam fidem, quantum ab {*ad FrLmMzPz[62]} ea in quibus omnes vel plures et praecipue magis famosi concordant, alii scilicet Christiani {*scilicet Christiani: om. FrLmMzPz[63]} credere constringuntur {*alii... constringuntur: omit (Scott)}.	Master There is the opinion of some that Christians are not only bound to adhere firmly to those doctors just mentioned, but also doctors who have not been approved by the church and who disagree among themselves, even about matters which concern the catholic faith, with respect to those matters about which all or most of them, especially the more famous, agree.
Discipulus Scio plures qui hoc sentire videntur, sed non sum memor quod audierim vel viderim quemquam eorum hoc auctoritate vel ratione probare. Ideo tu ad hoc allegationes aliquas nitaris {*nitere FrMz[64]} {niteris LmPz[65]} invenire.	Student I know many people who seem to think this, but I am unable to remember hearing or seeing any of them prove it by authority or reason. So would you try to find some arguments for it?
Magister Quod hoc pluribus modis probari possit apparet. Nam illis opportet adhibere fidem quibus non credere est iniquum. Sed non credere doctoribus est iniquum, teste Leone Papa qui, ut habetur 24, q. 3, c. Quid autem, ait, "Quid autem iniquius est quam impia sapere et sapientibus doctoribus {*sapientibus doctoribus: sapientioribus doctoribusque LmMzPzZn[66]} non credere?" Ergo doctoribus est credendum, praesertim quantum ad illa in quibus omnes vel plures et magis famosi consentiunt.	Master It seems that this can be proved in many ways. For we must place trust in those whom it is wrong not to believe. But it is wrong not to believe doctors, as Pope Leo attests when he says, in 24, q. 3, Quid autem [c.30, col.998], "What is more wrong than to think impious thoughts and not believe the wiser and those who are doctors?" Doctors ought to be believed, therefore, especially with respect to those matters about which all or most of them, and the more famous, agree.
Amplius in intelligendis scripturis divinis illis est credendum a quibus scripturae sunt discendae, teste beato Clemente, qui, ut legitur {habetur Fr[67]} dist. 37, c. Relatum, ait, "Oportet ab eo scientiam discere scripturarum qui eam a maioribus secundum veritatem sibi traditam servat." Igitur {*ergo FrMz[70]} maioribus est credendum. Doctores autem sunt maiores. Ergo oportet doctoribus credere.	Further, as blessed Clement attests, in connection with understanding the divine scriptures those people should be believed from whom the scriptures should be learnt. He says, as we read in dist. 37, c. Relatum [c.14, col.139], "We must learn knowledge of the scriptures from him who preserves it in line with the truth handed down to him by the seniors." Therefore seniors should be believed. Doctors, however, are seniors. Therefore we must believe doctors.
Item praesumendum est pro multitudine et maxime sapientum dist. 9 {*19 FrLmMzPzZn[71]}, In canonicis {canonis Fr[72]} et dist. 16 {?81 Fr[73]} {*61 LmMzPzZn[74]}, Nullus invitis {*invitus Zn[75]}. Sed illis credendum est pro quibus praesumitur. Igitur {*ergo FrMz[76]} credendum est multitudini doctorum {trs.3412 Fr[77]}, cum inter sapientes debeant computari.	Also, presumption should favour the multitude, and especially the multitude of the wise (dist. 19, In canonicis [c.6, col.61] and dist. 61, Nullus invitus) [c.13, col.231]. But those should be believed in whose favour we make presumption. The multitude of doctors should be believed, therefore, since they should be numbered among the wise.
Rursus, ille prudentiae suae innititur qui ea que sibi credenda seu tenenda {timenda Fr[78]} {trs.321 Fr[79]} videntur, doctorum assertionibus praesumit praeponere, ut colligitur ex verbis Hieronimi quae ponuntur Extra de constitutionibus, Ne innitaris. Nemo autem prudentiae suae {*trs. FrMz[80]} debet inniti, Salomone hortante Proverbiorum 3, qui ait, "Ne innitaris prudentiae {*add. tuae Vg[81]} [[tuae Fr adds in margin [82]]]". Ergo assertionibus {*add. in FrMz[83]} quibus concordant doctores nullus debet sententiam suam praeponere. Et per consequens omnes alii doctoribus {doctores FrLmMzPz[84]} in huiusmodi credere constringuntur.	Again, that person relies on his own prudence who presumes to prefer those things which it seems to him should be believed or held to the assertions of the doctors, as we gather from the words of Jerome found in Extra, De constitutionibus, Ne innitaris [c.5, col.8]. No one, however, should rely on his own prudence, as Solomon urges, when he says in Proverbs 3:5, "Do not rely on your own prudence." No one, therefore, should prefer his own opinion to assertions about which doctors agree, and consequently all others are bound to believe doctors in matters of this kind.
Praeterea, fide dignorum testimonio est credendum. Doctores autem qui fide digni sunt censendi testes sunt assertionum suarum, quemadmodum apostoli appellantur testes Christi, quia evangelicam ausi fuerunt asserere veritatem. Ergo quando doctores concordant, {*add. et FrLmMzPz[85]} praesertim famosi, alii credere tenentur {trs. Lm[86]} eidem {*eisdem FrLmMzPz[87]}.	Moreover, the testimony of those who are worthy of credit should be believed. Those doctors, however, who are worthy of credit should be considered witnesses of their own assertions, just as the apostles are called witnesses of Christ, because they dared to assert gospel truth. When doctors agree, therefore, and especially those who are famous, others are bound to believe them.
Adhuc unicuique experto et perito in {add. ?ea Fr[88]} aliqua scientia {*add. arte vel facultate Fr[89]} {arte vel facultate Mz[90]} est credendum. Doctores autem theologiae sunt experti et periti in theologica facultate. Ergo credendum est eisdem.	Besides, anyone who is experienced or skilled in some science, art or faculty should be believed. Doctors of theology, however, are experienced and skilled in the faculty of theology. Therefore, they should be believed.
CAP. IV. Discipulus Si est aliqua opinio quae omnibus obviet supradictis ipsam audire desidero, ut mihi detur occasio intelligendi profundius veritatem.	Chapter 4 Student If there is some opinion which opposes all the above, I want to hear it, so that I will be given an opportunity of understanding the truth more profoundly.
OPINION 4: the Bible, Bible writers, and the apostles must always be believed; others sometimes but not always
Magister Est quaedam opinio quae, viam eligens mediam, praedictis omnibus in aliquo adversatur, tenens quod scripturae divinae contentae in biblia et eiusdem sacrae scripturae scriptoribus {trs. Fr[91]} et universali ecclesiae atque apostolis absque ulla dubitatione in omnibus est credendum. Nullis aliis, quantacunque {quantaque LmPz[92]} doctrina vel sanctitate praepolleant, est in omnibus absque omni exceptione fides necessario adhibenda. Ita quod nec in {*om. FrLmMzPz[93]} concilio generali, si {*nisi FrMz[94]} esset congregata universalis ecclesia, nec decretis aut decretalibus vel assertionibus summorum pontificum nec doctorum dictis, sive fuerint {fuerat Fr[95]} ab ecclesia approbati sive non fuerint {fuerunt Mz[96]} approbati {fuerint approbati: om. Fr[97]}, est necessario credulitas in omni dicto et casu absque omni exceptione praestanda, licet in multis negari non debeant et quo ad multa Christiani ipsis credere teneantur.	Master There is an opinion which chooses a middle way and opposes all the above [opinions] in some way. It holds that the divine scriptures contained in the bible, the writers of that holy scripture, the universal church and the apostles should be believed in everything without any hesitation. Trust in everything without any exception should not necessarily be given to any others, however distinguished they are in learning or sanctity. So it is that belief without any exception in every saying and case should not necessarily be offered to a general council, unless the whole church has been gathered together, or to the decrees, decretals or assertions of the highest pontiffs or to the sayings of doctors, whether they have been approved by the church or have not been approved, though in many matters they should not be denied and christians are bound to believe them in respect of many matters.
Can we be bound to believe anyone who may sometimes err?
Discipulus Istam opinionem alias non audivi nec legi. Ideo, ut cognoscam quod {*an FrMz[98]} aliquid apparentiae vel veritatis contineat, ipsam intendo aliqualiter tecum discutere. Videtur primo quod sibi ipsi repugnet. Nam sicut qui in uno criminosus ostenditur in nullo negocio admittendus est tanquam testis veritatis, sed suspectus est habendus {admittendus LmPz[99]}, ita qui in uno errat vel errare potest in nullo sibi necessario est credendum, sed merito potest haberi suspectus, quod sicut errat in uno ita errat in alio. Quod de intentione Augustini videtur esse aperte, secundum quam {*quem FrLmMzPz[100]} si in scripturis divinis aliquod {ad Mz[101]} {sic ad Fr[102]} mendacium etiam minimum reperiretur, ei {*eis ??[103]} fides esset minime adhibenda. Unde dicit in prima epistola ad Hieronimum, ut {et FrMz[104]} habetur dist. 9, c. Si ad scripturas: {*add. "Si ad scripturas LmMzPz[106]} sanctas admissa fuerint vel officiosa mendacia, quid {*add. in Zn[107]} eis remanebit auctoritatis?", quasi diceret nihil. Si ergo concilio generali, summis pontificibus et quibuscunque doctoribus non est necesse in omnibus credere, sequitur quod in nullo est eis fides necessario adhibenda. Cuius oppositum opinio praedicta tenere videtur. Videtur ergo quod sibimet repugnet. Tu vero narra quomodo ad haec {*?hoc FrMz[108]} {ad haec: adhuc LmPz[109]} opinio eadem respondere conatur.	Student I have not heard or read that opinion anywhere else. So that I may learn, therefore, whether it contains any plausibility or truth, I intend to have some discussion of it with you. First of all, it seems that it is self-contradictory. For, just as someone who is shown to be guilty in one affair should not be admitted as a witness of truth in any lawsuit but should be regarded as suspect, so someone who errs or can err in one thing should not be believed necessarily in anything but can deservedly be regarded as suspect, because just as he errs in one thing so he errs in another. This seems clearly to be Augustine's opinion. According to him if any falsehood, even the slightest, were to be found in the divine scriptures, trust should not be put in them. Whence, in his first letter to Jerome, as found in dist. 9, Si ad scripturas [c.7, col.17], he says: "If even falsehoods in accordance with duty are admitted in the holy scriptures, what authority will remain in them?", as if to say, none. If it is not necessary, therefore, to believe a general council, the highest pontiffs and any doctors at all on every matter, it follows that trust should not necessarily be put in them in any matter. The aforesaid opinion seems to hold the opposite of this. Therefore, it seems to be self-contradictory. Set out now how that opinion tries to reply to this [argument].
Magister Respondetur {*respondet Mz[110]} quod secus est de criminoso et de errante vel potente errare absque omni crimine et peccato. Criminoso enim in nullo credendum est {om. Fr[111]}, unde nec ad testimonium debet admitti. Ex quo enim damnabiliter a regula rationis recessit non est firmiter praesumendum quod rationem et veritatem velit in quocunque tenere, nisi forte in aliquo quod ad concupiscentiam vel commodum eius absque omni contrario suae voluntati pertineat. Sed {add. si FrMz[112]} de errante aut potente errare absque omni crimine {trs. Fr[113]} et peccato (nisi forte veniali) non est praesumendum quod velit scienter aliquid asserere contrarium veritati. Unde et errantes in quibusdam et opiniones falsas -- non scienter nec {*neque Mz[114]} culpabiliter, absque assertione, adhaesione vel defensione temeraria vel pertinaci aut damnabili -- tenentes, ad perhibendum testimonium veritati, in iudicio et extra, debent admitti, et in multis debet adhiberi fides eisdem. Et ideo quamvis secundum istam opinionem non sit necessarium in omni dicto et casu absque omni exceptione credere concilio generali, Romanis pontificibus et doctoribus quibusque {*quibuscunque Mz[115]}, tamen in multis est credendum eisdem, quemadmodum eorum testimonia sunt etiam in iudicio admittenda. Sed si generale concilium quodcunque {quandocunque Fr[116]} vel Romanus pontifex aut quicunque doctor scienter vel culpabiliter aliquod falsum assereret {assererent Fr[117]} vel defenderet {defenderent Fr[118]} vel quomodolibet adhaereret {adhaererent Fr[119]}, nulli assertioni eius, nisi aliter de eius veritate constaret, esset fides vel credulitas firmiter {om. Fr[120]} adhibenda.	Master The reply is that there is a difference between a guilty man and one who errs or can err without any offence or sin. For the guilty man should not be believed in anything and so should not be admitted as a witness. For, from the fact that he has abandoned the rule of reason in a way worthy of condemnation, it should not firmly be presumed that he wants to hold to reason and truth in anything, except perhaps in a matter that pertains to his own desire or convenience and is in no way contrary to his own will. But it should not be presumed of anyone who errs or can err without any offence or sin, except perhaps a venial one, that he wishes knowingly to assert something contrary to the truth. Whence, both those who err in certain matters and those who hold false opinions -- but not knowingly or culpably and without any rash, pertinacious or blamable assertion, adherence or defence -- ought to be permitted to present testimony to the truth, in court and outside it, and in many matters trust ought to be shown in them. And although, therefore, it is not necessary according to that opinion to believe a general council, the Roman pontiffs and all doctors in every saying and case without any exception, they ought nevertheless be believed in many cases, just as their testimonies should also be allowed in court. But if any general council, a Roman pontiff or any doctor were knowingly or culpably to assert or defend or in any way at all cling to something false, trust or belief should not firmly be put in any assertion of its or his unless its truth were established in some other way.
Discipulus Contra ista auctoritas Augustini militare videtur. Ideo dic quomodo isti respondent ad istam.	Student Augustine's text seems to militate against those [views]. Tell me how they reply to it, therefore.
Magister Respondetur quod Augustinus loquitur de scripturis quarum omnibus partibus est eadem ratio praestandi fidem. Et de omnibus talibus verum est quod si una sola pars inveniretur falsa nulli parti talis scripturae esset credendum propter hoc quod ibi sic scribitur. Talis autem est scriptura divina, quia cuilibet assertioni contentae in ipsa ideo {*eadem ??[121]} fides praestanda est, quia instinctu Spiritus Sancti ibidem est scripta et asserta. Sed quando est aliqua scriptura totalis et non eadem ratio praebendi credulitatem cuilibet parti eius, quamvis una pars admittatur, alia potest non admitti, quemadmodum libri philosophorum et {om. Fr[122]} aliorum gentilium ac etiam secularium pro parte admittuntur et pro parte repelluntur: {reperiuntur Mz[123]} dist. 37 {27 Mz[124]} para. {om. Fr[125]} Sed econtra {contra FrMz[126]}, et {1 Mz[127]} c. {1 Fr[128]} Turbat, et c. Si qui {*quid FrLmMzPz[129]} veri {*add. A quo c. Si quid veri FrMz[130]} dicit glossa accipi "argumentum quod testes et instrumenta possunt in parte rata haberi {add. et Fr[131]}, pro parte non". Sic etiam "donatio pro parte est valida {add. et Fr[132]}, pro parte non", argumentum 17. q. 4. quaest {*Questi FrLmMzPz[133]}. Et "utor pro me quo non {quo non: questionem et Fr[134]} utor contra me", ut notat glossa, dist. 9, c. 1 {om. Fr[135]}. Sic dicitur quod generali concilio et aliis in uno casu est credendum et in {om. Fr[136]} alio non, quia non est eadem ratio credendi {*add. sibi FrMz[137]} in omnibus.	Master It is replied that Augustine is speaking of writings in all parts of which there is the same reason for showing trust. And it is true of all such writings that if one single part were found to be false no part of that writing should be believed for the reason that it is so written there. The divine scripture is such a writing, however, because the same trust should be shown in every assertion contained in it since it is written and asserted there by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit. But when there is some complete piece of writing and there is not the same reason for believing each part of it, it is possible not to admit one part even if another part is admitted, just as the books of the philosophers and other gentiles and also of seculars are partly admitted and partly rejected (dist. 37, para. Sed econtra [Gratian, dictum post c.7, col.137], c. Turbat [c.8, col.137] and c. Si quid veri [c.13, col.139]). The gloss says that from Si quid veri "an argument" can be taken "that witnesses and documents can be considered partly established and partly not". So also "a grant is partly valid and partly not" (an argument from 17, q. 4. Questi [c.41, col.826]). And "I use on my own behalf that which I do not use against myself" (gloss on dist. 9, c. 1) [Rather, dist. 10, c. 1; gloss, v. Contra haereticos, col. 31]. So it is said that a general council and others [popes, doctors, etc.] should be believed in one case and not in another, because there is not the same reason for believing them in every case.
CAP. V. Discipulus Quod recitasti de differentia inter criminosum {*add. et FrLmMzPz[138]} errantem seu errare potentem absque peccato, quantum ad hoc quod non criminoso sed alii est saepe credendum, apparentiam videtur mihi habere, ex quo plura cogitandi est mihi data occasio. Nunc autem dic quare tenet praedicta opinio quod non est credendum in omnibus absque omni exceptione generali concilio et aliis qui non fuerunt scriptores scripturae divinae qui nec {*qui nec: neque FrLmMzPz[139]} soli ecclesiam universalem constituunt	Chapter 5. Student What you have said about the difference between a guilty man and one who errs or is able to err without sin, namely that not the guilty man but the other one should often be believed, seems to me to have a show of truth, and it gives me an opportunity to think about more things. Explain now, however, why the above opinion holds that a general council and others who neither were writers of divine scripture nor by themselves constitute the universal church should not be believed in everything without any exception
A General Council may err, according to opinion 4
Magister Hoc dicit propter hoc, quod concilium generale et omnes alii supradicti possunt errare {add. et Fr[140]} etiam culpabiliter contra veritatem orthodoxam et aliam.	Master It says this because of the fact that a general council and all the others mentioned above can err, even culpably, against orthodox truth and other truth.
Discipulus Si concilium generale potest errare, multo fortius et Romanus pontifex et quaelibet alia congregatio partialis ac quilibet doctor et scriptor qui non fuit scriptor sacrae scripturae errare valebit, et si non in omnibus absque omni exceptione est concilio generali credendum, multo magis aliis in omnibus absque omni exceptione minime est credendum. Quare sufficiat nobis ad praesens hoc {hec Fr[141]} de concilio generali tractare scilicet {*secundum FrLmMzPz[142]} opinionem praescriptam. Sane de his et aliis quae spectant ad ipsam primam partem nostri dialogi lib.5 c.26 et 27 {*add. et FrLmMzPz[143]} 28 et 29 aliquantulum diffuse tractavimus {?tractamus Fr[144]}. Ideo circa hoc {*hec FrLmMzPz[145]} noli hoc {*hic FrLmMzPz[146]} diu morari, sed aliqua motiva breviter tange absque deductione prolixa.	Student If a general council can err, it is much more the case that both the Roman pontiff and any other partial gathering at all and any doctor and writer at all who was not a writer of sacred scripture will be able to err, and if a general council should not be believed in everything without any exception, it is much more the case that others should not be believed in everything without any exception. Let us content ourselves for the moment, therefore, with considering this matter, according to the aforesaid opinion, in connection with a general council. Certainly, we have treated at some length these and other matters which pertain to the first part of our Dialogue in book 5, chapters 26, 27, 28 and 29, so do not linger for long over these matters here, but touch briefly on some arguments without drawing them out at length.
Magister Motiva ibi tractata fundantur principaliter in hoc, quod una est sola {*trs. FrMz[147]} ecclesia, scilicet {om. Fr[148]} militans universalis et tota, cuius concilium generale est solummodo pars, quae non potest errare contra fidem; et in hoc, quod illa congregatio quae valet ex voluntate humana dissolvi et cessat, cuiusmodi est concilium generale, potest contra fidem errare; et {om. Fr[149]} in hoc, quod omnes illae personae quae existentes in diversis locis possunt contra fidem errare possunt {*om. FrLmMzPz[150]}, etiam si ad eundem locum convenerunt {*convenerint FrMz[151]} {*add. poterunt contra fidem errare FrLmMzPz[152]}; et in hoc, quod nulla vocatio humana {*add. certarum personarum et paucarum nec commissio humana FrMz[153]} facta pluribus personis praesertim paucis potest eas confirmare in fide; et in hoc, quod congregati in concilio generali non sunt dicendi non posse errare, neque propter sapientiam eorundem, {neque ... eorundem: om. Fr[154]} neque propter sanctitatem, neque propter auctoritatem vel potestatem, neque propter promissionem factam a Christo, quae salvari potest si fides in aliis extra concilium generale remaneat.	Master The arguments considered there are based principally on the fact that it is the one church only, that is the church militant, universal and whole, of which a general council is only a part, which can not err against the faith; and on the fact that a gathering which can be dissolved by human will and which ceases (and a general council is of this kind) can err against the faith; and on the fact that all those persons who while living in different places can err against the faith will be able to err against the faith even if they meet in the same place; and on the fact that no human summoning of certain people, especially a few, and no human mandate given to several people, especially to a few, can confirm them in faith; and on the fact that those gathered in a general council should not be said to be unable to err, either on account of their their wisdom or sanctity or authority or power, or on account of the promise made by Christ (which can be satisfied if faith remains in others outside the general council).
Quibus additur allegatio talis. Omnis congregatio illorum qui pauci sunt respectu aliquorum {*aliorum Fr correction} catholicorum etiam praelatorum potest contra fidem errare, quia non est tenendum necessario quod quidam pauci sint {sunt Fr[156]} in fide confirmati quantumcunque {?quamquam Fr[157]} {quantumque Pz[158]} insimul congregentur. Quamvis enim saepe legatur quod praesumendum est pro multitudine, ut notat glossa, dist. 19, In canonicis, non tamen ita legitur {legit Mz[159]} quod praesumendum sit pro paucitate. Cum igitur {*ergo Mz[160]} non sit {pro paucitate ... sit: om. Fr[161]} [[an insertion mark and an illegible marginal addition in Fr [162]]] taliter pro multitudine praesumendum quin liceat {licet Fr[163]} credere multitudine posse errare, dicente Domino Exod. 23[:2] "Non sequeris turbam ad faciendum malum", multo minus praesumendum est pro paucitate. Et per consequens non est necesse credere quoscunque paucos quorum nullus confirmatus est {*trs. FrLmMzPz[164]} in fide non posse errare. Sed pauci Christiani etiam respectu episcoporum possent sufficere ad celebrandum concilium generale, sicut saepe respectu multitudinis praelatorum pauci ad generale concilium {trs. Fr[165]} convenerunt {convenerant Lm[166]}. Nam, ut legitur in decretis dist. 18 {*16 FrMzZn[167]} c. Sexta synodus {*Sexta synodus: Prime adnotatio Zn[168]}, in generali concilio Anquiritano fuerunt solummodo 18 patres, {*add. qui valde pauci fuerunt respectu totius multitudinis patrum. In concilio etiam Gangrensi fuerunt 18 /*16 Zn[169]\ patres FrMz[170]}, in {add. concilio Fr[171]} Antiocheno fuerunt patres 30 {*29 Zn[172]}, in Arelatensi fuerunt 19, in quodam alio Arelatensi fuerunt 11 patres. In alio Arelatensi fuerunt 18 {*19 Zn[175]}, in concilio Aurasisensi fuerunt 16, in Empanensi fuerunt 16 {*26 Zn[176]}, in Aureliensi fuerunt 31, in Avernensi fuerunt 15, {in Empanensi ... 15: in Aureliensi ... 15 in Empanensi fuerunt 16 Fr[177]} in Maticensi fuerunt 21, in Lugdunensi fuerunt 17 {*18 Zn[178]}, in alio Lugdunensi {*add. fuerunt Fr[179]} 20. Igitur {*ergo FrMz[180]} concilium generale potest errare contra fidem.	The following argument is added to these. Every gathering of those who are few in respect of other catholics, even of the prelates, can err against the faith, because it should not necessarily be held that a particular few have been confirmed in faith, however much they are gathered at the same time. For although we often read that a presumption should be made in favour of multitude, as the gloss on dist. 19, In canonicis [col.83] notes, yet we do not read in the same way that a presumption should be made in favour of fewness. Now since a presumption should not be made in favour of multitude in such a way that it is not permitted to believe that the multitude can err (for the Lord says in Exodus 23:2 "Do not follow the crowd in doing evil"), much less should [such] a presumption be made in favour of fewness. Consequently it is not necessary to believe of any few at all, none of whom has been confirmed in the faith, that they can not err. But a few christians, even with respect to the [number of] bishops, could suffice to celebrate a general council, just as often a few in respect of the multitude of prelates have gathered together at a general council. For as we read in the decretals, dist. 16, Prima adnotatio [c.11, col.47], there were only 18 [28 Friedberg] fathers at the general council at Ancyra, and these were very few of the total multitude of fathers. There were also 16 fathers at the council of Gangra, 29 fathers at the council of Antioch, 19 at Arles, and 11 fathers at another council there. There were 16 at another council at Arles, 16 at the council of Orange, 26 at Albon, 31 at Orleans, 15 at Auvergne, 21 at Mâcon, 18 at Lyons and 20 at another council there. A general council, therefore, can err against the faith.
Amplius, illa congregatio potest errare contra fidem quae ad hoc quod autentica sit censenda {add. non LmMzPz[181]} indiget ab homine confirmari qui valet contra fidem errare, quia non magis confirmatur in fide indigens confirmatione quam confirmans. Sed concilium generale, ut sit autenticum et ut eius assertio vel diffinitio sit reputanda autentica et ut auctoritatem obtineat, indiget confirmari a papa, qui potest contra fidem errare, teste Gelasio papa, qui, ut habetur 23, {*25 FrLmMzPz[182]} q. {*add. 1 Mz[183]}, c. {om. Fr[184]} 1, ait, loquens de sede prima -- per quam papam {papa LmPz[185]} intelligit -- quod "unamquamque synodum sua auctoritate confirmavit et continuata moderatione custodit." Cui concordare videtur Pascasius papa, qui, ut habetur Extra, De electione, c. Significasti, ait, "... cum omnia concilia per ecclesiae Romanae auctoritatem et facta sint et robur acceperunt {*acceperint FrMzZn[187]}". His consentit Iulius papa, qui, ut habetur dist. 17, c. Regula, ait, "Nec ullum ratum est aut erit unquam concilium quod eius", scilicet Romanae ecclesiae, "non fuerit fulcitum auctoritate". Hinc Gratianus 25, q. 1, para. His ita respondetur, loquens de sacris canonibus etiam generalium conciliorum, ait, "Sacri quidem canones ita aliquid constituunt ut suae interpretationis auctoritatem sanctae Romanae ecclesiae reservent {conservent FrMz[189]}". Ex his aliisque quampluribus colligitur quod concilium generale papa confirmat et ei auctoritatem praestat. Papa autem potest errare contra fidem. Igitur {*ergo Mz[190]} etiam concilium generale potest errare contra fidem {Igitur ... fidem: om . Fr[191]} [[Fr adds in margin [192]]]. Et ita non est necessarium in omnibus absque omni exceptione credere concilio generali, praesertim cum secundum quosdam aliquando erraverit, ut eis apparet, et {om. FrMz[193]} in prima parte istius Dialogi lib. 5 existit probatum.	Further, that gathering can err against the faith which needs to be confirmed by a man who can err against the faith before it is to be considered authentic, because one needing confirmation is not more confirmed in the faith than one confirming. But for a general council to be authentic, for an assertion or definition of its to be regarded as authentic and for it to obtain authority, it needs to be confirmed by the pope, who can err against the faith, as pope Gelasius attests. In 25, q. 1, c. 1 [col.1007], speaking about the first see, by which he means the pope, he says that "it has confirmed every single synod by its authority and guards them with constant guidance." Pope Paschasius seems to agree with this when he says, as found in Extra, De electione c. Significasti [c.4, col.49], "... since all councils have been brought about by and have received their strength from the authority of the Roman church." Pope Julius agrees with these. As found in dist. 17, c. Regula [c.2, col.51], he says, "No council is or ever will be valid that has not been supported by its," that is the Roman church's, "authority." Hence Gratian, speaking of the sacred canons even of general councils, says in 25, q. 1, para. His ita respondetur [col.1011], "The sacred canons so determine any matter that they reserve the authority of its interpretation to the holy Roman church". We gather from these and very many other [texts] that the pope confirms a general council and furnishes it with authority. The pope, however, can err against the faith. A general council, therefore, can also err against the faith. Thus it is not necessary to believe a general council in everything without any exception, especially since some people say that it has sometimes erred, as it seems to them and as was proved in book five of the first part of this Dialogue.
CAP. VI Discipulus Sicut superius recitasti c. 6, {*4 FrLmMzPz[194]} quamvis secundum istam opinionem non sit simpliciter necessarium credere in omnibus absque omni exceptione concilio generali, tamen secundum eandem in multis negari non debet et quo ad multa Christiani tenentur eidem credulitatem praestare. Ideo ista duo ultima nunc secundum opinionem saepe dictam declara	Chapter 6. Student Although, as you recorded in chapter 4 above, it is not simply necessary according to that opinion to believe a general council in everything without any exception, nevertheless, according to that same opinion, in many matters it ought not be denied and, with respect to many matters Christians are bound to accord it belief. Would you now make clear, therefore, how that oft-stated opinion understands those two particular points
A council's statement on a matter of fact within their direct knowledge should be presumed true, according to opinion 4
Magister Ad evidentiam istorum dicitur esse sciendum quod eorum quae asseruntur per concilium generale quaedam consistunt in facto, quia videlicet concilium generale narrat et asserit illa quae facta {*facti FrMz[195]} sunt, quemadmodum historia scripturae divinae narrat rem gestam. Quaedam autem non consistunt in facto sed in ipsa natura rei de qua loquitur, sicut cum narrat et asserit ea quae spectant ad naturam Dei et creaturarum, sive simplicium sive compositarum vel etiam illarum quae unitatem {veritatem Fr[196]} solummodo aggregationis vel ordinis habere noscuntur.	Master It says that to make these clear it should be known that some of the matters that are asserted by a general council consist in fact, because, that is, a general council tells of and asserts matters of fact, just as the story of divine scripture tells what was done. Some of the matters, however, do not consist in fact but in the very nature of the thing of which it speaks, as when it tells of and asserts things which pertain to the nature of God and of his creatures, whether simple or composite, or also of those things which are known to have unity only of aggregation or order.
