William of Ockham, Dialogus,
part 3, tract 2, book 2.

Text and translation by John Scott.

Copyright (c) 1999, The British Academy

CAP. I

Discipulus Sicut canonibus sacris testantibus ordo ecclesiasticus confunditur {confundatur &Mz} si sua iurisdictio unicuique {*episcopo &NaRe} {om. &MzPe} non conservatur {*servatur &MzNaPeRe} Extra, De accusationibus, Sicut olim in glossa et 11, q. 1, Pervenit, sic ordinem mortalium manifestum {mandatum &Re} est {om. &Pe} confundi si unicuique {unicuicumque &Re} praesidenti {*etiam add. &MzNaPeRe} in temporalibus et maxime {et add. &Mz} supremo sua iura non servantur. Servari autem non possunt nisi cognoscantur. Et ideo {*et ideo: idcirco &MzNaRe} post praedicta quae sunt {*sint &NaRe} iura et potestas Romanorum imperatorum {imperatoris &Mz} {*trs. &NaRe} censeo {conscio &Mz} indagandum. Primo autem inquiram quae iura et quam {om. &MzPe} potestatem habet {*habeat &MzNaPeRe} imperator super temporalia. Ut tamen a fundamentis eorum {*om. &NaRe} {rerum &MzPe} incipiam, ante omnia {querere add. &Mz} quaero an potestas imperatoris et papae potestas {*trs. &MzNaPeRe} sint {sunt &Mz} distinctae potestates {*trs. &MzNaRe} an {*sive &MzNaPeRe} una sit ex {*ab &MzNaPeRe} alia aut {*sive &MzNaPeRe} non.

CHAPTER 1

Student Just as the ecclesiastical order is thrown into confusion if a bishop does not preserve his jurisdiction, as the sacred canons attest (the gloss on Extra, De accusationibus, c. Sicut olim [col.1600] and 11, q. 1, c. Pervenit [c.39, col.637}), so it is clear that the order of humanity is thrown into confusion if the rights of each person who is in command in temporal affairs too, and especially he who is supreme ruler, are not preserved. They can not be preserved, however, unless they are known. Now I propose, therefore, that we investigate what are the rights and the power of the Roman emperors. Yet in order to begin with the basics I ask first of all whether the power of the emperor and the power of the pope are distinct powers, whether one comes from the other or not.

The rights and powers of the Roman Emperor

Are the powers of the Emperor and the pope distinct powers?

Magister {om. &NaRe} Tenent multi quod sunt {sint &Pe} potestates distinctae.

Master Many people maintain that they are distinct powers.

Discipulus Si aliqua decreta {*dicta &MzNaRe} maiorum consonent {*sonent &NaRe} {sonant &MzPe} assertioni {*hanc assertionem &NaRe} {assertionem &Mz} adducas. Forte enim ex illis melius intelligam omnia quae circa hanc materiam recitabis.

Student If there are statements of our fathers which affirm that assertion would you bring them forward. For perhaps I will better understand from them everything that you are going to say on this matter.

Magister Multi canones sacri et plures glossae super decreta et {seu &Re} decretales videntur asserere {*manifeste add. &MzNaPeRe} quod sunt {sint &Pe} potestates distinctae. Unde Nicolaus Papa, ut habetur {*dist. add. &MzNaPeRe} 96, c. Cum ad verum, ait, "Cum ad verum ventum est ultra sibi nec imperator iura pontificatus arripit {*arripuit &MzNaPeReZn} nec pontifex nomen imperatorium {imperatoris &MzNaPeRe} usurpavit." Ubi dicit glossa {*"Argumentum add. &MzNaReZn}: cum iste potestates sint {sunt &Mz} divisae {distinctae &NaRe} quod {*om. &Zn} imperator non habet gladium a papa."

Master Many sacred canons and glosses on the decrees and decretals seem to assert clearly that those powers are distinct. So as we find in dist. 96, c. Cum ad verum [c.6, col.339], Pope Nicholas says, "Since the truth has come, the emperor has not seized the rights of the pontificate for himself nor has the pontiff usurped the imperial name for himself." Here the gloss [on the word usurped col.466] says, "Argument: since those powers are separate, the emperor does not have his sword from the pope."

Item {*ut add. &NaRe} habetur eadem distinctione c. Duo sunt, {*Gelasius papa ait, "Duo sunt add. &MzNaRe} quippe imperator {imperator add. &Na} auguste, quibus principaliter hic {om. &Pe} mundus regitur, {om. &Na} {regatur &Mz} {et add. &Mz} auctoritas sacra {sacri &Pe} pontificum {pontificatus &Mz} {pontificis &Pe} et potestas regalis {*trs. &MzNaReZn}." Ubi glossa super vocabulo principaliter {*auctoritas &Zn} ait, "Neuter pendet ex reliquo." Et ita est argumentum pro imperatore.

Again, as we find in the same distinction, c. Duo sunt [c.10, col.340], Pope Gelasius says, "There are indeed, august emperor, two [powers] by whom this world is principally ruled, the sacred authority of bishops and royal power." Here the gloss on the word authority [col.468] says, "Neither depends on the other." And on these same lines is the argument on behalf of the emperor.

Item glossa Extra, {om. &Pe} Qui filii sunt legitimi c. Causam super verbo quod ad regem ait, "Sic patet quod iurisdictio temporalis a {*et &MzNaReZn} spirituali {*spiritualis &MzNaReZn} divisa est et distincta {*trs.4231 &NaReZn}."

Again, the gloss on the words quod ad regem in Extra, Qui filii sunt legitimi, c. Causam [col.1535] says, "Thus it is clear that temporal and spiritual jurisdiction are separate and distinct."

Item glossa dist. 10, c. Imperium super verbo administrationibus {administrationis &NaRe} ait, "Distincta est enim potestas sua a potestate pontificali."

Again, the gloss on the word administrationibus in dist. 10, c. Imperium [col.32] says, "For their power is distinct from pontifical power."

Item Gregorius, ut legitur {*habetur &MzNaPeRe} {*Extra add. &MzNaPeRe} De privilegiis, c. Sicut {duo sunt &Pe} ait, "Sicut in iudiciis laicorum privilegia turbare nolumus, ita eis praeiudicantibus nobis volumus moderata {*trs. &MzNaReZn} auctoritate resistere." Ubi dicit glossa sic, {om. &Pe} "Est argumentum {tamen add. &Pe} quod ecclesia non vult iura alterius sibi arrogare quia iurisdictio distincta esse debet."

Again, as we find in Extra, De privilegiis, c. Sicut [c.2, col.849], Gregory says, "Just as we do not want to disturb the privileges of the laity in their courts, so we want to resist with moderate authority those who are prejudicial to us." Here the gloss says the following, "The argument is that the church does not want to arrogate to itself the rights of the other because its jurisdiction should be distinct."

Item Innocentius, ut legitur Extra, De iudiciis {*c. Novit add. &Pe} ait, aut {*om. &MzNaReZn} "Non putet aliquis quod iurisdictionem illustris {om. &NaRe} regis Francorum perturbare aut minuere intendimus {*intendamus &MzNaPeReZn}, cum ipse iurisdictionem nostram nec velit nec debet {*debeat &MzNaPeReZn} impedire."

Again, as we read in Extra, De iudiciis, c. Novit [c.13, col.242], Innocent says, "Let no one think that we intend to disturb or diminish the jurisdiction of the illustrious king of the Franks, since the latter neither wants nor ought to hinder our jurisdiction."

Discipulus In his verbis non sit mentio {*sermo &NaRe} de imperatore sed de rege Francorum.

Student There is no reference in these words to the emperor, but to the king of the Franks.

Magister Ex his verbis {om. &Mz} habetur quod potestas regis Francorum distincta est {*trs. &NaRe} a potestate papae. Et per consequens a fortiori potestas imperatoris {et per consequens ... imperatoris om. &Pe} {*et per consequens ... imperatoris: Ex quo concluditur quod multo fortius potestas imperatoris distincta est a potestate pape &MzNaRe}, tum quia maior est potestas imperatoris quam potestas regis Francorum, tum quia, sicut tactum est supra, non videtur {*legitur &MzNaRe} in scripturis quod sit aliqua {*trs. &MzNaPeRe} potestas tributa {*trs. &NaRe} papae super imperatorem quam non habeat super regem Franciae {*Francorum &MzNaPeRe}.

Master We discover from these words that the power of the king of the Franks is distinct from the power of the pope. We conclude from this that it is much more the case that the power of the emperor is distinct from the power of the pope. This is (i) because the emperor's power is greater than the power of the king of the Franks and (ii) because, as was touched on above, we do not read in the scriptures that any power over the emperor was bestowed on the pope which he does not have over the king of the Franks.

Item {*Hinc &NaPeRe} {hic &Mz} glossa super verbo {*verba predicta &MzNaRe} Innocenti quae {*3 &MzNaRe} {qui &Pe} ait, propter {*"Per &MzNaReZn} hoc quod hic dicitur {*trs. &NaZn} patet quod ecclesia vel Papa non habet utrumque gladium." Et infra, "Non igitur {*ergo &NaReZn} {non igitur om. &Mz} de temporali iurisdictione {non add. &Mz} debet se intromittere {*papa add. &NaReZn} nisi in subsidium, scilicet cum iudex secularis est negligens {*trs. &MzNaPeReZn}."

Hence the gloss on the above words of Innocent III says [col.532], "It is clear from what is said here that neither the church nor the pope has both swords. ... Therefore the pope should not involve himself in temporal jurisdiction except to provide protection, that is when a secular judge is negligent."

Item, sicut allegatum est supra, Cyprianus, ut legitur dist. 96 {*10 &MzNaRe} {8 &Pe} c. cum ad verum {*cum ad verum: Quoniam &MzNaPeRe} {*ait add. &NaPeRe}, "Actibus propriis et dignitatibus distinctis officia potestatis utriusque discernit {*discrevit &MzNaPeReZn}," scilicet {om. &Pe} Christus. Ubi Glossa super verbo discernit {*discrevit &MzNaPeRe} {*ait add. &MzNaRe}, "Cum ergo istae potestates {*trs. &MzNaPeReZn} sunt {*sint &NaPeReZn} distinctae, licet sit {*licet sit: est hic &MzNaPeReZn} argumentum quod imperium non habetur a papa." Et {*infra add. &NaPeRe}, "Ego credo potestates distinctas esse, {et ego credo potestates distinctas om. &Mz} licet papa quandoque utramque potestatem sibi assumat." Ex his {*quibus &NaRe} aliisque quampluribus colligitur quod potestas papae et imperatoris sunt distinctae potestates {*trs. &MzNaPeRe}.

Again, as was argued above, Cyprian says, as we read in dist. 10, c. Quoniam [c.8, col.21] "By their own proper resposibilities and distinct dignities he," that is Christ, "distinguished the duties of each power." The gloss here on the word distinguished [col.33] says, "Since those powers are distinct, therefore, there is here an argument that the empire is not obtained from the pope. ... I believe that those powers are distinct, although sometimes the pope assumes both powers to himself." From these and very many other [examples] we gather that the power of the pope and of the emperor are distinct powers.

 

CAP. II

Discipulus Quod {quot &Mz} sunt {*sint &NaRe} distinctae potestates {*trs. &MzNaPeRe} videtur quod non debet in dubium revocari sed qualiter distinguuntur {*distinguantur &MzNaPeRe} ignoro. Ideo dic secundum aliquam sententiam qualiter {quomodo &Pe} distinguuntur {distinguantur &Mz}.

CHAPTER 2

Student It seems that it should not be called into doubt that they are distinct powers, but I do not know how they are distinguished. Tell me, therefore, how according to any opinion they are distinguished.

The opinion that the pope has power in spiritual matters, the emperor in temporals

Magister Dicitur quod per {in &Mz} hoc distinguuntur, quod papa habet potestatem in spiritualibus et {etiam &Na} imperator in temporalibus.

Master It is said that they are distinguished by this, that the pope has power in spiritual matters, the emperor in temporal matters.

Discipulus Istam assertionem si potes auctoritatibus aliquibus {*trs. &MzNaPeRe} fulcire nitaris.

Student Try to buttress that assertion with some authorities if you can.

Magister Ista {*hec &NaRe} assertio quampluribus auctoritatibus posset {*videtur posse &MzNaPeRe} muniri. Ait enim Innocentius tertius, ut scribitur {*legitur &MzNaPeRe} Extra, De maioritate et obedientia, c. Solitae, {ait add. &Mz} "Non negamus {negavimus &Na} quin praecellat imperator in temporalibus illos duntaxat {trs. &Pe} qui ab eo recipiunt {recipiant &Mz} temporalia. Sed et {*om. &MzNaPeReZn} pontifex in spiritualibus antecellit quae tanto sunt temporalibus digniora quanto {quantum &Pe} anima corpori praefertur {praeest &Mz} {*trs. &MzNaPeReZn}."

Master That assertion seems able to be strengthened by many authorities. For as we read in Extra, De maioritate et obedientia, c. Solitae [c.6, col.196], Innocent III says, "We do not deny that in temporal matters the emperor rules only those who receive temporal goods from him. But the pope is superior in spirtual matters which are worthier than temporal matters to the extent that the soul is esteemed over the body."

Item Cyprianus, ut habetur {legitur &Pe} dist. 10, {4 &Pe} c. Quoniam idem et Nicolaus Papa, ut legitur dist. 96, c. Cum ad verum dicunt officia istarum {illarum &Mz} potestatum esse distincta {*discreta &NaRe} a Christo "ut {*et add. &NaReZn} Christiani imperatores pro aeterna vita pontificibus indigerent, {adigerent &Mz} et pontifices pro cursu temporalium tantum {*tantummodo &MzNaPeReZn} {*rerum add. &MzNaReZn} imperialibus legibus uterentur, quatenus {qualiter &NaRe} spiritualis actio a corporalibus {*carnalibus &MzNaPeReZn} distaret incursibus {cursibus &Pe} et Deo militans minime negotiis secularibus [[et Deo ... secularibus: margin &Pe]] se implicaret, ac vicissim non ille rebus divinis deditus {*praesidere &MzNaPeReZn} videretur qui esset negotiis secularibus implicatus."

Again, Cyprian, as we find in dist. 10, c. Quoniam idem [c.8, col.21, and Pope Nicholas, as we read in dist. 96, c. Cum ad verum [c.6, col.339], say that the duties of those powers were distinguished by Christ "so that christian emperors needed pontiffs for eternal life and pontiffs made use of imperial laws in the course of temporal affairs only, so that spiritual acts were separate from carnal efforts, and so that one serving as a soldier of God did not involve himself in secular affairs and, on the other hand, he who had been involved in secular affairs was not seen to have the management of divine matters."

Item idem Nicolaus eadem distinctione c. Denique sic ait {*sic ait: dicit sic &MzNaRe}, "Denique {sic ait denique om. &Pe} hi, sunt {*om. &MzNaPeReZn} quibus {qui &MzPe} tantum humanis rebus et non divinis praesse permissum {promissum &NaRe} est, quomodo {quando &Pe} de his per quos divina ministrantur {monstrantur &Mz} iudicare praesumant penitus ignoramus."

Again, in the same distinction c. Denique [c.5 col.338], Nicholas says the following, "Finally, we do not at all understand how those people who are allowed to be in command of human affairs only and not divine affairs, presume to make judgements about ones by whom divine matters are managed."

Item Gregorius &Nazianzenus scribens imperatoribus {imperatori &Mz} Constantinis {*Constantinopolitanis &NaPeRe} {Constantinopolitano &Mz}, ut habetur dist. 10 {4 &Pe}, c. Suscipitis, ait, "Suscipitisne libertatem verbi? libere {*Libenter &MzNaPeReZn} accipitis quod lex Christi sacerdotali vos subiicit potestati atque istis {illorum &Mz} tribunalibus subdidit {*subdit &MzNaPeReZn}? Dedit enim et nobis {vobis &Pe} potestatem, dedit et {*om. &MzNaReZn} principatum multo perfectiorem principalibus {*principatibus &MzNaZn} {principantibus &Re} vestris {vestrorum &Mz}. Nunquid aut {*trs. &MzNaReZn} iustum {Nunquid aut iustum: Aliter numquam &Pe} vobis videtur, si cedat spiritus Sanctus {*om. &MzNaPeReZn} carni, si a terrenis coelestia separentur {*superentur &NaReZn}, si divinis praeferantur humana?" {divinis ... humana: divina ... humanis &Pe}

Again, as we find in dist. 10, c. Suscipitis [c.6, col.20], Gregory Nazienzanus writing to the emperors in Constantinople says, "Do you accept the freedom of the word? Do you freely accept that the law of Christ has subjected you to priestly power? For he both gave us power and gave us a rule more perfect than your sovereignty. Or does it seem just to you if the spirit gives way to the flesh, if heavenly affairs are surpassed by earthly affairs, if human affairs are preferred to divine affairs?"

Item Innocentius tertius ubi {ut &Mz} prius ait, "Fecit Deus duo luminaria magna {*trs. &MzNaReZn} in firmamento coeli, luminare maius, ut praeesset diei, et {om. &PeRe} luminare minus, ut praeesset {diei ... praeesset om. &Na} nocti, utrumque magnum et alterum maius." Et infra: {inferius &Pe} "Ad firmamentum ergo {*igitur &NaReZn} coeli, hoc est universalis {ad firmamentum ... universalis om. &Mz} ecclesiae, fecit Deus {Dominus &NaRe} duo luminaria magna {*trs. &MzNaPeReZn}, id est duas instituit {constituit &Mz} dignitates, quae sunt pontificalis auctoritas et regalis {imperialis &Pe} potestas. Sed illa, {ista &Mz} quae praeest {quae praeest: querere &Mz} diebus, id est spiritualibus, maior est; quae vero carnalibus, minor {est add. &Pe}, ut {et &NaRe} quanta est {differentia add. &Re} [[margin]] inter lunam et solem, diversitas {*om. &MzNaReZn} tanta {est add. &Pe} inter reges et pontifices {trs.321 &MzNaPeReZn} esse {*differentia &NaReZn} {se &Pe} {sic &Mz} cognoscatur." Ex his aliisque auctoritatibus innumeris, quarum aliquae sunt adductae supra c. 1, colligitur {tollitur &Mz} quod imperator habet potestatem in temporalibus et papa in spiritualibus.

Again, Innocent III says at the same place as above [Extra, De maioritate et obedientia, c. Solitae c.6, col.196], "God made two great lights in the firmament of heaven, a greater light to preside over the day and a lesser light to preside over the night, one of which is great and the other greater. For the firmament of heaven, therefore, that is the universal church, God made two great lights, that is he established two dignities, which are pontifical authority and royal power. But that one which presides over the days, that is over spiritual affairs, is greater; that presiding over carnal affairs is lesser, so that the difference between bishops and kings is known to be as great as that between the sun and the moon." From these and innumerable other texts, some of which were brought forward in chapter 1 above, we gather that the emperor has power in temporal affairs and the pope in spiritual affairs.

 

CAP. III

Discipulus Sufficienter videtur ostensum quod potestas imperatoris respicit temporalia, carnalia, secularia et humana et potestas papalis spiritualia. Sed quae sunt {*sint &NaRe} temporalia et {*quae add. &MzNaRe} spiritualia {trs.321 &Pe} perfecte {profecte &Pe} non {*trs. &MzNaRe} intelligo. Ideo quae sunt {*sint &NaRe} {om. &Mz} temporalia, et {*om. &MzNaPeRe} carnalia, secularia et humana quae respicit potestas imperialis investigare coneris {*conemur &NaRe}.

CHAPTER 3

Student It seems to have been shown adequately that the emperor's power has regard to temporal, carnal, secular and human affairs and papal power to spiritual affairs. But I do not perfectly understand what are temporal affairs and what are spiritual affairs. Let us try to investigate, therefore, what the temporal, carnal, secular and human affairs are that imperial power has regard to.

What are temporal matters?

Magister Quibusdam videtur {*trs. &NaRe} quod quae sunt {*sint &MzNaRe} illa {*ista &NaRe} in {om. &MzPe} quibus consistit imperialis {*imperatoris &MzNaPeRe} potestas ex diversis distinctionibus quae in diversis scripturis habentur colligitur.

Master It seems to some people that from various distinctions found in different writings we gather what those affairs are over which the emperor's power endures.

Discipulus Libenter audiam distinctiones illas {istas &Mz} {om. &Na}.

Student I will willingly listen to those distinctions.

Magister Una est quod hominum quidam sunt carnales et {*om. &MzNaPeRe} quidam spirituales {*trs.321 &MzNaPeRe} {*sive animales add. &NaRe}. et {*om. &MzNaPeRe} Haec distinctio {haec distinctio: hoc discernitur &Mz} habetur expresse {*habetur expresse ad: ex 1 &MzNaRe} {distinctio ... ad: distinguitur et habetur haec dictinctio expresse &Pe} ad Corinthios c. 2 et 3 Ubi apostolus ait manifeste {om. &Pe} {*Ubi apostolus ait manifeste: colligitur manifeste. Ait enim apostolus c. 2 /1 &Re\ &MzNaRe}, "Animalis {*autem add. &MzNaReVg} homo non percipit ea quae sunt spiritus {ipsius &MzPe} Dei." Et post, {om. &Pe} "Spiritualis autem {alius &Mz} {om. &Pe} iudicat haec {*om. &NaReVg} omnia et ipso {*ipse &MzNaPeReVg} a nemine iudicatur."

Master One is that some men are spiritual, some carnal or natural. We clearly gather this distinction from 1 Corinthians 2 and 3. For the apostle says in 2:14-15, "The man who is natural, however, does not perceive those things which are from God's spirit ... He who is spiritual judges all things and is himself judged by no one."

Alia distinctio est quod quaedam sunt personae ecclesiasticae et {om. &Mz} quaedam seculares. Haec distinctio colligitur ex verbis Hieronymi quae ponuntur 12 {72 &Mz} {2/11 &Pe} q. 1, c. Duo sunt ubi ait, "Duo sunt genera {hominum add. &MzNaPeRe} Christianorum. Est autem unum genus quod mancipatum {mancipatur &MzPe} est {ex &MzPe} divino officio et deditum {datur &Mz} contemplationi et orationi quibus {*om. &MzNaPeReZn} ab {et ob &Na} omni strepitu temporalium rerum vacare {*rerum vacare: cessare &MzNaPeReZn} convenit, {communicat &Pe} ut sunt clerici et Deo devoti scilicet {*videlicet &NaRe} {et &Pe} conversi." Et infra, "Aliud vero genus est Christianorum {trs. &MzNaPeRe} {est add. &Mz} ut sunt laici. Laos {laicos &Pe} enim Graecae est populus. Latine {*om. &NaPeReZn} His licet temporalia possidere {habere &Mz}." sed non nisi ad usum {*sed non nisi ad usum om. &MzNaPeRe}

Another distinction is that some people are ecclesiastical and some are secular. We gather this distinction from the words of Jerome when he says in 12, q. 1, c. Duo sunt [c.7, col.678], "There are two kinds of christians. There is one kind who are devoted to the divine office and for whom it is appropriate, since they are dedicated to contemplation and prayer, to stand back from all the din of temporal affairs, namely those who are clerics and those who are faithful to God as monks. ... The other kind of christians is the laity. For laity is Greek for people. It is permissible for them to possess temporal goods."

Alia distinctio {om. &MzPe} est quod rerum quaedam sunt ecclesiasticae et {*om. &MzNaPeRe} quaedam temporales seu {*temporales seu om. &MzNaPeRe} seculares. Haec {enim add. &Na} distinctio ex diversis sacris canonibus sumitur {*colligitur &MzNaPeRe} qui {*quod &NaPeRe} quasdam vocant res {*trs. &MzNaRe} ecclesiasticas, per hoc insinuantes quod quaedam sunt seculares. Unde in concilio Antiocheno, ut {om. &Mz} habetur 12 {11 &Pe} q. 2 {*1 &NaRe} c. Episcopus, sic legitur, "Episcopus ecclesiasticarum habet {*habeat &MzNaReZn} rerum {*trs. &MzNaReZn} potestatem."

Another distinction is that some goods are ecclesiastical, some are secular. We infer this distinction from various sacred canons because they call some goods ecclesiastical, implying by this that some are secular. So as we read in the [report of] the council of Antioch found at 12, q. 1, c. Episcopus c.23 [col.684], "Let the bishop have power over ecclesiastical goods."

Alia divisio {*distinctio &NaRe} est {divisio est om. &Mz} {*quod add. &MzNaPeRe} causarum quaedam sunt ecclesiasticae et {om. &Pe} quaedam seculares, 12 {*11 &NaRe}, q. 1, para. {c. &Pe} 1, in glossa.

Another distinction is that some cases are ecclesiastical and some are secular (11, q. 1, para. 1, in the gloss).

Alia est {*distinctio add. &NaRe} quod criminum quaedam sunt ecclesiastica {crimina add. &Pe} et quaedam secularia. Haec divisio {*distinctio &MzNaPeRe} innuitur ibidem.

Another distinction is that some offences are ecclesiastical and some are secular. This distinction is hinted at in the same place.

Alia est {*distinctio add. &NaRe} quod poenarum quaedam {*alia &MzNaPeRe} est ecclesiastica sive canonica, alia secularis sive legalis. Haec divisio {*distinctio &MzNaRe} sub his verbis quod poenarum alia est canonica, alia {est add. &Pe} legalis in diversis doctoribus innuitur {*invenitur &MzNaPeRe}.

Another distinction is that some penalties are ecclesiastical or canonical, others are secular or belong to the law. This distinction is found in various doctors under these words, that some penalties are canonical, others belong to the law.

Alia est {*distinctio add. &NaRe} quod quidam sunt iudices seculares {*et add. &MzNaRe} quidam ecclesiastici. Hoc {*Haec distinctio &NaRe} ex multis {*innumeris &MzNaPeRe} canonibus {*sacris add. &MzNaPeRe} colligitur.

Another distinction is that some judges are secular and some are ecclesiastical. We infer this distinction from innumerable sacred canons.

Alia est {*distinctio add. &NaRe} quod negotiorum quaedam sunt temporalia {*secularia &MzNaPeRe} {*et add. &NaRe} quaedam spiritualia. Hanc divisionem {*distinctionem &MzNaRe} innuit apostolus cum dicit 2 ad Corinthios {*Timotheum &NaRe} 2 {2 ad Corinthios: Crisostomus &Mz} {7 &Pe}:[4], "Nemo militans Deo implicat se negotiis secularibus." Cum enim dicit quaedam negotia esse {*trs. &NaRe} secularia a quibus abstinent militantes Deo insinuat aliqua {*alia &NaRe} esse spiritualia a quibus non abstinent.

Another distinction is that some affairs are secular and some are spiritual. The apostle hints at this distinction when he says in 2 Timothy 2:4, "No one serving as a soldier of God gets entangled in secular affairs." For when he says that some affairs, from which those serving as soldiers of God keep away, are secular, he implies that others, from which they do not keep away, are spiritual.

Alia est {*distinctio add. &NaRe} quod dignitatum {dignitas &Mz} alia est ecclesiastica, alia {est add. &Pe} secularis {*trs.321 &MzNaRe}.

Another distinction is that some dignities are secular, some ecclesiastical.

Alia est {*distinctio add. &NaRe} quod quaedam sunt leges seculares et {om. &Mz} quaedam ecclesiasticae. Haec divisio {*distinctio &MzNaRe} ponitur in decretis dist. 3, para. {c. &Pe} 1 cum dicitur, "Omnes hae species secularium legum sunt partes. Sed quia constitutionum {*constitutio &MzNaPeReZn} alia {aliqua est &Mz} civilis, alia ecclesiastica," etc.

Another distinction is that some laws are secular and some are ecclesiastical. This distinction is cited in the decretals when it says in dist. 3, para. 1 [col.4] "All these special cases are parts of the secular laws. But because one constitution is civil, another ecclesiastical," etc.

Alia est {*distinctio add. &NaRe} quod iurisdictionum {*iurisdictio &MzNaPeRe} alia est temporalis, alia est {*om. &MzNaRe} spiritualis. Haec {Hinc &NaRe} divisio {*distinctio &MzNaRe} ex his {*illis &MzNaRe} quae allegata sunt supra c. 1 huius secundi colligitur evidenter.

Another distinction is that some jurisdiction is temporal and some spiritual. We clearly infer this distinction from what is brought forward above in chapter 1 of this second book.

CAP. IV

Discipulus Puto quod multae tales distinctiones {trs. &Pe} {*alie add. &MzNaRe} inveniuntur {inveniantur &Pe} in scripturis quare {*quas &NaRe} non adducas. alias {*om. &NaPeRe} Aestimo enim quod ex istis habeo {*habebo &MzNaPeRe} occasionem intelligendi {incedendi &Mz} alias et investigandi de potestate quam imperator super diversa temporalia noscitur {*dinoscitur &MzNaPeRe} habere {*trs. &MzNaPeRe}. Quia tamen ex praedictis adhuc nescitur {*nescio &MzNaPeRe} qualiter {*temporalia add. &MzNaPeRe}, carnalia, secularia et humana a spiritualibus, et {*om. &NaRe} ecclesiasticis ac {*et &NaRe} divinis {ac divinis om. &Mz} [[

CHAPTER 4

Student I think that many other such distinctions which you need not bring forward are found in writing. For I reckon that from those [above] I will have the opportunity of understanding the others and of investigating the power which the emperor is known to have over various temporal affairs. Yet because I still do not know from the above [examples] how temporal, carnal, secular and human affairs are distinguished from spiritual, ecclesiastical and divine affairs, would you therefore mark out some small difference between them, according to the opinion of some people?

Magister Sunt quidam dicentes quod praedicta vocabula, scilicet {*om. &MzNaRe} {trs. &Pe} temporalia, carnalia, spiritualia {*trs. &MzNaPeRe} etc {et etiam &Pe} in diversis scripturis {scripturis add. &Pe} accipiuntur aequivoce. Quae {qui &Mz} tamen cum quaeritur {cum queritur: conqueritur &Mz} quam potestatem habent laici in temporalibus et {*quam /habent add. &Mz\ clerici add. &MzNaRe} in spiritualibus ad unam significationem restringuntur, ut per temporalia intelligantur {intelliguntur &Mz} illa quae respiciunt {respicit &NaRe} [[correct to respiciunt interlinear &Re]] regimen {regnum &Mz} humanum vel {*humanum vel om. &MzNaRe} humani generis {*trs. &MzNaRe} in solis naturalibus constituti absque omni revelatione divina. quae {*Quod &NaRe} [[scilicet regimen add. margin &Re]] servarent illi qui nullam legem praeter naturalem et positivam humanam susciperent et quibus nulla alia lex esset imposita. Per spiritualia autem {*om. &NaRe} intelliguntur {*intelligantur &NaRe} illa {om. &Pe} quae respiciunt {respicit &NaRe} regimen fidelium inquantum divina revelatione instruuntur {*instruitur &MzNaPeRe}.

Master There are some people who say that the above words, temporal, spiritual, carnal, etc, are taken equivocally in various writings. Yet when it is asked what power the laity have in temporal affairs and clerics in spiritual affairs, these words are confined to one meaning, so that by temporal affairs are understood those matters which pertain to the rule of the human race considered purely naturally without any divine revelation. Those who assumed only natural and positive law and on whom no other law has been imposed preserved this rule. By spiritual affairs are understood those matters which pertain to the rule of the faithful in so far as that rule is drawn up by divine revelation.

Discipulus Secundum {?in &Re} ista imperatores et alii infideles de multis intromiserunt se de {*in &MzNaPeRe} regendo sibi subiectos {subditos &Pe} quae {qui &Mz} {*nec add. &MzNaRe} ad temporalia vel {*nec &MzNaRe} {*ad add. &MzNaPeRe} spiritualia minime {*om. &MzNaRe} pertinebant.

Student According to that, emperors and other unbelievers, in ruling those subject to them, interfered in many matters which pertained neither to temporal nor to spiritual affairs.

Magister Hoc conceditur. Omnia enim quae spectabant {spectant &Na} ad culturam et {*om. &NaRe} falsorum deorum {*et add. &NaRe} iniquitatem nec inter temporalia nec {*inter add. &MzNaPeRe} spiritualia sunt numeranda sed superstitiosa sunt censenda.

Master This is granted. For everything that pertained to the worship of false gods and to wickedness should be reckoned as among neither temporal nor spiritual matters but should be considered as superstitious.

CAP. V

Discipulus Arbitror me aliquantulum {*aliqualiter &NaRe} {*trs. &MzNaPeRe} intelligere quomodo temporalia a spiritualibus distinguuntur {*distinguantur &MzNaRe}. Ideo ad potestatem imperatoris super {ad &Pe} temporalia descendens, interrogo primo an imperator verus Romanorum per universum mundum super temporalia {spiritualia &Na} habeat {habet &Pe} hanc {*om. &NaPeRe} potestatem ita ut cunctae regiones mundi ei {et &Re} in temporalibus subiiciantur {*sint subiecte &MzNaRe}.

CHAPTER 5

Student I think that I understand to some extent how temporal affairs are distinguished from spiritual affairs. Getting down, therefore, to the power of the emperor over temporal affairs, I ask first whether a true emperor of the Romans has such power over temporal affairs throughout the whole world that all the regions of the world have been made subject to him in temporal affairs.

THE EMPEROR'S POWER IN TEMPORAL MATTERS

Are all parts of the world subject to the Emperor in temporals?

Opinion 1: affirmative

Magister Circa hoc sunt diversae opiniones, sicut tactum est supra. Una est quod de iure omnia regna mundi sunt subiecta in temporalibus imperatori Romanorum {trs.3412 &Pe}.

Master As was touched on above, there are various opinions about this. One is that all the kingdoms of the world are by right subject to the emperor of the Romans in temporal affairs.

Discipulus Quamvis superius libro primo {trs. &Pe} {*libro primo: primo huius &MzNaRe} c. 26 aliquas glossas super decreta et decretales hanc opinionem tenentes adduxeris, adhuc tamen aliquas alias si quae sint {*sunt &NaRe} {*ad idem add. &NaRe} allega.

Student Although you brought forward in chapter 26 of [book] 1 of this [tractate] [[reference wrong]] some glosses on the decrees and decretals which maintain that opinion, would you nevertheless adduce some others, if there are any.

Magister Glossa dist. 63, c. Adrianus super illo verbo {om. &Mz} per singulas provincias insinuare hoc {*trs. &MzNaPeRe} videtur dicens, "Ergo in Francia et in Hispania unus est imperator, 72 {*ut 7 &MzNaReZn} {27 &Pe} q. 1, c. {in add. &Mz} amplius {*In apibus &NaReZn}. Quod concedo nisi probent se exemptos esse {*om. &MzNaPeReZn} ab imperatore, ut 23, q. 8, {c. add. &Pe} [[interlinear]] {*para. add. &Zn} Ecce. Unde et {om. &Mz} hic {om. &MzPe} {et hic: ad hec &NaRe} {*Et hic: adhuc &Zn} a capite suo {adhuc add. &Mz} dabunt tributum imperatori {omnes add. &Zn}, cum {*non add. &MzNaRe} probent se exemptos, et {*ut &MzNaReZn} ff. de censibus l. ult. Si enim dicunt se non subesse Romano imperio igitur {ergo &MzNaRe} {*om. &Zn} per consequens dicunt se non {trs.312 &Pe} habere aliquid proprii, ut supra {scilicet &NaRe} dist. 1, Ius Quiritum {quesitum &Mz}. Fatemur {Fateantur &MzNaPeRe} {*Fateamur &Zn} igitur {*ergo &MzNaRe} imperatorem esse dominum mundi, ut ff. ad legem Rhod. qui {de ut l. &Pe} levandae {*qui leandae: l. deprecatio &Zn}." Sed non est maior [[aliter minor: margin &Re]] ratio quod Francia et Hispania sunt {*sint &MzNaPeRe} subiectae {subiecta &Pe} Romano imperio quam alia regna. Igitur {*Ergo &MzNaRe} universa regna {*et add. &MzNaRe} fidelium et infidelium sunt subiecta imperatori de iure licet non de facto.

Master The gloss on the words per singulas provincias in dist. 63, c. Hadrianus [c.22, col.322] seems to imply this when it says, "Therefore there is one emperor in France and in Spain, as in 7, q. 1, c. In apibus. I grant this unless they prove that they are exempt from the emperor, as in 23, q. 8, para. Ecce. Whence they [[all, Zn]] will still give tribute to the emperor from their head, since they do not prove that they are exempt, as in ff. de censibus l. ult.. For if they say they are not subject to the Roman emperor, they are saying as a consequence that they do not have anything of their own, as in dist. 1, c. Ius quiritum above. Let us confess therefore that the emperor is lord of the world, as in ff. ad l. Rhod. l. deprecatio." But there is not a greater reason for France and Spain to be subject to the Roman emperor than for other kingdoms. All kingdoms of both believers and unbelievers, therefore, are subject to the emperor in law, although not in fact.

Item glossa Extra, De electione, {*c. add. &Pe} Venerabilem {*sic ait add. &NaRe} super verbo in Germanos, sic ait {*sic ait om. &NaRe} sicut {*"Sic &MzNaPeReZn} {*ergo add. &MzNaReZn} {igitur add. &Pe} imperium {*regnum &NaPeReZn} {regimen &Mz} mundi translatum est in {*ad &MzNaReZn} Theutonicos. Nam {et ideo &Pe} ipsi habent regimen {*regnum &NaPeReZn} Romanae ecclesiae 9 {*de consecratione &MzNaPeRe} dist. 5, {*c. add. &PeZn} in diem {*die &MzNaPeRe}. Et sic patet quod imperium {om. &Pe} non est apud Graecos licet largo modo {*nomine &Zn} appellatur {*appelletur &MzNaPeReZn} imperium {*imperator &Zn} Extra, de maioritate et obedientia, c. {om. &NaRe} Solitae. Sicut et rex Francorum et {*Francorum et om. &MzNaPeReZn} Scotorum {*Schacorum &Zn} dicitur rex, quoniam extra ecclesiam non est imperium et 4 {*et 4: 24 &MzNaPeReZn} q. 1. {*c. Schisma add. &Zn} para. {haec add. &Re} Sed {secundum &Pe} {*nec add. &Zn} illud. sed {*om. &NaRe} Est {*autem add. &MzZn} {quod add. &Re} {an add. &Na} imperator ille super {*omnes add. &MzNaPeReZn} reges, 7, q. 1, c. {om. &NaRe} In apibus {in apibus: amplius &Pe}, et omnes nationes sub eo sunt 11, q. 1, {*para. add. &MzNaReZn} {c. add. &Pe} haec {*sed &Zn} si quis ibi {ubi &MzNaPeRe} volumus {*ibi volumus: in vers. voluminis &Zn}. Ipse enim est princeps mundi et dominus {et dominus om. &Mz} ff. ad l. Rhod. qui le {qui le om. &NaRe} {*qui le: de iact. &PeZn} et hac {ac &Mz} deprecarie {deprecatio &Mz} {*et hac deprecarie: l. /om. &NaRe\ deprecatio &NaPeReZn}. Et etiam Iudaei {iudeus &Mz} {mundi &NaRe} sub ipso {*eo &MzNaPeReZn} sunt, Supra {extra &Pe} {*C. &NaReZn} de Iudaeis {*Iuda &Zn} {*l. add. &Zn} Iudaei et omnes provinciae et {etiam &NaRe} {*om. &PeZn} 43 {*63 &NaRe} {42 &Pe} dist. {*c. add. &Pe} Adrianus. Et omnia sunt in potestate imperatoris 8. dist. {*c. add. &Pe} Quo iure descendis {defendis &MzNaPeRe} {?et c. 2 add. &Pe} et 23, q. 8, {*c. add. &Pe} Convenior."

Again, the gloss on the words in Germanos in Extra, De electione, c. Venerabilem [c.34, col.167] reads as follows: "In this way, therefore, rule of the world was transferred to the Teutons. For they have the rule of the Roman church, de consecratione, dist. 5, c. in die. And so it is clear that the empire is not with the Greeks, although the emperor is broadly called by that name, Extra, De maioritate et obedientia, c. Solitae. So too is the king of the the Czechs [[or is it the chess pieces?]] called a king, since there is no empire outside the church, 24, q. 1, c. Schisma, para. sed nec illud. There is however indeed an emperor over all kings, 7, q. 1, c. In apibus, and all nations are under him, 11, q. 1, para. Sed si quis, in vers. voluminis. For he is the prince and lord of the world, ff. ad l. Rhod. de iact. l. deprecatio. And even the Jews are under him, c. de Iuda, l. Iudaei, and all provinces, 63, dist. c. Adrianus. And everything is in the power of the emperor, 8, dist. c. Quo iure defendis and 23, q. 8, c. Convenior."

Item glossa dist. 1, {*c. add. &Pe} Ius Quiritum, quae pro parte allegata est prius, dicit quod "Iudaei utuntur iure Romano et vocantur Romani quia omnes vocantur Romani subiecti Romano Imperio, prout dicitur populus {*proprium &NaReZn} {populum &Mz} Romanorum {*est add. &Zn} habere filios in potestate, prout etiam {et &Mz} sunt gentiles sub Romano Imperio. Nam imperator est princeps totius mundi [...] ff. ad l. Rhod. {l. add. &Pe} qui levandae. Qui igitur {*ergo &MzNaReZn} non vult esse sub Romano Imperio nec haereditatem habere potest nec alia quae hic de iure humano {*Romano &Zn} enumerantur."

Again, the gloss on dist. 1, c. Ius Quiritum [col.6], part of which was brought forward earlier, says, "The Jews use Roman law and are called Romans because all are called Romans who are subject to the Roman empire, just as it is said that the characteristic of Romans is to have their children in their power, just as there are also gentiles under the Roman empire. For the emperor is prince of all the world, ... ff. ad l. Rhod. ... qui levandae [Digest 14.2.8]. Whoever does not want to be under the Roman empire, therefore, can have neither an inheritance nor the other things that are counted here as part of Roman law."

Item glossa 23, q. 8, c. Convenior super verbo omnia infert ait {*dicens &MzNaRe}, igitur {*"Ergo &MzNaRe} omnia sunt imperatoris ut supra dist. 8, Quo iure."

The gloss on the word omnia in 23, q. 8, c. Convenior [col.1372] implies the same thing, saying, "Therefore everything belongs to the emperor, as above at dist. 8, c. Quo iure."

Discipulus Satis apparet esse opinio {*opinionem &NaPe} {opinioni &Re} {*trs. &MzNaRe} aliquorum {*multorum &MzNaRe} imperatorem Romanorum {om. &Mz} esse principem seu {*et &MzNaPeRe} dominum {*trs.321 &MzNaRe} totius mundi. Pro qua {etiam add. &Pe} opinione nitere allegare.

Student It is clear enough that many people have the opinion that the emperor of the Romans is the lord and prince of the whole world. Try to argue for that opinion.

Magister Haec opinio in uno principio {*motivo &MzNaRe} fundari videtur principaliter {*trs.312 &MzNaRe} quod tale est. Imperio Romano aliquando totus mundus fuit subiectus et ipsum {*idem &MzNaPeRe} Romanum imperium non est privatum aliquo dominio cuiuscunque regni quod sibi fuit subiectum. Igitur {*ergo &MzNaRe} adhuc {ad ?hec &NaRe} omnia regna {*mundi add. &MzNaPeRe} imperio Romano {*trs. &MzNaRe} sunt subiecta.