Per istam distinctionem conatur ista opinio {add. respondere et Fr[197]} declarare praescripta, dicens quod si concilium generale erraret, sive circa illa quae consistunt in facto sive circa alia, ille cui hoc constaret ei credere non deberet, et eidem liceret in hoc contradicere et negare concilium generale. Ille autem cui {om. Mz[198]} hoc {hec Fr[199]} non constaret quantum ad illa quae facti {facta LmPz[200]} sunt deberet credere assertioni et testimonio concilii generalis, praesumendo quod concilium generale quantum ad illa quae facti {facta LmPz[201]} sunt nihil assereret nisi quae essent sibi certa, quemadmodum etiam iudex tenetur credere testibus etiam {*om. FrMz[202]} quos non potest repellere {*add. sed reputat FrMz[203]} et reputare debet {debeat Fr[204]} idoneos et veraces licet in rei veritate deponant falsum. Nec iudex ignoranter credendo falsis testibus peccat, imo peccaret si non crederet, ex quo nihil habet contra ipsos unde suspicari possit quod falsum dicant. Sed (*?? Sic} fideles ignoranter {ignorantes Fr[205]} credentes concilio generali erranti non peccant in huiusmodi, imo si nollent adhibere fidem peccarent ex quo nihil habent contra concilium generale.	By this distinction that opinion tries to make the above-mentioned points clear, saying that if a general council were to err, either about matters that consist in fact or about other matters, he to whom this was evident ought not believe it and would be permitted in this matter to contradict and deny the general council. He to whom this was not evident, however, ought, with respect to matters of fact, to believe the assertion and testimony of the general council, on the presumption that, with respect to matters of fact, the general council would assert nothing about which it was not certain, just as a judge too is bound to believe witnesses whom he can not reject but regards and ought to regard as suitable and truthful, even if in point of fact they make a false deposition. A judge who in ignorance believes false witnesses does not sin; on the contrary, he would sin if he did not believe, because he has nothing against them on the basis of which he can suspect that they speaking falsehood. Thus the faithful who in ignorance believe a general council which is in error do not sin in matters of this kind [i.e., of fact]; on the contrary, they would sin if they were to refuse to show trust, because they have nothing against that general council.
Si autem concilium generale erraret circa alia quam circa ea quae facti {facta LmPz[206]} sunt, puta {*add. circa FrMz[207]} illa quae de Deo vel creaturis in sacris literis asseruntur, nulli Christiano cui hoc non constaret liceret assertionem concilii generalis negare nec de ea publice disputare, nisi aliqui periti et opinionis laudabilis impugnarent eandem, et hoc propter scandalum evitandum et ut concilio generali a quolibet qui nescit ipsum errare circa huiusmodi honor et reverentia debita deferatur {*deferantur Mz[208]} {deferuntur Fr[209]}; debentque singuli, etiam qui assertionem contrariam antea tenuissent (non tamen fuissent certi), explicite pro assertione concilii generalis praesumere et quasi conditionaliter adhaerere -- si scilicet non est contraria catholicae veritati -- ita ut {non Fr[210]} publice non teneant opinionem contrariam, etiam opinando in mente; tamen possunt opinari contrarium et sollicite scrutando scripturas quaerere veritatem.	If a general council were to err, however, about matters other than matters of fact, for example about what is asserted about God or creatures in sacred literature, no Christian to whom this [i.e., that the council was in error] was not evident would be permitted to deny that assertion of the general council or to dispute about it publicly, unless some men who were learned and of praiseworthy views were opposing it -- this is so that scandal should be avoided and honour and due reverence be offered to a general council by everyone who does not know that it is in error about this matter; and each person, even those who had previously maintained an opposing assertion (but had not been certain), should make an explicit presumption in favour of the assertion of the general council and adhere to it, as it were conditionally -- that is, if it is not opposed to catholic truth -- so that they do not publicly hold an opposing opinion, even as a conjecture in their mind; they can, nevertheless, [but not publicly?] conjecture the opposite and seek the truth by carefully examining the scriptures.
Si autem concilium generale non errat circa {om. Fr[211]} huiusmodi quae non consistunt in facto, nulli licet maxime publica {publice LmMzPz[212]} {publici Fr[213]} assertione {assertioni LmMzPz[214]} ipsum negare nec contrarium opinari aut quomodolibet etiam dubitando publice defensare etiam si prius opinatus fuisset contrarium, cum de contrario etiam {*et FrMz[215]} ex quo est falsum nemo possit esse certus, licet quis deceptus {om. Fr[216]} posset {*possit Mz[217]} putare se esse certum.	If a general council, however, does not err about matters which do not consist in fact, no one is permitted to deny it, especially by a public assertion, or to conjecture or defend the opposite in any way at all, even by doubting publicly, even if he had previously conjectured the opposite, since about that opposite, just because it is false, no one can be certain, although someone who is deceived can think that he is certain.
Si autem non errat circa ea quae in facto consistunt, ei omnes Christiani sine dubitatione credere debent quia, cum non errat {*erret FrMz[218]} non {nec Mz[219]} possunt Christiani probabiliter suspicari quod aliquo decipiatur errore in asserendo vel narrando veritatem rei gestae {add. etc FrMz[220]}.	If, however, it does not err about those matters which consist in fact, all christians should believe it without hesitation because, since it is not in error, christians can not suspect with probability that it is deceived by some error in asserting or telling of the truth of something that was done. [Note in the above passage the "objective" notions of certainty and probability.]
CAP. VII Discipulus Ista opinio multa tenet quae magna discussione indigere videntur. De quibus forsan postea conferam tecum, sed, omissis ad praesens aliis, solummodo dicas quare dicit aut innuit quod aliter se possunt et debent habere Christiani in adhaerendo concilio generali cum asserit aliquid {*trs. FrMz[221]} circa ea {circa ea: om. Fr[222]} quae facti sunt et cum aliquid asserit circa alia, illa {ipsa Lm[223]} scilicet quae scientiae sunt et non facti	Chapter 7 Student That opinion maintains many things which seem to need great discussion. Perhaps I will discuss these with you later, but leaving aside other matters for the moment, would you tell me only why it says or implies that Christians can and should behave differently in adhering to a general council when it makes some assertion about matters of fact than when it makes assertions about other matters, that is matters of [theoretical] knowledge not of fact
Magister Ut hoc melius intelligas scire debes quod ea quae facti sunt in multiplici differentia sunt. Quaedam enim explicite in scripturis divinis habentur, sicut quod apostoli circumibant {*circuibant MzPz[224]} cum Christo, quod Paulus fuit Romae, et huismodi quae in libris historialibus bibliae affirmantur. Quaedam vero non reperiuntur in biblia, sed ab aliis quam a scriptoribus bibliae eorum accipitur certitudo qui {que FrLmPz[225]} ipsa {*ea FrMz[226]} {ex ea LmPz[227]} explicite in suis inseruerunt historiis. Quaedam autem in huiusmodi {*add. libris FrMz[228]} solum habentur implicite, ita quod absque subtili deductione ex illis minime elici possunt. Quaedam autem in libris huiusmodi non habentur, sed ipsis narrantibus per se ipsos sunt nota. Et de istis principaliter intelligit opinio suprascripta. Rursus non solum eorum quae facti sunt sed etiam aliorum quaedam continentur in scripturis divinis explicite, et quaedam implicite ita quod nisi a doctis cum magno labore et studio ex illis quae in scripturis habentur {*add. explicite Mz[229]} {add. implicite Fr[230]} inferri non possunt. Et de istis etiam locuta est memorata opinio.	Master To understand this better you should know that matters of fact are of great diversity. For some of them are found explicitly in the divine scriptures, such as that the apostles travelled around with Christ, that Paul was at Rome, and things of this kind that are asserted in the historical books of the bible. Some of them, however, are not found in the bible but they receive their warranty from writers other than writers of the bible who have inserted them explicitly in their histories. Some of them, however, are found only implicitly in books of this kind so that they can not be drawn out from them without subtle deduction. Some of them, however, are not found in books of this kind but are known directly to those narrating them. It is these that the aforesaid opinion mainly means. Again, some matters of fact as well as other matters are contained explicitly in the divine scriptures, and some implicitly so that they can not be inferred from what is found explicitly in the scriptures except with great labour and study by learned men. The aforesaid opinion has also spoken about these.
Ex his dicitur quod quia pauciores homines {*add. et FrLmMzPz[231]} rarius decipiuntur vel decipi possunt in factis et gestis quae per se ipsos cognoscunt quam in his quae solummodo ex aliis subtili et multis incognita ratiocinatione eliciunt, ideo magis creditur hominibus in his quae asserunt se vidisse vel audivisse aut aliquo sensu alio {om. Fr[232]} percepisse quam in his quae ex dictis aliorum vel etiam ex sibi notis arguendo concludunt. Unde et saepe doctori theologiae {doctori theologiae: doctor in theologia Fr[233]} de aliquo facto testimonium perhibenti {exhibetur Fr[234]} multi absque dubio credunt {crederent FrMz[235]}, qui tamen opinionibus eius {*suis FrLmMzPz[236]}, quantum ad ea quae sunt scientiae et iuris {quantum ... iuris: om. LmPz[237]} quamvis {*quantum ... quamvis: quantumcumque FrMz[238]} firmissime imo pertinaciter adhaereat eis, non credunt {credant Fr[239]}, imo ipsum errare et falsa dicere et asserere firmissime putant, quia tenent quod scienter non diceret falsum et arbitrantur {arbitraretur LmPz[240]} quod de illo quod est facti {*trs. FrMz[241]} est certus, quem deceptum circa alia scilicet scientiae et iuris {*scilicet scientiae et iuris: om. FrLmMzPz[242]} arbitrantur.	From these points it is said that because fewer men are deceived -- and that more rarely -- or can be deceived about facts and deeds they know directly than about things they only draw out from other [persons or facts] by a subtle process of thought unknown to many, men are, therefore, more believed about things they say they have seen or heard, or perceived by some other sense, than about things they infer from the words of others or even by arguing from things known to them. Thus often many people believe without doubting a doctor of theology offering testimony about some fact, and yet do not believe his opinions [about matters of theoretical knowledge and law], however much he were to adhere to them most firmly, even pertinaciously -- indeed, they most firmly think that he is wrong and is saying and asserting falsehoods. This is because they hold that he would not knowingly speak a falsehood, and they think that he is certain about the matter of fact but think he is deceived about the other matters.
Sic dicunt de concilio generali quod cum asserit aliquid quod facti est quod dicit per se ipsum cognoscere vel invenisse explicite in scripturis divinis vel in libris illorum quibus, quantum ad illa quae asseruntur {*asserunt Sc} se cognoscere per se ipsos, est credendum ab omnibus qui de contrario non sunt vel non possunt esse certi, semper est adhibenda fides concilio generali nisi possit probari contrarium.	In the same way they say of a general council that trust should always be given to it when it asserts some matter of fact [1] that it says it knows directly or has found explicitly [2] in the divine scriptures or [3] in books by those whom -- with respect to those things which they [the authors] claim they know directly -- everyone who is not or can not be sure of the contrary should believe unless the opposite can be proved.
Quo ad alia autem quae taliter minime cognoscuntur sed solummodo arguendo ex aliis {*add quorum Ki} accipitur eorum {om. Ki} notitia a petitis et {*petitis et: peritis FrMz[243]} scientibus {a petitis et scientibus: apertis scientiis LmPz[244]} argumenta sophistica a veris discernere, non est necessarium tantam credulitatem praestare concilio generali, eo quod notum est per {*et FrMz[245]} {om. LmPz[246]} certum plures literatos et qui periti putantur, quantumcunque {quamquam Fr[247]} sint in concilio generali, nescire in multis sophismata a veris argumentis discernere. Quia tamen {cum FrMz[248]} plurimi {plurium FrMz[249]} fallaciarum naturam ignorantes {om. FrMz[250]}, etiam qui memoriam literarum supra alios habere noscuntur, non solum in theologia et philosophia sed etiam in scientiis legalibus paralogisantur, {*paralogisant FrMz[251]} credentes demonstrationem et infallibile facere argumentum quando, {add. que Fr[252]} quamvis ignoranter, sophistice omnino procedant {*procedunt FrMz[253]}, ideo {*om. FrMz[254]} quando {*add. igitur FrMz[255]} in generali concilio congregati, praesertim si pauci sint, sicut aliquando fuerunt {fuerint LmPz[256]} solummodo undecim, quemadmodum probatum est prius, et in scientia discernendi sophisticas rationes a veris sunt minime eruditi vel non sunt notabiliter excellentes, non est tanta fides adhibenda eisdem quando ratiocinando ex aliis quamvis indubiis aliquam assertionem determinant quanta adhibenda eis esset {*trs. FrMz[257]} si aliquid quod facti est {esset Fr[258]} assertive proferrent firmiter affirmando hoc vel per se ipsos evidenter cognoscere vel per illos quibus omnino in huiusmodi est credendum.	With respect to other matters, however, that are not known in this way but only by arguing from other [propositions] knowledge of which is acquired from learned men who know how to distinguish sophistical arguments from true ones, it is not necessary to show so much belief in a general council. This is because it is well known and certain that many who are learned and thought to be experts, in many cases -- however much they are in a general council -- do not know how to distinguish sophistical arguments from true ones. Because, however, many, ignorant of the nature of fallacies (even those who are known to have a memory of literature above others), reason falsely, not only in theology and philosophy but also in the legal sciences, believing that they are producing a demonstration and an infallible argument when they are proceeding (though in ignorance) completely sophistically, therefore, when gathered together in a general council -- especially if there are few of them (as there were sometimes only eleven, as was proved above) and they are not skilled in the science of distinguishing sophistical arguments from true ones, or are not notably distinguished -- such great trust should not be given to them when they decide on some assertion by a process of reasoning from other [assertions] (even if undoubted) as should be given to them if they put forward assertively some matter of fact that they firmly declare they manifestly know directly or from others who should be completely believed in matters of this kind.

Answers (according to opinion 4) to the arguments of opinion 1 to prove the infallibility of a general council.

CAP. XII Discipulus Contra praedicta obiiciam aliqua, ut cum audiero responsiones ad ipsa clarius intelligam an praescripta aliquid contineant veritatis.	Chapter 12 Student I will make some objections to the foregoing so that when I have heard replies to them I will understand more clearly whether what has been written above contains any truth.
Objections against opinion 4  (1) against the claim that general councils may err
Hoc itaque videtur, quod nullo modo sit credendum quod concilium generale possit {*aliquid add. FrMz[351]} diffinire contra catholicam veritatem. Nam, sicut illi saepe accipiunt {*trs.231 FrMz[352]} qui opinantur praedicta, Deus {dicitur FrMz[353]} nunquam deficiet in necessariis congregationi {congregatio FrMz[354]} fidelium, quae est ecclesia Dei. Sed concilium generale non diffinire aliquid contra fidem est necessarium ecclesiae suae.	And so it seems that we ought in no way believe that a general council can define anything against catholic truth. For, as those who hold the above opinion often assume, God will never fail the gathering of the faithful, that is the church of God, in what is necessary. But it is necessary for his church that a general council not define anything against the faith.
Tum quia totam ecclesiam Dei non exponi periculo haeresis et errorum {*erroris FrMz[355]} {errorem LmPz[356]} est necessarium ecclesiae Dei. Si autem concilium generale aliquid diffiniret contra fidem, tota ecclesia Dei exponeretur periculo haeresis et erroris, quia nemo {*non FrMz[357]} tunc inveniretur qui posset aut sciret defendere fidem contra concilium generale.	This is so on the one hand because it is necessary to the church of God that the whole church of God not be exposed to the danger of heresy and error. If a general council were to define something against the faith, however, the whole church of God would be exposed to the danger of heresy and error, because there would not then be found anyone who could or would know how to defend the faith against the general council.
Tum quia non induci in tentationem est necessarium ecclesiae Dei. In oratione enim quam Christus fideles docuit universos hoc petitur; Christus autem non docuit in Oratione Dominica petere nisi necessaria; ergo non induci in tentationem est necessarium ecclesiae Dei. Tota autem ecclesia Dei induceretur in tentationem gravissimam si concilium generale aliquid diffiniret contra fidem. Ergo {*ipsum add. FrMz[358]} non diffinire aliquid contra fidem est necessarium ecclesiae Dei. Ex quo infertur quod credendum est {quod add. FrMz[359]} concilium generale non posse errare contra fidem.	This is so also because it is necessary that the church of God not be led into temptation. For this is sought in the prayer which Christ taught all the faithful; Christ, however, in the Lord's Prayer did not teach us to seek anything not necessary; not to be led into temptation, therefore, is necessary for the church of God. The whole church of God would be led into the most severe temptation, however, if a general council were to define something against the faith. It is necessary for the church of God, therefore, that it [the council] not define anything against the faith. From this we infer that we should believe that a general council can not err against the faith.
Tum, quia illud concilium quod {istis add. FrMz[360]} est suscipiendum {*trs. FrMz[361]} sicut sanctum evangelium non potest errare contra fidem. Concilium autem generale recipiendum est sicut sanctum {om. Fr[362]} evangelium, teste Gregorio, qui, ut habetur dist. 15, Sicut, ait, "Sicut sancti evangelii quatuor libros, sic {sicut LmPz[363]} quatuor concilia recipere {concipere FrMz[364]} et venerari me fateor". Igitur {*ergo FrMz[365]} concilium generale errare contra fidem non potest.	This is also so because that council which should be received like the holy gospel can not err against the faith. A general council should be received like holy gospel, however, as Gregory attests when he says, as we read in dist. 15, Sicut [c.2, col.35], "I confess that I accept and venerate the four councils like the four books of the holy gospel." Therefore, a general council can not err against the faith.
Tum quia universalis ecclesia errare non potest. Diffinitio autem et iudicium generalis concilii tanquam diffinitio universalis ecclesiae debet haberi quia universali consensu constituta videtur, ut Gregorius, ubi prius, videtur asserere, dicens, "Cunctos {*cunctas FrLmMzPzZn[366]} vero quas praefata veneranda concilia personas respuunt, {respiciunt FrMz[367]} respuo; et quas venerantur, complector, quia dum universali sunt constituta consensu, se et non illa destruet {destruit Zn[368]} quisquis praesumit {aut add. Zn[369]} absolvere quos ligant aut ligare quos absolvunt." Huic Gelasius Papa concordare videtur, qui, ut habetur 15 {*25 Zn[370]}, q. 1, c. Confidimus, ait, "Confidimus quia nulla {*nullus FrMzZn[371]} causa venerationis {*causa venerationis: iam veraciter Zn} Christianus ignoret unuscuiusque {*uniuscuiusque FrLmMzPzZn[372]} synodi constitutum quod universalis ecclesiae probetur {*probavit Zn} assensu {*assensus FrMzZn[373]} nullam exequi magis {*sedem add. Zn} prae caeteris oportere quam primam." Ex quibus colligitur quod id quod fecit {*facit FrMz[374]} concilium generale ab universali fit ecclesia. Et per consequens concilium generale errare non potest.	This is so also because the universal church can not err. A definition and judgement of a general council, however, ought to be regarded as a definition of the universal church because it seems that they [councils] are established by universal consent, as Gregory seems to assert in the same place as before [col. 35] when he says, "Indeed all those persons whom the aforesaid venerable councils reject, I reject, and those they venerate, I embrace, because, so long as they are established by universal consent, anyone who presumes to release those whom they bind or to bind those whom they release will destroy himself and not them." Pope Gelasius seems to agree with this. He says, as found in 25, q. 1, c. Confidimus, "We trust that every Christian now truly knows that the first See, above all, must carry out the decision of any synod that the assent of the universal church has approved." From these we gather that what a general council does is done by the universal church. And consequently a general council can not err.
(2) against the claim that in the Bible there may be things that at some times need not be understood
Secundo contra praedicta specialiter quo ad hoc quod dicit quod {*om. FrMz[375]} non omnium contentorum in lege divina verum intellectum esse omni tempore necessarium ad salutem obiici potest. Nam si alicuius contenti in lege divina verus intellectus et primus non esset omni tempore necessarius ad salutem, frustra illud fuisset positum in ipsa {*om. FrMz[376]} lege divina, cum ipsa {*om. FrMz[377]} lex divina non nisi propter salutem electorum fuit {*sit FrMz[378]} data. Sed posset dici de eo "ut quid membranas occupat", dist. 19. Si Romanorum, ubi dicit glossa ex hoc accipitur "argumentum quod {om. FrLmMzPz[379]} nullum verbum positum in aliqua scriptura debet vacare nec poni superflue {*trs. FrMzZn[380]}." Verus ergo intellectus et primus omnium contentorum in ipsa {*om. FrMz[381]} lege divina est necessarius ad salutem.	Secondly, an objection can be made against the foregoing especially in so far as it says that a true understanding of everything contained in the divine law is not at all times necessary for salvation. For if a true and primary [[i.e. in the literal or historical sense]] understanding of anything contained in the divine law were not at every time necessary for salvation, that [thing] would have been put in the divine law uselessly, since the divine law was only given for the salvation of the chosen, but it could be said of it: "Why does it take up parchment?" (dist. 19, Si Romanorum [col.80]) -- where the gloss says that from this is taken "an argument that no word put in any writing should be void nor be put in unnecessarily". A true and primary understanding of everything contained in the divine law, therefore, is necessary for salvation.
Amplius, verus intellectus eorum quae in nova lege traduntur fuit necessarius ad salutem illis qui fuerunt {fuerint Lm[382]} summi {simul FrMz[383]} in veteri testamento. Nam necesse fuit maiores in veteri testamento trinitatis et incarnationis mysterium explicite et non solum implicite credere. Ergo cuiuslibet expresse scripti in lege divina, tam nova quam veteri, intellectus verus {*trs. FrMz[384]} est necessarius ad salutem, ut {et Fr[385]} saltem aliqui primum explicite credant et non ignorent. Haec sunt inter alia quae possunt obiici contra praedicta, ad quae aliquas responsiones audire desidero.	Further, a true understanding of those things that are handed down in the new law was necessary for salvation for those who were leaders in the old testament. For it was necessary that the greater persons of the old testament believe explicitly, not just implicitly, the mystery of the trinity and the incarnation. A true understanding, therefore, of anything at all expressly written in the divine law, whether the new or the old, is necessary for salvation, in such a way that at least some believe explicitly the primary sense and are not ignorant of it. These are some of the objections that can be made against the abovementioned points, to which I want to hear some answers.
CAP. XIII	Chapter 13
Answers on behalf of opinion 4 (1): it is not necessary for councils to be infallible
Discipulus Ad primum respondetur per distinctionem de necessario, quia aliquid esse necessarium ecclesiae Christi dupliciter potest intelligi: vel quia est utile, vel quia sine illo non est nec unquam erit salus.	Master The reply to the first of them is by a distinction of the word "necessary", because that something is necessary for the church of Christ can be understood in two ways: either that it is useful, or that without it there is not nor ever will be salvation.
Primo modo accipiendo necessarium, concilium generale non diffinire aliquid contra catholicam veritatem est necessarium ecclesiae Dei, sicut {in add. FrMz[386]} papam non errare nec diffinire aliquid contra fidem est necessarium, id est {id est: et FrMz[387]} utile, {*ecclesie dei add. FrMz[388]}. Sed quantum ad omnia talia necessaria Christus non semper adest ecclesiae, quinimo contraria permittit vel potest permittere evenire, unde et plures summi pontifices erraverunt pertinaciter {?impertinaciter FrMz[389]} contra fidem.	Taking "necessary" in the first way, it is necessary for the church of God that a general council not define anything against catholic truth, just as it is necessary, that is useful, for the church of God that the pope not err nor define anything against the faith. But Christ is not always with his church with respect to everything that is necessary in this way, but rather permits or can permit the opposite to come about: whence, several highest pontiffs have erred pertinaciously against the faith.
Secundo modo accipiendo necessarium, concilium generale non errare contra fidem non est necesse ecclesiae, quia, quamvis concilium generale erret {*erraret FrMz[390]}, in multitudine fidelium posset tamen {om. FrMz[391]} per veram et catholicam fidem salvari, quinimo haberet scripturas sacras, quibus {*per quas FrMz[392]} errorem concilii generalis posset convincere manifeste si diffiniret aliquid contra ipsas. Si autem diffiniret {diffinire LmPz[393]} aliquid esse tenendum tanquam de necessitate fidei quod tamen non {om. Mz[394]} esset necesse credere, per easdem Scripturas possent Christiani alii {*trs. FrMz[395]} aperte ostendere quod taliter diffinitum ad fidem minime pertineret.	Taking "necessary" in the second way, it is not necessary for the church that a general council not err against the faith, because, even if it were to err, it would still be possible to be saved among the multitude of the faithful [the church] through true and catholic faith. Indeed it [the multitude] would have the sacred scriptures through which it could clearly convict the general council of error if it were to define anything against them. If, moreover, it were to define that something should be held as a necessity of faith which in fact it was not necessary to believe, other christians could clearly show by those same scriptures that the thing so defined did not pertain to the faith.
Cum autem accipitur {*quod add. FrMz[396]} si {om. Fr[397]} concilium generale diffiniret aliquid contra fidem tota ecclesia Dei exponeretur periculo haeresis et erroris, respondetur per distinctionem de periculo. Est enim quoddam periculum tantummodo imminens seu circumstans, et est periculum involvens seu prosternens.	When it is taken [as a premise], however, that if a general council were to define something against the faith the whole church of God would be exposed to the danger of heresy and error, reply is made by a distinction of the word "danger". For there is a certain danger which is only threatening or surrounding, and there is a danger which is enveloping or subverting.
Periculo imminenti seu circumstanti totam ecclesiam Dei exponi negari non debet sed concedi; hoc enim fatetur ecclesia ipsa {om. FrMz[398]} cum in quadam collecta dicit, "Deus qui nos in tantis periculis constitutos" etc, a quibus liberari {deliberari Fr[399]} deposcit cum alibi dicit, "A cunctis nos mentis et corporis defende periculis." Talibus periculis {talibus periculis: om. LmPz[400]} expositus fuit apostolus Paulus sicut ipse fatetur 2 Cor. 2 {2 Cor. 2: 1 Cor. 12 FrMz[401]}, et {om. FrMz[402]} a quolibet {qualibet FrMz[403]} se liberatum fuisse dicit c. 1:[10] cum ait, "de tantis periculis eripuit nos." In tali periculo etiam fuit aliquando {*trs. FrMz[404]} tota ecclesia Dei quae erat sub veteri testamento Deut. 20:[4]: "Dominus Deus vester in medio vestri est pro vobis contra adversarios dimicabit et {*ut FrMzVg[405]} eruet {*eruat MzPzVg[406]} {emat Fr[407]} vos de periculis." Tali enim {*etiam FrLmMzPz[408]} periculo se exponere ex causa rationabili est laudabile iudicandum. Unde etiam in laudem proeliantium contra infideles dixit Delbora ut habetur Iudicum 5:[2], "Sponte obtulistis de Israel animas vestras ad periculum."	It should not be denied but granted that the whole church of God is exposed to threatening or surrounding danger, for the church itself confesses this when it says in one of its collects, "God who has established us in such great dangers" etc. [PL 78, col. 48], and it asks to be freed from these when it says elsewhere, "Defend us from all dangers of mind and body" [PL 217, col. 917]. The apostle Paul was exposed to such dangers, as he himself confesses in 2 Cor. 2, and he says in 2 Cor. 1:10 that he was freed from every [danger], saying, "He snatched me away from such great dangers." The whole church of God has also sometimes been in such danger as it was in the time of the old testament: "The Lord your God is with you, to fight for you against your enemies so as to rescue you from dangers" (Deut. 20:4). Indeed, it should be judged praiseworthy to expose oneself to such danger for a rational reason. For this reason Deborah spoke in praise of those fighting against the unbelievers, as we read in Judges 5:2, "You people of Israel freely offered your souls to danger."
Involvens periculum {*trs. FrMz[409]} seu prosternens est duplex, scilicet spirituale et corporale {*trs.321 FrMz[410]}; sed neutri {*unquam add. FrMz[411]} exponetur tota ecclesia Dei, licet corporaliter {corporale Fr[412]} multi ex fidelibus involvantur non nunquam. Spirituale autem finaliter nullus electus incurreret {*incurret FrLmMzPz[413]}, et de tali periculo videtur intelligere sapiens cum Ecclesiastici 3:[27] ait, "Qui amat periculum in illo peribit."	Enveloping or subverting danger is of two kinds, corporal and spiritual, but the whole church of God will never be exposed to either, even if many of the faithful are sometimes enveloped corporally. None of the chosen, however, will finally incur the spiritual [kind], and the wise man seems to mean such danger when he says in Ecclesiasticus 3:27 "He who loves danger will perish in it."
Si itaque concilium generale diffiniret aliquid contra fidem, poterit tota ecclesia Dei exponi periculo haeresis et erroris {errores Fr[414]}, primo modo accipiendo periculum, quemadmodum aliquando, quia non potuit concilium generale {*trs. FrMz[415]} convocari {convocare FrMz[416]}, Christianitas {Christianos FrMz[417]} quo ad multos fuit periculo haeresis convoluta {*involuta FrMz[418]} et quo ad {om. Mz[419]} alios impugnata, teste Isidoro, qui, ut legitur dist. 15, {*c.1 add. Zn} {c. 2 add. FrMz[420]}, ait, enim {*om. MzZn[421]} "In praecedentibus namque {autem Fr[422]} donis {*annis Zn} persecutione fervente docendarum plebium minime dabatur facultas. Inde Christianitas in diversas haereses scissa est." Posset tamen contingere quod quamvis generale concilium {*trs. FrMz[423]} diffiniret aliquid contra fidem ecclesia Dei non {om. FrMz[424]} exponeretur periculo, quia posset contingere quod congregati in concilio generali essent pauci et viles, tam in re quam in hominum {hominis Mz[425]} {honoris Fr[426]} reputatione, respectu illorum qui ad illud concilium generale {*om. FrMz[427]} minime convenissent. Et tunc illorum leviter error {*trs. FrMz[428]} extirparetur per multitudinem meliorum et sapientiorum et famosiorum {famosorum FrLmMzPz[429]} illis, quibus etiam multitudo simplicium adhaereret magis scilicet quam {*trs. FrMz[430]} decem vel duodecim aut quindecim per quos possit {*posset FrMz[431]} generale concilium celebrari. Quemadmodum {*aliquando scilicet add. FrMz[432]} in concilio Arelatensi tantummodo undecim patres fuerunt (dist. 16, Sexta {*Prima adnotatio Zn[433]}), quamvis tunc multiplicati fuerunt Christiani et plures occupaverunt {*ac plures occupantes Mz[434]} {occupationes LmPz[435]} provincias quam diebus nostris {et plures ... nostris: om. Fr[436]}. Periculo autem involventi seu etiam {*om. FrMz[437]} prosternenti nequaquam exponeretur {exponetur Fr[438]} tota ecclesia Dei quamvis concilium generale diffiniret aliquid contra fidem, quia remanerent aliqui vel multi vel pauci qui tali diffinitioni erroneae minime consentirent sed pro loco et {pro add. Mz[439]} tempore contradicerent manifeste {etc add. Mz[440]}.	And so if a general council were to define something against the faith, the whole church of God could be exposed to the danger of heresy and error, taking "danger" in the first sense ["threatening", not "enveloping"] -- just as sometimes, because a general council could not be called together, Christianity, in respect of many christians, has been enveloped in the danger of heresy and, in respect of others, has been attacked [that is, the danger was "enveloping" in respect of some but not in respect of the whole Church; such danger can happen because a council meets and defines wrongly, or because no council meets when one is needed], as Isidore attests when he says in dist. 15, c. 1 [Canones, col.34] "For in the preceding years, while persecution was raging, the faculty of teaching the people was not given and so Christianity was split into various heresies." It could happen, however, that even if a general council were to define something against the faith, the church of God would not be exposed to danger, because it could happen that those gathered together in the general council were few and worthless, both in truth and in human reckoning, in comparison to those who had not come together to that council; then their error would be easily eradicated by the great number who were better, wiser and more renowned than them, to whom the multitude of the simple would adhere, rather than to the ten, twelve or fifteen by whom a general council could be celebrated -- as an example, there were once only eleven fathers at the Council of Arles (dist. 16, Prima adnotatio [c.11, col.47]), even though at that time the number of christians had increased and they were occupying more provinces than in our day.) The whole church of God, however, would not be exposed to enveloping or subverting danger even if a general council were to define something against the faith, because there would remain some, many or a few, who would not consent to such an erroneous definition but would according to place and time clearly contradict it.[That is: the Church as a whole will never fall into "enveloping" danger because there will always be some christians -- at least a few, and perhaps even most of the wiser and more renowned -- who will resist the error.]
Discipulus Saltem multitudo Christianorum, maxime laicorum et simplicium, prosternenti exponeretur periculo, potissime si papa esset praesens in tali concilio atque {*vel FrLmMzPz[441]} errori huiusmodi consentiret, et papa cum consentientibus sibi potentior esset aliis, quod tamen pro inconvenienti debet haberi.	Student At the least, the multitude of christians, especially the lay and the simple, would be exposed to subverting danger, especially if the pope were present in such a council or were to consent to an error of this kind, and the pope and those agreeing with him were more powerful than the others. This should be regarded as unsuitable.
Magister Respondetur quod in tali casu magis timendum est {esset Mz[442]} de periculo clericorum in sacris literis peritorum {om. Fr[443]} et aliorum quam de multitudine laicorum, id est simplicium, praesertim quando multitudo clericorum per avaritiam, ambitionem, simoniam et alias vias pravas ad ordines, dignitates et beneficia ecclesiastica pervenisset {pervenissent Fr[444]} et aliis esset criminibus irretita, quia plura et maiora temporalia amitteret quam simplices laici si papae temporaliter praevalenti {praevalent Mz[445]} {praevaleret Fr[446]} perseveranter resisterent {*resisteret Fr[447]} et ab obtinendis dignitatibus et beneficiis ecclesiasticis clericos repelleret papa non laicos. Propter quod procliviores essent clerici ad assentiendum errori papae et concilii generalis, quia, ut testatur Iohannes papa, pro ut legitur 16, q. 2, c. 1, "Humani moris est illum vereri cuius iudicio et voluntate nunc erigitur nunc deprimitur." Clerici etiam, propter sacrarum literarum maiorem {*trs.321 FrMz[448]} noticiam quam habent vel tenentur habere {*trs. FrMz[449]}, et quia quaestio fidei, licet spectet ad laicos (dist. 86 {*96 Zn[450]} c. Ubinam), principalius tamen pertinet ad clericos, magis peccarent et gravius quam laici; et ideo magis verendum esset {est Fr[451]} ne Deus eos permitteret ruere in errorem. Multitudo insuper Christianorum, dum tamen {cum FrMz[452]} alii {alio FrMz[453]} vel saltem unus {unius Fr[454]} fidelis remaneat, potest involventi periculo haeresis et erroris aliis exigentibus peccatis ipsorum exponi; quibus in haereticam pravitatem labentibus, valet {valent Mz[455]} {valeret Fr[456]} ille qui de lapidibus potest suscitare filios Abrahae, vel de aliquibus ipsorum aut de aliis, quando voluerit numerum Christianorum augere {augeri Fr[457]}.	Master The reply is that in such a case there should be greater fear of danger to clerics learned in the sacred scriptures and to others [i.e. other clerics] than to the multitude of the laity, that is the simple, especially when the multitude of clerics had attained their orders, offices and ecclesiastical benefices by avarice, flattery, simony and other improper ways and had been entangled in other crimes, because they would lose more and greater temporalities than simple laymen if they were to persevere in resisting a temporally more powerful pope and the pope were to hold back clerics but not laymen from obtaining ecclesiastical offices and benefices. For this reason clerics would be more disposed to give assent to an error of the pope and general council, because, as Pope John attests in 16, q. 2, c. 1, [Visis litteris, col.785] "It is human nature to fear him by whose judgement and will one is either raised up or pressed down." Because too of the greater knowledge of sacred literature which clerics have, or are bound to have, and because the question of faith, even though it does pertain to laymen (dist. 96, Ubinam), pertains more chiefly to clerics, they sin more and more seriously than laymen; and there should be a greater fear, therefore, lest God permit them to rush into error. Moreover, as long as some or at least one of them remains faithful, the multitude of christians, driven by their other sins, can be exposed to the enveloping danger of heresy and error. While these are slipping into heretical wickedness, he who can raise up the children of Abraham from stones [Matthew 3:9] can, whenever he wishes, increase the number of christians, either from some of them [those slipping into heresy] or from others.
Discipulus Indica breviter qualiter respondetur ad allegationes sequentes quibus probatur concilium generale non posse errare contra fidem.	Student Indicate briefly how reply is made to the arguments which follow and by which it is proved that a general council can not err against the faith.
Magister Ad ista quibus accipit {*accipitur ??[458]} quod ecclesia Dei induceretur {duceretur Fr[459]} in temptationem gravissimam si concilium generale aliquid contra fidem diffiniret, respondetur quod totam ecclesiam Dei induci in temptationem dupliciter intelligi potest, vel ut temptationi {temptatio FrMz[460]} succumbat -- et ne hoc accidat petitur in Oratione Dominica, et nunquam eveniet nec eveniret quamvis {quam Mz[461]} concilium generale {*trs. FrMz[462]} contra fidem erraret {errare Pz?Lm[463]} -- vel ut temptatione impugnetur qua {quae FrMz[464]} graviter infestetur. et {*om. FrMz[465]} Hoc poterit evenire, teste beato Iacobo, qui c. 1:[2] suae canonicae ait, "Omne gaudium existimate fratres charissimi {*mei FrMzVg[466]} cum in temptationibus {*temptationes FrMzVg[467]} variis {*varias FrMzVg[468]} incideritis."	Master To the arguments in which it is taken [as a premise] that the church of God would be led into the most severe temptation if a general council were to define something against the faith, the reply is that the idea of the whole church of God being led into temptation can be understood in two ways, either that it succumbs to temptation -- and we ask in the Lord's Prayer that this not happen, and it never will, nor would it come about even if a general council were to err against the faith -- or that it is assailed by temptation by which it is seriously afflicted. This could come about, as blessed James attests when he says in his letter 1:2, "Consider it nothing but joy, my brothers, when you come upon various temptations."
{add 12 LmPz[469]} Ad allegationem sequentem, tenentem quod generale concilium recipiendum est sicut sanctum Evangelium secundum Gregorium, respondetur quod hoc intelligendum est de generali concilio rite, iuste et {ac Fr[470]} catholice celebrato, secundum {sicut FrMz[471]} quod dicitur omnes {om. Lm[472]} apostolicae sedis sanctiones debere accipi sicut si voce Petri essent firmatae, secundum Gratianum, dist. 19. Hoc autem intelligi debet de illis sanctionibus vel decretalibus epistolis in quibus nec praecedentium patrum decretis nec evangelicis praeceptis aliquid contrarium invenitur, ita tamen quod hoc vocabulum "sicut" omnimodam similitudinem nequaquam importet {reportet Mz[473]}, sicut nec Math. 5:[48] cum dicit Christus "Estote perfecti sicut {*et add. MzVg[474]} pater vester coelestis perfectus est", nec illud c. 22:[39] "Diliges proximum tuum sicut teipsum", nec illud Iohannis 10 {*20 Vg[475]}:[21] "Sicut misit me pater et ego mitto vos." Quamvis enim generale concilium aliquid rite et {*ac Mz[476]} catholice diffiniat et determinet et ideo sit sicut sanctum evangelium suscipiendum, sanctum tamen evangelium cum maiori reverentia et devotione suscipiendum est quam concilium generale quodcunque.	To the following argument which holds that a general council should be accepted, according to Gregory, like holy gospel, the reply is that this should be understood of a general council celebrated rightly, justly and in catholic fashion, in the way it is said that all sanctions of the apostolic see should be accepted "just as if" they were declared by the voice of Peter, according to Gratian (dist. 19 [Sic omnes, col. 60). This should be understood of those sanctions or decretal letters in which nothing is found which is opposed either to the decrees of earlier fathers or to gospel precepts, yet in such a way that the phrase "just as" [or "like" or "as] does not imply an identical likeness -- as it does not in Matthew 5:48, when Christ says, "Be perfect, as your heavenly father is perfect", and in Matthew 22:39, "Love your neighbour as you do yourself", and in John 20:20, "As my father sent me, so I send you". For even if a general council defines and determines something properly and in catholic fashion, so that, therefore, it should be received "just as" holy gospel, yet the holy gospel should be received with more reverence and devotion than any general council whatever.
Ad aliam autem allegationem accipientem quod diffinitio generalis concilii tanquam diffinitio universalis ecclesiae debet haberi, respondetur quod concilium generale {*trs. FrMz[477]} non debet regulariter occulte seu secrete aut paucis scientibus celebrari, sed vulgandum {volgandum Mz[478]} {obligandum Fr[479]} est per universalem ecclesiam, hoc est per omnes regiones in provincia {*?seu provinciiis add.[480]} in qua seu in {*om. FrMz[481]} quibus catholici commorantur, generale concilium convocari {*congregari FrMz[482]} debere, quatinus omnes catholici tacite vel expresse consentiant et quasi auctoritatem tribuant, ut ad concilium profecturi eorum nomine circa ordinanda et diffinienda in generali concilio {ac add. FrLmMzPz[483]} canonice et catholice atque rite procedant, ut merito quicquid catholice et licite {*trs.321 FrMz[484]} statuerint vel diffiniverint {*diffinierint FrLmMzPz[485]} universali statuatur et diffiniatur assensu. At vero si quid indigne aut {At vero ...aut: atque non indigne universalis ecclesie probetur assensus aut aliquid FrMz[486]} illicite et non canonice vel non catholice statuerint vel diffiniverint {*diffinierint FrLmMzPz[487]} universalis ecclesiae nullatenus statutum vel diffinitum probetur assensu. Talis enim assensus ad nihil illicitum potest extendi, quia talis assensus ecclesiae universalis {*trs. FrMz[488]} est secundum intentionem assentientium interpretandus, quemadmodum iuramentum secundum intentionem iurantis interpretari debet, ut notat Glossa Extra, De iureiurando super c. Quintavallis. Quando igitur concilium generale rite convocatur et in omnibus catholice et sancte procedit, quicquid fecerit ab universali ecclesia fieri est putandum. Et ideo de tali concilio generali loquitur {*loquuntur FrMz[489]} Gregorius et Gelasius. Si autem aliquid fecerit illicite et non catholice minime universalis ecclesiae probatur assensu {assensus FrMz[490]}, quia universalis ecclesia quamvis consenserit quod convocaretur concilium generale non tamen putanda est nec expresse nec tacite {*in add. FrMz[491]} aliquod illicitum consentire.	To another argument which takes it as a premise that a definition by a general council should be considered as like a definition by the universal church, the reply is that a general council should not as a rule be celebrated privately, secretly or with few knowing about it, but it should be made known throughout the universal church, that is throughout every region in the province or provinces in which catholics live, that a general council ought to be gathered together, so that all catholics tacitly or expressly agree and bestow, as it were, authority on it, for the purpose that those coming to the council in their name should proceed, in the matters they have to ordain and define in the general council, canonically, properly and in catholic fashion, with the result that what they decree or define in a licit and catholic fashion is deservedly decreed and defined with universal assent. But if, on the other hand, they decree or define something unworthily or illicitly and not in a canonical or catholic way, let that decree or definition not be approved by the assent of the universal church. For assent of this kind can not be extended to anything illicit, because this kind of assent of the universal church should be interpreted according to the intention of those assenting, just as an oath should be interpreted according to the intention of the one swearing it, as the gloss on Extra, De iureiurando, c. Quintavallis notes (s. v. Iuramentum, col. 816; cf. gloss on Extra, De iureiurando, Veniens, s. v. Praescivisset, col. 808). When a general council is properly convoked, therefore, and proceeds in everything in a catholic and holy way, whatever it does should be considered as done by the universal church. It is about a general council of this kind, therefore, that Gregory and Gelasius are speaking. If it does anything illicitly and not in a catholic way, however, it is not approved by the assent of the universal church, because even if the universal church has agreed that the general council be convoked, yet it should not be thought that it consents, either expressly or tacitly, to anything illicit.
Aliter respondetur quod postquam acta generalis concilii per universos catholicos populos {*trs. FrMz[492]} fuerunt {fuerint Fr[493]} promulgata {provulgata Pz[494]}, si nullus contradicens aut impugnans apparet, sunt putanda ab universali ecclesia approbata, et de talibus conciliis {*generalibus add. FrMz[495]} loquuntur Gregorius et Gelasius. Si autem acta generalis concilii non fuerunt {*fuerint FrMz[496]} apud omnes populos catholicos diligenter exposita, non est dicendum quod tale concilium generale {*om. FrMz[497]} sit explicite ab universali ecclesia approbatum, licet si sancte et catholice fuerit celebratum possit dici implicite ab universali ecclesia approbatum.	Another reply is that if, after the acts of a general council have been made known among all catholic people, no one is seen to contradict or attack them, they should be considered as approved by the universal church, and it is about general councils of this kind that Gregory and Gelasius are speaking. If, however, the acts of a general council have not been carefully expounded among all catholic people, it should not be said that such a council has been explicitly approved by the universal church, although it can be said that it has been implicitly approved by the universal church if it has been celebrated in a holy and catholic way.
Discipulus Istud est calumniabile, ut videtur, nam non minus ligat quicquid statuitur vel diffinitur per concilium generale quam statutum apostolicae sedis, sed illud universalem ligat ecclesiam, (Extra, De constitutionibus, Omnium {*Quoniam FrMzZn[498]}), nec oportet ad hoc ut liget quod omnium auribus inculcetur (Extra, De postulatione, Ad hoc {*haec MzZn[499]}). Igitur {*ergo FrMz[500]} et quicquid statuitur vel diffinitur a concilio generali universalem ligat ecclesiam et per consequens {approbato add. Fr[501]} pro approbato ab universali ecclesia est habendum.	Student That seems to be disputable, for whatever is decreed or defined by a general council is no less binding than a decree of the apostolic see, but that binds the universal church (Extra, De constitutionibus, c. Quoniam [c13, col.16]), and it is not necessary for it be binding that it be pressed into the ears of everyone (Extra, De postulatione, c. Ad haec [c.1, col.41]). Whatever is decreed or defined by a general council, therefore, also binds the universal church and must, as a consequence, be considered approved by the universal church.
Magister Respondetur quod statutum apostolicae sedis etiam post duos menses non ligat nisi illos ad quos ipsius noticia poterat pervenire, quia ignorantes, praesertim ignorantia invincibili, minime ligat, Extra, De constitutionibus, Cognoscentes. Sic etiam quod statuitur vel diffinitur in concilio generali non ligat universalem ecclesiam nisi per universalem ecclesiam fuerit legitime divulgatum, et ideo non est censendum explicite approbatum ab universali ecclesia antequam taliter publicetur. Non oportet autem taliter diffinitum singulorum auribus inculcare, sed sufficit taliter publicare quod nullus se possit, si in contrarium venerit, per ignorantiam excusare.	Master The reply is that even after two months a decree of the apostolic see binds only those to whose notice it was able to come, because it does not bind those who do not know it, especially those whose ignorance can not be overcome (Extra, De constitutionibus, c. Cognoscentes [c.2, col.7]). In this way too, what is decreed or defined in a general council does not bind the universal church unless it has been duly made known throughout the universal church, and it should not be considered explicitly approved by the universal church, therefore, before it has been made public in this way. It is not necessary, however, for something defined in this way to press upon the ears of each person, but it is enough if it has been made public in such a way that no one can excuse himself by ignorance if he has come to the opposite [conclusion].
CAP. XIV Discipulus Nunc superest tractare ista quae secundo {*om. FrLmMzPz[502]} obiecta sunt contra dicta superius c. 12 quibus videtur ostensum quod omnium contentorum in scripturis divinis verus intellectus et primus {prius Fr[503]} {*add. est FrLmMzPz[504]} omni tempore necessarius ad salutem. Narra igitur quomodo opinantes illi respondent ad ipsa {praedicta Fr[505]}	Chapter 14 Student It now remains to consider the objections in chapter 12 against the things said earlier [by opinion 4], by which [objections] it seems to be shown that a true and primary understanding of everything contained in the divine scriptures is at all times necessary for salvation. Tell me, therefore, how those holding this opinion [i.e. opinion 4] reply to those [objections].
Answer (2): it need not always be possible to understand every passage in the Bible
Magister Ad primum illorum, cum dicitur quod frustra esset positum in scriptura illud cuius verus intellectus non est omni tempore necessarius ad salutem, respondetur quod falsum assumitur, quia ad hoc, quod aliquid non frustra ponatur in scriptura divina, sufficit quod aliquando, licet non omni tempore, eius verus intellectus et primus sit necessarius ad salutem, quemadmodum veritas ipsa multa dixit et protulit nequaquam frustra quorum tamen intellectus verus {*trs. FrMz[506]} non erat tunc necessarius ad salutem. Mater enim sua sanctissima {sanctissimas LmPz[507]} nunquam aliquo necessario ad salutem extitit destituta, et tamen quando Christus dixit sibi et patri putativo Lucae 2:[49], "Quid est quod me quaerebatis? Nesciebatis quia in his quae patris mei sunt oportet me esse?", ipsa verum intellectum et primum illorum verborum Christi non concepit {conceperit Fr[508]}, cum immediate subiungatur ibidem, "Et ipsi non intellexerunt verbum quod locutus est ad illos." Quae tamen sicut prius habetur mater eius conservabat in corde suo verum intellectum ipsorum postea habitura. Christus etiam dixit apostolis, ut legitur Lucae 16 {*18 FrMz[509]}:[31-33], "Ecce ascendimus Hierosolymam, et consummabuntur omnia quae scripta sunt per prophetas de filio hominis. Tradetur enim gentibus et illudetur et flagellabitur et conspuetur et postquam flagellaverint occident eum et die tertia resurget." Quorum {*add. tamen FrMz[510]} verborum {om. Fr[511]} verum intellectum tunc minime habuerunt, quia immediate subiungitur, "Et ipsi nihil horum intellexerunt. Erat enim verbum istud absconditum ab eis et non intelligebant quae dicebantur." Eisdem etiam dixit Christus, ut habetur Iohannes 16:[16-17], "Modicum et iam non videbitis me et iterum modicum et {add. iam Fr[512]} videbitis me ... quia vado ad patrem." Quorum tamen verborum verum intellectum non habuerunt, quia de ipsis scribitur ibidem, "Dixerunt {dixerint Lm[513]} igitur {*ergo FrMzZn[514]} ex discipulis eius adinvicem, 'Quid est hoc quod dixit {*dicit FrMzVg[515]} nobis: Modicum et non videbitis me'", et post, "nescimus quid loquitur." Ex quibus aliisque quampluribus colligitur manifeste quod {om. Mz[516]} plura dixit Christus apostolis quorum {*add. tamen FrMz[517]} intellectum verum {*trs. FrMz[518]} minime tunc habuerunt. Ex quo concluditur quod verus intellectus illorum {ipsorum Fr[519]} tunc non erat apostolis necessarius ad salutem. Cum igitur tunc essent in statu salutis nihil defuit eis quod tunc erat eis necessarium ad salutem. Et tamen constat quod tunc Christus non dixisset {*dixit FrMz[520]} talia frustra. Ergo, a simili, poterunt in scripturis divinis aliqua contineri quamvis {*quamquam Fr[522]} {?quantum Mz[523]} eorum intellectus verus {*trs. FrMz[524]} et primus non sit omni tempore necessarius ad salutem.	Master To the first of them, when it says that anything of which a true understanding is not at all times necessary for salvation would have been put in scripture uselessly, the reply is that it makes a false assumption, because for something not to be put in divine scripture uselessly it is enough that a true and primary understanding of it is sometimes, even if not at all times, necessary for salvation, just as Truth himself said and revealed many things which were not useless but of which a true understanding was not at that time necessary for salvation. For his most holy mother never lacked anything necessary for salvation, and yet when Christ said to her and his putative father in Luke 2:49, "Why were you searching for me? Did you not know that I must be about my father's business?", she did not come to a true and primary understanding of those words of Christ, since the text immediately adds, "And they did not understand the words that he spoke to them." (Luke 2:50) As is found above, however, his mother kept these things in her heart, to come to a true understanding of them later. Christ also said to the apostles, as we read in Luke 18:31-3, "See, we are going up to Jerusalem, and everything that is written about the Son of Man by the prophets will be accomplished. For he will be handed over to the gentiles and he will be mocked and flogged and spat upon. After they have flogged him they will kill him, and on the third day he will rise again." Yet they did not then have a true understanding of those words, since the text immediately adds (Luke 18:34), "And they understood nothing about these things, for that saying was hidden from them and they did not understand what was said." As we read in John 16:16, Christ also said to them, "A little while, and you will no longer see me, and again a little while, you will see me ... because I am going to the Father." They did not have a true understanding of these words, however, because in the same place it is written of them, "Some of his disciples therefore said to one another, 'What is this that he says to us: A little while, and you will not see me...We do not know what he is talking about.'" We clearly gather from these and very many other texts that Christ said many things to the apostles of which, nevertheless, they did not have a true understanding at the time. We conclude from this that a true understanding of those things was not at the time necessary to the apostles for salvation. Since at the time they were in a state of salvation they lacked nothing that was then necessary to them for salvation. And yet it is certain that at the time Christ did not say such things to them uselessly. By similar [reasoning], therefore, some things could be contained in the divine scriptures although a true and primary understanding of them is not at all times necessary for salvation.
Discipulus Forte dicerent {*diceretur FrMz[525]} ad ista quod non est inconveniens aliqua in scripturis divinis {scripturis divinis: scriptura divina Pz[526]} haberi quorum verus intellectus non est omni tempore {omni tempore: om. Fr[527]} omnibus catholicis necessarius ad salutem, quemadmodum illa quae dixit matri et apostolis non erant {erat FrMz[528]} eis necessaria ad salutem. Verus tamen intellectus omnium quae in scripturis divinis {non add. LmPz[529]} habentur semper est aliquibus, etsi non omnibus, necessarius ad salutem.	Student Perhaps it would be said to those [arguments] that it is not unsuitable for some things to be found in the divine scriptures the true understanding of which is not at all times for all catholics necessary for salvation, just as the things he said to his mother and the apostles [quoted just above] were not necessary to them for salvation. Nevertheless, a true understanding of everything found in divine scripture is always for some, though not all, necessary for salvation.
Magister Ut videtur aliis hoc {hec Fr[530]} non valet, quia qua ratione plurium intellectus {*om. FrMz[531]} quae Christus dixit {*trs. FrMz[532]} matri suae et apostolis tunc nulli fidelium {*fideli eorum FrLmMzPz[533]} erat {*trs. FrMz[534]} ullatenus {*intellectus FrMz[535]} necessarius ad salutem, ratione consimili non est inconveniens aliqua reperiri in scripturis divinis {*om. FrMz[536]} quorum verus intellectus nulli pro aliquo tempore est necessarius ad salutem; et tamen illa non sunt frustra posita in scripturis nec frustra membranas occupant {occupat FrLmMzPz[537]}, quia verus intellectus ipsorum pro aliquo tempore erit aliquibus necessarius ad salutem, quo tempore idem intellectus aliquibus aperietur, vel per investigationem humanam ex scripturis vel per {*miraculosm add. FrMz[538]} revelationem, si verus intellectus ipsorum humana intentione {*inventione FrLmMzPz[539]} vel eruditione haberi non potest. Propter quod {*idem FrMz[540]} etiam nullum verbum in scriptura divina vacat nec aliquid est superflue positum, quia quamvis multa sunt {*sint Mz[541]} in ea quorum verus intellectus non est semper necessarius ad salutem, aliquibus tamen aliquando necessarius erit.	Master This does not seem valid to other people, because whatever the reason why the understanding of many things Christ said to his mother and the apostles was not at the time necessary to any of those believers for salvation, for like reason it is not unsuitable for some things to be found in the scriptures of which a true understanding is at some time not for anyone necessary for salvation; and yet those things have not been put in the scriptures uselessly and do not "take up parchment" uselessly [cf. above], because at some time a true understanding of them will be for some people necessary for salvation, and at that time such understanding will be opened to some people, either by human exploration of the scriptures, or by miraculous revelation if a true understanding of them can not be had by human discovery or learning. For the same reason too there is not a word in divine scripture that is "void" or anything that has been "put in unnecessarily" [cf. above], because although there are many things in it of which a true understanding is not always necessary for salvation, yet at some time it will be necessary for some people.
Cum autem {*postea add. FrMz[542]} accipitur quod verus intellectus eorum quae in lege nova traduntur fuit necessarius ad salutem illis qui fuerunt sub veteri testamento, respondetur quod aliquorum, puta incarnationis et trinitatis, et non omnium erat verus intellectus literis {*literalis FrMz[543]} explicitus necessarius {om. Fr[544]} ad salutem, quia multa continentur in lege nova quorum verus intellectus literalis nulli in veteri testamento extitit revelatus. Quod veritas ipsa videtur asserere cum dicit, ut habetur Matt. 13:[17], "Multi prophetae et iusti cupierunt {cupierint Lm[545]} videre quae {vos add. Lm[546]} videtis, et non viderunt, et audire quae auditis, et non audierunt {audierint Lm[547]}", et eadem sententia {*trs. FrMz[548]} habetur Luc. 10:[24].	However, when it is later taken as a premise that a true understanding of those things that are handed down in the new law was necessary for salvation for those who lived in Old Testament times, it is replied that a true, literal and explicit understanding of some things, like the incarnation and the trinity, was necessary for salvation, but not of all things, because there are many things contained in the new law of which a true, literal understanding was not revealed to anyone in the Old Testament. Truth himself seems to assert this when he says, as we read in Matthew 13:17, "Many prophets and just men wanted to see what you are seeing, and they did not see, and to hear what you are hearing, and they did not hear", and a similar saying is found in Luke 10:24.
CAP. XV	Chapter 15
Can interpretation ever need a new revelation?
Discipulus Unum {utrum Mz[549]} in praemissis innuitur {*invenitur FrMz[550]} scilicet c. 14 {*scilicet c. 14: om. FrLmMzPz[551]} quod probabile {*improbabile FrMz[552]} omnino non {*om. FrLmMzPz[553]} videtur, quod scilicet aliqua in sacris literis habentur {*continentur FrMz[554]} quorum verus intellectus et primus solummodo per revelationem divinam haberi potest, quia {et Fr[555]} quamvis posset alicui videri quod aliqua in scripturis sacris {*divinis FrMz[556]} non essent superflue posita quorum verus intellectus per studium et meditationem in scripturis haberi {possit, omnino tamen improbabile videtur quod ea in scripturis non essent superflue posita quorum verus intellectus per studium et meditationem in scripturis haberi add. Fr[557]} [[Fr in margin]] non posset {possit Fr[558]} sed quod {*om. FrMz[559]} per solam revelationem divinam haberi possit, tamen hoc {tamen hoc: om. LmPz[560]} non videtur probabile {haberi possit ... probabile: om. FrMz[561]} quia ita posset Deus revelare verum intellectum ipsorum si non essent scripta sicut postquam sunt {sint Fr[562]} scripta. Cum igitur ex scripturis nulla capiatur utilitas nisi intelligantur sequitur quod illa quorum intellectus per solam revelationem valet haberi prius inutiliter omnino scribuntur.	Student One thing which seems to be completely improbable is found in the preceding words, namely that some things are contained in sacred literature of which the primary and true understanding can be had only by divine revelation. This is because, although someone might think that something had not been put in the divine scriptures unnecessarily if a true understanding of it could not be had by study and meditation on the scriptures but can be had by divine revelation alone, still this does not seem probable, because God could in this way reveal a true understanding of such things if they had not been written just as [he can] after they have been written. Since, therefore, no benefit is taken from the scriptures unless they are understood, it follows that those things which can be understood by revelation alone are quite unprofitably written down first.
Rursus non solum talia inutiliter sed etiam periculose {perniciose Fr[563]} essent scripta, quia ista scriptura quae non potest intelligi ad cuius tamen intellectum capiendum possunt niti legentes et circa quam si non intelligatur periculose contingit {contigit Mz[564]} errare videtur esse periculosa legentibus. Sed ad capiendum intellectum quorumcunque quae in scripturis divinis habentur possunt niti legentes circa quae si erraverint periculose errabunt, quia, ut ait Hieronymus, et habetur 24. q. 3. c. Haeresis, "Quicunque aliter scripturam intelligit quam sensus Spiritus Sancti {trs. FrMz[565]} flagitat, a quo scriptura est, licet ab ecclesia non recessit {*recesserit FrMzZn[567]}, tamen haereticus appellari potest." Igitur {*ergo FrMz[568]} periculose talia essent scripta. Volentes enim ad verum intellectum ipsorum pervenire et non valentes laberentur faciliter in errorem. Haec inter alia sunt quibus praedicta assertio posse improbari {reprobari Fr[569]} videtur. Tu narra quomodo respondetur {respondeatur Fr[570]} ad ipsa primo tamen nitaris {*nitere FrMz[571]} {niteris LmPz[572]} pro opinione illa allegare {om. FrMz[573]}.	Again, such things would have been written not just unprofitably but even dangerously, because that writing which can not be understood yet which those reading can try to gain an understanding of and about which it is possible to err dangerously if it is not understood, seems to be dangerous to its readers. But readers can try to gain an understanding of everything which is contained in the divine scriptures and if they are in error about these matters they will err dangerously, because, as Jerome says in 24, q. 3, Haeresis [c.27, col.997], "Whoever understands scripture in a sense other than the sense which the Holy Spirit, by whom it was written, demands, can be called a heretic even if he has not withdrawn from the church." Such things, therefore, would have been written dangerously. For those who wanted to arrive at a true understanding of them but were not able to do so, would slip easily into error. These among others are [the arguments] by which it seems the aforesaid assertion can be rejected. Tell me how reply is made to them, but first try to argue for that opinion.