Master This opinion seems to be based mainly on one reason, which is as follows. The whole world has sometimes been subject to the Roman empire and the Roman empire has not been deprived of any lordship over any kingdom which was subject to it. All the kingdoms of the world, therefore, are still subject to the Roman empire.

Discipulus Quomodo probatur quod totus mundus fuit subiectus Romano imperio?

Student How is it proved that the whole world has been subject to the Roman empire?

Magister Hoc testatur evangelium {evangelista &Pe} cum dicit, "Exiit edictum a Caesare Augusto ut describetur {*describeretur &MzNaPeReVg} universus orbis." Hoc etiam {om. &MzPe} testatur Constantinus qui, ut allegatum est supra dist. 96, {*c. add. &Pe} Constantinus, ait, discernentes {*"Decernentes &NaPeReZn} sancimus ut principatum teneat," scilicet sedes Romana, "tam {om. &Mz} super quatuor sedes Alexandrinam, Antiochenam, Hierosolymitanam, et {*om. &NaReZn} Constantinopolitanam, quam super omnes in universo orbe terrarum ecclesias Dei {trs. &NaRe}." {*Et infra add. &NaRe}: "Haec omnia vero quae per hanc {*nostram add. &Zn} imperialem maiestatem {*om. &MzNaPeReZn} et {*om. &Zn} sacra {*sacram &NaPeReZn} {et add. &Mz} personalia {*et per alia &NaPeReZn} [[gap before et &NaRe]] divinalia {*divalia &MzNaReZn} decreta {secreta &Pe} statuimus et confirmamus {*confirmavimus &NaZn} usque in finem mundi illibata et inconcussa manere decrevimus {*decernimus &NaReZn}. Unde coram Deo {domino &Pe} vivo, qui nos regnare praecepit, et coram eius terribili {tribunali &Re} iudicio obtestamur {?obsecramus &Pe} omnes nostros successores imperatores {trs. &Pe} et cunctos optimates, et {*om. &MzNaReZn} satrapas etiam, amplissimum senatum, et universum populum in toto orbe terrarum nunc et in posterum [...] nulli eorum quoquomodo licere {trs. &NaRe} {ledere &MzPe} {*haec add. &Zn} aut confringere {frangere &Na} {fugere &Mz} aut in quoquam {in quoquam: quoquomodo &MzNaRe} {aut confringere aut in quoquam: om. &Pe} convelli {*convellere &Zn}." In quibus quidem {*om. &MzNaPeRe} verbis Constantinus ostendit universum orbem terrarum sibi fuisse subiectum, non quidem de facto quia tunc aliqui populi rebellaverunt. Igitur {*ergo &MzNaRe} de iure etc {*om. &NaPeRe}.

Master The gospel attests to this when it says [Luke 2:1], "A decree went out from Emperor Augustus that all the world should be registered." Constantine attests to this too when he says, as was brought forward above from dist. 96, c. Constantinus [c.14, col.342], "So determining we decree that it," that is the see of Rome, "should have rule both over the four sees of Alexandria, Antioch, Jerusalem and Constantinople and over all the other churches of God throughout the whole world. ... Now we resolve that all of these things, which we have decreed and confirmed through this our sacred imperial [order] and through other divine decrees, should remain undiminished and undisturbed until the end of the world. Whence, before the living God, who commanded us to rule, and before his terrible judgement, we call on the emperors who succeed us, all our nobles and satraps, the whole senate and all people throughout the whole world, now and forever, [...] to witness that none of them is permitted in any way to violate or in any way to overthrow these things." Constantine shows in these words that the whole world was subject to him, not in fact, however, because at that time some people were in rebellion. Therefore it was in law.

Discipulus Quomodo probatur quod Romanum imperium non fuit privatum iure et dominio quod habuit super quodcunque regnum vel provinciam?

Student How is it proved that the Roman empire has not been deprived of the right and lordship which it had over any kingdom or province?

Magister Hoc sic probatur. Si Romanum imperium fuit privatum iure et dominio quod habuit super quodcunque regnum [[Magister ... regnum: margin &Pe]] vel {seu &Mz} provinciam {vel provinciam: om. &Pe} aut fuit privatum a iure vel {*aut &MzNaPeRe} ab homine: non a iure quia de {a &Pe} tali privatione nullum ius habetur quia {*om. &NaRe} nec divinum nec humanum; nec ab homine quia nullus homo {*om. &NaRe} inferior imperatore qui erat dominus mundi poterat {*potuit &MzNaPeRe} privare imperatorem {trs. &Na} tali iure aut {*et &NaRe} dominio.

Master This is proved as follows. If the Roman empire was deprived of the right and lordship which it had over any kingdom or province it was deprived either by right or by a person: not by right because no one has the right, either divine or human, of such a deprivation; not by a person because no one inferior to the emperor, who was the lord of the world, could deprive the emperor of such right and lordship.

{*Discipulus add. &MzNaRe} [[interlinear &Re]] Videtur quod illa {*ista &MzNaPeRe} ratio non procedit. Primo quia imperium Romanum potuit privari tali iure {iuri &Mz} et tali {*om. &MzNaRe} dominio per potentiam regnorum rebellantium, quia, ut legitur {*habetur &MzNaRe} Extra, De regulis iuris, c. Omnis, "Omnis res ex {*per &MzNaReZn} quibuscunque {*quascunque &MzNaReZn} causis {*causas &MzNaReZn} nascitur, per easdem dissoluitur." Romanorum {*Romanum &MzNaPeRe} autem imperium acquisivit ius et dominium super alia regna per potentiam gladii. Igitur {*ergo &MzNaRe} {*et add. &Na} per potentiam gladii potuit perdere idem ius et dominium. Secundo quia imperator Romanorum per negligentiam suam {om. &Pe} et culpam potuit perdere iurisdictionem {*ius et dominium &MzNaRe} suam {*om. &MzNaRe} quam {*quod &MzNaRe} habuit super multa {*alia add. &NaRe} [[margin &Na]] regna. Nam sicut notatur in glossa 22, q. ultimo c. De forma, "Eadem fide tenetur quis subdito suo sicut subditus domino. [...] Et si non fecerit privatur dominio quod habuit {*habet &NaReZn} in vasallo." Si igitur {*ergo &MzNaRe} imperator iniuste tractavit aliqua {*alia &NaRe} regna vel non defendit {defendebat &Mz} ea in necessitate iuste {iusta &Mz} perdidit iurisdictionem {*ius et dominium &MzNaRe} {suam add. &Pe} quam {*quod &MzNaRe} habuit super ipsa {hec dicta regna &Mz}. Tertio quia praescriptione iura {iuris &Pe} tolluntur {tolli &Pe}. Poterant igitur {*ergo &MzNaRe} alia regna praescribere contra imperium. Et sic imperator potuit {*poterat &MzNaRe} perdere ius et dominium quod habuit super quaedam {*alia add. &MzNaRe} regna.

Student That argument does not seem to be valid. This is (i) first because the Roman empire could be deprived of this right and lordship by the power of kingdoms rebelling, because, as we read in Extra, De regulis iuris, c. Omnis [c.1, col.927], "Through whatever causes a thing arises, by those same causes it is dissolved." The Roman empire acquired its right and lordship over other kingdoms, however, by the power of the sword. It is also by the power of the sword, therefore, that it could lose that right and lordship. This is (ii) secondly because by his negligence and fault the emperor of the Romans could have lost the right and lordship which he had over many other kingdoms. For, as is noted in the gloss on 22, q. 5, c. De forma [col.1281], "Anyone is bound to his subject by the same faith as is the subject to his lord. ... And if he shall not have kept it, he is deprived of the lordship which he had over his vassal." If the emperor has treated some kingdoms unjustly, therefore, or has not defended them in their necessity, he has justly lost the right and lordship which he had over them. This is (iii) thirdly because rights are removed by prescription. Other kingdoms, therefore, could have prescribed against the empire. And so the emperor could have lost the right and lordship which he had over some other kingdoms.

Magister Nonnullis apparet quod ista {istam &Pe} rationem praescriptam {*trs. &MzNaRe} nequaquam impediunt {impedivit &Pe}.

Master It is clear to some people that those [reasons] do not obstruct the previous argument.

Primum non quia, sicut tactum est prius, licet magna pars mundi fuit {*fuerit &MzNaRe} per potentiam gladii subiugata {*Romano add. &MzNaPeRe} imperio omnes tamen sponte postea {*trs. &NaRe} consenserunt {concesserunt &Pe} subdi eidem imperio [[omnes ... imperio: margin &Pe]]. Et ideo extunc per potentiam gladii dissolui non poterat.

The first does not because, as was touched on above, although a great part of the world was subjugated to the Roman empire by the power of the sword, yet afterwards they all willingly agreed to be subjected to that same empire. And therefore it could not thereafter be dissolved by the power of the sword.

Secundum quod {om. &Mz} est {trs. &Pe} {*quod est: etiam &NaRe} de culpa imperatoris vel Romanorum quod etiam {*quod etiam om. &NaRe} non impedit, ut videtur, quia {etiam add. &Pe} nec in eo vel {*nec &MzNaPeRe} in eis apparet tanta culpa quod Romanum imperium {*trs. &MzNaRe} privari debuit {*trs. &MzNaPeRe} iure et dominio quod habuit {*quod habuit om. &NaRe} super quaecunque regna {*quaecunque regna: quodcunque regnum &MzNaPeRe}. Esto tamen {*etiam &NaRe} quod talis culpa commissa fuisset non tamen debuit imperium absque sententia universitatis mortalium aut alicuius vel {aut &Pe} aliquorum gerentis vel gerentium vicem eiusdem {*om. &MzNaRe} universitatis {*mortalium add. &MzNaRe} tali iure privari. Nulla autem talis sententia per universitatem mortalium aut alicuius vel aliquorum gerentis vel gerentium vicem eiusdem universitatis {*unquam add. &MzNaRe} data {*lata &MzNaPeRe} fuit contra Romanum imperium. Igitur {*ergo &MzNaRe} Romanum imperium {igitur romanum imperium om. &Pe} tali iure vel dominio minime est privatum.

The second also, about a fault of the emperor or of the Romans, does not, it seems, obstruct it because neither in him nor in them does so great a fault appear that the Roman empire should have been deprived of its right and lordship over any kingdom. Even granted that such a fault had been committed, the empire should nevertheless not have been deprived of its right without the decision of the totality of mortals or of some one or ones acting in the place of the totality of mortals. However, no such decision against the Roman empire has ever been asserted by the totality of mortals or by any one or ones acting in their place. Therefore the Roman empire has not been deprived of that right or lordship.

Nec tertium de praescriptione praescriptam rationem impedire videtur. Tum quia non apparet quod unquam aliquis in hoc praescripserit contra Romanum imperium quia nullus potuit se bona fide {*trs.231 &MzNaPeRe} alienare a Romano imperio. Et ideo quicunque se alienant {*alienavit &MzNaPeRe} se {om. &MzNa} a Romano imperio alienant {*alienavit &MzNaPeRe} se a {*om. &MzNaPeRe} sola potentia. Tum {om. &Mz} quia sicut in spiritualibus et ecclesiasticis contra obedientiam et visitationem non praescribitur, sic contra dominium Romani imperii nullus potest praescribere {nullus potest praescribere: om. &Pe}. Quod patet {*probatur &MzNaPeRe} ex hoc, quod praescriptio in temporalibus est ex iure imperiali. Imperator autem nunquam fecit legem vel statutum quod aliquis posset praescribere taliter {*trs. &MzNaPeRe} contra Romanum imperium. Igitur {*ergo &MzNaRe} nulla in hoc casu poterit {*potest &MzNaPeRe} allegari praescriptio.

Nor does the third, about prescription, seem to obstruct the previous argument. This is (i) because it does not seem that anyone ever has prescribed against the Roman empire in this matter, because no one could in good faith remove himself from the Roman empire. And whoever did remove himself from the Roman empire, therefore, removed himself only from its power. It is also (ii) because as in spiritual and ecclesiastical affairs it is not prescribed against obedience and supervision [[or the right of visitation?]], so no one can prescribe against the lordship of the Roman empire. This is proved from the fact that in temporal affairs prescription is by imperial law. However, the emperor has never made a law or statute that someone could prescribe in this way against the Roman empire. Therefore, no prescription can be brought forward in this case.

CAP. VI

Discipulus &Recita opinionem contrariam.

CHAPTER 6

Student Relate a different opinion.

Opinion 2: The Roman Emperor is not now lord of all nations

Magister Alia opinio est quod licet aliquando imperator Romanorum fuerit {fuit &Mz} dominus totius mundi, nunc tamen non est dominus omnium nationum.

Master Another opinion is that although the emperor of the Romans was once the lord of the whole world, yet now he is not the lord of all nations.

Discipulus Pro ista opinione aliquas allegationes {rationes &Pe} coneris adducere.

Student Would you try to bring forward some arguments for that opinion.

Magister Pro ista opinione allegatur primo sic. Quod papa approbat et nos approbare debemus et pro veritate tenere debemus {*om. &MzNaPeRe} dist. 1 {*19 &MzNaPeRe} {*c. add. &Pe} Si Romanorum. Sed papa {om. &Pe} videtur approbare assertionem Francorum et aliorum qui asserunt se non esse imperio {*trs.312 &MzNaRe} subiectos. Si enim opinionem illorum minime approbaret nihil deberet statuere propter assertionem {assertiones &Na} ipsorum, praeferentium {*presertim &NaPeRe} quod sonaret in approbationem assertionis eiusdem {eorumdem &Re} [[margin]]. Sed ut legitur Extra, De privilegiis, Super specula papa propter hoc quod Franci et alii subtrahentes se ab imperio Romano {*ab imperio romano: a romano imperio &MzNaPeRe} legibus imperialibus non utuntur statuit quod ius civile Parisiis {*Parisius &MzNaRe} vel {et &Pe} in aliis {*om. &NaRe} civitatibus seu aliis locis vicinis nullatenus doceatur vel audiatur. Quod {quia &Pe} in assertionem vel {*assertionem vel om. &NaRe} approbationem dictae assertionis {nationis &Pe} Francorum vel {*et &MzNaRe} aliorum sonare videtur. Igitur {*ergo &MzNaRe} eandem assertionem approbare et veram reputare debemus.

Master A first argument for that opinion is as follows. What the pope approves we also ought to approve and hold as true (dist. 19, c. Si Romanorum [c.1, col.58]). But the pope seems to approve the assertion of the Franks and others who assert that they are not subject to the Roman empire. For if he did not approve their opinion he should not have decreed anything about their assertion, especially anything that sounds like approval of their assertion. But, as we read in Extra, De privilegiis, c. Super specula [c.28, col.868], because Franks and others remove themselves from the Roman empire and do not use imperial laws the pope decreed that civil law should not be taught or heard in Paris, or in neighbouring cities or other places. This seems to sound like approval of the above assertion of the Franks and others. Therefore we should approve that same assertion and regard it as true.

Discipulus Forte dicerent alii quod papa non fecit tale statutum quia {et &Mz} approbaverit {*approbavit &MzNaPeRe} dictam {*praedictam &MzNaPeRe} assertionem Francorum sed quia voluit quod litterati magis theologiae insisterent et quia frustra tale statutum dimisisset ad insinuandum se non approbare {probare &Na} assertionem illam quia propter hoc literati {*franci &NaRe} et alii opinionem suam {*trs. &MzNaPeRe} nullatenus reliquissent.

Student Perhaps others would say that the pope did not make such a statute because he approved that assertion of the Franks but because he wanted the learned to pursue theology more and because he would have issued in vain a statute insinuating that he did not approve of that assertion because the Franks and others would not have abandoned their own opinion on that account.

Magister Videtur multis {*aliis &NaRe} quod ista responsio {predictam add. &Mz} non impediat {*impedit &MzNaRe} praescriptam rationem {*trs.3412 &NaRe} {praescriptam rationem om. &Mz} quia papa ad quem spectat omnia peccata et errores corrigere insinuare debuit dictam assertionem si est falsa se nullatenus approbare.

Master It seems to others that that reply does not obstruct the previous argument, because the pope, to whom the correcting of all sins and errors belongs, should have implied that he did not approve the said assertion, if it is false.

Discipulus Aliam rationem adducas ad idem.

Student Would you bring forward another argument for the same [opinion].

Magister Alia ratio talis est. Sancti canonizati ab ecclesia non sunt credendi existere {*om. &NaPeRe} in peccato mortali aut in rebellione damnabili vel alia {*aliqua &NaRe} iniuria decessisse. Sed plures fuerunt sancti reges et alii qui imperatorem minime recognoverunt superiorem in temporalibus et {om. &Re} in hoc finierunt dies suos; exemplum de sancto Ludovico rege Francorum et pluribus regibus Angliae. Igitur {*ergo &MzNaRe} vere non fuerunt subditi {*subiecti &MzNaPeRe} Romano imperio.

Master [2] Another argument is as follows. Saints canonised by the church should not be believed to have given way to mortal sin or blameworthy rebellion or any wrong. But there have been many saintly kings and others who have not recognised the emperor as their superior in temporal affairs and have finished their days with this opinion. Examples are St. Louis king of the Franks and many kings of England. Therefore they truly were not subject to the Roman empire.

Discipulus Forte dicerent alii quod isti {*illi &MzNaRe} sancti {*viri add. &NaRe} nesciverunt {nescierunt &Mz} se esse {*om. &NaRe} subiectos {subiecti &Pe} Romano imperio et si scivissent hoc {de vero de add. &Pe} [[margin]] facto et {in &Re} {om. &Na} verbo {et verbo om. &Pe} recognovissent. Quare per ignorantiam iuris {talis add. &Pe} civilis poterant {poterunt &Mz} {*potuerunt &NaRe} excusari.

Student Perhaps others would say that those saintly men did not know that they were subject to the Roman empire and if they had known this they would have recognised it in deed and in word. They could be excused, therefore, through ignorance of the civil law.

Magister Apparet aliis quod haec {ista &Pe} responsio non sufficit, quia reges et principes tenentur scire an habeant superiorem vel non {*habeant add. &MzNaPeRe}. Ignorantia autem {om. &Pe} iuris {*illius &MzNaPeRe} quod quis tenetur scire {trs. &Pe} non excusat, 1, q. 4, sed {*para. &MzNaRe} {c. &Pe} Notandum. Igitur {*ergo &MzNaRe} reges et principes per talem ignorantiam nullatenus fuerunt {*trs. &MzNaRe} excusati {accusati &Re}.

Master It appears to some that this reply is not adequate, because kings and princes are bound to know whether they have a superior or not. Moreover, ignorance of that which someone is bound to know does not excuse (1, q. 4, para. Notandum {c.12, col.422]. Therefore kings and princes are not excused by such ignorance.

Discipulus Forte dicerent aliqui quod reges illi et principes non tenebantur habere tantam peritiam iurium civilium et historiarum ut cognoscerent se subiectos Romano imperio.

Student Perhaps some people would say that those kings and princes were not bound to have such knowledge of civil law and history as to know that they were subject to the Roman empire.

Magister Ad hoc {*Ad hoc: Adhuc &NaRe} dicitur {*obicitur &NaRe} quod debuerunt ab aliis inquirere {om. &Pe} {*querere &MzNaRe} {*trs.312 &MzNaRe} si nesciverunt {nesciunt &Mz} per seipsos, {semetipsos &Mz} teste glossa quae dicit {*om. &MzNaRe} dist. 36 {*38 &MzNaPeRe} c. {para. &NaRe} 1, ait {om. &Pe} "Non excusatur {excusetur &Pe} quis {quos &Pe} per ignorantiam qui potest habere peritorum copiam {*trs. &MzNaRe}."

Master It is still objected that they should have sought to learn from others if they did not know themselves, as the gloss on dist. 38, para. 1 [[I can't find this quote, although the subject of the dist. is ignorance of the law]] attests when it says, "No one is excused by ignorance who can have a supply of knowledgable men."

Discipulus Ad hoc respondetur {*diceretur &NaRe} {dicitur &Mz} quod non invenerunt peritos qui in {om. &Na} hoc eos instruerent {instruxerunt &Pe} quia {quoniam &Pe} multi periti sunt qui {*sunt qui om. &NaRe} magis desiderant destructionem Romani imperii quam {?quantum &Pe} exaltationem {*trs.3412 &NaRe} et simplices tantum {*om. &MzNaPeRe} quantum possunt informant quod non omnes mortales sunt subditi {*subiecti &MzNaPeRe} Romano imperio. Non autem oportet {*trs. &MzNaRe} quod reges et principes ac alii laici sint {sunt &Mz} nimis solliciti {*in add. &MzNaRe} inquirendo an sint subiecti Romano imperio, teste glossa 72 {*quae 1 &MzNaRe} q. 4, sed {c. &Pe} {*para. &MzNaRe} Notandum {*ait add. &MzNaRe}, "Ad hoc autem quod quis {aliquis &NaRe} probabiliter dicatur errare, non requiritur quod sit nimis {minus &Na} diligens, scrupulosus et curiosus in inquirendo, nec quod sit nimis negligens et dissolutus in {*non &Zn} inquirendo {querendo &Mz}." Et ita adhuc {*ad hoc &MzNaRe} reges et principes {*alii laici &MzNaRe} {et alii laici add. &Pe} per ignorantiam poterunt {*potuerunt &NaRe} excusari licet non cognoscant {*recognoscant &MzNaPeRe} se esse {*om. &NaRe} subiectos Romano imperio.

Student To this it might be said that they did not find learned men who would instruct them in this because many learned men desire the destruction of the Roman empire more than its exaltation, and simple men, as much as they can, inform them that not all mortals are subject to the Roman empire. It is not appropriate, however, that kings and princes and other laity be too solicitous in inquiring whether they are subject to the Roman empire, as the gloss on 1, q. 4, para. Notandum [col.587] attests when it says, "For it to be said with probability that someone errs, he is not required to be too careful, scrupulous and thoughtful in inquiring, nor be too negligent and lax in not inquiring." And so in this matter kings and other laity could have been excused by ignorance although they did not recognise that they were subject to the Roman empire.

Magister Contra hoc obiicitur quia de {om. &Na} bono communi debent maxime reges et principes summe esse {*trs. &MzNaRe} solliciti licet non debeant esse nimis diligentes scrupulosi et curiosi. Sed ex Romano imperio dependet bonum commune totius generis humani. Igitur {*ergo &MzNaRe} circa {contra &Re} [[vel tanquam margin &Re]] hoc praecipue reges et principes summam diligentiam adhibere tenentur.

Master It is objected against this that kings and princes especially ought to be greatly solicitous of the common good, although they ought not be too careful, scrupulous and thoughtful. But the common good of the whole human race depends on the Roman empire. In connection with it, therefore, kings and princes are bound to exhibit the greatest care .

Discipulus Aliam rationem si occurrat {*occurrit &MzNaRe} allega.

Student Bring forward another argument if one occurs to you.

Magister Adhuc {ad hoc &NaRe} pro opinione praedicta {*taliter add. &MzNaRe} allegatur sic {*om. &MzNaRe}. Ad officium summi pontificis summe {*potissime &MzNaRe} spectat instruere laicos, et potissime {*precipue &NaRe} reges et principes ex quibus obedientia {*salus &MzNaPeRe} aliorum dependet {*pendet &NaRe}, in his quae spectant ad fidem et iustitiam et bonos mores. Sed si de iure omnes mortales sunt {sint &MzPe} Romano imperio subditi {*subiecti &MzNaRe} {*trs.312 &MzNaPeRe} contra iustitiam, agunt reges et principes qui subiici Romano imperio recusant. Igitur {*ergo &MzNaPeRe} de hoc debent {*deberent &MzNaRe} {*summi add. &MzNaPeRe} pontifices imperatores {*om. &MzNaPeRe} reges et principes instruere diligenter. Hoc autem {etiam &Mz} non fecerunt {*etiam add. &NaRe} plures sancti summi pontifices [[reges et ... pontifices: margin &Pe]], quod tamen {non add. &Pe} fecissent si hoc ad iustitiam pertineret. Aliter enim de bono communi et salute eorum {*illorum &NaRe} ex {*pro &MzNaPeRe} quibus rationem reddent {reddunt &Mz} Deo non fuissent solliciti. Igitur {*ergo &MzNaRe} non est probabile quod omnes mortales sunt {*sint &NaPeRe} modo subiecti Romano imperio.

Master [3] A further argument for the above opinion is as follows. It belongs above all to the office of the highest pontiff to instruct the laity, and especially kings and princes on whom the salvation of others depends, in matters that pertain to faith, justice and good morals. But if all mortals are subject by right to the Roman empire, kings and princes who refuse to be subjected to the Roman empire are acting against justice. The highest pontiffs, therefore, should have been carefully instructing kings and princes about this matter. However, even many holy highest pontiffs did not do this, and yet they would have done so if it pertained to justice. For otherwise they would not have been solicitous about the common good and the salvation of those for whom they will render an account to God. It is not probable, therefore, that all mortals are now subject to the Roman empire.

Discipulus Videtur quod haec ratio dupliciter potest {*trs. &MzNaRe} impediri: uno modo dicendo {de deo &Mz} quod summi pontifices ignoraverunt omnes mortales debere subiici {*subdi &MzNaRe} Romano imperio. Hoc enim ad ius {om. &Pe} civile spectat. Ipsi autem iuris civilis non tenentur esse periti nec in his quae spectant {spectat &Na} ad ius civile tenentur {*docere add. &MzNaRe} fideles instruere {*om. &MzNaRe}. Aliter potest dici quod summi pontifices adverterunt reges et principes et {*ac &MzNaPeRe} alios laicos {*multos add. &NaRe} nullo modo velle acquiescere admonitioni qua {*admonitioni qua deberent: anuncianti eis quod &MzNaPeRe} [[change to annunciantibus &Re interlinear]] deberent {*debent &NaPeRe} esse Romano imperio subditi {*subiecti &MzNaPeRe} {*trs.312 &MzNaPeRe}. Et ideo tacuerunt iuxta illud {dictum add. &Pe} Salomonis Proverbia 23 {33 &Mz}, "In auribus insipientium ne loquaris {loqueris &Pe}. Despiciunt {*despicient &MzNaReVg} enim doctrinam eloquii tui."

Student It seems that this argument can be obstructed in two ways. (i) [It is obstructed] in one way by saying that the highest pontiffs did not know that all mortals should be subjected to the Roman empire. For this pertains to civil law. They are not bound to be learned in the civil law, however, and they are not bound to teach the faithful in those matters that pertain to the civil law. (ii) In another way it can be said that the highest pontiffs perceived that kings, princes and many other laity in no way wished to give assent to anyone announcing to them that they ought to be subject to the Roman empire. And therefore they were silent in accordance with what Solomon says in Proverbs 23:9, "Do not speak in the hearing of fools. For they will despise the wisdom of your words."

Magister Nonnullis {om. &Mz} apparet {*trs. &NaPeRe} quod {nullis add. &Mz} neutra istarum rationum {*responsionum &MzNaRe} impedit praescriptam rationem. Prima non, tum quia non est verisimile quod summi pontifices ignoraverunt omnes esse subiectos Romano imperio si continet veritatem, praesertim cum hoc glossatores canonum et {*canonum et om. &MzNaPeRe} decretorum quae summus pontifex ignorare non debet asserere manifeste videantur {*trs.312 &MzNaPeRe}. Tum {omnia &Re} secundo {*om. &MzNaPeRe} quia licet summus pontifex non teneatur habere peritiam excellentem iuris civilis non tamen debet {*trs. &NaPeRe} ignorare omnino omnia {*illa add. &NaRe} quae sunt iuris civilis, {non tamen debet ... civilis om. &Mz} imo illa quae tangunt totam universitatem mortalium scire tenetur {tenentur &Mz}. Aliter enim de multis peccatis mortalibus quae {quia &Re} redundarent in periculum totius ecclesiae non posset {possent &Pe} corripere Christianos quia de illis quae nescit {se add. &Pe} [[interlinear]] esse peccata non debet eos corrigere {*corripere &MzNaPeRe}. Igitur cum {*igitur cum: cum ergo an &MzNaRe} omnes mortales esse subiectos {*esse subiectos: sint subiecti &MzNaPeRe} Romano imperio omnes tangat ita ut quicunque {quecunque &Re} scienter recusat subesse Romano imperio [[omnes ... imperio: margin &Pe]], si est ei subiectus, peccat mortaliter, hoc summus pontifex ignorare non debet quia de illis quae a pluribus {*plurimis &MzNaRe} {vel plurimis add. &Pe} et communiter fiunt {fuerit &Na} debet {debent &MzPe} scire an sint peccata mortalia vel non.

Master It seems to some people that neither of those replies obstructs the aforesaid argument. (i) The first does not because it is not probable that the highest pontiffs did not know, if it is true, that everyone is subject to the Roman empire, especially since the glossators on the decretals, which the highest pontiff ought not be unaware of, seem clearly to assert this. [It also does not] because although the highest pontiff is not bound to have an excellent knowledge of the civil law, yet he ought not be wholly ignorant of all that is in the civil law, indeed he is bound to know those things which affect the whole totality of mortals. For otherwise he could not correct Christians for many mortal sins which redound to the danger of the whole church, because he ought not correct them for those things which he does not know to be sins. Since it so affects everyone, therefore, whether all mortals are subject to the Roman empire that whoever knowingly refuses to be subject to the Roman empire, if he is subject to it, sins mortally, the highest pontiff ought not to be unaware of this, because he ought to know of those things which are done by many people and communally whether they are mortal sins or not.

Secunda {secundo &Pe} {*etiam add. &NaRe} {autem add. &Mz} responsio ut videtur {responsio ut videtur: om. &Pe} non impedit rationem illam. Nam non constabat summis pontificibus quod omnes laici qui non subdebant se {*romano add. &MzNaPeRe} imperio erant ita {*trs. &NaRe} obstinati quod nullo modo vellent de veritate informari. Ergo saltem experiri debebant an doctrinam veram in hac parte {audire add. &Mz} volebant recipere {om. &Mz}. Item constat quod multi fuerunt sancti reges et {*principes ac add. &MzNaRe} alii laici quamplures qui iustitiam dilexerunt {*diligebant &NaRe} et bonum commune {*ecclesie &NaRe} et odio habebant {etiam add. &Mz} omnem iniustitiam. Aliter enim {om. &Pe} omnes {principes et add. &Pe} reges et {*principes ac add. &MzNaRe} alii laici extitissent delectatores {*dilectores &MzNaPeRe} iniquitatis et per consequens in statu damnationis fuissent. Igitur {*ergo &MzNaRe} parati fuerint {*fuerunt &MzNaPeRe} de omni iustitia spectante ad ipsos informari. Et per consequens parati fuerunt erudiri quod {*an de &MzNaRe} {sive &Pe} iure essent subiecti Romano imperio vel penitus a subiectione huiusmodi {huius &NaPeRe} liberati.

It seems that (ii) the second reply also does not obstruct that argument. For it was not evident to the highest pontiffs that all the laity who did not subject themselves to the Roman empire were so obstinate that they did not in any way want to be informed about the truth. They should at least have tested, therefore, whether they were willing to receive true teaching in this matter.Again, it is certain that there were many holy kings and princes and many other laity who loved justice and the common good of the church and hated all injustice. For otherwise all kings, princes and other laity would have been lovers of wickedness and consequently would have been in a state of damnation. Therefore they would have been prepared to be informed about any matter of justice pertaining to them. And consequently they were prepared to be instructed whether they were by right subject to the Roman empire or were wholly free from subjection of that kind.

 

Amplius aliqui {*qui &MzNaPeRe} sunt in veritate {*trs.231 &NaPeRe} subiecti Romano imperio de iure {*trs.45123 &NaRe} et tamen nolunt de facto {trs.231 &Pe} esse subiecti Et tales {*et tales om. &MzNaPeRe} nihil {vel &Mz} iuste possident, quia {quod &Mz} tales nihil {om. &Mz} possident iure imperatoris. {*Qui autem nihil possidet /possident &Pe\ iure /iuris &NaRe\ imperatoris et tamen est subiectus imperatori nihil /vel &Mz\ iuste possidet add. &NaPeRe}, teste beato {*om. &MzNaRe} Augustino qui super Iohannem et ponitur in decretis dist. 8, {*c. add. &Pe} Quo iure ait, "Iure igitur {*om. &MzNaPeReZn} humano dicitur, `Haec villa mea est, hic servus meus est, haec domus mea est' [[hic servus ... est: margin &Pe]] {haec domus mea est om. &Re}. {*Iura autem humana, iura imperatorum sunt." Et infra: "Tolle iura imperatorum, et quis /quilibet &Pe\ audeat /audiat &Re\ dicere, `Haec villa mea est, meus est iste servus, mea est hec /ista &Pe\ domus' add. &MzNaPeRe}?" Et infra: {et infra om. &Re} "Noli ergo {*om. &MzNaPeReZn} dicere, `Quid mihi et regi?' Quid tibi ergo {om. &Mz} et possessioni? {possessori &NaRe} Per iura regum possidentur possessiones. Dixisti, `Quid mihi et regi'? Noli dicere possessiones tuas, quia ipsa {om. &Re} iura renunciasti humana, quibus possessiones possidentur." Et idem Augustinus ad Vincentium ut {*prout &MzNaRe} legitur {ut legitur: om. &Pe} 24 {*23 &NaRe} q. 7, c. {*1 add. &MzNaPeRe} ait, "Res quaecunque terrena nullo {*non &MzNaPeReZn} tempore {ratione &NaRe} {*recte &Mz} possideri a quocunque {*trs.231 &MzNaReZn} potest nisi {*vel add. &MzNaPeReZn} iure divino, quo cuncta iustorum sunt, vel iure humano, quod in potestate regis {*regum &MzNaPeReZn} terrae est." Ex quibus verbis {*om. &MzNaRe} colligitur quod nullus subiectus imperatori vel regi aliquid iuste possidet nisi iure imperatorum {imperatoris &Mz} vel regum {*regis &MzNaRe}. Et per consequens si omnes nationes de iure sunt {sint &Mz} subiectae Romano imperio nullus rex vel princeps aut alius laicus aliquid iuste possidet qui renunciat iuri {*iura &MzNaRe} imperatoris {*imperatorum &MzNaRe} et non vult esse subiectus imperatori. Hinc glossa dist. 1, {*c. add. &Pe} Ius Quiritum, {quesitum &Mz} ut allegatum est superius {*supra &NaRe}, ait, "Qui non vult esse sub Romano imperio nec haereditatem habere potest nec alia quae hic de iure humano scilicet Romanorum {*humano scilicet Romanorum: Romano &Zn} enumerantur." Omnes igitur {*ergo &NaRe} {enim &Mz} reges et principes ac {et &Pe} {*alii add. &MzNaPeRe} laici qui recusarent {*recusant &MzNaPeRe} esse sub {*subiecti &MzNaRe} Romano imperio nihil iuste possiderent {*possident &MzNaPeRe}. sed {nam vel iuste possident &Mz} {*Si autem nihil iuste /om. &Na\ possident &NaPeRe}, de omnibus quae iniuste {*om. &MzNaPeRe} possident non possunt facere eleemosynam {*eleemosynas &NaRe} nec aliquid {aliud &Na} alicui donare nec oblationes publicas nec {et &Pe} holocausta sive {*nec holocausta sive: ad altare nec &NaRe} {holocausta sive om. &Mz} sacrificia, quia licet in casu {*in casu om. &MzNaPeRe} de quibusdam illicite acquisitis possit eleemosyna fieri vel {*de quibus tamen non potest fieri &NaRe} oblatio aut {*vel &MzNaRe} sacrificium tamen de iniuste possesso {*possessis &MzNaPeRe} {*ita ut non sint possidentis add. &MzNaPeRe} nullum praedictorum fieri potest. {igitur ecclesia add. &Pe} &Peccant {*Peccat &MzNaRe} etiam {*ergo ecclesia et &MzNaRe} {et &Pe} omnes clerici et religiosi qui extra tempus necessitatis et {*om. &MzNaPeRe} aperte recipiunt dona, eleemo synas, {*trs. &MzNaRe} [[et omnes ... eleemosynas: margin &Na]] oblationes {om. &Pe} vel sacrificia de illis quae possident de facto non de iure reges et principes ac alii laici qui Romano imperio subdi recusant.

[4] Further, those who are in truth subject in law to the Roman empire and yet refuse to be subject in fact, possess nothing justly, because such people do not possess anything by right of the emperor. He who possesses nothing by right of the emperor, however, and yet is subject to the emperor possesses nothing justly, as Augustine attests when he says in [his commentary] on John, as found in dist. 8, c. Quo iure [c.1, col.12], "By human law one says, `This is my villa, this is my servant, this is my house.' Human laws, however, are the laws of the emperors. ... Remove the laws of the emperors and who would dare to say, `This is my villa, this is my servant, this is my house'? ... Do not say, `What is the king to me?' What therefore is your possession to you? Possessions are possessed by the laws of kings. Have you said, `What is the king to me'? Do not say `your possessions', because you have renounced those human laws by which possessions are possessed." And Augustine says the same thing to Vincent, as we read in 23, q. 7, c. 1 [col.950], "Any earthly thing can not rightly be possessed by anyone except either by divine law, by which all things belong to the just, or by human law, which is in the power of the kings of the earth." We gather from these [texts] that no one subject to the emperor or to a king possesses anything justly except by the law of the emperors or the king. And consequently if all nations are by right subject to the Roman empire, no king, prince or other layman who renounces the laws of the emperors and does not want to be subject to the emperor possesses anything justly. Hence the gloss on dist. 1, c. Ius Quiritum [col. 6] says, as was brought forward above, "He who does not want to be under the Roman empire can have neither an inheritance nor the other things that are reckoned here as of Roman law." All kings, princes and other laity, therefore, who refuse to be under the Roman empire possess nothing justly. If they possess nothing justly, however, they can not, from everything they do possess, give alms or give anything to anyone or [make] public offerings or sacrifices at the altar, because although alms can be given from certain goods acquired illicitly, from which nevertheless an offering or sacrifice can not be made, yet none of those things can be done from things possessed unjustly which do not belong to the possessor. Therefore the church and all clerics and religious sin if they openly receive, except at a time of necessity, alms, gifts, offerings or sacrifices from those things which kings, princes and other laity who refuse to be subjected to the Roman empire possess in fact and not in law.

 

CAP. VII

Discipulus Adhuc allega pro opinione praemissa.

CHAPTER 7

Student Argue further for that opinion.

Magister Pro ista opinione allegatur sic. {*Pro ista opinone allegatur sic om. &MzNaRe} Quod imperator Romanorum non sit dominus omnium {*etiam add. &NaPeRe} {et add. &Mz} temporalium {*secularium &MzNaPeRe} sacri canones asserere {*testari &MzNaPeRe} videntur {*secundum add. &MzNaPeRe} quod {*quos &MzNaRe} sunt plures qui non habent superiorem, quod {et &Pe} tamen non esset verum {tamen non esset verum: tamen verum esset &Pe} si omnes seculares essent subiecti {sub &Pe} Romano imperio {*subiecti Romano imperio: imperatori subiecti &MzNaRe}. Innocentius namque tertius, ut legitur {*habetur &MzNaRe} Extra, De haereticis, {*c. add &Pe} Excommunicamus, ait, "Si vero dominus temporalis, requisitus et monitus ab ecclesia, suam {sua &Pe} terram purgare neglexerit ab haeretica foeditate {heretica foeditate: hereditate &Mz}", etc {*om. &MzNaPeRe}. Et infra: "Eadem nihilominus {om. &Mz} [[gap left]] lege servata circa {excommunicatus &Pe} eos qui non habent dominos principales."

Master The sacred canons seem to attest that the emperor of the Romans is not the lord even of all who are secular. According to them there are many people who do not have a superior; yet this would not be true if all who are secular were subject to the emperor. For as we find in Extra, De hereticis, c. Excommunicamus [c.13, col.787], Innocent III says, "Indeed if a secular lord, despite being asked and advised by the church, neglects to purge his land of the filth of heresy ... nevertheless keeping the same law for those who do not have principal lords."

Item idem Extra, Qui filii sunt legitimi {*c. add. &Pe} Per venerabilem ait, "Insuper cum rex Franciae {*om. &MzNaReZn} superiorem in temporalibus non {*minime &MzNaPeReZn} recognoscat sine iuris alterius laesione in eo se iurisdictioni nostrae subdere {*subicere &MzPeReZn} {subiacere &Na} potuit."

Again, in Extra, Qui filii sunt legitimi, c. Per venerabilem [c.13, col.714] the same [pope] says, "Moreover since the king does not recognise a superior in temporal affairs he could subject himself to our jurisdiction without wounding anyone else's right in doing so."

Item glossa Extra, De foro competenti, c. Ex transmissa loquens {liquens &Na} de ipsa {*papa &MzNaPeRe} ait, "Licet concedat clerico contra laicum {*non tamen concedit laico contra laicum /clericum &Mz\ add. &MzNaPeReZn}, dum tamen alium superiorem habet {*habeat &MzNaPeReZn} {*trs.312 &MzNaPeReZn}" non concedit laico contra clericum {non concedit laico contra clericum om. &MzNaPeRe}. Ex his {*quibus &NaRe} colligitur quod sunt plures laici qui superiorem non habent et per consequens non omnes sunt imperatori subiecti.

Again, speaking about the pope, the gloss on Extra, De foro competenti, c. Ex transmissa [col. 544] says, "Although he makes a grant to a cleric against a layman, yet he does not make a grant to a layman against a layman as long as he has another superior." We gather from these [two texts] that there are many laymen who do not have a superior, and consequently not everyone is subject to the emperor.

Discipulus Licet ista allegatio {*trs.231 &NaRe} appareat fortis, tamen secunda {illa &Pe} auctoritas de rege Francorum {*Francie &MzNaRe} non videtur ad propositum pertinere, tum quia glossa ibidem, ut allegatum est primo huius c. 18, asserit quod rex Francorum {*Francie &MzNaPeRe} de iure subest Romano imperio; tum quia Innocentius non dicit quod rex Franciae non habet superiorem in temporalibus sed quod rex {*Francie add. &NaRe} non cognoscit {*recognoscit &NaPeRe} {recognoscat &Mz} superiorem. Potest enim {*autem &MzNaRe} aliquis habere superiorem licet {*hoc add. &NaRe} non recognoscat.

Student Although that argument seems strong, yet the second text, about the king of France, does not seem pertinent to the argument. This is (i) because the gloss at that point, as was brought forward in chapter 18 of the first [book] of this [tractate], asserts that the king of France is by right subject to the Roman empire. It is also (ii) because Innocent does not say that the king of France does not have a superior in temporal affairs, but that the king of France does not recognise a superior. Someone can have a superior, however, even if he does not recognise this.