CAP. XVI Magister Quod {quot Fr[574]} plura contineantur {contineatur Lm[575]} in scripturis {sacris seu add. Fr[576]} divinis quorum verus intellectus et primus virtute humani ingenii ex literis {*scripturis FrMz[577]} sacris colligi nequeat, sed per revelationem divinam solummodo possit haberi, videtur posse probari. Nam verus {prius Fr[578]} intellectus et primus {verus Fr[579]} proferentis orationem ambiguam habentem multos sensus haberi non potest nisi proferens orationem eandem quem {quod FrMz[580]} intellectum habeat aperte declaret. Si quis dixerit, "Iohannes cantat missam", cum plures appellantur {*appellentur FrMz[581]} hoc nomine, audiens non sciet {sciendum FrMz[582]} [[but corrected Fr]] de quo loquens {loqueris Mz[583]} intelligit nisi ipse sibi revelet. Unde et propter hoc videtur ut nititur declarare quaedam {quod Fr?Mz[584]} opinio quam tractavimus prima parte istius dialogi libro 7 quod quando lex aliqua vel constitutio habet plures sensus, a conditore est interpretatio requirenda. Nemo enim alius potest scire {scrire Pz[585]} intellectum quem habuit {habet Fr[586]} legis conditor in condendo. Plures autem orationes ambiguae in scripturis divinis habentur, nam secundum doctrinam sanctorum patrum non solum voces quae in orationibus ponuntur sunt signa, sed etiam res significatae per voces sunt signa aliarum rerum. Unde et veritas ipsa, ut testatur {*refert FrMz[587]} Gregorius in omelia super parabolam seminantis, insinuavit aperte quod "semen" verbum, "ager" mundum, "volucres" daemonia, "spinae" divitias signant {significant Fr[588]}. Una autem et eadem res {*trs.312 FrLmMzPz[589]} plures alias res contrarias {incontrarias Mz[590]} etiam {om. Mz[591]} {*trs. Fr[592]} in scripturis sacris significat {*signat FrMz[593]}. "Leo" etiam aliquando signat verbum, ut ibi "Vicit leo de tribu Iuda", aliquando diabolum, ut ibi "tanquam leo rugiens", etc. {*om. Fr[594]}, aliquando virum fortem, aliquando crudelem. Ergo orationum ambiguarum, quarum non parva invenitur in sacris literis multitudo, cum res significant {*signant FrMz[595]}, verus et primus intellectus non haberi {*trs. FrMz[596]} potest nisi ipse revelet, scilicet Deus qui huiusmodi orationes {*trs. FrMz[597]} revelavit.	Chapter 16 Master It seems provable that many things are contained in the divine scriptures of which a true and primary understanding can not be gathered by the power of human wit from the sacred scriptures, but can be obtained only by divine revelation. For a true and primary understanding of someone uttering an ambiguous phrase which has many senses can be obtained only if the one uttering the phrase makes quite clear what understanding he has. If someone says, "John sings mass", when there are many men called by this name, someone hearing him will not know whom the one speaking means unless he, [the speaker], reveals it to him. It is for this reason, it seems, that an opinion we dealt with in Book 7 of the first part of this Dialogue [cf. chapter 4] tries to make clear that when some law or constitution has several senses, its author's interpretation should be sought, for no one else can know the thought the author of a law had in framing it. Many ambiguous phrases are found in the divine scriptures, however, for according to the teaching of the holy fathers not only are the words put in phrases signs, but the things signified by the words are signs of other things too. For this reason, as Gregory reports in his homily on the parable of the sower [PL 76, col. 1131], Truth himself clearly implied that "the seed" designates the word, "the field", the world, "the birds", demons and "the thorns", wealth. One and the same thing, however, signifies several other things, even contrary things, in the sacred scriptures. "Lion" sometimes designates the Word, as in "the lion of the tribe of Judah was victorious" (Apoc. 5:5), sometimes, the devil, as in "like a roaring lion" (1 Peter 5:8), sometimes, a strong man, sometimes, a cruel man. A true and primary understanding, therefore, of ambiguous phrases which signify things, of which not a small number is found in sacred literature, can not be had unless he, that is God, who has revealed such phrases, reveals it.
Haec allegatio et conclusio principalis declaratur et confirmatur per aliam in exemplis fundatam apertis. Nam plura revelata fuerunt {fuerint Fr[598]} prophetis ac viris contemplativis in sapientia sublimissimis divinorum, vel aliis per quos ad prophetas et viros illuminatos a Deo pervenerunt {pervenerint LmPz[599]}, ad quorum intellectum verum et primum ipsi prophetae, antequam fuerit {*fuit FrMz[600]} revelatus eisdem, non poterant pervenire. Ergo ratione consimili et multo maiori intellectus verus et primus {prius Fr[601]} illorum qui {*quae FrMz[602]} solummodo aenigmatice et sub similitudinibus et {om. FrMz[603]} figurationibus {signationibus Mz[604]} {significationibus Fr[605]} rerum in scripturis divinis revelata sunt a Deo haberi non potest nisi Deus revelet eundem. Consequentia aperta videtur. Antecedens multis probatur exemplis.	This argument and the main conclusion are made clear and confirmed by another [argument] based on plain examples. For many things were revealed to prophets, to contemplative men most distinguished in wisdom about divine matters, or to others, through whom they came by God's agency to the prophets and enlightened men, of which the prophets themselves could not arrive at a true and primary understanding before it was revealed to them. By a similar and much stronger argument, therefore, a true and primary understanding of those things which have been revealed by God in the divine scriptures only enigmatically and in similes and figures of things can not be had unless God reveals it. The inference seems clear. The premise is proved by many examples.
Iohannes enim evangelista singulariter illuminatus a Deo plura sibi in Apocalypsi revelata minime intellexit antequam intellectus eorum sibi revelaretur a Deo, unde et expositione multorum indiguit. Postquam enim vidit, ut legitur Apocalypsis 17:[3,6,7], "mulierem sedentem super bestiam ... ebriam de sanguine sanctorum", dixit ei angelus "Quare miraris? Ego dicam tibi sacramentum mulieris et bestiae." Minime tamen intellexit antequam angelus ei dixit, et ita ad verum intellectum et primum illius revelationis ante aliam non pervenit. Sic etiam mysterium septem stellarum et septem candelabrorum, de quo legitur c.1, antequam Christus revelavit sibi ipse Iohannes minime intellexit. Unde et Christus dixit eidem post visionem praedictam, "Scribe igitur {*ergo FrMzVg[606]} quae vidisti et quae sunt et quae oportet fieri post haec. Mysterium {sacramentum Vg[607]} septem stellarum quas vidisti in dextra {*dextera FrVg[608]} mea et septem candelabra aurea: {et add. FrLmMzPz[609]} septem stellae angeli {auguli LmPz[610]} sunt septem ecclesiarum, et candelabra septem, septem ecclesiae sunt." Idem etiam Iohannes {*cum add. FrLmMzPz[611]} ut habetur 7. c. interrogavit {*interrogaretur FrMz[612]} ab uno de senioribus, "Hi qui amicti sunt stolis {*albis add. Vg[613]} qui sunt et unde venerunt", respondit, "Domine mi, tu scis", quasi diceret quamvis ego viderim eos tamen nescio qui sunt et unde venerunt sed tu scis. Et ita ad verum et primum intellectum visionis illius Iohannes antequam sibi ille senior revelavit non pervenit.	For John the evangelist, who was singularly enlightened by God, did not understand many things revealed to him in the Apocalypse until that understanding was revealed to him by God, and thus he needed many things to be explained. For, as we read in Apocalypse 17:3,6,7, after he saw "a woman sitting on a beast ... drunk with the blood of the saints", an angel said to him, "Why do you marvel? I will tell you the mystery of the woman and the beast." Until the angel spoke to him, however, he had not understood, and so he did not arrive at a true and primary understanding of that revelation [of the woman] before another revelation [i.e. the angel's explanation]. So too John did not understand the mystery of the seven stars and the seven lampstands, of which we read in Apoc. 1:12-16, until Christ revealed it to him. For this reason Christ said to him after that vision (Apoc. 1:19-20), "Now write what you have seen, what is and what must happen after this. As for the mystery of the seven stars which you saw in my right hand and the seven golden lampstands: the seven stars are the angels of the seven churches, and the seven lampstands are the seven churches." When the same John, as we read in Apoc. 7:13,14, was asked by one of the elders, "Who are these who are robed in white and where do they come from?" he replied, "My lord, it is you who know", as though to say, although I saw them yet I do not know who they are or where they have come from, but you do know. And so John did not arrive at a true and primary understanding of that vision until that elder revealed it to him.
Ioseph etiam, de quo habetur Gen. 41, verum et primum intellectum somnii quod sibi Pharao enarravit per revelationem accepit. Unde et Pharao dixit eidem. "Ostendit tibi Deus omnia quae locutus es." Sic etiam interpretationem veram somniorum pincernae et pistoris Pharaonis per revelationem accepit. Nequaquam enim virtute humani ingenii poterat scire quod {que FrMz[614]} [[corrected Fr]] tres propagines et tria canistra in somniis illis plus signabant {significabant Fr[615]} tres dies quam tres ebdomadas vel tres menses vel tres annos. Per revelationem igitur {*ergo FrMz[616]} solummodo postquam fuerunt sibi praedicta {praedicta add. Fr[617]} somnia {*recitata add. FrMz[618]} interpretationem veram agnovit. Unde et ipse ut habetur 49 {*40 FrLmMzPz[619]} dixit, "Nunquid non Dei est interpretatio?", quasi dicat, ille qui fecit vos {om. Mz[620]} {*trs. Fr[621]} somniare et quid vera significarent somnia vobis minime indicavit, mihi interpretationem poterit revelare.	It was by revelation too that Joseph, about whom we read in Genesis 41, received a true and primary understanding of the dream which pharaoh narrated to him. That is why pharaoh said to him (Gen.41:39), "God has shown you everything that you have spoken." In the same way he also received by revelation a true interpretation of the dreams of pharaoh's cupbearer and baker (Gen.40:9-19). For it was not by power of human wit that he could know that the three branches and the three baskets in those dreams designated three days rather than three weeks or three months or three years. After those dreams had been related to him, therefore, he knew their true interpretation only by revelation. That is why he said, as we read in 40:8, "Is not the interpretation God's?", as if to say, he who made you dream and did not indicate to you how your dreams would signify true events could reveal the interpretation to me.
Item, Daniel plurium visionum quas viderat verum et primum intellectum antequam doceretur non accepit. Capitulo enim 7:[15-6], post visionem quatuor ventorum et quatuor bestiarum subiungitur, "Horruit spiritus meus, ego Daniel territus sum in his et visiones capitis mei conturbaverunt me. Accessi ad unum de assistentibus et veritatem quaerebam ab {de Fr[622]} eo de omnibus his. Qui dixit mihi interpretationem sermonum et docuit me." Cap. etiam 8:[15-6] post aliam visionem subiungitur. "Cum ... ego Daniel ... inquirerem intellegentiam, ecce stetit in conspectu meo quasi species viri. Et audivi vocem viri inter Ulai {om. FrLmMzPz[623]} [[space left in Mz]] et clamavit et ait Daniel {*Gabriel FrMzVg[624]} fac intelligere {virum add. FrMz[625]} istam visionem."	Again, Daniel did not receive a true and primary understanding of many visions he had seen until he was taught. For after his vision of the four winds and the four beasts, is added, in Dan. 7:15-6, "As for me, Daniel, my spirit was troubled and I was terrified by these things, and the visions of my head confounded me. I approached one of the attendants to ask him the truth concerning all this. He told me the interpretation of matters and taught me." He also adds in Dan. 8:15-6 after another vision, "When I, Daniel, ... tried to understand it, then someone appeared standing before me, having the appearance of a man, and I heard a human voice by the Ulai, calling, 'Gabriel, help him to understand this vision.'"
Ex his aliisque quampluribus evidenter colligitur ut videtur quod prophetis et illuminatissimis viris {viri Pz[626]} omnique sapientia divina et humana peritis plura revelata fuerunt quae tamen, antequam docerentur a revelante, non intellexerunt. Unde et saepe prophetis plures visiones fuerunt ostensae {*trs. FrMz[627]} quarum postea interpretatio extitit revelata, sicut Ieremiae 1 et 13 et Ezechiel 17 et Esaiae 5 et aliis locis quampluribus, sicut etiam Christus parabolas quas loquebatur turbis {tribus Fr[628]} apostolos docebat {dicebat FrMz[629]}, ut legitur Matthaei {*Marci Mz[630]} 4. Si ergo prophetae et viri illuminatissimi plurium quae viderunt non poterant nisi per novam revelationem novum {*verum Fr?Mz[631]} et {*ac FrMz[632]} primum accipere intellectum, multo magis alii aenigmaticarum visionum non possent {posset FrMz[633]} ad verum et primum intellectum pertingere nisi reveletur alicui {?aliter Mz[634]} qui aliis manifestet eundem. Cum igitur in scripturis divinis quamplures visiones et parabolae aenigmaticae et obscurae -- imo obscuriores quam sint quaedam per revelationem {*revelationes FrMz[635]} expositae -- {*que adhuc nequaquam sunt expositae add. FrMz[636]} habeantur, sequitur quod plura in scripturis divinis habentur ad quorum verum et primum intellectum nemo valeat {*valet FrMz[637]} absque revelatione pertingere.	From these and very many other [examples] we clearly gather, it seems, that many things were revealed to prophets, to most enlightened men, and to those learned in all divine and human wisdom, which they did not understand until they were taught by revelation. And thus many visions were often shown to prophets the interpretation of which was revealed later, as in Jeremiah 1 and 13, Ezechiel 17, Isaiah 5 and very many other places. In the same was Christ too taught the apostles about the parables which he spoke to the crowds, as we read in Mark 4. If prophets and most enlightened men, therefore, could receive a true and primary understanding of many things that they saw only through a new revelation, so much more would others be unable to attain a true and primary understanding of enigmatic visions unless it is revealed to someone who shows it clearly to others. Since, therefore, there are found in the divine scriptures very many enigmatic and obscure visions and parables which have not yet been explained -- more obscure indeed than some that have been explained by revelations -- it follows that there are many things found in the divine scriptures of which no one can obtain a true and primary understanding without revelation.
Amplius, sensus verus et primus orationis habentis {*plures add. FrMz[638]} sensus catholicos quam ad quemlibet illorum potest quilibet trahere sicut vult {voluit Mz[639]} haberi non potest nisi indicaverit ille qui protulit eam, quia, ex quo trahi potest ad diversos sensus maxime vocis, non potest sciri quem illorum intenderet {intenderit Fr[640]} proferens nisi ipse exprimat, praesertim si non potest elici aliquis sensus nec ex verbis antecedentibus nec consequentibus proferentis verba {*om. FrMz[641]}. Multa autem verba plurium visionum et parabolarum et aenigmaticarum locutionum in sacris literis conscriptarum {scripturarum Fr[642]} habere possunt diversos sensus catholicos, ad quorum quemlibet potest quilibet prout voluerit {voluit Mz[643]} trahere ea. Unde et diversi sancti talia verba quamplura diversimode exponunt {exponuntur FrMz[644]}. Alii etiam absque omni periculo eadem verba aliter quam sancti {?facti Fr[645]} ad diversos sensus traxerunt, et adhuc alii ad alios trahent. Quod etiam patet ex hoc quod secundum beatum Clementem, ut habetur 27 {*37 Zn[646]} dist. c. Relatum, "... multa verba {vera Fr[647]} sunt in scripturis divinis quae possunt trahi ad eum sensum quem sibi unusquisque {unusquique Pz[648]} elegerit {sponte presumit Zn[649]}." Ergo multo magis possunt trahi ad diversos sensus catholicos. Ex quo concluditur quod de ipsis verus et primus intellectus Dei revelantis absque nova revelatione sciri {*haberi FrMz[650]} non potest.	Further, if a phrase has several catholic senses, to any of which anyone can draw the phrase just as he wishes, its true and primary sense can not be had unless the speaker makes it known. For from the fact that it can be drawn to different senses, especially verbal [I don't know what "especially verbal" means], it is not possible to know which of them the speaker intended unless he himself expresses it, especially if it is not possible to draw out some sense either from the preceding or from the following words of the speaker. Many words in many visions, parables and enigmatic phrases written in sacred literature, however, can have different catholic senses, to any of which anyone can draw them just as he wishes And thus different saints expound many such words in different ways, and some other people have without any danger drawn the same words to different senses than the saints did and still others will [in future] draw them to other [senses]. This is also clear from the fact that, according to the blessed Clement, as found in dist. 37, c. Relatum [c.14, col.139], "There are many words in the divine scriptures that can be drawn to the sense that anyone chooses for himself." It is much more the case, therefore, [non sequitur!] that they can be drawn to different catholic senses. We conclude from this that God's true and primary meaning when he revealed them can not be had without a new revelation
Amplius, multa sunt in scripturis divinis quae mystice solummodo debent intelligi, sicut docet Gregorius in Moralibus in diversis locis, imo secundum eundem plura si intelligerentur literaliter generarent errorem. Sensus autem mysticus qui potest accipi ex verbis divinis virtute ingenii humani absque revelatione speciali non est ita approbandus a catholicis ut coaequetur illis quae habentur in biblia vel recipiantur {*recipiatur FrMz[651]} ad aliquid in fide catholica confirmandum nisi alibi in scripturis divinis habeatur {habetur Fr[652]} expresse, quod Augustinus etiam Hieronymus et Gregorius sentire {om. Fr[653]} videntur. Nam secundum Augustinum, ut habetur dist. 9. in diversis capitulis, scriptura divina est literis et expositionibus omnium episcoporum et aliorum praeponenda ita ut solis scriptoribus bibliae deferendus sit hic timor et honor ut non credantur {*credentur FrMz[654]} errare in aliquo. Qualis honor et timor nulli deferendus est post ipsos. Secundum Hieronimum etiam in prologo {pro add. Fr[655]} in libris proverbiorum et {8 FrMz[656]} {c. LmPz[657]} Gregorium {gregorius LmPz[658]} in Moralibus, liber Iudith, Tobiae et Machabaeorum {*ac add. FrLmMzPz[659]} Ecclesiasticus atque liber Sapientiae non sunt recipiendi ad confirmandum aliquid in fide. Dicit enim Hieronymus, sicut Gregorius: "{*Sicut add. P.L.} Iudith et {om. Fr[660]} Tobiae et Machabaeorum libros legit {leget LmPz[661]} quidem eos {*om. Zn[662]} ecclesia, sed inter canonicas scripturas non recepit, sic et haec duo volumina", scilicet Ecclesiastici {ecclesiasticus Fr[663]} et Sapientiae, "legit ad aedificationem plebis, non ad auctoritatem ecclesiasticorum dogmatum confirmandam {confirmanda FrMz[664]}." Sed expositiones episcoporum et aliorum qui fuerunt post {prae FrMz[665]} scriptores canonicarum scripturarum non sunt maioris auctoritatis quam libri praedicti. Igitur {*ergo FrMz[666]} sensus quicunque quem colligunt ex scripturis divinis, nisi alibi habeatur ex scripturis divinis, non est cum illa reverentia suscipiendus ut debeat {ut debeat: om. FrMz[667]} allegari ad confirmandum aliquid in catholica fide. Sensus autem verus et primus cuiuscunque revelati a Deo in scripturis valet ad auctoritatem ecclesiasticorum dogmatum confirmandum {*confirmandam LmPz[668]}. Ergo multorum in scripturis divinis sensus verus et primus absque revelatione divina haberi non potest.	Further, there are many things in the divine scriptures which should only be understood mystically, as Gregory teaches in various places in his Moralia [PL 75, col. 513; cf. col. 772]; indeed according to him there are many things which would generate error if they were understood literally. A mystical sense which can be taken from divine words by power of human wit without a special revelation, however, should not be so approved by catholics that it is placed on the same level as those things which are found in the bible, or taken to confirm something in the catholic faith, unless it is expressly found somewhere else in the divine scriptures, as Augustine, Jerome and Gregory also seem to think. For according to Augustine, as found in various chapters [[esp. chs. 5 and 8]] of dist. 9, divine scripture is to be preferred to the letters and expositions of all bishops and other men, so that such fear and esteem that they are not believed to err in any matter should be offered only to the writers of the bible. This kind of fear and esteem should be offered to no one after them. According to Jerome in his Prologue to the book of Proverbs and Gregory in the Moralia [Nothing found in Gregory], the books of Judith, Tobias, Maccabees, Ecclesiasticus and Wisdom should not be taken to confirm anything in the faith. Like Gregory, Jerome [[PL.28, col.1308]] says, "Just as the church does indeed read the books of Judith, Tobias and Maccabees but does not accept them among the canonical scriptures, likewise it also reads these two volumes", that is of Ecclesiasticus and Wisdom, "to edify the people but not to confirm the authority of the teachings of the church." But the expositions of bishops and others who lived after the writers of the canonical scriptures are not of greater authority than the aforesaid books. Therefore any sense which they infer from the divine scriptures, unless it is found elsewhere in the divine scriptures, should not be received with such reverence that it should be adduced to confirm something in the catholic faith. The true and primary sense of anything revealed by God in the scriptures, however, is valid for the confirmation of the authority of the teachings of the church. The true and primary sense of many things in the divine scriptures, therefore, can not be had without divine revelation.
Adhuc, non magis virtute ingenii humani potest haberi sensus verus et primus aliquorum mysticorum divinorum quam parabolarum humanarum. Sed multarum parabolarum et locutionum mysticarum seu aenigmaticarum {aenigmaticus Mz[669]} humanarum primus sensus proferentis virtute ingenii humani {om. Fr[671]} saepe haberi non potest nisi proferens manifestet. Quomodo enim uxor Samsonis, quamvis subtilissima extitisset, pervenisset ad sensum primum sui problematis, nisi forte a casu, quando dixit, "De comedente exivit cibus, et de forti egressa est dulcedo", nisi ipse revelasset {revellassat Pz[672]} eidem {om. Fr[673]}. Ita enim potest per "comedentem" et etiam {*per add. FrMz[674]} "fortem" significari ursus {visus Mz[675]} vel elephas aut draco vel cete maris aut alia bestia fortior leone (vel minus fortis), sicut leo. Per "cibum" etiam et per "dulcedinem" non solum mel sed etiam {*om. FrMz[676]} aliae res dulces comestibiles significari possunt. Alia etiam res per "comedentem" et {*alia per add. FrMz[677]} "fortem" et rursus alia res per "cibum" et alia per "dulcedinem" convenienter significari potest. Cum igitur, ut testatur Apostolus, 1. Corinth. 2 {1 FrMz[678]}:[11], nemo sciat "hominum quae sunt hominis nisi spiritus hominis qui in ipso est", nullo modo uxor Samsonis virtute humani ingenii, quantumcunque fuisset instructa, scivisset quod Samson intelligebat per "comedentem" et "fortem" leonem et per "cibum" atque "dulcedinem" mel, nisi ipse sibi dixisset. Ergo multo fortius verus et primus intellectus visionum et revelationum divinarum haberi non potest virtute humani ingenii, quia, sicut dicit Apostolus, 1. Cor. 2:[11], "Quae Dei sunt nemo cognovit nisi spiritus Dei."	Further, a true and primary sense of any divine mysteries can not any more be had by power of human wit than can be had of human parables. But the utterer's true sense of many human parables and mystical or enigmatic sayings can not often be had by power of human wit unless the one uttering them shows it clearly. For how would Samson's wife, even if she had been very subtle, have arrived (except perhaps by chance) at the primary sense of his riddle when he said, "Out of the eater came food, and out of the strong came something sweet", if he had not revealed it to her. For by "eater" and also by "the strong", a bear or an elephant or a serpent or a whale or some other beast stronger than a lion (or less strong) can be designated, as much as a lion. Also by "food" and by "something sweet", not only honey but other sweet eatables can be signified. Also, "eater" and "the strong" can suitably signify two different things, and again "food" and "something sweet" can signify different things. Since, therefore, as the Apostle testifies in 1 Cor.2:11, no one knows "what is in a man except the spirit of the man that is within him", however well taught Samson's wife had been, she would in no way have known by power of human wit that by "eater" and "the strong" Samson meant a lion and that by "food" and "something sweet" he meant honey, if he had not told her. A fortiori, a true and primary understanding of divine visions and revelations, therefore, can not be had by power of human wit, because, as the Apostle says in 1 Cor.2:11, "No one comprehends what is God's except the spirit of God."
Praeterea, primus intellectus minus obscuri {obscurus Fr[679]} non potest haberi virtute ingenii humani; ergo multo fortius primus intellectus illorum quae sunt magis obscura virtute humani ingenii haberi non potest. Consequentia videtur probatione minime indigere. Antecedens videtur posse probari auctoritate beati Gregorii secundum quem, ut videtur, primus intellectus quem habuit Christus in parabola seminantis, quae est minus obscura et minus aenigmatica quam multae visiones et revelationes quae non sunt expositae per revelationem in scripturis, virtute ingenii humani haberi non potuit. Dicit enim {etiam Fr[680]} super parabolam illam, "Quis mihi unquam crederet si 'spinas' divitias interpretari voluissem?", quasi diceret nullus. Et tamen absque illa interpretatione primus intellectus parabolae haberi non potuit, quia Christus exponendo praedictam parabolam sic interpretatus est. Ergo primus intellectus aliarum parabolarum, visionum et revelationum quae per Deum revelantem non sunt expositae virtute humani ingenii haberi non potest.	Further, the primary understanding of something less obscure can not be had by power of human wit; a fortiori, therefore, the primary understanding of those things that are more obscure can not be had by power of human wit. The validity of the inference does not seem to need proof. The premise seems provable from a text of blessed Gregory, according to whom, it seems, the primary understanding which Christ had of the parable of the sower, which is less obscure and enigmatic than many visions and revelations which have not been made clear by revelation in the Scriptures, could not be had by power of human wit. For he says about that parable, "Who would ever believe me if I had wanted 'thorns' to be interpreted as wealth?", as if to say, no one. And yet the primary understanding of that parable could not be had without that interpretation because Christ interpreted it in that way when expounding it. The primary understanding, therefore, of other parables, visions and revelations which have not been made clear by God's revealing them can not be had by power of human wit.
CAP. XVII Discipulus Deduxisti ratiocinationes {rationes Fr[681]} {rationationes Lm[682]} fundatas in scripturis ad probandum conclusionem praedictam. Nunc ipsam per auctoritates nitere confirmare.	Chapter 17 Student You have elaborated reasonings based on the scriptures to prove the above conclusion. Now try to confirm it through texts.
Magister Nonnullis apparet quod auctoritatibus tam scripturarum canonicarum quam aliarum potest ostendi, de quibus adducam paucas. Haec enim videtur Daniel dixisse c. 12 {1 et Fr[683]}:[4] ubi sic legitur, "Tu autem Daniel sermonem {*sermones Vg[684]} claude {*trs. FrMzVg[685]} et signa librum usque ad tempus statutum." Ex quibus verbis potest intelligi {*colligi FrMz[686]}, ut videtur, quod quidam sermones revelati Danieli ita sunt clausi ut nemo possit absque revelatione ad primum eorum intellectum pertingere.	Master It is clear to some people that this can be shown by texts from the canonical scriptures as well as from other writings. I will bring forward a few. For Daniel seems to have said as much in his twelfth chapter, where we read, "But you, Daniel, keep the words secret and the book sealed until the appointed time" (Dan. 12:4). It seems that we can gather from these words that some words revealed to Daniel have been kept so secret that no one can obtain the primary understanding of them without revelation.
Item, ut legitur Act. 8:[30-1], dixit Philippus eunucho legenti Ysaiam prophetam, "'Putasne intelligis {intelliges FrMz[687]} quae legis?' Qui ait, 'Quomodo possum si non aliquis ostenderit mihi?'", quasi diceret nullo modo. Ex quibus verbis habetur quod ex verbis {*illis add. FrMz[688]} scripturae quae legit eunuchus non potest aliquis primum intellectum ipsorum colligere nisi ab alio doceatur. Ergo ratione consimili aliorum quae aeque vel magis obscura sunt non potest primus intellectus haberi nisi revelatus appareat {aperiat Fr[689]}.	Again, as we read in Acts 8:30-1, Phillip said to the eunuch who was reading the prophet Isaiah, "'Do you think that you understand what you are reading?' He replied, 'How can I unless someone guides me?'" as though to say "in no way". We conclude from these words that no one, unless he is taught by someone else, can acquire the primary understanding of those words of scripture which the eunuch was reading. By similar reasoning, therefore, the primary understanding of other things which are as obscure or more obscure can not be had unless it is clear by revelation.