Magister Nonnullis apparet quod neutrum istorum concludit istam {*illam &MzNaPeRe} auctoritatem Innocentii non monstrare intentum: sed {*secundum &NaPeRe} quod {*non, quia &MzNaRe} ex verbis Innocentii allegatis {allegat &Mz} elicitur quod idem Innocentius {*reputat add. &MzNaPeRe} regem Franciae vere et iuste minime cognoscere {*recognoscere &MzNaPeRe} superiorem in temporalibus cum asserit {*asserat &NaRe} {*quod add. &MzNaPeRe} quia {om. &Mz} rex in temporalibus superiorem {om. &Mz} {*trs.312 &NaRe} minime recognoscit ideo sine laesione iuris alterius potuit se iurisdictioni papae subiicere. Sed si rex {ex &NaRe} false {falso &Na} et {false et: Francie &Mz} iniuste recognosceret {recognoscere &Pe} minime {*trs. &MzNaRe} in temporalibus superiorem {*trs.312 &MzNaPeRe} non oportet {*posset &MzNaPeRe} propter hoc sine laesione alterius iuris {*trs. &NaRe} se subiicere iurisdictioni Papae quia falsa et iniusta abnegatio {negatio &Pe} dominii alterius non tribuit abnegato {*abneganti &NaRe} {abutenti &Mz} {negato &Pe} potestatem subiiciendi se {om. &Na} iurisdictioni alterius absque laesione {*iuris add. &MzNaPeRe} veri domini sui. Innocentius igitur {*ergo &NaRe} reputat quod rex vere et {vel &Mz} iuste non recognoscit superiorem in temporalibus. Ex hoc concluditur quod primum non valet etiam secunda {*etiam secunda: quia illa &MzNaPeRe} glossa videtur contrariari {*contraria &MzNaPeRe} textui cum glossa {igitur &Pe} dicit {*dicat &MzNaRe} quod rex Franciae de iure subest {romano add. &Pe} imperio, et textus dicat quod quia {si &Mz} rex Franciae non recognoscit superiorem potest se subiicere iurisdictioni papae; quod tamen non esset {*posset &MzNaRe} si de iure subiectus esset {*trs. &MzNaPeRe} imperio quod {*quia &MzNaPeRe} {*hoc add. &MzNaRe} esset in praeiudicium imperatoris si esset {*sibi add. &MzNaPeRe} subiectus.

Master It seems to some people that neither of those [arguments] infers that that text of Innocent's does not show what is intended: the second does not because it is drawn out from the words of Innocent that are quoted that Innocent himself reckons that the king of France truly and justly does not recognise a superior in temporal affairs, since he asserts that because the king does not recognise a superior in temporal affairs, he could, therefore, without wounding anyone else's right subject himself to the jurisdiction of the pope. But if the king were not to recognise a superior in temporal affairs falsely and unjustly, he could not, for that reason, subject himself to the jurisdiction of the pope without wounding anyone else's right, because a false and unjust denial of the lordship of one person does not bestow on the one denying it the power of subjecting himself to the jurisdiction of another person without wounding the right of his true lord. Therefore Innocent reckons that the king does not recognise a superior in temporal affairs truly and justly. We conclude from this that the first [argument] is not valid because that gloss seems opposed to its text since the gloss says that the king of France is by right subject to the empire and the text says that because the king of France does not recognise a superior he can subject himself to the jurisdiction of the pope; yet he could not do this if he were by right subject to the empire because this would be to the prejudice of the emperor if he were subject to him.

Discipulus Occasio {*obiectio mea &MzNaPeRe} est apparentur exclusa ac per hoc praescripta allegatio videtur amplius confirmari, {*et add. &MzNaPeRe} tamen narra quomodo {*qualiter &MzNaRe} respondetur ad ipsam.

Student My objection seems to be excluded and because of this the above argument seems to be fully confirmed. And yet tell me how a reply is made to it.

Magister Ad primam decretalem respondetur {*trs.4123 &NaRe} quod {qui add. &Na} loquitur de his qui de facto non habent dominos principales quia illi {*/non add. &Pe\ propter hoc add. &MzNaPeRe} non minus tenentur obedire papae circa haereticos expurgandos {*expugnandos &MzNaRe} {impugnandos &Pe}.

Master The reply to the first decretal is that it is talking about those who do not in fact have principal lords, because those people are not less bound for that reason to obey the pope in the matter of overcoming heretics.

Ad secundam dicitur quod loquitur de rege Franciae {de tempore add. &Pe} pro {*tempore add. &MzNaRe} quo imperator reputari {*reputare &MzNaPeRe} videtur saltem de {om. &MzNaRe} [[add. interlinear &Re]] facto quia {*quod &MzNaRe} scilicet {*om. &NaPeRe} rex {trs. &Mz} Franciae non est {sit &Mz} {*sibi add. &MzNaRe} subiectus eo quod nec verbo nec facto sibi {*om. &MzNaRe} ostendit {*se add. &MzNaPeRe} de iure dominari debere {*om. &NaRe} regi Franciae. In quo casu propter errorem vel negligentiam imperatoris {*potest add. &MzNaPeRe} papa, non potestate {*auctoritate &MzNaPeRe} data sibi {*trs. &MzNaRe} a Christo sed quia {*quam &MzNaPeRe} ex consuetudine obtinet, talem iurisdictionem circa regem Franciae, si se subiiceret {*subiecerit &MzNaPeRe}, nihilominus super ipsum {*nihilominus super ipsum: exercere. /non add. &Mz\ Quam /nunquam &Pe\ &MzNaPeRe} iurisdictionem haberet {*habet &MzNaPeRe} papa non quia rex Franciae false {*falso &NaRe} et iniuste non recognoscit dominium imperatoris {imperatori &Mz} {imperatorem &Pe} sed quia imperator negligit propria iura vel ignorat quae iura habeat super regem Franciae et alios laicos universos. Sicut enim iudex ecclesiasticus potest se immiscere seculari iurisdictioni {trs. &NaPe} cum iudex secularis negligit facere iustitiam Extra, De foro competenti, {*c. add. &Pe} Ex tenore et c. Licet in glossa, ita papa potest {*trs. &MzNaRe} in {om. &Mz} multis casibus supplere ignorantiam vel negligentiam {vel negligentiam om. &Pe} {*trs.321 &NaRe} imperatoris circa subiectos {subditos &Re} eidem {*eiusdem &MzNaPeRe} [[crossed out with suos written above &Pe]].

In response to the second [decretal] it is said that it is talking about the king of France at a time when the emperor seems to reckon at least as a matter of fact that the king of France is not subject to him, in that neither by word nor by deed does he show that he by right rules over the king of France. Because of the mistake or negligence of the emperor the pope can in such a case exercise this sort of jurisdiction over the king of France, if he subjects him, not by means of the authority given to him by Christ but by means of that which he obtains from custom. The pope has this power not because the king of France falsely and unjustly does not recognise the lordship of the emperor but because the emperor neglects his own rights or does not know what rights he has over the king of France and all other laymen. For just as an ecclesiastical judge can meddle in secular jurisdiction when a secular judge neglects to do justice (Extra, De foro competenti, c. Ex tenore [c.11, col.251] and c. Licet in the gloss [col.559]), so in many cases the pope can make good the negligence or ignorance of the emperor towards his subjects.

Discipulus Si papa potest implere {*supplere &MzNaPeRe} negligentiam vel ignorantiam {trs.321 &Pe} imperatoris exercendo iurisdictionem temporalem {imperialem &Pe} circa regem Franciae, igitur {*ergo &MzNaRe} eadem ratione poterit privare imperatorem iure et dominio quod habet imperator super regem Franciae.

Student If the pope can make good the negligence or ignorance of the emperor by exercising temporal jurisdiction over the king of France, by the same argument, therefore, he could deprive the emperor of the right and lordship which the emperor has over the king of France.

Magister Respondetur quod papa nulla potestate quam habet vel {om. &Na} a Christo vel a {*ex &NaRe} consuetudine licita potest privare imperium {*imperatorem &Pe} a {*om. &MzNaPeRe} tali iure et dominio, quemadmodum non potest destruere imperium.

Master The reply is that by no power which he has either from Christ or from licit custom can the pope deprive the emperor of this kind of right and lordship, just as he can not destroy the empire.

Discipulus Nunquid potest imperator eximere regem Franciae vel alium ne ullo {illo &Pe} modo subsit imperio?

Student Can the emperor release the king of France or another [king] so that he is not in any way under the empire?

Magister Respondetur {om. &Mz} quod licet imperator possit {posset &MzPe} multas libertates concedere regi Franciae et aliis, tamen nullo {*trs. &NaRe} {tamen nullo: non tantum &Mz} modo {nullo modo: non &Pe} potest regnum Franciae vel aliud totaliter ab imperio separare ut nullo modo subsit imperio, quia hoc esset destruere imperium, quod non potest {possit &Mz} imperator.

Master The reply is that although the emperor can grant many freedoms to the king of France and to other [kings], yet he can not in any way totally separate the kingdom of France or another [kingdom] from the empire so that it is not in any way under the empire, because this would be to destroy the empire, something the emperor can not do.

Discipulus Dic quomodo respondetur ad glossam superius allegatam.

Student Tell me how reply is made to the gloss brought forward above.

Magister Respondetur quod glossa illa loquitur de laico qui de facto non habet superiorem, habet tamen {*habet tamen: licet &MzNaPeRe} de iure omnino {*omnis &MzNaPeRe} laicus fidelis et infidelis {*trs.321 &MzNaRe} quod {*om. &MzNaPeRe} subsit imperatori.

Master The reply is that that gloss is talking about a layman who in fact does not have a superior, although in law every layman, both unbelieving and believing, is under the emperor.

CAP. VIII {cap. viii om. &Pe}

Discipulus Videtur quod apparenter ad rationem adductam c. 7 respondisti {*respondetur &MzRe}. Ad rationes {*illa &MzNaRe} autem quae allegatae {*allegata &MzNaRe} sunt c. 6 ego responsiones aliquas recitavi praeter quas audire cupio {*trs. &MzNaPeRe} aliquas {*alias &MzNaRe} si ad ipsas aliter respondetur.

CHAPTER 8

Student It seems that a clear reply has been given to the argument brought forward in chapter 7. To those [arguments] brought forward in chapter 6 I have reported some replies. If there are other replies to them besides those I would like to hear them.

Magister Ad primam illarum, quae in hoc consistit quod illud quod approbat papa nos approbare tenemur, {debemus &MzPe} respondetur quod hoc {quod approbat ... hoc om. &NaRe} est verum {*trs. &MzNaPeRe} quando papa auctoritate papali aliquid diffiniendo {affirmando &Mz} et determinando approbat iuste {om. &Mz} et {om. &Pe} catholice. Si autem papa non diffiniendo {diffidendo &Mz} nec {vel &Pe} determinando {*vel /approbat aut &Mz\ non iuste aut /et &Mz\ non catholice etiam diffiniendo et /vel &Mz\ determinando add. &MzNaRe} aliquid approbat et non iuste {*et non iuste om. &MzNaRe} illud propter hoc {hec &Re} {*nequaquam add. &MzNaPeRe} approbare non {*om. &MzNaPeRe} tenemur. Unde et Innocentius quartus quamvis esset papa noluit opiniones suas {*tamquam add. &MzNaPeRe} autenticas reputari. Similiter nec {*etiam &MzNaPeRe} opinio {*opiniones &MzNaPeRe} Innocentii quinti quam {*quas &MzNaPeRe} etiam approbavit postquam fuit papa non tenemur aliter {*aliqualiter &MzNaPeRe} approbare. Nunc autem non invenitur quod aliquis papa diffiniendo et determinando approbavit {*approbaverit &MzNaPe} {approbaverunt &Re} non omnes mundi provincias vel regnum Franciae non {om. &Re} [[written but crossed out]] {*debere add. &MzNaPeRe} subiici Romano imperio. et {*om. &NaRe} {vel &Mz} omnino {*Ideo &MzNaPeRe} hoc non approbare astringimur {constringamur &Na} {*constringimur &Re} {stringimur &Mz} {*trs. &MzNaPeRe}. Esto autem {*etiam &MzNaPeRe} quod aliquis papa diffiniendo et {vel &Pe} determinando hoc approbasset, quia tamen hoc non iuste {*trs. &MzNaRe} approbasset, non tenemur {tenetur &Na} idem {illud &Mz} approbare.

Master To the first of them, which consists in this, that what the pope approves we should approve, the reply is that this is true when the pope approves something by using his papal authority in defining and determining it in a just and catholic way. If the pope approves something, however, neither by defining nor by determining it or even by defining and determining it in a way neither just nor catholic, we are for this reason not bound to approve it. So it was that although he was pope, Innocent IV did not want his opinions regarded as authentic. Similarly we are not bound to approve in any way the opinions of Innocent V either, even those which he approved after he was pope. Now we do not find, however, that any pope in a definition and determination approved that all the provinces of the world or the kingdom of France should be subject to the Roman empire. Therefore we are not bound to approve this. Even if some pope had in a definition and determination approved this, yet because he would not have approved this justly, we are not bound to approve the same thing.

Discipulus Contra istam responsionem {rationem &Pe} duo occurrunt.

Student Two [points] occur to me against that reply.

Primum est quod secundum istam responsionem {rationem &Mz} non tenemur plus {*trs. &NaRe} approbare quod approbat papa quam quod {non &Mz} {*approbat add. &MzPe} alius {aliquis &Mz} episcopus vel alius peritus in scripturis sacris noscitur approbare, quia quicquid {quod &Pe} episcopus vel peritus in scripturis {*literis &NaRe} sacris {trs. &Mz} iuste et catholice approbat et nos approbare tenemur eo quod omnem iustitiam et omne quod est catholicum approbare debemus {tenemur &Pe}.

The first is that according to that reply we are not more bound to approve what the pope approves than what any bishop or any expert in the sacred scriptures is known to approve, because whatever a bishop or expert in sacred letters approves in a just and catholic way, we too are bound to approve because we ought to approve all justice and everything which is catholic.

Secundum quod occurrit est quod si {om. &Mz} non tenemur approbare illud {*om. &MzNaRe} quod {*approbat add. &MzNaRe} papa etiam determinando et diffiniendo {*trs.321 &NaRe} approbat {*om. &MzNaPeRe} sequitur {*sequeretur &NaRe} quod possemus illud reprobare, quod videtur esse {*om. &MzNaPeRe} contra quandam constitutionem papalem, quam dicitur {ipse add. &MzPe} {*papam add. &NaRe} fecisse in ordine Fratrum Minorum, qua {quo &MzNa} cavetur, ut fertur, quod postquam quaecunque conclusio {om. &Na} {*questio &Re} fidei deducta fuerit ad fidem {*sedem &MzNaPeRe} apostolicam {*trs. &MzNaPeRe} ex tunc antequam fuerit per ecclesiam determinata nullus frater audeat unam vel aliam {alteram &Pe} partem {*trs.312 &NaPeRe} approbare, eligere vel affirmare. Si enim postquam conclusio {*questio &MzNaPeRe} alia {*aliqua &MzNaPeRe} in curia fidei {*trs.312 &MzNaPeRe} ceperit {cepere &Na} agitari nullus debet nec unam partem nec aliam approbare et per consequens neutram partem debet reprobare multo fortius illud quod papa approbat nullus aliqualiter debet {trs. &MzNaPeRe} reprobare.

The second [point] that occurs to me is that if we are not bound to approve what the pope approves, even in a determination and definition, it would follow that we could condemn it. This seems counter to a certain papal constitution [Redemptor noster], which a pope is said to have made in connection with the order of Friars Minor, by which (they say) it is provided that after any question of faith has been brought before the apostolic see, no brother thereafter should dare to approve, choose or affirm one side of it or the other before it has been determined by the church: for if after some question of faith has begun to be considered in the curia no one ought to approve any one side or other, and consequently ought not condemn either side, so much more is it the case that no one ought to condemn in any way what the pope approves.

Magister Ad primum istorum respondetur quod plus debemus approbare illud {*om. &MzNa} quod papa approbat {Magister ... approbat om. &Re} [[multo fortius id quod papa approbat: written but erased]]. quam illud {*om. &MzNaRe} quod approbat {quod approbat om. &Mz} quodcunque {*alius quicumque &MzNaPeRe} inferior, ipso {*om. &MzNaPeRe} papa {*om. &MzNaRe} quia quando papa approbat aliquid, nisi simus certi quod errat, {*nullo modo publice /publico &Mz\ et coram aliis neque /non &Re\ assertive neque /nec &Re\ opinative neque /nec &Re\ dubitative negare debemus, quamvis si simus /sumus &Mz\ certi quod errat add. &MzNaRe} contra fidem vel iustitiam possumus {*possimus &Re} et debemus {*debeamus &MzNaRe} in casu illo {illud &NaRe} {isto &Mz} publice et occulte omnibus modis {*trs. &MzNaRe} probare {*reprobare &MzNaPeRe}. Illud autem quod inferior papa, {*episcopus add. &MzNaPeRe} vel alius, approbat licet non simus {sumus &Mz} certi quod errat possumus etiam coram aliis publice dubitare {*dubitative &MzNaRe} vel {om. &Pe} opinionem {*opinative &MzNaRe} negare et contradicere assertioni eiusdem, licet {in casu add. &Pe} si non errat non debeamus {debemus &NaPe} asserere pertinaciter contrarium, cum {*quia &MzNaPeRe} nullum falsum pertinaciter debemus {trs. &Mz} asserere.

Master The reply to the first of those is that we ought to approve what a pope approves more than what someone else who is inferior approves, because when a pope approves something we ought not, unless we are sure that he is in error, in any way publicly or before others deny it, either assertively or opinionatively or doubtfully, although if we are sure that he is in error against faith or justice we can and should in that case publicly and secretively condemn it in every way. That which a bishop or someone else inferior to a pope approves, however, we can, even if we are not sure that he is in error, deny doubtfully or opinionatively even publicly before others and can contradict his assertion, although we should not assert the opposite pertinaciously if he is not in error, because we ought not assert anything false pertinaciously.

Ad secundum dicitur quod si papa etiam {et &Mz} diffiniendo {*et add. &MzRe} {vel add. &Pe} determinando errat contra fidem vel bonos mores vel contra {*vel contra: aut &MzNaRe} iustitiam et hoc constat nobis possumus et debemus ipsum apertissime reprobare, sic etiam si quaecunque conclusio {*questio &NaRe} fidei inceperit {*incipit &MzNaRe} in curia ventilari quicunque {vel add. &Mz} per scripturas sacras vel determinationes catholicas ecclesiae est certus de veritate potest et debet partem veram eligere {et add. &Pe} approbare et disserere {*asserere &MzNaPeRe} et partem falsam respuere et reprobare. Unde quod {*et &MzNaRe} nonnulli putant quod constitutio illa {om. &Mz} facta inter {*in &NaRe} ordinem {*ordine &Na} Fratrum Minorum a papa ut fertur est haeretica {*hereticalis &MzNaPeRe}, sapiens manifeste peiorem haeresim quae {quam &Pe} unquam fuit inventa a quocunque haeretico ita quod peior haeresis non potest {*non potest om. &MzNaRe} inveniri nec {*non &MzNaRe} posset {possit &Mz}.

In reply to the second it is said that if the pope errs against the faith or good morals or against justice, even if this is in a definition and determination, and this is certain to us, we can and ought to condemn him openly, so that even if some question of faith begins to be discussed in the curia anyone who is certain about its truth from the sacred scriptures or the catholic determinations of the church can and ought to choose, approve and assert the true side and reject and condemn the false side. For this reason too some people think that the constitution made by the pope in connection with the Friars Minor is, as they say, heretical, savouring of the worst heresy that has ever been devised by any heretic, so that a worse heresy could not be found.

Discipulus In auribus meis recitas quoddam mirabile. Ideo volo de hoc {*trs.231 &MzNaRe} tecum breviter {*hic add. &MzNaRe} conferre, licet in aliis operibus quorundam poterimus {*potuerimus &MzNaRe} plura {*plurima &NaRe} invenire quia forte hoc opusculum ad manus aliquorum perveniet {pervenit &NaRe} [[perveniet interlinear &Re]] qui opera alia non videbunt. Dic igitur {*ergo &NaRe} breviter secundum praedictos {dictos &Pe} opinantes quae est illa haeresis pessima quam sapit illa {om. &Re} constitutio antedicta {om. &Pe} et quare est pessima et quae absurditates secundum praefatos opinantes {quae est illa ... opinantes om. &Na} sequuntur ex ipsa.

Student You are offering something marvellous to my ears. Therefore I want to confer here briefly with you about this, although we have been able to find much in other works of certain [authors], because this little work will perhaps come into the hands of some people who will not see the other works. Tell me briefly, therefore, what is, according to those holding that opinion, that worst heresy which that constitution smacks of and why it is the worst and what absurdities, according to them, follow from it.

Magister Haeresis pessima, ut dicunt isti, quam secundum eos sapit constitutio antedicta, est quod papa sic dominatur fidei Christianae ut tota fides Christiana quam Christiani credere astringuntur sic pendet ex approbatione, {et add. &Mz} diffinitione et {seu &Mz} determinatione cuiuslibet pape, quod nullus christianus debet firmiter credere {trs. &Na} aliquid spectans ad fidem antequam sibi constet {constat &Mz} {*trs. &MzNaPeRe} quod papa qui pro tempore fuerit hoc tenet et approbat. Dicunt enim {*autem &NaRe} quod haec {om. &Na} haeresis pessima est quia secundum eam posset papa {*trs. &MzNaPeRe} mutare totam fidem et omnes articulos fidei et facere articulos contrarios articulis contentis {*etiam add. &NaRe} in Symbolo Apostolorum. Et ita in tota fide Christiana {christianorum &Pe} nihil esset certum et immutabile sed tota {totum &Mz} dependeret {*penderet &MzNaPeRe} ex voluntate papae. Et evangelium et totam scripturam {*divinam add. &MzNaPeRe} posset destruere et facere novam scripturam contrariam {*trs.321 &MzNaPeRe} cui omnes Christiani, quamdiu papa vellet, adhaerere deberent, quam tamen {*postea &MzNaPeRe} posset {*totam add. &MzNaPeRe} mutare successor suus {*ipsius &MzNaRe}. Et ita quilibet papa posset dare Christianis novam legem {*fidem &MzNaRe} quam pro tempore suo et quousque revocaretur per successorem ipsam {*ipsius &MzNaPeRe} tenerentur {teneretur &Na} accipere et approbare. Quo nihil peius posset dici contra fidem Christianam. Absurditates {absurditas &Na} autem quamplures {*om. &MzNaPeRe} praeter illas {quas add. &NaPeRe} concludunt per scripturas posse {*om. &MzNaRe} sequi ex constitutione praedicta. Dicunt plures inferri ex gestis temporis nostri, quarum una est quod nullus Frater Minor, quantumcunque literatus et doctus, debet amodo asserere nec approbare quod mundus non fuit ab aeterno nec etiam quod fuerit ab aeterno {nec etiam quod fuerit ab aeterno om. &Pe}. Alia est quod nullus Frater Minor deberet {*debet &MzNaRe} approbare amodo quod in divinis sit aliqua distinctio in personis. Alia est quod nullus eorum debet {deberet &Pe} approbare quod homo quantumcunque iustus non convertitur in divinam essentiam, quemadmodum in {si &Pe} sacramento altaris panis convertitur in corpus Christi. Alia est quod nullus eorum debet asserere amodo quod {*nec add. &MzNaRe} beatus Petrus {Iohannes &Pe} nec aliquis alius {*trs. &NaRe} homo qui non est Christus verus Deus {deus add. &Mz} et verus homo non creavit stellas nec quod sine tali homine Deus sciret quicquam facere. Alia est quod nullus eorum amodo {om. &Pe} debet asserere quod creaturae Dei non sunt purum nihil. {vel &Mz} Quod {quia &MzPe} omnes illae {*istae &MzNaPeRe} absurditates et quamplurimae {*quamplures &MzNaRe} aliae {*trs. &MzNaPeRe} {et aliae add. &Pe} consimiles {se add. &Mz} sequuntur {sequantur &Re} {consequuntur &Mz} ex constitutione {ratione &Mz} praedicta probant ex hoc quod omnia praedicta et alia {*plurima &MzNaPeRe} similia {*consimilia &MzNaPeRe} absurdissima opinabatur {om. &Mz} quidam {quod &Mz} magister in theologia de ordine Fratrum {minorum vel add. &Pe} Praedicatorum, nomine Aycardus {*trs. &MzNaPeRe} {*natione add. &MzNaPeRe} Theutonicus, de quibus accusatus fuit primo vel denunciatus et {*om. &MzNaPeRe} primo {*om. &MzNaRe} Archiepiscopo Coloniensi in cuius curia datis auditoribus Aycardo praedicto praescripta et alia consimilia ventilata fuerunt. Qui postea veniens in Avinionem {Avione &Pe} assignatis sibi auditoribus se praedicta docuisse et praedicasse non negavit. Pro quibus non fuit damnatus nec assertiones suae {om. &Pe} {predicte add. &Mz} praescriptae et aliae statim damnatae fuerunt sed cardinalibus traditae fuerunt {*trs. &MzNaRe} ut deliberarent an inter haereses essent {*trs.312 &MzNaPeRe} computandae. Praeceptum etiam fuit quibusdam magistris in {*om. &NaRe} theologia {*theologiae &NaRe} ut supra {*super &NaRe} haec {*hoc &NaRe} {om. &Pe} communem deliberationem haberent. Et ita notorium est quod omnes assertiones praefatae et plures aliae consimiles Aycardi praedicti {*trs. &NaRe} in curia agitatae fuerunt nec postea papa aliquis {aliquid &Na} {trs. &Pe} determinavit quaestiones seu {sive &Pe} conclusiones praedictas {*seu conclusiones praedictas: easdem &MzNaRe}. Igitur {*ergo &MzNaRe} de omnibus nec unam partem nec aliam debet aliquis Frater Minor eligere nec {*vel &MzNaPeRe} approbare seu affirmare {confirmare &Mz}. Et consimiliter si in curia ventilarentur {*ventilaretur &MzNaPeRe} an Christus fuit {*fuerit &NaRe} natus de virgine {an a beata maria add. &Mz} vel an Beata Maria fuerit {fuit &Mz} virgo {*post partum add. &MzNaPeRe} vel {*aut &NaRe} an resurrectio mortuorum {*corporum &MzNaRe} sit futura vel aliquod {*aliquid &MzNaPeRe} simile {*consimile &MzNaRe} non liceret {licebit &NaRe} {*fratri minori add. &NaRe} asserere nec {*om. &NaRe} unam partem nec aliam.

Master They say that the worst heresy, which according to them that constitution smacks of, is that the pope dominates christian faith in such a way that the whole of christian faith which christians are bound to believe so depends on the approval, definition and determination of any pope at all that no christian should firmly believe anything pertaining to faith before he is certain that the pope at the time holds and approves it. They say moreover that this is the worst heresy because according to it the pope could change the whole faith and all the articles of faith and could make articles opposed even to the articles contained in the Apostles' Creed. And so nothing would be certain and unchangeable in the whole of christian faith and all of it would depend on the will of the pope. And he could destroy the gospel and the whole of divine scripture and could create a new opposed scripture to which all christians would have to adhere, as long as the pope wished it, all of which afterwards his successor could change. And so any pope could give christians a new faith which they would be bound to accept and approve during his time and until it was revoked by his successor. Nothing worse than this could be said against the christian faith. They conclude from the scriptures, moreover, that additional absurdities follow from that constitution. They say that many are inferred from deeds of our own time, one of which is that no Friar Minor, however learned and skilled, should henceforth assert or assent [to the proposition] that the world has not existed since eternity, nor even that it has existed since eternity. Another is that no friar minor should henceforth assent [to the proposition] that there is any distinction among the persons within the divine. Another is that none of them should approve [the proposition] that a man, however just, is not changed into the divine essence, as in the sacrament of the altar bread is changed into the body of Christ. Another is that none of them should assert henceforth that neither blessed Peter nor any other man who is not Christ, true God and true man, did not create the stars and that without such a man God would not know how to make anything. Another is that none of them should henceforth assert that the creatures of God are not pure nothingness. That all these absurdities and very many similar ones follow from that constitution they prove from the fact that a certain master in theology of the order of preaching brothers, Aycardus by name [Eckhart], of the German nation, believed all the above and many other most absurd things. He was first accused of or denounced for these [beliefs] by the archbishop of Cologne, in whose court a hearing was given to Aycardus and the above beliefs and other similar ones aired. When he subsequently came to Avignon and assessors were appointed for him he did not deny that he had taught and preached the above things. He was not condemned for them nor were his assertions, those above and others, immediately condemned, but they were entrusted to cardinals to determine whether they should be reckoned as heresies. Certain masters of theology were also instructed jointly to consider the matter. And so it is notorious that all the above assertions of Aycardus and very many others like them were discussed in the curia and that no pope subsequently determined those questions. No friar minor, therefore, should choose, approve or affirm one side or another of any [of those questions]. And similarly, if it were discussed at the curia whether Christ was born of a virgin or whether the Blessed Mary was a virgin after giving birth or whether there would be a future resurrection of bodies or anything similar, a friar minor would not be permitted to assert one side or the other.

CAP. IX

Discipulus De ista constitutione papae {*papali &MzNaRe} ut formatur {*fertur &MzNaPeRe}, quaestio {*quomodo &MzNaPeRe} potest variis modis {trs. &Re} excusari et quomodo omnes excusationes viis quamplurimis impugnantur et deterius {*demonstrative &NaPeRe} ut videtur pluribus {plurimum &Mz} reprobantur ut {*om. &MzNaPeRe} in quodam opere cuiusdam potero invenire. Ideo {*nolo add. &MzNaPeRe} hic {om. &Na} plura {plurima &Mz} {plus &Na} de ipso {*ipsa &MzNaPeRe} {*trs.231 &MzNaPeRe} audire. non cupio {*non cupio om. &MzNaPeRe}. Dic itaque {igitur &Pe} quomodo ad secundam rationem {trs. &Na} {responsionem &Mz} 6 c. positam superius {om. &Pe} {*trs.3421 &NaRe} respondetur.

CHAPTER 9

Student About that papal constitution, as it is reported, I can find out in a certain person's work how it can be defended in different ways and how all the defences are attacked in many ways. Therefore I do not want to hear more about it here. And so tell me how reply is made to the second argument put in chapter 6 above.

Magister Respondetur quod {*quia add. &MzNaPeRe} imperator non requisivit reges et alios ut recognoscerent {cognoscerent &Na} eum suum superiorem {*trs. &MzNaPeRe}, et {*om. &NaRe} ideo si {*om. &MzNaRe} illi {*qui add. &NaRe} parati fuissent recognoscere imperatorem suum superiorem {*trs. &NaRe} {et ideo ... superiorem om. &Pe}, si hoc eis patenter fuisset ostensum, per ignorantiam sufficienter {om. &Mz} de omni peccato excusandi fuissent {fuerint &Mz} {*fuerunt &NaPeRe}. Cum autem dicitur quod reges et principes de bono communi {*summe add. &MzNaRe} debent esse solliciti et per consequens debuerunt summe {*trs. &MzNaRe} esse solliciti quaerere {*om. &MzNaRe} {et per consequens ... quaerere om. &Pe} an essent Romano imperio {*trs. &NaRe} a {*ex &NaRe} quo dependet bonum commune {trs.231 &MzNaRe} subiecti, dicitur quod licet summe debeant {debebant &Mz} esse {*trs.231 &MzNaPeRe} solliciti de bono communi non tamen tenentur esse summe solliciti {de bono ... solliciti om. &Pe} de omni {communi &Mz} eo quod spectat ad bonum commune et quod leviter ab eis sciri {sancti add. &Na} non potest, praesertim cum {*quando &MzNaPeRe} non inveniuntur {*inveniunt &NaRe} sapientes qui eos ad {*de &NaRe} hoc admoneant {adiuvent &Pe}. Et ideo licet ex universali imperio dependeat bonum commune quia tamen reges {*plures add. &NaRe} et principes plures {om. &Re} et {*ac &MzNaPeRe} multi alii laici non poterant leviter scire se esse subiectos imperatori {*imperio &MzNaPeRe} nec imperator ad {*de &MzNaPeRe} hoc requisivit eos {*eosdem &MzNaPeRe} nec sapientes eos monebant ut de hoc essent solliciti per ignorantiam excusantur {per ignorantiam excusantur om. &MzNaPeRe}. Sed contrarium asserebant multi qui pro sapientibus habebantur. Ideo tenebantur de {ad &Pe} hoc non {*trs.4123 &MzNaPeRe} esse solliciti.

Master The reply is that because the emperor has not demanded of kings and others that they recognise him as their superior, those, therefore, who would have been prepared to recognise him as their superior if this had been clearly showed to them should have been sufficiently excused by ignorance of every sin. When it is said, however, that to the highest degree kings and princes should be solicitous for the common good, and consequently should have been to the highest degree solicitous whether they were subject to the Roman empire, on which the common good depends, it is said that although they ought to be to the highest degree solicitous of the common good, yet they are not bound to be solicitous to the highest degree of everything [[what of eo?]] which pertains to the common good and which can not easily be known, especially when they do not find wise men who advise them about this. And therefore although the common good depends on the universal empire, yet because many kings and princes and many other laymen could not easily know that they are subject to the empire and the emperor has not made demands on them about this and wise men were not advising them that they should be solicitous about this, they are excused by ignorance. But many who are held to be wise assert the opposite. Therefore they were not bound to be solicitous about this.

Discipulus Dic quomodo ad rationem tertiam respondetur.

Student Tell me how reply is made to the third argument.

Magister Respondetur quod licet summi pontifices debebant {*debeant &NaRe} instruere et docere reges et principes de his quae spectant ad fidem {ad fidem: om. &Mz} et iustitiam et bonos mores non tenentur *tamen {trs. &MzNaPeRe} de omnibus talibus eos instruere quia non possent {*possunt &MzNaRe} et nullus ad impossibile obligatur. Et ideo sufficit summis pontificibus {et ideo sufficit summis pontificibus om. &Pe} in licitis {*in licitis: iustis &MzNaPeRe} et sanctis instruere illis de illos {*illis de illos: eos de illis &MzNaPeRe} quae magis utilia et necessaria erant pro temporibus suis, quia doctrina peritorum et praelatorum debet qualitati temporum {*temporis &MzNaPeRe} convenire. Propterea {*propter &MzNaPeRe} enim {*quod &MzNaRe} {quos &Pe}, quia temporibus plurimorum {*plurium &MzNaRe} summorum pontificum erat magis utile et necessarium reges et principes ac laicos alios aliis {*om. &NaRe} instrui {*de aliis add. &NaRe} quam quod essent Romano imperio {*trs. &MzNaRe} subiecti, {*ideo add. &NaRe} non tenebantur illis temporibus illos {*ipsos &MzNaPeRe} in {*de &MzNaRe} {ad &Pe} hoc instruere, praesertim cum imperatores non requisiverunt {requisiverint &Re} {requisierunt &Mz} alios inferiores {*om. &NaRe} {superiores &MzPe} quod {quos &Na} eos superiores suos {minime add. &Pe} recognoscerent. Et forte tunc expediebat {expediebant &MzPe} illam veritatem tacere quamvis nunquam expedivit {*expedierit &NaPeRe} {expedierunt &Mz} asserere contrariam {contraria illam &Mz} falsitatem. Ex his patet ad rationem {*ad rationem om. &MzNaPeRe} quod secundum istos multi recusabant subdi Romano imperio qui tamen {cum &Na} in {om. &Na} hoc mortaliter {mortalem &Pe} non peccabant quia {quod &Pe} ignorantia probabilis excusavit {excusat &Mz} eos {*eosdem &MzNaPeRe}.

Master The reply is that although the highest pontiffs should instruct and teach kings and princes about those matters that pertain to the faith, justice and good morals, they are nevertheless not bound to instruct them about all such matters, because they can not, and no one is under an obligation to the impossible. And therefore it is enough for just and holy highest pontiffs to instruct them about those matters which were more useful and necessary for their own times, because the teaching of the learned and of prelates should be adapted to the quality of the time. For this reason, because it was more useful and necessary in the times of many highest pontiffs for kings, princes and other laymen to be instructed about other matters than that they were subject to the Roman empire, they were not therefore bound in those times to instruct them about this, especially since the emperors did not demand of others that they recognise them as their superiors. And perhaps it was then expedient to be silent about that truth, although it has never been expedient to assert the contrary falsehood. It is clear from this that according to them many men were refusing to be subject to the Roman emperor who were in this, nevertheless, not sinning mortally because they were excused by likely ignorance.

Et per hoc respondetur ad ultimum quod tangitur in eodem capitulo, quia multi qui de iure sunt subditi {*subiecti &MzNaPeRe} Romano imperio et tamen nolunt subdi eidem iuste possident ea {*illa &MzNaRe} quae possident, quia sunt bonae fidei possessores, credentes se {om. &NaRe} iuste et licite possidere et dominium verum habere. Et ideo iuste et licite possunt ea {*eadem &MzNa} dare et de eis eleemosynam {*eleemosynas &MzNaPe} et {*oblationes et add. &MzNaPe} sacrificia {et ideo ... sacrificia om. &Re} facere. Clerici etiam qui {etiam qui: quoque &Pe} putant eos iustos possessores, si non laborant ignorantia crassa et supina, possunt ab eis eleemosynas, sacrifica et oblationes accipere {*recipere &MzNaRe}. Et cum dicitur nihil tales {*trs. &MzNaRe} possident iure imperatorum {*imperatoris &MzNa} {romanorum add. &Pe}, respondetur quod etiam {vel &Mz} iure imperatoris quodammodo possident, {possidet &Pe} quia {*licet &MzNaPeRe} huiusmodi {*huius &NaRe} bonae fidei sunt {*om. &MzNaPeRe} possessores {*hoc /om. &Na\ ignorent /ignorant &MzPe\ add. &MzNaPeRe}, quia propter hoc quod sunt bonae fidei possessores auctoritate etiam {et &Na} iurium imperialium possunt {etiam add. &Pe} multa praescribere et usurpare {*usucapere &Re} CHECK MSS et per continuationem temporum {*temporis &MzNaPeRe} verum dominium {*trs. &MzNaPeRe} acquirere {habere &Mz}.

And in this way reply is made to the last [argument] touched on in that same chapter, because many who are by law subject to the Roman empire, and yet refused to be subjected to it, possess justly those things which they possess, because they are possessors in good faith, believing themselves to possess justly and licitly and to have true lordship. And therefore they can justly and licitly give those things away and make alms, offerings and sacrifices of them. If they do not labour under gross and heedless ignorance, clerics too who think that they are just possessors can accept from them alms, sacrifices and offerings. And when it is said that such people possess nothing by the emperor's law, the reply is that in a certain manner they are possessors even by the emperor's law, although possessors in such good faith do not know this, because on account of the fact that they are possessors in good faith, they can prescribe and usucapt many things even by the authority of imperial laws and as time passes can acquire true lordship.

 

CAP. X

Discipulus Hactenus inquisivimus {*quesivimus &MzNaPeRe} an cunctae mundi regiones {nationes &Mz} imperatori sint subiectae. Et intelligo de illis {istis &Mz} quae ad iurisdictionem temporalem seu {ad add. &Pe} patrimonium ecclesiae minime spectant. Nam de illis quae spectant ad ecclesiae patrimonium {*trs. &MzNaPeRe} in tertio huius {huiusmodi &Mz} erit sermo de quibus {quo &Mz} {quibusdam &Pe} {*etiam add. &MzNaPeRe} in tractatu de potestate papae et cleri plura poterimus invenire. Nunc autem ad personas quae non sunt de iurisdictione temporali ecclesiae descendamus. Et primo videamus de malis, quam potestatem videlicet {om. &Re} habet {*habeat &MzNaRe} imperator super malos {*trs.3412 &MzNaPeRe}, an videlicet {*scilicet &NaRe} imperator {an videlicet imperator om. &Pe} pro omni crimine possit punire malos sibi subiectos. Et quia, sicut {om. &Na} tactum est {prius add. &Pe} supra c. 3 {*trs. &MzNaRe} huius secundi, criminum quaedam sunt {om. &Pe} ecclesiastica {*et add. &MzNaRe} quaedam secularia, inquiramus hic {hoc &Mz} solummodo de criminibus secularibus, quia de criminibus ecclesiasticis tractabimus in tertio huius {huiusmodi &Mz} secundi {*om. &MzNaPeRe}. Cupio itaque inquirere an Imperator valeat punire omnes {*sibi add. &MzNaPeRe} subiectos {subditos &Re} pro quocunque crimine seculari quod non est ecclesiasticum.

CHAPTER 10

Student Thus far we have sought to know whether all the regions of the world are subject to the emperor. And I understand about those things which do not pertain to the temporal jurisdiction or patrimony of the church. For in the third [book] of this [tractate] there will be discourse about those things that pertain to the patrimony of the church and we will also be able to find out much about it in the tractate About the Power of the Pope and Clergy. Now, however, let us come to persons who are not of the temporal jurisdiction of the church. And first let us reflect on the wicked, that is what power the emperor has over the wicked, whether the emperor can, that is to say, punish the wicked who are subject to him for every crime. And because some crimes are ecclesiastical and some are secular, as was alluded to above in chapter three of this second [book], let us inquire here only about secular crimes, because we will deal with ecclesiastical crimes in the third [book] of this [second tractate]. And so I want to ask whether the emperor can punish all those subject to him for any crime at all that is secular and not ecclesiastical.

The Emperor's power over the wicked: Can he punish every secular crime?

Opinion 1: He cannot

Magister Circa hoc sunt diversae sententiae. Una est {scilicet add. &Pe} quod {*non add. &MzNaPeRe} pro omni crimine seculari potest imperator punire omnes {om. &Na} sibi subiectos. Quod tali ratione probatur. Idem pro eodem crimine non est a diversis iudicibus puniendus {*trs.4123 &MzNaRe} quorum unus non est sub alio vel {*et &MzNaRe} {om. &Pe} qui non habent {habet &Mz} ab aliquo uno et eodem principe {principio &Pe} potestatem. Ex hoc enim ut patet {*ut patet om. &MzNaPeRe} posset periculosa contentio et seditio {et seditio om. &Mz} inter ipsos iudices oriri {*exoriri &MzNaPeRe} dum uterque vellet ad suum forum trahere criminosum, quod tamen nequaquam fieri posset. Sed ad iudicem ecclesiasticum spectat punire criminosos pro diversis criminibus secularibus. Ergo pro illis criminibus non debet imperator punire eosdem. Maior huius {*istius &MzNaPeRe} rationis videtur de se patens, minor per sacros canones videtur {*aperte add. &MzNaRe} posse probari. Ex consilio enim Iohannis Papae, ut habetur Extra, De officio iudicis {om. &Pe} ordinarii, {*c. add. &Pe} Perniciosa {Perniciosam &NaRe}, sic legitur {*habetur &MzNaPeRe} habent {*"Habeant &MzNaPeReZn} enim {*igitur &NaPeReZn} {sibi &Mz} episcopi singularum urbium in suis diocesibus {superiorem add. &Pe} potestatem {et add. &Pe} liberam {*trs. &MzNaReZn} {ut add. &Pe} adulteria {vel ultima &Mz} inquirere et scelera {*trs.231 &MzNaReZn} ulcisci {ulciscere &Mz} et iudicare." Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod omnia crimina secularia sunt per episcopos punienda, {*tum add. &MzNaPeRe} quia adulterium {*est crimen seculare add. &MzNaRe}, quod {cum &MzNaRe} etiam {et &Mz} apud infideles et {etiam &MzPe} sola lege naturae contentos putatur {*putetur &MzNaPeRe} crimen {*trs. &MzNaPeRe}, tum quia indistincte dicit et scelera. Igitur {*ergo &MzNaRe} omnia scelera {igitur omnia scelera: et &Pe} intelligit.

Master There are different opinions about this. One is that the emperor can not punish all those subject to him for every crime. This is proved by the following argument. The same person should not be punished for the same crime by different judges, one of whom is not under another and who do not have power from one and the same prince. For a dangerous struggle and dissension could arise among those judges from this as each was wanting to drag the criminal to his own court; yet this could not be done. But it does belong to an ecclesiastical judge to punish criminals for various secular crimes. Therefore the emperor should not punish the same people for those crimes. The major [premise] of this argument seems evident of itself, while the minor seems clearly provable from sacred canons. For we find from the Council of Pope John, as we read in Extra, De officio iudicis ordinarii, c. Perniciosa [c.1, col.186], "Therefore let the bishops of every city have unfettered power in their dioceses to inquire into, punish and judge adulteries and crimes." We gather from these words that all secular crimes should be punished by bishops, both because adultery is a secular crime, since it is thought to be a crime even among unbelievers and those content with the law of nature alone, and because he says "and crimes" without distinction. Therefore he means all crimes.

Item Innocentius tertius, ut habetur Extra, De iudiciis, {*c. add. &Pe} Novit, ait, "Nullus qui sit {se &Na} sanae mentis ignorat quoniam {*quin &NaReZn} ad officium nostrum spectet {spectat &MzPe} de quocunque peccato mortali corrigere {*corripere &NaReZn} quemcunque {*quemlibet &MzNaPeReZn} Christianum et si correctionem contempserit per districtionem ecclesiasticam coercere." Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod quilibet Christianus pro quolibet {*quocumque &MzNaRe} crimine est per iudicem ecclesiasticum puniendus.

Again, as we find in Extra, De iudiciis, c. Novit [c.13, col.242], Innocent III says, "No one who is sound mind does not know that it pertains to our office to correct every christian for any mortal sin at all and, if he disdains correction, to curb him through an ecclesiastical penalty." We gather from these words that every christian should be punished for any crime by an ecclesiastical judge.

Item Calixtus Papa, ut habetur 24, q. 3, c. Si quis {*Romipetas add. &NaRe}, ait, "Si quis {ait si quis om. &Mz} Romipetas et peregrinos et apostolorum limina et aliorum sanctorum oratoria visitantes capere seu rebus quas {quae &MzPe} ferunt spoliare {spoliatores &Mz} et {om. &MzNaPeRe} mercatores novis theloneorum et pedagiorum {podagiorum &Re} exactionibus molestare tentaverit, donec satisfecerit, communione careat {caret &Pe} Christiana."

Again, as we find in 24, q. 3, c. Si quis Romipetas [c.23, col.996], Pope Calixtus says, "If anyone tries to seize pilgrims to Rome and pilgrims and visitors to the tombs of the apostles and to the oratories of other saints or to despoil them of the goods they are carrying and to annoy merchants with novel exactions of tolls and taxes, let him be deprived of christian communion until he has made satisfaction."

Item ex Concilio {ex concilio om. &Pe} Agatensi, ut legitur eisdem {om. &Pe} causa et {2 &Re} quaestione c. Itaque, sic habetur, "Itaque censuimus {censum &Re} {censemus &Pe} {censuerimus &Mz} homicidas {huiusmodi notorios &Mz} et falsos testes a communione ecclesiastica submovendos nisi poenitentia {*penitentiae &Zn} et {*om. &MzNaPeReZn} satisfactione {satisfactionis &MzNaPeRe} crimina diluerint admissa." Ex quibus {his &MzPe} etiam {*om. &MzNaPeRe} patet quod capientes {sapientes &Mz} etiam laicos, spoliatores et {*om. &MzNaPeRe} qui {om. &Pe} theloneis et pedagiis molestant indebite mercatores, homidicae et falsi testes per iudicem ecclesiasticum puniuntur et tamen constat quod ipsa {*ista &MzNaRe} sunt secularia crimina.

Again, as we read in the same causa and quaestio, c. Itaque, we find the following from the council of Agatensis [c.20, col.996], "And so we have considered that murderers and false witnesses should be removed from ecclesiastical communion unless they have cleansed themselves of the crimes committed by the reparation of penance." It is clear from these [last two] that those seizing even laymen, despoilers who annoy merchants without just cause by tolls and taxes, murderers and false witnesses are punished by an ecclesiastical judge, and yet it is certain that those are secular crimes.

Item iudex {om. &Pe} ecclesiasticus punit incendiarios, 23, q. ultimo, c. {om. &NaRe} Pessimam {pessimo &Pe}. Item punit illos qui filios {*suos add. &MzNaRe} occidunt, Extra, De illis {*hiis &MzNaPeRe} quae {*qui &MzNaPeRe} filios occiderunt, De infantibus, et eos qui exercent torneamenta, Extra, De torneamentis, c. Felicis {felices &Mz} et c. Ad audientiam, et sagittarios, Extra, De sagittariis, c. 1, et {om. &Mz} stupra {*stuprum &MzNaRe}, Extra, De adulteriis et stupris {*stupro &PeZn}, c. 1 {?11 &Mz}, et c. {*om. &NaRe} adulterium {*eodem titulo add. &NaRe} {et q. add. &Pe} {et c. add. &Mz} per totum, et raptores, Extra, De raptoribus, c. 1, et tamen ista sunt crimina secularia. Igitur {*ergo &MzNaRe} crimina secularia sunt per iudicem ecclesiasticum punienda.

Again, an ecclesiastical judge punishes arsonists (23, q. 8, c. Pessimam [c.32, col.964]). He also punishes those who kill their own children (Extra, De iis qui filios occiderunt, c. De infantibus [c.3, col.793]), and those who engage in tournaments (Extra, De torneamentis c. Felicis [c.1, col.804] and c. Ad audientiam [c.2, col.804] and archers (Extra, De sagittariis, c. 1, [col.805]) and debauchery (Extra, De adulteriis et stupro, c. 1 [col.805], and adultery (throughout the same titulus), and abductors (Extra, De raptoribus, c. 1 [col.808), and yet these are all secular crimes. Secular crimes, therefore, should be punished by an ecclesiastical judge.

Quod etiam ex auctoritatibus divinae scripturae {*trs. &MzNaRe} videtur posse probari. Ait enim veritas {*ipsa add. &MzNaPeRe} Matth. 18:[15-7], "Si peccaverit in te frater tuus, etc {*vade et corripe eum inter te et ipsum solum. Si te audierit lucratus eris fratrem tuum. Si autem non te audierit, adhibe tecum adhuc unum vel duos ut in ore duorum vel trium testium stet omne verbum. Quod si non audierit eos, dic ecclesie. Si autem ecclesiam non audierit, sit tibi sicut ethnicus et publicanus" &MzNaRe}. Ex quibus {*verbis add. &MzNaPeRe} colligitur quod ad ecclesiam spectat etiam de peccatis quae committuntur {etiam add. &Pe} in proximum quae constat {constant &Mz} esse secularia quemlibet corrigere Christianum.

This also seems provable from texts of divine scripture. For Truth himself says in Matthew 18:15-7, "If your brother sins against you, go and point out the fault when the two of you are alone. If he listens to you, you have regained your brother. But if you are not listened to, take one or two others along with you, so that every word may be confirmed by the evidence of two or three witnesses. If he will not listen to them, tell it to the church. If he refuses to listen even to the church, let him be to you as a gentile and a tax gatherer." We gather from these words that it pertains to the church to correct every christian even for sins which are committed against a neighbour and which are certainly secular.

Item apostolus 2 {*1 &MzNaRe} ad Corinthios 6:[3] reprehendit Corinthios qui {*quia &Na} litigabant apud iudices infideles qui erant seculares et quia non {*om. &MzNaPeRe} deferebant {*deserebant &MzNaPeRe} iudicium ecclesiae quae debuit iudicare inter fratrem {*et fratrem add. &MzNaPeRe} etiam de secularibus dicens, "Nescitis quoniam angelos iudicabimus? Quanto magis secularia?" Igitur {*ergo &MzNaRe} de seculari {*secularibus &MzNaRe} pertinet {*spectat &MzNaPeRe} ad iudicem ecclesiasticum iudicare et per consequens per iudicem ecclesiasticum sunt criminosi et {*etiam &MzNaRe} pro criminibus secularibus puniendi.

Again, in 1 Cor. 6:3 the apostle rebuked the Corinthians because they were litigating before unbelieving judges who were secular and because they were abandoning the judgement of the church which ought to judge between brother and brother even about secular matters. He said, "Do you not know that we are to judge angels - to say nothing of secular matters?" Therefore it pertains to an ecclesiastical judge to judge concerning secular matters, and consequently criminals should be punished by an ecclesiastical judge even for secular crimes.

CAP. XI

Discipulus Recita sententiam contrariam.

CHAPTER 11

Student Set out a contrary opinion.

Opinion 2: It pertains to the Emperor, and only to a secular judge, to punish the secular crimes of those subject to secular judges

Magister {om. &Re} Alia sententia est quod ad {om. &Mz} imperatorem et iudicem secularem solummodo spectat pro criminibus secularibus plectere {complectere &MzPe} criminosos illos videlicet qui criminibus {*iudicibus &MzNaRe} secularibus sunt subiecti.

Master Another opinion is that it pertains to the emperor and a secular judge only to punish for secular crimes those criminals who are subject to secular judges.

Discipulus Ista sententia duo asserit. Primum est quod ad iudicem secularem spectat punire huiusmodi criminosos. tantum {*om. &MzNaRe} Secundum est quod hoc non {om. &Mz} spectat ad ecclesiasticum iudicem {*trs. &MzNaPeRe}. Primo igitur {ergo &Na} allega pro primo.

Student That opinion makes two assertions. The first is that it pertains to a secular judge to punish criminals of this kind. The second is that this does not pertain to an ecclesiastical judge. First, therefore, argue for the first [assertion].

Magister Quod ad iudicem secularem spectat {spectet &NaRe} punire huiusmodi {huius &Re} criminosos tam auctoritatibus sacrae scripturae quam sacris {om. &NaRe} canonibus videtur posse probari. Apostolus enim loquens de potestatibus secularibus ait ad Romanos 13:[3-4], "Principes non sunt etc {*timori boni operis sed mali. Vis autem non timere potestatem? Bonum fac et habebis laudem ex illa. Minister enim dei est tibi in bonum. Si autem malefeceris, time; non enim sine causa gladium portat. Dei enim minister est /tibi ... est om. &Na\ vindex /iudex &NaRe\ in iram ei qui malum agit." &MzNaRe}

Master That it pertains to a secular judge to punish criminals of this kind seems provable both from texts of sacred scripture and from the canons. For speaking of secular powers the apostle says in Romans 13:3-4, "For rulers are not a terror to good conduct but to bad. Do you wish to have no fear of the authority? Then do what is good and you will receive its approval. For it is God's servant for your good. But if you do what is wrong, you should be afraid, for the authority does not bear the sword in vain. It is the servant of God to execute wrath on the wrongdoer."

Item Beatus Petrus in {om. &NaRe} canonica sua prima {trs.312 &Na} c. 2:[13-4] ait, "Subiecti {subditi &Pe} estote omni creaturae humanae {om. &MzRe} propter Deum, {omni ... Deum: etc. &Pe} {*sive regi quasi precellenti, sive ducibus tamquam ab eo missis ad vindictam malefactorum." add. &MzNaRe} Ex quibus auctoribus {*auctoritatibus &PeVe} videtur posse {*aperte &MzNaPeRe} probari quod crimina praecipue secularia per seculares iudices sunt plectenda {complectenda &Mz}.

Again, blessed Peter in the second chapter of his first letter [1 Peter 2:13-4] says, "For the Lord's sake accept the authority of every human institution, whether of the king as supreme, or of dukes as sent by him to punish those who do wrong." It seems clearly proved by these texts that crimes, especially those that are secular, should be punished by secular judges.

Et {*quod &MzNaPeRe} etiam {*in &NaRe} sacris canonibus videtur ostendi. ut habetur {*ut habetur: Nam &MzNaPeRe} ex Concilio {ex concilio om. &Mz} [[gap left]] Teuronensi {*3 add. &MzNaPeRe} ut {om. &Na} legitur 23. q. 5. c. Incestuosi, sic habetur, "Incestuosi, parricidae, homicidae {om. &Pe} multi apud nos reperiuntur sed {si &Pe} aliqui {aliquis &Na} ex illis nolunt sacerdotum admonitionibus aurem accommodare, volentes in pristinis perdurare criminibus. Quos oportet per secularem {*secularis &MzPeZn} potentiae disciplinam a tam prava consuetudine coerceri."

This also seems to be shown in the sacred canons. For as we read in 23, q. 5, c. Incestuosi [c.22, col.937], the following is found from the third council of Tours, "Many committers of incest, parricides and murderers are found among us, but some of these refuse to give their ear to the warnings of priests, wanting to persist in their original crimes. It is fitting that these be restrained from such wicked habits by the discipline of a secular power."

 

Item Cyprianus in nono genere Abusionum, {*ut add. &MzNaPeRe} habetur {om. &Pe} eisdem {eadem &Pe} causa et {om. &MzPe} quaestio c. Rex ait, "Rex debet furta cohibere, adulteria punire, impios de terra perdere, parricidas et periuros non sinere {om. &Pe} vivere, filios suos non sinere impie agere." Ex quibus aliisque {quibus aliisque: quibusque aliis &Pe} quampluribus colligitur quod huiusmodi {huius &Re} crimina sunt a {om. &Pe} iudicibus secularibus punienda.

Again, Cyprian says of the ninth kind of abuse, as we find in the same causa and quaestio, c. Rex [c.40, col.941, "The king should restrain thieves, punish adulteries, eliminate the impious from the land, not permit parricides and perjurers to live, and not allow their sons to act impiously." We gather from these and very many others that crimes of this kind should be punished by secular judges.

CAP. XII

Discipulus Iam {?tam &NaRe} manifestum puto ad seculares iudices pertinere punire pro criminibus secularibus {om. &Pe} criminosos sibi subiectos, ideo {*ut &MzNaPeRe} pro {per &MzPe} hoc non curo {*curem &MzNaPeRe} plures allegationes audire. Ideo nitere allegare pro secundo ,{*scilicet add. &MzNaRe} quod ad iudices ecclesiasticos non spectat punire huiusmodi {huius &Re} criminosos.

CHAPTER 12

Student I now think it clear that it pertains to secular judges to punish criminals who are subject to them for secular crimes, so that I do not care to hear more arguments for this. Therefore try to argue for the second [assertion], namely that it does not pertain to ecclesiastical judges to punish criminals of this kind.

Magister Hoc auctoritatibus {auctoritate &Pe} sanctorum patrum videtur posse probari {*ostendi &MzNaPeRe}. Hoc enim Augustinus super Amos Prophetam et ponitur 23, q. 25 {*5 &MzNaRe}, {*c. add. &MzNaPeRe} Sunt quaedam {quidam &MzPe} videtur asserere. Qui sic {*qui sic om. &MzNaRe} Ait {*enim add. &Re}, "Sunt quaedam {om. &Mz} enormia flagitia quae {qui &Mz} potius per mundi iudices quam per antistites et rectores ecclesiarum vindicantur, sicut {sic &Mz} {*est add. &MzNaReZn} {enim add. &Pe} cum quis interficit pontificem, apostolicum, presbyterum, episcopum {*trs. &MzNaPeReZn} sive diaconum. Huiusmodi {huius &Re} reos {om. &Mz} {res &Pe} reges et principes mundi damnant. Ergo non sine causa gladium portant {portat &Mz} qui talia scelera vindicant {*diiudicant &MzNaPeReZn}. Sunt enim {autem &NaRe} maxime constituti propter homicidas, raptores, {propter homicidas raptores om. &Na} {constituti add. &Re} ut {unde &Pe} etiam {*et &MzNaPeReZn} illos {istos &Mz} damnent {damnant &Pe} et alios {scilicet add. &MzPe} suo timore compescant." Ex quibus verbis patet quod raptores et homidicae non sunt per iudicem ecclesiasticum puniendi. Et simili {*consimili &MzNaPeRe} ratione omnia {*nec &MzNaPeRe} alia crimina secularia non {*om. &MzNaPeRe} debent per ipsum puniri {*trs.312 &MzNaPeRe}.

Master It seems that this can be shown from texts of the holy fathers. For Augustine seems to assert this [when writing] on the prophet Amos, as located in 23, q. 5, c. Sunt quaedam [c.39, col.941]. he says, "There are some immensely shameful acts which are punished by judges from the world rather than by priests and rulers of churches, as when someone kills a pontiff, apostolic, bishop, presbyter or deacon, kings or princes of the world condemn those guilty of this kind of thing. It is not in vain, therefore, that those who determine such enormities carry a sword. They have been appointed especially because of murderers and abductors, in order both to condemn them and to curb the fear of others." It is clear from these words that robbers and murderers should not be punished by an ecclesiastical judge. And by a similar argument nor should other secular crimes be punished by one.

Amplius omnia crimina secularia {*trs. &MzNaRe} videntur per eundem iudicem punienda. Et qui ab aliquibus eorum plectendis excluditur, de nullis eorum licite iudicare {*trs. &MzNaPeRe} potest. Sed aliqua secularia crimina scilicet {*om. &NaRe} quae morte aut truncatione membri vel effusione sanguinis sunt plectenda per ecclesiasticum iudicem minime vindicantur {*iudicantur &NaRe}, Extra, Ne clerici vel monachi secularibus {om. &Mz} se immisceant negotiis {om. &Mz} {*trs.312 &NaRe} c. clerici {*Clericis &NaPeRe} {clericos &Mz} et c. Sententiam {*et add. &NaRe} Extra, De raptoribus, {*c. add. &Pe} In archiepiscopatu et {om. &MzPe} 23, q. ultimo, {*c. add. &Pe} His a quibus {*et add. &NaRe} dist. 51, {1 &MzPe} Aliquantos. Igitur {*ergo &MzNaRe} nec {ne &Mz} alia secularia crimina sunt per ecclesiasticum iudicem {trs. &Mz} punienda nisi super criminosos iurisdictionem habeat secularem.

Further, it seems that all secular crimes should be punished by the same judge. And he who is excluded from judging some of them can not licitly judge any of them. But some secular crimes, which should be punished by death, the cutting off of a limb or the shedding of blood, are not judged by an ecclesiastical judge (Extra, Ne clerici vel monachi secularibus negotiis se immisceant, c. Clericis [c.5, col.658] and c. Sententiam [c.9, col.659], and Extra, De raptoribus, c. In archiepiscopatu [c.4, col.809], and 23, q. 8, c. His a quibus [c.30, col.964], and dist. 51, c. Aliquantos [c.1, col.203]. Neither should other secular crimes, therefore, be punished by an ecclesiastical judge, unless he has secular jurisdiction over the criminals.

Rursus punitiones omnium {*criminum &MzNaPeRe} secularium inter curas singulares {*seculares &MzNaPeRe} et negotia secularia computantur. Sed iudicibus ecclesiasticis curae seculares et negotia secularia {computantur ... secularia om. &Pe} sunt interdicta, teste apostolo qui ad {*2 &MzNaRe} Timotheum 2 {1 &MzPe} ait, "Nemo militans Deo implicat se negotiis secularibus {implicat ... secularibus: etc &Pe}. Cui concordat canon apostolorum ex quo, {*ut add. &MzNaPeRe} legitur dist. 84 {*88 &MzNaPeRe}, c. Episcopus, sic habetur, "Episcopus aut sacerdos {*presbyter &Zn} {*aut add. &MzNaPeReZn} diaconus nequaquam seculares vires {*curas &MzNaPeReZn} assumant {*assumat &MzNaPeRe}; sin {si &MzPe} aliter deiiciatur." Et ex concilio Cartaginensi {*4, ut add. &MzNaPeRe} in eadem distinctione c. Episcopus {*legitur add. &NaRe}, sic habetur, "Episcopus nullam rei {rei add. &Mz} familiaris curam ad {a &NaPe} se revocet, sed lectioni et orationi et verbo praedicationis tantummodo vacet." Et beatus Cyprianus, ut legitur {*habetur &MzNaRe} 21, q. 5 {*3 &Zn} c. {om. &MzNaRe} Hi qui, ait, {"Hi add. &NaRe} qui in ecclesia Domini ad ordinem {*ordinationem &MzNaPeReZn} clericorum promoventur, in nullo ab {a &Mz} administratione {ministratione &Mz} divina advocentur {revocentur &Mz} {*avocentur &NaReZn}, nec {ne &MzNaPeRe} molestiis vel {*et &Zn} secularibus negotiis alligentur nec ab altaribus {*altariis &Zn} et {altaribus et: aliqualibus &Mz} sacrificiis recedant sed {in add. &Pe} die et {*ac &MzNaReZn} nocte coelestibus rebus et {ac &MzNaPeRe} spiritualibus serviant." Ex quibus et {*aliisque &MzNaRe} {que aliis &Pe} sacris canonibus quae {*qui &MzNaPeRe} ponuntur dist. 88, c. decernit {*Decrevit &NaRe} {decernimus &Pe} et c. Consequens et c. Perlatum {prelatum &Pe} est {*om. &MzNaPeRe} et Extra, Ne clerici vel monachi {*secularibus se negotiis immisceant add. &MzNaRe} c. 1 et c. Sed nec procuratorum {*procurationes &MzNaReZn} et c. {1 et c. sed nec procuratorum et c. om. &Pe} Clericis et Extra, De vita et honestate clericorum, c. Clerici et 21, q. 3, c. 1 et c. Placuit et c. Cyprianus et c. sacerdotium {*Sacerdotum &Zn} colligitur quod iudices ecclesiastici curis et negotiis secularibus se immiscere non debent. Igitur {*ergo &MzNaRe} ad ipsos non spectat de criminibus secularibus iudicare.

Again, the punishment of secular crimes is reckoned among secular cares and occupations. But secular cares and occupations are forbidden to ecclesiastical judges, as the apostle attests when he says in 2 Tim. 2:4, "No one serving in the army of God gets entangled in secular occupations." The rule of the apostles agrees with this, as we read in dist. 88, c. 3, Episcopus [c.3, col.307]. In it we find, "Let a bishop or priest or deacon not take on secular cares; but if he do otherwise let him be deprived [of office]." And, as we read in the same distinction, c. 6, Episcopus [col.307], the following is found from the fourth Council of Carthage, "Let a bishop not recall to his mind the care of any private matter, but let him occupy himself only with reading, prayer and the word of preaching." And, as we read in 21, q. 3, c. Hi qui [c.6, col.857], blessed Cyprian says, "Let those who are advanced to ordination as clerics in the church of the Lord not be diverted from divine administration in any way nor be bound to secular troubles and occupations, and let them not withdraw from the altar or from sacrifices, but let them serve heavenly and spiritual affairs day and night." From these and other sacred canons located at dist. 88, c. Decrevit [1. col.306] and c. Consequens [c.2, col.307] and c. Perlatum [c.4, col.307] and Extra, Ne clerici vel monachi secularibus se negotiis immisceant, c. 1 [col.657] and c. Sed nec procurationes [c.4, col.658] and c. Clericis[c.5, col.658] and Extra, De vita et honestate clericorum, c. Clerici [c.2, col.449] and 21, q. 3, c. 1 and c. Placuit [c.3, col.856] and c. Cyprianus [c.4, col.856] and c. Sacerdotum [c.7, col.857] we gather that ecclesiastical judges should not involve themselves in secular cares and occupations. Therefore it does not pertain to them make judgement on secular crimes.

alioquin {*Ad hoc &MzNaPeRe} iudiciorum {*iudiciarius &MzNaPeRe} ordo confunditur {confundatur &Re} si {quod &Na} unicuique iudici sua potestas non servatur {si unicuique ... servatur om. &Pe}. Et per consequens qui iudicare illos {om. &Pe} praesumit {*trs. &MzNaRe} qui {illa que &Pe} pertinent {*om. &MzNaPeRe} ad alium iudicem {*spectant add. &MzNaPeRe}, tanquam mittens falcem suam in messem alienam, iudiciarium {iudiciariam &Mz} ordinem {ordinationem &Mz} confundit et potestatem alterius perturbare {*turbare &MzNaPeRe} et impedire conatur. Quod sacri canones detestantur, {testantur &Pe} dist. 96, c. Cum ad unum {*verum &MzNaPeRe} {*et add. &NaRe} Extra, De iudiciis {*c. add. &Pe} Novit {*et add. &NaRe} Extra, De privilegiis, Sicut in iudicariis {*iudiciis &MzNaPeRe}. Cum ergo criminibus secularibus irretiti per secularem iudicem sunt {*sint &NaPeRe} plectendi, eos iudex ecclesiasticus punire non debet sed eos debet relinquere iudicibus secularibus {*trs. &MzNaRe} puniendos, quemadmodum papa causas seculares iudicibus secularibus ne videatur iuribus ipsorum detrahere relinquit {*derelinquit &MzNa PeRe}, Extra, Qui filii sunt legitimi, c. {om. &NaRe} Causam et c. late {*Lator &MzNaPeRe} {*et add. &MzRe} Extra, De foro competenti, c. Si quis {*clericus add. &MzNaRe} et c. Ex transmissa et c. Verum et c. Licet tenor {*et c. Ex tenore &MzNaPeRe} et Extra, De probationibus {*appellationibus &MzNaRe}, c. Si duobus ubi Alexander tertius {enim &Mz} sic dicit, "Denique quod quaeris si a tali {*civili &NaPeReZn} iudice ante iudicium, {iudicem &Pe} vel post ad nostram audientiam fuerit appellatum, an {aut &Pe} huiusmodi {huius &Re} teneat {om. &Pe} appellatio {*trs. &MzNaReZn}. Tenet quidem in his quae {*qui &NaPeReZn} sunt nostrae temporali iurisdictioni subiecta {*subiecti &NaReZn} {subiectos &Pe}, in aliis vero, etsi {etiam si &Mz} de consuetudine ecclesiae teneant {*teneat &NaReZn}, papali {*om. &Zn} {spirituali &Na} {spiritualiter &Re} secundum {sed &Na} iuris rigorem credimus non tenere." legem {*om. &MzNaPeRe} Ubi glossa super verbo tenet {*credimus &Zn} {tenere &NaPeRe} {non tenere &Mz} ait, "Et ita patet quod iurisdictio temporalis non pertinet ad ecclesiam, nec de ea debet se intromittere in praeiudicium iudicis secularis."

In addition, the right order of the judiciary is thrown into confusion if the power of each judge is not preserved. And consequently he who presumes to judge those who concern another judge, as though thrusting his scythe into another's harvest, is confusing the right order of the judiciary and trying to disturb and hinder another's power. The sacred canons abominate this (dist. 96, c. Cum ad verum [c.6, col.339] and Extra, De iudiciis, c. Novit [c.13, col.242] Extra, De privilegiis, c. Sicut in iudiciis [c.2, col.849]. Therefore, since those who are entangled in secular crimes should be punished by a secular judge, an ecclesiastical judge should not punish them but should leave them to be punished by secular judges, just as the pope abandons secular cases to secular judges so that he is not seen to detract from their rights (Extra, Qui filii sunt legitimi, c. Causam [c.7, col.712] and c. Lator [c.5, col.711] and Extra, De foro competenti, c. Si quis clericus [cols 543-4] and c. Ex transmissa [c.6, col.249] and c. Verum [c.7, col.250] and c. Licet [c.10, col.250] and c. Ex tenore [c.11, col.251] and Extra, De appellationibus, c. Si duobus [c.7, col.412] where Alexander III speaks as follows, "And then you ask whether an appeal is binding if it has been made from a civil judge to our hearing before judgement or after. It is binding indeed in the case of those who are subject to our temporal jurisdiction; with others, however, we believe that it is not binding according to the rigour of the law even if it is binding by the custom of the church." Here the gloss on we believe [col.911] says, "And it is clear from this that temporal jurisdiction does not belong to the church, which should not involve itself to the prejudice of a secular judge."

 

CAP. XIII

Discipulus Auctoritates allegatae {allegare &NaRe} circa praemissa ita videntur esse {*om. &MzNaPeRe} contrariae ut omnino alterae sint {*negande add. &NaRe} nisi {non &Mz} per sententiam seu {aut &Mz} assertionem {assertiones &Mz} {seu assertionem om. &Pe}, quae mediet {medie &Mz} {mediat &Pe} inter opiniones praescriptas valeant concordari. Ideo gestio scire an sit aliqua sententia media inter sententias prius {*superius &MzNaRe} recitatas.

CHAPTER 13

Student The texts brought forward in connection with the above [opinions] seem to be so opposed that one or the other should be absolutely denied unless they can be harmonised by an opinion or assertion that mediates between the above opinion. I want to know, therefore, whether there is some intermediate opinion between the opinions recorded above.

Opinion 3: An intermediate opinion

Magister Nonnullis apparet quod auctoritates praedictae {*prescripte &MzNaRe} possunt {possent &Mz} per unam {*om. &NaRe} sententiam mediam {om. &Mz} concordari. Ad cuius evidentiam dicitur esse sciendum quod ad ecclesiam spectat duplex punitio seu correctio, una {est add. &Pe} in foro poenitentiali, alia in foro contentioso. Prima spectat ad iudicem ecclesiasticum respectu cuiuslibet Christiani pro quocunque peccato et de illa multae auctoritates loquentes de illa {*hac &MzNaRe} materia debent {debet &Na} intelligi et istam {*illam &MzNaPeRe} nulla auctoritas allegata {ecclesiastica &Mz} negat ab ecclesiastico iudice. Secunda {*punitio seu add. &MzNaPeRe} correctio in {*de &MzNaRe} criminibus secularibus in triplici casu spectat ad iudicem ecclesiasticum. Primus est quando criminosi iurisdictioni temporalis {*temporali &MzNaRe} iudicis ecclesiastici sunt subiecti. Secundus est quando non est iudex secularis vel quando {*om. &NaRe} iudex secularis est negligens facere {*in faciendo &MzNaRe} iustitiam vel {*et &MzNaRe} crimina punire {*puniendo &MzNaPeRe}. Tertius est quando iudex secularis nullam potest delinquenti poenam inferre cui tamen potest iudex ecclesiasticus {*trs.231 &NaRe} poenam {om. &Mz} inferre {*infligere &MzNaRe}. Quod contingit {contigit &Re} quando de iure {*de iure om. &MzNaPeRe} est crimen {*trs. &MzNaRe} manifestum sed persona delinquens est ignota, quemadmodum fuit de illo {de illo om. &Pe}, de quo legimus {*legitur &MzNaPeRe} 5, q. 1, c. Quidam malignus {*maligni &ReZn}, *spiritus {om. &MzNaPeRe} qui scripsit {scripserunt &Re} libellum famosum contra Castorium notarium {Castorium notarium: consistorium &Pe} ac responsalem {*responsale &Na} {*beati /domini &Pe\ Gregorii add. &MzNaPeRe}, quem Gregorius poena excommunicationis astrinxit nesciens quis esset, quomodo {*quem &MzNaPeRe} iudex secularis quamdiu ignoravit personam delinquentis {*delinquentem &MzNaPeRe} nulla {*nullam &NaRe} {in illa &Mz} potuit {om. &Mz} poena punire {puniret &Mz} {puniri &Re}. Et isto modo saepe iudices ecclesiastici excommunicationis sententiam proferunt in fures et alios delinquentes occultos contra quos iudices {ecclesiastici ... iudices om. &Pe} seculares nullo modo possunt procedere.

Master It is clear to some people that the above texts can be harmonised by an intermediate opinion. To make this clear they say that it should be known that a double form of punishment or correction belongs to the church, one in the area of penance, the other in the area of litigation. The first belongs to an ecclesiastical judge with respect to any christian for any sin, and many texts speaking about this matter should be understood of that [punishment] and no text adduced denies this to an ecclesiastical judge. The second punishment or correction of secular crimes belongs to an ecclesiastical judge in three cases. The first is when criminals are subject to the temporal jurisdiction of an ecclesiastical judge. The second is when there is not a secular judge or the secular judge is negligent in doing justice or punishing crimes. The third is when a secular judge can impose no penalty on a transgressor, on whom, nevertheless, an ecclesiastical judge can inflict a penalty. This happens when there is a clear crime but the transgressor is unknown, as was the case with that one, of whom we read in 5, q. 1, c. Quidam maligni [c.2, col.544], who wrote the slanderous little book against the notary Castorius, with blessed Gregory's reply. Not knowing who it was, Gregory bound with a penalty of excommunication him whom a secular judge could have punished with no penalty as long as he did not know who the transgressor was. And ecclesiastical judges often pronounce a sentence of excommunication in that way against thieves and other secret transgressors against whom secular judges can in no way proceed.

 

CAP. XIV {cap. xiv om. &Pe}

Discipulus De primo casu et tertio praedictorum nolo hic discutere {*disserere &MzNa} {deserere &Re} quia directe spectare videntur {videtur &Mz} ad tractatum de potestate papae et cleri, sed secundum cupio aliqualiter tecum discutere. Primo autem cupio {*gestio &MzNaPeRe} scire an sit aliquis alius casus a praedictis in quo iudex ecclesiasticus secundum praedictos {predictas &Pe} opinantes {opiniones &Pe} invito iudice seculari valeat plectere criminibus secularibus irretitos qui iurisdictioni seculari {*temporali &NaRe} ecclesiae minime sunt subiecti.

CHAPTER 14

Student I do not want to discuss here the first and third cases referred to above because they seem to pertain directly to the tract About the power of the pope and clergy, but I do want to discuss the second with you to some extent. First, however, I desire to know whether there is any other case apart from the ones referred to above in which, according to those so opining, an ecclesiastical judge can, when a secular judge is unwilling to do so, punish those involved in secular crimes who are not subject to the temporal jurisdiction of the church.

Magister Videtur eis quod in nullo {*alio add. &NaPeRe} casu posset {*possit &NaRe} hoc iudex ecclesiasticus nisi forte sit aliquis casus qui valeat reduci ad aliquem praedictorum.

Master It seems to them that in no other case could an ecclesiastical judge do this, unless perhaps it was some case that could be reduced to one of the above.

Discipulus Contra hoc est glossa expresse, ut videtur Extra, {om. &Mz} De foro competenti, c. Licet, quae {qui &Mz} dicit in {nisi &Mz} haec verba super verbo {quo add. &MzNaPeRe} vacante {*imperio add. &Zn}, "Iste ergo est {*trs. &NaPeReZn} unus casus in quo iudex ecclesiasticus potest se immiscere iurisdictioni seculari {*trs. &MzNaPeReZn}, scilicet cum superior non inveniatur {*invenitur &MzNaPeReZn}. Alius est cum iudex secularis negligit facere iustitiam, ut patet in {patet in: hic /hoc &Pe\ ?supra /legitur verbo &Pe\ /in verbo &Mz\ dummodo etc et 1 &MzNaPeRe} {*patet in: hic ver. dummodo et infra &Zn} c. proximo {*et c. 2 /3 &Mz\ add. &MzNaReZn} arg. 23. q. 5. Administratores. Tertius est cum aliquid ambiguum fuerit et difficile {dissimile &Mz} et inter iudices variatur, extra {*infra &MzNaReZn} Qui filii sint {sunt &Pe} legitimi {*c. add. &Zn} Per venerabilem. Quartus casus est in omni crimine ecclesiastico, puta in {*om. &MzNaPeReZn} usura et {*om. &MzNaPeReZn} sacrilegio et consimilibus {*similibus &MzNaReZn} {et consimilibus om. &Pe}, ut 5 {*6 &Zn} {16 &NaPeRe} {26 &Mz} q. 2, c. {et 9 &Pe} 1, et 12, q. 11 {*2 &NaReZn}, c. Nulli liceat et infra De usuris {usura &Mz} {*c. add. &Zn} qui {quoniam &Mz} qui metus causa {*qui qui metus causa: Quoniam &NaPeReZn}. Quintus casus {*om. &NaZn} est {quintus casus est om. &Mz} cum per denunciationem criminis {om. &Mz} quis {*causa &MzNaPeReZn} defertur ad iudicem ecclesiasticum, ut {*om. &Zn} supra {ut supra: scilicet &MzNaRe} {ut supra om. &Pe} c. {*tit. &Zn} &Zn} proximi {*proximo &MzNaPeRe}, novit."

Student The gloss is expressly against this, as it seems from Extra, De foro competenti, c. Licet which has the following on the words vacante imperio [col.547], "This is one case, therefore, in which an ecclesiastical judge can involve himself in secular jurisdiction, namely when a superior is not found. Another is when a secular judge neglects to do justice (see here on the word dummodo and within c. proximo and c. 2 [and] the argument in 23, q. 5, c. Administratores.) A third is when something is doubtful and difficult and there are differences among judges (see within, Qui filii sint legitimi, c. Per venerabilem.) A fourth case is in connection with any ecclesiastical crime, for example, usury, sacrilege and the like, as in 6, q. 2, c. 1 and 12, q. 2, c. Nulli liceat and within De usuris, c. Quoniam. A fifth case is when a case is referred to an ecclesiastical judge by denunciation of the crime (above tit. proximo, novit).

Item ratione connexitatis {connexionis &Pe} quia potest iudex ecclesiasticus iudicare de dote ex quo cognoscit de matrimonio de dono dato {quia potest ... dato: ut /om. &Pe\ in dote infra De donationibus /donatione &Na\ /donatis &Mz\ &MzNaPeRe} inter virum et uxorem, De prudentia. Ex ista {*qua &NaRe} glossa aperte patet {*trs. &MzNaPeRe} quod praeter omnes {*casus &MzNaPeRe} praedictos sunt tres casus, scilicet tertius qui {*om. &NaPeRe} hic est {*om. &MzNaPeRe} enumeratus {enumeratur &MzRe} {enumerati &Pe} et quintus et sextus in quibus {quo &Mz} potest iudex ecclesiasticus immiscere se iurisdictioni seculari, et per consequens in quibus potest punire criminibus secularibus irretitos {*involutos &MzNaRe} licet non sint {om. &Pe} {possunt &Mz} iurisdictioni seculari {*temporali &MzNaPeRe} ecclesiae {*trs. &MzNaPeRe} subiecti. Et licet ista videantur {videatur &Mz} manifesta ex glossa, {ex glossa om. &Pe} tamen dic quomodo respondetur ad ipsa.

The same [can be said] by a logical argument in the case of a dowry (see De donationibus inter virum et uxorem, c. De prudentia [c.3, col.725]. It is quite clear from the gloss on that, that there are three cases in addition to the ones cited above, that is the third related here and a fifth and sixth in which an ecclesiastical judge can involve himself in secular jurisdiction and, consequently, in which he can punish those entangled in secular crimes even if they are not subject to the temporal jurisdiction of the church. Although these seem clear from the gloss, nevertheless tell me how a reply is made to them.

Magister Respondetur quod in quibusdam casibus potest iudex ecclesiasticus instruendo, monendo et etiam praecipiendo immiscere se causis secularibus, in quibus tamen crimina secularia, invito iudice seculari qui paratus est exhibere iustitiae complementum, punire non potest, nec etiam valet in eis diffinitivam proferre sententiam, sed proferenda est sententia a iudice seculari qui iustitiam facere est paratus. Et si sic intelligit {*intelligat &NaRe} glossa praedicta, {praescripta &Mz} est consona {*est consona: consonat &MzNaPeRe} veritati, si autem aliter {om. &Na} intelligit {*intelligat &NaRe}, sacris canonibus contradicit.

Master The reply is that in certain cases an ecclesiastical judge can involve himself in secular cases by instructing, advising and even ordering and yet in those cases he can not punish the secular crimes, even with no secular judge willing and prepared to show the fullness of justice, and can not even pronounce a definitive sentence, but sentence should be pronounced by a secular judge who is prepared to do justice; and if one understands the above gloss in this way, it is in accord with the truth; if, however, one understands it otherwise, it contradicts the sacred canons.

Discipulus Quibus canonibus contradicit?

Student What canons does it contradict?

Magister Dicitur quod contradicit canoni Alexandri tertii, qui ut legitur Extra, De foro competenti, c. Ex transmissa ait, "Ex transmissa nobis insinuatione B.C. et W {Be et W: 23 B et V &Na; B et C &Pe; 2B C et V &Re} militum {W militum om. &Mz} [[gap in ms]] ecclesiae tuae intelleximus quod cum R. de Casmiale {*Cassaville &Zn} {Casasale &MzNaRe} eos super quaedam {*quadam &MzNaPeZn} possessione {quaedam possessione: quartam possessionem &Re} coram Trecensi {coram Trecensi: cortresensi &Mz} episcopo traxisset in causam, nobilis vir de Capis {*Campis &MzNaPeReZn} eorum dominus sub debito fidelitatis {*eis add. &MzNaPeReZn} inhibuit, {exhibuit &NaRe} ei {*om. &MzNaPeRe} ne de seculari feudo in iudicio ecclesiastico responderet {*responderent &MzNaPeReZn}." Et ita {*infra &MzNaReZn}, "Per dominum feudi causam {causa &NaRe} {om. &Mz} iubeas terminari. Et si ipse malitiose distulerit, tu ei {eius &Pe} debitum {defectum &Pe} {in add. &Na} finem imponas." Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod iudex ecclesiasticus de causa spectante ad iudicem secularem se intromittere {*trs. &MzNaRe} non debet imponendo per sententiam finem causae si iudex secularis potest et vult {velit &Mz} iustitiam facere {*exhibere &MzNaRe}.

Master They say that it contradicts the canon of Alexander III who says, as we read in Extra, De foro competenti, c. Ex transmissa [c.6, col.249], "From the report of the knights BC and W from your church which has been despatched to us, we have understood that when R. de Cassaville hauled them before the bishop of Troyes on a charge over a certain possession, their lord, a nobleman from Campis, restrained them through their duty of loyalty, lest they appear in an ecclesiastical court on the issue of a secular feud. ... You should order the case of the feud to be brought to an end by their lord. And if he maliciously defers it, you are to impose on him an enforced conclusion." We gather from these words that in a case pertaining to a secular judge an ecclesiastical judge should not involve himself by imposing a conclusion to the case through his sentence if the secular judge can and wishes to manifest justice.

Item {iterum &Na} dicunt {*isti add. &NaRe} quod illud {*om. &NaRe} contradicit canoni Innocentii, qui ut habetur ibidem {infra 3 &Pe} {*eodem titulo &NaRe} {?4 ?in &Mz} c. Ex tenore ait, "Nos igitur {ergo &Mz} attendentes {attente tendentes &Mz} quod sic sumus cum {*om. &MzNaPeReZn} viduis in iustitiam {*iustitia &Zn} {iustitie &MzNaPeRe} debitores, quod {et &Pe} aliis iniustitiam {iustitiam &Na} facere non debemus, mandamus quatenus, nisi sit talis causa quae ad ecclesiasticum iudicem noscatur {noscitur &Pe} pertinere {*trs. &NaReZn}, ei supersedere curetis, dummodo per iudicem secularem suam possit iustitiam obtinere; alioquin, non obstante contradictione ipsius, causam ipsam ratione praevia terminetis." Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod iudex ecclesiasticus causae seculari supersedere debet quandocunque iustitia potest per iudicem secularem {*trs. &MzNaRe} obtineri.