Item, psalmista [119:34] ait, {om. Fr[690]} "Da mihi intellectum" etc, quasi diceret, ad primum intellectum multorum legis tuae scrutando provenire {*pervenire FrLmMzPz[691]} non potero nisi tu reveles. Ideo da mihi intellectum primum eorum {*illorum FrLmMzPz[692]}. Plura enim sunt in lege antiqua statuta quorum nulla ratio potest per hominem assignari quare praecepit illa Deus filius {*filiis FrLmMzPz[693]} Israel, sicut illa [Deut.22:10-1] "Non arabis in bove {*simul add. Vg[694]} et asino. Non indueris vestimento quod ex lana linoque contextum est", etc {*et similia FrMz[695]}. Et per consequens primus {primum Mz[696]} intellectus talium contentorum in lege absque revelatione haberi non potest. Hinc Hieronymus in prologo Bibliae ait ca. 7, "Quis enim digne exprimit tria et {*aut FrZn[697]} quatuor scelera Damasci, Gazae et Tyri {tiro Mz[698]} et Idumeae?" {idumeo Mz[699]} etc. Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod prophetia Amos prophetae digne explicari non potest nisi per revelationem divinam. Hoc etiam beatus Gregorius super Ezechielem omelia 15 videtur asserere dicens, "Scriptura sacra tota quidem propter vos {*nos FrMzZn[700]} scripta est, sed non tota intelligitur a vobis {*nobis FrMz[701]}. Multa quippe in illa ita aperte scripta sunt ut pascant parvulos, quaedam vero obscurioribus sententiis ut exerceant fortes, quatenus cum labore intellecta plus grata sint {sunt Fr[702]}. Nonnulla autem ita in ea clausa sunt ut dum {*non add. FrMz[703]} intelligimus agnoscentes {agnoscentis FrLmMzPz[704]} infirma nostrae cecitatis ad humilitatem magis quam intelligentiam proficiamus." Ex quibus verbis habetur {*aperte add. FrLmMzPz[705]} quod aliqua sunt in scripturis sacris quae intelligere non valemus. Loquitur enim beatus Gregorius in persona omnium {omniumque FrMz[706]} viatorum et fortium qui obscuriores noverunt {venerunt Fr[707]} {noverint Lm[708]} elucidare sententias. Constat quod per revelationem quaeque {*quaecumque FrMz[709]} scripta sunt possunt intelligi et eorum potest primus intellectus haberi. Idem etiam Gregorius pro se et pro {om. Fr[710]} {et pro: in LmMzPz[711]} omnibus aliis catholicis 3 libro Moralium c. 17 {7 FrMz[712]} loquens de amicis Iob ait, "Utrum continuis septem diebus et septem noctibus cum afflicto Iob sederint, an certe diebus septem {om. Zn[713]} et noctibus totidem instantia ei crebrae visitationis adhaererent {adhaeserint Zn[714]} ignoramus. Saepe enim rem quamlibet tot diebus agere dicimur quamvis {*non add. FrLmMzPzZn[715]} eisdem diebus ad eam continue non {*om. FrLmMzPzZn[716]} vacemus. Saepe vero scriptura sacra sic totum pro parte sicut pro toto partem ponere consuevit." Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod cum scriptor libri Iob determinate intendit {*intenderit FrLmMzPz[717]} loqui de septem diebus et septem {om. Mz[718]} noctibus continuis vel non continuis, quia de his vel {nichil Mz[719]} de illis scriptura illa fuerit vera et non de utrisque {utriusque LmPz[720]}, sequitur quod nos ad primum intellectum verborum illorum determinate {determinante Fr[721]} non possumus pervenire {provenire LmPz[722]}.	Also, the psalmist says (119:34), "Give me understanding" etc, as though to say, "Unless you reveal it, I will not be able to arrive at the primary understanding of many things in your law by examination. Give me, therefore, the primary understanding of those things." For there are many things decreed in the old law for which no reason can be given by a man why God commanded them to the children of Israel, such as (Deut.22:10-1), "You shall not plough with an ox and a donkey together. You shall not wear clothes made of wool and linen woven together", and similar things. And consequently the primary understanding of such things contained in the law can not be had without revelation. Hence, in chapter seven of his Prologue to the bible, Jerome says, "For who expresses appropriately the three or four transgressions of Damascus, Gaza, Tyre and Edom?" etc. We gather from these words that the prophecy of the prophet Amos can only be explained appropriately by divine revelation. Blessed Gregory in his fifteenth homily on Ezechiel seems to assert this too when he says, "The whole of sacred scripture was indeed written for our sake, but not all of it is understood by us. To be sure many things in it have been written so clearly that they feed children, some in more obscure statements to exercise the vigorous, since things understood with effort are more pleasing. Some things in it, however, are so concealed that while we do not understand them, knowing the infirmities of our blindness, we make progress more in humility than in intelligence." We clearly conclude from these words that there are some things in the sacred scriptures which we can not understand. For blessed Gregory is speaking in the person of all pilgrims and of the vigorous who know how to cast light on more obscure sentences. It is certain that by revelation whatever has been written can be understood and the primary understanding of it can be had. Speaking about the friends of Job in chapter 17 of book 3 of his Moralia [[PL 75, col. 610]], the same Gregory says on his own behalf and on behalf of all other catholics, "Whether they sat continuously for seven days and seven nights with the afflicted Job, or indeed for seven days and same number of nights were devoted to him in the perseverance of their constant visiting, we do not know. For often we are said to do something for so many days even if we are not continually occupied in it for that many days. Indeed sacred scripture has often been accustomed in this way to put the whole for the part and the part for the whole." We gather from these words that since the writer of Job intended to speak specifically of seven days and nights that were either continuous or not continuous, because that scripture is true of one or the other but not of both, it follows that we can not arrive definitely at the primary understanding of those words.
CAP. XVIII Discipulus Nolo plures allegationes audire pro assertione praescripta, sed cupio scire quomodo respondetur ad allegationes in contrarium superius cap. 15 inductas. Ideo narra aliquas responsiones ad ipsas.	Chapter 18 Student I do not want to hear further arguments for the afore-mentioned assertion, but I do want to know how one can reply to the arguments to the contrary brought forward in chapter 15 above. Would you, therefore, relate some replies to them.
Magister Ad primam, quae consistit in hoc, quod talia essent superflue posita in scripturis divinis si primus intellectus ipsorum antequam essent impleta absque revelatione divina haberi non posset, respondetur quod non superflue posita sunt, quia scripta sunt ad exercitationem, quia in talibus verbis multiplices latent sensus praeter primum sensum revelantis, quos dum illi qui in exponendis scripturis divinis allegorice {*?et add.[723]} tropologice {*delectant add. FrLmMzPz[724]} ex huiusmodi aenigmatice revelatis eliciunt, utiliter occupantur, quemadmodum beatus Gregorius in Moralibus sibi profecit et aliis verba beati Iob diversimode exponendo; et tamen ad illum intellectum quem habuit Iob in pluribus verbis absque revelatione, nisi forte a casu, non potuit pervenire. Verba enim plura Iob modis innumeris a beato Gregorio et aliis poterant exponi, quibus tamen modis beatus Gregorius ipsa nequaquam exposuit. Et ita verba Iob plures sensus possunt habere praeter illum quem habuit {*Job add. FrLmMzPz[725]}. Quis ergo scit quod {*si Fr[726]} beatus Gregorius sensit {*sensum Fr[727]} quod {quam LmMzPz[728]} {*quem Fr[729]} actualiter in mente Iob habuit in proferendo verba illa expresse {*expressit FrMz[730]}. Non videtur quod ipsemet {*beatus add. FrMz[731]} Gregorius hoc scivit. Et ideo forte aliquando beatus Gregorius ad illum sensum quem {quam Mz[732]} actualiter Iob intendebat verba Iob exposuit et tamen {om. Fr[733]} ipse hoc nescivit. Sic etiam verba Iohannis in Apocalipsi et aliorum prophetarum multos sensus possunt habere, teste {*beato add. FrLmMzPz[734]} Hieronymo qui in prologo Bibliae ita {*om. FrLmMzPz[735]} ait, "In verbis singulis", scilicet Apocalipsis, "multiplices latent intelligentiae". Sed quem intellectum habuit beatus Iohannes {in eis add. FrMz[736]} vel Christus revelans hoc nullus exponens Apocalipsim certitudinaliter scivit {*scit FrMz[737]} {om. LmPz[738]} nisi cui Deus revelavit.	Master To the first, which consists in this, that such things would have been put in the divine scriptures unnecessarily if, before they were fulfilled, the primary understanding of them could not be had without divine revelation, the reply is that they have not been put in unnecessarily because they have been written for exercise, in that numerous senses besides the primary sense of the person revealing it lie hidden in such words. While those who delight in expounding the divine scriptures allegorically and tropologically draw these [senses] out of things revealed thus enigmatically, they are being usefully occupied, just as blessed Gregory profited himself and others by expounding the words of Job in different ways in his Moralia; and yet, unless perhaps by chance, without revelation he could not have arrived at the understanding Job had of many words. For many words of Job were able to be expounded by blessed Gregory and others in countless ways, yet blessed Gregory did not expound them in those ways. And so Job's words can have more senses than the sense that Job himself had. Who knows, therefore, whether blessed Gregory expressed the sense which Job actually had in mind in uttering those words? It does not seem that blessed Gregory himself knew this. And perhaps, therefore, blessed Gregory did sometimes expound the words of Job according to that sense which Job himself actually intended, yet without knowing this himself. So too the words of John in Apocalypse and of other prophets can have many senses, as blessed Jerome attests when he says in his Prologue to the Bible, "In each of the words", that is, in Apocalypse, "numerous understandings lie hidden" [PL 28, col. 177]. But, unless God has revealed it to him, no one expounding Apocalypse knows with certainty what understanding blessed John had or Christ had in making this revelation.
Discipulus Contra istud obiici potest, quia verba scripturae divinae eodem spiritu, scilicet Spiritu Sancto, exposita sunt quo {que FrMz[739]} sunt scripta. Ergo eundem sensum quem habuit revelans habuerunt et exponentes, quare exponentes verba divinae scripturae ad primum intellectum ipsorum pervenerunt.	Student Against that it can be objected that the words of divine scripture have been expounded by the same spirit, that is the Holy Spirit, by which they were written [cf. above]. Those expounding it, therefore, have had the same sense which the one revealing it had. For this reason those expounding the words of divine scripture have arrived at the primary understanding of them.
Amplius, omnes sensus catholici eorundem verborum sunt aeque primi, quia non est ratio quod unus sit primus magis quam alius. Scilicet {*Sed FrLmMzPz[740]} omnes sensus secundum quos beatus Gregorius exposuit verba quaeque Iob sunt catholici. Ergo quilibet eorum est aeque primus. Et ita beatus Gregorius pervenit ad primum intellectum omnium verborum Iob. Et consimili {simili Fr[741]} ratione alii sancti exponentes Apocalipsim et alias prophetias atque quaeque obscura scripturae divinae ad primum intellectum pervenerunt.	Further, all catholic senses of the same words are equally primary, because there is no reason that one is more primary than another. But all the senses according to which blessed Gregory expounded every word of Job are catholic. Anyone of them at all, therefore, is equally primary. And so Blessed Gregory arrived at a primary understanding of all the words of Job. And, by similar reasoning, other saints expounding Apocalypse and other prophecies and whatever is obscure in divine scripture arrived at a primary understanding [of them].
Magister Ad primum istorum respondetur quod {?quid Fr[742]} quia {trs. FrMz[743]} omne verbum est a Spiritu Sancto et "omnis sapientia a domino Deo est", ut legitur Eccles. 1:[1], ideo scripturae divinae, quando non erronee exponuntur, {*aliquo modo eodem spiritu exponuntur add. FrLmMzPz[744]} quo sunt traditae, sed {*tamen ??; tum FrLmMzPz[745]} quia {quando ?firmiter add. Mz[746]} {*quando fuerunt FrLmPz[747]} traditae, a solo Deo fuerunt, et nequaquam virtute ingenii humani inventae sunt {*fuerunt FrMz[748]}. Expositiones autem non erroneae sanctorum saltem saepe virtute ingenii humani assistente divina influentia {affluentia FrMz[749]} generali ex scripturis et ratione infallibili fuerunt inventae {om. FrMz[750]}. Ideo non omnino {cum FrMz[751]} eodem modo verba scripturae divinae eodem Spiritu Sancto sunt scripta et a viris sanctis exposita. Propter quod expositiones sanctorum non sunt tantae auctoritatis quantae sunt illa quae scripta sunt in {iure et add. Fr[752]} scripturis canonicis.	Master The reply to the first of these is that because every word is from the Holy Spirit and "all wisdom is from the Lord God", as we read in Ecclesiasticus 1:1, then, when the divine scriptures are not erroneously expounded, they are expounded in some way by the same Spirit as that by which they were handed down. Yet when they were handed down they were from God alone, and were not invented by force of human wit. But expositions of the saints which are not erroneous have been, often at least, invented by force of human wit, from the scriptures and by infallible argument, with the general assistance of the divine influence. Therefore the words of divine scripture were written by the Holy Spirit and expounded by holy men by the same Holy Spirit, but not in altogether the same way. For this reason the expositions of the saints are not of such great authority as things written in the canonical scriptures.
Si tamen expositiones huiusmodi {*etiam add. FrMz[753]} per certitudinem {*primum add. FrMz[754]} exprimerent intellectum verborum scripturae divinae eiusdem essent auctoritatis, non quia ab expositoribus sunt simpliciter {*om. FrMz[755]} expressae sed quia in canone Bibliae reperiuntur.	If, however, such expositions also were to express with certainty the primary understanding of the words of divine scripture, they would be of the same authority -- not because they have been expressed by those expositors but because they are found in the canon of the bible.
Sic etiam si plures, puta 10 vel 20, magistri {vel add. Fr[756]} lectores vel praedicatores verbi divini {*dei FrMz[757]} aut alii his temporibus sacras literas exponentes, eandem auctoritatem aenigmaticam et obscuram in Apocalipsi {scriptura add. Fr[758]} vel prophetia {prophetica Fr[759]} alia scriptam secundum diversum [[secundum diversum: cf. in diversum, Oxford Latin Dictionary, "diversus", 4b; cf. Seneca, De ira, III.21.3, Livy XXXVI.x.7]] exponerent {exponent LmPz[760]} intellectum non erroneum sed verum et sanum, posset aliquo modo concedi quod quilibet istorum eodem spiritu eandem auctoritatem exponerent {*exponeret FrLmMzPz[761]}, quia omnis {enim add. FrMz[762]} sensus verus et sanus est a Spiritu Sancto, a quo inspirati locuti sunt scriptores literarum sanctarum {gap in text Mz[763]}; {*non tamen ??} eodem modo esset quaelibet expositionum huiusmodi a Spiritu Sancto quo modo {*om. FrLmMzPz[764]} ab ipso scripturae divinae sunt traditae.	So also if many, say 10 or 20, masters, lectors or preachers of the word of God, or others expounding sacred literature in these times, were to expound the same enigmatic and obscure text written in Apocalypse or another prophecy according to a [variety of] different understanding[s], not erroneous but true and sound, it could be granted in some way that each of them would be expounding that text by the same Spirit [as that by which it was written], because every true and sound sense is from the Holy Spirit, who inspired the writers of sacred literature; however, each of these expositions would not be from the Holy Spirit in the same way as the divine scriptures were handed down by Him.
Si {sed Lm[765]} etiam quilibet sensuum praedictorum inveniretur sententialiter in Biblia, quamvis unus eorum in uno loco et alius in alio, quilibet eorum esset {essent Lm[766]} tantae auctoritatis quantae sunt alia quae scripta sunt in Biblia, non quia ab {om. FrLmMzPz[767]} aliquo istorum exprimitur sed quia sententialiter in Biblia reperitur. Et tamen non omnis imo forte nullus talium sensuum esset primus intellectus et verus illius textus {sensus FrLmMzPz[768]} quem tales exponentes exponerent.	Also if any of those senses were found implicitly in the bible, even if one of them was in one place and another in another, each of them would be as authoritative as other things written in the Bible, not because it is expressed by any of them [i.e., expositors] but because it is found implicitly in the bible. Not every such sense, however, indeed perhaps none of them, would be the primary and true understanding of that text which such expositors were expounding.
Si autem nullus istorum reperiretur sententialiter, nec implicite nec explicite, in canone Bibliae tamen quilibet illorum esset verus et {om. FrLmMzPz[769]} sanus purus {et primus add. LmMzPz[771]} {et purus et primus add. Fr[772]} [[omitting primus, against Mz Fr Pz and with Ly]]. Certum esset quod nullus esset primus sensus auctoritatis expositae a quolibet istorum vel saltem {*om. FrLmMzPz[773]} hoc non constaret, et tamen quilibet illorum esset aliquo modo a Spiritu Sancto, cum omnis doctrina sana et quae secundum pietatem est sic aliquo modo a Spiritu Sancto.	If, however, none of them [those true and sound senses] was found in its substance, neither implicitly nor explicitly, in the canon of the Bible, each of them, nevertheless, would be [ex hypothesi] true, sound and pure. Certainly none would be the primary sense of the text expounded by any of them, or it would not be certain that it was, and yet each would in some way be from the Holy Spirit, since every sound doctrine in accord with piety is in some way from the Holy Spirit. [[The text of this answer to the first objection is suspect at various points.]]
Ad secundum dicitur quod primus intellectus verborum scripturae divinae, quantum ad illa quae a solo Deo revelata fuerunt, est ille propter quem fuerunt principaliter revelata, sicut illorum verborum quae angelus dixit Danieli vel beato Iohanni vel aliis prophetis, et quae etiam in prophetiis inspirata fuerunt, et {om. FrLmMzPz[774]} quae Christus dixit discipulis suis, primus sensus est ille propter quem inspirata vel prolata fuerunt. Unde primus sensus parabolarum Christi est ille quem Christus postea discipulis suis expressit, quia propter illum principaliter protulit eas, et tamen multos alios sensus possunt habere.	To the second, it is said that the primary understanding of the words of divine scripture, with respect to those matters that have been revealed by God alone, is that [understanding] for the sake of which they were principally revealed, just as the primary sense of those words which the angel said to Daniel or to blessed John or to other prophets, and also those which were inspired in the prophecies, and which Christ said to the disciples, is that [sense] on account of which they were inspired or uttered. Thus the primary sense of the parables of Christ is that which Christ afterwards expressed to his disciples, because he uttered them chiefly on that account; and yet they can have many other senses.
Quantum autem ad illa verba scripturae divinae quae homines sive boni sive mali dixerunt, primus intellectus est ille quem in mente habuit ille qui protulit, sicut primus intellectus probleumatis Samsonis fuit ille quem actualiter cogitavit. Quod tamen probleuma sub eisdem verbis potuisset, et adhuc posset, alius proponere et alium intellectum habere. Qui intellectus esset primus intellectus eiusdem proferentis, et ita alius esset intellectus probleumatis Samsonis, in quantum prolatum fuit ab ipso, et alius esset intellectus eorundem verborum si alius eadem verba sub alio intellectu proferret, quemadmodum istorum verborum non variatorum, "Rex praecepit {*praecipit Fr?Mz[775]} fures suspendi". Alius communiter est intellectus primus eorum qui proferunt ea in Francia et illorum {eorum Fr[776]} qui proferunt ea vel scribunt in Anglia et illorum qui proferunt ipsa in Castella, quia Franci communiter intelligerent {*intelligunt FrMz[777]} {intellexerunt LmPz[778]} ipsa de rege Franciae, Anglici de rege Angliae, et alii de rege Castellae, et audientes ipsa in diversis regnis diversum ex eis capiunt intellectum. Si autem eadem verba proferuntur in civitate vel patria quae secundum veritatem vel secundum opinionem hominum nulli regi est subiecta, audiens ipsa ex ipsis verbis praecise ad primum intellectum proferentis pervenire non posset, quia non posset scire an intelligeret de rege Castellae ve avo {*ve avo: vel alio FrLmMzPz[779]}, propter hoc quod ista verba proferens potest intelligere de uno rege vel {rege vel: et Fr[780]} de alio secundum quod {*sue add. FrLmMzPz[781]} fuerit placitum voluntati. Cuius voluntas {est add. Fr[782]} ab alio sciri non potest nisi Deus vel ipsemet sibi {om. Fr[783]} voluerit revelari {*revelare FrLmMzPz[784]}. Et si duo vel plures proferant verba {ista add. Fr[785]} praedicta et de diversis regibus ipsa intelligant alius erit intellectus primus istorum verborum inquantum proferuntur ab uno et inquantum proferuntur ab alio.	With respect to those words of divine scripture, however, which men, either good or bad, have uttered, the primary understanding is that which he who uttered it had in mind, just as the primary understanding of Samson's puzzle was that which he actually had in mind. Someone else, however, could have, and still could, set forth this puzzle in the same words and have another understanding [of it]. This understanding would be the primary understanding of the one uttering it, and so there would be another understanding of Samson's puzzle, in as much as it was uttered by that person, and there would be another understanding of the same words if someone else were to utter the same words under another understanding, just as there is of the unchanging words, "The king commands that the thieves be hanged". Commonly there is one primary understanding of those who utter them in France, another of those who utter or write them in England, another of those who utter them in Castille, because the French commonly mean them of the king of France, the English of the king of England, and the others of the king of Castille, and those who hear them in different kingdoms take a different understanding from them. If the same words are uttered, however, in a city or country which, in truth or in the opinion of men, was not subject to any king, the one hearing them could not from the words themselves alone arrive at the primary understanding of the one uttering them, because he could not know whether he was referring to the king of Castille or some other, because the speaker of those words can refer to one king or another according as it pleases his will. This will can not be known by anyone else unless God or he himself wishes to reveal it to that other person. And if two or more people utter those words and mean them of different kings, the primary meanings of those words as they are uttered by one and by the other will be different.
CAP. XIX Discipulus Adhuc dupliciter obiiciam contra praedicta {praedictam LmPz[786]}. Non enim videtur bene dictum quod beatus Gregorius non pervenerit ad primum intellectum verborum beati Iob, quia de multis verbis Iob quae non debent {dicunt Fr[787]} ad literam sed mystice duntaxat intelligi, sicut de illis, "Pereat dies in qua natus sum", et de multis aliis, asserit manifeste quod Iob ipsa {ea Fr[788]} intellexit sicut ipse exponit. Quod non fecisset nisi scivisset illum fuisse primum intellectum Iob, quia secundum praedicta ille est primus intellectus verborum alicuius quem proferens actu habet in mente.	Chapter 19 Student I will object in two ways again to the foregoing. For it does not seem well said that blessed Gregory did not arrive at the primary understanding of the words of blessed Job, because he clearly asserts of many of the words of Job which should not be understood literally but only mystically (such as, "Let the day perish on which I was born" (Job 3:3), and many others) that Job understood them just as he [Gregory] expounds them. He would not have done this if he had not known that that was Job's primary understanding because, according to the above, the primary understanding of anyone's words is that which the speaker actually has in mind.
Rursus, secundum praedicta multa essent verba in scriptura divina quae -- quamvis legi possint et debeant ad aedificationem plebis, et {in Fr[789]} convertendo ipsa in sensus morales et alios qui absque {*ab Sc} eis ab ingeniosis hominibus accipi valent, quemadmodum fabulae poetarum et aliorum fingentium bruta fuisse locuta et multa tractasse {tracta esse Fr[790]}, atque aliae, utiliter applicari possint {possunt FrLm[791]} ad mores informandos -- tamen ad auctoritatem ecclesiasticorum dogmatum confirmandam et ad roboranda illa quae in contentionem {contentione Fr[792]} veniunt et ad firmandam fidem in re dubia essent nullatenus alleganda, cum primus intellectus ipsorum haberi non possit et alii intellectus eorum authentici minime sint putandi nisi per alias scripturas vel assertiones quae refelli non debeant valeant demonstrari. Cuius tamen contrarium sanctos patres fecisse cognovimus. Augustinus enim ad Bonifatium ut {et FrMz[793]} habetur 23, q. 6, c. Schismatici, per "vias et saepes" schismaticos intelligit {*schismaticos intelligit: om. FrMz[794]}, de huiusmodi {*quibus Sc} loquitur Christus Lucae 14:[23] inter {*intelligit ??} haereses et schismata, volens per eadem verba probare quod haeretici {*et scismatici add. FrMz[795]} intrare ecclesiam sunt cogendi. Et tamen per vias et saepes ita possunt intelligi alia crimina sicut haereses et schismata. Unde et alii criminosi sunt per severitatem ecclesiasticam coercendi. Nec habetur quod Christus ibi per vias et saepes {ibi add. Fr[796]} intellexerit haereses et schismata. Innocentius etiam tertius ut habetur Extra, De maioritate et obedientia, Solitae et alii plures per illa verba dicta {*om. FrMz[797]} Hieremiae 1:[10], "Ecce constitui te hodie super gentes et super {om. Fr[798]} regna", probant quod imperium sacerdotio est subiectum, et tamen quod illa verba Hieremiae 1 de papa respectu imperii debeant intelligi nequaquam revelatum est a Deo.	Again, from the above there would be many words in divine scripture which -- although they can and should be read so as to build up the people, for example by directing them to the moral and other senses which can be taken from them by ingenious men, just as the stories of poets and others who represent brute beasts as having spoken and discussed many things, and other stories, can usefully be applied to the shaping of morals, nevertheless -- should not be brought forward to strengthen the authority of ecclesiastical teachings, to bolster those matters that come into contention and to strengthen the faith in any doubtful matter, since their primary understanding can not be had and other understandings of them should not be thought authentic unless they can be demonstrated from other writings or assertions which should not be rejected. Yet we have learnt that the holy fathers did the opposite of this. For Augustine writing to Boniface, as we read in 23, q. 6, c. Scismatici [c.1, col.947], understands the highways and hedgerows of which Christ speaks in Luke 14:23 to mean heresies and schisms, wanting to prove by these words that heretics and schismatics should be forced to enter the church. And yet by highways and hedgerows other crimes can be understood as well as heresies and schisms; thus also other guilty men should be restrained by ecclesiastical strictness. Nor is it established that Christ by highways and hedgerows there meant heresies and schisms. Also, Innocent III, as we read in Extra, De maioritate et obedientia, c. Solitae [c.6, col.196], and many other [writers] prove through the words of Jeremiah 1:10, "See, today I appoint you over nations and over kingdoms", that the empire is subject to the church, and yet it has not been revealed by God that those words of Jeremiah 1:10 ought to be understood of the pope with respect to the emperor.
Magister Ad primum istorum respondent {respondetur FrMz[799]} quidam dicentes quod quemadmodum literatus quidam in libro quem {om. FrMz[800]} de praestigiis fortunae composuit saepe tali expositione et modo loquendi usus est "contigit", {contingit Lm[801]} id est contingere potuit, "quandoque eveniet", id est si {scilicet Fr[802]} quando evenire contigerit, {contingit Fr[803]} sic {si FrMz[804]} etiam beatus Gregorius cum saepe sententialiter dixit, "Iob dixit intellexit {intelligit Fr[805]} vel dicere voluit" nihil aliud dicere intendebat nisi quod Iob sic intelligere potuit -- sed quod actualiter Iob sic intellexerit non intendebat asserere; et ad hoc designandum sepe tali modo loquendi {*om. FrLmMzPz[806]} utitur beatus Gregorius, "Aliter possunt {*possint FrMz[807]} verba Iob intelligi", per hoc insinuans quod saepe non intendebat asserere cum dixit, "Sic intellexit Iob", quod tunc Iob in mente talem habuit intellectum sed quod talem habere poterat intellectum {sed quod ... intellectum: om Fr[808]}. Sic etiam multi praedicantes et exponentes sacras scripturas de diversis sanctis viris et feminis vel alia determinata materia tali modo loquendo {*loquendi FrLmMzPz[809]} utuntur, "De hoc sancto prophetavit vel locutus est Isaias" vel Ieremias vel alius propheta aut alius scriptor alicuius partis scripturae canonicae, et tamen si recte {ratione Fr[810]} sapiunt non intendunt quia tunc propheta vel alius in mente de tali sancto vel materia loqui volebat sed quod intelligere poterat {poterit Fr[811]} aut quod de tali materia talia verba possunt intelligi. Et ad hoc designandum intelligentes frequenter talibus verbis utuntur, "Talia verba scripturae divinae de hoc vel de hoc possunt exponi".	Master To the first of these some people reply by saying that just as a certain scholar in the book which he composed On the Deceptions of Fortune often used the following discourse and way of speaking: "it happened", that is, it could have happened, "at some time it will result", that is, if ever it happens to result, so also, when (as he often did) blessed Gregory said in substance, "Job said, meant or wanted to say", he was intending to say merely that Job could have meant this; he was not intending to assert that Job actually did mean this. And to indicate this, blessed Gregory often uses this way [of speaking]: "In another way the words of Job can be be understood...", by this insinuating that when he (Gregory) said, "Job meant the following", he was often not intending to assert that at that time Job had such a meaning in mind but that he could have had such a meaning. In the same way too, many who preach and expound the sacred scriptures as they refer to different holy men and women or some other definite matter use the following way of speaking, "Isaiah" (or Jeremiah or another prophet or another writer of some part of canonical scripture) "said or prophesied about this holy man", yet if they are thinking rightly, they do not mean that the prophet or other person was at that time wanting to speak in his mind about the saint or matter, but that he could have meant it or that such words can be understood about such a matter. And those meaning to indicate this frequently use the following words, "These words of divine scripture can be expounded" about this or that.
Discipulus Possuntne adduci aliqua exempla ex scripturis pro tali modo loquendi?	Student Can some examples of such a way of speaking be adduced from the scriptures?
Magister Videtur quibusdam quod sic. Unde Exod. 8:[18] dicitur de magis Pharaonis {Pharaonos LmPz[812]}, "Feceruntque similiter malefici incantationibus suis ut educerent ciniphes", idem {*id est FrMz[813]} facere conati fuerunt. In Iob [9:4] etiam dicitur, "Quis resistit {*restitit FrMzVg[814]} Deo", id est resistere voluit "et pacem habuit?" Si enim resistit {*restitit FrMz[815]} ponitur pro resistere voluit et fecerunt ponitur {om. Fr[816]} pro facere conati fuerunt videtur quod intellexit possit {potuit Fr[817]} poni pro intelligere potuit.	Master It seems to some people that the answer is "yes". So, speaking about Pharaoh's magicians, Exodus 8:18 says, "The magicians likewise by their incantations worked to bring forth gnats", that is, they tried to work it. Job 9:4 too says, "Who has resisted God", that is has wanted to resist, "and had peace?" For if "has resisted" is put for "has wanted to resist" and "worked" for "tried to work" it seems that "meant" can be put for "could have meant".
Discipulus Dic quomodo respondetur ad secundam obiectionem quam adduxi.	Student Tell me how reply is made to the second objection that I brought forward.
Magister Nonnulli concedunt quod verba scripturae de quorum primo intellectu per certitudinem non {om. FrMz[818]} constat adduci {om. FrMz[819]} ad probandum {*per add. FrMz[820]} illa sola quae in contentionem veniunt aliorum non {vero Fr[821]} debent. Ad manu ducendum tamen et ad persuadendum vel aliquo modo declarandum aliquid de quo est contentio sub aliquo sensu sano non erroneo {errando Fr[822]} adduci possunt, quemadmodum ad persuadendum aliquo modo articulos fidei et etiam ea quae per solam revelationem possunt cognosci rationes et argumenta a sanctis et {om. Fr[823]} aliis adducuntur {adducunt Fr[824]}, quae tamen ad probandum huiusmodi sufficienter allegari non debent. Et ideo quemadmodum sancti {sunt FrMz[825]} similitudines et {om. FrMz[826]} naturales rationes assumunt {indigent FrMz[827]} ad declarandum quomodo tres personae sunt unus Deus et quomodo corpus Christi vere {verum Fr[828]} est in sacramento altaris et similia, sic etiam sanctus Augustinus per verba Salvatoris de viis et sepibus voluit declarare quod haeretici et schismatici intrare ecclesiam sunt cogendi. Si tamen de hoc esset apparens contentio, per illam solam auctoritatem Christi sufficienter probari non posset. Sic {si FrMz[829]} etiam per verba divina dicta Ieremiae, ut allegatum est supra, declarari potest quod imperium est aliquo modo indignius sacerdotio et summo pontificatu, quod tamen per verba illa ostendi non posset nisi aliunde constaret, quemadmodum per quasdam {*quascumque FrMz[830]} similitudines et {om. FrMz[831]} rationes naturales a sancto Augustino et aliis quibuscunque adductas sufficienter declarari non posset quod tres personae sunt unus Deus, etiam apud {om. FrMz[832]} Christianos {Christianis Fr[833]}, nisi per alium modum certitudinem ipsius acciperent {acciperet Fr[834]}. Propter quod, ut quidam putant, per illa verba Ieremiae non potest ostendi quod imperium est a papa vel quod imperator aut alius rex quicunque est vasallus papae nec aliquid aliud, nisi quod per alias vias potest sufficienter ostendi. Sic generaliter aliqui arbitrantur quod per nullum sensum mysticum cuiuscunque auctoritatis scripturae divinae potest aliquid sufficienter ostendi nisi constet quod idem sensus mysticus est primus intellectus scribentis {est primus intellectus scribentis: om. Fr[835]} aut revelantis vel docentis, vel nisi alibi in sacra scriptura {*trs. FrMz[836]} tanquam sensus primus sententialiter habeatur, aut per aliam viam {*trs. FrMz[837]} manifestam irrefragabiliter possit ostendi. Ex quo videtur posse concludi quod de stulta temeritate excusari non possit {*possint ??[838]} qui per solos sensus mysticos scripturae divinae, quos nec ex aliis locis scripturae possunt argumento evidenti inferre {inferri Fr[839]} nec per rationem irrefragabilem possunt concludere nec per certam ac {et FrMz[840]} specialem ac miraculosam revelationem certificati {specificati Mz[841]} sunt, de ipsis aliqua futura contingentia audent {?auderet Fr[842]} praedicere vel futura quando {*trs. FrMz[843]} evenient quae absque determinatione temporis in sacris literis sunt praedicta asserere non formidant vel quaeque alia non metuunt affirmare quae per aliam viam indubiam et apertam manifestare non possunt. Cuilibet enim tali videtur Iohannes Apocalipsi ultimo [22:18] comminari cum dicit, "Si quis apposuerit ad haec {hoc Fr[844]} apponet {apponat Lm[845]} Deus {dominus Fr[846]} super {semper Pz[847]} illum plagas." Cui Salomon videtur alludere cum ait Proverbiorum 30:[6] "Nec {*ne FrLmMzPzVg[848]} addas {cadas LmPz[849]} quicquam {quicquid FrLmMzPz[850]} verbis illius et arguaris inveniarisque mendax." Tales enim temerarii et pravitati haereticae {heretici Fr[851]} propinqui, credentes se ad omnium contentorum in {in add. Fr[852]} scripturis sacris primum posse pertingere intellectum, minime imitantur humilitatem beati Augustini, qui quamvis fuerit in scripturis supra {ultra Fr[853]} alios eruditus, fatetur se non omnia intelligere quae in scripturis diligentissime legit. Unde pertractans 10 {*20 Zn[854]} De civitate Dei verba beati Pauli apostoli {om. Fr[855]} {*2 add. FrMz[856]} {et add. LmPz[857]} ad Thess. 2:[6] ubi dicitur, "Et nunc quid detineat scitis {sicut Fr[858]} ut reveletur in suo tempore" ait etc {*trs. FrLmMzPz[859]}, "Quid {*quod Zn[860]} autem ait, 'Et nunc quid detineat scitis', {scies FrLmMzPz[861]} id est quid sit {*in mora add. Zn[862]} {space left Mz[863]} quae causa sit dilationis {dilectionis LmPz[864]} eius, 'ut reveletur in suo tempore', scitis, quoniam hoc {*om. Zn[865]} scire illos dixit {dicit Lm[866]} aperte hoc dicere voluit {*noluit Zn[867]}. Et ideo nos qui nescimus quod illi sciebant pervenire cum labore ad id quod sensit apostolus cupimus non valemus praesertim quia et illa quae addidit hunc sensum faciunt obscuriorem. Nam quid est, 'Iam enim mysterium iniquitatis operatur, tantum {ut add. Vg[868]} qui modo tenet teneat donec de medio fiat {fiet Fr[869]} et tunc revelabitur iniquus.' Ego prorsus quid dixerit me fateor ignorare." Quod in epistola ad Romanos {*Hieronimum ??[870]} {ad Romanos: contra ad solum FrMz[871]} ut {et FrMz[872]} habetur dist. 9. c. Ego solus {*solis Zn[873]} insinuare videtur dicens, "Si aliquid in eis", scilicet scripturis canonicis, "ostenderetur {*offendero Zn[874]} {ostendere FrMz[875]}, quod videatur contrarium veritati, nihil aliud existimo {*om. Zn[876]} quam mendosum esse codicem {comitem FrMz[877]} vel non esse assecutum interpretem, quod dictum {ductum Fr[878]} est, quod {*vel Zn[879]} me minime intellexisse non ambigam" {non ambigam: ambiguam Fr[880]}.	Master Some people grant that words of scripture whose primary meaning is not established with certainty should not be brought forward to prove through them alone matters which come into contention from others. They can be brought forward, nevertheless, under some sound, not erroneous sense, to lead someone by the hand or to persuade them or to make clear in some way something about which there is dispute, just as reasons and arguments from the saints and from others are brought forward to persuade (someone) in some way of the articles of faith and even of those things that can be known by revelation alone, and yet these should not be brought forward as sufficient proof of matters of this kind. And therefore, just as holy men adopt similes and natural reasons to make it clear how three persons are one God and how the body of Christ truly is in the sacrament of the altar and the like, so too holy Augustine wanted to make clear through the words of the saviour about the highways and hedgerows that heretics and schismatics should be forced to enter the church. Yet if there were a clear dispute about this, it could not be proved adequately solely by that text of Christ. Thus also it can be shown through the divine words said to Jeremiah, as quoted above, that the empire is in some way less worthy than the priesthood and the highest pontiff, yet that could not be shown by those words unless it were established from another source, just as it could not adequately be made clear even to christians by any similes and natural reasons adduced from Saint Augustine and any others at all that three persons are one God, unless they were to accept its certainty through some other means. For this reason some people think that it can not be shown by those words of Jeremiah that the empire is from the pope or that the emperor or any other king at all is a vassal of the pope or anything else at all except what can be shown adequately in other ways. Thus some people think as a general rule that nothing can be shown adequately through any mystical sense of any text at all of divine scripture unless it is established that that very mystical sense is the primary meaning of the one writing, revealing or teaching it, or unless it is found in substance elsewhere in sacred scripture as the primary sense, or it can be shown inviolably in some other clear way. It seems possible to conclude from this that they can not be absolved of foolish rashness who, from mystical senses of divine scripture alone, which they can not infer by evident argument from other places in scripture and can not demonstrate by inviolable argument and have not been assured of them by certain, particular and miraculous revelation, dare to predict any future contingents, or are not afraid to affirm when future events will come about which have been predicted in sacred literature without a specification of time, or do not fear to assert any other things which they can not show clearly by another undoubted and obvious way. For John seems to threaten any such person when he says in the last chapter of Apocalypse (22:18), "If anyone adds to these, God will add plagues to that person." Solomon also seems to allude to such a person when he says in Proverbs 30:6, "Do not add anything to his words, or else he will rebuke you and you will be found a liar." For such rash men, near to heretical wickedness, believing themselves able to arrive at the primary meaning of everything contained in the sacred scriptures, do not imitate the humility of the blessed Augustine who, although he was learned in the scriptures above other men, admits that he does not understand everything which he reads most carefully in the scriptures. For this reason, when in chapter 20 of The City of God [[Loeb vol.6, 358-60]] he treats the words of the blessed apostle Paul in 2 Thess. 2:6, "And you know what is now restraining him, so that he may be revealed when his time comes" etc, he says: "As for the words, 'And you know what is now restraining him' -- that is, you know what delay or cause of delay there is, 'so that he may be revealed when his time comes' -- since he said that they knew, he would not say it openly. And therefore we who do not know what they knew are eager but unable to arrive, even with an effort, at what the Apostle meant, especially because what he added makes this meaning more obscure. For what is (2 Thess. 2:7-8), 'For the mystery of lawlessness is already at work; only let him who now holds him, hold until he is taken out of the way and then the lawless one will be revealed'? I confess myself completely ignorant of what he has said." He seems to imply this in his letter to Jerome, as we read in dist. 9, c. Ego solis [c.5, col.17], where he says, "If I meet with anything in them", that is the canonical scriptures, "that seems contrary to the truth, I do not doubt that it is simply that the codex is faulty or that the translator has not followed what was said or that I have not understood it."
Discipulus Verba praedicta de apponentibus et addentibus {aliquid vel add. Fr[881]} aliqua contraria verbis scripturae divinae debent intelligi, non de apponentibus et addentibus quae {om. FrMz[882]} ex aliis locis scripturae nequeant extrahi evidenter. Aliter enim sancti patres complura {*quamplura FrLmMzPz[883]} verba scripturae mystice exponendo graviter deliquissent {delinquissent Fr[884]}. Imo videtur quod per verba salvatoris possit ostendi quod verba huius scripturae aliter quam per revelationem miraculosam possint {possit FrLmMzPz[885]} intelligi, cum ait discipulis suis Matt. 24:[15], "Cum videritis abhominationem desolationis, quae dicta est a Daniele propheta, stante {*stantem Vg[886]} in loco sancto: qui legit, intelligat." Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod Christus insinuavit aperte intellectum primum prophetae {*prophetiae ??[887]} Danielis de quo {*qua FrLmMzPz[888]} ibi sit mentio aliter quam per revelationem miraculosam posse haberi.	Student The remarks above should be understood of those adding things opposed to the words of divine scripture, not of those adding things which can not be clearly extracted from other places of Scripture. For otherwise the holy fathers would have transgressed seriously in expounding mystically very many words of scripture. Indeed it seems that it can be shown by the words of the saviour that the words of this Scripture can be understood otherwise than by [i.e. without needing] miraculous revelation. For he says to his disciples in Matt. 24:15, "When you see the abomination of desolation standing in the holy place, as was spoken of by the prophet Daniel: let the reader understand." We gather from these words that Christ clearly implied that the primary understanding of the prophecy of Daniel mentioned there can be had otherwise than by miraculous revelation.
Magister Ad hoc respondetur quod quadrupliciter potest aliquid addi scripturis divinis. Quia potest {aliquid add. FrLmMzPz[889]} addi aliquod falsum. Potest etiam eis apponi verum non tamen tanquam primus intellectus scripturae. Potest etiam eis addi verum tanquam primus intellectus ipsarum {earum scripturarum sive scripture add. Fr[890]} possibilis haberi ex sola meditatione scripturarum supposita influentia divina. Potest etiam eis addi verum tanquam primus intellectus haberi possibilis per revelationem vel {*per add. FrMz[891]} alicuius facti novi exhibitionem apertam {aptam Fr[892]}.	Master The reply to this is that something can be added to the divine scriptures in four ways. Something false can be added. Also something true, yet not as the primary meaning of the scripture, can be added to them. Also something true can be added to them as their primary meaning able to be obtained solely from meditation on the scriptures, with divine influence being assumed. Something true can also be added to them as the primary meaning able to be obtained by revelation or the clear showing of some new fact.
Qui primo modo {om. Fr[893]} aliquid apponit {apponet LmMzPz[894]} vel addit scripturis divinis quandoque pertinax haereticus est censendus, quandoque vero errans solummodo, est putandus, secundum diversitatem falsi quod additur et etiam secundum varietatem adhaesionis addentis.	Anyone who adds something to the divine scriptures in the first way should sometimes be considered a pertinacious heretic but sometimes should only be thought of as in error, according to difference in the falsity added and also according to the difference in adherence of the one adding it.
Si vero apponatur eis aliquod verum quod non est primus intellectus scripturae, non tanquam primus intellectus sed solummodo tanquam verum nequaquam scripturae contrarium sed tanquam aedificans ad salutem vel aliquo modo ad declarationem catholicae veritatis, laudabiliter addi potest, et sic sancti {patres add. Fr[895]} veritates plurimas sacris literis addiderunt.	Now if something true which is not the primary meaning of the scripture is added to them, not as the primary meaning but only as something true which is not opposed to scripture but which builds salvation or in some way makes catholic truth clear, it can be added in a praiseworthy way; and in this way the saints have added many truths to sacred literature.
Tertio modo potest addi aliquid scripturis tanquam primus intellectus possibilis haberi ex meditatione scripturarum. Et si vere sic potest haberi, potest {haberi potest: om. LmPz[896]} addi laudabiliter {*trs.321 FrMz[897]} ad ea, quia sic addere non est aliud quam dicere explicite et aperte quod scriptura dicit implicite et latenter. Si autem talis intellectus vere ex scripturis haberi non potest et tamen apponitur tanquam primus intellectus, falso apponitur; et aliquando apponens est {*om. FrMz[898]} tantummodo errans aliquando haereticus est censendus. Asserere enim pertinaciter {est add. FrLmMzPz[899]} aliquid {*aliquod verum FrMz[901]} {?tamquam Lm[902]} esse primum intellectum scripturae divinae quod {*qui FrLmMzPz[903]} non est {om. LmPz[904]}, {*est add. Fr[905]} [[interlinear addition]] sapit {*sapere FrMz[906]} haeresim manifestam, quia quamvis verum quod apponitur non sit falsum nec contrarium catholicae veritati, tamen assertio qua dicitur esse primus intellectus scripturae est erronea atque falsa.	Something can be added to the scriptures in the third way, as the primary meaning able to be obtained from meditation on the scriptures. And if it can truly be obtained in this way, it can be added to them in a praiseworthy way, because to add something in this way is only to say explicitly and openly what the scripture says implicitly and in a hidden way. If such an understanding can not truly be obtained from the scriptures, however, and yet is added as the primary meaning, it is added falsely; and the one adding it should be considered sometimes as only in error and sometimes as a heretic. For to affirm pertinaciously something true as the primary meaning of divine scripture when it is not, is to suggest manifest heresy; because although the true thing that is added is not false or opposed to catholic truth, yet the affirmation that it is the primary meaning of the scripture is erroneous and false.
Quarto modo potest aliquid addi scripturis tanquam primus intellectus dummodo habeatur per revelationem vel per exhibitionem apertam novi facti, ut {et Mz[907]} {etiam Fr[908]} sancti apostoli per revelationem novam plurium parabolarum Christi a Christo exponente ipsas acceperunt {acceperint Fr[909]} primum intellectum. Sic etiam discipuli videndo {videntes Fr[910]} statuam Caesaris poni in templo poterant accipere primum intellectum prophetiae Danielis. Sic etiam discipuli ut habetur Ioan. 2:[19,21-2] videntes Christum resurrexisse a mortuis ceperunt intellectum illorum verborum Christi, "Solvite templum hoc et in tribus diebus excitabo illud." Post haec enim verba {verbis FrMz[911]} ibidem subiungitur, "Ille autem dicebat de templo corporis sui. Dum {*cum FrLmMzPzVg[912]} ergo resurrexit {*resurrexisset Vg[913]} a mortuis recordati sunt discipuli eius quia hoc {haec Fr[914]} dicebat et crediderunt scripturae {scripturis Fr[915]} et sermoni quem dixit {eis add. Fr[916]} Iesus."	Something can be added to the scriptures in a fourth way as the primary meaning as long as it is obtained by revelation or by the clear showing of a new fact, just as by a new revelation the holy apostles received the primary meaning of many parables of Christ though Christ expounding them. In this way too, when the disciples saw the statue of Caesar being put in the temple they were able to arrive at the primary understanding of Daniel's prophecy (Matt. 24:15). In the same way, when the disciples saw that Christ had risen from the dead they grasped the meaning of those words of his which we read in John 2:19, "Destroy this temple and in three days I will raise it up." For after these words is added (John 2:21-2), "But he was speaking of the temple of his body. After he was raised from the dead, therefore, his disciples remembered that he said this and they believed the scripture and the word that Jesus spoke."

CAP. XX Discipulus {sequitur ut et cetera add. Fr[917]} Ut expediamus nos de ista materia narra quomodo respondetur ad secundam obiectionem quam c. 15 induxi.	Chapter 20 Student So that we may free ourselves from this matter tell me what reply is made to the second objection I introduced in chapter 15.
Magister Respondetur ad ipsam quod sicut scriptura sacra et in locis planis et aliis obscurioribus, quorum tamen primus virtute ingenii humani potest accipi intellectus, pie legentibus fructuosa existit, licet aliis occasio sit errandi (unde et communiter omnes haeretici haereses suas in scripturis divinis fundare conati sunt), sic etiam illa quorum primus intellectus absque revelatione haberi non potest salubria sunt et utilia legentibus ea non ad capiendum primum intellectum ipsorum sed ad humilitatem et alios sensus mysticos capiendos, licet periculosa et mortifera sunt superbis atque stultis qui altiora se quaerunt et {*temere add. FrMz[918]} investigant quae minime apprehendere valent.	Master The reply to it is that just as, both in those places that are clear and in others that are more obscure, yet of which the primary meaning can be arrived at by force of human wit, sacred scripture is profitable for those who read it piously, though it is an occasion of erring for others (which is why all heretics have generally tried to base their heresies on the divine scriptures), so also those matters of which the primary meaning can not be had without revelation are beneficial and useful for those reading them not with the purpose of grasping their primary meaning but for humility and the purpose of grasping their other mystic senses, though they are dangerous and deadly to the proud and foolish who inquire into matters that are above them [Cf. Ecclesiasticus 3:22] and rashly investigate what they can not understand.
CAP. XXI Discipulus Quia opinio supra primo capitulo {*huius tertii add. FrMz[919]} recitata, quamvis concedat quod scripturis canonicis et determinationibus generalium conciliorum sit certa credulitas adhibenda, tamen {cum FrMz[920]} hoc generaliter negat de scripturis aliis quibuscunque, ideo videamus an illa {necessaria add. FrMz[921]} sit consona veritati. Primo autem pone opinionem cum motivis eiusdem.	Chapter 21 Student Although the opinion recited above in chapter one of this third [book] grants that sure belief should be offered to the canonical scriptures and the decisions of general councils, yet it denies this generally of any other writings at all. Let us see, therefore, whether that is in accord with the truth. Now first set down that opinion with the arguments for it.
OPINION 1 again: Why other writings besides the Bible and councils are not authoritative.
Magister Opinio praedicta {*opinio praedicta: om. FrMz[922]} ponitur et probatur in haec verba. Quod autem scripturis aliis, quae scilicet humano spiritu revelante {*revelate FrMz[923]} sunt {*et add. Marsilius} traditae, nemo certam credulitatem aut veritatis confessionem praebere teneatur, apparet {aperiet FrMz[924]}, quoniam nulli scripturae falsum signari {signare LmMzPz[925]} {*significare Marsilius} {significari Fr[926]} potenti tenetur quis firmiter credere aut ipsam tanquam veram simpliciter {principaliter Fr[927]} confiteri. Hoc autem patiuntur scripturae innitentes {innitantes LmPz[928]} humanae inventioni singularis personae aut collegii partialis. Possunt enim a veritate deficere ut {et Lm[929]} experientia palam est {*om. FrMz[930]}, et habetur enim {*om. FrMz[931]} {etiam LmPz[932]} in Psalmo [116:11], "Ego autem dixi in excessu meo: omnis homo mendax." Scripturae vero canonicae non sic quia non sunt ab humana inventione sed immediate traditae Dei {*trs. FrLmMzPz[933]} inspiratione qui {quae FrLmMzPz[934]} non potest falli nec fallere vult.	Master It is put and proved in the following words. Now that no one is bound to offer sure belief or a confession of truth to other writings, that is those which have been revealed and handed down by the human spirit, is clear, since no one is bound to believe firmly or acknowledge as simply true any writing that is capable of expressing falsehood. This can be true, however, of writings that rely on human invention by a single person or partial group. For they can be wanting in truth, as is clear from experience, and as we read in Psalm 116:11, "I said in my excess: 'Everyone is a liar'". The canonical scriptures, however, are not like this, because they are not passed on by human invention but immediately by the inspiration of God, who can not be deceived and does not want to deceive.
Hanc enim sententiam et differentiam humanarum et divinarum scripturarum aperte confirmat Augustinus 13 epistolarum ad Iohannem {*Hieronimum Marsilius[936]} cum dixit, "Ego enim fateor charitati tuae omnino {*om. FrMzZn[937]} solum ex {*om. FrMz[938]} omnium {*enim Marsilius} scripturarum libris quae iam canonicae {*canonici Marsilius} appellantur didici hunc honorem timoremque deferre, ut nullum earum {*eorum Marsilius} auctorem scribendo aliquid errasse firmissime credam. Ac si {*aliquid add.Marsilius FrMzZn[939]} in eis offeratur literis, quod videatur contrarium veritati, nihil aliud quam vel mendosum esse {esset FrMz[940]} codicem vel interpretem {interpretationem Fr[941]} non assecutum esse quod dictum est, vel me minime intellexisse non ambigam. Alios autem ita lego ut quantacunque sanctitate doctrinaque praepolleant non ideo verum {verbum FrMz[942]} putem {prime Fr?Mz[943]} quia {ipsum add. FrMz[944]} ita senserunt {Marilius Ly: censerunt FrLmMzPz[945]}; sed quia mihi vel per illos auctores canonicos, vel probabili ratione, quod a vero non abhorrent {*abhorreat Zn[]} {haberent Mz[946]} {habuerunt Fr[947]} persuadere poterant {*potuerunt FrMzZn[948]}." Sed {*om. FrMz[949]} hoc idem replicat et admonet in prologo libri {libro FrLmMzPz[950]} de Trinitate cum dixit, "Noli lector sic {*scilicet FrLmMzPz[951]} meis literis quasi scripturis canonicis inservire; sed in illis et {om. Fr[952]} quod non credis {*credebas Augustine} cum inveneris incunctanter {?innominanter Mz[954]} {space left Fr[955]} crede; in istis autem scilicet meis {*scilicet meis: om. FrLmMzPzZn[956]} quod certum {tecum Fr[957]} non habeas {*habebas Augustine} nisi certum intellexeris noli firmiter tenere." Idem quoque dixit in epistola ad Fortunatianum et aliis pluribus libris. Idem quoque videtur sensisse Hieronymus in expositione catholicae fidei cum dixit, "Novum et vetus testamentum recipimus in eo librorum numero quot {*quod FrLmMzPz[959]} sanctae catholicae ecclesiae tradit auctoritas."	This opinion and the difference between human and divine writings is clearly confirmed by Augustine in the thirteenth of his letters to Jerome [[PL.33, col.277]] where he said, "I confess to your charity that I have learnt to offer only to those books of writings which are now called canonical this honour and fear, so that I most firmly believe that no author of these has erred in writing anything. And if I meet with anything in these writings that seems opposed to the truth, I do not doubt that it is only that the codex is faulty, or the translator has not followed what was said, or I have not understood it. I read others authors in such a way, however, that no matter how distinguished they are in learning and holiness I do not thereby think something true because they have thought it so, but because they have been able to persuade me, either by those authors who are canonical or by probable reasoning, that it is not inconsistent with the truth." Augustine repeats this advice in the prologue of his book De Trinitate [[PL 42, col. 869]] where he said, "Do not", reader, "be submissive to my writings as to canonical scriptures. But in the latter believe unhesitatingly even what you did not believe when you came across it. In the former do not firmly hold to what you did not consider certain unless you understand it as certain." He also said the same thing in his letter to Fortunatianus and in many other books. Jerome seems to have thought the same in his exposition of the catholic faith when he said, "We accept the new and old testament in that number of books which the authority of the holy catholic church has handed down."
Augustinus ergo scripturas {sacras add. LmPz[960]} proprias a canonicis separavit nec ipse qui tantae fuit sanctitatis auctoritatis et scientiae suas traditiones canonicas appellare praesumpsit. Hoc enim impium {imperium Fr[961]} est et {om. LmPz[962]} sacrilegii modus quidam, quoniam circa {om. FrMz[963]} humana traditione dicta {acta Fr[964]} vel scripta error et falsum contingere {contigere Mz[965]} potest, quod in canone secundum veritatem dicto {acto Fr[966]} {*et eidem modi [*aut eiusmodi Marsilius] quam per generale concilium canonice scripture interpretationem factam diximus add. FrMz[967]} nullatenus evenire contingit.	Augustine, therefore, distinguished his own writings from those that are canonical and did not presume, despite his great holiness, authority, and knowledge, to call his own teachings canonical. For to do so would be impious and, in a certain way, sacrilege since with things said or written on the basis of human teaching error and falsity can occur. It is not possible for this to happen in the canon, truly so called, or in such an interpretation of canonical scripture as we have said to have been made by a general council.
Propter quod etiam ex concilio Carthaginensi 3 {est Fr[968]} prohibitum reperitur {*rationabiliter Marsilius; gap left in Mz} valde ne sub nomine harum canonicarum scilicet aliae quaevis scripturae legantur. Unde legitur ibidem et in Isidori Codice continetur haec series item, "Placuit ut praeter scripturas canonicas nihil {om. Fr[970]} in ecclesia legatur sub nomine divinarum scripturarum. Sunt autem canonicae scripturae Genesis et caeterae quae de volumine Bibliae numerantur ibidem."	For this reason we also find it very reasonably prohibited by the third Council of Carthage that any other writings be read under the name of these canonical writings. So we read in the same place, and the following passage is also contained in the codex of Isidore, "It is decreed that nothing besides the canonical scriptures be read in church under the name of divine scriptures. The canonical scriptures, however, are Genesis" and the others which are listed there from the volume of the Bible. [For all the above, see Marsilius, Defensor pacis, II.xix.4-7]
CAP. XXII Discipulus Primo contra istam assertionem nitere allegare.	Chapter 22 Student First of all try to argue against that assertion.
Objections against the rejection of all other writings
Magister {om. LmMzPz[971]} Nonnullis apparet quod ex ista {*ipsa FrMz[972]} possint {possunt Fr[973]} plures absurditates inferri. Quarum prima est quia {*quod FrLmMzPz[974]} ex quo scriptores scripturae canonicae de hoc seculo migraverunt, nullorum mortalium {moralium FrMz[975]} scripturis {om. FrMz[976]} credulitas {incredulitas FrMz[977]} est praebenda, et ita nulli mortales {morales FrMz[978]} essent ad ferendum testimonium admittendi in quocunque casu. Quantae autem et quot absurditates ex ista sequuntur nullus sanae mentis ignorat. Quod autem ista absurditas ex assertione praescripta sequatur manifeste {*manifestum FrMz[979]} apparet. Nam quorum scripturis quibuscunque non est praestanda certa credulitas ipsorum {in add. FrLmMzPz[980]} verbis minime est credendum, quia qui potest falsum asserere in scripto in solo verbo falsum asserere potest.	Master It appears to some people that many absurdities can be inferred from it. The first of these is that because the writers of canonical scripture have departed this world, belief should not be shown in the writings of any who are alive, and so no one who is alive should be allowed to bear witness in any case at all. No one of sound mind does not know how many great absurdities follow from this. It seems clear, however, that this absurdity follows from the above assertion. For if we should not give sure belief to any of their writings, we should not believe their words, because anyone who can make a false assertion in writing can make a false assertion in word alone.
Secunda absurditas quod {quae FrMz[981]} nulli historiae, nulli legendae cuiuscunque sancti, nullis gestis de summis pontificibus, aliis clericis, imperatoribus, regibus et aliis hominibus fidelibus {que add. Fr[982]} vel infidelibus quae non in scripturis canonicis continentur {*om. FrMz[983]} sed in aliis scripturis {*habentur add. FrMz[984]} est credendum. Ex quo ulterius concludetur quod dubitare licet an praeter episcopos, imperatores et reges in quibuscunque partibus orbis terrarum de quibus in scriptura divina et conciliis generalibus fit mentio, et praeter illos quos scimus nunc et vidimus praesidere, unquam fuerint alii quemcunque fidelem vel infidelem populum gubernantes, vel saltem dubitare de quolibet alio {*om. Fr[985]} in speciali non erit illicitum, cum de aliquibus {de aliquibus: aliquis FrMz[986]} ipsorum {fuerit add. FrMz[987]} validiori testimonio quam per scripturam {*non add. FrMz[988]} canonicam {non add. Fr[989]} constare non possit. Sequitur etiam {in Mz[990]} quod nulli esset illicitum credere quod postquam scripta est scriptura divina {*canonica FrMz[991]} Deus nullum fecit miraculum quod {quia FrLmMzPz[992]} ipse non vidit vel non {om. Fr[993]} cognoverit {cognoverat Fr[994]} per se ipsum, nec {*quia FrMz[995]} fortiori testimonio {testimonii LmPz[996]} quam per scripturas sanctorum patrum quae tamen non sunt canonicae sibi liquere {*non add. FrMz[997]} potest. Ex quo concluditur {*ulterius add. FrMz[998]} quod dubitare licet an quicunque canonizati per Romanam ecclesiam sint legitime propter vitam et miracula cathalogo sanctorum asscripti quia potissime de hoc liquet per legendas ipsorum.	A second absurdity is that we should not believe any history, any legend of any saint at all, any deeds of the highest pontiffs, other clerics, emperors, kings and other men whether of the faith or not which are found not in the canonical scriptures but in other writings. From this it will be concluded further that it is permissible to doubt whether, except for the bishops, emperors and kings in all parts of the world mentioned in the divine scriptures or by general councils and those whom we know now or have seen to be in command, there have ever been others ruling any people whether of the faith or not, or at least it will not be impermissible to have such doubt of any such one in particular, since nothing can be known about any of them by any stronger testimony than writing which is not canonical. It follows also that anyone is permitted to believe that since the canonical scripture was written, God has not done any miracle that he has not seen himself or known directly, because it can not be clear to him by any stronger testimony than by the writings of the holy fathers, which are, however, not canonical. From this it is concluded further that it is permissible to doubt whether any one at all canonised by the Roman church has been enrolled in the catalogue of saints legitimately on account of his life and miracles, because this is a matter which is clear chiefly through their "legends".
Alia absurditas sequitur, quod videlicet libris antiquis, instrumentis productis ex archivis publicis et scripturis quae factae sunt calumniis {columpniis Fr[999]} et aliis quibuscunque quae non reperiuntur in Biblia fides esset nullatenus adhibenda. Cuius contrarium in sacris legibus et canonibus {*trs.321 FrMz[1000]} imperialibus reperitur expresse. Ex hac enim absurditate infertur aperte quod per huiusmodi libros instrumenta et scripturas nunquam esset ferenda sententia, quia per illas scripturas quibus non est adhibenda fides sententia ferri non debet, sicut nec est ferenda sententia per testes quibus credere non oportet.	Another absurdity which follows is that no trust should be extended to ancient books, to documents produced from public archives, to writings made for the purpose of accusations and to any others at all which are not found in the Bible. The opposite of this is found expressly in sacred canons and imperial laws. For from this absurdity we clearly infer that judgement should never be made on the basis of books, documents and writings of this kind, because judgement ought not be made on the basis of writings to which trust should not be extended, just as judgement should not be made on the basis of witnesses whom it is not appropriate to believe.
CAP. XXIII Discipulus Istae allegationes contra praescriptam assertionem ad praesens sufficiant. Nunc dic quomodo respondetur ad motiva eius.	Chapter 23 Student Let those arguments against that assertion be enough for the moment. Tell me now how reply is made to the reasons in support of it.