Again, they say that it contradicts the canon of Innocent who says, as we find in the same title, c. Ex tenore [c.11, col.251], "Giving heed to the fact, therefore, that we are under an obligation to widows in justice, but so that we should not do an injustice to others, we determine that unless it is a case such as is known to pertain to an ecclesiastical judge, you are to take care to refrain from it as long as she can obtain justice from her secular judge; otherwise, notwithstanding the objection of that [judge], you are to bring that case to an end, with reason as your guide." We gather from these words that an ecclesiastical judge should refrain from a secular case whenever justice can be obtained from a secular judge.

CAP. XV {XIV &Pe}

Discipulus Cum isti dicunt {*dicant &MzNaPeRe} quod nunquam ecclesiasticus iudex potest vel {*potest vel om. &MzNaRe} debet punire criminibus secularibus involutos vel iudicialiter se intromittere de causa spectante ad iudicem secularem diffinitivam proferendo sententiam quando iudex secularis potest et vult iustitiae plenitudinem {complementum &Pe} adhibere {*exhibere &MzNaPeRe}, dic quomodo ad ista {*illa &MzNaRe} {predicta &Pe} quae glossa praescripta allegat in contrarium respondetur.

CHAPTER 15

Student Since they say that an ecclesiastical judge should never punish those involved in secular crimes or, by offering a definitive sentence, introduce himself judicially in a case pertaining to a secular judge when the secular judge can and wishes to present full justice, tell me how reply is made to what the above mentioned gloss asserts to the contrary.

Magister Ad istud {*illud &MzNaPeRe} quod adducitur {adducit &MzNa} {om. &Pe} de difficili et ambiguo in tertio casu quem ponit, respondetur quod saepe inter seculares iudices iudicium difficile et ambiguum prospicitur {perspicatur &Pe} cuius veritas absque auctoritate scripturarum sacrarum {*sanctarum &MzNaRe} iudicari non potest, et in illo {*isto &MzNaPeRe} casu recurrendum est praecipue ad summum pontificem ad quem spectat potissime in hoc casu indicare iudicii veritatem, non quidem in causa aliqua speciali proferendo diffinitivam sententiam quando iudex secularis cognita veritate paratus est facere {*ferre &NaRe} iustam {*trs. &MzNaPeRe} sententiam, sed per auctoritatem scripturae divinae debet indicare iudicii veritatem docendo, monendo et etiam praecipiendo si oportet ut quod {*om. &MzNaPeRe} iudex scilicet {*om. &NaRe} secularis cuius interest {ut add. &Mz} iustitiae faciat complementum. Quod si iudex secularis non {*om. &MzNaPeRe} voluerit {*noluerit &MzNaRe} {noluit &Pe} vel non {vel non: cum &Pe} potuerit, summus pontifex in pluribus casibus potest ferre {*proferre &NaRe} {facere &Pe} iustam {*trs. &NaRe} sententiam et {om. &Re} in quibusdam casibus, scilicet in causis sanguinis, {singulis &Re} debet hoc aliis {*alii &NaRe} committere.

Master To what is brought forward in the third case which it puts about what is difficult and ambiguous, the reply is that among secular judges a difficult and ambiguous judgement is often discerned, the truth of which can not be judged without the authority of the holy scriptures, and in that case there should be recourse especially to the highest pontiff to whom it particularly pertains in this case to indicate truth in this judgement, not indeed by oferring a definitive judgement in some particular case when the secular judge is prepared to pass a just sentence when he has learnt the truth; but he should indicate truth in this judgement through the authority of divine scripture by teaching, advising and even instructing, if it is necessary that the secular judge whom it concerns carry out the execution of justice. But if the secular judge is unwilling or unable to do so, the highest pontiff can pronounce a just sentence, and in certain cases, namely in cases of blood, he should entrust this to someone else.

Discipulus Potestne ista responsio aliqua ratione fulciri?

Student Can this reply be strengthened by some argument?

Magister {om. &Re} Videtur quod haec responsio tali ratione potest muniri in auctoritate domini {*Deuteronomii ab &NaRe} {ab &Mz} Innocentii {*Innocentio &NaRe} [[gap in &Mz after Innocentii]] allegata immediate {*indistincte &MzNaPeRe}. Dicitur {videtur &Mz} quod, "Si difficile et ambiguum apud te {apud te om. &MzNaPeRe} iudicium esse prospexeris {*perspexeris &Zn} {esse prospexeris om. &MzNaPeRe} inter sanguinem et sanguinem, causam et causam {et add. &Pe}, lepram et non {*om. &MzNaPeReVg} lepram {prospicitur add. &MzNaRe} {perspicitur add. &Pe} et iudicium inter portas videris {interportas videris om. &MzNaPeRe} variari, {variatur &MzNaPeRe} {et add. &Mz} venies {veniendum est &MzNaPeRe} ad sacerdotem {*sacerdotes &MzNaPeReVgZn} Levitici generis et ad iudicem qui illo tempore fuerit," - per quos Innocentius intelligit summum pontificem et coadiutores {*suos add. &MzNaPeRe} - "qui indicabunt iudicii veritatem." Sed constat quod circa causas sanguinis difficile et ambiguum potest apparere iudicicum potestque circa eos {*eas &MzNaRe} iudicium secularium {*iudicum add. &NaRe} [[crossed out &Re]] variari {vocitari &Pe}. Igitur {*ergo &MzNaRe} {etiam add. &Na} {non add. &Pe} {*et add. &MzRe} in {*hoc add. &MzNaPeRe} casu pro causis sanguinis est ad summum pontificem recurrendum, non quod {*quidem ut &MzNaPeRe} exerceat iudicium in causis {causa &Mz} sanguinis sed ut indicet in genere quale iudicium a secularibus iudicibus {*trs. &MzNaPeRe} in talibus causis debeat exerceri. Igitur {*ergo &MzNaRe} similiter {*consimiliter &MzNaPe} in quibuscunque causis secularibus, civilibus vel criminalibus, quandocunque inter iudices seculares difficile et ambiguum apparet iudicium et inter eos iudicium variatur, recurrendum est potissime ad {*summum add. &MzNaPeRe} pontificem ut indicet iudicii veritatem, non diffiniendo sed docendo et {*om. &MzNaPeRe} monendo et si necesse fuerit praecipiendo, iuxta illud Malachiae 2 {om. &Mz}, "Labia sacerdotis custodiunt scientiam et legem exquirent {*exquirunt &MzNaPeRe} ex ore eius, {*quia angelus domini exercituum est." add. &MzNaRe}

Master It seems that this reply can be strengthened by the following argument in the text of Deuteronomy 17:8-9, brought forward without distinction by Innocent. He says [in Extra, Qui filii sint legitimi, c. Per venerabilem c.13, col.714] that "If a judicial decision is too difficult for you to make between one kind of bloodshed and another, one kind of legal right and another, or one kind of assault and another - any such matters of dispute in your towns - ... you shall go the levitical priests and the judge who is in office in those days;" - by these Innocent understands the highest pontiff and his assistants - "they shall announce to you the decision in the case." But it is certain that a difficult and doubtful judgement can appear in cases of blood and that the judgement of secular judges about them can vary. Even in this case, therefore, recourse should be had to the highest pontiff for cases of blood, not indeed so that he may carry judgement into effect in cases of blood, but so that he may indicate in general what kind of judgement should be carried into effect by secular judges in such cases. In any secular cases, therefore, civil or criminal, whenever a difficult or doubtful judgement appear among secular judges and judgement varies among them, recourse should be had chiefly to the highest pontiff so that he may indicate the truth about the judgement, not by definitive judgment but by teaching, advising and, if it necessary, directing, as in Malachi 2:7, "The lips of a priest guard knowledge and people seek the law from his mouth, for he is the messenger of the Lord of hosts."

Discipulus Per istam rationem {responsionem &Pe} sufficeret quod in tali casu iudices seculares recurrerent ad aliquem in {om. &Mz} sacris literis eruditum qui eis per scipturas sacras {om. &Mz} sciret indicare iudicii veritatem.

Student By that argument it would be enough in such a case that secular judges were to have recourse to someone well-informed in sacred letters who knew how to indicate the truth about this judgement through the sacred scriptures.

Magister Respondetur quod si iudices seculares parati essent comperta {*cognita &MzNaRe} veritate iudicii iustitiam perhibere {*exhibere &MzNaPeRe} sufficeret quod ad eruditum in sacris {literis et add. &Mz} scripturis recurrerent, sed quia {om. &Re} posset contingere quod iudices seculares vel nolunt {*nollent &MzNaRe} {vel nolunt: non vellent &Pe} audire seu acceptare iudicii veritatem vel nollent etiam {*om. &MzNaRe} facere iustitiam etiam {om. &Pe} cognita veritate, ideo possent esse quamplures casus {*trs. &MzNaPeRe} in quibus necesse esset {esse &Na} recurrere {requirere &NaRe} [[recurrere interlinear &Re]] ad illum qui habet {*haberet &NaPeRe} praecipiendi auctoritatem {*trs. &MzNaPeRe} principibus {*iudicibus &MzNaPeRe} secularibus {*et supplendi eorum neglegentiam vel malitiam si nollent facere iustitiam. Huiusmodi /auctoritatem add. &Re margin\ autem est /habet &Re margin\ summus pontifex qui habet auctoritatem precipiendi iudicibus secularibus add. &NaRe} ut iustitiam facerent {*faciant &MzNaRe} {*trs. &MzNaPeRe} qui et {*etiam &NaPeRe} si nollent {*nolint &NaRe} {nolunt &Mz} potest per se vel per alios supplere negligentiam vel malitiam eorundem.

Master The reply is that if secular judges were prepared to show justice once they had learnt the truth about the judgement it would be enough for them to have recourse to someone well-informed in the sacred scriptures, but because it could happen that secular judges either refused to hear or accept the truth about the judgement or refused to do justice even when they had learnt the truth there could, therefore, be many cases in which it was necessary to have recourse to him who had the authority to order secular judges and to make good their negligence or malice if they refuse to do justice. The highest pontiff has such authority, however; he has the authority to order secular judges to do justice, and, if they refuse, can even make good their negligence or malice himself or through others.

Discipulus Unde habet solus {*summus &MzNaPeRe} pontifex hanc potestatem?

Student From what does the highest pontiff have this power?

Magister Sicut invenire poteris {poteritis &Mz} in tractatu de potestate papae et cleri, circa {contra &Re} hoc sunt diversae ac {*diversae ac om. &MzNaPeRe} contrariae opiniones {*trs. &MzNaRe}. Una est quod hoc habet ex Christi ordinatione expressa {*trs.231 &MzNaPeRe}, alia est quod hoc habet ex consuetudine rationabili et praescripta.

Master There are opposing views about this, as you will be able to discover in the tract About the Power of the Pope and Clergy. One is that he has this by the express regulation of Christ, another is that he has it by reasonable and prescribed custom.

Discipulus Videtur quod ista Innocentii textui {*trs. &MzNaRe} aperte {om. &Pe} repugnat {*repugnant &MzNaRe}. Nam Innocentius in decretali {*illa add. &MzNaPeRe} Per venerabilem non dicit quod cum difficile et ambiguum prospicitur iudicium {om. &Pe} ad summum pontificem spectat indicare iudicii veritatem solummodo docendo, {dicendo &Re} {*monendo add. &MzNaRe} et praecipiendo, sed sic {*etiam /om. &MzPe\ dicit &MzNaPeRe} quod {aliquid add. &Mz} ad ipsum pertinet in hoc casu iurisdictionem temporalem exercere. Dicit enim {*in add. &NaRe} {ibi add. &MzPe} haec verba, "Verum etiam {et &Mz} in aliis regionibus, certis causis inspectis, temporalem iurisdictionem casualiter exercemus, non quia {*quod &MzNaPeReZn} alieno iuri praeiudicare velimus, sed quia, sicut in Deuteronomio {decretali &Pe} {decretis &Mz} continetur: Si difficile et ambiguum," etc {om. &Pe} et infra, "In quibus {casibus add. &Pe} cum aliquid fuerit {aliquid fuerit: assumit &Pe} difficile et {*vel &MzNaReZn} ambiguum, ad iudicium est sedis apostolicae recurrendum. Cuius sententiam si superbiens contempserit observare mori praecipitur, id est per excommunicationis sententiam velut mortuus a communione {*fidelium add. &MzNaPeRe} separari." Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod papa in casu praedicto temporalem exercendo iustitiam fert sententiam.

Student It seems that these clearly oppose Innocent's text. For in that decretal c. Per venerabilem he does not say that when a difficult and doubtful judgement is discerned it pertains to the highest pontiff to indicate the truth about the judgement by teaching, advising and ordering only, but he also says that in this case it pertains to him to exercise temporal jurisdiction. For he says the following words [col.716], "Indeed in other regions, when certain cases have been examined, we even casually exercise temporal jurisdiction, not because we want to be prejudicial to the right of another, but because, as we find in Deuteronomy, If a judicial decision is too difficult," etc ... "When something is difficult or doubtful in such [cases], recourse should be had to the judgement of the apostolic see. If anyone in his pride disdains to observe its sentence he is ordered to die, that is by a sentence of excommunication to be separated like a dead man from the communion of the faithful." We gather from these words that in the above case the pope passes sentence by exercising temporal justice.

Magister Respondetur quod sicut quaedam {*alia add. &MzNaPeRe} verba Innocentii in eadem decretali videntur quasi violenter exponenda ut ab haeretica pravitate salventur, sic {*etiam add. &NaPeRe} {et add. &Mz} verba ista sane debent exponi ne perperam {palam &Pe} et iniuste iuribus imperatoris et aliorum laicorum praeiudicare monstrentur.

Master The reply is that just as it seems that some other words of Innocent in that same decretal should be expounded as it were violently so that they may be saved from heretical wickedness, so these words too should be expounded soundly lest they are shown falsely and unjustly to prejudice the rights of the emperor and other laymen.

Discipulus Quae sunt illa verba Innocentii quae sunt violenter exponenda ut ab haeretica pravitate salventur {absolventur &Pe}?

Student What are those words of Innocent which should be violently expounded so that they are saved from heretical wickedness?

Magister Nonnullis apparet quod ista verba Innocentii, sunt {*"Sane &MzNaPeReZn} cum Deuteronomii lex secunda interpretatur {*interpretetur &MzNaPeReZn}, ex vi vocabuli comprobatur ut quod ibi decrevimus {*decernitur &NaReZn} {decernuntur &Pe} in novo testamento debeat observari," nisi violenter exponantur sapiunt haeresim manifestam, scilicet {nisi ... scilicet: eo &Pe} quod {multa add. &Pe} ceremonialia {criminalia &Mz} veteris {decretis &Mz} legis in novo testamento debeant observari eo quod {*multa add. &MzNaRe} ceremonialia {criminalia &Mz} {eo quod ceremonialia om. &Pe} quae {*om. &NaRe} videntur {*in Deuteronomio &MzNaPeRe} decernuntur {*decernantur &MzNaRe}, sicut patet fere per totum.

Master It seems to some people that these words of Innocent [col.716], "When the second law of Deuteronomy is interpreted, it is proved from the force of the language that what is determined there should be observed in the New Testament," smack of manifest heresy unless they are violently expounded, that is that many ceremonial acts of the old law should be observed in the New Testament, because many ceremonial acts are determined on in Deuteronomy, as is clear almost throughout it.

Discipulus Innocentius intelligit quod illa quae decernuntur in Deuteronomio spiritualiter observanda sunt in novo testamento {*trs.345612 &MzNaPeRe} non ad literam nec ad {*secundum &MzNaPeRe} sensum literalem.

Student Innocent means that those things that are determined in Deuteronomy should be observed spiritually in the New Testament, not according to the letter or in the literal sense.

Magister Videtur quod hoc non sufficit. {sufficiat &Pe} Nam illo {*isto &MzNaPeRe} modo omnia ceremonialia {criminalia &Mz} et quaecunque continentur in aliis libris Pentateucon {*Pentateuci &MzPeRe} et in {om. &MzPe} aliis libris {Pentateucon ... libris om. &Na} veteris testamenti sunt servanda in novo testamento, teste Gratiano qui dist. 6, dicit, {c. add. &Pe} "Sunt in lege quaedam moralia, ut non occides, etc, quaedam mystica, utpote sacrificiorum praecepta, ut de agno et {ut de agno: et alia &Zn} hic {*hiis &MzNaPeReZn} similia. Moralia mandata ad naturale ius {trs. &NaRe} spectant atque {ac &Re} nonnullam {*ideo nullam &MzNaReZn} imitationem {*mutabilitatem &MzNaPeReZn} recepisse monstrantur. Mystica vero, quantum ad superficiem, et {*om. &MzNaPeReZn} a naturali iure {om. &Pe} probantur aliena, sed {*om. &MzNaPeReZn} quantum ad moralem intellectionem {*intelligentiam &MzNaPeReZn}, inveniuntur {invenitur &Re} sibi annexa, ac per hoc, {om. &Mz} sunt et ad {*sunt et ad: et /etiam &NaPeRe\ si secundum &MzNaPeReZn} superficiem videntur {*videantur &MzNaPeReZn} esse imitata {*mutata &MzNaPeReZn}, tamen secundum moralem intelligentiam imitabilitatem {*mutabilitatem &NaPeReZn} nescire probantur." Innocentius autem simpliciter {*singulariter &MzNaRe} dicit illa quae in {om. &Na} Deuteronomio {decretis &Pe} decernuntur servanda esse in novo testamento, innuens quod illa quae decernuntur {discernuntur &Mz} in aliis libris Pentateucon {*Pentateuci &MzPeRe} non sunt servanda in novo testamento. Aut ergo intellexit {*intelligit &MzNaRe} quod illa quae decernuntur {discernuntur &Mz} in Deuteronomio sunt servanda in novo testamento secundum sensum literalem, et hoc est haereticum, aut secundum sensum {om. &Re} moralem, et sic illa quae decernuntur {discernuntur &Mz} in aliis libris sunt servanda {*trs. &MzNaRe} in novo testamento. {aut ergo intellexit ... testamento om. &Pe}

Master It seems that this does not suffice. For all the ceremonial acts and whatever is contained in the other books of the Pentateuch and of the Old Testament should be preserved in this way in the New Testament, as Gratian attests when he says in dist. 6 [c.3, col11], "There are in the law certain moral teachings, that you shall not kill etc., certain as it were mystical commands about sacrifices, as of a lamb and such like. Moral mandates pertain to natural law and are shown therefore not to have undergone any change. On the surface, the mystical [mandates] are proved to be alien to natural law, in terms of moral understanding, they are found connected to them, and, in this way, even if they seem to be changed on the surface, they are nevertheless proved not to know any change in terms of moral understanding." Innocent, however, says in particular that those things which are determined in Deuteronomy should be preserved in the New Testament, implying that those things which are determined in the other books of the Pentateuch should not be preserved in the New Testament. He means, therefore, that those things that are determined in Deuteronomy should be preserved in the New Testament either according to the literal sense, and this is heretical, or according to the moral sense, and in this way those things that are determined in the other books should be preserved in the New Testament.

Discipulus Quomodo possunt exponi verba Innocentii superius scripta {*superius scripta: suprascripta &NaRe} quod {*ut &MzNaPeRe} nec unum sapiant {sapiunt &Mz} errorem nec alium, quod scilicet {*videlicet &MzNaPeRe} ceremonialia quae {*in add. &MzPeRe} Deuteronomii {*Deuteronomio &MzPeRe} decernuntur {discernuntur &Mz} sunt secundum superficiem literae {om. &Re} in novo testamento servanda {*trs.4123 &MzRe}, vel quod {om. &Re} ceremonialia {quae Deuteronomii ... ceremonialia om. &Na} vel {*seu &NaRe} mystica quae in aliis libris {*trs. &MzRe} decernuntur {discernuntur &Mz} non sunt servanda secundum moralem intelligentiam in novo testamento?

Student How can the above words of Innocent be expounded so that they do not smack of either error, that is that the ceremonial acts that are determined in Deuteronomy should be preserved in the New Testament in the surface sense, or that the ceremonial or mystical acts which are determined in the other books should not be preserved in the New Testament according to their moral understanding?

Magister Potest dici quod Innocentius intelligit quod {*om. &MzNaPeRe} non {nisi &Mz} solum {solummodo &Mz} ex natura {veritate &Pe} rei videtur {*om. &MzNaPeRe} haberi quod illa que decernuntur in Deuteronomio secundum moralem intelligentiam servanda sunt {trs. &Mz} in novo testamento sed etiam quod hoc habetur ex vi vocabuli, eo quod Deuteronomium {*Deuteronomii &MzNaRe} lex secunda interpretatur.

Master It can be said that Innocent means that it is not only from the nature of reality that it is held that those things that are determined in Deuteronomy should be preserved in the New Testament according to their moral understanding, but also that this is held from the force of the language in that the law of Deuteronomy is interpreted as second.

Discipulus Nunc dic quomodo exponuntur alia verba eiusdem Innocentii ne iuribus imperatoris et aliorum laicorum {om. &Mz} praeiudicare monstrentur {monstrantur &Pe}.

Student Now tell me how Innocent's other words are expounded so that they are not shown to prejudice the rights of the emperor and other laymen.

Magister Dicitur quod verba praescripta Innocentii intelligenda sunt quando imperator et alii clerici {*laici &MzNaPeRe} non volunt {*non volunt: nolunt &MzNaRe} secundum {*om. &MzNaPeRe} veritatem {*cognita veritate &NaRe} {veritate &Mz} iudicii facere iustitiae complementum. Tunc {nunc &Pe} enim potest papa {*trs. &NaRe} casualiter iurisdictionem temporalem exercendo in causis spectantibus ad imperatorem et alios laicos diffinitivam ferre {facere &Pe} sententiam.

Master It is said that the above words of Innocent should be understood of when the emperor and other laymen, having learnt the truth about the judgement, refuse to undertake the execution of justice. For then the pope, by casually exercising temporal jurisdiction, can pass a definitive sentence in cases pertaining to the emperor and other laymen.

 

CAP. XVI {cap. xvi om &Pe}

Discipulus Quia ista tertia sententia {*trs. &MzNaPeRe} auctoritates quae videntur contrariae nititur concordare et nullam vult negare, discurramus per eas et videamus {*quomodo add. &MzNaRe} secundum istam sententiam quomodo {*om. &MzNaRe} debent intelligi. Per hoc enim {*forsitan add. &NaRe} melius ad veritatem {*totius add. &MzNaRe} istius forsan {*om. &NaRe} materiae potero pervenire. Dic itaque primo quomodo secundum opinionem istam decretalis illa, debeat {debet &Pe} intelligi scilicet {*debeat intelligi scilicet om. &MzNaRe} Extra, De officio iudicis ordinarii, {*c. add. &Pe} perniciosam {*Perniciosa, supra 10 c. allegata, {*debet intelligi add. &MzNaRe}.

CHAPTER 16

Student Because that third opinion tries to harmonise texts that seem opposed and does not want to deny any of them, let us run through them and see how they should be understood according to that opinion. For by doing this I will perhaps better be able to arrive at the truth of that whole matter. And so tell me first of all how, according to that opinion, the decretal Extra, De officio iudicis ordinarii, c. Perniciosa [c.1, col.186], brought forward in chapter 10 above, should be understood.

 

Magister Uno modo respondetur quod decretalis ista {*illa &MzNaPeRe} loquitur de potestate inquirendi, ulciscendi et iudicandi adulteria et alia scelera clericorum et illorum qui temporali iurisdictioni episcoporum sunt subiecti.

Master One reply is that that decretal is talking about the power of inquiring into, avenging and punishing adulteries and other crimes of clerics and those who are subject to the temporal jurisdiction of bishops.

Aliter dicitur quod loquitur indistincte de omnibus quando iudices seculares negligunt adulteria {om. &Pe} et alia scelera secularia debita animadversione punire. {punitione &Pe} Sic enim in multis regionibus iudices ecclesiastici puniunt fornicationes et alia plura {*trs. &MzNaRe} scelera quia iudices seculares talia crimina non {odiunt nec add. &Pe} puniunt vel {sed &Pe} favent huiusmodi {huius &Re} criminosis. Et ideo si iudices seculares {talia crimina ... seculares om. &Na} de fornicationibus, adulteriis et huiusmodi criminibus secularibus debitam et sufficientem sumerent {om. &NaRe} ultionem, iudices ecclesiastici de ipsis puniendis invitis iudicibus secularibus et prohibentibus se intromittere non deberent {debent &Mz}.

Otherwise it is said that it is talking about everyone without distinction when secular judges neglect to punish with due chastisement adulteries and other secular crimes. For it is thus that in many regions ecclesiastical judges punish acts of fornication and many other crimes, because secular judges either do not punish such crimes or countenance criminals of this kind. And therefore if secular judges were to take due and sufficient vengeance for acts of fornication, adulteries and secular crimes of this kind, ecclesiastical judges should not involve themselves in punishing them if the secular judges are unwilling for them to do so and forbid them.

Discipulus Haec responsio quantum ad crimen {crimina &Pe} adulterii veritati videtur contraria {*trs.231 &MzNaPeRe} cum adulterium {adulterii &Mz} crimen ecclesiasticum sit {ecclesiasticum sit: esset sic &Mz} censendum et {ecclesiasticum sit censendum et om. &Pe} ad iudicem ecclesiasticum spectat {*spectet &MzNaRe}. Nam ad eundem iudicem spectat crimen adulterii ad quem causae matrimoniales pertinere noscuntur; {pertinere noscuntur om. &Pe} sed {huiusmodi add. &Pe} causae matrimoniales {om. &Pe} ad iudicem ecclesiasticum spectant, {pertinent &Mz} ut notat glossa {*Extra add. &MzNaPeRe}, De foro competenti, {*c. add. &Pe} Ex tenore, allegans capitulum Extra, De officio delegati, {c. add. &Pe} Causam quae {autem &Pe} et capitulum {om. &Pe} Extra, De consanguinitate et affinitate, {c. add. &Pe} Ex literis. igitur {*Ergo &MzNaRe} et crimen adulterii spectat ad ecclesiasticum iudicem.

Student This reply seems contrary to the truth with respect to the crime of adultery since adultery should be considered an ecclesiastical crime and pertains to an ecclesiastical judge. For the crime of adultery pertains to the same judge to whom matrimonial cases are known to pertain; but matrimonial cases pertain to an ecclesiastical judge, as the gloss on Extra, De foro competenti, c. Ex tenore [c.11, col.548] notes, citing the chapter Causam quae from Extra, De officio delegati and the chapter Ex literis from Extra, De consanguinitate et affinitate. The crime of adultery, therefore, pertains to an ecclesiastical judge.

Magister Respondetur quod tam crimen adulterii quam causa matrimonialis aliquo modo spectat ad iudicem ecclesiasticum et aliquo modo ad iudicem secularem. Cuius ratio assignatur quia matrimonia {*matrimonium &MzNaPeRe} non solum reperiuntur {*reperitur &MzNaPeRe} apud fideles lege ecclesiastica et divina utentes, verum etiam {*verum etiam: sed &MzNaRe} apud infideles et {om. &Mz} sola lege naturae contentos et ideo causa matrimonialis, in quantum matrimonium est a lege divina, {om. &Mz} spectat ad ecclesiasticum iudicem et, in quantum est a lege naturae, spectat ad iudicem secularem. Similiter crimen {crimina &Pe} adulterii, in quantum est contra matrimonium prout est a lege divina, spectat ad iudicem ecclesiasticum; in quantum autem est contra matrimonium prout est a lege {divina spectat ... lege om. &Pe} naturae, spectat ad iudicem secularem. Unde crimen adulterii in quantum est contra prohibitionem divinam vel ecclesiasticam est puniendum per iudicem ecclesiasticum, sed adulterium {*crimen adulterii &MzNaPeRe} ut {quando &Mz} est {*ut est: in quantum esset &NaPeRe} contra matrimonium ut {*est add. &MzNaPeRe} a lege naturae est {*esset &NaRe} per secularem iudicem est {*om. &MzNaPeRe} puniendum. Et ideo si non est {*sit &MzNaPe} contra legem naturae quod unus vir habeat plures mulieres {*uxores &NaPe} {et ideo ... mulieres om. &Re} sed sit solum {*solummodo &NaRe} contra legem divinam et ecclesiasticam, qui prius {*primo &MzNaPeRe} contraheret cum una et postea {post &Pe} cum alia quam cognosceret pro adulterio {*cum secunda add. &MzNaPeRe} non esset puniendus per iudicem secularem, quia iudex secularis post {*per &MzNaPeRe} solam legem naturae non iudicarent {*iudicaret &MzNaPeRe} ipsum adulterum {adulterium &MzNaRe}, sed puniendus esset per iudicem ecclesiasticum {*trs. &MzNaPeRe}, qui per legem divinam vel ecclesiasticam ipsum adulterum {adulterium &MzNaRe} puniret {*reputaret &MzNaPeRe}.

Master The reply is that the crime of adultery, like a matrimonial case, pertains in some ways to an ecclesiastical judge and in some ways to a secular judge. The reason given for this is that because matrimony is found not only among believers who accept ecclesiastical and divine law but among unbelievers and those content with natural law only, a matrimonial case, in so far as matrimony is based on divine law, pertains as a result to an ecclesiastical judge and, in so far as it is based on the law of nature, pertains to a secular judge. Similarly, in so far as it is against matrimony as it is based on divine law, the crime of adultery pertains to an ecclesiastical judge; in so far as it is against matrimony as it is based on the law of nature, however, it pertains to a secular judge. The crime of adultery, therefore, in so far as it is against a divine or ecclesiastical prohibition, should be punished by an ecclesiastical judge; but in so far as a crime of adultery was against matrimony as it is based on the law of nature, it should be punished by a secular judge. And if it is not against the law of nature, therefore, that one man should have many wives, but only against divine and ecclesiastical law, he who was to contract a marriage first with one [woman] and later with another [woman] whom he knew [[is this right? --- i.e. "knew" sexually, so that the second marriage was consummated]], should not be punished by a secular judge for adultery with the second, because a secular judge would not judge him to be an adulterer solely by the law of nature, but should be punished by an ecclesiastical judge who would regard him as an adulterer in terms of divine or ecclesiastical law.

Discipulus Dic qualiter respondetur ad decretalem Innocentii tertii {om. &NaRe} Extra, De iudiciis, {*c. add. &Pe} Novit.

Student Tell me what reply is given to Innocent III's decretal, Extra, De iudiciis, c. Novit [c.13, col.242].

Magister Dicitur {*Respondetur &MzNaRe} quod Innocentius signanter dicit ad suum officium pertinere de quocunque peccato mortali quemlibet Christianum corrigere {*corripere &MzNaPeRe} {*trs.312 &MzNaPeRe}; non tamen semper {om. &Pe} spectat ad ipsum punire quemlibet Christianum de peccato mortali quocunque {*trs.312 &NaRe} de {*in &NaRe} foro contentioso. Hoc enim {om. &Pe} esset totaliter {talem &Pe} absorbere potestatem puniendi crimina quam habet imperator et alii iudices seculares. Quando tamen correctus {*correptus &NaRe} de peccato mortali contemnit correctionem {*correptionem &NaRe} et non est {om. &Mz} aliquis iudex secularis qui contemnentem pro peccato commisso plectat digne {*condigne &MzNaPeRe}, potest papa ipsum per districtionem ecclesiasticam coercere, {*et add. &MzNaPeRe} in eo casu loquitur Innocentius. Quem {quod &Pe} etiam {*om. &NaRe} licet sit iudex secularis qui sufficienter ipsum punit {*puniat &MzNaRe} {*trs. &MzNaRe} pro primo crimine seculari potest punire pro contemptu quo contemnit correctionem {*correptionem &NaRe} ecclesiae, quia {qui &Pe} iste {*ille &NaPeRe} contemptus quando est criminalis debet inter crimina ecclesiastica computari.

Master The reply is that Innocent expressly says that it pertains to his office to reprove any christian for any mortal sin; nevertheless it does not always pertain to him to punish any christian for any mortal sin in a civil court. For this would be to absorb totally the power of punishing crimes which the emperor and other secular judges have. Nevertheless when someone reproved for a mortal sin disdains the reproof and there is no secular judge to punish the disdainer worthily for the sin he has committed, the pope can restrain him with an ecclesiastical penalty, and it is of this case that Innocent is speaking. Even if there is a secular judge who punishes such a person sufficiently for his first secular crime, he [the pope] can punish him for the disdain by which he disdains the reproof of the church, because when that disdain is criminal it should be reckoned as among ecclesiastical crimes.

Discipulus Videtur quod quando {*licet &MzNaPeRe} papa coercet {*coerceret &MzNaRe} quemlibet Christianum pro quocunque peccato mortali non totaliter {taliter &NaRe} [[corrected to totaliter &Re]] absorbetur {*absorberetur &NaRe} potestas imperatoris et aliorum laicorum qui {*om. &NaRe} crimina secularia habent {*om. &NaRe} {habeant &MzPe} puniendi, {trs. &Mz} potestatem {*om. &NaRe} quia alia est poena canonica et alia legalis, et ideo quamvis criminosus a iudice puniatur {*trs.312 &MzNaPeRe} seculari poena legali poterit nihilominus pro eodem crimine puniri a iudice ecclesiastico poena canonica.

Student It seems that even if the pope were to coerce every christian for every mortal sin, the power of the emperor and other laymen to punish secular crimes would not be totally absorbed, because on the one hand there is a canonical penalty and on the other there is a legal penalty, and therefore even if a criminal is punished with a legal penalty by a secular judge, he could nevertheless for the same crime be punished with a canonical penalty by an ecclesiastical judge.

Magister Hoc videtur {*om. &MzNaPeRe} pluribus irrationabile {*omnino videtur add. &MzNaPeRe} quia sicut, habetur Extra, De iudiciis, {c. add. &Pe} At si clerici, nullus debet duplici poena puniri {*conteri &MzNaPeRe} quando {quoniam &Mz} una sufficit. Et ideo qui per iudicem secularem pro aliquo crimine {*scelere &MzNaRe} sufficienter punitur, per iudicem ecclesiasticum alia poena puniri non debet. Hoc consuetudo ecclesiae conservat {*servat &MzNaRe} quia raptores et {*om. &MzNaRe} homicidae et alii scelerati quando coram iudice seculari {*trs. &MzNaRe} conveniuntur {*convincuntur &MzNaRe} et poena condigna plectuntur, ecclesia eis nullam poenam publicam {*trs.2341 &MzNaPeRe} imponit nec extra forum poenitentiae {*om. &MzNaPeRe} poenitentibus {*penitentiale &MzNa} {penitentialem &Re} de eis se aliqualiter {aliqualem &Pe} intromittit.

Master This seems altogether irrational to many people because, as we find in Extra, De iudiciis, c. At si clerici [c.4, col.240], no one should be crushed with a double penalty when one is enough. And therefore he who is sufficiently punished by a secular judge for some crime should not be punished by an ecclesiastical judge with another penalty. The custom of the church preserves this [principle], because when robbers, murderers and other miscreants are convicted before a secular judge and punished with an appropriate penalty, the church does not impose any public penalty on them and does not involve itself with them in any way beyond the imposition of penance.

Discipulus Dic quomodo respondetur ad alios canones qui in eodem 10 capitulo {*trs. &NaPeRe} adducuntur {adducitur &Mz}.

Student Tell me how reply is made to the other canons which are brought forward in chapter 10.

Magister Respondetur quod omnes debent intelligi quando iudices seculares in puniendo huiusmodi {huius &Re} scelera negligentes sunt {*trs. &MzNaPeRe} vel quando huiusmodi {huius &PeRe} scelerati sunt occulti ita quod in iudicio {iudiciis &Pe} convinci non possunt.

Master The reply is that they should all be understood of when secular judges are negligent in punishing crimes of this kind or when miscreants of this kind are concealed so that they can not be convicted in court.

 

CAP. XVII {xvi &Pe}

Discipulus Specialiter desidero scire quomodo secundum eandem assertionem respondetur ad auctoritates quae de sacris literis adducuntur.

 

CHAPTER 17

Student I especially want to know how, according to that assertion, reply is made to the texts adduced from the sacred book.

Magister Ad auctoritatem salvatoris, "Si peccaverit in te frater tuus" etc., multipliciter respondetur. Uno modo quod intelligitur quando iudex secularis negligens est {*trs. &MzNaPe} in faciendo iustitiam {etc add. &Pe}.

Master To the Saviour's text [Matt. 18:15], "If your brother sins against you" etc., there are many replies. One is that it is understood of when a secular judge is negligent in doing justice.

Aliter dicitur quod per illa verba salvatoris non tribuitur aliqua potestas iudicibus ecclesiasticis plus quam iudicibus secularibus. Nam ibi non capitur {*accipitur &MzNaPeRe} ecclesia pro viris ecclesiasticis qui clerici appellantur sed pro congregatione fidelium universali vel particulari quae {qui &Mz} clericos et laicos comprehendit. dicunt {*Dicitur &MzNaPeRe} enim quod in tota scriptura divina non capitur {*accipitur &MzNaPeRe} hoc {*om. &MzNaPeRe} nomen ecclesiae specialiter pro clericis, licet {sed &Mz} sic saepe capiatur {*accipiatur &MzNaPeRe} {*trs. &MzNaPeRe} in canonibus sacris. Voluit igitur {*ergo &MzNaRe} salvator quod peccatum delinquentis post secretam correctionem et adhibitionem testium ultimo diceretur {dividetur &Mz} alicui {alteri &Mz} congregationi fidelium laicorum vel clericorum vel simul utrorumque. quod {*Quam &MzNaPeRe} si non audiret, haberetur sicut ethnicus et publicanus.

In another way it is said that by those words of the Saviour power is not given to ecclesiastical judges more than to secular judges. For in that text church is not taken to stand for ecclesiastics who are called clerics but for the whole or a particular gathering of believers, which comprises clerics and laymen. For it is said that in the whole of divine scripture the word church does not stand particularly for clerics, although it is often taken in that way in the sacred canons. The Saviour meant, therefore, that after solitary correction and the summoning of witnesses the sin of a transgressor was to be told finally to some gathering of believers, lay or clerical or both at the same time. If he were not to listen to this, he would be held to be like a Gentile and tax collector.

Aliter dicitur quod {om. &Re} per illa {*eadem &MzNaPeRe} verba ecclesiae nulla {*trs. &NaRe} datur {*tribuitur &MzNaPeRe} potestas puniendi peccantes sed solummodo attribuitur {*tribuitur &MzNaRe} {potestas ... attribuitur om. &Pe} ei {*sibi &MzNaPeRe} potestas corrigendi {*corripiendi &NaPeRe} absque punitione aliqua {*alia &NaRe}. Nam per illa {*eadem &MzNaPeRe} verba nihil plus attribuitur {*tribuitur &MzNaPeRe} ecclesiae quam fratri in quem {*in quem: inquit &Mz} peccatur et testibus adhibitis. Sicut enim dicitur, "Si te non audierit, adhibe tecum adhuc unum vel duos", testes {*om. &NaRe} et sicut dicitur, {*"Quod add. &MzNaRe} si illos non audierit, {adhibe ... audierit om. &Pe} de {*dic &MzNaPeRe} ecclesiae", ita dicitur, et {*om. &NaRe} "Si {*autem add. &NaReVg} ecclesiam non audierit sit tibi {sibi add. &Na} sicut Ethnicus et publicanus." Per quae verba innuitur quod ultimo debet facere ecclesia illud {*om. &NaRe} quod prius fecit frater {fratri &Mz} in quem {in quem: inquantum &Mz} spectabatur {*peccabatur &MzNaPeRe} et quod fecerunt {fecerit &Mz} testes adhibiti. Quo facto ille in quem peccatur debet ipsum {*habere &MzNaPeRe} peccantem {potestatem &MzNa} reputare {*om. &MzNaPeRe} {*sicut add. &MzNaRe} {contra add. &Mz} Ethnicum et publicanum, quia ibi {*illi &Na} dicitur, "Sit tibi sicut Ethnicus et publicanus", hoc est, {*vel add. &NaPe} vita {vel evites &Mz} eum sicut ethnicum et publicanum {quia ibi ... publicanum om. &Re} {*vel add. &NaRe}, amore iustitiae et propter bonum commune vel {*et &MzNaPeRe} ut boni inter malos quiete vivant, trade {tradere &Re} eum iudici qui de eo faciet {*faciat &MzNaRe} complementum iustitiae {*trs. &MzNaPeRe}. Sed per praedicta verba Salvatoris non tribuitur fratri {potestas add. &Mz} in quem peccatur nec testibus adhibitis {adhibetur &Re} potestas {om. &Mz} puniendi fratrem delinquentem sed solummodo corrigendi {*corripiendi &NaRe}. Igitur {*ergo &MzNaRe} per eadem verba {solummodo ... verba om. &Pe} solummodo attribuitur {*tribuitur &MzNaPeRe} ecclesiae potestas delinquentem corrigendi {*corripiendi &NaPeRe}.

In another way it is said that no power to punish sinners is given to the church by those words, but only the power to reprove, without any other punishment, is given to it. For nothing more is given to the church by those words than to a brother who is sinned against and to summoned witnesses. For just as it is said, "If you are not listened to, take one or two others along with you", and "If he refuses to listen to them, tell it to the church", so it is said, "If he refuses to listen even to the church, let him be to you as a Gentile and a tax collector." These words mean that the church ought to do finally what the brother who was sinned against did first and what the summoned witnesses did. Once this has been done, he who was sinned against should consider the sinner as a Gentile and tax collector, because to him it is said, "Let him be to you as a Gentile and a tax collector", that is, either avoid him as a Gentile and tax collector, or, out of a love of justice and on account of the common good and so that the good may live quietly among the evil, hand him over to a judge who will ensure the execution of justice concerning him. But those words of the Saviour do not give to the brother who is sinned against nor to the summoned witnesses the power to punish a transgressing brother, but only to reprove him. By those same words, therefore, the church is given power only to reprove a transgressor.

Quod tali ratione probatur. Non magis licet fidelibus praeiudicare {punire scilicet &Mz} imperatori et aliis laicis fidelibus quam infidelibus, nec magis debent istis vel illis praeiudicare usurpando potestatem puniendi reos qui {*quando &NaRe} puniendi sunt per illos aut {*quam &MzNaPeRe} in negando eis {*ei &NaRe} censum vel dignitatem temporalem in eorum praeiudicium usurpando. Sed Christus noluit {om. &Mz} ut {*quod &MzNaPeRe} fideles praeiudicarent imperatori infideli negando ei censum cum dixerit Matth. 12 {*22 &MzNaPeRe}:[21], "Reddite Caesari quae sunt Caesaris" {*trs.2341 &MzNaPeReVg}; {et que sunt dei deo add. &Mz} {etc add. &Pe} nec voluit quod aliquis fidelium {*fidelis &NaPeRe} {infidelis &Mz} usurparet sibi aliquam {*om. &NaRe} dignitatem temporalem in praeiudicium imperatoris infidelis, in cuius signum noluit fieri rex temporalis super Iudaeos Ioh. 6. igitur {*Ergo &MzNaRe} etiam {et &Mz} per praedicta {*praescripta &MzNaPeRe} verba {*trs. &MzNaPeRe} noluit tribuere fidelibus potestatem puniendi reos qui {*quando &NaPeRe} essent plectendi per alios.