Answers to the arguments in favour of Opinion 1: How to use writings that may contain errors.
{*Magister add. FrLmMz[1001]} Ad primum, cum dicitur quod nulli scripturae falsum significari {*significare FrMz[1002]} potenti tenetur quis firmiter credere aut ipsam tanquam veram simpliciter confiteri, respondetur quod, si ista propositio intelligeretur de scriptura vel de scriptore {*vel de scriptore: om. ??}, posset concedi aliquo modo, quia scripturae falsae aliquo modo {*aliquo modo: om. FrMz[1003]} praesertim postquam constiterit quod ipsa est {*ipsa est: potest esse FrMz[1004]} falsa adhibere fidem non debet hoc sciens. Sed multae sunt scripturae non canonicae quae hoc mimine patiuntur, nec quod hoc minime {*om. FrMz[1005]} patiantur per experientiam constare potest. Multae enim sunt scripturae non solum sanctorum patrum sed infidelium philosophorum et aliorum immo et haereticorum in quibus nullum falsum {om. Fr[1006]} poterit reperiri. Quamvis enim haeretici in quibusdam scripturis erraverint {erraverunt Fr[1007]} quidam tamen eorum in quibusdam aliis nullatenus erraverunt. Unde et Origines licet ut fertur turpissime erraverit sicut recitat beatus Augustinus 11 De civitate Dei tamen in multis scripturis eius nullus error apparet {appareret Fr[1009]}. Et ideo multis scripturis infidelium licet adhibere fidem.	Master To the first, which says that no one is bound firmly to believe or acknowledge as simply true any writing capable of expressing a falsehood, the reply is that, if it were understood of a writing, the proposition could be granted in some way, because no one who knows that some writing is wrong should extend trust to it, especially after it has been established that it can be wrong. But many writings which are not canonical do not permit [such a judgement], nor can it be established by experience that they do permit it. For there are many writings not only of the holy fathers but of philosophers outside the faith and of others, even of heretics, in which no falsehood can be found. For although heretics have erred in some of their writings, some of them, nevertheless, have not erred in certain others. Thus, although it is said that Origen erred most wickedly, as blessed Augustine records in book 11 of The City of God [[ch. 23; Loeb, pp. 515-21]], yet in many of his writings no error appears. It is permitted, therefore, to extend trust to many writings of those outside the faith.
Sed si intelligatur de scriptore, {scripturis Fr[1010]} -- ut videlicet, quamvis alicui scripturae alicuius scilicet {*om. FrLmMzPz[1011]} non scriptoris scripturae canonicae adhibenda sit fides, non quia a tali scriptore est scripta sed quia per scripturas canonicas aut per rationem naturalem potest ostendi quia nullam contineat {continet Lm[1012]} falsitatem, tamen ipsi scriptori potenti falsum asserere seu significare non tenetur quis firmiter credere, et ideo scripturam {scriptura FrMz[1013]} eius {quamquam add. FrLmMzPz[1014]} non est necesse tanquam veram simpliciter confiteri nisi possit {posset FrMz[1015]} aperte probari quod est consona scripturis canonicis vel rationi evidenti naturali -- maiorem apparentiam habere videtur. Et tamen sic intellecta a veritate aliena videtur.	But if it is understood of a writer -- that is, that even if trust should be extended to some writing by someone who is not a writer of canonical scripture, not because it has been written by this writer but because it can be shown by the canonical scriptures or by natural reason that it contains no falsity, yet no one is bound firmly to believe that writer who is capable of asserting or expressing a falsehood, and therefore it is not necessary to acknowledge his writing as simply true unless it can be clearly proved that it agrees with the canonical scriptures or evident natural reason -- it seems to have greater plausibility. And yet understood in this way it seems inconsistent with the truth.
Kinds of presumptions, kinds of assertions
Ad cuius declarationem dicitur esse sciendum quod, sicut secundum iura canonica et alia, aliqua {*alia FrMz[1016]} est praesumptio in cuius contrarium est aliqua probatio admittenda et alia in cuius contrarium nulla probatio est admittenda, ita potest aliquis alii homini vel assertioni credere et ipsam confiteri tanquam veram dupliciter, quia vel credulitate tam certa ut nullam velit in contrarium probationem admittere vel audire aut credulitate firma non tamen tam certa quin reputet {*reputat FrMz[1017]} quod sit probatio in contrarium audienda si quis fide dignus offerat se contrarium probaturum.	It is said that to make this clear it should be known that just as, according to canonical and other laws, there is a [kind of] presumption in opposition to which some proof should be allowed and another [kind of] presumption in opposition to which no proof should be allowed, so someone can believe and admit as true some person or assertion in two ways, either with such certain belief that he will not admit or hear any proof to the contrary, or with firm belief yet not so certain that he does not reckon that proof to the contrary should be listened to if someone worthy of belief offers to prove the contrary.
Primo modo nulli scriptori cuiuscumque scripturae non canonicae in omnibus dictis aut scripturis {*scriptis Mz[1018]} eius est credendum. Alicui tamen assertioni eius taliter credere licet et oportet in quatuor casibus. Puta si assertio eius patenter et aperte per scripturas canonicas per assertionem universalis ecclesiae per rationem naturalem {naturaliter Fr[1019]} evidentem praesertim consonam catholicae fidei vel bonis moribus aut per apertum miraculum possit {posset Fr[1020]} ostendi.	No writer of any writing at all that is not canonical should be believed in the first way in everything he says or writes. It is permissible, however, to believe some assertion of his in this way, and it is appropriate in four cases; for example, if his assertion can be clearly and plainly shown by canonical scriptures, by the assertion of the universal church, by evident natural reason, especially in agreement with catholic faith or good morals, or by a clear miracle.
Secundo modo pluribus aliis quam scriptoribus scripturae canonicae in multis aliis quam in praedictis quatuor casibus est credendum -- quia {*puta ??[1021]} summis pontificibus conciliis generalibus et aliis sanctis episcopis et doctoribus atque fide dignis viris et ab ecclesia probatis -- quantum ad ea quae facti sunt quae videlicet per se ipsos vel per alios fide dignos quibus credere tenebantur potuerunt cognoscere. Et peccat qui eis non credit quia reverentiam quam Deus tantis viris adhibuit {exhibuit Lm[1022]} denegare praesumit. Qui enim eis et huiusmodi non crederet {crederent Fr[1023]} dubitaret an scienter in huiusmodi mentirentur {mentiretur FrMz[1024]}. Et ita sine causa ipsos non crederet esse veraces. In huiusmodi ergo credendum est eis. Propter quod non solum per testes sed etiam per libros antiquos et instrumenta quae de {quae de: de qua Mz[1025]} falsitate convinci non possunt et {*per add. FrMz[1026]} scripturas antiquorum licite iudex fert sententiam et peccaret si non ferret.	We should believe in the second way many other writers than those of canonical scripture and in many other cases than in the above four -- for example, supreme pontiffs, general councils and other holy bishops and doctors and men worthy of belief and approved by the church -- with respect to matters of fact, that is, those matters which they could have known by themselves or through other men worthy of belief whom they would be bound to believe. He who does not believe these is a sinner, because he presumes to deny the reverence that God has offered to such great men. For he who would not believe them and men of this kind would doubt whether they might lie knowingly in matters of this kind, and so without any reason he would not believe that they are truthful. In matters of this kind, therefore, they should be believed. For this reason a judge can legitimately make a judgement -- and would sin if he were not to do so -- not only on the basis of witnesses but also on the basis of ancient books, of documents which can not be convicted of falsity, and of the writings of the ancients.
Quantum autem ad illa quae pure sunt scientiae et non facti scripturis sanctorum patrum et auctorum ac consiliorum est reverentia exhibenda, quia doctrina eorum minime est spernenda sed sollicite attendenda et cum diligentia audienda, praesertim cum de aliquo pertinente ad fidem vel mores quaeritur veritas de quo in scripturis suis tradiderunt quod senserunt, et qui doctrinam eorum cum posset negligeret legere {negligeret legere: legere negligenter Fr[1027]} si erraret {et add. FrMz[1028]} de temeritate plectibili esset merito arguendus, quia contra praeceptum Salomonis prudentiae seu peritiae propriae convinceretur inniti. Doctrina insuper eorundem si in aliqua sui parte videatur {videtur Fr[1029]} contraria veritati pie et sane exponenda est si potest et ad verum intellectum trahenda. Et quamvis ad sanum intellectum trahi non possit, non sunt statim de haeretica pravitate notandi, licet errantes debeant reputari {?replicari Fr[1030]}.	With respect to matters purely of [theoretical] knowledge and not of fact, however, reverence should be shown to the writings of holy fathers and authors and of councils, because their teaching should not be rejected but should be carefully attended to and listened to with attentiveness, especially when the truth is being sought about some matter pertaining to faith or morals about which they have handed down in their writings what they thought, and anyone who was to neglect to read their teaching when he could read it would deservedly be accused of punishable rashness if he were to err, because he would be convicted of relying, against the instruction of Solomon [Proverbs 3:5], on his own discretion or knowledge. Moreover if any part of their teaching seems opposed to the truth it should be expounded piously and soundly if it can be, and should be led towards a true meaning. And even if it can not be led to a sound meaning they should not be censured immediately for heretical wickedness, although they ought to be regarded as erring.
Nonnullis tamen apparet {*trs. FrLmMzPz[1031]} quod quantum ad decretales et constitutiones ac diffinitiones solennes summorum pontificum et aliorum episcoporum ac generalium provincialium {pronuncialium Pz[1032]} et episcopalium conciliorum et etiam capitulorum et collegiorum quorumcunque intendentium alios ad suam assertionem firmiter defensandam cogere et artare et quantum ad alias scripturas eorundem et aliorum est discretio facienda, quia si in primis scripturis invenitur aliquid catholicae veritati contrarium statim auctores eorum sunt haeretici reputandi, quia de pertinacia ex {ex add. Fr[1033]} hoc ipso quod cogunt {contingit Fr[1034]} alios suo errori pertinaciter adhaerere possunt manifeste convinci. Si in illis {*aliis FrMz[1035]} error aliquis reperitur cuius contrarium tenens vel scribens eundem errorem non tenetur explicite credere, non est statim auctor huiusmodi scripturae erroneae haereticus iudicandus sed est de pravitate haeretica excusandus nisi per alios modos, de quibus multa diximus in prima parte istius Dialogi lib. 4, de pertinacia convinci valeat apertissimis documentis {ostendi add. Fr?Mz[1036]} [[added between lines in Mz]].	It seems to some people, however, that a distinction should be made with respect to (1) the decrees, constitutions and solemn definitions of the highest pontiffs, of other bishops, of general, provincial and episcopal councils and even of chapters and any colleges at all which intend to compel and constrain others to defend firmly their own assertion and (2) with respect to other writings of these same people and of others. Because if something opposed to catholic truth is found in (1) the former writings, the authors of it should immediately be regarded as heretics, since they can clearly be convicted of pertinacity from the fact that they compel others pertinaciously to cling to their error. If in (2) the other writings some error is found the opposite of which the one holding or writing that error is not explicitly bound to believe, the author of such an erroneous writing should not immediately be judged heretical, but should be excused of heretical wickedness unless by the plainest evidence he can be convicted of pertinacity in other ways, many of which we have spoken about in book 4 of the first part of this Dialogue.
Porro licet viri {iuri Pz[1038]} huiusmodi venerabiles in aliquo aperte convincantur errare, et ideo liceat eis {eos Fr[1039]} qui de hoc sunt certi ipsos {om. Fr[1040]} quantum ad hoc negare et improbare, in aliis tamen quibuscunque de quibus non est certum ipsos errare praesumendum est pro dictis eorum, ita ut absque temeritate culpari non possint {possunt Fr[1041]} neque in genere neque in specie, et quanto plures virorum huiusmodi in aliqua sententia concordaverint tanto magis praesumendum est pro eadem, non tamen sic quin in contrarium valeat audiri probatio.	Moreover, even if venerable men like this are clearly convicted of erring in something, so that those who are certain of this are permitted to reject them in respect of this matter and to condemn them, yet in any other matters concerning which it is not certain that they err, presumption should be made in favour of what they say, so that they can not be blamed without rashness either in general or in particular, and the more many such men have agreed on some opinion the more should there be a presumption in favour of it, yet not so that a proof to the contrary can not be listened to.
Et quamvis in his quae pure sunt scientiae seu peritiae praesumendum est {*sit LmMzPz[1042]} pro huiusmodi scripturis ipsorum, tamen fortius praesumendum est pro scripturis eorundem quantum ad illa quae facti sunt, quia fortius praesumendum est ipsos nolle {non velle Fr[1043]} mentiri quam per ratiocinationes non esse deceptos. Et ideo in his quae facti sunt, praesertim de his quae per se ipsos se insinuant cognoscere, tenetur quilibet credere ipsis, nisi per fide digniores de contrario certus existat.	And although there should be a presumption in favour of writings by such men on matters purely of [theoretical] knowledge or skill, yet there should be even a stronger presumption in favour of their writings on matters of fact, because there should be a stronger presumption that they do not want to lie than that they are not deceived by reasoning. In matters of fact, therefore, especially those which they imply that they know directly, everyone is bound to believe them, unless, through those more worthy of belief, he is certain of the contrary.
Discipulus Contra praedicta obiici potest, quia non est necesse credere alicui testimonio per quod infallibilis certitudo haberi non potest. Sed per humanum testimonium haberi non potest {*trs.231 FrMz[1045]} infallibilis certitudo, etiam cum de aliquo testimonium perhibet multitudo, teste Moyse, imo Deo per Moysen, Exod. 21 {*23 ?MzVg[1046]}:[2] qui ait, "Non sequeris turbam ad faciendum malum nec in iudicio plurimorum acquiesces sententiae ut a vero devies." Ergo non est necesse credere humano testimonio cuicunque, et per consequens non est necesse credere quibuscunque scripturis illorum quorum testimonium est humanum tantummodo reputandum, cuius modi sunt scriptores omnes praeter illos qui scripturas scripsere divinas.	Student An objection can be raised against the foregoing, because it is not necessary to believe any testimony by which infallible certainty can not be had. But infallible certainty can not be had by human testimony, even when a multitude presents its testimony about some matter, as Moses - or rather, God through Moses - attests when he says in Exodus 23:2, "You shall not follow a majority in wrongdoing; when you bear witness in a lawsuit, you shall not side with the majority so as to deviate from truth." It is not necessary, therefore, to believe any human testimony at all, and, as a consequence, it is not necessary to believe any of the writings of those whose testimony is to be regarded as only human. All writers except those who wrote the divine scriptures are of this kind.
Magister Ad hoc respondetur quod saepe necesse est credere testimonio quamvis per ipsum infallibilis certitudo haberi non possit, saltem credulitate {credulitas FrMz[1047]} illa contra quam non obstante quod dubitatione careat {caret Fr[1048]} debeat aut possit admitti probatio {etiam add. FrMz[1049]}. Alioquin in nullo negocio quibuscunque testibus qui non sunt confirmati in gratia plus quam {plus quam: om. FrLmMzPz[1050]} universali ecclesiae esset credendum. Quare propter testimonium huiusmodi non {*numquam FrMz[1051]} esset a iudice contra aliquem ferenda sententia. Saepe igitur testimonio fide dignorum omni exceptione maiorum [[cf. OLD, "maior", senses 6-8]] qui {que qui Fr; que LmMzPz[1053]} reprobari aut {vel Fr[1054]} convinci de falsitate non possunt {potest LmMzPz[1055]} est credendum, quamvis per ipsum certitudo infallibilis haberi non possit. In huiusmodi enim sufficit certitudo possibilis et sufficiens quamvis non sit infallibilis.	Master The reply to this is that often it is necessary to believe testimony even if infallible certainty can not be had by it, with that belief at least against which proof can or should be admitted, notwithstanding the fact that the belief may lack doubt. Otherwise the universal church should in no matter believe any witnesses who have not been confirmed in grace; a judge should therefore never pass sentence against anyone on the basis of such testimony. Often, therefore, one must believe the testimony of men worthy of belief, rising above every objection, who can not be condemned for or convicted of falsity, even if infallible certainty can not be had through their testimony. For in matters of this kind possible [probable?] and sufficient certainty, even if it is not infallible, is enough.
Cum autem accipitur quod per testimonium humanum certitudo {*infallibilis add. FrMz[1056]} haberi non potest, respondetur quod quamvis per humanum testimonium praecise, excluso omni testimonio speciali divino, infallibilis certitudo haberi non possit, tamen {cum FrMz[1057]} concurrente {concurrenti Fr[1058]} divino testimonio {*per humanum testimonium add. FrLmMzPz[1059]} certitudo infallibilis potest haberi, et nonnunquam per divinum testimonium possumus {possimus Fr[1060]} {haberi add. Fr[1061]} esse certi quod humanum testimonium debet {debeat Fr[1062]} infallibile reputari. Si enim humanum testimonium per divinum miraculum approbetur de infallibilitate eius debemus esse certi. De quo etiam infallibiliter possumus esse certi si ab universali ecclesia, praesertim in his quae sunt necessaria ad salutem, fuerit approbatum, propter promissionem Christi ex qua colligitur quod Christus nunquam deficiet ecclesiae in his quae sunt necessaria ad salutem.	And when it is taken [as a premise], that infallible certainty can not be had by human testimony, the reply is that even though infallible certainty can not be had from human testimony by itself, all special divine testimony being excluded, yet infallible certainty can be had from human testimony when divine testimony concurs with it, and sometimes we can be certain by divine testimony that human testimony ought to be regarded as infallible. For if human testimony is confirmed by a divine miracle we should be certain of its infallibility. We can be infallibly certain of this too if it has been confirmed by the universal church, especially in connection with those matters that are necessary to salvation, because of Christ's promise [Matthew 28:20], from which we gather that Christ will never fail the church in those matters that are necessary for salvation.
CAP. XXIV Discipulus Sufficiant ista ad praesens de allegatione praescripta. Ideo dic qualiter ad auctoritates sequentes opinio memorata respondet.	Chapter 24 Student Let that be enough for the moment about that argument. Tell me now, therefore, how that opinion responds to the texts that follow.
Magister Quantum ad auctoritates Augustini et Hieronymi, primo respondetur {*respondet FrMz[1063]} quo ad hominem dicens quod contrarium opinantes ipsos nequaquam allegare deberent cum teneant quod non est necesse aliis credere {*trs. FrMz[1064]} scripturis quam canonicis quae in Biblia continentur. Quare vel frustra praedictas auctoritates allegant vel opinionem propriam facto negant cum allegando Augustinum et {om. FrMz[1065]} Hieronymum pro opinione sua firmanda facto ostendant {ostendunt Fr[1066]} quod auctoritatibus Augustini {*et Hieronymi add. FrMz[1067]}, qui non fuerunt scriptores alicuius partis Bibliae, est credendum.	Master The first response to the texts from Augustine and Jerome is an ad hominem one which says that those who hold the opposite opinion should not bring them forward, since they [who hold the opposite opinion] maintain that it is not necessary to believe writings other than the canonical ones contained in the bible. Either they bring those texts forward in vain, therefore, or in doing so they deny their own opinion, since in bringing forward Augustine and Jerome to strengthen their own opinion they disclose by their act that we ought to believe texts of Augustine and Jerome, who were not writers of any part of the bible.
Ad rem autem respondetur {respondet LmPz[1068]} {*respondet dicens FrMz[1069]} primo ad auctoritatem Augustini aut {*ad FrLmMzPz[1070]} Hieronimi {*Hieronimum FrLmMzPz[1071]} quod intentio Augustini ibidem est quod universaliter absque omni exceptione solis scriptoribus bibliae ille timor deferatur {est deferendus Fr[1072]} et honor ut eo ipso quod ibi aliquid {om. FrMz[1073]} invenitur credatur absque omni probatione in contrarium audienda esse verum. Alii {aliquando FrMz[1074]} autem multi ita legendi sunt ut quamvis in multis, praecipue in his quae facti sunt, debeat eisdem credi, tamen {credi tamen: esse creditum FrMz[1075]} non in omnibus quae facti sunt vel scientiae seu peritiae eo ipso debeat aliquid reputari verum tam certitudinaliter {actudinaliter Fr[1076]} quod nulla probatio in contrarium possit admitti quia ipsi ita senserunt, cum errare potuerunt, licet non semper erraverint {*erraverunt FrMz[1077]} et aliqui eorum in nulla scriptura aliquod falsum protulerunt assertive. Et ideo assertiones eorum in his quae sunt scientiae seu peritiae nec sunt taliter necessario recipiendae a legentibus nisi easdem vel per scripturas sacras vel per irrefragabilem rationem vel approbationem universalis {universalem LmPz[1078]} ecclesiae vel per operationem {per operationem: participationem FrMz[1079]} miraculi possint ostendere quod sint consonae veritati. In his autem quae facti sunt quae asserunt vel per se ipsos vel {fide dignos add. Fr[1080]} fide dignorum relatione {revelatione Fr[1081]} legitima cognovisse ipsis {ipse Fr[1082]} tanquam fide dignis est credendum nisi per alios credibiliores possit {*posset FrLmMzPz[1083]} contrarium probari, quia in huiusmodi non est inconveniens quod plus credatur {cedatur LmPz[1084]} uni quam alteri. Quemadmodum secundum quosdam in historiis et translationibus plus credendum est Hieronymo quam Augustino.	The reply to the argument itself [ad rem, in contrast with ad hominem] says, first with respect to the text of Augustine to Jerome, that Augustine's intention there is that this fear and honour should be offered universally and without any exception only to writers of the Bible, so that from the fact that something is found there it should be believed to be true and no proof to the contrary should be listened to. Many others should be read, however, in such a way that, although in many things, especially matters of fact, they should be believed, nevertheless it is not the case that in all matters of fact or [theoretical] knowledge or skill something should, from the very fact that they have thought thus, be regarded as true so certainly that no contrary proof can be admitted, since they were able to err, though they did not always err and some of them did not in any writing put forward assertively anything false. And their assertions in matters of [theoretical] knowledge and skill, therefore, should not necessarily be accepted by readers in this way unless they can show -- by the sacred scriptures, by unshakeable reason, by the confirmation of the universal church, or by the operation of a miracle -- that these assertions are in agreement with the truth. In matters of fact, however, which they assert that they have learnt either directly or from a legitimate report from those worthy of trust, they should be believed as worthy of trust, unless the contrary could be proved by others who are more believable (because it is not inappropriate in matters of this kind that one person be believed more than another, just as some people say that in matters of history and translation Jerome should be believed more than Augustine).
Veruntamen dicitur, sicut tactum est supra, quod pro assertionibus omnibus doctorum approbatorum ab ecclesia praesumendum est quousque de contrario constet, quemadmodum praesumitur pro assertione iudicis et etiam multitudinis antequam constiterit {constat Fr[1085]} contrarium. Notandum {*notatur FrLmMzPz[1086]} autem quod Augustinus in auctoritate illa loquens de scriptoribus aliis a scriptoribus canonum {*canonis LmMzPz[1087]} {canonice Fr[1088]} Bibliae inter hos {homines FrMz[1089]} scriptores {scriptoris FrMz[1090]} et illos non distinguit. Et ideo sive fuerint {sunt Fr[1091]} summi pontifices sive alii, sive scripserint aliquid in concilio generali sive extra, consimile de eis iudicium est habendum ut {et LmPz[1092]} in his quae scientiae sunt vel iuris non ideo aliquid putetur certitudinaliter modo praedicto esse verum quia ipsi ita scripserunt nisi id aliquo praedictorum modorum, scilicet per scripturam {*scripturas FrLmMzPz[1093]} divinam {*canonicas FrMz[1094]} {divinas LmPz[1095]} vel rationes irrefragabiles aut operationem miraculi aut per approbationem universalis ecclesiae, persuadere valuerint.	It is said, however, as was alluded to above, that there should be a presumption in favour of all the assertions of doctors approved by the church until the contrary is established, just as there is a presumption in favour of the assertion of a judge, and even of a multitude, before the opposite has been established. It is noted, however, that in that text, speaking of writers other than the writers of the canon of the bible, Augustine does not distinguish between different categories of writers. And, therefore, whether they were highest pontiffs or others, whether they wrote something in a general council or outside it, the same judgement should be made about them, so that in matters of [theoretical] knowledge or law something should not therefore be thought certainly true in the aforesaid way because they have written it, unless they have been able to make it persuasive in some of the aforesaid ways -- that is, by the canonical scriptures, by unshakeable arguments, by the operation of a miracle or by the confirmation of the universal church.
Consimiliter ad auctoritatem aliam {*trs. FrMz[1096]} Augustini dicitur quod scripturae suae non sunt tantae auctoritatis quantae sunt divinae. Cum hoc tamen stat {constat Fr[1097]} quod in quibusdam sit ei {eis LmPz[1098]} credendum et quod non est negandus nisi ab illo qui certus est ipsum a veritate recedere.	To the other text of Augustine it is said in a similar way that his writings are not of such great authority as are divine writings. Nevertheless it is consistent with this that he should be believed in certain matters and that he should not be rejected except by someone certain that he is departing from the truth.
Et eodem modo dicitur ad auctoritatem Hieronymi quod solum novum et vetus testamentum recipi debent inter scripturas canonicas et tamen pluribus scripturis aliis quo ad multa est credendum et in multis negari non debent.	And in the same way it is said in response to the text from Jerome that only the new and old testaments should be accepted as canonical writings, and yet many other writings should be believed on many matters and ought not be rejected in many cases.
Et eodem modo respondetur ad concilium Carthaginense quod ipsum solummodo prohibet, praeter scripturas canonicas quae sunt Genesis et caeterae {ceteris LmPz[1099]} quae de Biblia numerantur, alias legi sub nomine divinarum scripturarum. Cum quo stat quod legendae sunt et quod alicuius auctoritatis sunt ita ut quo {que Fr[1100]} ad multa negari non debeant et in multis sit credendum eisdem.	A similar reply is made to the council of Carthage, that it only forbids other writings, besides the canonical scriptures which are Genesis and the others that are reckoned as in the bible, being read "under the name of divine scriptures", with which it is consistent that they (the others) should be read and that they should be of some authority, so that in many matters they should not be rejected and in many they should be believed.
CAP. XXV Discipulus Nunc secundum praescriptam opinionem supra c. 4 recitatam narra quomodo respondetur ad illa quae supra 2 c. ostendunt {*ostenduntur FrLmMzPz[1101]}, quod decretis et decretalibus summorum pontificum et canonibus apostolorum qui in Biblia non habentur et dictis doctorum ab ecclesia approbatorum est fides absque dubitatione aliqua adhibenda.	Chapter 25 Student Tell me now how reply is made, according to that opinion set down in chapter four above, to the things shown in Chapter two above, that trust without any doubt should be offered to the decrees and decretals of the highest pontiffs, to the canons of the apostles not found in the bible, and to the sayings of doctors approved by the church.
Reply by opinion (4) to the reasons given by opinion (2) for believing the writings of apostles, popes and approved doctors
Magister Opinio illa concedit quod canonibus apostolorum quamvis non inserantur in Biblia est adhibenda certa credulitas, quia quamvis non sint {sunt Fr[1102]} inscripti {*inserti FrLmMzPz[1103]} in scripturis canonicis scriptores tamen scripturarum canonicarum fuerunt et {*om. FrLmMzPz[1104]} auctores earum. Et ideo recipi debent cum reverentia et credulitate firma ita ut {om. Fr[1105]} non liceat credere quod aliquid contentum in eis sit falsum aut perversum.	Master That opinion grants that sure belief should be offered to the canons of the apostles even if they are not inserted in the bible because the writers of the canonical scriptures were the authors of them even if they have not been inserted in the canonical scriptures. And they should be received, therefore, with such reverence and firm belief that it is not permissible to believe that anything contained in them is false or perverse.
Discipulus Licet {om. FrMz[1106]} [[Fr adds in margin; space left Mz [1107]]] teneamur credere quod nullus scriptorum Bibliae in scribendo quamcunque partem Bibliae errare potuerit, sicut nec potuit errare praedicando vel verbis asserendo aliquid quod tunc fuit scriptum vel post fuit scribendum in quacunque parte Bibliae, tamen non artamur credere {concedere Fr[1108]} quod nullus eorum potuerit errare in scripturis aliis a Biblia, sicut nec cogimur credere nullum eorum potuisse errare alia asserendo quae non erant scripta nec scribenda in Biblia. Cum ergo nequaquam credere astringamur quod semper quilibet eorum in verbis et factis tenuerit veritatem, nam et beatus Petrus princeps aliorum apostolorum aliquando ad veritatem minime ambulavit, non tenemur ergo credere {cedere Pz[1109]} quod in aliis scripturis a canone Bibliae nunquam dimiserit {dimiserint LmPz[1110]} veritatem.	Student Although we are bound to believe that none of the writers of the bible could have erred in writing any part of the bible, just as they could not have erred in preaching or asserting verbally anything which was then written or was afterwards to be written in any part of the bible, yet we are not constrained to believe that none of them could have erred in writings other than the bible, just as we are not forced to believe that none of them could have erred in asserting other things which were not written nor to be written in the bible. Since we are not forced to believe, therefore, that each of them always held to the truth in his words and his deeds, for even blessed Peter, the head of the other apostles sometimes did not walk in the truth, we are as a result not bound to believe that in other writings apart from the canon of the bible they never put aside the truth.
Magister Ad hoc respondetur dupliciter. Uno modo quod quamvis quilibet apostolorum per se a veritate deviare potuerit, sicut et Petrus, tamen collegium apostolorum errare non potuit. Unde et quando Petrus erravit nequaquam erravit collegium apostolorum sed unus eorum, scilicet Paulus, ipsum correxit. Unde videtur quod illa promissio Christi Matthaei ultimo [28:20], "Vobiscum sum ... usque ad consummationem seculi", non tantum debeat intelligi de universali ecclesia sed etiam de collegio apostolorum pro tempore eorundem, quia ipsis immediate fuit dicta promissio et in ipsis fuit facta universali {universalis Fr[1111]} ecclesiae. Cum igitur canones apostolorum dicuntur fuisse totius collegii apostolorum videtur quod non sit dubitandum quin quicquid contineatur {*continetur FrMz[1112]} in eis nullo modo sit falsum aut perversum.	Master There are two ways of replying to this. One way is that although any one of the apostles by himself could have deviated from the truth, as even Peter did, yet the college of the apostles could not have erred. So even when Peter erred, the college of apostles did not err, but one of them, namely Paul, corrected him. It seems from this that the promise of Christ in the last chapter of Matthew [28:20], "I am with you to the end of the age", should be understood not only of the universal church but also of the college of the apostles during their time, because the promise was made directly to them and in them was made to the universal church. Since, therefore, the canons of the apostles are said to have been from the whole college of the apostles, it seems that it should not be doubted that anything contained in them is in no way false or perverse.