This is proved by the following argument. No more are believers permitted to wrong the emperor and other believing laymen than are unbelievers, and they should no more wrong him [[reading isti]] or them by usurping their power to punish the guilty, when they should be punished by them, than by denying them tax or by usurping to their prejudice any temporal dignity. But Christ did not want believers to wrong an unbelieving emperor by denying him tax since he said in Matthew 22:21, "Render to Caesar that which is Caesar's"; nor did he want any believer to usurp for himself any temporal dignity to the prejudice of an unbelieving emperor, in token of which he refused to be made temporal king over the Jews in John 6:15. Likewise, by those above words, therefore, he did not give to believers the power to punish the guilty when they should be punished by others.

 

CAP. XVIII {XVII &Pe}

Discipulus &Recita quomodo respondetur ad auctoritates {*auctoritatem &MzNaPeRe} apostoli 1 {*ad add. &Pe} Corinthios 6:[3] cum dixit {*dicit &MzNaPeRe}, "Nescitis quoniam angelos iudicabitis {*iudicabimus &MzNaPeReVg}? Quanto magis secularia?" {seculares &Mz} {quanto magis secularia: etc &Pe}

CHAPTER 18

Student Set out what reply is made to the text of the apostle in 1 Cor. 6:3 when he says, "Do you not know that we are to judge angels, to say nothing of secular matters?"

 

Magister Respondent {*Respondetur &MzNaPeRe} quod apostolus in illo {isto &Mz} capitulo non intendit prohibere Corinthiis {*Corinthios &MzNaRe} in omni casu apud infideles iudicare {*iudicari &MzNaPeRe}, nec intendit asserere quod soli fideles habeant {*debent &MzPeRe} {debet &Na} secularia iudicare, et ideo non reprehendit omnes illos qui in quocunque casu requirebant {in add. &Na} iudicium infidelium - sic enim tam verbis quam factis sibimetipsi fuisset contrarius - sed reprehendit solummodo illos fideles qui indiscrete {indistincte &Re} aut {*vel &MzNaRe} malitiose aut {vel &Pe} scandalose apud infideles et iniquos iudicari volebant. Ad cuius intelligentiam dicitur esse sciendum quod, sicut iudex cum prospexerit aliquos velle litigare coram se primum {*prius &MzNaPeRe} {*potest et add. &MzNaRe} debet inducere partes ut inter se componant antequam incipiant litigare, Extra, De transactionibus {translationibus &Mz} {*c. ultimo add. &MzNaPeRe} ut {*et &NaRe} {om. &MzPe} Extra, De symonia, {*c. add. &Pe} Querelam {*et add. &NaRe} 5, q. 2, {c. &Mz} Si primates {*et add. &NaRe} 90. dist. c. Studendum, ubi sic loquitur {*legitur &MzNaRe}, "Studendum est episcopis ut dissidentes {desidentes &NaRe} fratres, sive clericos sive laicos, ad pacem magis quam ad iudicium coerceant {*cohortentur" &NaReZn} {coerceantur &Pe} {coercere &Mz}, sic praelatus alicuius collegii specialis {spectabilis &Mz} {specialiter &Pe?Re} potest inducere subditos suos ut si unus adversus alterum {*alium &MzNaPeRe} negotium habuerit prius {om. &NaRe} magis componant quam ad iudicium conveniant {*veniant &MzNaRe} et, si inter se non potuerint {poterint &Pe} amicabiliter {amicabilem &Pe} componere, potest eos introducere {*inducere &MzNaPeRe} ut quando voluerint {*valuerint &MzNaRe} absque praeiudicio iudicis superioris primo litigent coram iudice vel iudicibus constituto vel {constituto vel om. &Pe} constitutis, aut {om. &Re} electo vel electis per ipsos vel per collegium antequam recurrant {incurrant &Mz} absque necessitate ad iudicem extra idem collegium. Sic possent monachi propter multa scandala et {*trs.231 &MzNaRe} inconvenientia evitanda ordinare inter se ut, si monachus haberet causam adversus {versus &Mz} monachum vel {etiam add. &Mz} monasterium adversus monasterium, concordarent {*ante componerent &MzNaPeRe}, si possent, antequam {*quam &MzNaPeRe} venirent ad iudicium episcopi et, si non possent absque iudicio concordare, quod antequam ad iudicium episcopi venirent {*recurrerent &MzNaRe} ipsam {*ipsi &MzNaRe} causam coram {et si non possent ... coram: ipsi tamen pro &Pe} aliquibus monachis constitutis iudicibus vel electis a partibus vel a {*om. &MzNaPeRe} collegio agitarent. Quo ordinato monachi qui indiscrete vel malitiose aut scandalose, relicto iudicio monachorum, recurrerent ad iudicium episcoporum essent merito arguendi, quamvis illi qui necessitate compulsi vel ex causa rationabili ad iudicium episcopi recurrerent non essent reprehendendi sed in casu laudandi. Ad propositum dicitur quod apostolus considerabat quod aliqui Corinthii indiscrete vel {*om. &MzNaRe} malitiose aut etiam {*aut etiam: et &MzNaPeRe} scandalose, {se add. &Mz} relictis iudicibus fidelibus qui erant constituti vel constituendi pro causis fidelium terminandis, apud infideles iudicari volebant absque omni necessitate et {vel &Mz} utilitate, et hos reprehendit apostolus, non illos, si qui fuerint {*fuerunt &MzNaRe}, qui compulsi vel per {alios add. &Pe} adversarios vel ne auctoritati infidelium {fidelium &Pe} praeiudicarent licite {illicite &Mz} iudicari volebant apud eos {*ipsos &MzNaRe}. Unde et {*om. &NaRe} ipsemet Paulus non refugit iudicium Caesaris dicens, {om. &Pe} {ut &Pe} sicut legitur Actuum 25:[10-11], "Ad tribunal Caesaris sto, ubi me oportet iudicari. Iudeis non nocui, sicut tu melius nosti. Si enim nocui, aut dignum aliquid morte {morti &Pe} {*trs. &NaReVg} feci, non recuso mori. Si vero nihil est eorum quae {qui &Mz} {*hii add. &NaReVg} {?hic add. &Pe} {hoc add. &Mz} accusant me, {om. &MzNaPeRe} nemo potest me illis donare. Caesarem appello."

Master The reply is that in that chapter the apostle is not intending to forbid the Corinthians from being judged by unbelievers in every case, nor is he intending to assert that only believers should judge secular matters, and therefore he is not rebuking all those who in any case at all sought the judgement of unbelievers - for he would have been contradicting himself both in word and in deed - but he is rebuking only those believers who indiscriminately, maliciously or scandalously want to be judged by unbelievers and enemies. To understand this it is said that it should be known that, just as when a judge discerns that some people want to litigate before him he can and should first induce the parties to agree between themselves before they begin to litigate (Extra, De transactionibus, last chapter [Ex parte c.11, col.210], and Extra, De symonia, c. Querelam [c.15, col.753], and 5, q. 2, c. Si primates [c.4, col.546], and dist. 90, c, Studendum [c.7, col.314], where we read the following, "Bishops should take pains to urge brothers who disagree, whether clerics or laymen, towards peace rather than towards the court."), so the ruler of any particular college should induce his subjects, if one of them has a lawsuit against another, to agree rather than to come to court and, if they can not agree between themselves in a friendly way, he can induce them, without prejudice to a superior judge, to litigate first, when they are able to do so, before a judge or judges set up or chosen by themselves or by the college before they have recourse when it is not necessary to a judge outside their college. In the same way, in order to avoid scandals and many unsuitable events monks could arrange among themselves, if one monk were to have a case against another or one monastery against another, to come to an agreement before they came before the bishop's judgement, if they could, and, if they could not agree without a judgement, to treat the case before some monks set up as judges or chosen by the parties or the college before they had recourse to the bishop's judgement. Once this was arranged, monks who abandoned the judgement of the monks and indiscriminately, maliciously or scandalously had recourse to the judgement of bishops should deservedly be censured, although those who had recourse to a bishop's judgement by force of necessity or for a rational cause should not be rebuked but in some cases praised. In response to the case proposed it is said that the apostle decided that some Corinthians had abandoned the believing judges who had been set up or should have been set up for bringing cases between the faithful to an end and were wanting indiscriminately, maliciously and scandalously to be judged by unbelievers without their being any necessity or utility in this, and it was these the apostle rebuked, not those, if there were any, who were wanting licitly to be judged by unbelievers, compelled either by their opponents or by their wish not to prejudice the authority of unbelievers. So it was that Paul himself did not flee from the judgement of Caesar but said, as we read in Acts 25:10-11, "I am appealing to the emperor's tribunal; this is where I should be tried. I have done no wrong to the Jews, as you very well know. Now if I am in the wrong or have committed something for which I deserve to die, I am not trying to escape death; but if there is nothing to their charges against me, no one can turn me over to them. I appeal to the emperor."

 

CAP. XIX {cap. xix om. &Pe}

Discipulus Auctoritates adductae {*inductae &MzNaPeRe} supra c. 11 non videntur isti tertiae sententiae {*trs. &NaRe} obviare. Ideo noli indicare an aliqui respondere conentur {conantur &Pe} ad ipsas sed dic quomodo respondetur ad auctoritates et rationes duodecimo {?10 &Mz} capitulo {*trs. &MzNaRe} {duodecimo capitulo: supra &Pe} allegatas, quia illae videntur tertiae sententiae obviare {*repugnare &MzNaRe}.

CHAPTER 19

Student The texts brought forward in chapter 11 above do not seem to be opposed to that third opinion. Do not indicate, therefore, whether some people try to reply to them, but tell me how reply is made to the texts and arguments adduced in chapter 12, because they seem to be incompatible with that third opinion.

 

Magister Uno modo respondetur ad ipsas {*omnes &NaRe} videlicet quod {*trs. &MzNaPeRe} illae {*om. &MzNaPeRe} concludunt quando seculares iudices {om. &Mz} non inveniuntur circa punitiones {*punitionem &NaRe} criminum secularium negligentes. Unde secundum istam opinionem si laici circa illa {*om. &MzNaRe} {ista &Pe} temporalia dispensanda et {om. &Pe} circa negotia secularia et curas seculares ac circa crimina secularia punienda in nullo {in nullo: si primo &Mz} invenirentur defectuosi seu negligentes vel desides, cleri {*clerici &MzNaPeRe} et maxime episcopi de {hiis add. &Mz} huiusmodi {criminibus add. &Mz} in nullo se {om. &Na} intromittere {*trs. &MzPeRe} deberent, sed deceret eos omnia huiusmodi committere laicis etiam {et &Mz} res ecclesiasticas dispensandas. Unde ad literam sicut verba sonant ea quae sacri canones, sicut allegatum est supra c. 11 {*12 &MzNaPeRe}, circa hoc praecipiunt adimplere deberent {debent &Mz} et tantummodo verbo praedicationis ac {*om. &NaPeRe} lectioni et orationi vacare.

Master There is one reply to all of them and that is that they are conclusive when secular judges are not found to be negligent in the punishment of secular crimes. According to that opinion, therefore, if laymen were not found in any way to be defective, negligent or indolent in arranging temporal affairs, in secular occupations or cares, and in punishing secular crimes, clerics, and especially bishops, should not involve themselves in any way in matters of this kind, but it would be proper for them to commit everything of this kind, even the arranging of ecclesiastical possessions, to laymen. So they should fulfil to the letter, just as the words signify, those things which the sacred canons, as adduced in chapter 12 above, command about this, and devote themselves only to the preaching of the word, to reading and to prayer.

 

CAP. XX {cap. xx om. &Pe}

Discipulus Quaesivimus quam potestatem habet {*habeat &NaRe} imperator super malos, nunc investigemus qualem {*quam &MzNaRe} potestatem {om. &Pe} obtineat {habet &Pe} super bonos sibi subiectos. {*/et add. &Pe\ Specialiter autem /om. &Pe\ interrogo an imperator talem habeat potestatem super bonos sibi subiectos add. &NaPeRe} utrum {*ut &MzNaPeRe} sibi omnes teneantur {*trs.231 &MzNaRe} in omnibus obedire.

CHAPTER 20

Student We have sought to learn what power the emperor has over those who are bad; let us now investigate what power he possesses over the good who are subject to him. I especially want to ask, however, whether the emperor has such power over the good subject to him that all of them are bound to obey him in everything.

 

The Emperor's power over the Good: Are they bound to obey him in everything?

Magister Respondetur quod in illicitis et iniustis nullus debet sibi {*trs. &NaRe} obedire.

Master The reply is that no one should obey him in unlawful and unjust matters.

Discipulus Nunquid in omnibus licitis omnes sibi debent {*debeant &MzNaPeRe} obedire ita ut peccent {*peccet &MzNaPeRe} qui sibi recusaverint {*recusaverit &MzNaPeRe} in licito quocunque {*trs. &MzNaPeRe} {sibi add. &Pe} obedire?

Student Should all so obey him in everything lawful that whoever refuses to obey him in anything lawful commits a sin?

Magister Respondetur quod non ex hoc ipso {ipse &Mz} quod aliquis in aliquo licito {licite &Mz} sibi {*trs.4123 &MzNaPeRe} non obedierit est iudicandus peccare. Si enim alicui praecipiat {*praeciperet &MzNaPeRe} {*trs. &MzNaPeRe} ieiunare vel non bibere vinum vel aliquid tale quod ad officium imperatoris non pertinet {*spectat &MzNaPeRe}, sibi obedire minime tenetur {*teneretur &MzNaPeRe}, sed in his quae spectant ad regimen populi temporalis et hoc {*temporalis et hoc om. &NaRe} in temporalibus quilibet obedire sibi {*trs. &MzNaPeRe} tenetur.

Master The reply is that it is not the case from this that anyone who [[reading qui to govern obedierit]] does not obey him in something lawful should be judged to be sinning. For if he were to order someone to fast or not to drink wine or some such thing that does not pertain to the office of emperor, he would not be bound to obey him, but in those things which pertain to the government of people in temporal affairs, everyone is bound to obey him.

Discipulus Nunquid in huiusmodi quilibet tenetur magis obedire imperatori quam cuilibet {*cuicumque &MzNaPeRe} alteri {*inferiori add. &MzNaPeRe}, puta regi suo aut duci aut {vel &Mz} marchioni aut {*vel &NaRe} alteri domino suo immediato? Videtur enim quod quemadmodum episcopus est superior abbate {ad abbatem &Re} et tamen {?cum &Pe} hoc non obstante in multis monachi magis tenentur obedire abbati quam episcopo, ita non obstante quod imperator sit superior regibus {*et add. &NaPeRe} ducibus et aliis dominis temporalibus, tamen subditi aliorum dominorum magis tenentur obedire dominus suis immediatis quam imperatori.

Student Is anyone more bound to obey the emperor in matters of this kind than anyone else inferior to him, such as his king or duke or margrave or another direct lord of his? For it seems that just as a bishop is superior to an abbot and yet notwithstanding this in many matters monks are more bound to obey their abbot than their bishop, so notwithstanding the fact that the emperor is superior to kings, dukes and other temporal lords, the subjects of other lords are nevertheless more bound to obey their direct lords than the emperor.

Magister Respondetur quod sicut secundum multos papa est immediatus praelatus {dominus &Pe} omnium Christianorum in spiritualibus ita ut omnes in omnibus huiusmodi magis debeant sibi {*trs. &MzNaRe} obedire quam cuicunque alteri {*om. &MzNaPeRe} praelato inferiori, ita imperator est dominus in temporalibus {*trs.3412 &MzNaRe} {in temporalibus om. &Pe} omnium immediatus {immediate &Mz} ita {om. &Pe} ut in his quae spectant ad regnum {*regimen &MzPeRe} mortalium magis sit obediendum imperatori quam cuicunque domino inferiori. Quod beatus Augustinus super epistolam ad Romanos sentire videtur, qui super illud, verbum {*om. &MzNaRe} "Qui resistunt sibi ipsis {*ipsi &MzNaPeReVg} {*trs. &NaReVg} damnationem acquirunt", ait, "Si quid ipse proconsul iubeat {ait ... iubeat om. &Pe} et aliud imperator, nunquid dubitat {*dubitatur &NaRe} illo contempto illi esse serviendum?" Idem in {*etiam &MzNaPeRe} libro Confessionum 2 {22 &Pe} et ponitur dist. 8, c. quicunque {*Que contra &MzNaRe} {quecumque &Pe} ait, "In potestatibus societatis humanae maior potestas minori ad {om. &Pe} obediendum praeponitur." Est {*om. &MzNaPeRe} igitur {*Ergo &MzNaRe} semper magis obediendum {*est add. &MzNaPeRe} imperatori quam cuicunque alteri {*om. &MzNaPeRe} domino inferiori.

Master The reply is that just as, according to many people, the pope is the direct head of all christians in spiritual matters in such a way that in all matters of this kind everyone is more bound to obey him than any inferior head at all, so the emperor is the direct lord of everyone in temporal affairs in such a way that in those matters that pertain to the government of mortals the emperor ought more to be obeyed than any inferior lord. Blessed Augustine seems to think this. Writing about the Letter to the Romans he says about the words, "Those who resist will incur judgement" [Rom. 13:2], "If the proconsul himself should order something and the emperor another thing, is it doubted that with the former spurned the latter should be served?" Also in the second book of his Confessions, included in dist. 8, c. Que contra [c.2, col.13], the same man says, "In regard to the powers in human society, the greater power should be put before the lesser for obedience." The emperor should always be more obeyed, therefore, than any inferior lord at all.

Discipulus Ex istis {*isto &MzNaPeRe} videntur duo sequi inconvenientia {*trs. &MzNaPeRe}. Primum est quod omnes sunt servi imperatoris et quod unus non est magis servus {*imperatoris add. &MzNaRe} quam alter {*alius &MzNaPeRe} nec unus respectu imperatoris est magis liber quam alius, quia qui aeque {*equaliter &MzNaRe} alicui obedire tenentur sunt aequaliter servi illius vel aequaliter liberi. Igitur si {*igitur si: Si ergo &MzNaRe} omnes subditi {subiecti &Pe} imperatoris tenentur {teneantur &Pe} sibi tanquam domino immediato in omnibus quae spectant ad regimen populi obedire, omnes aequaliter sunt {*trs. &NaRe} servi illius {*ipsius &NaRe} {eius &Pe} vel aeque liberi.

Student Two unsuitable [conclusions] seem to follow from this. The first is that everyone is a slave of the emperor and that no one man is more a slave of the emperor than another, nor, with respect to the emperor, is one man freer than another, because those who are equally bound to obey someone are equally his slave or equally free. If all the subjects of the emperor, therefore, are bound to obey him as their direct lord in everything that pertains to the government of the people, all are equally his slaves or equally free.

Secundum {sed &Mz} inconveniens quod sequeretur {*sequi videtur &MzNaRe} {sequitur &Pe} est quod quicunque veniret ad bellum pro {*cum &MzNaPeRe} domino suo contra imperatorem committeret crimen laesae maiestatis, quia quicunque est immediate {*immediatus &NaRe} subditus {*trs. &NaPeRe} imperatori {*imperatoris &MzNaRe} committit crimen lesae maiestatis si cogitat de morte imperatoris, quod facit ille qui venit ad bellum mortale contra imperatorem {*ipsum &MzNaRe} Quid autem dicitur {vel quid add. &Mz} de istis enarra.

The second unsuitable [conclusion] that seems to follow is that anyone who was to come with his lord to war against the emperor would commit the crime of lese-majeste, because anyone who is a direct subject of the emperor commits the crime of lese-majeste if he thinks the death of the emperor, which that person does who comes to a mortal battle against the emperor. Now tell me what is said about these two points.

Magister Ad primum {istum &Mz} dicitur {videtur &Mz} quod non sequitur ex praedictis quia, sicut dictum est prius, {quod add. &Mz} subditi imperatoris non in omnibus tenentur sibi obedire sed in his {aliis &Re} tantum quae spectant ad regimen populi, hoc est in his quae sunt necessaria {*trs. &NaRe} ad regendum iuste et utiliter populum sibi subiectum. Et ideo si praeciperet aliquid quod {non add. &Re} [[in margin]] est {*esset &MzNaPeRe} contra {in &Re} utilitatem populi sibi subiecti non tenerentur {teneretur &Pe} sibi {om. &Pe} obedire {ei add. &Pe} {*tenerentur sibi obedire: esset /essent &Mz\ /ad add. &Mz\ obediendum sibi &MzNaRe}. sed in his quae sunt necessaria ad regendum iuste et utiliter populum sibi subiectum {*sed in his ... subiectum om. &MzNaPeRe} Et inde est quod servi imperatoris et liberi non tenentur sibi aequaliter obedire, sed in multis tenentur sibi obedire servi {*obedire servi: servi sui obedire &NaRe} in quibus non tenentur liberi {*non tenentur liberi: liberi sibi non tenentur &NaRe}. Nam servi ad solum praeceptum imperatoris omnia bona quae tenent tenentur sibi dimittere {admittere &Re} absque hoc quod aliquam utilitatem communem praetendant {*praetendat &MzNa}, sed ad hoc liberi non tenentur {*trs.231 &MzNaPeRe}, nec imperator potest eis hoc {*trs. &MzNaRe} praecipere absque utilitate {voluntate &Mz} boni communis, imo etiam neque absque manifesta utilitate et {*utilitate et om. &NaRe} necessitate. In multis etiam aliis tenentur servi imperatoris sibi obedire {*trs. &MzNaRe} in quibus liberi minime sunt adstricti. Dignitati enim {etiam &Mz} humani generis derogaret si omnes essent servi imperatoris et ideo derogaretur {*derogaret &MzNaRe} eidem si imperator {om. &Pe} in omnibus posset {*trs.312 &NaRe} tractare liberos sicut servos. Quare cum imperator teneatur {tenetur &Mz} procurare ea quae spectant ad dignitatem et utilitatem {*trs.321 &MzNaRe} totius humani generis {*trs. &MzNaRe}, et {*om. &NaPeRe} nullo {vero add. &Pe} modo debet velle liberos {*omnes &MzNaRe} tractare {*trs. &MzNaPeRe} sicut servos. Quare etiam liberi non tenentur sibi obedire in omnibus in quibus servi.

Master In response to the first it is said that it does not follow from the above, because, as was said earlier, the subjects of the emperor are not bound to obey him in everything but only in those matters that pertain to the government of the people, that is in those things that are necessary for ruling the people subject to him justly and beneficially. And therefore if he were to command something which was contrary to the benefit of the people subject to him, he would not have to be obeyed. And hence it is that the servants of the emperor and those who are free are not bound to obey him equally, but his servants are bound to obey him in many matters in which the free are not bound. For solely at the command of the emperor his servants are bound to abandon to him all the goods that they possess without his alleging some common benefit, but the free are not bound to this and the emperor can not command it of them without its being advantageous to the common good, indeed without its being a clear necessity. Servants of the emperor are bound to obey him in many other matters as well to which the free are not obligated. For it would detract from the dignity of the human race if all were servants of the emperor, and it would detract in a similar way, therefore, if the emperor could treat the free like servants in everything. Since the emperor is bound to make provision for those things which pertain to the benefit and dignity of the whole human race, therefore, he should in no way wish to treat the free as servants. The free are not bound, therefore, to obey him in everything in which his servants are bound to obey him.

Ad secundum dicitur {*conceditur &MzNaPeRe} quod quicunque venit cum quocunque domino suo ad bellum iniustum contra imperatorem incidit in crimen laesae maiestatis et poena criminis etiam {*om. &MzNaPeRe} laesae maiestatis est puniendus et {*puniendus et om. &NaRe} plectendus. Quod imperatores Honorius et Arcadius in 14 {*9 &MzNaRe} libro eodem {*codicis &MzNaPeRe} {?citet add. add. &NaRe} ad Legem Iuliam {?iuliani &Mz} et poena criminis laesae {*et poena criminis laesae om. &MzNaPeRe} maiestatis testari videntur et {ut &Pe} habetur 6, q. 1, {c. 13 add. &Pe} Si quis ubi ait {si quis ubi ait om. &Pe} {si quis ubi ait: para. Verum, aiunt &MzNaRe}, {enim add. &MzNaPeRe} "Si quis cum {om. &Mz} militibus vel privatis, barbaris etiam, {om. &Pe} {et &Mz} scelestam {celestem &NaRe} inierit factionem aut factionis {factiones &Pe} {factis &Mz} ipsius susceperit {suscepit &Na} sacramentum et {om. &Mz} {*vel &NaReZn} {etiam &Pe} dederit, de nece etiam {om. &Pe} illustrium virorum {*trs. &MzNaPeReZn}, qui consiliis et consistorio nostro intersunt, senatorum etiam - nam et ipsi pars corporis nostri {*trs. &MzNaPeReZn} sunt - vel {et &MzNaPeRe} cuiuslibet postremo qui nobis militat cogitaverit, {agitaverant &Pe} eadem enim {om. &MzNaPeRe} severitate {?se veritate &Mz} voluntatem sceleris, quae {*qua &MzNaReZn} effectum, puniri iura voluerunt, {volunt &Pe} ipse {ipsi &Pe} quidem utpote {om. &NaRe} maiestatis reus gladio ferietur {*feriatur &MzNaPeReZn}, bonis eius omnibus fisco nostro addictis. {adductis &Pe} Filii {filiis &Pe} vero eius, quibus vitam imperatoria {imperator &Pe} speciali {specialem &Pe} {*specialiter &MzNaReZn} benignitate {*lenitate &MzNaReZn} concedimus {concedere &Pe} - paterno {patrono &Mz} enim {omnium &Pe} deberent {*debent &MzNaPeRe} perire {punire &Pe} supplicio, in quibus paterni, {patroni &Mz} hoc est haereditarii, criminis exempla {existere &Pe} metuuntur - a materna et {*a materna et om. &MzNaPeReZn} a successione {a successione: ascessione &Mz} omnium proximorum {christianorum &MzPe} habeantur alieni."

In regard to the second, it is granted that anyone coming with any lord of his to an unjust war against the emperor falls into the crime of lese-majeste and should be punished with the penalty for that crime. The emperors Honorius and Arcadius in the ninth book of their codex on the Julian law of majesty, found in 6, q. 1, Si quis [c.22, col.560], seem to attest to this when they say, "If anyone joins a wicked faction with knights or infantry, even barbarians, or receives or gives the oath of allegiance of that faction concerning the death of even illustrious men who attend the councils and assembly of us and of the senators too - for they too are part of our body - or finally thinks of this of anyone who fights for us (for the laws want the willing of a crime, by which it is effected, to be punished with the same severeity) let him be struck by the sword as if guilty of lese-majesty, with all their goods yielded to our fisc. Let their sons, to whom we especially grant life with imperial gentleness - for they, in whom the examples of the paternal, that is the hereditary, crime are measured, ought to perish with the paternal punishment - be held as foreigners from the succession of all that is nearest to them."

Discipulus Hoc beato Augustino obviare videtur qui asserit quod si quis vadat {*vadit &MzNaPeRe} ad bellum etiam iniustum, dummodo non constet sibi esse iniustum, non peccat. Ait enim, ut legitur 23, q. 1, c. Quid culpatur, "Vir iustus, si forte etiam {et &Mz} sub rege, hodie {*homine &MzNaPeReZn} sacrilego, militet, recte potest illo iubente bellare, si vice pacis ordinem servans, quod sibi iubetur vel non esse contra praeceptum Dei {om. &NaRe} certum est, vel {ut &NaRe} utrum sit, certum non est, ita ut fortasse reum faciat regem iniquitas imperandi, {imperanda &Pe} innocentem autem militem ostendit {*ostendat &MzNaReZn} ordo serviendi." Ex quibus verbis colligi potest quod si rex vel alius duxerit milites suos ad bellum etiam iniustum contra imperatorem, si non est certum militibus quod bellum domini sui {om. &Pe} est {sit &Pe} iniustum, licite {om. &NaRe} contra imperatorem bellare possunt.

Student This seems to conflict with blessed Augustine who asserts that if someone goes to war, he does not sin, even if it is unjust, as long as it is not evident to him that it is unjust. For, as we read in 23, q. 1, c. Quid culpatur [c.4, col.892], he says, "If a just man by chance serves as the soldier of a king, even if the latter is an idolatrous man, he can rightly go to war at that one's command, if, in preserving right order instead of peace, either he is certain that what he is ordered to do is not against the command of God or he is not certain whether it is, so that the injustice of giving the order makes the king guilty while the right order [involved in] serving shows that the soldier is innocent." We can gather from these words that if a king or someone else leads his soldiers even to an unjust war against the emperor, the soldiers can lawfully go to war against the emperor if it is not certain to them that their lord's war is unjust.

Magister {om. &Re} Respondetur ad hoc {ad hoc om. &Pe} quod si bellatores cum domino suo pugnant contra alium qui non est dominus eorundem excusantur a peccato, licet bellum sit iniustum, dummodo hoc {*om. &NaRe} ignorarent {*ignorent &NaPeRe} et non laborarent {*laborent &NaPeRe} ignorantia supina et crassa {*trs.321 &NaPeRe}. Sed si vadunt ad bellum cum domino suo {*om. &NaRe} inferiori contra dominum suum superiorem, et praecipue contra imperatorem qui est dominus eorum {excusantur a peccato ... eorum om. &Mz} immediatus, non excusantur a crimine laesae maiestatis si bellum est {*trs. &MzNaRe} iniustum, licet hoc ignorent, quia magis debent praesumere pro imperatore quod habeat iustum bellum {*trs. &MzNaRe} quam pro domino eorum inferiori, {*et add. &MzNaPeRe} ideo, cum non {*cum non : nisi &MzNaPe} sunt {*sint &MzNaPeRe} certi quod dominus eorum inferior {eorum inferior om. &Pe} habeat {*habet &MzNaPeRe} bellum iustum contra imperatorem, non excusantur a crimine laesae maiestatis.

Master The reply to this is that if warriors fight with their lord against someone else who is not their lord they are absolved of sin, even if the war is unjust, as long as they do not know this and are not labouring under a negligent and crass ignorance. But if they go to war with an inferior lord against a superior lord of theirs, and especially against the emperor who is their direct lord, they are not absolved of the crime of lese-majeste if the war is unjust, even if they do not know this, because they should rather presume in favour of the emperor that he has a just war than in favour of their inferior lord, and therefore, unless they are certain that their inferior lord has a just war against the emperor, they are not absolved of the crime of lese-majeste.

CAP. XXI

Discipulus Disputavimus quamvis breviter de potestate imperatoris super personas. Nunc videamus de potestate ipsius super res temporales, an videlicet ipse {videlicet ipse: imperator &Mz} sit dominus omnium temporalium rerum quae ad ecclesiam minime spectant.

CHAPTER 21

Student We have investigated, however briefly, the power of the emperor over persons. Let us now see about his power over temporal things, whether, that is, he is the lord of all temporal things that do not pertain to the church.

The Emperor's power over things: Is he lord of all temporal things that do not belong to the Church?

Magister Circa hoc sunt diversae opiniones sive {*opiniones sive om. &MzNaRe} sententiae. Una est quod imperator omnium rerum huius mundi {*huius mundi: huiusmodi &MzNaPeRe} non est dominus {*trs.456132 &MzNaPeRe}.

Master There are various opinions about this. One is that the emperor is not the lord of all things of this kind.

Opinion 1: He is not

Discipulus Pro ista opinione aliquas allegationes {rationes &Pe} adducas?

Student Would you bring forward some arguments for that opinion?

Magister Haec assertio videtur multipliciter posse probari. Primo sic: imperator non est dominus illarum rerum quae {*in add. &MzNaPeRe} nullius hominis {bonis &MzNaPeRe} sunt et quae occupanti conceduntur {concedunt &Na}. Sed multae sunt res quae {*in add. &MzNaRe} nullius hominis {*bonis &MzNaRe} sunt et quae occupanti conceduntur, {sed ... conceduntur om. &Pe} dist. 1, {*c. add. &Pe} Ius naturale dicitur {*om. &MzNaPeRe} in textu et in {*om. &NaRe} glossa. igitur {*Ergo &MzNaRe} imperator non est dominus huiusmodi {huius &Re} rerum.

Master This assertion seems provable in many ways. The first is as follows: the emperor is not the lord of those things which are not among the goods of anyone and which are granted to the one taking possession of them. But there are many things which are not among the goods of anyone and which are granted to the one taking possession of them (dist. 1, c. Ius naturale [c.7, col.2], in the text and in the gloss). Therefore the emperor is not the lord of things of this kind.

Amplius qui est dominus quarumcunque rerum temporalium {*trs. &MzNaPeRe} eas si vult vendere potest, 1, q. 1. c. Eos qui, ubi sic legitur, "Omnis enim {om. &MzNaPeRe} dominus quod {qui &Pe} habet si vult vendit, sive {?suum &NaRe} servuum sive aliquod {quid &MzNaRe} {*aliquid &PeZn} aliud eorum quae possidet." Sed imperator non potest vendere, sicut nec {sicut nec: et &Pe} alienare, multas res temporales, quia tunc posset vendere et alienare {multas ... alienare om. &Pe} imperium, {?in perpetuum &Mz} quod non est verum. igitur {*Ergo &MzNaRe} imperator non est dominus omnium temporalium rerum.

Further, he who is the lord of any temporal things at all can sell them if he wishes to, 1, q. 1, c. Eos qui [c.21, col.364], where we read the following, "Every lord sells what he has if he wants to, either his slave or anything else that he possesses." But there are many temporal things that the emperor can not sell, nor indeed alienate, because then he could sell and alienate the empire, and this is not the fact. Therefore the emperor is not the lord of all temporal things.

Rursus qui rem temporalem alteri donat alienat a se dominium illius {*eiusdem &NaRe} {huius &Pe} rei sed imperatores multas res donaverunt non solum clericis sed etiam {et add. &Pe} laicis. Igitur {*Ergo &MzNaRe} illae res a dominio imperatoris sunt alienatae.

Again, he who presents a temporal thing to another person, deprives himself of lordship over it, but emperors have presented many things not only to clerics but also to laymen. Therefore those things have been alienated from the emperor's lordship.

Item {*Ad hoc &NaRe} qui in distributione rerum {om. &Pe} temporalium {*trs. &MzNaRe} habet {habeat &MzPe} portionem {partem &MzPe} specialem non est dominus {deus &Mz} {temporalis add. &Pe} aliarum partium {*portionum &NaRe} quae aliis conceduntur. Sed imperator capiens praedia {*praedam &NaPeRe} {praedicta &Mz} in bello iusto habet portionem specialem, dist. 1, Ius militare, ubi sic legitur, "Ius militare est belli inferendi solennitas," et infra, "Item praedae decisio et {*pro add. &MzNaReZn} personarum quarumlibet {*qualitatibus et &MzNaPeReZn} pro laboribus iusta divisio {decisio &Mz} ac principis portio." {fieri convenit add. &Mz} Ergo imperator non est verus {*om. &MzNaPeRe} dominus aliarum partium {*portionum &MzNaPeRe}.

In addition, he who has a particular portion in a distribution of temporal things is not the lord of the other portions which are granted to others. But an emperor who captures booty in a just war has a particular portion, dist. 1, c. Ius militare [c.10, col.3], where we read as follows, "A military right includes the formality of waging war ... then the decision about the booty: a just division according to the quality and labour of the people, with a portion for the prince." Therefore the emperor is not the lord of the other portions.

Item res fisci propriae sunt imperatoris, ut notat glossa Extra, De iudiciis, c. {om. &MzNaRe} Cum venissent, sed res fisci a rebus aliis distinguuntur quia quorundam et non omnium res {*specialiter add. &NaRe} confiscantur, 6, q. 1, para. {c. secundum &Pe} Verum. igitur {*Ergo &MzNaRe} imperator non est domnius omnium rerum temporalium {*trs. &MzNaPeRe}.

Again, the things of the fisc are proper to the emperor, as the gloss on Extra, De iudiciis, c. Cum venissent [col.531] notes, but the things of the fisc are distinguished from other things because things of certain people and not of all people are particularly confiscated (6, q. 1, para. Verum [c.21, col.559, but reference seems wrong]). Therefore the emperor is not the lord of all temporal things.

Item {*Praeterea &NaRe} si imperator est dominus omnium temporalium rerum quae ad ecclesiam minime spectant, aut omnes res sunt communes imperatori et aliis aut sunt propriae imperatoris. Sed non sunt communes imperatori et aliis [[aut sunt ... aliis: margin &Pe]] quia {qui &Na} tunc nullae res essent propriae, nec sunt propriae imperatori {*imperatoris &MzNaRe} quia tunc nullus alius haberet dominium alicuius rei nec aliquis alius posset dicere, `Mea est haec res', cum imperator solus {*om. &MzNaPeRe} posset dicere, `Haec res est mea', si est sua propria, eo quod, sicut dicit glossa dist. 1, c. {*para. &MzNaRe} {*1 add. &MzPe} ibidem {*"Ubi &MzNaPeRe} dicitur {iudicantur &NaRe} aliquid meum esse, et {*om. &MzNaPeRe} per consequens iudicatur tuum non esse, ff. de procreation. {*procura. &MzNaPeRe} pomp. in fine." igitur {*Restat ergo quod /om. &Mz\ &MzNaRe} imperator non est dominus omnium {huiusmodi add. &Pe} [[interlinear]] temporalium rerum {om. &Mz}.

Moreover, if the emperor is lord of all temporal things which do not pertain to the church, all things either are common to the emperor and to others or are proper to the emperor. But they are not common to the emperor and to others because then no things would be proper, and they are not proper to the emperor because then no one else would have lordship of any thing and no one else could say, `This is my thing', since the emperor could say, `This thing is mine', if it is proper to him because, as the gloss on dist. 1, para. 1 [col1, but reference seems wrong] says, "Where something is said to be mine, it is judged consequently not to be yours, ff. De procur. pomp in fine." The fact remains, therefore, that the emperor is not the lord of all temporal things.

Rursus si imperator est dominus omnium rerum temporalium {*trs. &MzNaRe} {Rursus ... temporalium om. &Pe} aut est dominus omnium huiusmodi rerum iure divino, naturali vel {*naturali vel: aut iure nature, aut iure &MzNaPeRe} humano: non iure divino quia, ut dicit Augustinus super Iohannem et ponitur dist. 8, quod {*Quo &MzNaPeRe} iure, {*"Iure add. &MzNaPeRe} divino: `Domini est terra et plenitudo eius'. Pauperes et divites Deus {dominus &MzNaRe} de uno limo fecit; pauperes et divites {Deus ... divites om. &Pe} una terra portat." Igitur {*Ergo &MzNaRe} imperator non est dominus omnium temporalium {*huiusmodi &MzNaPeRe} rerum iure divino, {dominio &Re} [[corrected to divino in margin]] praesertim {*cum add. &NaRe} teste Augustino ibidem, per {*om. &MzNaPeRe} "Ius divinum quod {*om. &MzNaPeRe} in scripturis divinis habemus." Nunquam {*Nusquam &MzNaRe} autem legitur in scripturis divinis {*sacris &MzNaRe} {habemus ... divinis om. &Pe} quod Deus dedit {*dederit &NaRe} imperatori dominium omnium rerum {om. &NaRe} temporalium. Nec imperator est dominus {*omnium add. &MzNaRe} huiusmodi {huius &Re} rerum iure naturae quia iure naturae omnia sunt communia nec iure humano quia iura humana sunt secundum {*om. &MzNaRe} iura imperatorum dist. 8. {*c. add. &Pe} Quo iure. Imperator autem non potuit sibi appropriare dominium alienarum {aliarum &Mz} rerum. igitur {*Ergo &MzNaRe} iure imperatoris {*imperatorum &NaRe}, quod est ius humanum, imperator non est dominus omnium rerum temporalium {*trs. &MzNaRe} {om. &Pe}.

Again, if the emperor is lord of all temporal things, he is lord of all temporal things of this kind either (i) by divine law or (ii) by the law of nature or (iii) by human law. (i) He is not lord by divine law because, as Augustine says in [his commentary on] John which is found in dist. 8, c. Quo iure [c.1, col.12], "By divine law `The earth is the Lord's and all that is in it' [Psalm 24:1]. God made the poor and the rich from the one mud; the one earth supports the rich and the poor." The emperor is not the lord of all temporal things of this kind by divine law, therefore, especially since, as Augustine attests in the same place, "We find divine law in the divine scriptures." Nowhere in the sacred scriptures, however, do we read that God gave the emperor lordship of all temporal things. (ii) Nor is the emperor the lord of all things of this kind by the law of nature, because by the law of nature everything is common; (iii) nor by human law, because human laws are the laws of the emperors (dist. 8, c. Quo iure [c.1, col.12]). The emperor, however, could not appropriate to himself the lordship of the things that belong to others. Therefore by imperial law, which is human law, the emperor is not the lord of all temporal things.

 

CAP. XXII

Discipulus Pro opinione contraria libenter audiam aliquas rationes.

CHAPTER 22

Student I will willingly listen to some arguments for a contrary opinion.

Opinion 2: The Emperor is lord of all temporal things

Magister Opinio contraria, {libenter audiam ... contraria om. &Pe} quae ponit quod imperator est dominus {deus &Mz} omnium rerum temporalium {*trs. &MzNaPeRe}, videtur posse fulciri pluribus rationibus. Nam ille qui est dominus totius mundi {om. &Pe} est dominus omnium illorum quae {qui &MzPe} sunt in mundo et per consequens est dominus omnium {illarum add. &Pe} rerum temporalium {*trs. &MzNaRe}. Sed imperator est dominus totius mundi, sicut probatum est supra capitulo 5. huius secundi. Igitur {*Ergo &MzNaRe} imperator est dominus omnium temporalium rerum.

Master A contrary opinion, which lays down that the emperor is the lord of all temporal things, seems supportable by many arguments. For he who is the lord of the whole world is the lord of everything which is in the world and, consequently, is the lord of all temporal things. But the emperor is the lord of the whole world, as was proved above in chapter 5 of this second book. Therefore the emperor is the lord of all temporal things.

Item si {*qui &MzNaPeRe} est dominus aliquarum personarum est dominus rerum {om. &Na} spectantium ad easdem personas. Sed imperator est dominus omnium {*hominum add. &NaRe}, saltem qui non sunt clerici vel spectantes ad ipsos. Igitur {*Ergo &MzNaRe} saltem est dominus omnium rerum pertinentium {spectantium &Mz} ad illos {ipsos &Mz} qui sunt sibi subiecti.

Again, he who is the lord of any persons is the lord of things pertaining to those people. But the emperor is the lord of all men, at least of those who are not clerics or do not pertain to them. Therefore he is the lord at least of all things belonging to those who are subject to him.

Item ille in cuius potestate sunt omnia est dominus omnium temporalium rerum quia res temporales potissime videntur esse in potestate domini. Sed {om. &Pe} in potestate imperatoris sunt omnia, sicut testatur glossa Extra, De clement. {*electione &NaRe} {cleric. &MzPe} {*c. add. &Pe} Venerabilem quae allegata est supra quinto capitulo huius secundi. Igitur {ergo &Mz} imperator est dominus omnium rerum temporalium {*trs. &MzNaPeRe}.

Again, he in whose power everything lies is the lord of all temporal things because temporal things seem especially to lie in the power of a lord. But everything lies in the power of the emperor, as the gloss attests on Extra, De electione, c. Venerabilem [col. 167], which was brought forward above in chapter five of this second book. Therefore the emperor is the lord of all temporal things.