Aliter dicitur quod canones apostolorum per universalem ecclesiam quae tunc parvi numeri fuit {sunt LmPz[1113]} approbati fuerunt. Ecclesia autem universalis errare non potest. Et ideo nihil erroneum aut iniquum continetur in eis.	In another way it is said that the canons of the apostles were approved by the universal church, which at that time was small in number. The universal church, however, can not err. And, therefore, nothing erroneous or wicked is contained in them.
Discipulus Quomodo respondetur ad allegationes quibus ostenditur quod decretis et decretalibus summorum pontificum adhibenda est fides?	Student How is answer made to the arguments by which it is shown that trust ought to be offered to the decrees and decretals of the highest pontiffs?
Magister Ad illos {*illas FrMz[1114]} datur responsio Graciani dist. 19, Haec {*Hoc FrMz[1115]} autem, est {*om. FrLmMzPz[1116]} quod videlicet illis {om. Fr[1117]} adhibenda est fides "in quibus nec praecedentium patrum decretis nec evangelicis praeceptis aliquid contrarium invenitur." Si autem aliquid illicite et non canonice scripserunt {scripserit FrMz[1118]} {*scripserint LmPz[1119]} repudiandum est ab illo qui hoc cognoscit {cognoscat Fr[1120]}. De illis vero {*om. FrLmMzPz[1121]} quae sunt consona veritati intelligunt Nicolaus papa et Agatho papa et {*aut FrLmMzPz[1122]} alii sancti patres qui de hoc loquuntur.	Master Gratian's reply (dist. 19, [para.] Hoc autem [c.7, col.62]) is given to them, namely that trust should be offered to those [decrees] "in which nothing is found which is contrary to the decrees of the fathers who have gone before us or to gospel precepts." If they have written anything impermissibly and not canonically, however, it should be repudiated by whoever knows this. Popes Nicholas and Agatho or other holy fathers who talk about this mean those matters which conform to the truth.
Discipulus Quid faciendum esset de decretalibus summorum pontificum qui continerent aliquid erroneum aut perversum si catholici hoc nescirent?	Student What would have to be done about decretals of the highest pontiffs which contain something erroneous if catholics did not know this?
Magister Pro hac materia potes recurrere {currere Fr[1123]} ad {primum add. Fr[1124]} septimum librum {*trs. Fr[1125]} primae partis istius Dialogi ubi de hoc multa discussimus.	Master For this matter you can go back to the seventh book of the first part of this Dialogue where we have discussed many aspects of this.
Discipulus Hoc non obstante dic breviter quid de hoc {de hoc: om. Fr[1126]} sentit opinio supra c. 2. {4 ??} recitata.	Student Notwithstanding that, say briefly what the opinion cited in chapter 2 [rather, 4] above thinks about this.
Magister Illa opinio tenet quod si aliqua decretalis summi pontificis in rei veritate est contraria fidei aut bonis moribus illi qui hoc ignorant praesumere debent pro ipsa, non tamen sic quin possint, et in casu teneantur, probationem in contrarium admittere. Si vero aliqui, praecipue literati et scientiae excellentis vel etiam mediocris, se offerant probaturos decretalem summi pontificis esse contrariam fidei vel bonis moribus aut non esse recipiendam inter scripturas authenticas alii eorum probationes audire tenentur, praesertim si periculum fidei aut morum aut etiam personarum immineat, quia in hoc casu quilibet Christianus salutem fidei, bonorum morum, et personarum catholicarum erroneae decretali summi pontificis et honori {et add. Fr[1127]} temporali ipsius praeferre tenentur {*tenetur ??[1128]}, et quicunque commode {coniuncte FrMz[1129]} potest audire rationes monstrantes decretalem papae esse erroneam seu haereticalem et noluerit, {nolunt Fr[1130]} si ipsam defenderit vel etiam pro ipsa praesumpserit credens et fautor pravitatis haereticae est censendus, quia ignorantia talem non excusat eo quod talis ignorantia est affectata vel crassa et supina quae non excusat.	Master That opinion holds that if any decretal of a highest pontiff is in truth of fact contrary to faith or good morals, those who do not know this ought to make a presumption in favour of it, yet not in such a way that they can not, and in a particular case are not bound to, admit proof to the contrary. Indeed, if some people, especially those learned and excelling or even middling in knowledge, offer to prove that a decretal of a highest pontiff is contrary to the faith or to good morals or should not be accepted among authoritative writings, others are bound to listen to their proofs, especially if it threatens danger to the faith, to morals or even to persons, because in this case any christian is bound to put the salvation of faith, good morals and catholic persons before an erroneous decretal of a highest pontiff and his temporal honour, and whoever can conveniently listen to arguments showing that a decretal of a pope is erroneous or heretical and refuses to do so should be considered a believer and supporter of heretical wickedness if he defends it or even makes a presumption in its favour, because ignorance does not excuse such a person in that such ignorance is pretended or crass and supine, which does not excuse.
Discipulus Videtur quod probationes contra decretales summorum pontificum sunt minime audiendae, quia ratione consimili audiendae essent {sed add. Fr[1131]} probationes contra sacram scripturam. Et ita doctor vel literatus alius qui commode posset {possit Fr[1132]} et non legeret libros haereticorum et philosophorum contra scripturam sacram peccaret quod tanquam {om. FrMz[1133]} inconveniens est habendum.	Student It seems that proofs against decretals of the highest pontiffs should not be listened to, because [otherwise] it would for a similar reason be appropriate to listen to proofs against sacred scripture, and in this way, a doctor or other learned man who was conveniently able to read and did not read the books of heretics and philosophers against sacred scripture would sin, which must be regarded as unsuitable.
Magister Ad hoc respondetur quod non est simile de sacra scriptura et de decretali summi pontificis, quia firmiter est tenendum quod scriptura sacra errare non potest. Ideo nisi aliqua causa moveat {movet Fr[1134]} specialis non oportet legere vel audire aliquam probationem contra ipsam qualescunque et quotcunque {quodcunque FrLmPz[1135]} affirment se posse probare aliquid contra eam. Sed de papa firmiter catholici literati praecipue et intelligentes ac ratione vigente {*vigentes FrMz[1136]} credere obligantur quod potest errare et per consequens quod contra quamcunque scripturam ipsius, praesertim in his quae scientiae seu peritiae sunt, de qua in speciali non constat quod est consona scripturae sacrae vel rationi evidenti vel assertioni universalis ecclesiae vel per divinum miraculum confirmata, debet auditi {*audiri FrLmMzPz[1137]} probatio {prolatio Fr[1138]}. Et ideo nolentes {volentes LmPz[1139]} audire probationes contra decretales papae cum possunt si errant per ignorantiam nullatenus excusantur. Sed de quolibet illorum verificaretur {verificabatur Mz[1140]} {verificantur Fr[1141]} illud apostoli ignorans ignorabitur.	Master The reply to this is that sacred scripture and a decretal of the highest pontiff are not similar, because it should be firmly held that sacred scripture can not err. Unless some particular reason moves us, therefore, it is not appropriate to read or listen to any proof against it, however many people of whatever kind assert that they are able to prove something against it. But catholics, especially those who are learned and skilful and vigorous in reason, are obliged to believe firmly of the pope that he can err and, as a consequence, that proof against any writing of his should be listened to, especially in matters of [theoretical] knowledge or skill, if it is not certain specifically that it is in accord with sacred scripture or clear reason or an assertion of the universal church or has been confirmed by a divine miracle. And those refusing to listen to proofs against papal decretals when they can do so, therefore, are not excused through ignorance if they err, but to any of them the Apostle's text would apply, that he who does not know will not be known (1 Cor. 14:38].
Discipulus Qualiter respondetur ad allegationes quibus ostenditur quod dictis doctorum ab ecclesia approbatorum est credendum?	Student How is answer made to the arguments by which it is shown that the sayings of doctors approved by the church should be believed?
Magister Respondetur ad eas quod dictis doctorum {*ab ecclesia approbatorum add. FrMz[1142]} taliter est credendum et praesumendum pro ipsis si non constet aperte quod obviant veritati. Et ideo opuscula eorum recipienda sunt cum reverentia, non tamen sic quin liceat credere quod aliquid poterat reperiri in eis {ipsis Fr[1143]} contrarium veritati, quia de facto unus contrariatur alteri et per consequens aliquis eorum erravit, quia contraria non possunt simul esse vera. Iste tamen honor deferendus est eis ut nullus credatur fuisse {esse Fr[1144]} pertinax in assertione falsae sententiae. Et ideo nullus eorum {earum Fr[1145]} de pravitate haeretica est notandus. Sed praesumendum est de quolibet quod tanta sollicitudine quanta potuit {quanta potuit: om. FrMz[1146]} quaesiverit {que fuerunt FrMz[1147]} veritatem quamvis non semper invenerit {invenerunt Fr[1148]}.	Master The reply to them is that we should believe in this way and make a presumption in favour of the sayings of doctors approved by the church if it is not clearly established that they conflict with the truth. And so their small works should be accepted with reverence, yet not so that it is not permitted to believe that something could be found in them contrary to the truth, because in fact one of them is opposed to the other and consequently one of them has erred, since contraries can not be true at the same time. Such honour should be offered to them, however, that none of them should be believed to have been pertinacious in the assertion of a false opinion, and none of them, therefore, should be censured for heretical wickedness, but there should be a presumption about each of them that he has sought the truth with as much care as he could even if he has not always found it.
Ad illud quod accipitur quod assertionibus summorum pontificum et in expositione sanctarum scripturarum {*trs. FrMz[1149]} est credendum, quibus tamen praeferuntur expositiones doctorum, respondetur quod assertionibus huiusmodi summorum pontificum credendum est modo praeposito {*praeexposito FrLmMzPz[1150]}. Et ideo eodem modo credendum est dictis doctorum ab ecclesia approbatorum.	To the point taken [as a premise] that assertions of the highest pontiffs, even in the exposition of sacred scriptures, should be believed, with the expositions of doctors preferred nonetheless, the reply is that assertions of this kind by the highest pontiffs should be believed in the way expounded before. And in the same way, therefore, should the sayings of doctors approved by the church be believed.
Ad illud autem Hormisdae papae respondetur quod intelligit de illis quae {qui Fr[1151]} a sede apostolica sunt catholicae {*catholice FrLmMzPz[1152]} constituta seu diffinita, pro quibus praesumendum est nisi probatio evidens in contrarium affirmetur {*asseratur FrMz[1153]}.	To that [argument] of Pope Hormisdas, however, the reply is that he means those matters which have been established or defined by the apostolic see in conformity with catholic doctrine, in favour of which there should be a presumption unless clear proof to the contrary is asserted.
Et eodem modo dicitur ad canonem Nicolai papae.	The same response is made to the canon of Pope Nicholas.
CAP. XXVI Discipulus Restat secundum opinionem saepe dictam ut narres {narras Fr[1154]} quomodo respondetur ad allegationes inductas c. 3 quibus {*ostenditur add. FrLmMzPz[1155]} quod etiam doctoribus ab ecclesia minime approbatis quo ad ea in quibus omnes {unus Fr[1156]} {om. LmMzPz[1157]} vel plures eorum et praecipue magis famosi concordant alii {?aliquando FrMz[1158]} fidem adhibere tenentur.	Chapter 26 Student There remains that you should explain how, according to that often mentioned opinion [i.e. of chapter 4], reply is made to the arguments brought forward in chapter three, by which it is shown that others are bound to show trust also to doctors not approved by the church, in respect of those matters in which all or most of them, and especially the most famous, agree.
OPINIONS 3 and 4: non-approved doctors
Magister Ad primam illarum allegationum cum accipitur quod teste Leone papa non credere doctoribus est iniquum, respondetur quod intentio Leonis ibidem est qui {*quod FrLmMzPz[1159]} non credere doctoribus ab ecclesia approbatis quo ad ea quae sunt consona pietati est iniquum impia sapiendo {*sapiendum FrMz[1160]}. Et ideo praemittit ibidem, "Quid est iniquius quam impia {ipsa FrMz[1161]} sapere" etc. Sed non credere doctoribus qui se mutuo reprobant {*eis qui non sunt ab ecclesia approbati add. FrMz[1162]} non est iniquum.	Master To the first of those arguments, when it is taken [as premise] that it is wicked, as Pope Leo attests [24, q. 3, c.30, Quid autem col.998], not to believe the doctors, the reply is that Leo's meaning in that place is that not to believe doctors approved by the church in respect of things in conformity with piety is wicked, thinking impious thoughts. And that is why he puts first in that place, "What is more wrong than to think impious thoughts", etc. But not to believe those doctors who mutually condemn each other and are not approved by the church is not wicked.
Discipulus Secundum {Discipulus Secundum: om. FrMz[1163]} {*Discipulus: Sequitur ex add. Fr[1164]} [[marginal addition]] hoc {*quod add. Fr[1165]} [[interlinear]] non aliter credendum est doctoribus approbatis ab ecclesia quam non approbatis, quia sicut iniquum est impia sapiendo {*sapiendum FrMz[1166]} non credere {*doctoribus ab ecclesia approbatis ita iniquum est impia sapiendum, non credere add. FrMz[1167]} aliis doctoribus qui sunt ab ecclesia minime approbati. Et ita non aliter credendum est istis quam illis.	Student It follows from this that doctors approved by the church should be believed no differently than those not approved, because, just as it is "wicked, thinking impious thoughts," not to believe doctors approved by the church, so it is "wicked, thinking impious thoughts," not to believe other doctors who have not been approved by the church. And so the one group should be believed in the same way as the other.
Magister Respondetur quod impia sapere contingit dupliciter, scilicet {sed Mz[1168]} impie seu pertinaciter vel non impie et non pertinaciter, quemadmodum {enim add. Fr[1169]} etiam in his quae fidei sunt contingit errare pertinaciter et non pertinaciter et ita contingit errare impie et non impie. Nunquam autem vel raro discreditur doctoribus ab ecclesia approbatis, quando dicta eorum possunt haberi, impia sapiendo {*sapiendum Mz[1170]} {sapiendi Fr[1171]} nisi impie, quia raro et eorum quidam {quidem Fr[1172]} in nullis penitus erraverunt. Sed saepe contingit impia sapiendo {*sapiendum FrMz[1173]} non impie tamen non credere doctoribus ab ecclesia minime approbatis, cum etiam sapiendo {*sapiendum FrLmMzPz[1174]} impia contingat in multis non credere eis, cum in multis errent quod ex contrarietate inter ipsos perpenditur {propenditur FrLmMzPz[1175]} evidenter. Propter quam contrarietatem tam crebram et {etiam Mz[1176]} fantasticorum assertionem pro assertionibus eorum est minime praesumendum. Et ideo aliter credendum est doctoribus ab ecclesia approbatis quam aliis.	Master The reply is that it is possible to "think impious thoughts" in two ways, that is impiously or pertinaciously, or not impiously and not pertinaciously, just as also in matters of faith it is possible to err pertinaciously and not pertinaciously; and so it is possible to err impiously and not impiously. Never or rarely, however, are doctors approved by the church disbelieved "thinking impious thoughts" except impiously [i.e. pertinaciously], when what they have said can be had [e.g. their books obtained -- text corrupt?], because they [the doctors] have erred rarely and some of them in nothing at all. But it is often possible for someone "thinking impious [i.e. erroneous] thoughts", but not impiously, not to believe doctors not approved by the church, since it is possible [without pertinacity] even for someone "thinking impious thoughts" not to believe them in many matters, since they err in many matters, which is clearly understood from the opposition among them. Because of this very frequent opposition and their assertion of imaginary things there should not be a presumption in favour of their assertions [so disbelieving them, even when they are actually right, is not evidence of fault]. And therefore doctors approved by the church should be believed differently from others.
Propter sanctitatem enim et veritatem ac {et Fr[1177]} utilitatem doctrinae doctorum ab ecclesia approbatorum reverentia tanto merito debetur eisdem ut nemo qui non {om. Fr[1178]} est certus eos vel eorum {vel add. LmPz[1179]} aliquem defecisse debeat quodcunque dictum eorum vel {aliquorum add. Fr[1180]} alicuius ipsorum negare contrarium sapiendo aut aliquam assertionem alicuius eorum ad falsum aut perversum trahere intellectum antequam mentem et {aut Fr[1181]} motiva eorum vel alicuius eorum {ipsorum Fr[1182]} si potest viderit diligenter. Sed tantam reverentiam non tenemur doctoribus ab ecclesia minime {probatis seu add. Fr[1183]} approbatis necessario exhibere praesertim cum studere in libris eorum propter diversas opiniones indociles {*inutiles FrMz[1184]} et fantasticas ac vix opinabiles assertive vel opinative insertas in eis impedimentum maximum praestet scientiae necessariae et utili ecclesiae Dei.	For reverence is so deservedly owed to doctors approved by the church, on account of their sanctity and the truth and utility of their teaching, that no one who is not sure that they have fallen short (or that one of them has) should deny any saying of theirs (or of his) by thinking its opposite, or lead any assertion by any one of them to a false or perverse meaning, before he has carefully examined, if he can, their (or his) meaning and reasons. But we are not bound necessarily to show such great reverence to doctors not approved by the church, especially since studying their books presents the greatest impediment to the knowledge which is necessary and useful to the church of God because of the various useless, unreal and hardly tenable opinions inserted assertively or as an opinion in them.
Discipulus Dic qualiter respondetur ad allegationem sequentem.	Student Tell me how reply is made to the argument following.
Magister Respondetur quod scripturae divinae principaliter docendae {discendae FrMz[1185]} sunt a doctoribus ab ecclesia approbatis et ab illis qui sunt veritatis et non propriarum opinionum amatores, qui in docendo in divinis literis et aliis authenticis scripturis {*trs. FrMz[1186]} ac rationibus irrefragabilibus, solam veritatem non inanem gloriam aut favorem cuiuscunque quaerentis {*quaerentes LmMzPz[1187]} {quaerens Fr[1188]}, se fundare nituntur, parati opiniones proprias revocare si eas per se vel per alios doctores vel discipulos excellentes vel parum intelligentes cognoverint {*cognoverunt FrMz[1189]} veritati quomodolibet adversari, non autem ab illis qui opiniones vel assertiones proprias vel sui ordinis, collegii, nationis, amicorum vel adhaerentium aut faventium vel cuiuscunque personae qualitercunque coniunctae, relictis aut spretis opinionibus seu assertionibus aliorum verioribus vel probabilioribus tenent aut defendunt vel teneri cupiunt aut defendi.	Master The reply is that the divine scriptures should be taught principally by doctors approved by the church and by those who are lovers of the truth and not of their own opinions, who in their teaching seek only the truth and not empty glory or anyone's favour, and try to base themselves on divine literature, other authentic writings, and unshakeable arguments, being prepared to retract their own opinions if they learn, of themselves or from other doctors or from students (those who excel or those who understand little), that these [opinions] are in any way opposed to the truth. [Teaching should], however, not be by those who, putting aside or spurning the truer or more probable opinions or assertions of others, hold or defend, or want to be held or defended, their own opinions or assertions or those of their own order, college, nation or of their friends or those who favour or support them, or of any person at all who is linked to them in some way.
Discipulus Quid si aliquis superior vel praelatus voluerit cogere sibi subiectos approbare et {vel Fr[1190]} tenere opiniones seu doctrinam alicuius doctoris ab ecclesia minime approbati?	Student What if any superior or prelate wants to compel those subject to him to approve and hold the opinions or teaching of any doctor not approved by the church?
Magister Dicitur quod talis praelatus peccaret mortaliter et omnes consentientes sibi et faventes.	Master It is said that such a prelate and all who agree with him and support him would sin mortally.
Discipulus Nunquid secundum opinionem istam artantes sibi subiectos ad defendendum opiniones doctoris vel doctorum huiusmodi sunt haeretici {*inter hereticos Mz[1191]} {vel inter hereticos Fr[1192]} computandi si {sed Mz[1193]} inter opiniones illas aliqua in rei veritate scripturae divinae repugnant {repugnat Mz[1194]} {*repugnet Fr[1195]} quamvis non patenter sed latenter?	Student According to that opinion, should those who constrain those subject to them to defend the opinions of a doctor or of doctors of this kind be counted among the heretics if there is among those opinions one which in truth of fact conflicts with divine scripture, but only implicitly and not openly?
Magister Respondetur quod tales sunt haeretici reputandi licet doctor tales opiniones inveniens possit a pravitate haeretica excusari quia deceptus absque pertinacia opinionem suam quae est in rei veritate haeretica quamvis hoc nesciat poterit divulgare. Sed poenis et statutis aut minis vel terroribus aut persecutionibus quibuscunque arcentes {*artantes Mz[1196]} seu cogentes sibi subiectos ad tenendum opinionem huiusmodi et tali artationi seu coactioni consentientes de pertinacia excusari non valent. De taliter enim artantibus seu consentientibus intelligi debet illud Urbani {*pape add. FrMz[1197]} quod habetur 24, q. 3, {4 FrMz[1198]} c. Qui aliorum cum ait, "Qui aliorum errorem defendit multo amplius est damnabilior illis qui errant, qui {*quia FrMzZn[1199]} non solum ille errat sed etiam {et in FrMz[1200]} aliis offendicula erroris praeparat et confirmat", quantum in eo est cogendo alios per huiusmodi artationem seu obligationem errori pertinaciter adhaerere. "Unde quia magister erroris est" per compulsionem huiusmodi "non tantum haereticus sed etiam haeresiarcha dicendus est."	Master The reply is that such people should be regarded as heretics, although a doctor who acquires such opinions can be absolved of heretical wickedness, because having been deceived without pertinacity he will be able to publish his opinion, which in truth of fact is heretical though he does not know it. But those who constrain or compel by punishments and statutes or threats, terror, or any sort of persecution those subject to them to hold an opinion of this kind and those who agree to such punishment or compulsion can not be absolved of pertinacity. For it is about those constraining in that way or those agreeing to it that the words of Pope Urban found in 24, q. 3, c. Qui aliorum [c.32, col.999] should be understood when he says: "He who defends the error of others is much more to be condemned than those who err, because not only does he err himself but he also prepares and confirms obstacles of error for others", as much as he can compelling others by such constraint or obligation of this kind to adhere pertinaciously to an error. "Because he is a teacher of error, therefore," by this sort of compulsion, "he should be said to be not just a heretic but a heresiarch."
Discipulus Alias allegationes prosequere.	Student Go on with the other arguments.
Magister Ad aliam quae accipit {incipit Fr[1201]} quod pro multitudine et maxime sapientum praesumendum est, respondetur quod non est semper pro multitudine sapientum taliter praesumendum ut in illis quae scientiae sunt aliquis multitudini sapientum {insipientum FrLmMzPz[1202]} qui non sunt ab ecclesia approbati credere teneatur antequam invenerit per {quia FrMz[1203]} scripturas sacras aut rationem evidentem vel operationem miraculi aut per assertionem universalis ecclesiae quod eorum assertio sit consona veritati, licet pro eis taliter praesumere liceat ut eorum assertio minime reprobetur aut negetur nisi constiterit quod obviat veritati.	Master To another [argument], which takes it that there should be a presumption in favour of the multitude, and especially of the wise, the reply is that there should not always be a presumption in favour of the multitude of the wise in such a way that in matters of [theoretical] knowledge someone is bound to believe a multitude of the wise who have not been approved by the church before he has found out through the sacred scriptures or clear reason or the operation of a miracle or the assertion of the universal church that their assertion is in accord with the truth, although it is permitted to make such a presumption in their favour that their assertion should not be condemned or denied unless it has been established that it conflicts with the truth.
Ad aliam cum accipitur quod ille prudentiae suae innititur qui ea quae sibi tenenda vel credenda {*trs.321 FrMz[1204]} videntur doctorum assertionibus praesumit praeponere secundum quod innuit Hieronymus Extra, De constitutionibus, c. Ne innitaris, respondetur quod Hieronymus ibidem {ibi Fr[1205]} loquitur de decretis patrum qui fuerunt scriptores scripturae divinae et de pluribus ab ecclesia approbatis, non autem de {hiis et add. Fr[1206]} aliis qui se invicem reprehendunt et reprobant, quia ad illos non oportet regulariter recurrere --	To another [argument], when it is taken [as a premise], according to what Jerome implies in Extra, De constitutionibus, c. Ne innitaris [c.5, col.8], that he relies on his own prudence [[which Proverbs says we should not do]] who presumes to put those things which it seems to him should be believed or held before the assertions of doctors, the reply is that in that place Jerome is talking about the decrees of the fathers who were writers of divine scripture and about the many who have been approved by the church. [He is] not [talking] about others who find fault with and condemn each other, however, because it is not appropriate regularly to have recourse to them --
licet in casu tenetur quis {*tenetur quis: aliquis teneatur FrMz[1207]} quid senserint indagare. Si enim dicant se opiniones suas accepisse a scripturis {*trs.231 FrMz[1208]} divinis, non sunt opiniones huiusmodi reprobandae seu spernandae vel negandae ab eo qui non est certus eas esse contrarias veritati antequam motiva earum viderit diligenter. Si enim opiniones eorum fuerint catholicae et in sacris fundatae scripturis, qui eas negaverint {*negaverit LmMzPz[1209]}, praesertim assertores eorum {*earum FrMz[1210]} persequendo vel persequentibus in hoc favendo, nolens notitiam {*motiva FrMz[1211]} eorum catholicam {*catholica FrMz[1212]} quamvis commode possit legere vel audire attendere {*attente FrLmMzPz[1213]} non potest de pravitate haeretica excusari, quia talis errans qui {*om. FrMz[1214]} non quaerit cauta {tanta Fr[1215]} sollicitudine veritatem quando tenetur; quaerere {*quare FrMz[1216]} est inter haereticos computandus {computandum Mz[1217]}, prout insinuat Augustinus ut habetur 24, q. 3, c. Dixit apostolus.	although on occasion someone may be bound to investigate what they think. For if they say that they have received their opinions from the divine scriptures, such opinions should not be condemned, rejected, or denied by someone not certain that they are contrary to the truth, before he has looked carefully into their reasons; for if their opinions are catholic and based on the sacred scriptures, he who denies them, especially by persecuting those who assert them or by supporting their persecutors, and refuses to read or listen attentively to their Catholic arguments, even though he can conveniently do so, can not be absolved of heretical wickedness, because such an errant is not seeking the truth with careful solicitude when he is bound to do so, and therefore he should be counted among the heretics, as Augustine implies in 24, q. 3, c. Dixit apostolus [c.29, col.998].
Et ita in casu non solum illi "in insipientiam" damnabilem "cadunt" -- secundum Leonem papam, ut habetur 24. q. 3. c. Quid autem, {ubi dicitur add. Lm[1218]} quid autem {*quid autem: om. FrMz[1219]} iniquius quam qui -- {*quam qui: "qui cum FrMzZn[1220]} ad cognoscendam {cognoscendum FrMz[1221]} veritatem aliquo impeditur {*impediuntur FrMzZn[1222]} obscuro, non {nec FrMz[1223]} ad propheticas voces, non {nec FrMz[1224]} ad apostolicas literas, non {*nec FrMzZn[1225]} ad evangelicas auctoritates, sed ad semetipsos recurrunt", sed etiam illi qui ad dicta aliorum qui etiam non sunt ab ecclesia approbati vel etiam {om. Fr[1226]} sunt ab ecclesiasticis et clericis reprobati erronee et iniuste non recurrunt; {*et in casu qui sic ad alios non recurrunt add. FrMz[1227]} eorum motiva legere negligentes suae prudentiae vel forsitan {etiam Fr[1228]} aliorum prudentiae erronee innituntur {nituntur FrMz[1230]} {innitantur LmPz[1231]}.	And so, on occasion, not only do those "fall into" reprehensible "stupidity", -- according to Pope Leo, as we read in 24, q. 3, c. Quid autem iniquius [c.30, col.998] -- "who, when they are prevented by some obscurity from learning the truth, have recourse not to the voices of the prophets, not to apostolic writings, not to gospel texts, but to themselves", but also those who do not have recourse to what has been said also by others who have not been approved by the church, or have even been rebuked erroneously and unjustly by ecclesiastics and clerics; and on occasion those who thus fail to have recourse to others, neglecting to read their reasons, are relying erroneously on their own prudence, or perhaps on the prudence of others.
Non autem illi qui scripturas sacras et doctrinam sanctorum patrum et aliorum opiniones scrutantur sollicite, cum eas possunt habere, suae prudentiae reprehensibiliter innituntur licet inventiones {intentiones Fr[1232]} proprias validis {validas Fr[1233]} munitas rationibus quorumcunque et quotcunque doctorum aliorum opinionibus qui non sunt ab universali ecclesia approbati praeponant {proponant LmPz[1234]}.	It is not the case, however, that those who punctiliously investigate the sacred scriptures, the teaching of the holy fathers, and the opinions of others, when they can obtain possession of them, are relying reprehensibly on their own prudence, even if they prefer their own inventions, fortified by strong arguments, to the opinions of any other doctors at all, no matter how many there are, who have not been approved by the universal church.
Ad aliam allegationem cum accipitur quod fide dignorum testimonio est credendum, respondetur quod fide dignorum testimonio in his quae facti sunt omnes credere debent, nisi sint aliqui qui sciant eos a veritate declinare. Sed in his quae scientiae sunt aut iuris aut peritiae non est necesse omnes credere testimonio fide dignorum etiam qui nesciunt eos errare nec quo ad omnia in quibus non errant. Et hoc quia notum est quod vacantes scientiis etiam doctores {doctoris Fr[1235]} qui nullum falsum assererent scienter {*trs. FrMz[1236]} errant {erant Pz[1237]} in his quae scientiae sunt et artium cum etiam peritissimi erraverint {erraverunt Fr[1238]} et multa {*in add. FrMz[1239]} huiusmodi ignoraverint {ignoraverunt Fr[1240]}.	To the other argument, when it is taken [as a premise] that the testimony of those worthy of trust should be believed, the reply is that in matters of fact everyone should believe the testimony of those worthy of trust, except any who know that they are deviating from the truth. But in matters of [theoretical] knowledge, law or skill it is not necessary for everyone to believe the testimony of those worthy of trust, even if they do not know that they are in error, nor in respect of everything about which they do not err. This is because it is known that those who devote themselves to [theoretical] knowledge, even doctors who would not knowingly assert anything false, err in matters of [theoretical] knowledge and the arts, since even the most expert err and do not know many things in matters of this kind.
Ad ultimam dicitur per praedicta quod non omni experto {experimento FrMz[1241]} in aliqua arte est credendum in omnibus eo quod multorum non habet {habent Fr[1242]} experientiam neque peritiam quae tamen spectant ad artem. Et ideo potest in multis errare et sophisticis rationibus decipi.	To the last [argument] it is said according to what has been said before that not everyone expert in a field should be believed in everything, because they do not have experience or skill in many matters which do nonetheless pertain to that field. They can, therefore, err in many things and be deceived by sophistical arguments.