Rursus non minus est imperator dominus omnium {om. &Pe} rerum quae {qui &Mz} sunt illorum qui sunt {qui sunt: existentium &Mz} in {*de &MzNaPeRe} imperio suo sive de regno suo {*suo sive de regno suo om. &MzNaPeRe} quam rex est dominus omnium rerum {*que sunt add. &MzNaPeRe} illorum qui sunt de regno suo. Sed rex est dominus omnium rerum quae {qui &Mz} sunt illorum qui sunt {qui sunt: existentium &Mz} in {*de &MzNaRe} regno suo {Sed rex ... suo om. &Pe}. Igitur {*Ergo &MzNaRe} {*et add. &MzNaPe} imperator est dominus omnium rerum quae spectant ad illos {ipsos &Pe} qui sunt de imperio. Maior videtur nota {*manifesta &MzNaPeRe}. Minor probatur per illud quod legitur 2 {*1 &MzNaPeRe} Regum 8:[10-17] ubi sic habetur, "Dixit itaque Samuel omnia verba Domini ad populum [...] et ait, `Hoc erit ius regis qui imperaturus est {in add. &Mz} vobis. Filios vestros tollet et ponet {mittet &Pe} {monet &Mz} in curribus suis facietque {*sibi add. &MzNaPeReVg} equites et {in &Na} praecursores quadrigarum suarum et constituet sibi tribunos et centuriones [[quadrigarum ... centuriones: margin &Pe]] et aratores agrorum suorum et messores segetum et fabros armorum et curruum {cursuum &MzPe} suorum. Filias quoque {filas quoque: filiasque &Mz} vestras faciet sibi unguentarias et sutarias {*focarias &NaReVg} et pannificas. Agros quoque vestros et {om. &Na} vineas et oliveta {et add. &Pe} optima tollet et dabit servis suis. Sed et {om. &Pe} segetes vestras et vinearum redditus addecimabit ut det eunuchis {ethnicis &Pe} et famulis suis. Servos etiam {om. &Pe} vestros et ancillas et iuvenes {om. &Mz} [[gap left in ms]] vestros {*optimos &MzNaPeReVg} et asinos auferet et ponet in opere suo. Greges quoque vestros addecimabit, vosque eritis ei {trs. &NaPeRe} servi." Ex quibus {*verbis add. &MzNaPeRe} colligitur quod omnia quae habebant pertinebant {om. &Mz} ad ius regis et per consequens ad dominium eius, praesertim cum sint servi eius {*ipsius &MzNaRe} cum dicitur {*dicatur &MzNaPeRe} expresse, "... vosque eritis ei {trs. &NaPeRe} servi." Quicquid enim servus habet domini sui {*om. &MzNaPeRe} est et quicquid servus acquirit domino acquirit.

Again, the emperor is no less lord of all the things which belong to those who are of the empire than a king is lord of all the things which belong to those who are of his kingdom. But a king is lord of all the things which belong to those who are of his kingdom. Therefore the emperor also is lord of all the things which belong to those who are of the empire. The major [premise] seems evident. The minor [premise] is proved by what is said in 1 Kings 8:10-17, where we find the following, "So Samuel reported all the words of the Lord to the people ... . He said, `These will be the ways of the king who will reign over you. He will take your sons and appoint them to his chariots and to be his horsemen and to run before his chariots; and he will appoint for himself commanders of thousands and commanders of fifties, and some to plough his ground and to reap his harvest, and to make his implements of war and the equipment of his chariots. He will take your daughters to be perfumers and cooks and bakers. He will take the best of your fields and vineyards and olive orchards and give them to his courtiers. He will take one tenth of your grain and of your vineyards and give it to your officers and your courtiers. He will take your best male and female slaves, and the best of your young men and donkeys and put them to his work. He will take one tenth of your flocks, and you shall be his slaves." We gather from these words that everything which they had pertained to the right of the king, and consequently to his lordship, especially when they are his slaves, since it expressly says, " ... and you shall be his slaves." For whatever a slave has is the lord's, and whatever a slave acquires, he acquires for the lord.

Amplius non minus sunt omnia de imperio imperatoris quam antiquitus illa quae pertinebant ad regna regum infidelium erant eorum. Sed illa quae pertinebant ad regna regum infidelium {*trs. &MzNaRe} erant [[eorum ... erant: margin &Pe]] ipsorum. Igitur {*Ergo &MzNaRe} omnes res temporales quae spectant ad imperium et ad illos qui sunt de imperio sunt imperatoris. Maior evidens est {*trs. &MzNaPeRe} ut videtur. Minor probatur per illud quod legitur {in add. &Mz} Genesi 14 {9 &Re}, "Reduxitque," scilicet Abraham, "omnem substantiam et Loth fratrem suum cum substantia illius {ipsius &MzNaPeRe} mulieres {mulieris &Pe} quoque {om. &Pe} et populum." Et post, dicit {*"Dixit &MzNaPeReVg} autem rex Sodomorum ad Abraham, `Da mihi animas, caetera {caeteras &Pe} tolle tibi.' Qui respondit {*ei add. &MzNaReVg}, `Levo manum {manus &MzNaPeRe} meam {meas &MzNaPeRe} ad Dominum Deum excelsum possessorem coeli et terrae quod a filo subtegminis usque ad corrigiam caligae, non accipiam ex omnibus quae tua sunt.'" Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod Abraham reputavit ista {*illa &NaRe} quae reduxerat fuisse {om. &NaRe} regis Sodomorum. &Reduxerat autem multa quae erant illorum qui erant de regno illius {*eiusdem &MzNaRe} regis; igitur {*ergo &MzNaRe} Abraham reputavit quod etiam illa que spectabant ad ipsos {*illos &MzNaRe} qui erant de regno eius {*regis &MzNaRe} erant ipsius regis. Et {*om. &MzNaPeRe} Hoc confirmatur per aliqua {*Ambrosium &NaRe} {hoc quod dicitur &Pe} in libro de Patriarchis et {ut &Pe} habetur 23, {om. &Pe} [[gap in ms]] q. 5, c. Dicat qui ait, "Dicat aliquis cum ipse vicerit, {vixerit &Pe} `Quomodo dixerit {*dicit &Zn} {dixit &MzNaPeRe} {*Abraham add. &MzNaPeReZn} ad regem Sodomorum, `Nihil sumam {*a te' add. &MzNaPeReZn}, cum praeda utique in potestate victorum {*victoris &NaPeReZn} fuerit?' deceret {*Docet &MzNaPeRe} militarem disciplinam ut regi serventur {servent &MzPe} omnia." Ex quibus {*verbis add. &MzNaPeRe} colligitur quod praeda quam capiunt militantes {milites &Pe} sub rege est regis et tamen praeda est victorum {*victoris &MzNaPeRe} et ista {*ita &MzNaPeRe} praeda militum {*militis &MzNaRe} victorum {*victoris &MzNaRe} principaliter est {*trs. &MzNaRe} regis licet etiam aliquo modo sit {om. &Mz} ipsius militis. Igitur {ergo &Mz} eadem ratione alia bona {*licet etiam ... bona: et omnia &NaRe} {Igitur eadem ratione alia bona: sunt tamen principaliter regis et omnia &Pe} quae {sunt militis sunt principaliter regis et omnia quae add. &Mz} sunt in regno sunt principaliter ipsius regis.

Further, everything of the empire is no less the emperor's than in former times those things which pertained to the kingdoms of unbelieving kings were theirs. But those things which pertained to the kingdoms of unbelieving kings were theirs. Therefore all temporal things which pertain to the empire and to those who are of the empire are the emperor's. The major [premise] seems evident. The minor [premise] is proved by what we read in Genesis 14:16,21-3, "Then he," that is Abraham, "brought back all the goods, and also brought back his nephew Lot with his goods, and the women and the people. ... Then the king of Sodom said to Abraham, `Give me the persons, but take the goods for yourself.' But Abraham said to the king of Sodom, `I have sworn to the Lord, God Most High, maker of heaven and earth, that I would not take a thread or a sandal-thong or anything that is yours.'" We gather from these words that Abraham regarded those things that he brought back to have belonged to the king of Sodom. He brought back many things, however, which belonged to those who were of the kingdom of that king. Therefore Abraham considered that even those things which belonged to those who were of the kingdom of the king were that king's. This is confirmed by Ambrose in his book in his book On the Patriarchs, which is found in 23, q. 5, c. Dicat [c.25, col.938] and says, "Let someone who has triumphed say, `How does Abraham say to the king of Sodom, `I will take nothing from you', when the booty was surely in the control of the conqueror?' He teaches military discipline, that everything is preserved for the king." We gather from these words that the booty which those going to war under a king capture is the king's, and yet booty is the victor's, and so the booty of a victorious soldier belongs principally to his king and everything which is in a kingdom belongs principally to the king.

 

CAP. XXIII {xxii &Pe}

Discipulus Si est {si est: sicut &Na} aliqua opinio quae mediet inter opiniones praedictas non differas recitare.

CHAPTER 23

Student If there is any opinion which lies between the aforesaid opinions, do not hesitate to record it.

Opinion 3: an intermediate opinion

Magister Est una opinio quod imperator non est {om. &Re} sic dominus omnium rerum temporalium {*trs. &MzNaPeRe} quae etiam {*om. &MzNaPeRe} minime spectant ad ecclesiam {*trs.3412 &MzNaPeRe} ut ad libitum suum liceat sibi vel valeat de omnibus huiusmodi {huius &Re} rebus quod voluerit ordinare, est tamen dominus quodammodo {*trs. &MzNaRe} omnium pro eo quod {in add. &Mz} omnibus huiusmodi {huius &Re} rebus quocunque contradicente potest uti et eas applicare ad utilitatem communem quandocunque viderit communem utilitatem {*trs. &MzNaPeRe} esse praeferendam utilitati privatae. Ad cuius evidentiam est {*dicitur esse &MzNaRe} sciendum {intelligendum &Mz} quod rerum quaedam sunt mobiles, et {*om. &MzNaPeRe} quaedam {vero add. &Mz} immobiles et utrarumque quaedam spectant solummodo ad imperatorem quarum {quorum &Mz} nullus alius habet dominium vel dispensationem nisi ex speciali commissione imperatoris. Quae possunt vocari imperiales res {*trs. &MzNaPeRe} et res fisci. Quaedam sunt {*om. &MzNaPeRe} quae {*autem &MzNaRe} spectant ad alios quae {*qui &MzNaRe} {*earum add. &MzNaPeRe} aliquo modo sunt dominorum {*domini &NaRe} {dominium &Mz}. earum {*om. &MzNaPeRe} &Rerum mobilium quae specialiter spectant {pertinent &Mz} ad imperatorem, imperator sic est dominus quod potest de eis quicquid voluerit ordinare absque hoc quod ad restitutionem aliquam teneatur. {tenebatur &Re} Aurum enim {vero &Mz} et argentum, et {*om. &MzNaPeRe} lapides pretiosos, vestes, {et add. &Mz} arma, animalia et omnes {*om. &MzNaRe} alias res {*trs. &MzNaRe} mobiles potest vendere, donare, legare et alienare prout voluerit {prout voluerit om. &Pe} absque hoc quod ad restitutionem teneatur. {teneantur &Mz} Licet enim peccaret illicite rex {*et ex &MzNaPeRe} mala {illicita &Pe} causa res huiusmodi {huius &Re} alienando non tamen teneretur eas imperio vel aliis {*alii &MzNaRe} {alio &Pe} restituere. Quarundam etiam {om. &Re} rerum immobilium {mobilium &Mz} ita {*isto modo &MzNaPeRe} est dominus, ut {*unde &MzNaPeRe} {*et add. &MzNaRe} taliter dare vel {*et &MzNaPeRe} alienare potest aliqua castra vel {*et &MzNaPeRe} aliquos agros {agnos add. &Mz} vineas et civitates. Unde in talibus habet dominium et ius pinguissimum. Quarundam autem rerum immobilium non habet ius et dominium {*trs.321 &MzNaRe} ita pingue quia non potest eas vendere, donare, vel {*om. &MzNaPeRe} legare vel alienare, sicut [[eas ... sicut: margin &Pe]] imperium et regna quorum alienationes {*alienatio &NaRe} redundarent {*redundaret &NaRe} in notabile detrimentum {nutrimentum &Na} imperii et ideo {*et ideo om. &MzNaRe} alienare non potest, et si alienaret {alienarentur &Re} de facto, talis alienatio [[non potest ... alienatio: margin &Pe]] non teneret de iure, sed omnia essent ad ius imperii revocanda et ipse, si posset, reddere {*restituere &MzNaPeRe} teneretur {conaretur &Mz} [[revocanda ... teneretur: margin &Pe]]. Est tamen quodammodo dominus talium, in quantum potest eas {*ea &MzNaPeRe} vendicare et defendere et eis uti pro utilitate communi, nec aliquis alius ius in eis {*trs.231 &NaRe} habere dignoscitur. &Rerum etiam spectantium ad alios habet dominium in quantum {et add. &Pe} ex causa, et {*om. &MzNaRe} pro communi utilitate {*trs. &MzNaPeRe} populi {*om. &MzNaPeRe} et propter delictum possidentium potest {*eas add. &MzNaPeRe} ab eis auferre et sibi appropriare vel aliis donare. Quia tamen hoc non potest pro suo {*sue &NaRe} arbitrio voluntatis sed pro culpa possidentium vel ex causa, scilicet pro utilitate communi, ideo non habet in eis dominium {*et ius add. &MzNaPeRe} ita pingue sicut in rebus primis quas potuit {*potest &MzNaPeRe} sicut placuerit sibi {*trs. &NaRe} {om. &Mz} alienare ad libitum, ita ut qualitercunque alienaverit {alienavit &Pe} saltem conferendo obedientibus alienatio tunc {*om. &MzNaPeRe} teneat nec {se add. &Pe} sit per aliquem revocanda.

Master There is one opinion that the emperor is not the lord of all temporal things which do not pertain to the church, in the sense that at his own pleasure he is permitted or able to make what arrangements he wishes about all things of this kind, yet he is to a certain extent lord of everything because of the fact that he can use all things of this kind, despite anyone's objection, and apply them to the common benefit, whenever he sees that the common benefit should be preferred to a private benefit. To make this clear they say that it should be known that certain things are movable, certain are immovable, and some of each belong only to the emperor. No one else has lordship or charge of these, which can be called imperial things or things of the fisc, except by special commission of the emperor. Certain things, however, pertain to others, who are lords over them in some way. Of those moveable things which pertain especially to the emperor, the emperor is the lord to the extent that he can make any arrangements he wishes about them without being bound to make any restitution. For he can sell, present, bequeath and alienate just as he wishes, gold and silver, precious stones, clothing, arms, animals and other moveable things without being bound to make restitution. For even if he were to sin by alienating things of this kind illicitly and from an evil cause he would nevertheless not be bound to make restitution to the empire or to another person. He is also lord of some immoveable things in this way, as a result of which he can in the same way give and alienate some castles and fields, vines and cities. So in such things he has a very full lordship and right. He does not have such a full lordship and right, however, in some immoveable things because he can not sell, present, bequeath or alienate them, just as he can not alienate the empire and kingdoms the alienation of which would redound to the notable detriment of the empire, and if he were in fact to alienate them, such an alienation would not hold in law but everything should be resumed into the right of the empire and he himself would be bound to make restitution if he could. He is lord of such things to a certain extent, however, in so far as he can appropriate and defend them and use them for the common benefit; and no one else is known to have any right in them. He also has lordship of things pertaining to others in so far as he can remove them from them for a reason, for the common benefit and because of an offence by those possessing them and can appropriate them for himself or can present them to others. Yet because he can not do this according to his own free will but because of a fault by their possessors or for a reason, namely for the common benefit, he therefore does not have as full a lordship and right in them as in the first things which he can alienate at his own pleasure just as he wishes, with the result that however he has alienated them the alienation holds, at least if he has conferred them on those who are obedient and ought not be recalled by anyone.

 

CAP. XXIV {xxiii &Pe}

Discipulus Secundum istam opinionem discurramus per allegationes pro opinionibus primis omnino contrariis supra 21 et 22 c. {om. &Na} {et 22 c. om. &Pe} recitatis et videamus quid ista opinio sentit de ipsis. Dic itaque primo quid {quod &Re} dicendum {*dicitur &MzNaRe} est {*om. &NaPeRe} de illis rebus quae {*in add. &MzNaPeRe} nullius hominis {*bonis &MzNaPeRe} sunt.

CHAPTER 24

Student Let us run through, according to this opinion, the arguments for the first of the completely opposing opinions recorded in chapters 21 and 22 above, and let us see what this opinion thinks of them. And so tell me first what is said about those things that are among no one's goods.

 

Magister Ad hoc dicitur quod illarum {*rerum add. &MzNaPeRe} quae {*in add. &MzNaPeRe} nullius hominis {*bonis &MzNaPeRe} sunt dominium principale post dominium divinum {*trs. &MzNaPeRe} est penes totum genus humanum, quia dominium {est penes ... dominium om. &Pe} {*omnium add. &MzNaPeRe} temporalium rerum dedit Deus primis parentibus pro se et posteris suis, sicut ex Genesi c. 1 colligitur. Imperator tamen nihilominus est dominus quodammodo omnium rerum huiusmodi {*trs. &MzNaPeRe} in quantum pro utilitate communi potest eas sibi taliter appropriare ut occupanti non concedantur nisi de beneplacito imperatoris {*et add. &MzNaPeRe} ut imperatori assignatur {*assignentur &MzNaRe} {assignantur &Pe} si hoc utilatiti communi prospexerit {perspexerit &Pe} expedire {impedire &Mz}.

Master To this it is said that after the divine lordship the principal lordship of those things that are among no one's goods is in the possession of the whole human race, because God gave lordship of all temporal things to our first parents for themselves and their descendants, as we gather from chapter one of Genesis. Yet nonetheless the emperor is to some extent the lord of all things of this kind in so far as he can appropriate them to himself for the common benefit in such a way that they are not granted to the one employing them, except at the good pleasure of the emperor, and are consigned to the emperor if he discerns that this is expedient for the common benefit.

Discipulus Nunquid potest imperator iubere ad libitum suum ut nullus inferior eo tales res sibi appropriaret {*appropriet &NaPeRe} {appropriat &Mz}?

Student Can the emperor at his own pleasure order that no one inferior to him appropriate such things to himself?

Magister Respondetur quod non {*potest add. &NaPeRe}. {appropriantur &Mz} Ideo enim {om. &Mz} imperatori certa stipendia sive redditus seu {*sive &NaRe} res temporales sunt {om. &Mz} determinatae {*trs. &NaPeRe} et {*om. &NaPeRe} {sed add. &Mz} pro suis usibus {sibi add. &Mz} assignatae {sunt add. &Mz} ut res aliorum non recipiat {*rapiat &NaRe} et res quae {*in add. &MzNaPeRe} nullius hominis {*bonis &MzNaPeRe} sunt occupanti dimittat nisi pro culpa vel {et &Pe} ex causa vel {*om. &NaRe} pro utilitate communi viderit quod eas debet {*debeat &NaRe} appropriare sibi.

Master The reply is that he can not. For certain stipends, taxes or defined temporal things have been assigned for his use so that he does not seize others' things and abandons to the one employing them things which are among no one's goods, unless for some offence or for some reason for the common benefit he sees that he should appropriate them for himself.

Discipulus Dic quomodo respondetur ad rationem {om. &Mz} secundam {*trs. &NaPeRe} quae in hoc consistit quod dominus temporalis {*temporalium rerum &NaRe} potest eas vendere si vult, quod non potest imperator.

Student Tell me how reply is made to the second argument which consists in this, that a lord of temporal things can sell them if he wants to, which is something the emperor can not do.

Magister Respondetur quod dominus temporalium rerum qui habet in eis divinum {*dominium &MzNaPeRe} et ius pinguissimum potest eas vendere si vult, et de tali dominio loquitur decretum {decretalis &Mz} 1, q. 1, {*Eos add. &NaRe}, {eas add. &MzPe} sed tale dominium non habet imperator respectu omnium temporalium rerum sed solum respectu quorundam {*quarundam &MzNaRe}.

Master The reply is that a lord of temporal things who has in them the fullest lordship and right can sell them if he wants to, and it is of such a lordship that the decretal 1, q. 1, c. Eos qui [c.21, col.364], is speaking, but the emperor does not have such lordship with respect to all temporal goods but only with respect to some of them.

Discipulus Quid dicitur de tertia ratione quae fundatur in hoc quod imperatores multas res donaverunt {donarunt &Mz}?

Student What does it say about the third argument which is based which is based on the fact that emperors have presented many things?

Magister Dicitur quod saepe multi donant res plures et tamen {non &Pe} retinent sibi dominium principale earundem rerum, et ideo imperator potest alienare a se {alias add. &Na} multas res non tamen sic quin in casibus multis ipsas valeat revocare et pro utilitate communi eas sibi appropriare, et ideo semper remaneat {*remanet &MzNaRe} aliquo modo dominus earundem.

Master It says that many people often present many things and yet retain for themselves principal lordship of them, and therefore the emperor can deprive himself of many things and yet not in such a way that he can not in many cases recall them and appropriate them to himself for the common benefit, and therefore he always remains lord of them in some way.

Discipulus Dic quomodo respondetur ad quartam quae accipit quod imperator de praeda capta in bello iusto habet portionem specialem.

Student Tell me how it replies to the fourth [argument] which accepts that the emperor has a special portion of the booty captured in a just war.

Magister Dicitur {*respondetur &MzNaPeRe} quod licet ius pinguius {*trs. &MzNaPeRe} habeat {habet &Mz} {*in add. &MzNaPeRe} portione speciali sibi assignata, est tamen dominus quodammodo {*trs. &MzNaPeRe} omnium {*om. &NaRe} aliarum portionum in quantum pro {om. &Re} utilitate communi potest eas sibi appropriare {*accipere &MzNaRe}.

Master The reply is that although he has a fuller right in the special portion assigned to him, he is nevertheless to some extent lord of the other portions in so far as he can take them to himself for the common benefit.

Discipulus dic {*om. &MzNaPeRe} Qualiter respondetur ad quintam rationem {*om. &MzNaRe} de rebus fisci?

Student How does it reply to the fifth [argument] about the things of the fisc?

Magister {om. &Re} Respondetur quod quamvis imperator in rebus fisci habeat pinguius ius quam in aliis, propter tamen rationes {trs. &Mz} dictas in omnibus etiam aliis habet aliquo modo dominium.

Master The reply is that although the emperor has a fuller right in the things of the fisc than in other things, nevertheless for the above reasons he has lordship in some way in all other things too.

Discipulus Quid dicitur de sexta quae accipit quod si imperator est dominus omnium aut omnes res sunt communes etc {*aut omnes sunt propriae imperatoris &MzNaRe}?

Student What does it say about the sixth [argument] which accepts that if the emperor is lord of everything, either all things are common or all things are proper to the emperor?

Magister Dicitur quod quia imperator non est eodem modo dominus omnium rerum temporalium {*trs. &MzNaPeRe} sed uno modo est dominus suarum {*quarumdam &MzNaPeRe} et alio modo aliarum, ideo nec omnes res sunt communes nec propriae {*nec propriae om. &NaRe} sed quaedam sunt propriae imperatoris ita quod nullius alterius, {*nec omnes add. &NaRe} sunt {om. &Pe} et {*proprie imperatoris ut &NaRe} nullus alius habet {*habeat &NaRe} proprietatem in ipsis, {*sed add. &NaRe} quaedam vero {*om. &NaRe} appropriantur aliis quarum tamen quodammodo est imperator dominus in quantum {etiam add. &Mz} potest {*eas add. &MzNaPeRe} ab illis {*ab illis om. &NaRe} tollere {*aliis add. &NaRe} pro utilitate communi.

Master It says that because the emperor is not lord of all temporal things in the same way, but is lord of some things in one way and of other things in another way, therefore neither are all things common - but some are proper to the emperor so that they belong to no one else - nor are all things proper to the emperor - so that no one else has ownership in them, but some things are appropriated to other people. Nevertheless the emperor is to some extent lord of these things in so far as he can remove them from others for the common benefit.

Discipulus &Narra qualiter dicitur ad rationem septimam {istam &Mz} {aliam &Pe} quae in hoc consistit quod imperator non est {om. &NaRe} [[add. interlinear &Na]] dominus omnium nec iure divino nec {*iure nature nec iure add. &MzNaRe} humano. {nec humano om. &Pe} etc {*om. &NaRe}

Student Tell me what it says to the seventh argument which consists in this that the emperor is not lord of everything by divine law nor by the law of nature nor by human law.

Magister Respondetur quod imperator est dominus omnium modis praedictis {*trs.3412 &MzNaRe}: iure humano quia, sicut imperium est ab hominibus et a Deo mediantibus hominibus, {et a Deo mediantibus hominibus om. &Pe} ita dominium quod habet imperator est ab hominibus et per consequens iure humano habet dominium omnium {om. &Na} huiusmodi rerum. Et cum dicitur quod iura humana sunt iura imperatorum, dist. 8, {*c. add. &Pe} Quo iure, respondetur quod {*pro add. &MzNaPeRe} tempore Augustini, {Augustinus &Mz} qui {quo &MzNaPeRe} dicit {*dixit &MzNaRe} illa {ista &MzPe} verba quae habentur dist. {*predicta add. &MzNaRe} 8, c. Quo iure, iura humana fuerunt {trs.231 &Re} iura imperatorum {imperatoris &Mz} quia tunc populus transtulit {*transtulerat &MzNaPeRe} potestatem {*suam add. &MzNaRe} condendi leges {*iura &NaRe} in imperatorem. Sed aliquando iura humana non fuerunt iura imperatoris {*imperatorum &NaRe} quia prius fuerunt humana iura {*trs. &NaRe} quam {*fuerint add. &NaRe} {fuerunt add. &Mz} iura imperatorum, {imperatoris &Mz} {quia prius ... imperatorum om. &Pe} {*et ideo imperator non est dominus omnium iure /iuris &Na\ /iurium &Re\ imperatorum /imperatoris &Mz\ add. &MzNaPeRe} sed est quodammodo dominus omnium iure {iuris &Na?Re} populi qui {*quo &MzNaRe} populus transtulit in imperatorem tale dominium omnium rerum quod {*quas &NaRe} dedit dominus {*deus &NaRe} primis {prius &Mz} parentibus {primis add. &Mz} et posteris suis, et {*ut &MzNaPeRe} pro utilitate communi possit {possent &Pe} {*uti add. &MzNaPeRe} eisdem et de eis disponere et ordinare prout utilitati communi viderit expedire.

Master The reply is that the emperor is the lord of everything in the above ways: by human law because, just as the empire is from men and from God with men as intermediaries, so the lordship which the emperor has is from men and, consequently, he has lordship of all things of this kind by human law. And when it is said that human laws are the laws of the emperors (dist. 8, c. Quo iure [c.1, col.12], the reply is that in Augustine's time, when he said the words found in the said dist. 8, c. Quo iure, human laws were the laws of the emperors because at that time the people had transferred their power to establish laws to the emperor. But human laws have sometimes not been the laws of the emperors because there were human laws before there were laws of the emperors, and therefore the emperor is not the lord of everything through the law of the emperors but is to a certain extent lord of everything through the law of the people, by which the people transferred to the emperor such lordship of all the things which God gave to our first parents and their descendants that he can use those things for the common benefit and order and arrange them as seems expedient for the common benefit.

 

CAP. XXV

Discipulus Nunc breviter narra qualiter respondetur secundum opinionem tertiam ad rationes adductas {addiectas &Re} supra c. 22 {*trs. &MzNaRe} pro opinione secunda.

CHAPTER 25

Student Briefly tell me now how according to that third opinion a reply is made to the arguments brought forward in chapter 22 above for the second opinion.

Magister Ad primam {istam &Mz} dicitur quod imperator non est sic dominus totius mundi ut ad libitum suum posset {*possit &MzNaPeRe} facere de omnibus hominibus mundi {*trs.345612 &MzNaPeRe} quod sibi placeat {*placuerit &MzNaPeRe}. Sed quia in his quae spectant ad bonum commune omnes sibi obedire tenentur et ideo non est dominus omnium temporalium rerum {om. &NaRe}, nisi modis praedictis supra c. {om. &Pe} 23. et {*om. &NaRe}

Master To the first of them it is said that the emperor is not lord of the whole world in the sense that he can do whatever pleases him with all the people of the world. But because everyone is bound to obey him in those matters which pertain to the common good, he is not for that reason also lord of all temporal things, except in the ways referred to above in chapter 23.

Ad secundam respondetur per idem, quod qui est dominus personarum est quodammodo dominus rerum spectantium ad sibi subiectos vel ad {*sibi subiectos vel ad om. &NaRe} personas easdem, et ideo imperator {*quodamodo add. &MzNaRe} est {trs. &Mz} dominus omnium rerum spectantium ad sibi subiectos, {vel ad personas ... subiectos om. &Pe} quia potest eis uti pro utilitate communi, non tamen ad libitum suum absque rationabili causa.

The reply to the second [argument] is the same, that he who is people's lord is to some extent the lord of the things pertaining to those people, and therefore the emperor is to a certain extent the lord of all the things pertaining to those subject to him, because he can use them for the common benefit, although not at his own pleasure without some reasonable grounds.

Ad tertiam dicitur {*repondetur &NaRe} {om. &MzPe} quod omnia sunt in potestate imperatoris quia omnia potest {imperator add. &Na} accipere sibi, pro utilitate communi non tamen ad libitum suum {*non tamen ad libitum suum: et non aliter &MzNaPeRe}. Et ideo est dominus isto {*illo &MzNaPeRe} modo quo dictum est prius {*et add. &MzNaPeRe} non aliter.

The reply to the third is that everything is in the power of the emperor because he can take everything to himself, for the common benefit and not otherwise. And he is lord in that way which was described before, therefore, and not in other respects.

Ad quartam {quartum &Mz} respondetur quod rex est quodammodo dominus omnium {om. &Re} {*illorum add. &MzNaPeRe} quae {qui &MzPe} sunt in regno suo, non tamen sic quod {*ut &MzNaPeRe} ad libitum {*suum add. &MzNaRe} possit de eis quod {quid &Re} voluerit ordinare, sed quia potest omnia tollere pro bono communi, et isto modo praedixit Deus quod omnia quae erant filiorum {filiis &Pe} Israel debebant spectare ad ius regis.

The reply to the fourth is that a king is to a certain extent the lord of all those things which are in his kingdom, yet not in such a way that he can at his pleasure make any arrangements he wants for them, but because he can remove everything for the common good. And it was in that way that God announced that everything that belonged to the children of Israel ought to pertain to the right of the king.

Discipulus Videtur quod non solum spectat {*spectabant &MzNaPeRe} ad illud {*om. &MzNaPeRe} ius regis {*posse add. &NaRe} accipere quae erant subditorum suorum pro utilitate communi sed {*etiam add. &NaRe} per {*pro &MzNaPeRe} utilitate propria scilicet {*om. &NaRe} regis, cum in auctoritate allegata ibidem dicatur expresse, {suorum etiam messores et add. &Mz} "Filios vestros tollet et ponet in curribus suis ... et constituet ... aratores agrorum {*suorum add. &NaPeReVg} et messores {om. &Mz} segetum ... ," et post, "Agros quoque {agros quoque: agrosque &Pe} vestros et vineas et oliveta optima tollet et dabit servis suis." {om. &Pe} Ex quibus {*verbis add. &MzNaPeRe} aliisque {*fere add. &MzNaPeRe} omnibus quae ponuntur in auctoritate allegata colligitur quod ad ius regis spectabat omnia posse {*trs. &NaRe} tollere seu {*tollere seu om. &MzNaRe} accipere pro utilitate privata regis.

Student It seems that it pertains to the right of a king to be able to take what belongs to his subjects not only for the common benefit but also for his own, that is the king's, benefit, since in the text cited there it expressly says [1 Kings 8:11, 12, 14], "He will take your sons and appoint them to his chariots ... and he will appoint ... some to plough his ground and to reap his harvests ... He will take the best of your fields and vineyards and olive orchards and give them to his courtiers." We gather from these words and almost all those found in the text that was cited that it pertains to a king's right to be able to take everything for the private benefit of the king.

Magister Respondetur quod utilitas regis est communis utilitas. Unde, sicut qui peccat in regem peccat quodammodo in omnes subiectos {omnes subiectos: omnibus subiectis &Pe} sibi {*trs. &MzNaRe}, sic qui aliquid facit regi hoc videtur quodammodo facere {*trs. &MzNaRe} in omnes {*in omnes: omnibus &NaPeRe} sibi subiectos {*subiectis &NaPeRe}. Et ideo quando rex propria negocia non posset expedire per proprias res et proprios servos {*per ... servos: per proprios servos et per proprias res &MzNaRe}, posset tollere pro negociis propriis {suis &Mz} expediendis et res et servos aliorum et filios {*trs.231 &MzNaRe} subiectos {*subiectorum &MzNaPeRe} sibi {*trs. &MzNaPeRe} ut {*et &MzNaPeRe} in hoc subveniret {subvenirent &Re} utilitati communi. Et isto modo Deus dicit {*dixit &MzNaPeRe} {*trs. &MzNaPeRe} quod omnia {quod omnia: per omnia quod &Mz} illa pertinebant ad ius regis. Quando autem non erat in tali necessitate non poterat hoc {*om. &NaRe} facere {*supradicta add. &NaRe}, et ideo, ut legimus {*legitur &MzNaRe} 1 {*3 &MzNaPeRe} Regum 21 {om. &Pe} [[gap left in ms]], Naboth Israelita {*Jesraelites &MzNaPeRe} noluit dare nec {dare nec om. &Pe} communicare {*commutare &MzNaRe} nec vendere {nec dare add. &Pe} vineam suam regi Achab quia videbat quod rex ex nulla {magna add. &Mz} necessitate quaerebat eam {*eandem &MzNaRe} nec {aut &Pe} propter bonum commune sed solummodo ex avaritia et cupiditate. Sic {*Hinc &MzNaPeRe} etiam omnis multitudo {om. &Pe} Israel, ut habetur 3 Regum 21 {11 &NaRe} {*12 &Pe}, dicit {*dixit &MzNaPeRe} ad Roboam filium Salomonis, "Pater tuus durissimum iugum nobis imposuit {*trs. &NaPeReVg}", insinuando quia {*quod &MzNaPeRe} contra iustitiam et legitimam potestatem regis oppresserat eos. Quamvis igitur {*ergo &MzNaRe} rex posset {*possit &MzNaRe} tollere res et servos per {*et &MzNaPeRe} filios subditorum et applicare utilitati suae, quando propria non sufficiunt et utilitas communis impediretur nisi negocia {propria add. &Pe} regis propterea {*propria &NaRe} expedirentur, hoc tamen non potest quando hoc {haec &Mz} in utilitatem communem minime redundare {*redundaret &NaPeRe}. {redundarent &Mz} videtur {*om. &MzNaPeRe}

Master The reply is that the king's benefit is the common benefit. Hence, just as he who sins against a king sins to some extent against everyone subject to him, so he who does something for a king seems to some extent to do this for all those subject to him. And therefore when a king was not able to expedite his own affairs by using his own slaves and his own things, he was able, in order to expedite his own affairs, to take away the things, slaves and sons of others subject to him and in this he assisted the common benefit. And it was in this way that God said that all those things pertained to the king's right. When there was no such necessity, however, he could not do the above things, and therefore, as we read in 3 Kings 21:1-4, Naboth the Jezreelite refused to give, exchange or sell his vineyard to King Ahab because he saw that the king was not seeking it out of any necessity or for the common good but only out of avarice and greed. Hence too, as we read in 3 Kings 12:4, the whole multitude of Israel said to Rehoboam, the son of Solomon, "Your father made our yoke heavy", implying that he had oppressed them against justice and the legitimate power of a king. Therefore, although a king can take away the things, servants and sons of his subjects and apply them to his own benefit, when his own resources are not sufficient and the common benefit would be hindered if the king's own affairs were not expedited, nevertheless he can not do this when it would not redound to the common benefit.

Discipulus Hoc videtur valde urgere quod Deus dicit {*dixit &MzNaPeRe}, "Vosque ei {om. &MzPe} eritis servi." Servi enim nihil proprium habent.

Student This seems to urge strongly that God said [1 Kings 8:17], "And you shall be his slaves." For slaves have nothing of their own.

Magister Respondetur quod non ideo dicit {*dixit &MzNaPeRe} eis {*deus &MzNaPeRe}, "Vosque ei {om. &MzPe} eritis servi", quia {qui &Pe} futuri erant servilis conditionis et non liberi, cum legitur {*legatur &NaPeRe} 3 Regum 9:[22] quod, "De filiis Israel non constituit Salomon {Salomoni &Mz} servire quenquam, sed erant viri bellatorum {*bellatores &MzNaPeReVg} et ministri omnium {*eius &MzNaReVg} et principes et duces eius {*om. &MzNaReVg} et praefecti {et praefecti: praesertim &Pe} curruum et equorum." Sed erant futuri servi large capiendo {accipiendo &Pe} vocabulum {*capiendo vocabulum: accepto vocabulo &MzNaRe} servorum pro subditis qui in certis casibus tanquam liberi sunt {*om. &MzNaPeRe} subiecti cum {*om. &Re} [[written but crossed out]] {?tamen &Pe} domino {*suo add. &MzNaRe} servire {servi esse &Pe} censentur {*tenentur &MzNaRe}.

Master The reply is that God did not say, "And you shall be his slaves", because they were going to be of servile condition and not free, since we read in 3 Kings 9:22 that, "Of the Israelites Solomon made no slaves; they were the soldiers, they were his officials, his commanders, his captains, and the commanders of his chariotry and his cavalry." But they were going to be slaves with the word slaves taken broadly for those subjects who in certain cases are bound to serve their lord as free subjects.

Discipulus Dic quomodo respondetur ad quintam rationem {*trs. &MzNaPeRe}.

Student Tell me how it replies to the fifth argument.

Magister Respondetur sicut ad rationem {*om. &MzNaRe} praecedentem quod omnia quae sunt in regno sunt regis quo ad potestatem utendi eis pro bono communi non quo {autem &Pe} ad potestatem disponendi de eis ad libitum suum {om. &NaRe} absque utilitate communi, et sic praeda capta in bello iusto est regis et est {*etiam &NaRe} aliquo {*alio &MzNaRe} modo, militum {*om. &MzNaRe} scilicet quo ad potestatem dividendi eam et distribuendi militibus qui ceperunt eam, iuste {et est aliquo ... iuste om. &Pe} tamen {*et add. &NaRe} absque personarum acceptione. hoc {*Hinc &MzNaPeRe} dicit glossa dist. 2 {*1 &MzNaPeRe}, {*c. add. &Pe} Ius militare, dicit {*"Dic &NaPeRe} quod principis sunt omnia quo ad tuitionem, sed ipse tenetur omnia {*ea &PeZn} dividere secundum merita personarum." ut supra dist. 2. ius militare sic dantur episcopo decimae ut dividat eas 12. q. 2. c. concesso super verbo omnia {*ut supra ... omnia om. &MzNaPeRe}. Hinc etiam dicit glossa 23, q. 5, c. Dicat super verbo omnia, "Si sub aliquo militetur, tota praeda {*trs. &MzNaReVg} est domini, sed ipse tenetur aequaliter dividere secundum qualitatem personarum, ut supra {scilicet &NaRe} dist. 2 {*1 &MzNaPeReZn} {*c. add. &Pe} Ius militare, sic {*sicut &MzNaPeReZn} decimae dantur {debentur &Pe} episcopo ut {vel &Na} dividat eas {*trs. &MzNaPeReZn} 12, q. 1 {*2 &MzNaReZn} {*c. add. &Pe} Concesso. Quod {Quid &NaRe} igitur {*ergo &MzNaReZn} dicitur quod iure gentium nostra fiunt quae capimus in bello {*ut add. &Zn} para. {*ff. &MzNaPeReZn} de adiu. {*acq. &NaPeReZn} {addiu. &Mz} rerum do. naturale {naturalis &Pe} para. ultimo verum est, quod capientis est, {capientis est: capitur &Pe} sed tamen {non &Re} tenetur illud {id &Re} {om. &Pe} dare domino ut dividat secundum merita hominum."

Master It replies, as to the preceding argument, that everything that is in a kingdom is the king's, with respect to his power to use it for the common good, not with respect to his power to dispose of it at his own pleasure without a common benefit. And booty taken in a just war is the king's in this way, and also in another way, that is with respect to his power to divide it and to distribute it to the soldiers who took it -- justly, however, and without partiality to any persons. Hence the gloss on dist. 1, c. Ius militare [col. 6] says, "Note that everything is the prince's in the sense of guarding it, but he is bound to divide them according to people's merits." Hence also the gloss on the word omnia in 23, q. 5, c. Dicat [c.25, col.1346] says, "If military service is performed under someone all the booty is the lord's, but he is bound to divide it equally according to the quality of persons, as above in dist. 1, c. Ius militare, just as tenths are given to a bishop so that he may divide them (12, q. 2, c. Concesso). What is said, therefore, that by the right of nations what we capture in war becomes ours, (as in ff. De acq. rerum do. naturale, para. ultimo), is true because it belongs to the one capturing, but he is bound nevertheless to give it to his lord to divide according to the merits of his men."

CAP. XXVI {xxv &Pe}

Discipulus Quaesivimus de aliquibus in speciali quam super {in &Pe} ipsa {ipsas &Re} {ipsis &Mz} imperator habeat potestatem. Nunc quaero in generali an in temporalibus imperator {*trs.312 &MzNaPeRe} habeat plenitudinem potestatis, quemadmodum secundum multos papa in spiritualibus potestatis plenitudinem {*trs. &MzNaPeRe} habere dignoscitur.

CHAPTER 26

Student About some things in particular we have asked what power the emperor has over them. Now I seek to find out in general whether the emperor has fullness of power in temporal matters, as the pope is known to have, according to some people, fullness of power in spiritual matters.

Does the Emperor have fullness of power in temporal things?

Magister Circa hoc sunt assertiones diversae. Una est quod imperator in temporalibus sic {*trs.312 &NaRe} habet plenitudinem potestatis quod omnia potest quae non sunt contra ius divinum vel {*nec &MzNaRe} contra {om. &Pe} ius naturale ita quod in omnibus huiusmodi tenentur sibi obedire omnes sui {*sibi &MzNaPeRe} subiecti.

Master There are different assertions about this. One is that the emperor has such fullness of power in temporal matters that he can do everything which is not against divine law or against natural law, with the result that all those subject to him are bound to obey him in all matters of this kind.

Opinion 1: The emperor has power to do anything not contrary to divine or natural law, and in such matters all his subjects must obey him

Discipulus Pro ista opinione {*assertione &NaRe} {allegatione &Mz} allegare nitere {*trs. &MzNaRe}.

Student Would you try to argue for that assertion?

Magister Pro ista opinione {*assertione &NaRe} potest multipliciter allegari. Qui enim nulla lege humana astringitur sed solummodo lege divina et lege naturali {*lege .. naturali: ad leges divinas et leges naturales &MzNaPeRe} obligatur omnia potest quae non sunt contra aliquam legum {legem &MzPe} praedictarum. Sed imperator nulla lege humana astringitur sed legibus divinis et naturalibus quia, sicut habetur ff. de legibus et glossa recitat Extra, De constitutionibus {*c. add. &Pe} Canonum, imperator legibus solutus est. igitur {*Ergo &MzNaRe} in temporalibus sic habet {om. &NaRe} [[add. margin &Re]] plenitudinem potestatis ut omnia possit quae non sunt contra leges divinas et {vel &MzPe} naturales.

Master Many arguments can be brought forward for that opinion. For he who is bound by no human law but is under an obligation only to divine laws and natural laws can do anything which is not against any of the above laws. But the emperor is bound by no human law, but by divine and natural laws because, as we find in ff. de legibus and as the gloss on Extra, De constitutionibus, c. Canonum [col.15] records, the emperor is released from laws. In temporal matters, therefore, he has such fullness of power that he can do everything which is not against divine and natural laws.

Amplius ille habet in temporalibus {trs.231 &Na} plenitudinem potestatis cuius voluntas in huiusmodi lege {*om. &MzNaPeRe} legis {legibus &Pe} habet vigorem; sed quod principi praecipue imperatori placuit {*placuerit &NaRe} legis habet vigorem; igitur {*ergo &MzNaRe} imperator in huiusmodi {temporalibus add. &Pe} habet {*trs.312 &NaRe} plenitudinem potestatis.

Further, that person has fullness of power in temporal matters whose will has the force of law in matters of this kind; but "what pleases a prince", especially the emperor, "has the force of law" [Digest 1.4.1pr]; therefore the emperor has fullness of power in matters of this kind.

Rursus ille habet plenitudinem potestatis in temporalibus cuius etiam error ius facit; {*sed error principis, scilicet imperatoris, ius facit add. &MzNaPe} in temporalibus; {sed hic est imperator add. &Re} [[in margin]] igitur {*ergo &MzNaRe} in temporalibus habet plenitudinem potestatis.

Again, that person has fullness of power in temporal matters whose very mistake makes a law; but "the mistake of a prince", namely the emperor, "makes a law" [source?] in temporal matters; therefore he has fullness of power in temporal matters.

Item si aliquis subiectus imperatori possit {*potest &MzNaRe} iuste resistere imperatoris praecepto {*trs. &MzNaPeRe} in temporalibus, quod {praeceptum add. &Re} [[interlinear]] non est contra ius divinum nec contra ius naturale {*nature &NaRe}, oportet quod aliquo iure possit sibi resistere, quia hoc recte possumus quod {de add. &MzPe} iure [[quod aliquo ... iure: margin &Pe]] possumus. Aut igitur {*ergo &MzNaRe} potest sibi resistere iure divino aut naturali {*iure nature &MzNaRe} aut {*iure add. &MzNaPeRe} humano: non iure divino aut {*vel &MzNaRe} naturali [[aut iure humano ... naturali: margin &Pe]] quia, sicut {*ut &MzNaPeRe} dictum est, praeceptum eius non est contra aliquod illorum iurium; nec iure humano quia, sicut habetur dist. 8, c. {om. &MzNaRe} Quo iure et allegatum est supra, "Iura humana iuri {*iura &NaRe} imperatoris {*imperatorum &NaReZn} non {*om. &MzNaPeReZn} sunt. contraria {*om. &NaReZn} {*Quare? add. &NaReZn} Quia {om. &Re} ipsa iura humana per imperatores et per reges seculi Deus distribuit generi humano." igitur {*om. &MzNaPeRe} Iure {iura &NaRe} {*autem add. &NaRe} imperatoris {*imperatorum &NaRe} nullus potest eius {*om. &MzNaPeRe} praecepto {*imperatoris add. &MzNaRe} resistere {*in huiusmodi add. &NaRe}. quia {*Ergo &NaRe} {igitur &Pe} imperator in omnibus huiusmodi omnia potest.

Again, if someone subject to the emperor can justly resist an order of his in temporal matters, an order which is not against divine law nor against the law of nature, it is necessary that he be able to resist it by some law, because we can do correctly what we can do by law. He can resist it, therefore, either by divine law, or by the law of nature, or by human law: not by divine or natural law because, as was said, his order is not against any of those laws, nor by human law because, as is found in dist. 8, c. Quo iure [c.1, col.12] and was brought forward above, "Human laws are the laws of the emperors. Why? Because God distributed those human laws to the human race through the emperors and kings of the world." By the law of the emperors, however, no one can resist an order of the emperor in matters of this kind. Therefore the emperor can do everything in all matters of this kind.

Praeterea illud ad quod societas humana se obligat eadem societas servare tenetur; sed societas humana obligat se ad obediendum generaliter regibus, et per consequens multo magis imperatori. Ait enim Augustinus libro secundo Confessionum ut {*et &MzNaPeRe} habetur dist. 8, {*c. add. &MzNaPeRe} Quae contra, "Generale quippe {factum seu add. &Pe} pactum est societatis humanae obtemperare regibus suis." Igitur {*Ergo &MzNaRe} in temporalibus generaliter obediendum est imperatori ut omnia possit quae non sunt contra ius divinum et {*vel &MzNaPeRe} naturale.

Moreover, human society is bound to observe that to which it binds itself; but human society binds itself to obey kings generally, and consequently the emperor much more so. For Augustine says in the second book of his Confessions, as found in dist. 8, c. Quae contra [c.2, col.13], "The general agreement of human society indeed is to obey its kings." In temporal affairs generally, therefore, the emperor ought to be obeyed, with the result that he can do anything which is not contrary to divine or natural law.

 

CAP. XXVII {xxvi &Pe}

Discipulus &Recita assertionem oppositam {*contrariam &MzNaRe}.

CHAPTER 27

Student Recite the opposite assertion.

Opinion 2: The Emperor has power only for the common good

Magister {om. &Re} Assertio contraria est quod imperator non habet in temporalibus plenitudinem potestatis, ut omnia possit quae non sunt contra ius divinum nec {*contra ius add. &MzNaPeRe} naturale, sed limitata est potestas, ut {om. &Pe} quo ad liberos sibi subiectos {subditos &Re} et res eorum solummodo illa potest {*possit &MzNaRe} quae prosunt ad communem utilitatem {*trs. &MzNaPeRe}.

Master The opposite assertion is that the emperor does not have fullness of power in temporal matters to be able to do everything which is not contrary to divine or natural law, but his power is limited, so that, with respect to free men subject to him and their things, he can do only those things which are useful to the common benefit.

Discipulus Pro ista opinione {*assertione &NaRe} aliquas {om. &Re} allegationes adducas.

Student Would you bring forward some arguments for that assertion?

Magister Pro ista {*ipsa &MzNaRe} taliter allegatur. Ille non habet plenitudinem potestatis ut omnia possit cuius leges non pro privato commodo sed pro communi utilitate fieri debent. Si enim haberet {habet &Pe} plenitudinem potestatis posset condere {concedere &Pe} leges non solum pro communi utilitate sed etiam {om. &Mz} pro privata {sed etiam pro privata om. &Pe} et {*om. &NaRe} utilitate {om. &Pe} propria vel aliena et {aliena et om. &Mz} etiam {*om. &NaRe} quacunque de {*ex &NaRe} causa, dummodo non esset contra ius divinum nec contra ius naturale. Sed leges imperiales, {*sicut add. &NaRe} et {ut &Mz} caeterae, fieri debent non pro privato commodo sed pro communi utilitate, teste Isidoro qui, ut {*sicut &MzNaRe} legitur {*habetur &MzNaRe} dist. 4, c. Erit autem, ait, "Erit autem haec {*om. &NaPeReZn} lex honesta, et {*om. &MzNaReZn} {scilicet &Pe} iusta, possibilis {possibilitatem &Re} secundum naturam et secundum consuetudinem patriae, loco, temporeque {*temporique &MzNaPeReZn} {*conveniens add. &MzNaPeReZn}, necessaria, utilis, manifesta quoque, ne aliquem {*aliquid &MzNaPeReZn} per obscuritatem in captione {inconveniens &Zn} {in captione: per captionem &Pe} contineat, nullo privato commodo, sed pro {om. &NaRe} communi {*civium add. &NaReZn} utilitate conscripta." Igitur {*ergo &MzNaRe} imperator non habet talis {*talem &MzNaPeRe} potestatis plenitudinem {*trs. &MzNaRe} ut omnia possit nisi {*om. &NaRe} quae {*non add. &NaRe} sunt pro communi utilitate.

Master It is argued as follows for it. He does not have fullness of power to be able to do everything whose laws ought to be made for the common benefit not for his private advantage. For if he were to have fullness of power he could establish laws not only for the common benefit but also for the private benefit of himself or someone else and for any reason at all, as long as it was not against divine or natural law. But imperial laws, like others as well, ought to be made not for private advantage but for the common benefit, as Isidore attests when he says, as we find in dist. 4, c. Erit autem [c.2, col.5], "Moreover, this law will be honest, just, possible according to nature and the custom of the country, appropriate to the place and time, necessary, useful, clear too so that through its obscurity it does not contain anything deceptive, composed not for any private advantage but for the common benefit of citizens." The emperor does not have such fullness of power, therefore, to be able to do everything which is not for the common benefit.

Amplius si imperator in huiusmodi habet {*haberet &MzNaPeRe} talem plenitudinem potestatis omnes alii reges et principes et {*ac &MzNaPeRe} alii laici sibi {om. &Pe} subiecti essent puri servi ipsius. Nam dominus {*servorum add. &MzNaRe} non habet maiorem potestatem super servos {*eos &MzNaRe} quam quod {*ut &MzRe} omnia possit praecipere eis {*trs. &MzPeRe} quae non sunt contra ius divinum nec contra ius naturale; imo forte nec tantam potestatem habet {*trs. &MzRe} super eos {quam quod ... eos om. &Na}. Si igitur {*ergo &MzNaRe} imperator non solum possit {*posset &MzNaPeRe} ista {*illa &MzNaPeRe} quae sunt pro communi utilitate sed etiam alia quaecunque in temporalibus quae non sunt contra ius divinum nec contra ius naturale, omnes alii sibi subiecti essent veri servi sui {*ipsius &MzNaPeRe}.

Further, if the emperor were to have such fullness of power in matters of this kind, all other kings and princes and other laymen would be subject to him purely as his slaves. For the master of slaves does not have greater power over them than to be able to order them to do anything which is not against divine or natural law; indeed perhaps he does not have such great power over them. If the emperor could not only do those things which are for the common benefit, therefore, but also any other things in temporal affairs which are not against divine or natural law, all others would be subject to him as his true slaves.

Rursus papa non habet potestatem plenariam {*potestatem plenariam: talem plenitudinem potestatis /om. &Mz\ &MzNaPeRe} in spiritualibus quia ea quae sunt supererogationis {*trs. &MzNaRe} non potest alicui praecipere, sicut virginitatem, ieiunium in pane et aqua, intrare religionem, et huiusmodi. Igitur {*Ergo &MzNaRe} {multo add.Na} multo {om. &Pe} magis imperator {om. &Pe} in temporalibus non habet {*trs.3412 &MzNaRe} talem plenitudinem potestatis.

Again the pope does not have such fullness of power in spiritual matters because he can not enjoin on anyone what is supererogatory, such as virginity, fasting with bread and water, entry to religion, and the like. It is much more the case, therefore, that the emperor does not have such fullness of power in temporal matters.

Item imperator non habet maiorem potestatem in temporalibus quam habuit {*habuerit &MzNa} populus, cum imperator habeat potestatem suam a populo, ut allegatum est supra, quia {*et &NaRe} populus plus iurisdictionis aut potestatis {*iurisdictionis aut potestatis: potestatis aut iuris &MzNaPeRe} non potuit transferre in {om. &MzNa} imperatorem {quia populus plus potestatis aut iuris non potuit transferre imperatorem add. &Mz} quam habuit. Sed populus nunquam habuit {*nunquam habuit: non habuit unquam &NaRe} talem potestatis plenitudinem {*trs. &MzNaPeRe} ut possit {*posset &MzNaRe} praecipere cuilibet de populo omne illud quod non est contra ius divinum aut {*nec &NaRe} contra ius naturale, quia non poterat praecipere ista {*illa &MzNaPeRe} quae non erant {sunt vel essent &Pe} de necessitate facienda, teste glossa Extra, De constitutionibus, {*c. add. &Pe} Cum omnis {*omnes &MzNaPe}, secundum quam in talibus {*scilicet add. &NaRe} quae {*non sunt add. &MzNaPeRe} de necessitate facienda "nihil potest fieri nisi omnes consentiant." Ergo si populus praecipit aliquid alicui de populo quod non est de necessitate faciendum {*facienda &Mz} {nihil potest ... faciendum om. &Re} non tenetur illud facere nisi velit. Restat igitur {*ergo &MzNaRe} quod imperator non habet talem potestatis plenitudinem {*trs. &MzNaPeRe}.

Again, the emperor does not have greater power in temporal affairs than the people had, since the emperor has his power from the people, as was argued above, and the people could not transfer to the emperor greater power or right than they had. But the people did not ever have such fullness of power that they could enjoin on any one of the people anything that is not against divine or natural law, because they could not enjoin those things that did not have to be done out of necessity, as the gloss on Extra, De constitutionibus, c. Cum omnes [col. 19] attests. According to it, in such matters that do not have to be done out of necessity "nothing can be done unless everyone agrees." If the people enjoin something on any one person that does not have to be done out of necessity, therefore, he is not bound to do it unless he wishes to. It remains, therefore, that the emperor does not have such fullness of power.

Praeterea falsare {*cassare &MzNaPeRe}, alienare, vendere, dare, {*trs. &MzNaPeRe} vel legare {*imperium add. &MzNaRe} non est contra ius divinum nec contra ius naturale, et {*om. &NaRe} tamen imperator hoc non potest. igitur {*Ergo &MzNaRe} non habet {*talem add. &MzNaPeRe} plenitudinem potestatis.

Moreover, to destroy, alienate, give away, sell or bequeath the empire is against neither divine nor natural law, yet the emperor can not do this. Therefore he does not have such fullness of power.

Rursus imperator non habet periculosam potestatem {*trs. &MzNaPeRe} bono communi {*trs. &MzNaRe}, sed talis plenitudo potestatis esset {est &Mz} periculosa bono communi {*trs. &Mz}. {sed talis ... communi om. &NaRe} Posset enim omnes subditos ad paupertatem redigere quod esset {esse &Na} {posset &Mz} contrarium bono communi {*trs. &MzNaRe}.

Again, the emperor does not have power which is dangerous to the common good, but such fullness of power would be dangerous to the common good. For he could reduce all his subjects to poverty and this would be contrary to the common good.

Item potestas quae solummodo est {*trs. &MzNaRe} constituta propter solam {*om. &MzNaRe} communem utilitatem non se extendit nisi ad illa {*illam &Na} quae ad communem utilitatem {non se ... utilitatem &Pe} ordinantur, {ordinatur &NaPe} et per consequens non se extendit {extendunt &Pe} {nisi ad illa ... extendit om. &Mz} ad omnia quae {*non add. &MzNaPeRe} sunt {nec add. &Mz} contra ius divinum aut {*nec &MzNaPeRe} contra ius naturale. Sed potestas imperialis est solummodo constituta ad utilitatem communem. igitur {*Ergo &MzNaRe} non se extendit ad illa {ista &Mz} quae ad communem utilitatem {*trs. &MzNaPeRe} non pertinent. Confirmatur hoc ratione {*hoc ratione: haec ratio &MzNaPeRe} {*quia add. &NaRe} illud quod non ordinatur ad finem debitum inordinatum videtur; {sed &Pe} quod autem {om. &Pe} est inordinatum {videtur quod autem est inordinatum om. &Na} non est licitum iudicandum; sed finis institutionis imperatorum {*imperatoris &MzNaPe?Re} est communis utilitas {voluntas &Mz}. Igitur {*ergo &MzNaRe} quod imperator auctoritate imperiali facit et non ordinat {aliquid add. &Mz} ad utilitatem communem est inordinatum {*est inordinatum: inordinate facit &MzNaPeRe} et per consequens illicitum {*illicite &MzNaPeRe}. Ex quo infertur quod imperator auctoritate imperiali non potest omnia quae non {om. &Mz} sunt contra ius divinum nec {vel &Mz} contra {om. &Mz} ius naturale, sed solum {*solummodo &MzNaRe} {om. &Pe} illa quae ad utilitatem communem proficiunt.

Again, power which is established only for the common good does not extend beyond those things that are ordered for the common benefit, and consequently does not extend to everything which is not against divine or natural law. But imperial power is established only for the common benefit. It does not extend, therefore, to those things that do not pertain to the common benefit. This argument is confirmed, because that which is not ordered for its due end seems disordered; what is disordered, however, should not be judged as licit; but the end of the establishment of an emperor is the common benefit. What the emperor does by imperial authority and does not order to the common benefit, therefore, he does in a disordered way, and consequently illicitly. We infer from this that by imperial authority the emperor can not do anything which is not against divine or natural law, but only those things that profit the common benefit.

 

CAP. XXVIII

Discipulus Quia ista opinio secunda {*trs. &MzNaPeRe} communitati mortalium et {in &Re} bono communi pro qua {*quo &MzNaPeRe} quilibet zelare tenetur sonare {*favere &MzNaPeRe} videtur, scire desidero quomodo ad rationes pro opinione contraria respondetur. Dic itaque qualiter respondetur ad primam {rationem add. &Pe} cap. 26 adductam.

CHAPTER 28

Student Because that second opinion seems to favour the community or mortals and the common good, for which everyone is bound to be zealous, I want to know how it replies to arguments for the opposite opinion. And so tell me how it replies to the first [argument] brought forward in chapter 26.

 

Magister Respondetur ad ipsam distinguendo {discutiendo &Mz} de lege humana quarum {*quia legum humanarum &MzNaPeRe} quaedam sunt leges imperatorum et aliarum personarum et communitatum particularium {pertinentium &Pe} imperatori subiectarum, quae civiles possunt appellari. Quaedam sunt quodammodo totius communitatis mortalium quae ad ius gentium spectare videntur, quae quodammodo sunt naturales {generales &Pe} et quodammodo humanae sive positivae, sicut ex his quae dicta sunt {primo add. &Mz} huius partis {*huius partis: primo huius &NaRe} capitulis {huius partis capituluis om. &Pe} 10 et 11 colligi potest. {*Primis legibus, scilicet pure civilibus, sive sint suae sive aliarum personarum vel communitatum particularium add. &NaRe} imperator nequaquam astringitur de necessitate, licet deceat eum vivere secundum leges suas. servatis {*Secundis &NaRe} legibus quae spectant ad ius gentium, pro eo quod omnes gentes et {*om. &MzNaPeRe} potissime {om. &Mz} rationales {*rationabiles &MzNaPeRe} et {etiam &Mz} ratione {*secundum rationem &MzNaPeRe} viventes tali iure utuntur, prout {*om. &NaPeRe} imperator ad idem {*ad idem om. &NaPeRe} astringitur, nec licet {om. &Pe} sibi eas irregulariter {*regulariter &NaRe} {irrationabiliter &Pe} transgredi, nisi {sed &MzNaPeRe} [[vel nisi: margin &Re]] in casu in quo viderit eas derogare utilitati communi. Unde non liceret {licet &Pe} sibi generaliter prohibere occupationes sedium, bella, captivitates, servitutes, postliminia, {postlimina &MzRe} legatorum non violandorum religionem et alia quae ad ius gentium spectare videntur {*noscuntur &MzNaPeRe}. Imperatorem autem non habere plenitudinem potestatis ut omnia possit in temporalibus {*trs.3412 &NaRe} quae non sunt contra ius divinum et {*nec contra /om. &Na\ ius &NaRe} naturale absolutum, de quo dictum est {supra primo add. &MzNaPeRe} huius capitulis 11 et 12 {*11 et 12: 10 et 11 &MzNaPeRe}, spectat ad ius gentium sicut et aliquos esse liberos et non pure {?petitur &Mz} servos ad ius gentium pertinere dignoscitur, et {*eo &MzNaPeRe} quod unum sequitur ex alio. Et ideo hac lege astringitur imperator {*trs. &MzNaPeRe}, quae tamen humana est quia de consensu omnium mortalium, {*nullo /vero &MzPe\ penitus add. &MzNaPeRe} contradicentes {*contradicente &NaRe}, {contradicendo &MzPe} contrarium posset servari pro lege.

Master It replies to it by making a distinction within human law, because some human laws are the laws of emperors and other people and particular communities subject to the emperor and these can be called civil [laws]. Some are to a certain extent [laws] of the whole community of mortals and these seem to pertain to the law of nations. These are to a certain extent natural and to a certain extent human and positive, as can be gathered from what was said in chapters 10 and 11 in the first [book] of this [part]. [[reference seems wrong]] The emperor is not bound by necessity to the first laws, that is the purely civil ones, whether they are his or [the laws] of other people or particular communities, although it is proper for him to live in accord with his own laws. Because of the fact that all nations, especially those that are rational and live in accord with reason, accept this law, the emperor is bound to these second laws which pertain to the law of nations, and he is not permitted to transgress them regularly, except in a particular case in which he sees that they detract from the common benefit. Hence he would not be permitted generally to prohibit occupations of places, wars, captures, slavery, reprisals, the non-violation of the religion of ambassadors and other things that are known to pertain to the law of nations. However, for the emperor not to have fullness of power to be able to do anything in temporal matters which is not against divine law or absolute natural law, which was discussed above in chapters 10 and 11 of the first [book] of this [part] [[seems wrong]], pertains to the law of nations, just as it is also known to pertain to the law of nations for some men to be free and not purely slaves, in that one follows from the other. And therefore the emperor is bound by this law, which nevertheless is a human law because, if all mortals agreed and there was no one at all in opposition, its opposite could be preserved as law.

Discipulus Dic quomodo respondetur ad rationem secundam {*trs. &NaRe}.

Student Tell me how it replies to the second argument.

Magister Ad illam {*illud &MzNaRe} dicitur quod illud quod placet principi, scilicet imperatori, rationabiliter et iuste propter bonum commune legis habet vigorem quando hoc {om. &Na} {scilicet legem communem add. &Re} [[interlinear]] explicat manifeste. Si autem aliquid {*sibi add. &NaPeRe} placet non propter bonum commune sed propter {*om. &NaRe} privatum non propter hoc legis habet vigorem {quando hoc ... vigorem om. &Mz} scilicet iuste sed inique et iniuste.

Master In response to that it is said that what pleases a prince, that is the emperor, reasonably and justly because of the common good has the force of law when he explains it clearly. If, however, something pleases him not because of the common good but because of some private good, it does not have on that account the force of law, that is [it is not done] justly, but wickedly and unjustly.

Discipulus Ista ratio {*responsio &MzNaPeRe}, {est add. &Mz} sicut et {om. &Mz} opinio praecedens {*om. &NaRe} capitulo praecedenti {*trs. &NaRe} recitata, veritati et auctoritati imperatorum {*imperatoris &MzNaPeRe} derogare videtur. Nam secundum {si &Pe} praescripta imperator nullam posset condere {concedere &NaPe} legem nisi generalem quae respicit {*respiceret &MzNaPeRe} {*scilicet add. &NaRe} bonum commune. Ex quo sequitur quod nullum posset privilegium concedere cuicunque quia privilegia sunt privatae scilicet {*om. &MzNaPeRe} legis {*leges &MzNaPeRe} non communia seu generalia {*communia seu generalia: communes seu generales &MzNaRe}, dist. 8. {*3 &NaRe} secundum {*para. &MzNaRe} quod {*Sunt autem &Zn} {haec &NaRe} {hoc &MzPe} quaedam {quidem &MzNaRe} et c. Privilegia. Sed imperatorem non posse {*dare add. &MzNaRe} {*aliquod add. &MzNaPeRe} privilegium speciale concedere {*om. &MzNaRe} cuicunque tam veritati quam auctoritati imperatoris derogare videtur.

Student That reply, like the opinion recorded in the previous chapter, seems to detract from the truth and authority of the emperor. For according to what was written above, the emperor could not establish any law except a general one, that is one that was mindful of the common good. It follows from this that he could not grant any privilege to any one at all, because privileges are private laws not common or general (dist. 3, para. Sunt autem quaedem [c.2, col.5] and c. Privilegia [c.3, col.5]. But for an emperor not to be able to give any particular privilege to any one at all seems to detract from his truth and authority.

Magister Ad hoc respondetur quod {*quia add. &MzNaPeRe} quaelibet privata persona et quodlibet particulare collegium est pars totius communitatis, ideo bonum cuiuslibet privatae personae {*trs. &MzPeRe} et cuiuslibet particularis collegii {*trs. &MzRe} est {*in &Re} bonum totius communitatis {ideo bonum ... communitatis om. &Na} et ideo illud {trs. &Pe} ad bonum commune {illud ad bonum commune om. &Mz} [[gap left in ms]] {*et ideo illud ad bonum commune om. &NaRe} poterit redundare et {*ad bonum commune /om. &Mz\ add. &MzNaRe} ordinari. valebit {*om. &NaRe} Quare si imperator concedendo specialia privilegia aliquibus personis vel collegiis particularibus {*intendit add. &MzNaPeRe} ratione non errante contra {*om. &MzNaPeRe} bonum commune, {*illa add. &MzNaPeRe} privilegia iusta sunt et ad bonum commune spectantia. Si autem non intendit modo praedicto bonum commune sed concedit {concedendi &Mz} huiusmodi privilegia ex amore privato vel {*ex aliqua /om. &Pe\ add. &MzNaPeRe} alia causa minus iusta, privilegia illa non sunt iusta sed iniqua et iniusta, et concedens vitium {*a vitio &MzNaRe} acceptionis personarum incurrit {*om. &MzNaPeRe} [[add. margin &Pe]] de quo {*de quo om. &MzNaRe} minime excusatur.

Master The reply to this is that because every private person and every particular college is part of the whole community, the good of any private person and any particular college could redound to the good of the whole community and be arranged for the common good. If in granting special privileges to some particular persons or colleges, therefore, the emperor intends the common good and his reasoning is not false, those privileges are just and pertain to the common good. If he does not intend the common good in that way, however, but grants privileges of this kind out of private love or for some other less just reason, those privileges are not just but are wicked and unjust, and the one granting them is not absolved of the fault of partiality towards persons.

Discipulus Dic qualiter respondetur {*dicitur &MzNaPeRe} ad rationem tertiam {*trs. &MzNaPeRe}.

Student Tell me what it says to the third argument.

Magister Dicitur quod error principis probabiliter {*probabilis &NaRe} {om. &Pe} ius facit facit {*om. &MzNaPeRe} itaque {*ita &MzNaPeRe} ut alii teneantur obedire nisi appareat {*constet &MzNaPeRe} eis quod error principis est contra ius divinum aut {*vel &MzNaPeRe} naturale aut {*vel &MzNaPeRe} {*contra add. &MzNaRe} bonum commune. quia si sic {*quia si sic: Alius /aliquis &Mz\ &MzNaRe} error principis non facit ius.

Master It says that a reasonable mistake by a prince makes law in the sense that others are bound to obey unless they are certain that the prince's mistake is against divine or natural law or against the common good. Another [sort of] mistake by the prince does not make law.

Discipulus {*Indica add. &MzNaRe} qualiter respondetur ad quartam rationem {*trs. &MzNaPeRe}.

Student Indicate how it replies to the fourth argument.

Magister Respondetur per {quod &Na} ista {*illa &MzNaPeRe} quae dicta {quae dicta: praedicta &Na} sunt superius in responsione {in responsione om. &Mz} ad primam rationem {responsionem &Mz} quia saepe praecepto imperatoris quod nec {*non &NaRe} est contra ius divinum nec {*contra ius add. &MzNaPeRe} naturale potest quis resistere iure humano non quidem {quidam &Pe} civili sed iure gentium sicut dictum est. Ad argumentum {*Augustinum &NaPeRe} dicitur quod loquitur de iuribus humanis civilibus non de iure gentium sed {*quia &MzNaPeRe} iura civilia sunt {*iura add. &MzNaPeRe} imperatorum {imperatoris &Mz} et regum sed ius gentium non est imperatorum nec {*et &MzNaRe} regum per institutionem ipsorum licet posset {*possit &NaRe} {*dici add. &NaPeRe} per ipsorum {*trs. &NaPeRe} approbationem et observantiam {*observationem &MzNaPeRe}.

Master The reply is by way of what was said above in response to the first argument, because by human law, not of the civil kind but, as was said, by the law of nations, someone can often resist an emperor's order which is not against divine or natural law. In reply to Augustine it is said that he is talking about human civil laws not about the law of nations, because civil laws are the laws of emperors and kings but the law of nations does not come from the disposition of emperors and kings, although it can be said to come with their approval and respect.

Discipulus Dic quid sentit ista opinio de ultima ratione.

Student Tell me what that opinion thinks about the last argument.

Magister Hoc sentit quod generale pactum est societatis humanae obtemperare regibus suis in his quae spectant ad bonum commune. Et ideo obligata est societas humana ad obediendum generaliter imperatori in his quae ad utilitatem communem proficiunt, non in {om. &Pe} aliis in quibus non dubitat quod nequaquam bono communi proficiant {*proficiunt &MzNaPeRe}.

Master It thinks that the general agreement of human society is to obey its kings in those matters which pertain to the common good. And therefore human society is under an obligation to obey the emperor generally in those matters which profit the common benefit, not in other matters about which it does not doubt that they do not profit the common good.

CAP. XXIX {xxviii &Pe}

Discipulus Postremo discutiamus succincte {?sustinere &Pe} an electus in regem seu imperatorem, {principem &Mz} eo ipso quod est electus antequam electio praesentetur vel etiam {?aliter &Mz} notificetur papae, de iure valeat et debeat se intromittere {*trs. &MzNaRe} de regno in temporalibus disponendo.

CHAPTER 29

Student Finally, let us discuss briefly whether someone elected as king or emperor can and should, by virtue of the fact that he has been elected, involve himself by right in arranging the temporal affairs of the kingdom before his election has been presented or even notified to the pope.

Should an elected secular ruler administer at once, or wait to notify the pope?

Magister Ad hoc secundum diversas opiniones quae recitatae sunt superius diversimode respondetur. Nam secundum illos qui dicunt quod imperium est a papa electus nullam administrationem habet de iure antequam confirmetur a papa. Secundum illos qui dicunt quod imperium non est a papa plus quam regnum Franciae vel regnum aliud quodcunque fidelium {*vel infidelium add. &MzNaPeRe} et quod imperator non est plus subiectus papae in temporalibus {*trs.6712345 &MzNaRe} quam rex Franciae ita quod {*ita quod: vel alius /aliquis &Mz\ &MzNaPeRe} quicunque, electus in regem seu imperatorem Romanorum, eo ipso quod est electus absque hoc quod electio praesentetur vel notificetur papae, habet plenam {potestatem per add. &Mz} administrationem in temporalibus et potest et debet se intromittere de imperio seu regno {scilicet add. &Pe} Romano, sed quia {*sed quia: nisi &MzNaPeRe} per Romanos vel illos in quos Romani auctoritatem suam iusque {*ius &NaPeRe} et potestatem seu {suam super &Pe} imperium {*seu imperium om. &NaRe} transtulerunt {*transtulerint &NaRe} ex causa {rationabili add. &Pe} pro bono communi ordinaverunt {*ordinaverint &NaRe} quod antequam electus se intromitteret {*intromittat &MzNaPeRe} {*trs. &MzNaPeRe} de regno vel imperio electio sua praesentetur {*papae debeat /debet &Pe\ /om. &Mz\ praesentari &MzNaPeRe}, quemadmodum {*aliquando add. &MzNaRe} electio papae ante ordinationem suam praesentabatur imperatoribus dist. 63, {*para. /c. secundum &Pe\ Electiones et add. &MzNaPeRe} c. Agatho.

Master Different replies are made to this according to the different opinions recorded above. For according to those who say that the empire is from the pope, the one elected has no [right of] administration before he is confirmed by the pope. According to those who say that the empire is no more from the pope than is the kingdom of France or any other kingdom of believers or unbelievers and that the emperor is no more subject to the pope in temporal affairs than the king of France or anyone else at all, one elected as king or emperor of the Romans has the full [right of] administration in temporal affairs by the very fact that he has been elected without this election being presented or notified to the pope and he can and should involve himself in the empire or Roman kingdom, unless the Romans or those to whom the Romans have transferred their authority, right and power have ordained [[grammar requires ordinatum erit, doesn't it?]] for some reason for the common good that before the one who has been elected involves himself in the kingdom or empire he should be presented to the pope, just as sometimes the election of the pope was presented to the emperor before his ordination (dist. 63, para. Electiones [c.25, col.242] and c. Agatho [c.21, col.240]).

Discipulus Omnino mihi videtur quod si imperium est a papa et imperator debet praestare iuramentum fidelitatis {om. &Pe} papae sicut vasallus domino suo, quod {*om. &NaRe} electus se intromittere non debet de regno nisi electio papae praesentetur {*trs. &MzNaRe} et papa declaraverit {?declinaverit &Na} voluntatem {*suam add. &MzNaRe} an velit quod electus intromittat se {*trs. &MzNaPeRe} de regno. {et add. &Pe} Nunc {*ideo &MzNaPeRe} aliam opinionem prosequere et pro ipsa nitere allegare.

Student It seems to me generally that if the empire is from the pope and the emperor ought to fulfil his oath of fidelity like a vassal to his lord, the one who has been elected should not involve himself in the kingdom unless his election is presented to the pope and the pope has declared his wish about whether he wants the elected to involve himself in the kingdom. Now, therefore, follow up with another opinion and try to argue for it.

Magister Quod electus statim debet {*debeat &NaRe} administrare videtur multipliciter {modo &Pe} posse probari. Nam consuetudo in talibus rationabilis maxime est spectanda et conservanda {*servanda &MzNaPeRe} sed consuetudo rationabilis {*rationalis &NaRe} fuit ab initio quod electus statim se intromittat {*intromisit &NaRe} {intromittit &Mz} {*trs. &MzNaPeRe} antequam praesentetur {*praesentaretur &MzNaRe} electio {*trs. &MzNaRe} papae. Imperatores enim tam {*om. &MzNaPeRe} fideles {*infideles &MzNaPeRe}, qui fuerunt imperatores veri quam {*quamvis &NaRe} infideles, {infidelis &Mz} {qui fuerunt ... infideles om. &Pe} nullam electionem praesentaverunt papae nec ipsum in aliquo requirebant. Quidam etiam imperatores {*trs. &NaRe} qui coronati fuerunt a papa in imperatores licet praesentaverunt {*praesentaverint &MzNaPeRe} et {*vel &NaRe} notificaverunt {*notificaverint &MzNaPeRe} papae electionem {*trs. &MzNaRe} suam {*om. &MzNaRe} quando {*ante &MzNaPeRe} coronationem Romae corona aurea susceperunt {*om. &MzNaPeRe} prius tamen administraverunt {administraverint &Na} et coronabantur alia vel aliis corona vel coronis. igitur {*Ergo &MzNaRe} ista consuetudo servanda est ut statim electus administrare incipiat.

Master It seems provable in many ways that the one who has been elected should at once administer. For in matters of this kind a reasonable custom especially should be observed and preserved, but it was a reasonable custom from the beginning that the one who was elected involved himself at once before his election was presented to the pope. For unbelieving emperors, who were true emperors although they were unbelievers, did not present any election to the pope and did not need him in anything. Some emperors too who were crowned as emperors by the pope did indeed administer and were crowned with another crown or crowns before their coronation in Rome with the golden crown, although they did notify or present their election to the pope. Therefore, that custom that the one who has been elected should at once begin to administer should be preserved.

Amplius electus ad istam {*aliquam &MzNaPeRe} dignitatem secularem pro qua non est alteri subiectus non tenetur alteri {*alii &NaRe} electionem suam {om. &Mz} praesentare antequam administret. Sed electus {om. &NaRe} [[add. margin &Re]] in imperatorem seu regem Romanorum non est pro Romano regno {*trs. &MzNaRe} subiectus papae cum pro regno Romano {om. &Pe} non sit vasallus papae. igitur {*Ergo &MzNaRe} administrare {ministrare &Mz} debet licet non praesentaverit electionem suam {om. &Pe} papae.

Further, someone elected to any secular dignity for which he is not subject to someone else is not bound to present his election to another before he administers. But someone elected emperor or king of the Romans is not subject to the pope for the Roman kingdom since he is not the pope's vassal for the Roman empire. He ought to administer, therefore, even if he has not presented his election to the pope.

Rursus non magis est rex Romanorum subiectus papae quam alii reges quicunque quia neque {nec &Re} {*iure divino nec /neque &MzNa\ add. &MzNaPeRe} iure humano etc {*om. &MzNaPeRe} sed multi sunt {*om. &MzNaRe} reges {*etiam add. &NaRe} {et add. &Mz} fideles qui etiam {*qui etiam om. &MzNaRe} ministrant {*administrant &MzNaPeRe} absque hoc quod notificent aliquid {*trs. &MzNaRe} papae vel de se ipsis vel de morte praedecessorum suorum {*om. &MzNaRe} sive suorum patrum {*trs. &MzNaRe}. {sive suorum patrum om. &Pe} igitur {*Ergo &MzNaRe} et rex Romanorum statim debet administrare {*trs. &MzNaPeRe}.

Again, the king of the Romans is no more subject to the pope than any other kings at all because neither by divine nor by human right [[lacuna in all mss it would seem]] but many kings, even those who are believers, administer without notifying anything to the pope either about themselves or about the death of their predecessors or fathers. Therefore, the king of the Romans too should immediately administer.

Discipulus Videtur quod iure humano Romanorum rex {*trs. &MzNaPeRe} est magis subiectus papae quam multi alii reges quia eligitur auctoritate papae qui instituit electores qui eum debent eligere.

Student It seems that by human law the king of the Romans is more subject to the pope than many other kings because he is elected by the authority of the pope who establishes the electors who have to elect him.

Magister Aliis videtur quod illud {*istud &MzNaRe} non obstat quia ius humanum aut est ius imperatorum {imperatoris &Pe} aut {*vel &NaRe} regum aut {*est add. &MzNaRe} ius canonicum quod est summorum pontificum sed iure imperatoris {*imperatorum &NaRe} non est rex Romanorum subiectus papae plus quam alii reges nec iure canonico. Tum quia summus pontifex non plus potuit sibi subiicere regem Romanorum quam alios reges, et ita si potuit sibi subiicere regem Romanorum, posset {*modo add. &MzNaPeRe} per eundem modum sibi subiicere {*trs. &NaRe} regem Franciae et quoscunque alios reges. Tum {*quia add. &MzNaPeRe} qui {om. &NaRe} non potest {potuit &Mz} tollere leges aliquas non potest sibi subiicere conditorem aliarum {*earumdem &NaPeRe} legum; sed papa non potest tollere leges imperiales, teste glossa quae dist. 10 {4 &Pe} c. Constitutiones ait, "Nunquid igitur {*ergo &MzNaPeReZn} legibus {leges &Mz} semper derogatur {derogetur &Pe} per canones? Absit, nisi quo ad causas spirituales", et {om. &Mz} infra, "Nec {non &Mz} posset papa leges tollere nisi quo ad suum forum." {suum forum: causas spirituales &MzPe} igitur {*Ergo &MzNaRe} papa per nullum canonem sive ius canonicum potuit sibi subiicere regem Romanorum qui legum est conditor.

Master It seems to others that that is not an objection because human law is either the law of emperors or kings or it is canon law which is [law] of the supreme pontiffs. But by the law of the emperors the king of the Romans is not more subject to the pope than are other kings, nor is he by canon law. This is (i) because the supreme pontiff is not able to subject the king of the Romans to himself more than other kings, and so if he could subject the king of the Romans to himself he would be able in the same way now to subject to himself the king of France and any other kings. This is (ii) because he who can not remove some laws, can not subject to himself the maker of those laws; but the pope can not remove imperial laws, as the gloss on dist. 10, c. Constitutiones [c.4, col.32] attests when it says, "Do the canons, therefore, always modify laws? Put [that idea] away, except in respect to spiritual matters ... and the pope can not remove laws except with respect to his own forum." By no canon nor canon law, therefore, could the pope subject to himself the king of the Romans who is the maker of laws.

Discipulus Adhuc {Ad hoc &Pe} conare roborare {*munire &MzNaRe} {om. &Pe} opinionem praemissam.

Student Try to strengthen that opinion further.

Magister Rursus {*om. &MzNaPeRe} Quod rex Romanorum eo {*ipso add. &MzNaPeRe} quod est electus administrare debeat antequam electio praesentetur papae probatur quia electus qui non indiget ab aliquo {*alio &MzNaPeRe} confirmari potest administrare antequam sua electio {*trs. &MzNaRe} {*alii add. &MzNaRe} praesentetur alteri {*om. &MzNaRe} quia omne ius et {aut &Mz} potestatem administrandi {*quod vel add. &MzNaPeRe} quam habet electus aut habet per confirmationem aut electionem {*per ... electionem: per electionem aut per confirmationem &MzNaRe}. Unde etiam {*et &MzNaRe} episcopi et alii qui confirmantur et {vel &Pe} {*confirmantur et om. &MzNaRe} consecrantur per {vel ante &Re} [[margin]] ipsam consecrationem nullam administrationem acquirunt sed quae administrationis sunt habent per confirmationem {vel consecrationem &Re} [[margin]] {papae add. &Pe}. Papa autem {*etiam &MzNaPeRe} per electionem {confirmationem &Pe} omnem {om. &Mz} administrationem habet, dist. 23, {24 &Pe} {*c. add. &Pe} {*In add. &MzNaPeRe} nomine, {domini add. &Pe} Qui igitur {*ergo &MzNaRe} non indiget confirmatione {*confirmari &MzNa?Re} eo ipso quod est electus omne ius administrandi habet. Sed electus in regem Romanorum non indiget confirmari a papa. Unde et Innocentius III, qui Extra, De electione, Venerabilem {venerabilis &Mz} magis explicare videtur quid {*que &NaRe} papa facit {quia add. &Mz} in electione {in electione: electis &Mz} {*in electione: electo &NaPeRe} regis {*in regem &MzNaPeRe} Romanorum, de confirmatione nullam facit {*penitus add. &MzNaRe} mentionem {mansionem &Mz}; nec legitur quod antiquitus aliquis electus in regem Romanorum {in regem Romanorum om. &NaRe} etiam fidelis {om. &Pe} sic {*om. &MzNaRe} {?si &Pe} fuerit {fuit &Mz} a papa {*trs.231 &MzNaPeRe} confirmatus; igitur {*ergo &MzNaRe} electus in regem Romanorum statim per ipsam electionem habet ius administrandi {absque confirmatione add. &Pe}.

Master That the king of the Romans, by the very fact that he has been elected, ought to administer before his election is presented to the pope is proved because someone elected who does not need to be confirmed by someone else can administer before his election is presented to someone else because every right and power to administer that someone elected has he has either by election or by confirmation. Hence, even bishops and others who are consecrated do not acquire any [right of] administration by that consecration, but they have by confirmation what [rights of] administration there are. The pope too has all [his right] of administration by election (dist. 23, c. In nomine c.1, col.77]. He who does not need to be confirmed, therefore, has every right to administer by the very fact that he has been elected. But the one elected as king of the Romans does not need to be confirmed by the pope. Hence too Innocent III, who in Extra, De electione, c. Venerabilem [c.34, col.79] seems to explain more about what things a pope does for the one who has been elected as king of the Romans, makes no mention at all of confirmation; nor do we read that of old anyone, even a believer, who was elected as king of the Romans was confirmed by the pope. Someone elected as king of the Romans, therefore, has by virtue of that election an immediate right to administer.

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